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Ways of Knowing: Realism, Non‐ Nursing Inquiry 2015; 22(2): 95–105 Feature Ways of knowing: realism, non-realism, nominalism and a typology revisited with a counter perspective for nursing science Bernard M Garretta and Roger L Cuttingb aUniversity of British Columbia, School of Nursing, Vancouver, BC, Canada, bInstitute of Education, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK Accepted for publication 22 March 2014 DOI: 10.1111/nin.12070 GARRETT BM and CUTTING RL. Nursing Inquiry 2015; 22:95–105 Ways of knowing: realism, non-realism, nominalism and a typology revisited with a counter perspective for nursing science In this paper, we reconsider the context of Barbara Carper’s alternative ways of knowing, a prominent discourse in modern nurs- ing theory in North America. We explore this relative to the concepts of realism, non-realism and nominalism, and investigate the philosophical divisions behind the original typology, particularly in relationship to modern scientific enquiry. We examine forms of knowledge relative to realist and nominalist positions and make an argument ad absurdum against relativistic interpre- tations of knowledge using the example of Borge’s Chinese Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge. We propose a contentious postpositivist practical classification for nursing knowledge that demonstrates and supports the idea that knowledge has both individual and subjective components. This classification supports the practical application of nursing knowledge within the paradigm of realist postpositivist science. Key words: epistemology, nursing knowledge, nursing philosophy, nursing science, ontology, postpositivism, ways of knowing. THE RISE OF ALTERNATIVE EPISTEMOLOGIES and aesthetic.) was developed in this manner and is often used as an epistemological basis for nursing knowledge (Car- One of the more popular lines of thought that is frequently per 1978). This approach adopts a rejection of scientific real- expressed in nursing is the notion that there are different ism and embraces nominalist perspectives, and so the ways of knowing in the explanation of phenomena. This theoretical justification behind this particular framework is idea, that there are different ways of knowing things is cer- worth re-exploring; at the very least to avoid it becoming tainly not new and forms the basis of any philosophical and another form of dogma within the profession as these argu- epistemological argument about the nature of knowledge ments have become a central discourse in nursing (McKenna, and justified belief. However, the principle that multiple Cutliffe and McKenna 1999; Kenney 2002, 303; Locsin and forms of knowledge should be regarded as equally valid as Purnell 2009, 251). forms of explanation is a more modern proposition, arising from the postmodern movement of the 1970s, and contem- REALIST, NOMINALIST AND NON-REALIST porary American Pragmatism (Kagan et al. 2009). Carper’s PERSPECTIVES OF KNOWLEDGE four different ways of knowing (empirical, ethical, personal Carper’s typology rests upon a nominalist perspective of Correspondence: Bernie Garrett, Associate Professor, University of British Columbia inquiry. A full discussion of realism, nominalism and non- School of Nursing, T201 – 2211 Wesbrook Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T realism is beyond the scope of this paper as there are 2B5. E-mail: <[email protected]> manyformssuchasna€ıve realism (the senses provide direct © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd BM Garrett and RL Cutting awareness of the external world: BonJour 2013), moral real- explanations that apply universally. Universals are character- ism (ethical propositions can represent truth: Brink 1989), istics or qualities that things commonly hold, and as such are transcendental realism (the scientific study of reality requires repeatable or recurrent entities (e.g. blood pressure, the col- phenomena to have manipulable internal mechanisms that our red, curly hair, mammals). Universals are often consid- can be actualized to produce specific outcomes: Bhaskar ered a fundamental feature of scientific realism, although 1975) and irrealism (the existence of multiple actual worlds: not all proponents would agree. So, realism is then rather Goodman 1978), to name but a few. Scientific realism repre- more complex than it may at first appear, as it involves both sents a philosophical field that has vast amounts written the description of things that represent the world accurately about it, and it is clearly linked to older philosophical views and the notion of mind-independent truths. including empiricism, rationalism and positivism. Neverthe- Various arguments have been advanced in support of sci- less, it is important to review the key arguments and distinc- entific realism over the years, such as the no miracles argu- tions here, as they are fundamental in understanding ment (Van Fraassen 1980) offered by Roy Bhaskar and arguments about the generation of knowledge behind Car- Hilary Putnam in 1975 (Bhaskar 1975; Putnam 1975; Mus- per’s typology. grave 2006; Porta and Keating 2008, 78). Putnam wrote: ‘the positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy Scientific realism that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle.’ Putnam later revised his earlier ideas on scientific realism and moved The thoughts behind realism go back to the ancient Greeks away from universals, arguing it does not make sense to say and were discussed by Socrates, Plato (Platonic thinking that the terms of one theory refer to real things, whereas the holds that abstract ideas define concrete realities) and terms of another do not, or that one theory rather than Aristotle, among others (Russell 1972). Scientific realism another is absolutely true, or true by virtue of there being a represents the view that we ought to believe in a shared unique correspondence between the terms in which it is mind-independent (or objective) reality that includes both expressed (Putnam 1995). For example, if we consider the observable and unobservable phenomena (Klee 1997; concept of pain, there are a number of theoretical models Sankey 2006, 2008). However, realism really became the that are compatible with an explanation of the phenomenon dominant philosophy of science following the demise of an- and, for Putnam, an assumption that one specific model will tirealist arguments of the logical positivists in the 1950s, give a complete truthful or final representation would be when doubts arose about their mutually exclusive separation considered a practical limitation, given the nature of evolu- of objects and theories in describing the world (Kuhn 1970; tion and knowledge development. These ideas were later Klee 1997; Garrett 2013). developed as a form of pragmatist argument (see below), Scientific realism presents two fundamental positions. but Putnam remains a defender of scientific realism in what First, that the essence of things is objective and given in nat- he calls ‘natural realism’ that rejects an ‘interface concep- ure, and even though our perceptions of them may be sub- tion’ of the mind with reality asserting that human percep- jective, they continue to exist outside our perception. tion and cognition spread all the way to real objects Therefore, the world as described by empirical science repre- themselves. Other scientific realists, notably Boyd (1989), sents a mind-independent (often called objective)realworld adopted logically similar versions of the no miracles argument. that we should be able to describe by using scientific theo- Boyd argues that the operational success of a theory lends ries. Second, that scientific inquiry will eventually produce credence to the idea that its unobservable aspects exist, theories analogous to ideal scientific theories that accurately because they were the basis on which the predictions were describe phenomena. For some realists, an ideal scientific originally made. theory has also been described as one where the things described by it exist objectively and independent of the thin- Nominalism ker and claims made in the explanatory theory are consid- ered true (in the sense they accurately explain a On the other hand, philosophers have frequently criticized phenomenon, given our existing knowledge). Therefore, the value of scientific realism and empirical explanations to there is good reason to believe in the theory (Leplin 1997; adequately describe the universe, particularly, using ontolog- Chakravartty 2011). ical (the nature of being) and epistemological arguments Another important aspect often argued by scientific about whether universal truths exist (Klima 2013). The terms realists is that the universe contains things that can all antirealism and nominalism are often used synonymously to be described in scientific terms and science strives for describe the positions that contest the existence of objective 96 © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Ways of knowing: a typology revisited truths and the principle of a mind-independent reality (or simply non-realism). These generally accept the princi- (Gonzalo 2011). John Stuart Mill suggested an early version ples of a common shared reality inherent in scientific real- proposing there was nothing universal except names, hence ism, but have treated its nature and the notions of universal the prefix ‘nomin’- (Mill 1843/1991). Nominalist critics truths and theories differently. often argue that scientific realism, as in all other forms of Ernst Mach, for example, put an instrumentalist empiri- explanation, requires us to accept truths on the basis of the cal position forward as an alternative to scientific realism. abstract
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