Contemporary Issues Concerning Scientific Realism

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Contemporary Issues Concerning Scientific Realism The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate: Contemporary Issues Concerning Scientific Realism Author(s): Curtis Forbes Source: Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2018) 1-11. Published by: The University of Toronto DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v9i1. EDITORIALOFFICES Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology Room 316 Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1K7 [email protected] Published online at jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations ISSN 1913 0465 Founded in 2006, Spontaneous Generations is an online academic journal published by graduate students at the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto. There is no subscription or membership fee. Spontaneous Generations provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge. The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate: Contemporary Issues Concerning Scientific Realism Curtis Forbes* I. Introduction “Philosophy,” Plato’s Socrates said, “begins in wonder” (Theaetetus, 155d). Two and a half millennia later, Alfred North Whitehead saw fit to add: “And, at the end, when philosophical thought has done its best, the wonder remains” (1938, 168). Nevertheless, we tend to no longer wonder about many questions that would have stumped (if not vexed) the ancients: “Why does water expand when it freezes?” “How can one substance change into another?” “What allows the sun to continue to shine so brightly, day after day, while all other sources of light and warmth exhaust their fuel sources at a rate in proportion to their brilliance?” Whitehead’s addendum to Plato was not wrong, however, in the sense that we derive our answers to such questions from the theories, models, and methods of modern science, not the systems, speculations, and arguments of modern philosophy. Like philosophy, science often begins in wonder; but when scientific inquiry has done its best, it would seem, the wonder doesnot always remain. Ex cathedra, the scientific image of reality found in our current best scientific theories, inculcated in our science classrooms, and artfully presented through more popular media proffers far more answers than, say, Aristotle’s treatises on natural philosophy ever could; these answers, furthermore, * Curtis Forbes recently received his PhD from the University of Toronto’s Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology. His on-going research project aims to make the scientific realism question more personal than is usual—rather than trying to determine which philosophical interpretation of science is best per se, his research asks how we might determine which interpretation is best for specific people. Not coincidentally, he spends much of his free time wondering whether, why, and how much he himself should believe about the modern scientific worldview. Spontaneous Generations 9:1 (2018) ISSN 1913-0465. University of Toronto. Copyright 2018 by the HAPSAT Society. Some rights reserved. 1 C. Forbes The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate seem vastly more precise, accurate, deep, consilient, elegant, empirically sound, and widely accepted than any given by the modern scientific worldview’s alternatives and predecessors. Making sense of reality through the lenses of our current best scientific theories can leave a curious person feeling immensely proud of our collective epistemic achievements, incredibly intellectually satisfied, and utterly convinced that the picture of reality painted by these theories is true (at least approximately speaking). But philosophers can’t help wondering: is that picture true, even as an approximation? Is our world really the way modern physical theory describes it, abuzz with various unobservable (though perhaps detectable) entities whose causal interactions make everything appear to us as it does? Is it the aim of empirical science to discover some hidden reality behind our everyday experience, and thereby satisfy our wonder? Is that even possible? These are distinctly philosophical questions, for although they are questions about the epistemic outcomes, long-term potential, and ultimate aims of scientific inquiry, scientific inquiry itself is unable toanswer them satisfactorily. The theories of modern science, taken as true, provide extremely satisfying explanations when we wonder why ice has more volume than water, why iron turns to rust, or why the sun keeps shining day after day. But when we wonder whether these theories are true, whether the methods of empirical science could ever help us arrive at true theories in the first place, or whether scientific inquiry even aims to arrive at such theories, wehave reached the limits of science and entered the domain of philosophy. “Scientific realism” refers to any philosophical thesis that constitutes an affirmative answer to one or more of the questions above, e.g., byasserting that the theories of modern science paint an approximately true picture of unobservable reality, that scientific inquiry is capable of arriving at approximately true theories (even if it hasn’t yet), and/or that the governing aim of scientific inquiry is to arrive at such theories (even if it never will). Whether they understand it as a metaphysical, epistemological, or axiological thesis, casual observation suggests that the average person finds some form of scientific realism to be intuitively correct; formal surveys establish that most academic philosophers do as well (Bourget and Chalmers 2014, 481). Nevertheless, realist interpretations of science certainly have their detractors, and the ongoing debate between realists and anti-realists has been a central part of philosophical thinking about science for at least the last four decades. Thinking earnestly about the merits of scientific realism now requires navigating contentious historiographical issues, being familiar with the technical details of various scientific theories, and addressing disparate philosophical problems spanning aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and beyond. For all these reasons, reviewing the extant literature on the topic can be both fascinating and frustrating. With that in mind, this special Spontaneous Generations 9:1(2018) 2 C. Forbes The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate issue of Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science collects over twenty invited and peer-reviewed papers under the title “The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate: Contemporary Issues Concerning Scientific Realism.” It was organized in the hope of providing a suitable forum for everyone to pause, catch their breath, and share their current thoughts on this topic. It should present a suitable place for any newly interested party to enter the debate and begin to make sense of the existing literature. Deeply immersed veterans whose thinking has shaped the course of the debate in recent years should find this collection valuable as well, including those who have contributed to it. Ultimately the hope is that this collection will help all curious parties better understand, appreciate, and reflect on the evolution of the scientific realism debate, its current state, and how we might move it forward fruitfully. I will count this collection as a success, however, so long as a few others find it as enjoyable to read as I have, even if, at the end, the shared wonder that drives the scientific realism debate remains. II. Articles For such a thoroughly discussed topic, it might seem strange that ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY and BAS VAN FRAASSEN—the former a champion of scientific realism and the latter an opponent—have contributed a dialogue entitled “What is Scientific Realism?” investigating that very question. Scientific realism now comes in a variety of subtypes—semirealism, structural realism, entity realism, etc.—as its defenders have tweaked, qualified, and clarified the basic position to fend off various anti-realist challenges. Butas Chakravartty and van Fraassen’s conversation makes clear, more abstract differences between people’s conceptions of scientific realism have not always been sufficiently appreciated. Thankfully, this dialogue clarifies the differences between each author’s conception of scientific realism, revealing some important common ground and better mapping the contested territory. Because it addresses such a basic question, and in doing so reveals the complexity of the dispute, Chakravartty and van Fraassen’s piece provides an ideal place to start for anyone reading through this entire collection. JEFFREY FOSS addresses the debate over scientific realism with a refreshing combination of candour and irreverence. Foss reminds us that our realist commitments to science should be retail rather than wholesale, so “philosophers really should respond to the question, ‘Are you a scientific realist’ with the question, ‘Which bit of science do you have in mind?”’ (26). At the same time, people’s explicit pronouncements might not be the best way to determine their true ontological commitments, for their behaviour often implicitly presumes (or denies) the (likely) truth of various scientific theories. As Foss sees it, regardless of whether we assent to or dissent from a Spontaneous Generations 9:1(2018) 3 C. Forbes The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate realist interpretation of science in the classroom, at conferences, or in our publications,
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