E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) objects can be justi objects canbe exists, butwhether,ortowhatdegree,theinferencefromsense-data stated, forRusselltheproblemofexternalworldisnotwhetherit signi The BertrandRussellResearchCentre,McMasterU. russell: 1899–1924 Essays inExperimentalLogic could havebeenmoreproductive. their di ultimately fruitlessexchangewithRussell. his accountof never explicitlyinvoked whatisatstakeintheirdisa reveals not is that Dewey’stheoryofinference miss themark.Althoughthes I outlining theirrespectivearguments, oftheexternalworld.After Dewey andBertrandRussellovertheproblem paper Iexplorethelittle-known this In of Mind proble his forstating even “necessary” I PROBLEM OFTHEINFERREDWORLD Our Knowledge 3 2 1 Chap. 3of Chap. Although Russell distinguishes between sense-data and sensations in the in sensations and betweensense-data AlthoughRusselldistinguishes

Philosophical Review , pp.141 W World” (1914) oftheExternal theirrespectiveworks“OnOurKnowledge n (1915), cance of the problem oftheexternalworld.Brie problem cance ofthe T ering criteriaofjusti , Vol.8: RUSSELL ANDDEWEYONTHE the JournalofBertrand RussellStud T 2 ., forhisargumentsconcerningthisdistinction. BertrandRussellandJohnDeweydebate the philosophical Our KnowledgeoftheExternalWorld 1915 , inthe second edition he nolonger sees “valid” or as the distinction , ed.JoAnnBoydston(Carbondale: W 1 z 24(1915):357–70.Revisedand and “The Existence of the World as aProblem” as World and“TheExistenceofthe ed. Hamilton, (1916).IshallquotefromJohnDewey, 3 zaslowjj Philosophy /McMasterU. WhileDeweyseestheverystatementofthis W e thinkers largelyspeakpastoneanother,I argue cation wouldhavebeenraisedand their exchange Josh Zaslow m, p.83.Hedirectsthereaderto on @ greement. Unfortunately,Deweyhimself , Canada , Canada mcmaster.ca e n.s.32(summer2012):55–68 ies show howDewey’scriticismsofRussell W only crucialtothisexchangebutalso inference duringthisshort-livedand rst debate,in1914–19,betweenJohn Had he done so, the crucial issue of thecrucialissue Hadhedoneso, l . 8 s 4 reprinted as Chap. 11 of Dewey’s of reprinted asChap.11 Southern Illinois U. P., 2008). Southern IllinoisU.P., l issn 0036-01631; 6 X The MiddleWorks, y (andcrudely) online1913-8032 The Analysisof W rst edition E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) distinctions iscrucialforunderstandingRussell’sproject. distinction emergesfromconsideringtheformer;yetattendingtoboth theseinturn,asthelatter and (ii)hardsoftdata.Iwilldiscuss primitive andderivativebeliefs, (i) between those frame hisdiscussionare version oftheproblemtoberesolv adequate andnuanced more distinctions, andultimatelyformulatesa problem, re the viding aninitialstatementof ti objectscan be jus- to whichtheinferencefromsense-dataexternal to investigatethedegree rather is edge oftheexternalworld.Hisconcern World”, isnotanattempttoraisescepticaldoubtsregardingour knowl- oftheExternal world detailedinRussell’schapter,“OnOurKnowledge to shednewlightonwhatisatstakeintheirexchange. is goal to adequatelydrawuponinhiscriticismofRussell.Mymodest Dewey’s accountofinference isadegreeofcontactwith there is framedintheseterms,Ishowthat Reichenbach in“Onthe Existence of anExternal World”, debate ( the of better statedastheproblem is problem oftheexternalworld the that doesn’t pursue,namelyhisclaim I willpursueoneofRussell’ssuggestionsthatDewey(unfortunately) degree di attempt toclarifythisexchangebyframingitintermsthataresome not betakingtheseasmysoleguide.InsteadIwill will I in whatfollows the respective argumentsthatDeweyandRusselldirect at one another, ier debatestartingin 1938. Russell relationship, particularlyTomBurke’s attentionhasbeendirectedtowardtheRussell–Dewey deal ofcritical misinterpret his project and as a resultmissthemark.Although great question tobeincoherent,RussellcontendsthatDewey’scriticisms joshzaslow 56 attention. of thepresentarticle,hashithertoescapedmuch which isthesubject June 1939):346–54(at346). W Before proceeding, it is crucial to note that the problem oftheexternal Before proceeding,itiscrucialtonotethatthe 5 4 Although detailingtheirearlierdebatenaturallyinvolveselaborating ed. This statement is admittedly tentative: Russell proceeds bypro- ed. Thisstatementisadmittedlytentative:Russellproceeds William Barrett notes theexchangeandbr Barrett William Samuel Meyer’s edited volume on Dewey volume Meyer’sedited Samuel , this work, among others, focuses on Dewey andRussell’slength- on focuses , thiswork,amongothers, Dewey andRussell:anExchange T 5 erent fromthose the thinkersthemselvesemploy.Inparticular, 4 Unfortunately, the earlier important debate, important Unfortunately,theearlier z — [NewYork:PhilosophicalLibrary,1985]). z an account,Iargue,thatDeweyfailed an ed. The two major distinctionsthat major two ed. The inferred oadly sides withDeweywhencritiquing and Russell’s exchange omits this earlier this omits Russell’sexchange and Dewey’s NewLogic:aReplyto world.Whentheproblem W nes itbyintroducingnew Journal of Philosophy of Journal 36(22 E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) interpretation prettycertainlytrue.” somehow commandingourassent as onthewholeandinsome yet … but inexact, complex, vague, I meanmattersofcommonknowledge, he says“ourinvestigationstartsfromwhatmaybecalled ‘data,’ bywhich our currentsetof accepted beliefs.Startingwithamethodologicalnote, visitors. At the same time, it is only in rare circumstances that we can be can we that circumstances rare in only is it time, same the At visitors. (ingeneral)theringingbellwithpresenceof associated our having predicated upon is tive, belief.Itispsychologicallyderivativebecauseit door wouldbeacaseoflogicallyprimitive,yetpsychologicallyderiva- this more of ineitherapsychological,orlogical,sense.Interms derivative) (or derivative) canbeprimitive (or primitive are that by notingthatbeliefs to invokefurtherbeliefs,butsimplythefactthatsoundoccurred. di purpose ofRussell’scontrastisprimarilytoillustrateajusti is notamatteroftheirrelativeinfallibility.The and derivativebeliefs this illustratesthatthedistinctionbetweenprimitive However, often do. couldand thereby formafalsebeliefaboutmyexperience.Icertainly primitive doesnotimplythatIcouldmisidentifythesoundand somebeliefsas identify doorbell isprimitive.Ofcourse,thatwemight Inthissense,mybeliefthatIheardthe sound. the that Iexperienced thefact the doorbelldoesnotdependuponfurtherbeliefs,butsimply fact, thedoorbell.Incontrast,mybeliefthatIheard in was, what Iheard wouldbederivativesinceitdependsuponthefurtherbeliefthat belief This mightrequiremyhavingheardthedoorbellring. warranted be if Ibelievethatsomeoneisatmyfrontdoor,forbeliefto instance, distinction between primitive and derivative beliefs ( primitive andderivativebeliefs between distinction re thanacritical lishing theexistenceofsuchagaprequireslittlemore estab- that agapexistsbetweenoursense-dataandobjects,forRussell settled beliefsbyinvokingthepossibilityofanevildemontoestablish WhileDescartesproceedsbydoubtingallofour ple, shouldbeclear. and thescepticalargumentprovided in Descartes’ X T The problem of the external world, Russellclaims,arisesfromwithin The problemoftheexternal 6 Having laid outthisinitialcontrast,Russellcomplicateshisdistinction To initiate hisversionoftheproblem,Russellmakesapreliminary To initiate ection onourbeliefs.

erence: injustifyingmybeliefthatIheardthedoorbell, I do not need OKEW 2 W , pp.70–105(at72). ne-grained categorization, thebeliefthatsomebodyisat ne-grained Russell andDeweyontheProblemofInferredWorld 6 Thedi T erence betweenthisproject Meditations OKEW 2 , p.75).For , forexam- W catory 57 E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) derivative beliefs particularlyinterestingbecauseour con the resultofaconsciousanddeliberateinference. atas it isimmediatelyformed,i.e.,thebeliefinquestionnotarrived lief, at least under ordinarycircumstances, tobelogicallyprimitive since visitor. Forthisreason,Russellconsidersbe- the latterasasignof the occurrenceofsound:mostusaresimply habituated to react to inferred thepresenceofavisitorfrom actively and actually have said to joshzaslow 58 footing than wenormallysuppose.Moreimportantly,throughthispro- areonlesscertain we discoverthatsomeofourcommon-sensebeliefs that thinks he beliefs our (p. 74).Throughacriticalassessmentof edge” di ticized byotherdata,not an outside standard, yet wemaydistinguish than others.AsRussellputsit,“althoughdatacanonlybecri- certainty wediscoverthatsomehavebetterclaimto beliefs tinizing ourstockof provide anexplicitargumentforou unjusti be to are ubiquitous,Russellconsidersthese persists ineachofourencounterswithit.Althoughbeliefssuchasthese is us when wearenottheretoobserveit,butalsothattheveryobject exists before have we what that assume quickly too even soordinaryaclaimas“Thatischair”,hethinkswe In suppose. ordinarily we consider themtobeonweakerfootingthan to reason, not necessarily todoubttheveracityofthesebeliefs, but at least cause ourbeliefsinobjectsareofthiskind,Russellseesusashavinggood derivative. Be- gagement withtheworld,theyarealsopsychologically mereen- our beliefs insuchobjectshavemostcasesarisenthrough logically primitive.However,as are stances, thesecommon-sensebeliefs circum- such In our beliefsinobjectssuchaschairsandtables. regarding Russell thinksasimilarcasecanbemade through anyexplicitinference, result ofwhatonemightcallhabituation. world: he considers our belief in persistent objects to have arisen as the oftheproblemexternal statement the basisforRussell’sinitial of logicallyprimitiveandpsychologicallyderivative beliefs that provides that ourcon tive. To the degreethatwe can bejusti alogical pointofview,dependentuponhowwellthey from beliefs is, T Russell considers theclassoflogicallyprimitivebutpsychologically Russell considers All oftheseconsiderations are tantamount to saying thatthroughscru- Just aswerarelyarriveatbe erent grades of certainty in thedi erent gradesofcertaintyin W W ed in terms of beliefs that are more psychologically primi- ed intermsofbeliefsthataremorepsychologically dence in such beliefsshouldbediminished.It is this feature W nd ourselves unable to dothis,hecontends unable ourselves nd liefs about other people’s emotions liefs aboutotherpeople’s r generalbeliefinobjects(p.77). apersistentobject;thatitnotonly T erent kindsofcommonknowl- W ed unlesswecan W dence insuch E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) cess we simultaneously discover that some of our beliefs are more di are beliefs cess wesimultaneouslydiscoverthatsomeofour 77). Equally,wewouldbehardpressedtogiveup our con cerned, nofurtherargumentisrequired” aside from their occurrence(p. or senseinanyway,because“asfarastheirmomentaryexistenceiscon- anargumentforourclaimsaboutwhatwesee, provide to do notneed to such scrutinyincludebeliefsaboutsensationsandlogical truths. We identi to doubt.TheexamplesofbeliefsthatRussell important toconsiderwhathisproblemis be inferredfromtheformer. can latter the which data, andtheextentto matter oftherelationhardtosoft the broader,andmorepressing, sense-data justi ofthedegreetowhich subsumed inthislaterstatement.Thequestion problem,theissueis Russell’s Although thesearetheinitialtermsof er, orinwhatway,theinferencefromsense-datatoobjectsisjusti they are related. Originally, I claimed thatRussell’squestionwaswheth- problem thatIprovidedearlier,itiscrucialtoseehow izations ofthe inferred world. ofthe problem his existence ofthosedata?”(p.80).Thisquestionis our ownharddatabeinferredfromthe than other existence ofanything rough structure ofourbeliefs,Russell ofourselves.Giventhis that theseobjectsexistinaworldindependent about the objects that we seem tosense,aswellthemoregeneralbelief beliefs while thesofterendofthisspectrumincludes,forexample,our W end ofthisspectrumwe harder the more orlessdoubtful”(pp.77–8).At ofthisprocess,becometoourminds those which,undertheoperation which resistthesolventin process ofscrutinizingourbeliefs.He says, “Imeanby‘hard’datathose He elaboratesworld asitprovidesthetermsinwhichheultimatelystateshisproblem. this contrastthe external of our beliefs.Thisdistinctioniscrucialforhisproblem between harddata baseduponhisdiscussionofrelativedegreescertaintyamongst and soft data as part of the valid ruleofinference. ing of Russell’s problem, andprovideinitialgrounds forunderstanding This discussion will provide an avenueforreachingaclearerunderstand- Russell’s actualproject. address to examining howDewey’scriticismsfail nd “the particular facts of sense, and the general truths oflogic”(p.79), general the and nd “theparticularfactsofsense, Before further elaborating hispr Before furtherelaborating While thisquestionmightseemradically di Russell formulatesasomewhatloosedistinctionbetween hard andsoft Russell andDeweyontheProblemofInferredWorld W es our belief in persistent objects is a particular case of es ourbeliefinpersistentobjectsisaparticularcase X uence of criticalre oblem, Russellsuggeststhatitis W nally poseshisquestion:“Canthe not . Iwillfollowhisadviceby T X erent fromthecharacter- ection, andby‘soft’data W es as mostresistant es W dence inany U W cult ed. 59 E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) more important challenge Dewey raises is whether Russell’s problemof whether more importantchallengeDeweyraisesis problem,ratherthantheproblemitself.However,deeperand his aslargelydirectedtowardhowRussellframes seen be ey’s targetmight such claimscanbemade. isattemptingtodeterminehowsafethegroundof Russell red—world how thingsreallyare.Inposinghisproblemoftheexternal—orinfer- us, we remain on muchground safer than when we make claims about in justifyingclaimsabouthowthingsseemto that is upon Russell insists training involved in making claims aboutourperceptions,thepointthat be saidofthe might Whatever lack. beliefs possess acertaintythatother pointisthat oncewehavesuchbeliefsinourinventory,they Russell’s know thelawsofvalidinferenceisirrelevanttoestablishingtheirvalidity. This isnodi problem. his to irrelevant be Russell considerssuchdetailsto sense-data, might beinvolvedinourcomingtoknowandformbeliefsabout need ofsurerfooting.Whateverhistory in ative knowledge,andtherefore for himallclearcasesofpsychologicallyderiv- facts. Ifanything,theyare concedesallofthesepsychological misses thetarget:Russellexplicitly as theknowledgedisclosedbystudyofphysiologyoroptics. upon agreatdealofknowledgethatgoesbeyondpureperception,such the cartbeforehorse:ourknowledgeof sense-data is itselfdependent jects asacaseofderivativeknow ob- about beliefs sense-data aspsychologicalprimitives,andour tifying in iden- However, them. of be madebetweenobjectsandourperception thatthereisadistinctionto illustrate as therefractionoflightinwater considersthatencounterswithphenomena such he cedes thispoint,as pends uponourcomplexinteractionswithobjects. Russell himselfcon- speaking,botharisesthroughandde- something that,psychologically situation.Ourknowledgeofsense-datais logical andepistemological Dewey wantstoemphasizethatthis runs contrary toouractualpsycho- hard to soft data (a contrastfrom sense-datatoobjects,oreven Russell speaksofaninference in which sense-data are considered thatitrestsuponabadpsychology.When is lem oftheexternalworld hard), what Deweyfoundobjectionableaboutit. joshzaslow 60 Because of hisinsistenceuponthepsychological issues athand, Dew- it Although thismightseemtobeparticularlydamningcriticism, One ofDewey’sprimary criticisms of Russell’sstatementtheprob- T erent than thefactthathistoryof howwecometo erent than ledge, DeweychargesthatRussellputs E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) a problem carriesanimplicit, Dewey thinksthattheverystatementof our harddataserveasevidenceforsoftdata, or towhatextent, the external worldisagenuinequestion. invoked insettingupthisquestion. harddata isbeing data, fullyconcedingthatknowledgebeyondpurely tion. Russell’sconcernistoaskwhatrelationourharddatabearssoft er hard andsoftdataareinterdependentornot,this is not Russell’s ques- against which to contrast it. However, itmustbeemphasizedthatwheth- data ashardobviouslyrequiresthatwehavesomeknowledgeofsoft our abilitytoidentifysome tend thatifsuchacontrastislegitimate,then some data as hard implies the existenceofsoftdata.Deweymightcon- identifying criticism intotheseterms,hisquestionwouldbewhether ey’s preferred terminologyofhardandsoft intermsofRussell’s Dewey’s psychologicalcriticismisreformulated problem. involvedinstatingthe implicitly beyond thepurelysensorymightbe to showhowinformation attempt largely Dewey’s subsequentcomments to them unless the term ‘sensory’ has a certain e certain a them unlesstheterm‘sensory’has to contrast betweenimmediateobjects[i.e.sense-data]and a world external disparaging preliminary it possibletoinstituteevena “Is asks, sceptically might beformulatedwithoutsuchlanguage,heremainsdubious.He theexternalworld of use ofwords,andevensuggeststhatthequestion unfortunate that identifyingcertaindataassensorymightsimplybean contrast thiswiththewaythingsactually words, wecanonly talk about the waythings other charges, canonlyhavesubstanceifithasagenuinecontrast.In he be, to Russell’s useofitisillicit.Todiscussthewaythingsseem ter acaseofsoftdata. things are.ForRussell,the former is paradigmatically hard data,thelat- tween appearance,orthewaythingsseemtobe,and reality, or the way thedistinctionbe- the factthatinstatinghisquestion,Russellinvokes to suchaquestionisdi of immediatedataorobjects?”(p.85).Unfortunately, a decisiveanswer U 7 The dubiousness of this attempted critique becomes clearerwhen The dubiousnessofthisattemptedcritique While thisdistinctionisnotitselfproblematic,Deweycontendsthat rmative answer to the question at hand ( hand rmative answertothequestionat Dewey, Middle Works Russell andDeweyontheProblemofInferredWorld z 8:84. U cult, if not impossible, to provide.Asaresult, cult, ifnotimpossible, data.Ifwewere to translateDew- 7 IfRussell’squestionis whether, are ibid seem . Yet, while Deweyadmits . Yet,while .). Hedrawsattentionto T to be if we can already can we if be to ect uponthemeaning 61 E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) losophy, 1977),pp.231–52. worst, committingthephilosophicalsinofpsychologism. At best,RusselltakesDeweytobemisusingtheword“logic”and,at Dewey callslogic“doesnotseem…tobeapartofatall”( Dewey Reprinted in printed from mental Logic 2joshzaslow 62 Possibility ofImme hinge ondi Russell’s notionof his widerdiscussionofinference. considers Russellianlogic,or the theoryofformalinference,tofallunder wider thanRussell’s.Indeed,he sense be usedtodiscussthesubjectina common ground in theirprojects.Dewey’slogicaltheoryisintendedto insists thatthereissome logic inthesamesenseasRussell,henonetheless project iscuriousbecause,althoughheconcedesthat he is notdiscussing ogy” ( claim thatDewey’slogicaltheoryisbetterdescribedas“partofpsychol- byaninstanceofRussell’sfrequent 134). Thisstatementispreceded (p. thought” with authority thanformine—thatlogicisconcerned better much “he takestheview—forwhichthereis because side his on theory (Dewey) hasthetraditionoflogical to Dewey,Russellconcedesthathe of inferencecanbetreatedasrelevanttotheirexchange.Inhisresponse ternal World”,Iwillnowexploretheextentto which Dewey’s account data. examine theextenttowhichour hard data justi justi reasserts thathisaimisa helpfully problemoftheexternalworld.Italso traditional identical withthe acertainclassofinferences,ratherthanbeing concerns his question statement istellingbecause it clari byDeweyaddressthestatement.However, the criticismsprovided store ofparticularsandfacts[i.e.,harddata]?”( softer, hestates,“thequestionarises:whatinferences are justi After notingthatourbeliefscanbelooselysortedintotheharderand From Dewey’sperspective,however, Russell restates his problem in his review of Dewey’s of review his Russell restateshisproblemin 9 8 Having speci Russell, “Professor Dewey’s Dewey’s Russell,“Professor On thismatterIaminagreementwith ibid. T erences in their respective conception respective their erences in Dewey andHisCritics ). In fact, he goes on to make the stronger claimthat what The JournalofPhilosophy , 8 in a way that is more clearly immune to this criticism. this to inawaythatismoreclearlyimmune W diate Knowledge”, diate nearly ed Russell’s project in “On Our Knowledge of the Ex- ofthe ed Russell’sprojectin“OnOurKnowledge immediateknowledgeisuna Essays inExperimentalLogic , ed. Sidney Morganbesser (NewYork:JournalofPhi- Sidney ed. , , Psychology,and Scienti Studies inPhilosophyandEducation 9 W es Russell’s problem. It reasserts that reasserts es Russell’sproblem.It Tom Burke, who claims “The reasons why Tom Burke,whoclaims“Thereasons W catory one—heisconcernedto s of logic”(“DeweyandRussellonthe this way of representinghis of thisway cceptable toDeweyultimately W Papers es ourbeliefsaboutsoft W c Methods z ”, Papers 8: 150). None of Essays in Experi- z 16(1919):5–22. 8:132–54.Re- z 17[1998]:149– W ed by this ed by ibid. ). E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) Certainty Russell considers logic—is a a Russell considerslogic—is account. OnDewey’saccount,thetheoryofformalinference—what but ratherheintendstoprovideacomplementary Russell considerslogic, the behaviourinvolvedininquiry. mate subject-matterof logic is a certain kind ofbehaviour;inparticular, timately what logic—i.e.thestudyofvalidinference—is of adequate account matteroflogic),hedoesnotthinkthatwehavean proximate subject sense(adiscussionthatDeweyconsidersthe some in ity ofinference is concernedwiththevalid- logic. Althoughwecertainlyknowthatlogic Boydston (Carbondale:SouthernIllino tion [i.e.thequestionofwhatsortthingsinferencesare].” inference] withoutraisingthisques- formal of subject-matter [thetheory explicit that“itispossible…todealwithwhatwascalledproximate is accountoftheultimatesubjectmatterthisstudy.He Dewey’s of by distinguishing the by distinguishing to notethatDeweyintroduceshis later book, Theory ofInquiry Jo AnnBoydston(Carbondale:SouthernI 53 [at150]).However,unlike his positionisthat“theformaldevelopmentaspecializedo formal ormaterialinference,itis su strict de a inferences. Althoughhedoesnotprovide employs adistinction,albeitlooseone,betweenformalandmaterial Infact,he par. a that Deweydoesnottreatallcasesofinferenceon purpose. Dewey’s perspective,arenothingmorethanamatterofemphasisand the di as we make them in oureveryday in them as wemake in terms of di material thinking.” British empiricists. erred intakingRusselltobeprovidingan To thisextent,Deweydoesnotseehisprojecttobeatoddswithwhat To understandwhatthis“widerdiscussion”involves,itisworthwhile 11 10 Despite his interest in this wider context of inference, it must be noted be his interestinthiswidercontextofinference,itmust Despite Dewey, Dewey, T (New York: Minton, Balch, 1929). Balch, (NewYork:Minton, erences between Deweyan and Russellianlogic, atleastfrom and erences betweenDeweyan about. In thisworkDeweydevelopsthepositionthatulti- about. The LaterWorks,1925–1953 The LaterWorks,1925–1953 T Russell andDeweyontheProblemofInferredWorld ering conceptions of experience. A ofexperience. conceptions ering (NewYork:HenryHolt,1938). 11 Materialthought,forexample, refers to inferences proximate Burke, Idon’ttakethisdi W eld thatcanbedevelopedindependently , Vol.4: is U. P.,p. 129.1988), Reprint of fromthe , Vol. 12: , Vol. llinois U.P.,1991),p. 31. Reprint of U account of experience on the modelofthe account ofexperienceonthe interaction withourenvironment, cient for my purposes to note that note cient formypurposesto 1929 lthough Dewey pursued this tack,he lthough Deweypursued 1938 z : The QuestforCertainty ultimate z T Logic: theTheoryofInquiry : erence to be helpfully explained erence tobehelpfully Logic: theTheoryofInquiry subjectmattersof W nition ofeither The Questfor 10 T , ed.JoAnn Assuch, shoot of Logic: the , ed. ul- 63 , E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) be characterized,thefactthatDe present in it)isthekindofreasoning understands he while formalinference(as josh zaslow 64 such causalconnections,whathecalls that thinks ical connectionholdingbetweenthetwo.Indeed,Dewey that theinferencefromscentto rabbit is warrantedbecauseofthephys- dog comingtoassociatethescentwithanimal,whatisimportant was involvedinthe training or history the presenceofarabbit.Whatever scent assignifying the a sign—i.e.totheextentthatitbehavestowards at leastengageininference-likebehaviour,insofarasittakesthescent is notdoneconsciously,thebeagleca of abeaglewhenscent-trackingexempli a as an objectorevent taking ence canbeaccountedforbythisbroaderunderstanding. of othercasesinferencesuggest ment sign andsigni depends uponthe thevalidity ofinferencesinvolvingsigns Whereas matical symbols. mathe- more abstractend,similarcasescanbeconstructedregarding the pressure, temperature,the presence ofcertainchemicalelements,etc.On laws)certainconditionsof physical (via certainmathematicallystated existence ofsmokebecause of itsmeaning.Thissymbol, inturn,implies bustion, while“smoke”,theword,se functions asanaturalsignof function byvirtueof their meaning.Toillustrate thedistinction,smoke their signi further occurrencesinvirtueof whichDeweyseesasrepresenting signs, to consciously). Incontrast form inferencesintermsof their inferencesandthatofhumans is animportantdi there or evende exhaustive tobe cases terms, thisshouldnotbetakentoimplythatheseessuch ences. infer- warranted of event tofunctionasasignandsustainthisclass selves, in the sense that calling somebody a “bachelor” implies thathe is “bachelor” selves, inthesensethatcallingsomebodya terminology, “material”) (or,inRussell’s logical of volving symbolsispartlyduetotherelations On Dewey’s account, the basic kind ofinferenceinvolvesanorganism basic the On Dewey’saccount, Although Deweyinitially describes inferenceinsuchfranklybiological W elds such asmathematics.Howeverelsethecontrastshould elds W ed—on Dewey’saccount,theadequacy of inferences in- involvements W nitive of all cases ofinference.Indeed,headmits T implication erence betweenthebehaviourofanimalsin symbols W sign re because the former is a product of com- product re becausetheformerisa —causal connections that hold between —causal connectionsthat offurtheroccurrences.Thebehaviour wey sees formalinferenceas are sees wey z aswell in theirs. Humans, he thinks, per- he intheirs.Humans, holdingbetweensymbolsthem- n besaidtomakeaninference,or rves asasymbol for the physical s that hethinksformalinfer- involvements W W es suchbehaviour.Althoughit cation, hethinksthatsymbols signs (and generallydothese , allowanobjector W ne- E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) 533–43. Revisedandreprintedin Reprinted from psychology, aside from being partofhisattempttoundermine the very an unmarried hallucination) theseinferencesare further, weknowthatinallbutextraordinarycircumstances(suchas but, objects, of whenever wetakeoursense-dataassigns inferences such only not we inferences isobviousinthesensethat these cases,forDeweythatwemakesuch in occurring inference implicit speaking.” such ‘fusion’ofqualities,givenand isevenidenticalwiththedi or symbols andsigns, between distinction and materialinferencescleanlymapsontohis formal that Dewey’sdistinctionbetween suggest and symbols,Idonotintendto “such fusionorconsolidationisprecisely such cases,Deweywantstoemphasize, In our responsetothelatter. the formerisfusedwith to response our that established objects issowell taking oursenseperceptionsassignsof ences. Forbetterorforworse, need tomakesuchinfer- don’t we which there isanimportantsensein Dewey’sresponseisthat objects, to of theinferencefromsense-data inferred world.When Russell’s problem isstatedintermsofthevalidity the of now agoodpositiontorelatethisaccountRussell’sproblem so forth,inthecontextofsetspropositions. role playedbyoperationsofconjunction, disjunction, conditionals and This, forexample,includesdiscussionofthe themselves. logical symbols intotherelationsthatholdbetweenabstract inquiry an is formal, logic thinks thatsymbolic,or Dewey fundamentally, logical theorems.More tomoreclearlystate ization isemployedinthestudyoflogicorder “symbolic” about symbolic logic, on hisview,isnotmerelythatsymbol- is apregnantandnotexternalsense,symboliclogic”(p.129).What in it is, operations; symbolic exclusively mal logicrepresentsananalysisof ti ments. Forpresentpurposes, what mattersisthatDeweyexplicitlyiden- inferences rootedinimplications and inferences predicated uponinvolve- W Although Deweyisnotsoexplicitonthismatter,hisinvocationof 12 Having brie Having providedabriefaccount of Dewey’sviewsoninference,weare es formal inferences as asubsetofinferencesinvolvingsymbols.“For- Dewey,“TheLogicof 12 Even if we, like Russell, wish to speak ofsomeform speak to Evenifwe,likeRussell,wish Russell andDeweyontheProblemofInferredWorld Journal ofPhilosophy,Psychology,andScienti x male. X y described the contrast between inferences using signs y describedthecontrastbetweeninferencesusing Judgments ofPractice”, Essays inExperimentalLogic also formerly justi not inference W inferred,is but amatterof ed. Middle Works W c Methods . do . As matteroffact, T implicitlymake erences between z 8: 49–64 (at 53). 8:49–64(at z 12 (1915): 505–23, 65 E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) post-1938 exchange,whichisnolessaptforthisinitialdebate: project. necessarilyhaveaproblemwiththe would it isnotclearthatDewey indeed Russell’sproject, is this If what, Russellasks,aretheircorollaries? If wetakeformalrulesofinferenc implication. Thisproblemcanbecle warranted,butratherinthesenseoflogical materially sense ofbeing in the not rather aboutwhatfurtherclaimsourharddatacansupport, notaboutinferences wedomake:hisconcernis inferred world—is fromhardtosoftdata—hisproblemofthe tion abouttheinference data. Understoodinthisway,Russell’sques- soft to inference fromhard inference whichis formal provides anaccount of also Dewey project, thisdoesnotendthematter: Russell’s concernissomethingelse. sense-data andtheworld:heneverdeniesthis. between connection holds siders his projectunchanged.Hisquestionisnotaboutwhetheracausal and nonethelesscon- them, concedes ones thatRusselldisputes. have emphasized,thepsychologicalfactsthatDewey appeals to are not causalconnectionbetweenthetwo.Yet,asI the of warranted because ofobjects,andthiskindinferenceisgenerally signs sense-data as justi suggeststhathereadsRussell’sdemandfora in respondingtoRussell sense-data and objects. That Dewey so ofteninvokespsychologicalfacts ranted, anditisduetonothingmorethanthecausalconnectionbetween account ofwhatmakessuchinferencesgenerallywar- adequate an have Russell’sproblem,alsoservestoillustratethatwealready of statement josh zaslow 66 he wascriticizing. his owncausebynotshowingan quacy ortheirbeingappropriatetothe developm overstated such his rejection of to moretolerable down or atleasttoned Dewe between Much oftheantagonism 13 Tom BurkemakesthefollowingclaimregardingDeweyandRussell’s While Dewey’stheoryofmaterialin

Dewey’s NewLogic:aReplytoRussell W cation ofthisinferenceinsuchmaterialterms.Thatis, we take our 13 prima facie y appreciationofthesigni z (Chicago:U.ofChicagoP.,1994),p.266. study oflogic.…Deweywasnothelping e and perception as our postulates, as e andperception z y and Russellmighthavebeenavoided, y closertowhatRussellmeansbythe arly statedinmathematicalterms. levelsofintensity,ifDeweyhadnot ference isn’tapplicabletoRussell’s ents [informallogic]astotheirade- W cance of the view of cance E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) to soft, there seemstobe nothing strongly thisconnectioncanbejusti disagree onthispoint,butwouldgotoaskabouthow not would implicationsforoursofterbeliefs—Russell hard datatohavecertain such an argument, andDewey’scriticismsdonotsuggestan a we action because him andme”( of relativeimportanceis,Ithink,the main sourceofdi importance to matters which heregards asvital.Th[e]di in his1919review,“Nodoubthe[Dewey]feelsthatIattachtoolittle es is Russell ment, butitrevealsthat To acknowledge this is nottodiminishtheimportanceoftheir disagree- upon Russell’sproblemoftheinferredworld. ultimatelyhaslittlebearing between sense-dataandanexternalworld However,thecontrast problem. terminology inhisinitialset-upof isonlyusingthis Russell misreading: itblindsDeweytothefactthat ofthetraditionalproblem.Thisisnottojustifysucha iteration other beyetan- to standable thatDeweytakesRussell’suseoflanguage itisunder- empiricism, resistance towardsthelanguageofsense-data hemissestherealquestion.Givenhisown target, his as sell’s problem theformulationofRus- takes Dewey Unfortunately, totheextentthat are notthetermsinwhichheultimatelyposeshisquestion. these that invoking a gap between sense-dataandobjects,itiscrucialtoremember the psychology,hequestionsitsrelevance. But aswehaveseen,althoughRussellmightaccept problem. Russell’s of that hethinksnothingmoreisrequiredinansweringordisposing That heputssomuchweight upon the psychology ofinferencesuggests proof. a such of possibility suggests thatheisdubiousaboutthe project overall attitudetowardsRussell’s Dewey’s or negativeanswer.However, question concerns a deductive argument from hard to soft data, Dewey’s question concernsadeductiveargumentfromhardtosoft make theinferencefromsense-datatoobjects a valid one. Since Russell’s emphasize thatweknowagreatdealabout the material conditionsthat to wants ference, itisapparentthatinhiscriticismsofRussell,Dewey theoryofin- Dewey’s Although thisprojectretainssomecontactwith tosoftdata,Dewey’scriticisms losetheirtraction. hard inference from If Russellisindeedlookingforadeductiveargumentfromhard data Although Dewey is certainly right thatthereisnogenuineproblemof certainly is Dewey Although When Russell frames his question intermsofthejusti While Russellinitiallysetsuphisproblemoftheexternalworldby Russell andDeweyontheProblemofInferredWorld Papers do 8:134). act asifthereissuchaworld—i.e.,wetakeour act a priori pecially perceptivewhen he suggests W ed. toruleoutthepossibilityof T erences between T W ering estimate cation ofour U rmative 67 E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3201\russell 32,1060 red.wpd June 25, 2012 (9:21 pm) such avaluationordismissal However, itisimpossibletomake ence iseitherpossibleornecessary. sceptical attitude amounts to little more thanadoubtthatsuchaninfer- joshzaslow 68 on this interesting exchange andNickGri on thisinteresting agement. Finally,Iwouldliketo 14 I would like tothankPaulForster(Unive would I thank theEditorforhiscomments. a priori U n (McMaster)forhissupportandencour- . 14 rsity of Ottawa)for inspiring me towork