Dissertation Abstract

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SCIENTIFIC ANOMALY AND BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS

OF LOW-DOSE CHEMICALS:

ELUCIDATING NORMATIVE ETHICS AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School

of the University of Notre Dame

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Kevin Christopher Elliott, B.S., M.A.

______Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Director

Graduate Program in History and Philosophy of Science

Notre Dame, Indiana

April 2004

Kevin C. Elliott

2004

SCIENTIFIC ANOMALY AND BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS

OF LOW-DOSE CHEMICALS:

ELUCIDATING NORMATIVE ETHICS AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY

Abstract

Kevin Christopher Elliott

The notion of “anomaly” has persisted for over 2,000 years, but its precise

meaning and significance remains unclear. This dissertation analyzes the importance of

scientific anomaly both for the philosophy of science and for ethical decision-making that

draws on scientific information. In the philosophy of science, it develops a novel account of anomaly. It first provides a conceptual framework for describing anomalies and critically evaluates previous descriptions by Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre

Lakatos, Larry Laudan, and Lindley Darden. Using the anomalous contemporary biological phenomenon known as “chemical hormesis” (i.e., beneficial effects from low doses of toxins) as a case study, the dissertation argues for a novel account that emphasizes three features of anomaly. Namely, researchers “characterize” anomalies in multiple ways, scientists use multiple strategies to “confirm” them, and anomalies interact with novel hypotheses in an ongoing, dialectical fashion. The dissertation argues

that this account is significant because it facilitates increased understanding of scientific

discovery and of the role that value judgments play in science.

The ethical component of the dissertation analyzes the ethical ramifications both of the hormesis case in particular and of policy-relevant anomalies in general.

Concerning the hormesis case, it argues that current evidence for the anomaly does not

provide adequate reason to alter regulatory policy. In the process, the dissertation

contributes to metaethics by developing a novel formulation of the naturalistic fallacy and

by clarifying its relation to the is/ought distinction. Regarding scientific anomaly in

general, the dissertation argues that researchers and policymakers have an ethical

responsibility to take reasonable steps to identify, reveal, and provide representative

information about all major, plausible characterizations of scientific anomalies to the

public or its representatives. This study suggests three rules of thumb (namely, analysis

of anomalies via analytic-deliberative processes, elimination and disclosure of conflicts

of interest, and research-ethics education on scientists’ social responsibilities) to help

researchers meet their ethical responsibilities with respect to anomalies. The dissertation

as a whole illustrates how the philosophy of science can contribute not only to greater

understanding of scientific reasoning but also to ethical insights for using scientific

knowledge.

For Janet,

whose love never fails

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... v

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...... 1 1.1 Introduction...... 1 1.2 Motivation for the Dissertation...... 3 1.3 Chapter Outline...... 7 1.4 Conclusion ...... 11

CHAPTER 2: FIVE ACCOUNTS OF SCIENTIFIC ANOMALY...... 13 2.1 Introduction...... 13 2.2 Terminology and Methodology ...... 14 2.3 Description of the Previous Accounts ...... 32 2.4 Evaluation of the Previous Accounts...... 50 2.5 Conclusion ...... 60

CHAPTER 3: CHEMICAL HORMESIS: A CASE STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC ANOMALY...... 61 3.1 Introduction...... 61 3.2 Overview of Hormesis Research ...... 65 3.3 Analysis of the Hormesis Anomaly Relative to Previous Descriptive Conclusions 84 3.4 Analysis of the Hormesis Anomaly Relative to Previous Explanatory Conclusions...... 116 3.5 Significance of the Chapter’s Analysis of the Hormesis Case ...... 128 3.6 Conclusion ...... 134

CHAPTER 4: A DIACHRONIC ACCOUNT OF ANOMALY ...... 135 4.1 Introduction...... 135 4.2 Motivation and Methodology for Developing Account D...... 136 4.3 Argument for Account D ...... 145 4.4 Significance of Account D...... 173 4.5 Conclusion ...... 193

CHAPTER 5: CHEMICAL HORMESIS AND THE IS/OUGHT DISTINCTION...... 195 5.1 Introduction...... 195 5.2 Reconstruction of Claim R ...... 197 5.3 Background on the NF and the IOD ...... 226 5.4 Eight Objections to Moore’s Description of the NF...... 234 5.5 An Alternative Formulation of the NF ...... 242

iii

5.6 The Connection Between NF* and IOD...... 260 5.7 Conclusion ...... 271

CHAPTER 6: CHEMICAL HORMESIS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND CONSENT...... 274 6.1 Introduction...... 274 6.2 Four Problems with Claim R ...... 276 6.3 An Ethical Lesson From the Hormesis Case ...... 317 6.4 Conclusion ...... 356

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ...... 358 7.1 Introduction...... 358 7.2 Philosophy of Science...... 359 7.3 Ethics ...... 362 7.4 Chemical Hormesis...... 367 7.5 Conclusion ...... 369

APPENDIX 1: CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE HORMESIS ANOMALY ...... 370

APPENDIX 2: CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE ENDOCRINE-DISRUPTION ANOMALY...... 377

APPENDIX 3: CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE MULTIPLE-CHEMICAL- SENSITIVTY ANOMALY...... 380

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 385

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Don Howard, the director of the Program in History and

Philosophy of Science at the University of Notre Dame, for his diligent leadership of the program throughout my time here. His enthusiasm encouraged me to come to Notre

Dame. I am also grateful for two fellowships that I received for my graduate study: a

Notre Dame Presidential Fellowship and a Pew Younger Scholars Fellowship from the

Pew Charitable Trusts.

I would also like to thank several faculty members who have been particularly helpful throughout my graduate career. Ernan McMullin has been a consistent source of encouragement, abundant knowledge, fascinating tidbits of information, and clear thinking. Phil Sloan has been a wonderful example not only of an excellent scholar but also of a professor with an exemplary character. David Solomon has also been a source of wise advice during my time at Notre Dame, and I thank him for being my teaching mentor. I also wish to thank Lenny Moss and Vaughn McKim for the time that they invested in my oral candidacy exams and my dissertation. I hope that I can incorporate some of these faculty members’ qualities as teachers, scholars, and human beings into my own career.

More than any other faculty member at Notre Dame, however, Kristin Shrader-

Frechette has shaped my scholarly development. I am grateful to her for her initial encouragement to investigate the phenomenon of chemical hormesis and for her advice in

developing some of my first journal articles. She has also been a tireless source of advice for improving the dissertation. Most important, though, is the way she has changed me as a person. She is so passionate about serving others and promoting justice that one can hardly resist following in her footsteps and striving to make the world more equitable and humane.

I also owe a significant debt of gratitude to my parents, Cris and Janelle. It is largely because of their encouragement and the effort that they channeled into my education that I have had the opportunity to pursue this degree. Regarding the dissertation itself, much of what I have accomplished is a tribute to Dad’s example of setting goals and working diligently to achieve them. He has been a faithful cheerleader.

More than anyone else, Mom taught me to think like a philosopher. Furthermore, her own life story has probably had a greater influence on the content of this dissertation than anything else. Her perseverance in living with anomalous health problems has given me much of the passion to pursue this project.

Finally, although I never would have been able to write the dissertation without the support of those that I have already mentioned, the person who has sacrificed the most throughout this project is my wife, Janet. During the past six years, she has continually made concessions so that I could study or think or write. She was the one who lifted my spirits when I was discouraged. Furthermore, she has not only seen me through the dissertation, but she has committed herself to living with its aftermath—she is willing to deal with both the blessings and the disadvantages of being a philosopher’s spouse. Thus, it is both fitting and a pleasure to dedicate the dissertation to my wife and best friend, Janet.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1: Introduction

Chemical companies currently produce six trillion pounds of roughly 75,000

different synthetic chemicals each year (Fagin et al. 1999). In 2001, industry released at

least six billion pounds of the most toxic of these chemicals into the environment.1 The human and environmental health effects of this chemical pollution are a matter of intense disagreement among different scientists, policymakers, and activist groups. Some, especially those affiliated with industry or the military, appeal to scientific research that questions the harmfulness of low levels of anthropogenic chemicals (see e.g., Ames et al.

1987, Efron 1984, Fumento 1993, Milloy 2001, Whelan 1993). Others, especially those in the medical and environmental communities, emphasize research that suggests potential dangers associated with very low environmental levels of some chemicals (see e.g., Ashford and Miller 1998, Colborn et al. 1996, Krimsky 2000, Markowitz and

Rosner 2002). These scientific disputes are aggravated by the significant amounts of money at stake in government decisions to regulate toxic chemicals and in legal decisions

1 The figure of 6 billion pounds of toxic chemical releases comes from the EPA’s toxics release inventory (http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/tri01/index.htm). This figure is a very conservative estimate of actual releases, however, because (1) it includes only data about roughly 650 particularly toxic chemicals, (2) it includes only data for industry in the United States, (3) it does not include small businesses, and (4) it does not include data that industry illegally withholds.

to impose liability for harms allegedly caused by them. For example, according to

estimates developed by the EPA in 1990, roughly 2% of the U.S. gross national product

(about $100 billion dollars per year) is spent on complying with environmental

regulations (Powell 1999, 1).2 Because of these widespread public disputes about the biological effects of toxic chemicals, it is of great practical as well as theoretical interest to examine and critically evaluate the science involved in the regulation of chemical toxins. This dissertation examines one crucial feature of regulatory science in particular that is also prevalent throughout science in general: the occurrence of scientific anomaly.

This introductory chapter introduces and motivates the dissertation by showing how scientific anomaly is important not only in the context of regulatory science but also in two areas of philosophy, namely, the philosophy of science and ethics. The following six chapters then contribute to both of these areas of philosophy by analyzing a specific case study of anomaly that is central to contemporary biological science and regulatory policy. Section 1.2 motivates the dissertation by showing how scientific anomaly is important but also in need of further study in both the philosophy of science and in ethics.

Section 1.3 then outlines how the rest of the dissertation’s chapters provide novel analyses of anomaly.

2 It is important to recognize, however, that much of the money that is spent on complying with government regulations may be “offset” for the population as a whole by savings in healthcare costs or other expenses associated with pollution. For example, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget claims that the societal benefits of the EPA’s regulations were three to five times greater than their costs between 1992 and 2002 (see the OMB website, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003_cost- ben_final_rpt.pdf).

1.2: Motivation for the Dissertation

Section 1.2 provides rationale for the dissertation’s study of anomaly in both the

philosophy of science and in ethics. It briefly summarizes the importance of anomaly in

each area and then argues that further analysis of anomaly is still needed. Turning first to

the philosophy of science, anomaly appears to be important for at least two related

reasons. First, most of the classic twentieth-century works on scientific method,

including those of N.R. Hanson (1958a; 1958b), Karl Popper (1959), Thomas Kuhn

(1970, 1977), Imre Lakatos (1970), and Larry Laudan (1977), suggested that anomalies

play a crucial role in the processes by which scientists develop new theories and alter previous ones. Specifically, they argued that anomalies serve as “catalysts” that spur researchers to investigate new ideas. Second, recent studies of scientific discovery by philosophers such as William Wimsatt (1987), Paul Thagard (1988), Lindley Darden

(1991), Ken Schaffner (1993), and Thomas Nickles (1997) argue that discovery often occurs via cyclical “feedback” processes in which scientists modify current theories or

models in response to anomalies. Thus, both classic discussions of scientific

methodology and contemporary studies of scientific discovery agree that anomalies are

central to progress in science.

Despite the importance of anomalies in the philosophy of science, however,

previous studies of them are problematic in at least three ways. First, as Elliott (2004)

argues, most attention has been paid to the later stages of the process by which scientists

alter their theories in response to anomalies rather than on the very earliest stages, in

which anomalies are first characterized, “confirmed,” and “localized” (see e.g., Darden

1991, Wimsatt 1987). This shortcoming of previous accounts appears to be

philosophically significant, because Bechtel and Richardson (1993), Darden (1991), and

Schaffner (1993) all hint that these early stages may play an important role in the theory-

change process. A second problem with philosophers’ previous studies of anomaly is

that even though thinkers such as Darden (1991), Kuhn (1970), Laudan (1977), Mayo

(1996), and Popper (1959) recognize that anomalies must be “confirmed” or shown to be

“genuine” before researchers attempt to alter theories in response to them, they do not

provide systematic accounts of that “confirmation” process. A final problem is that, as

chapter two argues, the most influential previous accounts of anomaly (e.g., Darden

1991, Kuhn 1970, Lakatos 1970, Laudan 1977, 1997, Popper 1959) are plagued by problems of ambiguity, incompleteness, and incoherence concerning the characteristics that anomalies display.

In ethics, specifically the ethical analysis of scientific research and science policy, anomaly appears to be important for at least four reasons. First, the policy process is likely to produce very difficult ethical decisions for scientific researchers and policymakers who must respond to anomalies. In particular, public pressure to generate quick responses to novel findings encourages scientists and policymakers to make recommendations for dealing with anomalies before they know very much about the anomalies’ characteristics (Collins and Evans 2002). In contrast, anomalies in highly theoretical areas of science might “simmer” relatively unnoticed for an extended period of time, enabling researchers to develop increased understanding of them (Kuhn 1970).

Second, at a time when biomedical ethicists are becoming increasingly concerned about the effects of financial conflicts of interest on scientific research and health policy (e.g.,

Angell 2000, Krimsky 2003, Wilkinson 2001), anomalies serve as particularly useful

tools for special-interest groups on both sides of public-policy conflicts to exploit on their

own behalf. On one hand, those who wish to dismiss an anomaly can label it as “junk

science” or “pseudoscience” or “voodoo science” (e.g., Huber 1991, Milloy 2001, Park

2000). On the other hand, those who wish to use an anomaly to influence policy can

appeal to the precautionary principle (see Harremoes et al. 2002, Miller and Conko 2001,

O’Riordan and Cameron 1994, Raffensperger and Tickner 1999, Soule 2000).

A third reason for the importance of anomaly in science-related ethics is that

numerous contemporary anomalies could have ramifications for contemporary public

policy if they were shown to be “genuine.” Nevertheless, ethicists must determine where

to place the burden of proof for showing that there is convincing evidence for the

anomalous phenomena. Some examples of these phenomena include health problems

such as chronic fatigue syndrome (e.g., Mawle et al. 1997) or adverse health effects

allegedly caused by amalgam dental fillings (e.g., Takahashi et al. 2001), electromagnetic

fields (e.g., NRC 1996a), or vaccines (e.g., Iizuka et al. 2000, IOM 2001). Other

examples include anomalous therapeutic effects allegedly caused by magnets (e.g.,

Collacott et al. 2000, Vallbona et al. 1997) or acupuncture (e.g., Allchin 1996) or

homeopathy (e.g., Belon et al. 1998, Benveniste 1988, Davenas et al. 1988, Linde et al.,

1997, Maddox et al. 1988).3 A fourth reason that anomalies are important for ethical

reflection about science policy is that anomalies are likely to be heavily emphasized

3 These health problems, effects, and therapies are anomalous in the sense that they all involve a set of phenomena on one hand that are problematic with respect to researchers’ expectations, assumptions, theories, or paradigms on the other hand. For example, researchers do not expect individuals who are free of any physiological signs of pathology to exhibit the sorts of health problems that those with chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) typically display. Furthermore, they do not have an accepted theory that explains the occurrence of CFS. Similarly, the biological effects allegedly caused by amalgam fillings, electromagnetic fields, vaccines, magnets, acupuncture, and homeopathy either run counter to many researchers’ expectations or fail to be explained by current scientific theories.

when public policy is at stake. For example, when a body of scientific evidence supports a particular policy, A, that runs counter to a political actor’s own agenda, B, he or she is likely to search for and emphasize conflicting (i.e., anomalous) scientific evidence as a way of resisting the evidence for policy A (Herrick and Sarewitz 2000, Sarewitz 2000,

Fagin et al. 1999, Wargo 1996).

Despite the apparent importance of anomalies for ethical reasoning about scientific research and policy, however, previous authors have focused primarily on the ethical ramifications of scientific uncertainty in general and not on anomalies in particular. For example, previous ethicists and policy analysts have written extensively about the ethical responsibilities of researchers and policymakers for responding to scientific uncertainty in general (see e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Cranor 1993,

Mayo and Hollander 1991, Shrader-Frechette 1991). These thinkers have focused particularly on two broad ethical suggestions. First, they have criticized misleading framing of information by scientists or policymakers, because it hinders the public’s free, informed consent to health hazards (e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Faden and

Beauchamp 1986, NRC 1996, Shrader-Frechette 1991). Second, these previous authors have argued that scientists and policy makers have a prima facie responsibility to respond to scientific uncertainty in ways that promote the public good (e.g., Cranor 1993,

Markowitz and Rosner 2002, Resnik 1998, Shrader-Frechette 1991). Nevertheless, these studies of scientific-research ethics and public policy have not focused on any unique features of scientific anomaly in particular that might alter or add to these general ethical obligations for dealing with uncertainty. The dissertation attempts to provide a more

complete analysis of anomaly and its significance in both science-related ethics and the philosophy of science.

1.3: Chapter Outline

This section begins by summarizing the dissertation as a whole, and it then turns to an overview of each chapter. The dissertation can be divided into two main parts, corresponding to the two areas in which section 1.2 argued that future research concerning anomaly is needed (i.e., philosophy of science and ethics). The first part, consisting of chapters two through four, addresses the need for further analysis in the philosophy of science by developing a novel account of anomaly, called account D. The second part, consisting of chapters five and six, accomplishes two tasks that contribute to a better understanding of the ramifications of anomaly for the ethics of scientific research and policy. First, it provides a detailed ethical analysis of the claims made by the proponents of one particular policy-relevant anomaly, namely, a biological phenomenon called “chemical hormesis.” Second, it develops a general lesson for ethics (called the

MPC lesson) based on the dissertation’s analysis of that particular anomaly. Both parts of the dissertation examine the contemporary anomalous phenomenon of hormesis as their primary case study. Roughly, hormesis consists of beneficial low-dose effects allegedly caused by toxins that produce harmful effects at higher doses (see chapter three for a detailed description of hormesis).

Chapter two, called “Five Accounts of Scientific Anomaly,” performs two tasks that provide a starting point for developing a novel account of anomaly in the philosophy of science. First, it provides a conceptual and terminological framework that facilitates

(a) the analysis of previous accounts of anomaly (in the rest of chapter two), (b) the examination of the hormesis case study of anomaly (in chapter three), and (c) the development of a novel account of anomaly (in chapter four) on the basis of the hormesis case study. Second, chapter two describes and evaluates five previous accounts of anomaly (by Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, and Darden) by analyzing each account in terms of two claims: (a) a “descriptive” conclusion concerning the characteristics of anomaly, and (b) an “explanatory” conclusion concerning the role that anomalies play in the development of novel scientific hypotheses.

Chapter three is entitled “Chemical Hormesis: A Case Study of Scientific

Anomaly.” In order to gain insights for developing an improved account of anomaly, the chapter analyzes the alleged phenomenon of chemical hormesis as a case study, using four main sections. First, it briefly recounts the history of research on chemical hormesis and the regulatory context that makes the phenomenon particularly socially significant.

Second, it analyzes the characteristics of the hormesis anomaly relative to the

“descriptive” conclusions of former theoretical accounts of anomaly. Third, it examines the characteristics of hormesis relative to the “explanatory” conclusions of previous anomaly descriptions. Fourth, it argues that the chapter’s analysis is significant, because it uncovers three characteristics of the hormesis anomaly that previous accounts have not emphasized but that could contribute to a more sophisticated philosophy of science.

The fourth chapter of the dissertation is called “A Diachronic Account of

Anomaly.” Based on the previous accounts of anomaly described in chapter two and the case study of chemical hormesis in chapter three (together with further empirical and theoretical support supplied in this chapter), chapter four proposes a novel account, D, of

anomaly. It makes three distinctive claims. First, anomalies display multiple

“characterizations.” The dissertation claims that anomalies are most appropriately described not in terms of a single empirical “component,” such as a phenomenon, that conflicts with a single theoretical “component,” such as a theory, but rather that researchers simultaneously explore and describe anomalies in terms of multiple characterizations, which may include different empirical and theoretical components.

Second, researchers employ multiple “elements” or activities in order to “confirm” anomalies. The chapter identifies many activities involved in showing an anomaly to be

“genuine” or “confirmed,” and it argues that researchers initially attempt to “confirm” multiple characterizations of the anomaly (see Darden 1991 for a discussion of anomaly confirmation). Third, anomalies have a “dialectical” relationship with novel scientific hypotheses. The dissertation argues not only that anomalies stimulate the development of novel hypotheses but also that those hypotheses “feed back” and suggest new or altered characterizations of the anomaly. Chapter four concludes by arguing that account D suggests novel insights concerning both scientific discovery and the role of value judgments in scientific practice.

Chapter five, “Claim R and the Is/Ought Distinction,” is the first of two chapters that attempt to investigate the ramifications of scientific anomalies for ethics. Chapter five (together with the first half of chapter six) analyzes the ethical issues associated with a specific case of anomaly (i.e., chemical hormesis) by evaluating an ethical claim, R, that some proponents of that anomaly have proposed. Chapter five in particular accomplishes three tasks. First, it identifies the ethical claim, R, that a number of proponents of chemical hormesis appear to accept. Claim R asserts the ethical

justifiability of allowing public exposure to hormetic chemicals that produce net beneficial effects and that meet other currently unspecified conditions (C1…Cn). Second, the chapter proposes three interpretations of claim R (namely, “substantive,” “practical,” and “definitional” interpretations). It argues that the first, definitional, interpretation is problematic because policy arguments containing claim R appear to violate the is/ought distinction (IOD). (Chapter six evaluates the substantive and practical interpretations of claim R). The third task of chapter five is to defend the cogency of the IOD by developing a novel formulation of the naturalistic fallacy (NF). The chapter’s version of the NF appears to place the burden of proof on those who reject the cogency of the IOD.

Thus, chapter five concludes that the definitional interpretation of claim R is problematic.

Chapter six is entitled, “Chemical Hormesis, Public Health, and Consent.” The first half of the chapter concludes the dissertation’s analysis of claim R by showing that the substantive and practical interpretations of the claim (identified in chapter five) are problematic. The second half of chapter six then develops a general lesson for ethics and policy (called the MPC lesson) based on the dissertation’s analysis of claim R in the hormesis case. Thus, each half of the chapter accomplishes an important task. First, it identifies four specific problems with the substantive and practical interpretations of claim R and therefore provides reason to question any alterations to regulatory policy on the basis of the hormesis phenomenon. Second, the chapter uses one of the four problems with claim R to illustrate a general ethical lesson for policymakers and scientific researchers, namely, that they have a responsibility to take reasonable steps to identify, reveal, and provide representative information about all major, plausible characterizations of policy-relevant anomalies to the public or its representatives.

Chapter seven, “Conclusions and Future Directions,” analyzes the state of prior research, the accomplishments of the dissertation, and promising directions for future studies, with respect to three different topics. The first topic is the nature of anomaly and its role in the philosophy of science. The second topic is ethics, including the formulation of the NF and the IOD, the ethical justifiability of allowing public exposure to hormetic-chemical effects, and researchers’ ethical responsibilities for responding to policy-relevant anomalies in general. The third and final topic is the ongoing scientific investigation of the chemical-hormesis anomaly. Chapter seven argues that the dissertation’s analysis of the hormesis case study may be significant not only for philosophy but also for further scientific studies of the hormesis phenomenon.

1.4: Conclusion

The dissertation’s analysis of anomaly appears to be significant for at least five reasons. First, it provides a comprehensive conceptual framework for understanding scientific anomaly. Second, using this framework and a detailed analysis of the hormesis case study, the dissertation develops a novel understanding of anomaly that may provide increased understanding of both scientific discovery and the role of value judgments in scientific practice. Third, it elucidates a plausible formulation of the NF and of its relation to the IOD. Fourth, based on an ethical analysis of the regulatory claims made by proponents of hormesis, it identifies specific areas of research that should be performed before hormesis is applied to regulatory policy. Fifth, the dissertation elucidates ethical responsibilities and rules of thumb for researchers and policymakers who must make policy decisions under scientific uncertainty regarding anomalies. As a

whole, this study illustrates how careful work in the philosophy of science can contribute to formulating public policy that is more ethical and more scientifically defensible.

CHAPTER TWO

FIVE ACCOUNTS OF SCIENTIFIC ANOMALY

2.1: Introduction

Five of the most influential twentieth-century descriptions of scientific theory

change (namely, those of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, and

Lindley Darden) all emphasize that anomalies serve as crucial “catalysts” for scientific

discovery and theory change. This chapter shows, however, that these accounts conflict

both in their descriptions of anomaly and in their explanations of anomaly’s precise

relationship to theory change. Furthermore, besides their comparative weaknesses, it appears that their understandings of anomaly face individual weaknesses of ambiguity, incompleteness, and incoherence. By highlighting these weaknesses with previous descriptions of anomaly, the chapter motivates the dissertation’s novel analysis of scientific anomaly in chapters three and four.

The dissertation analyzes these five descriptions of scientific practice, as opposed to other accounts of science, because they satisfy two desiderata: (1) they provide descriptions of scientific theory change that have been philosophically influential, and (2) their formulations include fairly detailed descriptions of scientific anomaly and its role in the process of theory change. Despite the philosophical significance of these accounts, however, no one has systematically compared their descriptions of anomaly. This

chapter provides a novel analysis of them in three main sections. Section 2.2 offers an

overview of the chapter’s terminology and methodology for analyzing the accounts.

Section 2.3 then provides a brief description of each account. Finally, section 2.4

evaluates them both individually and comparatively. In so doing, the chapter provides a

new, comprehensive framework for analyzing anomalies as well as a rationale for how

philosophical understanding of scientific anomalies needs to advance in the future.

2.2: Terminology and Methodology

Terminology

This first part of section 2.2 explains the dissertation’s terminology for analyzing

the five previous accounts of anomaly, and the next part defends a methodological

approach for describing and evaluating them. This part begins by explaining the goal of

the dissertation’s terminology. Second, it presents paradigm examples of anomaly and

two characteristics of those examples. Third, the dissertation uses those paradigm cases

and their characteristics as a basis for developing its terminology. Although the precise

definitions developed in this section may not initially seem to be significant, they serve as

an important starting point for the novel account of anomaly developed in chapter four.

The terminology is presented here, at the very beginning of the dissertation, in order to provide neutral terms for describing the previous accounts.

The goal of this section is not to provide a final, definitive system of terminology for describing anomaly. Rather, the goal is to provide a broad, working conceptual framework that can meet at least two desiderata: (1) it can accommodate the strengths of multiple previous accounts of anomaly, and (2) it does not beg questions about the

characteristics of scientific anomalies. The first goal (i.e., accommodating strengths of

multiple previous accounts) is important, because this chapter aims to describe five

different accounts of anomaly. The second goal (namely, avoiding question-begging

about anomaly characteristics) is also important, because the dissertation aims to avoid

the error of presupposing that the characteristics of some anomalies are characteristics of

all anomalies. For example, Laudan (1977) faulted previous definitions of anomaly for

allegedly presupposing that anomalies must involve an inconsistency relation, whereas he suggested that anomalies could also involve other problematic relations (such as his proposed relation of “insolubility”). The subsequent evaluation of the five previous accounts in sections 2.3 and 2.4 of this chapter indicates that they all run this risk of

employing overly specific terminology that does not adequately describe all anomalies.

Therefore, the primary value of the terminology developed here relative to the terms

employed in the five previous accounts is its generality, which enables it to avoid

begging questions about the characteristics of anomalies.

As a basis for developing terminology, it will be helpful to consider five

“paradigm” examples of anomaly that have influenced former accounts. First, the motion

of Uranus was a famous anomaly for mid-nineteenth-century astronomy. The observed

motion of the planet differed from the path predicted by Newtonian physics, and this

anomalous motion was eventually eliminated when astronomers discovered that the

planet Neptune was responsible for the deviation in Uranus’s predicted path (see e.g.,

Humphreys 1968). Second, the motion of the perihelion of Mercury persisted as an

anomaly for Newtonian physics until it was eventually eliminated by Einstein’s general

theory of relativity (see e.g., Kuhn 1970, Lakatos 1970). Third, Michelson and Morley’s

failure to measure ether drift was anomalous for nineteenth-century theories of electromagnetism and mechanics until Einstein eliminated it with his special theory of relativity (see e.g., Collins and Pinch 1993, Kuhn 1970). Fourth, the measured atomic weight of chlorine appeared to be anomalous throughout the nineteenth century, because it conflicted with Prout’s theory of atomic structure. In particular, Prout predicted that atomic weights should be whole-number multiples of the atomic weight of hydrogen, whereas the atomic weight of chlorine appeared to be about 35.5 times the atomic weight of hydrogen (see e.g., Lakatos 1970). Finally, Mendel’s laws of segregation and independent assortment faced numerous anomalies in early genetics experiments. To give just one example, the ratios of hereditary characteristics in the F2 generation was sometimes 2:1 rather than the predicted 3:1 in breeding experiments (see e.g., Darden

1991).

These five paradigmatic examples of anomaly display two fundamental characteristics. One characteristic concerns the descriptive features of anomalies, and the second addresses their explanatory relationship to scientific discovery and theory change:

Descriptive: Scientific anomalies display an “empirical” component, a “theoretical” component, and a problematic relation between them. Researchers provide evidence for the occurrence of a problematic relation between the components via 4 a process of anomaly confirmationD.

Explanatory: Scientific anomalies are important stimuli for the development of novel hypotheses.

4 The term ‘anomaly confirmationD’ is subscripted with a ‘D’ in order to clarify that “anomaly confirmationD” is distinct from other sorts of scientific “confirmation.” The dissertation uses the term ‘anomaly confirmationD’ to refer to scientists’ activity of showing that an apparent problematic relation actually is present. Darden uses the term ‘confirmation’ to refer to this activity, so the dissertation borrows her term but adds the subscript ‘D’ so that it is not confused with scientific confirmation in general.

For example, in the case of the anomalous motion of the planet Uranus, the empirical

component was a particular phenomenon (namely, the measured motion of the planet),

the theoretical component was a specific theory (i.e., the theory of Newtonian

mechanics), and the relation between them was one of inconsistency (given a set of

auxiliary hypotheses). Researchers did engage in a process of confirmationD, which

included efforts to show that the planet’s anomalous motion could not be dismissed as the

result of experimental errors. In accordance with the “explanatory” characteristic of

anomalies, the anomalous motion of Uranus also served as a stimulus for the

development of novel ideas. The most notable hypothesis proposed to resolve the

anomaly was the existence of another planet (later identified as Neptune) that pulled it off

its predicted course. Admittedly, these descriptive and explanatory characteristics are not

exhaustive of all the features that anomalies such as the motion of Uranus display. The

dissertation emphasizes the descriptive and explanatory characteristics because they are

so important that the five accounts of anomaly described later in the chapter all

acknowledge them, and they provide the basis for the novel account of anomaly

developed in chapter four.

The two characteristics of anomaly, and especially the descriptive characteristic,

help to identify a set of terms that are important for analyzing anomaly (see Figure 1 on

the next page for a systematic list of the terms). This section provides definitions for the

following: (a) ‘anomaly’ (including a description of the empirical and theoretical

components of anomalies), (b) ‘representation’ and (c) ‘problematic relation’ (both of which are parts of the dissertation’s definition of ‘anomaly’), and (d) ‘anomaly confirmationD’. In order to better describe the features of an anomaly (i.e., the empirical

Terminology for describing an anomaly:

Anomaly (prima facie problematic relation between emp. and theoret. components) Representation (one or more of a set of relations that components hold to one another) Problematic relation (failure to represent that which a comp. is designed to represent)

Anomaly confirmationD (process of arguing for an ultima facie problematic relation) General type (refers to a broad sort of anomaly component or relation) Specific type (refers to a particular anomaly component or relation)

Sample general types of empirical components: Experimental data (experimental results not directly explained by theories) Phenomena (generalizable events that are explained by theories) Models (physical, conceptual, or mathematical “representation”)

Sample general types of theoretical components: Experimental expectations (results that researchers expect from experiments) Models (physical, conceptual, or mathematical “representations”) Theories (sets of statements or models that facilitate explanation and prediction) Theory parts (specific statements or models that are elements of a theory) Paradigms (elements that provide fundamental guidance for inquiry in a domain)

Sample general types of problematic relations: Inconsistency (logical inconsistency relation between statements) Incompatibility (relation parallel to inconsistency that can hold between events) Inexplicability (failure of a theoretical component to explain an empirical component)

Figure 1: List of terminology defined in section 2.2.

and theoretical components and the relation between them), the section will also define

the notions of (e) feature “general type” and (f) feature “specific type.” Finally, it will analyze a number of different “general types” of anomaly empirical components (namely,

experimental data, phenomena, and models), theoretical components (i.e., models,

experimental expectations, theories, theory parts, and paradigms) and relations (namely,

inconsistency, incompatibility, and inexplicability).

First, consider the following five-part definition of ‘anomaly’, with the first part

providing the main thesis and the other four parts providing clarification of it:

(i) An anomaly consists of a prima facie problematic relation between a hypothetical “representation” (to be called the theoretical component of the anomaly) and that which it “represents” (to be called the empirical component of the anomaly); the empirical and theoretical components, together with the problematic relation between them, constitute a “characterization” of the anomaly.

The dissertation employs the general notion of a “problematic relation” in this definition,

because it then avoids begging questions about the nature of the relation; it could be

inconsistency or inexplicability or some other problematic relation. Similarly, the

general term ‘components’ is used in order to avoid begging questions about the nature of

the empirical and theoretical components (e.g., the theoretical component could consist of

different sorts of entities, including models or theories or paradigms). The components

are labeled “empirical” and “theoretical” not in an absolute sense but in a relative sense.

They vary on a continuum between those that are more empirical and those that are more

theoretical, and components that scientists regard as theoretical at one point in time may

be regarded as empirical at a later time (see e.g., Darden 1991, Laudan 1977, Shapere

1984). In the case of an anomaly, one component is labeled the “theoretical” component

because it provides a “representation” of the other, “empirical,” component. The term

‘representation’ is used because it is compatible with a variety of specific ways in which the theoretical component might relate to the empirical component. By using that term, however, the dissertation does not intend to raise connotations of traditional epistemological issues associated with it (e.g., correspondence theories of truth). A definition of ‘representation’ (and of ‘problematic relation’) for the purposes of the dissertation follows the definitions of ‘anomaly’ and ‘anomaly confirmationD’.

The other four parts of the definition of ‘anomaly’ require less elucidation, because they introduce less novel terminology:

(ii) An anomaly’s prima facie problematic relation may depend on implicit auxiliary hypotheses and assumptions (e.g., that the empirical component falls within the domain that the theoretical component is designed to “represent,” or that the description of the empirical component is not the consequence of experimental error).

(iii) As chapters two and three argue, an anomaly may admit of multiple characterizations that may provide different conceptualizations of the empirical component and identify different theories or theory parts as the theoretical component.

(iv) The occurrence of anomaly is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for altering or abandoning the theoretical component of the anomaly (but see the role of anomaly confirmationD, described in the next definition).

(v) Anomalies may admit of “degrees” of “anomalousness,” at least in the sense that some anomalies may affect more “central” aspects of a theory than other anomalies (see also the definition of anomaly confirmationD)

This definition has at least three strengths: (a) it fulfills the goal of being broad and of begging as few questions about the characteristics of anomaly as possible, (b) it distinguishes the empirical and theoretical components of anomaly without presupposing a fact/theory distinction, and (c) it distinguishes anomalous problems from other sorts of scientific problems (such as relations of incoherence or lack of adequate theoretical support within a theory or between theories that do not attempt to “represent” one

another; see Laudan 1977, Nickles 1988, Shapere 1977). As strengths (b) and (c)

indicate, the definition aims to strike a delicate balance between two desiderata. On one hand, the definition acknowledges the lack of a fact/theory distinction (e.g., by claiming that the components are only “empirical” and “theoretical” in a relative sense). On the other hand, the definition maintains a distinction between anomalies (which involve relatively empirical scientific results) and other scientific problems that involve primarily conceptual or theoretical difficulties.

Previous philosophical analyses of anomaly (e.g., Darden 1991, Laudan 1977) encourage the distinction between empirical problems (i.e., anomalies) and conceptual problems, with empirical problems including at least one “empirical” component.

Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to draw a line between these two sorts of difficulties. For example, Laudan attempts to distinguish empirical problems from conceptual problems by claiming that empirical problems are “first-order” questions about substantive entities, whereas conceptual problems are “second-order” questions about theories (1977, 48). He is forced to acknowledge, however, that his empirical and conceptual problems are actually just extremes on a continuum, because scientific claims about entities are always theory-laden. Ultimately, he distinguishes empirical problems from theoretical problems based on the notion that researchers treat some scientific claims as empirical and therefore as the subjects of empirical problems (1977, 15). The dissertation’s definition, which asserts that anomaly consists of a failure by the theoretical component to “represent” the empirical component, seems to preserve

Laudan’s notion that researchers treat some claims as empirical. (Namely, the component that is “represented” by the other component is the one that researchers treat

as empirical.) Furthermore, the definition has the virtue of acknowledging more

explicitly than Laudan that the empirical and theoretical components of anomalies need

not always be different in kind. For example, the empirical component of some

anomalies could be very well-confirmed models, even though models serve as the

theoretical components for many anomalies.5

Based on the preceding definition of anomaly, it is possible to formulate a parallel five-part definition of ‘anomaly confirmationD’:

(i) Anomaly confirmationD consists of showing that an ultima facie problematic relation holds between the theoretical and empirical components of an anomaly, which involves defending both the empirical component and the auxiliary hypotheses that render it problematic with respect to the theoretical component.6

(ii) A confirmedD anomaly’s ultima facie problematic relation depends only on explicit auxiliary hypotheses and assumptions that have been evaluated.

5 One could object, however, that the dissertation might be forced to classify some problems as anomalies even though Laudan would regard them as conceptual problems. The problematic cases would be those in which one theory or paradigm provides a more abstract “representation” of another theory or model that scientists do not treat as empirical. One response to this problem is that, because the dissertation’s conceptual framework is supposed to be broad and to avoid begging questions about the forms that anomalies might take, it seems advisable to err on the side of formulating a somewhat broad definition of anomaly. A second response is that, as long as a higher-level theory is designed to “represent” the lower-level theory, it seems that researchers take the lower-level theory to be a partial indication of the structure of the world for the sake of evaluating the higher-level theory. Such conflicts between a theory and “the world” are distinctive of scientific anomalies as opposed to other sorts of scientific problems, so it seems reasonable to classify such problems as anomalies. It is also noteworthy that the dissertation’s definition of ‘anomaly’ cuts across Shapere’s (1977) categories of “domain problems” (i.e., problems that require clarification of the boundaries and characteristics of a domain), “theoretical problems” (i.e., problems that call for a “deep,” theoretical account of a domain), and “theoretical inadequacies” (i.e., problems that reflect the failure of a theory to account fully for its domain). The dissertation’s “anomalies” are most similar to Shapere’s “theoretical inadequacies,” which involve conflicts between theories and empirical phenomena. Nevertheless, because the dissertation’s definition is broad enough to allow the theoretical component of an anomaly to be not only fully formed theories but also scientist’s initial expectations for the behavior of entities in a domain, some “theoretical problems” or “domain problems” (which do not involve fully formed theories) could also count as anomalies. It seems acceptable for the dissertation’s definition to cut across these categories to some extent, because Shapere did not claim that anomalies correspond to any single category of problems that he discussed. 6 To claim that the problematic relation between the empirical and theoretical components of an anomaly is ultima facie is to express the conviction that the empirical component not only appears to be problematic for the theoretical component but that it genuinely is problematic. In other words, the anomaly provides a sufficient reason to change the theoretical component (see part (iv) of the definition).

(iii) Researchers describe highly confirmedD anomalies in terms of a small set of characterizations, all of which identify a particular primary theory, model, or paradigm as the locus of error.

(iv) The occurrence of a confirmedD anomaly is a sufficient condition for altering or abandoning the theoretical component of the anomaly (although one might continue to employ the former theory for pragmatic purposes).

(v) Anomalies can be confirmedD to varying degrees, insofar as researchers can provide increasing degrees of evidence that a problematic relation actually holds between the empirical and theoretical components; in actual practice, however, an anomaly is never completely confirmedD.

This definition of ‘anomaly confirmationD’ has at least three strengths: (1) it

parallels the definition of ‘anomaly’, (2) it provides an analysis of the notion that

anomalies can become “significant” (Kuhn 1970, Laudan 1977) or “genuine” (Mayo

1996) or “confirmed” (Darden 1991) without begging questions about the many ways in

which that can occur, and (3) it is less arbitrary than the most detailed previous

description of “anomaly confirmationD,” provided by Darden (1991). Darden claims that

anomaly confirmation consists of showing “the correctness of the anomalous data” (1991,

271), which involves supporting researchers’ assumptions about the characteristics of

their experimental conditions and justifying their experimental equipment and

procedures. Nevertheless, it seems arbitrary in at least three ways to limit anomaly

confirmationD to the activity of justifying anomalous data. First, an anomaly consists not

just of data but of a problematic relation between an empirical component and a theoretical component. Therefore, anomaly confirmationD should arguably involve showing that a problematic relation is present rather than just that the empirical component is present. Second, what makes an anomaly “significant” or “confirmed” is the finding that a primary theory, model or paradigm is the locus of error. (After all, researchers know as soon as they obtain unexpected results that some element of their

theories, assumptions, or experimental practices is in error—what needs to be confirmed is that the primary theory or paradigm in particular is problematic.) Darden’s activity of justifying experimental data, however, is just one aspect of showing that a primary theory is problematic; one must also examine auxiliary hypotheses and assumptions associated with primary theories and with one’s interpretation of the data. Third, researchers often cannot convince other scientists that anomalous data are legitimate until after they identify a specific theory that can plausibly be altered to eliminate the anomaly. Thus, the process of showing that anomalous data are reliable is deeply intertwined with the other aspects of what the dissertation calls “anomaly confirmationD.”

Because the preceding definition of ‘anomaly’ asserts that the theoretical component is a hypothetical “representation” of the empirical component, it is important to explain what the dissertation means by that term. Such clarification is particularly essential in this case, because the notion of “representation” is often associated with philosophical debates about realism and truth that do not have anything to do with the definition of ‘anomaly’. For the purposes of the dissertation, a hypothetical

“representation” functions in one or more of the following ways:

(1) it may predict how the empirical component will manifest itself under particular circumstances (e.g., the kinetic theory predicts the pressure of a gas, given information about its volume and temperature),

(2) it may explain why the empirical component occurs under particular circumstances (e.g., the kinetic theory explains the pressure of a gas based on the motion of its constituent molecules),

(3) it may somehow describe the empirical component (e.g., Kepler’s laws described the paths of planets in the solar system),

(4) it may develop an analogy between the empirical component and another phenomenon (e.g., billiard balls; the kinetic theory of gases develops an analogy between gas molecules and billiard balls),

(5) it may express a presupposition concerning the characteristics of the empirical component (e.g., the central paradigm of toxicology, “The dose determines the poison,” expresses the presupposition that the effects of a toxin are always a function of its dosage).

This definition specifies the notion of “representation” while acknowledging the

possibility that not all theoretical components are designed to perform a single

representational activity, such as explanation or description.

The dissertation’s definition of a “problematic relation” is based on the notion of

a “representation.” The relation between the empirical and theoretical components of an

anomaly is problematic if and only if it constitutes a failure of the theoretical component

to “represent” fully that which it is designed to “represent.” For example, the

inconsistency relation between predictive statements of Newtonian mechanics and the

stated motion of Uranus was a problematic relation, because Newtonian theory was

designed to “represent” the motions of massive objects in such a way that it could

accurately predict their motion. This definition elucidates the notion of a problematic

relation while clarifying that it might take different forms, depending on which

“representational” activity the theoretical component is designed to perform.

Finally, because the dissertation’s definition of ‘anomaly’ is broad enough to

accommodate different sorts of empirical and theoretical components of anomaly and of

the relation between them, it is helpful to introduce two terms, ‘general type’ and

‘specific type’, for referring to these features of anomaly. First, ‘general type’ will refer

to a broad sort of anomaly component or relation.7 For example, models, theories, and

7 The dissertation refers to “general types” of anomaly components and relations but not to “general types” of anomaly confirmationD. One could, perhaps, refer to the different activities that contribute to confirmationD as different “general types” of confirmationD (e.g., these activities include showing that the anomaly falls within the domain of the primary theory and evaluating various sorts of auxiliary

paradigms are different “general types” of theoretical components. ‘Specific type’ refers

to a particular component or relation in an actual case of anomaly. For example, the

theory of Newtonian mechanics might be the “specific type” of the theoretical component

of a particular anomaly. Thus, in the case of the anomalous motion of the planet Uranus,

the “general type” of the theoretical component would be a theory, and the “specific

type” of the theoretical component would be the theory of Newtonian mechanics.

This chapter and the following chapters will include references to numerous

“general types” of anomaly components and relations. Therefore, it seems advisable to

provide rough definitions of some of the most common general types, although the

following is neither a mutually exclusive nor an exhaustive list. First, three of the most

common general types of empirical components are experimental data, phenomena, and

models.8 The dissertation will refer to experimental data as experimental results that are not directly explained by scientific theories, because they are affected in numerous small ways by random factors (see Bogen and Woodward 1988, Woodward 2000). An example of experimental data would be experimental results for the melting point of lead, which fluctuate around the value of 327 C. In contrast, phenomena are generalizable events that are explained by theories and for which experimental data provide evidence

(Bogen and Woodward 1988, Woodward 2000).9 For example, the melting of lead at 327

hypotheses). Calling these activities “general types” of confirmationD, however, might create the impression that they are individually sufficient for confirmationD rather than merely necessary aspects of the broader confirmationD process. Thus, the dissertation refers to these activities as “elements” of anomaly confirmationD. 8 Even though models themselves “represent” other phenomena, and therefore serve as the theoretical components of some anomalies, they can also serve as the empirical components of other anomalies. For example, researchers may regard a model as so uncontroversial that they can test higher-level theories by examining whether the theories accurately “represent” the features of the model. 9 Whereas phenomena are generalizable events, it seems very unlikely that experimental data could be generalizable under most circumstances (although they might be generalizable in principle). For example,

C is a phenomenon. Finally, a model is a physical, conceptual, or mathematical

“representation” of natural objects or systems. An example would be the VSEPR

(valence-shell-electron-pair-repulsion) model of atomic structure.

Some of the most common general types of theoretical anomaly components include experimental expectations, models, theories, theory parts, and paradigms.

Experimental expectations are the results that researchers expect from an experiment, which are inductively confirmable (in principle) because they are individual events. An example would be researchers’ expectations that an experiment to determine the melting point of lead will yield only data points that fall between 325 C and 329 C. Models were already defined in the previous paragraph as physical, conceptual, or mathematical representations. Theories are sets of statements or models that facilitate the explanation and prediction of phenomena in a particular domain.10 An example would be quantum mechanics. Theory parts are specific statements or models that are elements of a theory and that vary in their independence from the other statements or models of the theory.

The dissertation’s ‘theory parts’ are what Darden (1991, 18) calls ‘theory components’.

The dissertation will refer to paradigms as combinations of one or more elements (which may include theories, presuppositions, values, symbolic generalizations, and problem solutions) that provide fundamental guidance for conducting scientific inquiry in a

it would seem fairly unlikely that one would obtain exactly the same data point for two experimental tests of the melting point of lead, and even then one would assume that the two points were identical only because of limits in measurement accuracy. 10 The dissertation attempts to avoid debates between proponents of syntactic and semantic accounts of scientific theories by developing a description of theory that is compatible with either account (see e.g., Suppe 1977).

particular domain.11 An example of a paradigm would be the fundamental presupposition in toxicology that “The dose determines the poison” of a substance.

Common general types of problematic relations include inconsistency, incompatibility, and inexplicability. Inconsistency is the occurrence of a logical inconsistency relation between one or more statements of the theoretical component and a statement that describes the empirical component. Incompatibility is a relation that parallels inconsistency but that can hold between events or between events and statements (see e.g., Leplin 1975). For example, a statement that describes the theoretical component of an anomaly might be incompatible with the occurrence of a particular event, which constitutes the empirical component. Inexplicability is the failure of the theoretical component to explain the empirical component, given a particular account of scientific explanation (see e.g., Hempel 1964, Kitcher 1981, Laudan 1977,12 Salmon

1984, van Fraassen 1981).13

Finally, even though the dissertation does not refer to “general types” of anomaly

confirmationD, it will refer to “elements” of confirmationD, which are the activities that

11 The dissertation does not define the term ‘paradigm’ in a strictly Kuhnian sense. The dissertation’s definition roughly matches what Kuhn later calls ‘disciplinary matrices’ (1970), what Lakatos calls ‘research programmes’ (1970), and what Laudan calls ‘research traditions’ (1977). 12 Although Laudan (1977) distinguishes his proposed relation of “problem solving” from accounts of “explanation,” the dissertation will classify it as an account of explanation for the sake of economy. Laudan’s account of explanation (or, in his words, “problem solving”) is distinctive in two respects: (1) it includes approximate entailments of explananda as explanations, and (2) it does not require that the explanans of an explanation be true. 13 Two clarifications of the dissertation’s definition of ‘inexplicability’ are in order. First, the dissertation attempts to avoid debates between proponents of different accounts of scientific explanation by acknowledging that the inexplicability relation can take different forms, depending on the account of scientific explanation that one accepts. Second, the dissertation does not include a separate relation of “incompleteness” (see e.g., Darden 1991, Leplin 1975, Shapere 1974), because most examples of incompleteness appear to be failures of a theoretical component to explain a particular empirical component. (Another sort of incompleteness is a simplification (Shapere 1974), but simplifications do not appear to be anomalous under the dissertation’s definition of anomaly, because they are specifically designed to “represent” the empirical component in only some respects.)

contribute to the confirmationD process. For example, the following is a sample (neither

mutually exclusive nor exhaustive) list of those elements:

• eliminating errors in the description of the empirical component

• defending auxiliary hypotheses that render statements of the empirical component inconsistent with statement of the theoretical component

• arguing that the empirical component falls within the domain that the theoretical component is designed to “represent”

• developing a rival theoretical component that can perform most of the “representational” activities of the old theoretical component and that can eliminate the anomaly (thus supporting the conclusion that the empirical component falls within the domain of entities that the old theoretical component is designed to “represent”)

None of these elements is individually sufficient for anomaly confirmationD, but any of

them could be necessary under some circumstances.

Methodology

This second part of section 2.2 presents the methodology employed for describing

and analyzing previous accounts of anomaly throughout the rest of the chapter. First, the

description of each account in section 2.3 will consist of three elements: (1) a “big-

picture” explanation of anomaly’s role in the account, (2) the account’s “descriptive

conclusion,” and (3) the account’s “explanatory conclusion.” The “big-picture”

explanation of anomaly’s role in each thinker’s understanding of scientific practice

provides context for the second two elements of the description. Next, the “descriptive

conclusion” offers each account’s specific understanding of the “descriptive

characteristic” of anomalies (i.e., the components of anomaly, the relation between the

components, and the process of confirmationD). Finally, the “explanatory conclusion”

provides each account’s specific understanding of the “explanatory characteristic” of anomaly (i.e., the way that anomaly stimulates the development of novel hypotheses).

Concerning this methodology for section 2.3, one might raise at least two initial objections. First, a “misplaced-precision” objection is that the section is in danger of inaccurately describing previous accounts by using the terminology developed in section

2.2 to attribute a false degree of precision to them. For example, by using terms such as

‘data’ or ‘phenomena’ or ‘paradigm’ in precise ways that the previous accounts may not have employed them, the dissertation may misrepresent their accounts. A second,

“conflation,” objection is that the section may conflate distinct notions from different accounts of anomaly by using novel terms (e.g., ‘problematic relation’ or ‘anomaly confirmationD’) to describe distinct notions from multiple previous accounts. For example, section 2.3 will use the term ‘anomaly confirmationD’ to refer both to scientists’ activity of defending their description of an anomaly’s empirical component (see Darden

1991) and to scientists’ activity of defending auxiliary hypotheses that render the empirical component inconsistent with the theoretical component (see Popper 1959).

One might worry, however, that Darden arguably limited her use of the term ‘anomaly confirmation’ only to descriptions of anomalies’ empirical components.

A response to the misplaced-precision objection is that section 2.3 will attempt to describe the previous accounts not by unthinkingly using the exact terms that the previous accounts employed but rather by using terms that match the concepts that they employed. In response to the conflation objection, the section arguably will not conflate different notions by placing them under umbrella terms such as ‘problematic relation’ or

‘anomaly confirmationD’, because the dissertation’s terms are explicitly defined in such a

way that they serve as general categories. For example, Darden’s account of “anomaly

confirmation” focuses on the activity of defending experimental results. The

dissertation’s term ‘anomaly confirmationD’ includes any activity associated with defending an anomaly’s ultima facie problematic relation, so it can legitimately include

Darden’s notion of “anomaly confirmation” as well as other activities that do not focus only on defending experimental results.

The methodology for section 2.4, which evaluates each previous account, includes two parts. First, it analyzes the accounts’ strengths. By comparing them to actual scientific anomalies, the section argues that one of the previous accounts’ most salient strengths is their plausibility as faithful descriptions of scientific practice. Second, the section analyzes the previous accounts’ most serious weaknesses. By examining each account individually and then comparing them to one another, it argues that each account suffers from one or more problems of ambiguity, incompleteness, or incoherence.

A “triviality” objection to the methodology for section 2.4 is that, if all five previous accounts can describe actual cases of anomaly, then their descriptive ability may be somewhat trivial and inadequate to show that any one account is a plausible description of scientific practice in general. In fact, the ability of all five accounts to provide reasonable descriptions of specific anomalies seems to be particularly questionable and surprising when one considers that the details of the accounts appear to conflict with one another. In response, it appears that the ability of all five accounts to describe actual cases of anomaly does not threaten each account’s plausibility tout court but only each account’s plausibility as an exclusive or exhaustive account of anomaly. In other words, the ability of all five accounts to fit actual examples of anomaly merely

suggests that anomalies can display different characteristics (either in different instances

of anomaly or at different points in the development of a single anomaly) and that

different accounts focus on different characteristics. For example, it seems reasonable that, although Kuhn described Roentgen’s and Lavoisier’s anomalies as conflicts between phenomena and paradigms, one could also describe the anomalies (at some point in their development) as conflicts between experimental data and experimental expectations or between phenomena and theories.

2.3: Description of the Previous Accounts

This section presents five particularly influential accounts of scientific anomaly.

As the introduction mentioned, these accounts are chosen because they provide both

fairly detailed descriptions of scientific anomaly and also philosophically influential

accounts of anomaly’s role in scientific theory change. The description of each account

consists of three parts. First, it provides a “big-picture” understanding of anomaly’s role

in the account. Second, it provides the account’s “descriptive conclusion,” which

describes the empirical and theoretical components of anomaly, the problematic relation

between the components, and the confirmationD process by which researchers defend the anomaly’s problematic relation. Third, it presents the account’s “explanatory conclusion,” which states the role of anomaly in scientific theory change.

Popper

Anomalies are important in Popper’s philosophy of science, because his overriding goal was to develop a falsificationist demarcation criterion for science, and

anomalies constitute the potential falsifiers of theories (see e.g., Popper 1959, 1963). He aimed to develop a falsificationist account of scientific method as a competitor to the dominant “justificationism” associated with logical empiricism. Popper claimed that scientists cannot increase the logical probability of a theory’s truth above zero, no matter how many observations they make, because theories contain universal laws that make predictions about an infinite number of cases. Nevertheless, he insisted that science can still be distinguished from other sorts of activities even though scientific theories cannot be confirmed or justified. He attempted to draw a “line of demarcation” between scientific claims and non-scientific claims based on the notion that only scientific claims makes testable predictions that leave the claims open to falsification. When scientific theories make predictions that do conflict with actual observation, those observations count as anomalies for the theories.

It is fairly easy to reconstruct Popper’s specific understanding of anomaly (which will be called “account P” throughout the dissertation), because he very explicitly described the empirical and theoretical components of anomaly and the relation between them. First, he states that the empirical component of anomaly is a “basic statement” that describes an “event.” He refers to basic statements as singular, empirical statements that scientists accept by convention. He uses the term ‘event’ in roughly the same way that the dissertation defines the term ‘phenomenon’, namely, to refer to a generalizable occurrence. Popper claims that the theoretical component of an anomaly consists of a theory, which is composed of a set of statements. Finally, the problematic relation of an anomaly is one of inconsistency between the basic statement describing the phenomenon

(together with auxiliary hypotheses) and the statements of the theory.

With regard to ‘anomaly confirmationD’, Popper does not explicitly use that term, but one can discern at least two activities or elements in his account that contribute to

14 confirmationD. Those two elements correspond to two reasons that the falsification of a

theory is never certain (and therefore that an apparent anomaly may not be legitimate).

First, one can add or modify auxiliary hypotheses in order to eliminate the apparent

conflict between a basic statement and a theory (1959, 42, 83, 145). Second, one may

determine that the basic statement that conflicts with a theory is actually false (1959,

111). Therefore, the first element of confirmationD that one can discern in Popper’s

account is the defense of auxiliary hypotheses. Although he denies that researchers can

“confirm” those hypotheses, he claims that one can “corroborate” them by trying

unsuccessfully to falsify them. The other element of confirmationD is the defense of basic statements. Popper claims that researchers defend basic statements by corroborating “falsifying hypotheses,” which describe the events mentioned in the basic statements. The corroboration of falsifying hypotheses prevents scientists from falsifying theories based on one-time effects or random experimental artifacts.

Turning to Popper’s “explanatory conclusion,” he appears to claim that an anomaly plays a role in scientific discovery and theory change because it may spur researchers to develop a novel theory that is not inconsistent with it. As Gutting (1980) and Kleiner (1993) argue, the title of Popper’s book, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, may not be completely ironic. It might initially appear that Popper has little to say about

14 Recall that the term ‘confirmationD’ refers, in the dissertation, not to the normal activity of confirmation but rather to the activity of showing that an ultima facie problematic relation holds between the components of the anomaly. Thus, although Popper rejects the notion that theories can be confirmed, he would affirm that anomalies can be confirmedD (insofar as researchers can defend the occurrence of a problematic relation).

discovery, because he claims that the development of hypotheses is a psychological

matter and that it is only the testing of hypotheses that philosophers can properly analyze.

Nevertheless, as long as one considers the process of scientific discovery to include not

merely the development of novel theories but the entire process by which scientists move

from one theory to another, then Popper does offer an account of scientific discovery. He

claims that researchers respond to anomalies by developing alternative theories and

attempting to falsify them. Thus, anomalies play a crucial role as “engines” or

“catalysts” for scientific discovery and theory change.

Based on the preceding analysis, one can plausibly reconstruct both Popper’s descriptive conclusion (PDC) and his explanatory conclusion (PEC):

(PDC): A phenomenon, O, is anomalous with respect to a theory, T, iff a basic statement that describes O (together with auxiliary hypotheses A1…An) is inconsistent with one or more statements of theory T. Two elements of confirmationD are: (1) corroborating auxiliary hypotheses that render statements describing O inconsistent with statements of T, and (2) corroborating the “falsifying hypothesis” that describes O.

(PEC): Anomalies play a role in both scientific discovery and theory change in the sense that they may serve as stimuli for researchers to develop novel theories.

Kuhn

Anomalies play a particularly important role in Kuhn’s philosophy of science (see

Kuhn 1970, 1977a). A central part of his project was to describe the course of scientific

development, which he characterized in terms of “revolutionary” episodes that punctuate

periods of “normal science.” According to Kuhn, normal science is governed by

paradigms that structure scientific practice by guiding the questions that scientists ask and

the ways they answer those questions. In contrast, he thought that revolutionary science

is characterized by the questioning of reigning paradigms and that it can result in

dramatic changes in research methods, techniques, assumptions, and theories. Kuhn

believed that anomalies play the crucial role of initiating these periods of revolutionary science. He recognized that researchers may ignore anomalies for an extended period of time, but he insisted that scientists ultimately begin to question the reigning paradigm if anomalies become more significant (e.g., if they resist solution for an extended period of time).

Unfortunately, Kuhn did not describe the features of anomaly very precisely.

First, he is somewhat ambiguous about the “general types” of empirical anomaly

components. Sometimes he uses the term ‘phenomenon’ (1970, 57) or ‘occurrence’

(1977a, xvii) to refer to the empirical component. He seems to use those terms to refer to

generalizable events (as the dissertation does), because he emphasizes that researchers may not have the concepts for describing those generalizable “phenomena” until after they develop a new paradigm (1977a, 171).15 To the extent that researchers do not

initially have concepts for describing an anomalous “phenomenon,” however, it is

unclear that Kuhn can coherently claim that the empirical component of an anomaly

consists of a “phenomenon.” He seems to recognize this difficulty in some of his other

descriptions of anomaly, when he characterizes the empirical component of anomaly not

as a determinate phenomenon but as something almost indescribable. For example, he

says that anomaly occurs when “nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced

expectations that govern normal science” (1970, 52-53, italics added). Perhaps a partial

solution to Kuhn’s ambiguity would be for him to claim that researchers initially know

that an anomaly signals the occurrence of some phenomenon, but researchers do not have

15 Kuhn (1970, 63) offers the Bruner-Postman playing-card experiment as an example of the difficulties that scientists initially face when they try to conceptualize anomalous phenomena.

a concept to describe the phenomenon until after developing a new paradigm. Therefore,

the dissertation will assume for present purposes that Kuhn does consider the empirical

component of anomalies to be what the dissertation calls “phenomena.”

Whereas Kuhn is ambiguous about the empirical component of anomaly, he

clearly refers to the theoretical component as a “paradigm.” Nevertheless, one might

object that he uses the term ‘paradigm’ so vaguely throughout The Structure of Scientific

Revolutions that one cannot determine what he really means by the term (see e.g.,

Masterman 1970)! Fortunately, he later suggests in the “Postscript” to the second edition

of Structure (1970) that his preferred use of the term ‘paradigm’ is to refer to a problem

solution or exemplar. Therefore, his usage of the term accords with the dissertation’s

definition of ‘paradigm’ (i.e., as a methodology-guiding combination of one or more

elements, such as exemplars). With regard to the problematic relation of an anomaly,

Kuhn clearly states that it is one of inconsistency. He clarifies, however, that the

inconsistency relation can be the result of predictions that are either: (1) explicit, or (2)

“implicit in the design and interpretation of established laboratory procedures” (1970, 59,

italics added).

Kuhn’s account of anomaly confirmationD is difficult to analyze, for at least two reasons. First, the dissertation defines anomaly confirmationD as an epistemic activity, namely, as showing that a problematic relation genuinely holds between an empirical and theoretical component. Kuhn does not distinguish, however, between this epistemic activity and the closely related sociological and pragmatic considerations that also

encourage scientists to investigate anomalies. Examples of considerations that may be

partly epistemic and partly sociological or pragmatic include an anomaly’s being present

for an extended period of time, affecting central elements of the reigning paradigm, blocking practical applications of the paradigm, being large compared to similar problems, being similar to a set of previous problems, and attracting investigators for personal reasons (1970, 82, 1977a, 202). The second reason that Kuhn’s account is difficult to analyze is that he shows vague awareness of elements of confirmationD that he does not explicitly mention. For example, Kuhn mentions that the potential for researchers to obtain fluke experimental results is an important reason that researchers initially ignore anomalies (1970, 202). Thus, he seems to appreciate the role that eliminating fluke experimental results plays in anomaly confirmationD, but he does not elaborate on the ways in which researchers “weed out” those questionable results.

The dissertation responds to Kuhn’s ambiguity about confirmationD by formulating a charitable reconstruction of three elements at which he hints. First, as the preceding paragraph mentioned, he seems to recognize that researchers have to rule out fluke experimental results before they consider an anomaly to be genuine. Second, his claim that researchers often take an anomaly seriously after it has been present for an extended period of time seems to be not only a pragmatic or sociological point but also an epistemic one. Namely, if researchers have been trying to eliminate an anomaly rather than ignoring it, the long-term “resilience” of an anomaly does provide some reason to think that it reflects a genuine problematic relation. Third, Kuhn recognizes that researchers ultimately consider an anomaly to be “genuine” only after they show that a rival paradigm can eliminate it. His point seems to reflect another element of confirmationD, namely, showing that the anomaly actually falls within the old paradigm’s domain (which can be partially accomplished by showing that the anomaly falls within a

rival paradigm’s domain). Thus, Kuhn arguably acknowledges at least three elements of confirmationD: (1) showing that experimental results are not the result of experimental

errors or faulty instrumentation, (2) showing that anomalous results cannot be eliminated

despite efforts to eliminate them over an extended period of time, (3) showing that a rival

paradigm can eliminate the anomaly (thereby supporting the conclusion that the anomaly

falls within the old paradigm’s domain).

Kuhn’s explanatory conclusion is plausibly that anomalies play a role in scientific

discovery and theory change in the sense that an anomaly, once it is confirmedD to an

adequate extent, contributes to a state of “crisis” in which researchers explore alternatives

to the current paradigm. Although he downplayed the distinction between factual

“discoveries” and theoretical “inventions,” he claimed that both are the result of the

“crises” that result from anomalies. He states, for example:

Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the expected. (1970, 52-53)

Later, he claims, “If awareness of anomaly plays a role in the emergence of new sorts of

phenomena [i.e., discoveries], it should surprise no one that a similar but more profound awareness is prerequisite to all acceptable changes of theory” (1970, 67). Thus, Kuhn agreed with Popper that anomalies are important engines for scientific change; he merely placed much greater emphasis than Popper on the dramatic paradigm changes that anomalies can occasionally produce.

In summary, account K of anomaly appears to be something like the following:

(KDC): A statement that describes a phenomenon, O, is anomalous with respect to a paradigm, P, iff the description of O is inconsistent with a statement that describes the predictions of P. Three elements of anomaly confirmationD include: (1) showing that experimental results are not the result of experimental errors or faulty instrumentation, (2) showing that anomalous results cannot be eliminated despite efforts to eliminate them over an extended period of time, (3) showing that a rival paradigm can eliminate the anomaly (thereby supporting the conclusion that the anomaly falls within the old paradigm’s domain).

(KEC): Anomalies play a role in scientific discovery in the sense that an anomaly, once it is confirmedD to an adequate extent, contributes to a state of “crisis” in which researchers explore hypotheses that state alternatives to the current paradigm.

Lakatos

Anomalies are also centrally important to Lakatos’s (1970) philosophy of science, which aimed to forge a rapprochement between Popper and Kuhn. Lakatos admired

Kuhn’s insight that scientific researchers sometimes continue to investigate scientific theories even when they are afflicted by a “sea” of anomalies. Nevertheless, he believed that Kuhn provided a descriptive, uncritical account of scientific practice, and Lakatos wanted to maintain Popper’s normative approach to philosophy. He concluded that scientific practice is characterized by the development of “research programmes,” which are falsified only when two conditions are met. First, the old programme must be

“degenerating” (a notion that will be explained later in this section). Second, researchers must have developed a rival research programme with greater empirical content than the old programme. (In other words, the rival programme must be able to explain anomalies that the old research programme cannot explain). Thus, anomalies still play a crucial role in this account of scientific practice, because Lakatos believed that a research programme

is falsified only if it fails to explain anomalies that another research programme can explain.

Lakatos’s position on the features of anomaly appears to be relatively clear. He uses the term ‘phenomenon’ to describe the empirical component of anomaly (1970,

159). Furthermore, he arguably uses the term in the same way that the dissertation does

(to refer to a generalizable “event”), because he bases his own account of anomaly on

Popper’s account, which also refers to the empirical component of anomalies as generalizable “events.” Lakatos refers to the theoretical component of anomalies as

‘research programmes’, which consist of sequences of theories bound together by

“negative and positive heuristics.” For the sake of simplifying terminology, the dissertation will refer to Lakatos’s research programmes as “paradigms,” because they fall within its definition of paradigms (i.e., combinations of elements that provide fundamental guidance for research in a particular domain). Finally, he claims that the relation between the empirical and theoretical components is one of inexplicability (1970,

159).16

Lakatos’s account focuses primarily on two elements of anomaly confirmationD.

These two elements correspond to the two prerequisites for shifting to a new research

programme. First, he claimed that the old research programme must be degenerating

(1970, 157). According to Lakatos, a research programme is degenerating if it fails to

16 Laudan (1977, 28) claimed that virtually all previous writers (presumably including Lakatos) held that the anomalous relation is one of inconsistency rather than inexplicability. Nevertheless, the burden of proof would appear to be on anyone who denies that Lakatos held the anomalous relation to be one of inexplicability. First, Lakatos explicitly used the term ‘explanation’ to refer to the anomalous relation. Second, he claimed that an anomaly can be resolved in at least three ways, one of which is for it to be “neutralized” because an independent (non-rival) paradigm explains the anomaly. Such a “neutralization” seems to presuppose that the former paradigm merely failed to explain the anomaly, however, because the anomaly could not become neutral if it were inconsistent with the former paradigm.

produce both novel theoretical predictions and occasional empirical confirmation of those predictions (in his words, theoretically and empirically “progressive problem-shifts”).

This first prerequisite is an element of anomaly confirmationD in the sense that it provides some evidence that the old research programme is problematic (and therefore that the research programme, rather than some auxiliary hypothesis, is genuinely problematic with respect to the anomaly). Second, Lakatos claimed that the new research programme must be able to explain everything that the old research programme explained and also have some corroborated excess empirical content (1970, 116). This second prerequisite is also an element of anomaly confirmationD, in the sense that it supports the conclusion that the anomaly falls within the old research programme’s domain. (In other words, if the rival research programme is able to explain the same domain as the old programme and also eliminate the anomaly, it suggests that the anomaly falls within the former research programme’s domain).

The explanatory conclusion of Lakatos’s account is that anomalies play a role in scientific discovery and theory change in at least two senses. They may spur either (1) proposed revisions to a research programme’s “protective belt,” or (2) the development of a new research programme. In other words, Lakatos believed that anomalies could typically be resolved without abandoning a research programme; one could merely alter its auxiliary components. He did recognize, however, that particularly troublesome anomalies could spur scientists to develop alternatives to the original research programme. Thus, anomalies ultimately serve as the catalysts for changes in research programmes and (occasionally) shifts to new research programmes.

Lakatos’s account of anomaly can be summarized with the following statements:

(L1DC): A phenomenon, O, is anomalous with respect to a paradigm, P, iff P does not explain O. Two elements of confirmationD are: (1) showing that a rival paradigm, P’, with equal or greater empirical content than P, can explain anomaly O (thus providing some evidence that O falls within the domain of P), and (2) showing that paradigm P is degenerating (thus supporting the conclusion that P, as opposed to an auxiliary hypothesis, is the locus of error).

(L1EC): Anomalies play a role in scientific discovery in the sense that they may spur either (1) proposed revisions to a paradigm’s protective belt, or (2) the development of a new paradigm.

Laudan

Anomalies are particularly important to Laudan’s philosophy of science, because

he claims that scientific rationality consists in progressively solving problems, and he describes anomalies as one sort of problem that scientists try to solve (1977, 6). Rather than explaining the progressiveness of science in terms of its rationality, he reverses the relationship between these concepts and attempts to characterize scientific rationality in

terms of the most progressive efforts at solving particular problems. The two sorts of

problems that he discusses are empirical and conceptual ones. He divides the conceptual

problems into two further groups based on whether they are internal or external to a

particular theory. The empirical problems he divides into three groups: unsolved

problems, solved problems, and anomalous problems. He defines an anomaly for a

particular theory as a problem that is unsolved by that theory but that has been solved by

a rival theory. Thus, although Laudan thought that previous philosophers had

exaggerated the importance of anomalies relative to the other problems that scientists

face (namely, conceptual ones), he nevertheless thought that anomalies are central to

understanding scientific rationality.

It is somewhat difficult to determine Laudan’s exact position on the components of anomaly. He does indicate, however, that the empirical component need not be a particular set of data from any experiment (1977, 16-17). Therefore, considering that his examples of empirical components (e.g., Brownian motion and the regeneration of

Trembley’s polyp) consist of generalizable occurrences, the dissertation will tentatively classify the theoretical component in his account as “phenomena.” This conclusion is supported by Laudan’s later work, in which he refers to the empirical component of an anomaly as a “state of affairs” (1997). He consistently refers to the theoretical component as “theories,” but he claims that what are commonly called “theories” can be two very different sorts of entities. First, they can be “a very specific set of related doctrines,” such as a set of axioms or principles (1977, 71). Second, they can be “much more general, much less easily testable, sets of doctrines or assumptions” (1977, 71).

Laudan’s first sort of theory corresponds to what the dissertation calls “theories,” and his second sort corresponds to what the dissertation calls “paradigms.” He clearly thinks that what the dissertation calls “theories” serve as the theoretical component of anomalies, but it is less clear whether he thinks that “paradigms” can also serve as theoretical components. On one hand, Laudan seems to claim that “paradigms” cannot serve as theoretical components, because he says that a paradigm “makes no predictions … [and] solves no specific problems” (1977, 82). On the other hand, he says that anomalies for the theories within a paradigm can encourage scientists to alter the paradigm (1977, 98), which suggests that one could, perhaps, also consider the paradigm to be the theoretical component of the anomaly. The dissertation will tentatively interpret Laudan as claiming

that paradigms do not directly serve as the theoretical components of anomalies but that

they can be influenced by anomalies.

Laudan is somewhat clearer about the problematic relation of anomaly and the

process by which anomalies are confirmedD. As section 2.2 mentioned, he claims that an

anomaly’s problematic relation consists in the theoretical component’s failure to “solve”

the problem posed by the empirical component. Laudan’s notion of “problem solution”

appears to be a form of explanation, with two distinctive characteristics: (1) it includes

approximate entailments of explananda as explanations, and (2) it does not require that

the explanans of an explanation be true (1977, 23-25). Concerning confirmationD, he

mentions two elements, but (as with accounts P, K, and L1) he does not explicitly identify

them as elements of confirmationD. First, he claims that researchers must show that an alleged phenomenon is not the consequence of experimental errors or random fluctuations in data before they consider it to be a serious problem. Second, he argues that a problem does not generally count as a genuine anomaly for a theory, T, until a rival theory, T’, can solve the problem (Laudan 1977, 18-31). When researchers achieve this second element of confirmationD, they support the conclusion that theory T can indeed be faulted for failing to solve the problem. (In other words, the researchers show that the problem does probably fall within the domain of theory T.)

Once anomalies are confirmedD by being explained by a rival theory, Laudan

claims that researchers attempt to alter the original theory so that it can solve the

anomalies. Furthermore, if scientists consistently fail to solve the anomalies with the

original theory, he says that they may ultimately accept the rival theory. Thus, the

explanatory conclusion of account L2 is plausibly that anomalies spur scientists to

develop hypotheses for altering T so that it can solve the anomalies, and anomalies may

ultimately convince scientists to accept a rival theory that can solve the them.

Based on the preceding analysis, the descriptive and explanatory conclusions of

account L2 appear to be as follows:

(L2DC): A phenomenon, O, is anomalous with respect to a theory, T, iff T has not explained O and another theory, T’, has explained O.17 At least two elements of anomaly confirmationD include: (1) showing that an alleged phenomenon is not the consequence of experimental errors or random fluctuations in data, and (2) showing that T’ can explain O (which provides evidence that O falls within the domain of theory T and which is generally a prerequisite for a scientific problem to count as an anomaly (see Laudan 1977, 18-19).

(L2EC): Once anomalies are confirmedD by being explained by a rival theory, they spur scientists to develop hypotheses for altering T so that it can solve the anomalies, and they may ultimately convince scientists to accept the rival theory.

Darden

Darden’s account of scientific theory change emphasizes three “stages,” and anomaly plays the primary role in the third stage. In the first stage, researchers generate theories, using strategies such as the exploration of analogy, the development of interrelations between bodies of knowledge, the invocation of theory types (see Shapere

1977), and the proposal of vague ideas that can be progressively refined. In the second stage, scientists assess theories, using considerations such as the theory’s consistency, clarity, explanatory and predictive adequacy, scope, lack of ad hocness, fruitfulness, and relation to other theories. Finally, in the third stage, in which scientists change theories, they “confirm” and “localize” anomalies and then alter theories in response to them

17 Recall that Laudan distinguishes his preferred relation of “problem solution” from the typical relation of scientific “explanation,” but the dissertation treats problem solution as a form of explanation for the sake of simplicity.

(1991, 269). Thus, after researchers initially develop theories, Darden regards anomalies

as the primary initiators of scientific change.

It appears that Darden would regard the empirical component of anomaly as either

experimental data or phenomena, the theoretical component as a theory, and the

problematic relation as either inconsistency or inexplicability. Although she claims that the empirical component of an anomaly consists of “data” (e.g., 1991, 18, 280), it seems likely that she used the term ‘data’ to refer not only to what the dissertation calls

‘experimental data’ but also to what the dissertation calls ‘phenomena’. For example, she refers to the 2:1 ratios found in Cuenot’s genetic experiments as an example of anomalous “data,” but the 2:1 ratios are actually what the dissertation calls ‘phenomena’.

In other words, Cuenot’s experiments actually yielded experimental data that hovered around 2:1, but he interpreted those data as evidence for the phenomenon of 2:1 ratios.

Regarding the theoretical component of anomaly, she claims that it consists of “theories”

(1991, 18, 280), and her book provides no reason to think that she means anything other than what the dissertation calls ‘theories’. Finally, she claims that, even though the problematic relation of anomaly is usually inexplicability, it can consist of inconsistency as well (1991, 18, 270).18

Section 2.2 explained that the dissertation uses the term ‘anomaly confirmationD’

more broadly than Darden’s notion of anomaly confirmation, because the broader use

appears to be less arbitrary. Using the dissertation’s terminology, Darden appears to

18 The dissertation’s analysis of account D1 focuses on what Darden calls “empirical” anomalies (1991, 170), which she contrasts with “conceptual” problems. Although she uses the term ‘anomaly’ throughout her book to refer to empirical anomalies, she also provides an exceptionally broad definition of ‘anomaly’ as any “problem that is a difficulty for an existing theory” (1991, 18). The dissertation will focus on her narrower definition of an anomaly as an empirical problem, because that definition correlates better with her actual use of the term.

emphasize at least two elements of confirmationD. First, she recognizes that researchers must show “the correctness of the anomalous data” (1991, 271). This element includes such activities as justifying experimental protocols and instrumentation and showing that experimental data are replicable. Second, Darden refers to an activity that she calls

“anomaly localization,” which also falls under the dissertation’s definition of anomaly confirmationD. It involves showing that an anomaly falls within the domain of a primary

theory and that the anomaly requires changing the theory itself rather than auxiliary

hypotheses.

The explanatory conclusion of Darden’s account appears to be, therefore, that

after researchers confirmD anomalies by defending their empirical components and

localizing them within the domain of particular theories, they attempt to alter the

problematic theories so that they can explain the anomalies. These alterations could

involve deleting, altering, or adding theory parts. After developing altered forms of the original theory, researchers assess those altered forms. If the altered forms of the theory continually fail to be acceptable, researchers ultimately face the choice of ignoring the anomalies or developing a completely new theory (Darden 1991).

Account D1 appears, therefore, to include the following claims:

(D1DC): A set of experimental data or phenomena, D, is anomalous with respect to a theory, T, iff either (1) statements that describe D (together with auxiliary hypotheses) are inconsistent with one or more statements of T, or (2) T cannot explain D. At least two elements of anomaly confirmationD include: (1) showing “the correctness of the anomalous data” (1991, 271), and (2) showing that the empirical component falls within the domain of the theoretical component.

(D1EC): Anomalies play a role in scientific discovery in the sense that, after researchers confirmD them by defending their empirical components and localizing them within the domain of particular theories, they attempt to

alter the problematic theories (e.g., by deleting, altering, or adding theory components) so that they can explain the anomalies.

Shared Conclusions

Although section 2.4 will identify a number of apparent differences between these five previous accounts of anomaly, they do share a set of core claims in common. Given that this section has argued that all five previous accounts have a “descriptive” conclusion and an “explanatory” conclusion, it should not be surprising that their shared claims can also be summarized in terms of a shared “descriptive” conclusion and a shared

“explanatory” conclusion. These conclusions are, in fact, the characteristics of anomaly presented at the beginning of section 2.2:

Descriptive Conclusion: Scientific anomalies display an empirical component, a theoretical component, and a problematic relation between them. Researchers provide evidence for the problematic relation between the components via a process of anomaly confirmationD.

Explanatory Conclusion: Scientific anomalies are important stimuli for the development of novel scientific hypotheses.

Because these conclusions state only that on which all five previous accounts can agree, they may appear to be fairly trivial. The descriptive conclusion, in particular, provides even less detail than the general definitions of anomaly and anomaly confirmationD that were provided in section 2.2. Nevertheless, it is valuable to identify these shared conclusions, because they serve as the “foundation” for the novel account of anomaly that will be developed in chapters three and four.

2.4: Evaluation of the Previous Accounts

Strengths

This section contains two parts. The first part briefly analyzes the strengths of the previous accounts, and the second considers their weaknesses. Although this analysis admittedly does not provide an exhaustive description of the previous accounts’ strengths and weaknesses, it attempts to provide some motivation for developing a novel account of anomaly in chapters three and four. The first part argues that one of the most salient strengths of the previous accounts is their plausibility as descriptions of actual scientific practice. Their descriptive success applies both to their descriptive conclusions and to their explanatory conclusions. As the response to the “triviality” objection (in section

2.2) explained, however, the five accounts are plausible only in the sense that they describe at least some aspects of some scientific anomalies. Thus, although each account accurately describes particular examples of anomaly, it might also be possible for other accounts to describe the same examples either at different times in the development of the anomaly or under different descriptions of the anomaly.

Let us first consider Popper’s account. His descriptive and explanatory conclusions are plausible descriptions of scientific practice, because (even though he himself did not extensively compare his conclusions to actual instances of anomaly) his conclusions seem to describe some anomalies associated with astronomy and theories of light very well. For example, the anomaly of Uranus’s motion fits his descriptive conclusion: it consists of a phenomenon (namely, planetary motion in a particular path), whose description was inconsistent with the Newtonian theory (together with auxiliary hypotheses). Furthermore, researchers tried to confirmD the anomaly by showing that

auxiliary hypotheses (such as that no other massive bodies interfered with Uranus’s path)

were justifiable. With regard to Popper’s explanatory conclusion, the anomalous light

spot that appeared as a result of Fresnel’s diffraction experiment appears to fit Popper’s

claims. In response to the light-spot anomaly, researchers began to accept and to develop

the alternative wave theory of light.

Next, it is not surprising that Kuhn’s descriptive and explanatory conclusions are

plausible descriptions of scientific practice, because he explicitly argues that his account

fits actual examples of anomaly. Consider, for example, two anomalies that fit his

descriptive conclusion. Roentgen observed an anomalous phenomenon (i.e., a glowing

screen in the vicinity of a cathode ray tube), the description of which was inconsistent

with the current paradigm (as evidenced by scientists’ experimental practice). The

anomaly was at least partially confirmedD both by eliminating potential errors that could

have produced the anomalous results and by researchers’ shift to a paradigm that

acknowledged the existence of X-rays (Kuhn 1970, 57-59). Similarly, Lavoisier (and

other experimentalists, such as Priestley) observed anomalous phenomena in

experimental gas reactions, the descriptions of which were inconsistent with the

phlogiston paradigm. The anomaly was at least partially confirmedD both by researchers’ failure to eliminate the anomaly over an extended period of time (despite efforts to do so) and by their shift to the “oxygen” paradigm (1970, 70). Kuhn (1970, 68) offers two other examples of anomalies that fit his explanatory conclusion. First, as the anomalous predictions of Ptolemaic astronomy became more and more problematic, astronomers such as Copernicus began to search for an alternative astronomical paradigm. Second, as

the anomalous weight gain of calcined substances continued to resist resolution,

researchers such as Lavoisier began to consider alterations in the phlogiston paradigm.

Lakatos’s descriptive and explanatory conclusions are also plausible, because he

shows that they fit the anomalous motion of the perihelion of Mercury, as well as

Michelson’s anomalous failure to observe ether drift. First, as an example of anomaly

that fits his descriptive conclusion, the motion of Mercury’s perihelion was a

phenomenon that went unexplained by the Newtonian paradigm. Furthermore, Lakatos shows that the anomaly was at least partially confirmedD when a rival paradigm (i.e.,

Einstein’s) explained it (1970, 159). Both the Mercury anomaly and the Michelson ether-

drift anomaly exemplify his explanatory conclusion. The Mercury anomaly spurred a

shift to a new paradigm. Michelson’s anomalous results spurred both revisions (by

Lorentz) to the Newtonian paradigm and eventually a shift to a new paradigm.

Because Laudan shows that his account fits the anomalies of Trembley’s

regenerating polyp and of Brownian motion, his descriptive and explanatory conclusions

also appear to be plausible descriptions of scientific practice. The regeneration of

Trembley’s polyp was a phenomenon that went unexplained by vitalist biological theories, and the anomaly was partially confirmedD when alternative theories (namely,

materialist biological theories) appeared to be able to explain it. Similarly, Brownian

motion was a phenomenon that went unexplained by the classical theory of

thermodynamics, and it was partially confirmedD when Einstein and Perrin explained it

with the kinetic-molecular theory of heat (Laudan 1977, 20). As an example of his

explanatory conclusion, Laudan points out that naturalists throughout Europe responded

to the polyp anomaly by attempting to explain its behavior with variations of current

vitalist theories. Also, the anomaly of Brownian motion ultimately spurred scientists to

abandon classical thermodynamics in favor of the kinetic-molecular theory.

Finally, Darden’s descriptive and explanatory conclusions are also plausible

descriptions of scientific practice, because they fit numerous anomalies of Mendelian

genetics that she describes. For example, statements that describe the phenomenon of

63:1 red-versus-white inheritance in wheat were inconsistent with the initial statements of

Mendelian theory (together with auxiliary hypotheses). Furthermore, the anomaly was at

least partially confirmedD by showing that the phenomenon was reproducible. In the

same way, statements of the phenomenon of red-and-white flower breeding that gives rise

to pink flowers in the F1 generation were inconsistent with initial Mendelian theory, which stated that one character of each pair should dominate over the other. The anomaly was again at least partially confirmedD by showing that the phenomenon was

reproducible. These anomalies also support Darden’s explanatory conclusion (see 1991,

65ff). First, the anomalous hereditary ratios (e.g., 63:1) resulted in abandonment of the

initial one-unit-one-character component of Mendelian theory. Second, the anomalous

blending of characters and production of new characters led to the rejection of dominance as a general Mendelian theory component.

Weaknesses

This final part of section 2.4 argues that, in spite of the plausibility of the previous accounts, they have weaknesses both individually and when compared with one another.

First, they face individual weaknesses of ambiguity, incompleteness, and incoherence concerning anomaly components or relations or the process of confirmationD. Consider

Popper, for example. His account of anomaly confirmationD appears to be incomplete,

because he provides inadequate detail concerning the ways researchers corroborate

auxiliary hypotheses. He seems to suggest that scientists accept those auxiliary

hypotheses by convention, but researchers often engage in complex reasoning before

accepting them. For example, Galison (1987) and Mayo (1996, 92ff) recount very

complex reasoning processes by which researchers investigating the anomalous

phenomenon of neutral currents justified some of their auxiliary hypotheses. For

example, the researchers developed computer simulations and statistical analyses in order

to support the auxiliary hypothesis that they were not observing artifacts produced by

some feature of their experimental apparatus.

Although Kuhn provides an insightful and influential account of anomaly, he also

faces at least two individual weaknesses. First, his description of anomaly components

appears to be ambiguous, because he is unclear about the precise general types of

empirical components that anomalies can display (see section 2.3 of this chapter).

Second, his account of anomaly confirmationD is arguably ambiguous. Part of the

problem is that he discusses elements of confirmationD together with sociological and

pragmatic reasons for investigating anomalies but does not distinguish these different

sorts of considerations. Furthermore, he refers to some elements of confirmationD (such as the activity of eliminating errors associated with experimental data) very vaguely (see section 2.3).

Lakatos’s account also appears to be problematic. One particularly noticeable individual weakness is that his description of anomaly confirmationD is arguably

incomplete. He focuses on “theory-dominated” elements of confirmationD such as the

ability of another paradigm to explain the anomaly. He does not, however, emphasize more “experiment-focused” activities such as the elimination of experimental errors and the justification of auxiliary hypotheses. An example is his description of anomalies against Prout’s chemical theory, which stated that the atomic weights of all elements must be expressible in terms of whole numbers, as multiples of the atomic weight of hydrogen (1970, 128-130). Lakatos clearly recognizes that the Proutians could question whether the anomaly is actually confirmedD to a significant extent. For example, he claims that anomalous results depend on “interpretative theories” and that the Proutians could criticize those interpretative theories rather than abandoning their primary theory.

In order to determine when scientists such as the Proutians should consider anomalies to be highly “confirmedD,” however, he focuses almost exclusively on theoretical considerations. He suggests that scientists must try to replace first one theory (e.g., the interpretative one), then another theory (e.g., the primary one), then both theories, and they should choose the new set of theories with the greatest increase in theoretical and empirical content. Therefore, in deciding whether to consider an anomaly significant he does not emphasize more “experiment-focused” considerations such as whether experimentalists have eliminated the likely random and systematic errors associated with the instrumentation and experimental design that produced the anomalous results.

Considered individually, Laudan’s and Darden’s accounts also appear to be problematic. First, Laudan’s account of anomaly components is arguably ambiguous, because it is unclear whether he accepts only “theories” as theoretical anomaly components or also “paradigms” (see section 2.3). Second, his account of anomaly confirmationD appears to be incoherent, because philosophers such as Bechtel (1992)

provide examples of phenomena that are seemingly anomalous for theories even though

no alternative theories have been found that explain the phenomena. Turning to Darden’s

account, it appears to be ambiguous, because she is unclear about the precise general

types of empirical components that anomalies can display (see section 2.3). Furthermore,

section 2.2 argued extensively that her account of anomaly confirmationD is arguably

arbitrary, because it focuses only on defending the empirical component of anomalies.

Although individual analysis of the five previous accounts reveals important

weaknesses, however, it is particularly enlightening to compare them to one another.

That comparison reveals at least two general sorts of weaknesses: a “descriptive”

weakness with their descriptive conclusions, and an “explanatory” weakness with their

explanatory conclusions. Consider first the descriptive weakness:

Descriptive weakness: The descriptive conclusions of the previous accounts appear to be ambiguous and potentially incomplete when they are compared to one another, because they make different claims about the general types that anomaly components and relations display and about the elements of anomaly confirmationD.

One can support the presence of this weakness in previous accounts by considering each

feature of anomaly in turn. Concerning anomaly’s empirical component, Popper, Kuhn,

Lakatos, and Laudan refer to phenomena, whereas Darden may refer to both experimental data and phenomena.19 Thus, the previous accounts of anomaly appear to be

comparatively ambiguous, because the accounts that refer only to phenomena do not

clarify whether they intend to exclude the other general type of empirical component to which Darden may be referring (i.e., experimental data) or whether they merely overlooked it. Furthermore, the previous accounts (other than Darden’s) may be

19 Throughout this comparison of previous accounts, terms such as ‘phenomena’ and ‘experimental data’ are used in accordance with the dissertation’s definitions.

incomplete, if anomalies’ empirical components actually involve both experimental data

and phenomena (and possibly other general types, such as models).

With respect to anomaly’s theoretical component, Popper and Laudan and Darden

seem to refer to theories, whereas Kuhn and Lakatos appear to refer to paradigms. Thus, the previous accounts again appear to be comparatively ambiguous, because they do not clarify whether they intend to include only the general types of theoretical components to which they refer or whether they merely overlooked the other general types mentioned by other accounts. They may also be incomplete, if anomalies’ theoretical components actually involve both theories and paradigms, and possibly even other general types such as models and researchers’ expectations.

Concerning the problematic relation of anomaly, Popper and Kuhn refer to inconsistency, Lakatos refers to inexplicability, and Laudan and Darden refer to both inconsistency and inexplicability. Once again, at least some of the previous accounts appear to be comparatively ambiguous, because Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos do not clarify whether they intend to exclude other general types of anomaly relations or whether they

merely overlooked them. Their accounts may also be incomplete, if anomalies’ relations

actually involve both inconsistency and inexplicability, and possibly other general types

such as incompatibility.

Finally, with respect to anomaly confirmationD, the former accounts emphasize

different elements or activities of confirmationD. Roughly speaking, Popper, Kuhn,

Laudan, and Darden all emphasize the activity of defending the occurrence or description

of an anomaly’s empirical component (e.g., by defending the data yielded by

experiment). Popper also emphasizes the activity of defending the auxiliary hypotheses

that render the empirical component inconsistent with the theoretical component. Kuhn

emphasizes the activity of showing that an anomaly has not been eliminated despite

efforts to eliminate it over an extended period of time (thus providing some evidence that it is the consequence of justifiable experimental procedures, interpretations, and auxiliary hypotheses). Finally, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan emphasize the activity of showing that the anomaly is consistent with or explicable by a rival theory or paradigm (thus supporting the conclusion that the empirical component falls within the domain of the former theory). Thus, the accounts appear to be comparatively ambiguous, because it is not clear whether they intended not to emphasize the elements of confirmationD discussed

by other accounts or whether they merely overlooked them. And, as with the other

features of anomaly, the former accounts may be incomplete, if confirmationD actually includes all the elements mentioned by any of the accounts and possibly other elements that they have not mentioned.20

Comparison of the accounts’ explanatory conclusions yields another,

“explanatory” weakness:

Explanatory weakness: The explanatory conclusions of the previous accounts appear to be incoherent relative to other accounts’ descriptive and explanatory conclusions, because they make conflicting claims about the temporal relationship between the characterization of anomaly and the development of hypotheses in response to the anomaly.

The conflicting claims made by the former accounts take at least two forms. First,

Popper’s, Kuhn’s, Lakatos’s, and Darden’s explanatory conclusions appear to be

20 One might object that it is inappropriate to criticize the former accounts for failing to emphasize all the elements or activities associated with anomaly confirmationD, because they were not trying to provide a complete description of the confirmationD process. They merely recognized that scientists do not immediately consider anomalies to be wholly genuine or significant, and they pointed out some of the reasons for scientists’ initial skepticism. Even if one grants the objection, however, the previous accounts fall prey to a related problem, namely, that they provide only a limited picture of what is involved in an anomaly’s becoming wholly genuine or significant.

incoherent with respect to Laudan’s descriptive conclusion. Laudan’s descriptive

conclusion claims that empirical problems generally become anomalous only after an

alternative theory is available to explain them, whereas Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and

Darden claim that anomalies actually spur the development of the alternative theory.21

Second, Laudan’s and Darden’s explanatory conclusions appear to be incoherent with respect to each other’s explanatory conclusions as well as those of Popper, Kuhn, and

Lakatos. Laudan and Darden propose specific elements of confirmationD as typical

prerequisites for developing novel explanatory hypotheses. For example, Laudan claims

that a rival theory usually must be developed to explain the anomaly, and Darden

suggests that researchers must justify the occurrence of the explanatory component and

the localization of it within the domain of a particular theory. Unfortunately, Laudan and

Darden disagree about those prerequisite elements, and Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos do

not indicate that any one particular element of confirmationD is an essential prerequisite

for developing novel hypotheses in response to anomaly.

In sum, accounts P, K, L1, L2, and D1 appear to provide a valuable foundation for

considering scientific anomaly, but none of them are entirely adequate at present.

Considered individually, they display ambiguities about the features of anomaly and incompleteness concerning the process of anomaly confirmationD. When compared with

one another, they reveal further ambiguity and incompleteness concerning both the

features of anomaly and the elements of anomaly confirmationD. Moreover, they display

incoherence concerning the relationship between the process of anomaly confirmationD

and the development of novel hypotheses in response to the anomalies. Thus, the present

21 Laudan et al. (1992) emphasized this problem.

analysis suggests that it would be valuable to develop an improved account of anomaly,

one which provides a more detailed description of anomaly components, relation, and

confirmationD, together with a careful consideration of the way in which anomalies lead

to the development of scientific hypotheses.

2.5: Conclusion

This chapter provides a novel contribution to the philosophy of science, namely, a

systematic comparison of five major twentieth-century accounts of anomaly. It is

significant for at least four reasons. First, it provides a conceptual framework for

analyzing accounts of anomaly, offering clear definitions for critical terms such as

‘anomaly’ and ‘anomaly confirmationD’. These definitions are valuable because they are general enough to avoid begging questions about the characteristics of anomaly. Second, the chapter describes the five previous accounts’ “descriptive” conclusions (concerning the features of anomaly) and “explanatory” conclusions (concerning the way that anomalies stimulate the development of novel hypotheses). Third, it shows that the previous accounts’ descriptive and explanatory conclusions are plausible descriptions of scientific practice, because they fit actual instances of anomaly. Fourth, the chapter argues that, despite the accounts’ strengths, they face significant weaknesses of incompleteness, ambiguity, and incoherence. Thus, it motivates the attempt to provide a new and improved account of anomaly in chapters three and four.

CHAPTER THREE

CHEMICAL HORMESIS: A CASE STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC ANOMALY

3.1: Introduction

Edward Calabrese, who is perhaps the most influential researcher studying the anomalous toxicological phenomenon of “chemical hormesis,” recently claimed:

It is my feeling that unless toxicologists develop a renewed interest in the concept of hormesis critical progress in many areas will be delayed and the field as a whole will suffer. More important than this, however, is the troubling philosophical question of how a genuine toxicological hypothesis such as hormesis, [sic] could have been eliminated from debate in the most open of modern societies (Calabrese 2002, 189).

Calabrese claims to have found extensive evidence for the hormesis phenomenon, in which very low doses of toxic chemicals and radiation appear to produce an effect that is the opposite of the effect that the chemicals or the radiation produce at higher doses

(Calabrese and Baldwin 1997, 1998b, 1999b, 2003). This phenomenon results in a U- shaped dose-response curve that displays a threshold below which a toxic chemical has either no effects or perhaps even beneficial effects (see Figure 2 on the next page).22 A

22 The dose-response curve for hormetic chemicals is U-shaped, because their biological effects equal control levels at dosages close to zero, their effects drop below control levels as their dosages increase, and then their effects appear to reverse and rise above control levels as the dosages increase further. These U- shaped curves can also be inverted, thus representing low-dose effects that rise above the level of controls and high-dose effects that reverse and drop below controls (see the top curve in figure 2).

Figure 2: Examples of the general form of hormetic dose-response relationships. The bottom curve could represent the relationship between alcohol and human mortality, whereas the top curve could represent the hormetic effects of growth inhibitors on plant growth.

familiar example of this sort of dose-response is the effect of alcohol on human mortality.

Low levels of alcohol consumption decrease human mortality rates below control levels.

Nevertheless, high levels of alcohol consumption increase human mortality rates above control levels. Many other examples of chemical hormesis are more counter-intuitive than the case of alcohol. For example, some evidence exists that plant growth inhibitors may actually increase plant growth when the inhibiting chemicals are present at extremely low levels (Calabrese 1999). Similarly, very low levels of insecticides that are supposed to inhibit reproduction may actually stimulate reproduction (Calabrese and

Baldwin 1998b).

This chapter analyzes the hormesis case in order to determine what it can reveal about the nature of scientific anomaly. Section 3.2 describes the hormesis hypothesis, explains why it is particularly significant for contemporary regulatory policy, and provides an overview of recent research concerning the phenomenon. This section supplies the background for examining the ramifications of hormesis for philosophy of science and ethics throughout the rest of the dissertation. The next two sections of chapter three then analyze the hormesis case as an example of scientific anomaly, using the description of previous accounts of anomaly from chapter two to provide a framework for the analysis. The second chapter of the dissertation argued that one can describe earlier studies of anomaly in terms of a descriptive conclusion (which states the

components of anomaly, the relation between them, and the process of confirmationD)

and an explanatory conclusion (which explains the role of anomaly in the development of

novel hypotheses). Section 3.3 of this chapter analyzes the aspects of the hormesis

anomaly that correspond to the descriptive conclusions of previous accounts. These

features include researchers’ characterizations of the anomaly (which include its

empirical and theoretical components and the relation between them) and the processes

by which they are confirmingD it. Section 3.4 then analyzes the features of the hormesis

anomaly that correspond to the explanatory conclusions of the previous accounts (i.e., the

relationship between the anomaly and the development of novel scientific hypotheses).

Section 3.5 concludes the chapter by arguing that the analysis provided in sections

3.3 and 3.4 is significant for the philosophy of science. Those sections identify three

features of hormesis that have not been emphasized previously, either in this particular

case or in other instances of anomaly: (1) multiple, changing characterizations of the

anomaly, (2) manifold activities or strategies for confirmingD the anomaly, and (3) a

variety of “interactions” between the anomaly and novel hypotheses. Section 3.5 argues

that the failure of previous anomaly accounts to emphasize these three features of

anomaly may have weakened the philosophy of science in at least two ways. One way in

which the failure to emphasize these characteristics may have impoverished the

philosophy of science is that it may have prevented philosophers from recognizing

important factors (such as the development and choice of anomaly characterizations) that

affect the process of scientific discovery. Second, the failure to emphasize these three features of anomaly may have prevented philosophers from identifying significant ways in which value judgments enter into scientific practice (e.g., in the choice to emphasize particular anomaly characterizations over others). Therefore, by carefully analyzing the characteristics of the actual hormesis anomaly, chapter three lays the groundwork for developing a novel description of scientific anomaly (in chapter four) that has the potential to alleviate these weaknesses in previous philosophy of science.

3.2: Overview of Hormesis Research

This section provides a brief summary of the significance of chemical hormesis and the history of scientific research concerning it. The first part describes the regulatory context that contributes to the import of hormesis as a biological hypothesis. The next part then highlights the course of research on the anomaly from the early decades of the twentieth century to the renewal of interest in it in the 1980’s. The final part evaluates the particularly influential studies that Edward Calabrese and Linda Baldwin have recently performed in defense of hormesis.

Regulatory Context for Hormesis Research

Scientists are currently uncertain whether low doses of toxic chemicals are harmful. For over 50 years, toxicologists in the United States have been working to establish standards for safe human exposure to hazardous substances. Unfortunately, low-dose effects are usually small and therefore difficult to measure using statistical studies. Scientists have proposed various models (for a variety of chemicals) that are consistent with the observed data from statistical studies, but these models have very different implications for the extrapolation of low-dose effects (Paustenbach 1989, 82).

For most non-carcinogenic substances, scientists have assumed the existence of threshold doses. In other words, they claim that some dose level exists below which a substance ceases to be toxic. This assumption fits well with the notion that organisms have adaptive capabilities that enable them to respond effectively to low levels of environmental stressors. According to some models of carcinogenesis, however, even

one molecule of a carcinogen increases cancer risk. If such models are correct, this

would mean that no threshold exists, at least for carcinogens. Therefore, it is not

intuitively clear whether or not scientists should predict the effects of toxins using models with a threshold. At present, federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) employ threshold models for estimating the low-

dose effects of most toxins, but they employ linear, no-threshold models for carcinogens

(National Research Council 1994, 31).

The scientific uncertainty surrounding low-dose effects of chemicals contributes

to contemporary policy debates about the regulation of toxins and carcinogens. On one

hand, regulation of chemicals in the environment at very low levels proves to be quite

costly for industry (Calabrese and Baldwin 2003b, Kaiser 2003). For example, according

to estimates developed by the EPA in 1990, roughly 2% of the U.S. gross national

product (about $100 billion dollars per year) is spent on complying with environmental

regulations (Powell 1999, 1).23 These financial challenges are exacerbated when

chemical manufacturers are held legally liable for the harmful effects of toxic chemicals.

Therefore, there are economic incentives to loosen regulation and liability standards for

toxic and carcinogenic chemicals at low doses. This motivation to loosen standards is

strengthened by research that questions the harmfulness of low levels of anthropogenic

chemicals (see e.g., Ames et al. 1987, Efron 1984, Fumento 1993, Safe 2000, Whelan

23 Of course, the costs of environmental regulation may be offset for the nation as a whole by other factors, such as lower health-care costs. For example, the Office of Management and Budget (2003) estimated that environmental regulations enforced by the Environmental Protection Agency between 1992 and 2002 cost between $36 billion and $42 billion annually, but they produced benefits of between $146 and 230 billion annually.

1993). On the other hand, the medical and environmental communities emphasize research that suggests potential dangers associated even with very low environmental levels of some biologically significant chemicals (see e.g., Ashford and Miller 1998,

Colborn et al. 1996, Krimsky 2000, Markowitz and Rosner 2002). They argue that it may be ethically and pragmatically important to tighten regulation and liability standards for certain chemicals at low doses.

Two anomalous toxicological phenomena that researchers are currently investigating (namely, endocrine disruption and multiple chemical sensitivity) provide significant support for current efforts to tighten the regulation of toxic substances. First, some scientists allege that a number of toxins “mimic” hormones such as estrogen or interfere with the endocrine system in a variety of other ways (such as by blocking the production or metabolism of hormones). Because organisms are sensitive to very small changes in hormone levels, especially during development, researchers suggest that very low doses of these “endocrine disrupting” chemicals can cause developmental problems, reproductive cancers, behavioral changes, low sperm counts in male organisms, alteration of immune function, and decline in species populations (see e.g., Birnbaum 1994;

Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1996; Krimsky 2000, NRC 2000). The phenomenon is anomalous because researchers did not expect a wide variety of different toxins with seemingly different structures to bind to the receptors associated with the endocrine system. Although many scientists now believe that some form of endocrine disruption occurs in non-human organisms, the extent to which humans experience similar harmful effects from environmental chemicals is sharply debated (NRC 2000, Safe 2000).

A second significant anomaly associated with low-dose chemical effects has been labeled “multiple chemical sensitivity” (MCS) by many scientists and policy makers (see

Ashford and Miller 1998, Kerns 2001, Kroll-Smith and Floyd 1997). Ashford and Miller

(1998) estimate that 5% or more of the population could suffer from the family of diseases associated with MCS. Individuals affected by this disorder experience an initial

“sensitization” caused either by chronic exposure to toxic chemicals or by an acute exposure to one particular toxin. These individuals subsequently become extremely sensitive to a wide variety of chemicals and suffer chronic neurological, respiratory, and digestive problems.

Although researchers such as Ashford and Miller have provided evidence that

MCS is a real biological phenomenon, it remains anomalous, because many features of it conflict with current toxicological paradigms. For example, scientists cannot currently explain why some individuals would exhibit a non-allergenic response to substances at much lower doses than most other people. Furthermore, the alleged fact that those with

MCS experience adverse effects on many very different physiological systems at once

(e.g., the digestive, endocrine, neurological, and immune systems) does not accord with typical toxicological responses. Finally, some researchers allege that MCS sufferers exhibit “adaptation” responses in which they initially experience severe reactions but then gradually exhibit lessened apparent sensitivity to the toxins (unless they are separated from the chemicals and then re-exposed to them).24 Because of these anomalous features of the phenomenon, because controlled studies of MCS sufferers

24 It is important to emphasize that the lessened sensitivity that MCS sufferers exhibit after being exposed to toxic chemicals for a period of time may be only apparent. It is possible that the patients are still harmed by the toxins but that their obvious symptoms subside.

have produced conflicting results, because no mechanistic pathways have been

conclusively shown to cause the disorder, and because many of the afflicted individuals

exhibit psychological disturbances, many researchers regard the phenomenon as a

psychologically caused “somatization effect” or panic response to toxic chemicals (e.g.,

Black et al. 2000, Escobar et al. 2002, Tarlo et al. 2002, Van den Bergh et al. 1999).

Nevertheless, mounting evidence supports the plausibility of characterizing MCS as a

physiologically caused phenomenon. For example, Gilbert (1995) has shown that

exposure of rats to low doses of chlorinated pesticides can “kindle” components of the

limbic system that other scientists have hypothesized to be associated with MCS (see also

Ashford and Miller 1998, 256ff).25 In another study, Bell (1996) found that women with

chemical intolerances had a higher incidence than controls of physical symptoms that are

associated with sensitization of the amygdala, within the limbic system. Thus, the nature

of the MCS phenomenon and its causes remain uncertain and debated.

Whereas the endocrine-disruption and MCS anomalies support tightened government regulations, the anomaly of chemical hormesis is particularly significant because it could support loosened regulations. For example, a number of scientists have

suggested that the hormesis hypothesis might support allowing public exposure to low

levels of at least some toxic or carcinogenic chemicals (see e.g., Gerber et al. 1999, Lave

2001, Paperiello 1998, Poumadere 2002). These potential ramifications of hormesis for

public policy, together with the influential support of Calabrese, appear to be producing

increased interest in the phenomenon. Calabrese is the author of several textbooks on

toxicology and risk assessment (see Calabrese 1978, 1992, 1993). He is also the

25 “Kindling” refers to a sensitization of particular components of the brain, sometimes leading to seizures.

chairman of the Biological Effects of Low Level Exposures (BELLE) advisory board, a

group of scientists organized to develop a better understanding of biological responses to

low doses of chemical and physical agents.26 Furthermore, he is editor of the publication

Biological Effects of Low Level Exposures, he has organized several conferences related

to hormesis, and he recently published a summary of the hormesis hypothesis in the

journal Nature (Calabrese and Baldwin 2003). His work on hormesis was also recently

highlighted in a news article in Science (Kaiser 2003). Thus, under Calabrese’s

leadership, the hormesis phenomenon is becoming an increasingly important topic of

discussion in regulatory policy.

Early Research on Hormesis

Calabrese and his coworker, Linda Baldwin, have published several articles that

review the history of scientific research on chemical hormesis (see e.g., 2000a, 2000b,

2000c). They, as well as A.R.D. Stebbing (1998), look back to the work of Hugo Schulz

in the 1880’s as an important precursor to contemporary research on hormesis. Schulz

observed stimulatory effects on yeast fermentation when he exposed yeast to low doses

of poisonous substances that inhibit fermentation at higher doses. He and the

homeopathic physician Rudolph Arndt became well known for the claim that toxins in

general produce stimulation (relative to controls) of biological endpoints such as growth

or fertility at low doses (an effect that became known as the Arndt-Schulz law)

26 One should note that the BELLE advisory board, together with its associated journal Biological Effects of Low Level Exposures, is not a completely independent organization. It is heavily funded by industry, including Canadian Electric Utilities, Dow-Corning, the Electric Power Research Institute, Exxon, the GE Foundation, Gillette, Ontario Hydro, and RJReynolds. BELLE has also received some funding from the EPA.

(Calabrese and Baldwin 2000a, 2). In 1896, Ferdinand Hueppe (a distinguished bacteriologist and student of Nobel laureate Robert Koch) published an influential textbook in which he claimed to have observed, in bacteriological studies, the same phenomenon of poisons producing low-dose stimulation (relative to controls) of biological endpoints such as growth or longevity. Calabrese and Baldwin note that, because of Hueppe’s wide international influence, the concept of low-dose stimulation by poisons came to be known more generally as Hueppe’s Rule rather than the Arndt-Schulz law (2000a, 2).

Between the late nineteenth century and the 1930’s, other international research on plants, bacteria, fungi, and yeast also revealed apparent stimulatory effects from low levels of toxic chemicals that produced inhibitory effects at higher dose levels. The toxic substances included metal salts, organic compounds, and pesticides, and they stimulated endpoints such as growth, respiration, bacterial and fungal nitrogen fixation, fungal spore germination, and yeast fermentation. From 1924-1930, a German journal (translated as

Cell Stimulation Research) focused on the publication of such low-dose stimulatory effects (Calabrese and Baldwin 2000a). Southam and Ehrlich (1943) first proposed the term ‘hormesis’ (from the Greek word ‘hormo’, meaning ‘to excite’) in 1943 to describe this phenomenon of low-dose stimulation by toxic substances.27

27 An important ambiguity concerning the use of Southam and Ehrlich’s definition of hormesis is that they explicitly employed only the notion of low-dose stimulation in their definition, but later researchers such as Calabrese and Baldwin (2003) frequently use the term ‘hormesis’ to refer to low-dose inhibition of endpoints such as tumor formation. Section II of this chapter addresses this ambiguity and clarifies the definition of hormesis. For present purposes, however, one can regard hormesis as any occurrence of toxic effects that are beneficial at low doses and harmful at higher doses. Thus, whether a chemical is inhibitory or stimulatory at low doses, as long as it produces beneficial effects relative to controls at low doses and harmful effects relative to controls at higher doses, it is hormetic.

After the initial burst of interest in hormesis throughout the early decades of the

twentieth century, however, toxicologists seemed to lose interest in the phenomenon after the 1940’s. Calabrese and Baldwin have suggested a variety of factors that may have contributed to this lack of interest. First, researchers such as Schulz and Arndt associated hormesis with homeopathy, which was a severely criticized set of medical practices.

Second, the low end of the dose-response curve was not regarded as significant for any practical purposes during the middle decades of the twentieth century. Third, the hormesis phenomenon was not grounded in any evolutionary-based mechanism that could explain its presence. Finally, leading biostatisticians and dose-response modelers interacted primarily with critics rather than proponents of hormesis (Calabrese and

Baldwin 2000b, 37; see also Elliott 2000b, 351).

Interest in hormesis increased once again in the 1980’s and 1990’s, partly because a small number of researchers resumed investigation of it and partly because thinkers recognized its potential ramifications for government regulatory policy. The significance of hormesis for regulatory decisionmaking played an especially important role in the renewed studies of the phenomenon, because it encouraged grants to Calabrese from the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Air Force, the EPA, and the NIEHS. This funding added to the money already provided to his BELLE organization by Canadian

Electric Utilities, Dow-Corning, the Electric Power Research Institute, Exxon, the GE

Foundation, Gillette, Ontario Hydro, and RJReynolds.28 Stebbing had already published

a seminal paper on hormesis in 1982, in which he suggested that low-dose stimulation of

growth or body weight by toxins might be the result of biological overcompensation

28 This information about Calabrese’s funding comes from his curriculum vitae from 2002, which is available online at http://people.umass.edu/nrephc/EJCCVApril02.pdf (accessed November 2003).

responses to disruptions in an organism’s homeostasis (1982). Similarly, Luckey (1982)

suggested that low doses of ionizing radiation appeared to be advantageous. The journal

Health Physics then published an issue (vol. 52, no. 5) with a number of articles related to radiation hormesis in 1987. In that issue, Edward Calabrese and his coworkers attempted to provide a general overview of the evidence for chemical hormesis as well

(Calabrese et al. 1987). Soon after, Davis and Svendsgaard (1990) also drew attention to the occurrence of anomalous dose-response curves that were U-shaped (i.e., reflecting a reversal in the effect of a toxin), although they expressed skepticism about the extent to which those U-shaped curves were the result of any particular mechanism. Following this initial revival of interest in the phenomenon, Calabrese and his coworker Linda

Baldwin performed three extensive literature studies (see Calabrese and Baldwin 1997,

2001, Calabrese 2001b) that merit detailed discussion, because they provide the most extensive evaluations of the evidence for chemical hormesis to date.

Literature Studies by Calabrese and Baldwin

This part of section 3.2 describes and analyzes three literature studies performed by Calabrese and Baldwin. They performed an initial search (1997, 1998b) in which they used keywords associated with hormesis in order to find potentially relevant articles in computer databases. Their search resulted in 8,500 articles, which they manually narrowed down to 585 “potentially relevant” ones that might provide evidence for the hormesis phenomenon.29 They examined the evidence for hormesis in each study using a

29 As Elliott (2000a) argues, an important weakness of Calabrese and Baldwin’s literature search is that they do not clarify the status of the experimental studies that they did not consider to be “potentially relevant” to their investigation for hormesis. It is possible that they ignored a number of studies that

set of a priori qualitative evaluation criteria such as the number of different doses in the

study, the dose range, the reproducibility of apparent hormetic effects, and the statistical

significance of apparent hormetic effects. Based on the evaluation criteria, they found

evidence of hormesis in 350 of the 585 studies. Finally, they reevaluated the 350 studies

using a more objective, quantitative scoring system that assigned point values to the

studies based on the number of doses in the hormetic range, the magnitude of the

hormetic effect, and the number of doses that showed statistically significant effects

above control levels. Calabrese and Baldwin suggested that the “establishment of highly

restrictive, quantitative study design and response criteria permit a more objective

assessment of hormetic dose-response relationships” (1998b, III-10). Whereas they

judged by the qualitative criteria that 82% of the 350 studies showed moderate or high

evidence of hormesis, only 27% of the studies showed moderate to high evidence under

their quantitative evaluative scheme (Calabrese and Baldwin 1998b III-11; see also

Elliott 2000a, 182). One should note, of course, that these 350 studies that provided

evidence for hormesis constituted only a small portion of the 8,500 articles with which

they started, and these studies did not all provide statistical significance tests for their

results.

Calabrese and Baldwin made at least three important claims as a result of their

initial literature search. First, they claimed that chemical hormesis is widely

generalizable in terms of biological endpoint, organism, and chemical class (1998b, 4;

see also Elliott 2000a, 181ff). Second, they suggested (partly on the basis of quantitative

studies that showed apparent hormetic effects on endpoints related to carcinogenesis) that

actually provided convincing evidence against the occurrence of hormesis, but they do not discuss any of the experimental results that failed to provide evidence for the phenomenon.

the process of carcinogenesis may be a hormetic endpoint (1998b, VIII-1; see also Elliott

2000a, 185ff).30 Third, they claimed that “the concept of hormesis is counter to the cancer risk assessment practices by U.S. regulatory agencies such as the EPA, FDA, and

OSHA which assume that cancer risk is linear in the low dose area” (2000b, VIII-1; see also Elliott 2000a, 190ff).

Despite the evidence uncovered in Calabrese and Baldwin’s literature search, however, each of their three claims have been debated. With regard to the first claim

(i.e., the generalizability of hormesis), Elliott (2000a, 182ff) and Crump (2001) point out that Calabrese and Baldwin’s study was not designed such that it could provide evidence for the frequency at which hormesis occurs. For example, even though they found evidence for hormesis in 350 studies, those studies comprise only a tiny fraction of the total number of toxicology studies that have been performed. Furthermore, as Elliott

(2000a) argues, they fail to provide any information about the experimental results collected in their search that did not support the hormesis hypothesis; it is plausible that a number of these studies could have provided evidence against the occurrence of hormesis. Therefore, their results are consistent with the possibility that hormesis could

30 One might question how decreases in the occurrence of cancer could reflect hormesis, because hormesis is defined (at least as Southam and Ehrlich initially formulated the definition) as a low-dose stimulatory effect. The key to resolving this question lies in Elliott’s (2000a) claim that Calabrese and Baldwin do not distinguish clearly between endpoints related to the process of carcinogenesis and the process of carcinogenesis itself. On one hand, if Calabrese and Baldwin are focusing on endpoints related to carcinogenesis (e.g., DNA repair enzyme activity), then it would make sense to claim that the stimulation of those endpoints reflects hormesis. Calabrese and Baldwin would then just be making the (questionable) inference that the stimulation of those endpoints is directly related to an overall decrease in the process of carcinogenesis. On the other hand, if they are treating the entire process of carcinogenesis as the endpoint upon which hormetic effects are observed, then their claim provides an example of scientists using the term ‘hormesis’ to refer to concepts other than low-dose stimulation (a point to be explained further in section II of this chapter). In other words, Calabrese and Baldwin might be conceptualizing hormesis in terms of any U-shaped dose-response curve, whether it be upside-down (thus involving low-dose stimulation) or right-side up (thus involving low-dose inhibition, as in the case of the process of carcinogenesis).

be a very rare phenomenon. Calabrese and Baldwin claim, however, that the relatively small number of studies that exhibit evidence for hormesis could be partially explained by the fact that few studies include appropriate parameters for detecting hormesis (1998b,

IV-2). In other words, because most toxicology studies focus on the effects caused by high levels of toxins, they may not include any doses in the range at which a toxin would be expected to produce hormetic effects. Nevertheless, the precise extent to which invalid study design can account for the lack of evidence for hormesis cannot be decisively determined until researchers begin to design more studies that measure the low-dose effects of toxic substances. Furthermore, even if effects characteristic of hormesis (e.g., opposite effects of toxins at low doses as compared to high doses) do appear frequently in properly formulated studies, Davis and Svendsgaard (1990) and

Elliott (2000b, 360) emphasize that it is not clear whether a single phenomenon is responsible for the variety of U-shaped dose-response curves observed by Calabrese and

Baldwin. Therefore, it may be premature to claim that hormesis is a generalizable phenomenon.

Calabrese and Baldwin’s second claim, that the process of carcinogenesis may be a hormetic endpoint, is also debatable. First, to the extent that Calabrese and Baldwin justify this second claim based on the suggestion that hormesis is a widely generalizable phenomenon and therefore could be expected to apply to carcinogenesis, the questions in the previous paragraph about the generalizability of hormesis raise difficulties for their second claim as well. Nevertheless, Calabrese and Baldwin also support their second claim by appealing to evidence uncovered in their literature search that hormetic effects occur on some endpoints associated with carcinogenesis (e.g., DNA repair enzyme

activity or cell division in the stomach and kidney). As Elliott (2000a, 185ff) suggests,

however, the presence of hormetic effects on some endpoints associated with carcinogenesis is not convincing evidence that hormesis will be observed on dose- response curves that reflect the entire process of carcinogenesis (e.g., cancer-related illness or mortality). Because toxic chemicals frequently produce multiple biological effects at any particular dose level, some effects may prove to be beneficial (i.e.,

hormetic) while others remain harmful. Calabrese and Baldwin themselves note that

“stimulation of detoxifying enzyme levels observed in the larval form of a species would

be evaluated for its hormetic potential even though this increased metabolic activity,

while beneficial in the short-term, may have a detrimental effect on other endpoints”

(2000b, II-5). Furthermore, Yamasaki emphasizes that the effect of a particular chemical

on the process of carcinogenesis cannot be estimated in the absence of other chemicals

that play a role in the process: “the dose-response of initiating agents is influenced by

tumor-promoting agents, and the dose-response of tumor-promoting agents is influenced

by the presence of initiating agents” (1988, 11). Therefore, although investigators may

ultimately find that the entire process of carcinogenesis displays effects of a hormetic

sort, the evidence presented by Calabrese and Baldwin for such effects remains

questionable.

Finally, Calabrese and Baldwin’s third claim, that hormesis runs counter to

current government risk-assessment policy, is also unconvincing based on the evidence

provided in their initial literature search. Davis and Farland (1998) and Elliott (2000a,

191) claim that, even if hormesis occurs, it is not clear that government risk-assessment

policy needs to be changed. They argue that at least five factors should to be considered

before one concludes that hormesis runs counter to risk-assessment policy. First, toxic chemicals may have multiple effects, some of which are hormetic but others of which are not. Second, hormetic effects may occur at much lower doses in sensitive subpopulations than in the general population. Third, hormetic effects in laboratory settings may not occur regularly in real-world environments. Fourth, hormetic effects may be cancelled out as a result of interactive effects of multiple chemicals. Fifth, short-term hormetic effects on single endpoints may not carry over to long-term beneficial effects on an entire organism. Because of these factors, hormesis could occur for a particular toxin on a particular endpoint at a particular dosage, but the toxin might still produce a net harmful effect on a significant number of people at that dose level. Therefore, further argumentation for Calabrese and Baldwin’s third claim appears to be needed.

In response to the criticism that the methodology associated with their first literature search did not provide evidence for the frequency at which chemical hormesis actually occurs, Calabrese and Baldwin performed a second literature search (2001). In the second search, they screened 20,385 articles from the three journals Environmental

Pollution (1970-1998), Bulletin of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology (1966-

1998), and Life Sciences (1962-1998). They used precise a priori entry criteria to identify studies that had designs adequate to display hormetic effects if those effects occurred. For example, the studies needed to have “a concurrent control, a definable toxicity zone with doses greater than the NOAEL [thus insuring that the chemical studied was toxic at high dose levels] … and at least two doses below the NOAEL [thus providing the possibility to detect hormetic effects if they occurred]” (2001, 358). They collected 195 articles (out of the 20,385 screened) that contained 668 dose-response

relationships that met the entry criteria for having the potential to display hormetic

effects.31 Of these 668 dose-response relationships, 245 (37%) of them satisfied evaluative criteria supporting the presence of hormesis. The evaluative criteria required the presence of statistically significant beneficial low-dose effects if the studies determined statistical significance. In the studies in which the researchers did not determine statistical significance, the evaluative criteria required that at least three doses below the NOAEL displayed a 10% increase over controls (2001, 358). Calabrese and

Baldwin concluded that their findings “suggest that hormetic responses are quite common and indeed expected if assessed with the appropriate study design criteria” (2001, 359).

Despite the improvements in the design of Calabrese and Baldwin’s second literature search, some scientists continue to express reservations about the strength of their evidence for the generalizability of hormesis. First, Jonas notes that one cannot be sure about the quality of the data in the studies that Calabrese and Baldwin found.

Furthermore, he emphasizes that the original studies were not designed specifically to test the hormesis hypothesis. He suggests that, in order to rule out numerous potential random and systematic errors, new studies would need to be designed with rigorous attention to the experimental model, homogeneity and sex of animals, laboratory conditions, nutrition, adaptation period, randomization, diluent, pharmacy and manufacturer of toxin, details of the toxic exposure (including time of day and month and volume and route), contamination precaution, positive and negative controls, and

31 In this second literature search, Calabrese and Baldwin were more justified in their failure to provide information about the 20,190 studies that they ignored than they were in their first study, in which they failed to provide information about the experimental results that failed to support the hormesis hypothesis. In the second study, they used a screening technique to “weed out” toxicology studies that were unlikely to provide information about low-dose chemical effects (e.g., because the experiments did not include doses below the “no-observed-adverse-effect-level). Thus, the 20,190 studies that did not meet the screening technique are arguably irrelevant to the hormesis hypothesis.

appropriate statistical analysis (2001, 628). Second, Gentile (2001), Menzie (2001), and

Roberts (2001) all emphasize that the U-shaped dose-response curves observed by

Calabrese and Baldwin could be the result of many different processes produced by very

different mechanisms. Therefore, any claims concerning the generalizability of

“hormesis” as a particular phenomenon remain problematic, because it is not clear

exactly what phenomena underlie the U-shaped dose-response curves observed in the

literature search. Third, Roberts (2001) argues that one should qualify Calabrese and

Baldwin’s frequency data (i.e., their data that hormesis occurred in 37% of appropriately

designed studies). Roberts claims that, when one considers the regulatory ramifications

of hormesis and its generalizability, one should consider the frequency of hormetic dose-

response curves relative to all dose-response curves (including those in which a health effect is relatively rare, and therefore unlikely to exhibit hormetic effects). Calabrese and

Baldwin examined the frequency of hormetic dose-response curves only relative to dose- response curves in which control effects were high enough that hormetic effects were likely to be observed. Therefore, the figure of 37% may suggest an inflated notion of the frequency at which hormesis could be relevant to regulation.

Although Calabrese and Baldwin have not yet responded to all these concerns,

Calabrese has performed a third literature search in which he investigated a possible mechanism for hormetic effects. Starting in the early 1980’s, A. R. D. Stebbing (1982,

1998) suggested that chemical hormesis might involve feedback processes that result in temporary overcompensation for environmental stressors (1982). In other words,

Stebbing suggested that, immediately after a hormetic toxin is administered, a linear or threshold model may capture the relationship between the dose of the toxin and its effect.

He argued, however, that organisms’ defense mechanisms might later “kick in” and

overcompensate to the stressor (at low doses), thus gradually changing the linear curve to

a U-shaped dose-response curve for a period of time. Finally, he suggested that the

overcompensation response might wear off after an extended period of time, thus

returning the U-shaped dose-response curve to a linear or threshold curve (see Figure 3).

In order to investigate the extent to which hormesis might be the result of overcompensation effects, Calabrese surveyed previous biological and toxicological

studies that included both low doses and multiple time points. Although he notes that

few previous studies met these two criteria, he found 40 dose-time responses that

appeared to involve overcompensation to stressors. The effects occurred with a variety of

biological models (e.g., mice, rats, dog livers, peppermint plants, yeast), endpoints (e.g.,

growth, locomotion, immune response, hormone levels), and toxins (e.g., metal salts,

organic solvents, and disinfectants). He concluded: “The overcompensation responses, as seen in such a diverse set of biological systems and with a broad range of inducing agents as presented here, have been shown to be both highly reproducible and significant”

(2001b, 461-465). Nevertheless, he also found evidence that the toxins in some studies produced hormetic effects because they affected different receptor subtypes at different concentrations. In other words, some toxins appeared to have differential affinity for distinct but related receptor subtypes, so the toxins bound to different receptors depending on the toxin concentration. Therefore, the opposite effects produced by the toxin at low and high doses were the result of the toxins’ binding preferentially to different receptors (which produce opposite effects on a particular biological endpoint) at different concentration levels. This finding that toxins might have differential affinity for

Figure 3: Example of the temporal dependence of the dose-response relationships characteristic of “overcompensation hormesis.” The dose-response curve at Time 1 demonstrates how a toxin may initially inhibit a biological endpoint at all dose levels. At Time 2, the organism has overcompensated to the toxin, so the endpoint is stimulated above controls at low-dose levels. At Time 3, the overcompensation has begun to subside, and the endpoint is returning to homeostasis at low-dose levels.

distinct but related receptor subtypes suggested that other processes besides overcompensation might be responsible for the production of some U-shaped dose- response curves. Calabrese acknowledged, “[T]his process [i.e., of toxins acting on distinct receptor subtypes] may not be so much an overcompensation response as it is biological assurance to achieve an efficient return to homeostasis” (2001b, 465).

In sum, none of Calabrese and Baldwin’s three literature studies appear to provide conclusive evidence for the generalizability of hormesis as a particular biological phenomenon, but they have stimulated widespread contemporary interest in the phenomenon. Several journals, including the Journal of Applied Toxicology (vol. 20,

2000), Human and Experimental Toxicology (vol. 19, no. 1, 2000; vol. 20, no. 3, 2001; vol. 21, no. 2, 2002), Critical Reviews in Toxicology (vol. 31, nos. 4 and 5, 2001), and

Human and Ecological Risk Assessment (vol. 7, no. 6, 2001), have devoted issues or parts of issues to the discussion of chemical hormesis. Furthermore, articles discussing evolutionary approaches to the hormesis phenomenon by Gerber et al. (1999) and

Parsons (2001) have recently appeared in the Quarterly Review of Biology, with the famous evolutionary biologist George C. Williams as a coauthor on the 1999 paper.

Calabrese, Baldwin, and Holland (1999), Juni and McElveen (2000), Lave (2000, 2001),

Chapman (2001), Cross (2001), Jayjock and Lewis (2002, and Poumadere (2002), among others, have published recent articles concerning the regulatory ramifications of hormesis. Finally, Calabrese and Baldwin (2003) recently discussed the hormesis hypothesis in the journal Nature, and Jocelyn Kaiser (2003) has published a news report on the phenomenon in Science. Therefore, the time appears ripe for a deeper exploration

of current research on chemical hormesis and the nature of the phenomenon as a scientific anomaly.

3.3: Analysis of the Hormesis Anomaly Relative to Previous Descriptive Conclusions

The first section of this chapter provided an overview of previous and contemporary research concerning the hormesis phenomenon. Given this background, section 3.4 analyzes the actual hormesis anomaly relative to the descriptive conclusions of the five previous accounts of anomaly that were examined in chapter two. Chapter two argued that the former descriptive conclusions appear to suffer from ambiguity and incompleteness, partly because they make conflicting claims about the components of anomalies and the relations between them. One example is that Kuhn appears to claim that anomalies consist of phenomena that conflict with paradigms (1970), whereas

Darden seems to think that anomalies consist of either experimental data or phenomena that conflict with theories (1991). Nevertheless, chapter two argued that one can still formulate a descriptive conclusion that all the previous accounts would share:

Shared Descriptive Conclusion: Scientific anomalies display an empirical component, a theoretical component, and a problematic relation between them. Researchers provide evidence for the problematic relation between the components via a process of anomaly confirmationD.

In an effort to provide an improved account of anomaly, this section examines the characteristics of the hormesis case relative to the understandings of anomaly provided by the descriptive conclusions of previous accounts. The two parts of the section correspond to the two crucial features of the former accounts’ descriptive conclusions (i.e., anomaly characterizations and the process of anomaly confirmationD). The first part provides a novel examination of the multiple ways in which researchers have characterized the

hormesis anomaly in terms of an empirical component, a theoretical component, and a

problematic relation between them. It then argues that the multiplicity of

characterizations in the hormesis case is a feature of anomaly that was not emphasized by

previous accounts. The second part provides a new analysis of the multiple ways in

which researchers have attempted or may attempt (in the future) to confirmD the hormesis anomaly. It argues that the statements about anomaly confirmationD in previous accounts

of anomaly do not adequately emphasize the multiplicity of strategies that researchers

have employed for confirmingD the hormesis anomaly. The concluding section (3.5) of

the chapter argues that this analysis of characterizations and confirmationD in the

hormesis case is significant, because it has the potential to alleviate weaknesses in

previous philosophy of science concerning its descriptions of scientific discovery and of

the role that value judgments play in scientific practice.

Characterizations of the Hormesis Anomaly

This part of section 3.3 analyzes researchers’ characterizations of the hormesis

anomaly. First, it argues that scientists appear to be employing not one characterization

but rather multiple characterizations and that their preferred ones change over time.

Second, it responds to three objections that question whether scientific researchers or the

dissertation can coherently refer to multiple characterizations of a single anomaly. Third,

this part argues that the previous accounts of anomaly that were described in chapter two

do not emphasize the extent to which the hormesis anomaly exhibits multiple

characterizations.

Multiple Characterizations. Any attempt to analyze how researchers are

characterizing the hormesis anomaly is plagued by the fact that they do not appear to be

employing one particular characterization. In order to address this difficulty, it seems

most appropriate to provide a tentative (neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive)

summary of sixteen particularly important sets of characterizations that are being

employed by current scientists. A list of them appears in appendix one at the end of the

dissertation. The first two sets of characterizations (groups 1 and 2 in the appendix) both

have a set of experimental data as the empirical component. These two groups

characterize the hormesis anomaly in terms of an inconsistency relation between

statements that describe a set of data from one or more experiments on one hand and statements that describe researchers’ expectations for those data on the other hand. For example, researchers such as Vichi and Tritton (1989) appeared to regard the results of their experiments as anomalous in this sense. Davis and Svendsgaard (1990) also reported numerous experiments that displayed anomalies of this sort. Jonas (2001) and

Razzaghi and Loomis (2001) seemed to regard the U-shaped data sets from multiple previous toxicology studies as anomalous in this regard, because they did not expect such a large number of U-shaped data sets. The surprising data described in these characterizations could provide varying degrees of support for the occurrence of a generalizable hormesis phenomenon, depending on whether the data points provided just any evidence for beneficial effects or whether they provided statistically significant

evidence for beneficial effects (see the variations among the characterizations in group 1,

D-E, in the appendix). The data might provide even greater support for hormesis if they

consisted of statistically significant data points from multiple experiments rather than

from just one experiment. Furthermore, different experiments might test for hormetic

effects with different chemicals, organisms, and endpoints. Thus, depending on which

sets of data a researcher selects, one could formulate many different characterizations of the hormesis anomaly (see group 2 (DS1-E and DS2-E) in the appendix).

In other characterizations of the hormesis anomaly (such as groups 3 through 14),

a phenomenon is the empirical component.32 Elliott (2000b) argues, however, that

current researchers do not agree about how to define the phenomenon of hormesis

precisely. Instead, he claims that they are employing multiple concepts for it. Three broadly “operational” concepts for the phenomenon include: (1) “U-shaped-dose- response-curve hormesis,” (2) low-dose-stimulation/high-dose-inhibition hormesis,” and

(3) “beneficial hormesis.” Two other, “mechanistic” concepts are: (4)

“overcompensation hormesis” and (5) “multiple-effects hormesis.”33 According to the

first concept (U-shaped-dose-response-curve hormesis), the phenomenon consists of “any

non-spurious biological effect of a chemical that produces opposite effects at higher

doses” (2000b, 354). The resulting effect produces a U-shaped dose-response curve,

because the effects are close to controls at very low doses and then begin to differ from

controls as the dosage increases, until the effects reverse at still higher doses (see Figure

1). This concept occurs either explicitly or implicitly throughout the literature on

hormesis (see, e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 1998c, 353, Davis and Svendsgaard 1990,

32 The term ‘phenomenon’ is used here in the technical sense described in chapter two. In other words, it describes a generalizable event that can be predicted by a theory and for which the data in particular experiments provide evidence (see Hacking 1983, Bogen and Woodward 1988, Woodward 2000). 33 For the purposes of the dissertation, an operational concept can be defined as one that is defined in terms of its criteria of application, which in the case of hormesis involves the measurement of some biological endpoint. A mechanistic concept involves the isolation of a system in which hormetic phenomena are produced by the interaction of parts according to causal laws (see e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 1993, Bridgman 1927, Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, Wimsatt 1976).

Johnson and Bruunsgaard 1998, 263). Based on this concept, some researchers appear to characterize the hormesis anomaly as an inconsistency relation between statements that describe occurrences of the phenomenon of “U-shaped-dose-response-curve hormesis”

(henceforth, “U-shaped hormesis”) on one hand and statements that describe dose- response models that do not incorporate U-shaped responses on the other hand. One could employ a variety of characterizations that follow this general pattern, depending on the particular chemicals, organisms, and endpoints on which one alleged that the U- shaped dose-response curves occurred (see group 3, U-M, in the appendix).

The fourth set of characterizations that employ the phenomenon of U-shaped hormesis uses physiological theories (rather than dose-response models) as the theoretical component (see group 4, U-T, in the appendix). They consist of an inexplicability relation between the phenomenon of U-shaped hormesis and the group of physiological theories that fail to explain the occurrence of the phenomenon. According to scientists who employ this characterization (e.g.,Calabrese and Baldwin 1997, 1998, 1999), the anomaly is the inability of the group of theories that explain the effects of toxins (i.e., theories that describe toxins’ modes of action and theories that describe organisms’ defense responses to the toxins) to explain the phenomenon of U-shaped hormesis. Once again, these characterizations vary, depending on the specific chemicals, endpoints, and organisms in which U-shaped hormesis was alleged to occur. Furthermore, if researchers began to find evidence that one particular theory (e.g., a theory that describes organisms’ defense responses to toxins) was at fault for the anomaly, they might propose a more specific set of characterizations that employ that specific theory as the theoretical component (see group 5, U-TS).

As Elliott (2000b) argued, however, researchers employ other “operational”

concepts for the hormesis phenomenon besides “U-shaped hormesis.” For example, a

number of scientists appear to employ characterizations of hormesis that resemble groups

U-M, U-T, and U-TS but that replace the concept of U-shaped hormesis as the empirical

component with the concept of “low-dose-stimulation/high-dose-inhibition hormesis”

(henceforth, “low-dose-stimulation hormesis”). Low-dose-stimulation hormesis consists

of low-dose stimulatory effects that are produced by a chemical that engenders inhibitory

34 effects at higher doses. Characterizations that resemble U-M, U-T, and U-TS but that

employ the concept of low-dose-stimulation hormesis are employed by Southam and

Ehrlich (1943), Calabrese and Baldwin (1998b), and Foran (1998) (see group 6, including

L-M, L-T, and L-TS in the appendix). Still other characterizations resemble groups U-M,

U-T, and U-TS but employ Elliott’s concept of “beneficial hormesis” (see group 7,

including B-M, B-T, and B-TS). Beneficial hormesis consists of a beneficial effect produced by a chemical that produces harmful effects at higher doses.35 Researchers who explicitly or implicitly employ this concept include Gerber, Williams, and Gray (1999),

Teeguarden et al. (1998), and Turturro et al. (1998). Although Elliott did not provide further specification of the concept of beneficial hormesis in his article, one might also formulate a related concept, called “net-beneficial-hormesis.” An effect would qualify as an instance of net-beneficial-hormesis if and only if it consisted of an instance of

34 The distinction between U-shaped hormesis and low-dose-stimulation hormesis might not appear to be significant, but a number of researchers refer to hormesis specifically as the production of stimulatory effects at low doses by chemicals that produce inhibitory effects at higher doses (see e.g., the original definition of hormesis in Southam and Ehrlich 1943). Low-dose-stimulation hormesis is a subset of U- shaped hormesis, but it excludes cases in which a toxin produces inhibitory effects at low doses and stimulatory effects at higher doses. 35 The concept of beneficial hormesis is again very similar to the concepts of U-shaped and low-dose- stimulation hormesis, but beneficial hormesis stipulates that the low-dose effect of a hormetic toxin must produce not merely an opposite effect or a stimulatory effect but a beneficial effect.

beneficial hormesis and the beneficial effect also resulted in a net benefit to an

organism’s health (rather than merely a beneficial effect on one particular endpoint).

Gerber, Williams, and Gray (1999) hint that they may employ characterizations that

resemble U-M, U-T, and U-TS but that employ the concept of net-beneficial hormesis

(see group 8, including BN-M, BN-T, and BN-TS).

Other researchers (e.g., Stebbing 1982, 1998, Calabrese and Baldwin 1998, 1999)

appear to employ characterizations of the hormesis anomaly that employ one of the

“mechanistic” concepts described by Elliott (2000b). For example, Elliott defines

“overcompensation hormesis” as “a biological response in which processes are stimulated

to above-normal levels in an attempt to restore organismal homeostasis after it is altered

by a toxic chemical” (2000b, 356).36 Thus, one might employ characterizations of the

hormesis anomaly that parallel groups U-M, U-T, and U-TS but that replace the phenomenon of U-shaped hormesis with that of overcompensation hormesis as the empirical component of the anomaly (see group 9, including O-M, O-T, and O-TS). In

the future, it is plausible that researchers could also provide a more detailed description

of these overcompensation processes, perhaps including the specific mechanisms that

result in the overcompensation effect. Thus, one might be able to formulate other

characterizations that parallel groups O-M, O-T, and O-TS but that employ a specific description of the mechanism that constitutes the empirical component (see groups 10 and 11, including OS-M, OS-T and OS-TS).

36 One might question whether the phenomenon of overcompensation is actually mechanistic. The appropriate response seems to be that, even though overcompensation does not involve one particular mechanism, it is broadly mechanistic in that it describes a family of related mechanisms that might be responsible for hormetic effects.

Scientists such as Calabrese and Baldwin (1999) and Stebbing (1982, 1998) appear to have employed characterizations of the hormesis anomaly that employ at least two other mechanistic concepts of the phenomenon. First, Elliott describes another concept, “multiple-effects hormesis,” as “a low-dose effect, opposite to that which occurs at higher doses, that is caused by multiple biological effects of a chemical influencing the same endpoint in different ways at different dose levels” (2000b, 360). On the basis of this concept, one might characterize the hormesis anomaly as an inconsistency relation between the frequency at which multiple-effects hormesis occurs and researchers’

expectations about the frequency with which it occurs (see group 12, M-E). In other

words, researchers may have assumed that toxins only occasionally produce opposite

effects on an endpoint as a consequence of the toxins’ multiple biological effects. Thus,

it would be anomalous that these sorts of effects occur with a high frequency. Other

researchers, especially in the early twentieth century, suggested that hormesis might be

the same sort of phenomenon as homeopathy, even though they were not sure precisely

how to characterize homeopathy itself (see, e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 2000).

According to this characterization of hormesis, it would be an inconsistency relation

between statements that describe the phenomenon of hormesis (i.e., homeopathy) and

statements that describe the current paradigms of chemistry, physics, and toxicology,

which run counter to homeopathic phenomena (see group 13, H-P).37

37 Homeopathic medicine is based on treating people’s symptoms of illness by exposing them to small doses of substances that would produce their symptoms at higher doses. This medical approach is anomalous for at least two reasons. First, current physiological theories do not explain how low doses of toxic substances could relieve illnesses. Second, homeopathic physicians claim that their remedies are helpful even when they are diluted to the point that not even one molecule of the homeopathic remedy is left in solution! Such an effect is anomalous with respect to the paradigms of contemporary chemistry, physics, and toxicology (all of which presuppose that solutions cannot retain the effects of substances that are no longer present).

A fourteenth set of characterizations constitute a subset of groups that have

already been mentioned but that are important to set apart because of their unique

regulatory importance. Calabrese and Baldwin (1998a, 1998b) have made the

speculative claim that carcinogenic chemicals might produce hormetic effects on

endpoints that reflect the entire process of carcinogenesis or that are at least associated

with the process of carcinogenesis. (Elliott (2000a) argues that Calabrese and Baldwin

do not clearly distinguish whether they are referring to endpoints that reflect the entire

process of carcinogenesis (e.g., cancer-related mortality) or endpoints that are merely

associated with the process of carcinogenesis, such as DNA-repair enzyme activity or the

promotion of tumor growth.) One might suggest that Calabrese and Baldwin are

concerned with a particular set of characterizations that involve an inconsistency relation

between statements that describe hormetic effects on endpoints that reflect the entire

process of carcinogeness and statements that describe linear-no-threshold dose-response

models (see group 14, C-M). Depending on whether one conceptualized “hormetic”

effects as the occurrence of a U-shaped dose response, a beneficial (or net beneficial)

effect, an overcompensation phenomenon, or the result of multiple biological effects by a

chemical, the characterizations in group C-M could be subsets of groups U-M, B-M, BN-

M, O-M, OS-M, or L-M. The purpose of setting apart the characterizations in group C-M

is that they appear to have particularly significant ramifications for regulatory policy. In

other words, if regulatory policy concerning carcinogens is to be changed, it appears to be

particularly important to confirmD not just any characterizations of the hormesis anomaly

but rather characterizations that refer to policy-relevant endpoints (such as cancer-related

mortality), as C-M does.

Finally, still other, “auxiliary” characterizations (see groups 15 and 16) employ

auxiliary hypotheses or assumptions as the theoretical component rather than a primary

theory, model, or paradigm. These characterizations do not seem to be very important to

emphasize in the hormesis case, because the presence of auxiliary hypotheses and

assumptions associated with anomalies has already been emphasized by many

philosophers of science (see e.g., Duhem 1954, Laudan 1997, Mayo 1997). Nevertheless,

one example of a crucial auxiliary characterization in the hormesis case would be a

relation of inconsistency between statements that describe U-shaped data from a

particular experiment and statements that describe the assumption that the experiment

38 has been properly controlled (see group 15, D-A1). Another auxiliary characterization would be a relation of inconsistency between statements that describe U-shaped data from a particular experiment and statements that describe the assumption that the organisms under investigation were not unwittingly exposed to substances that interfered

with the effects of the toxin being studied (see group 16, D-A2). These auxiliary

characterizations reflect the possibility that the hormesis anomaly is merely a fluke result

or the consequence of inadequate experimental design. Davis and Svendsgaard (1998),

Jonas (2001), and Menzie (2001) suggest that one or more of these auxiliary

characterizations of hormesis may be appropriate.

Objections to Discussing Multiple Characterizations of Hormesis. Before

turning to the argument that previous accounts fail to emphasize the multiple

38 Note that the inconsistency relation between the empirical component (i.e., U-shaped data) and the theoretical component (i.e., the assumption that the experiment has been properly controlled) depends on other assumptions, such as that properly controlled toxicology experiments do not yield U-shaped data. The dependency of the anomalous relation in this characterization on other assumptions is no different from any other characterization of an anomaly, however.

characterizations of anomaly that are present in the hormesis case, this section must

address three objections against the dissertation’s discussion of multiple characterizations

of the hormesis anomaly. The first, “imprecision,” objection is a criticism directed

primarily at the scientific researchers investigating hormesis. The objection is that scientists should not employ multiple characterizations of a single anomaly, because it appears to reveal a lack of precision and conceptual clarity. The second, “distinction,” and third, “confusion,” objections criticize the dissertation itself for being imprecise in its description of hormesis characterizations. The distinction objection is that the preceding

list of sixteen hormesis characterizations is problematic, because this chapter has not

provided an explanation for how one is to distinguish multiple characterizations of the

same anomaly from characterizations of different anomalies. Finally, the confusion

objection is that, given the multiple characterizations of hormesis employed by current

researchers, it is not clear that the dissertation can employ the term ‘chemical hormesis’

without creating confusion about the precise phenomenon to which it is referring.

First, the imprecision objection states that scientific researchers should not

employ multiple characterizations of a single anomaly, because it reflects a lack of

precision, clarity, and coherence. An initial response to this objection is that anomalies

are generally mysterious and poorly understood, so it seems reasonable and unavoidable

for researchers to describe them in more than one way (Collins and Evans 2002, Collins

and Pinch 1993, Kuhn 1970). A second response to the imprecision objection is that

scientists can often work successfully despite a significant degree of conceptual

confusion (see Elliott 2000b). For example, empirical work on the units of selection in

evolutionary biology and on the nature of the gene in molecular biology provide excellent

examples of productive scientific work that nevertheless suffer from conceptual confusion (see e.g., Sober and Wilson 1998, Waters 1990). A third response to the imprecision objection is that there appear to be at least three reasons that researchers can employ multiple characterizations of an anomaly such as chemical hormesis without being imprecise or unclear. The first reason that one can employ multiple characterizations without being incoherent or imprecise is that some characterizations may be only proposed, rather than accepted. For example, it might be incoherent for

Calabrese and Baldwin to accept two characterizations of the hormesis anomaly simultaneously (e.g., characterizations that employ different empirical components, such as the phenomenon of overcompensation hormesis and the phenomenon of multiple- effects hormesis). Nevertheless, it would not be incoherent for them to propose both characterizations of the anomaly as possibilities, recognizing that only one characterization could ultimately turn out to be justifiable.

A second reason that researchers may be able to employ multiple characterizations of the hormesis anomaly without being imprecise or unclear is that some characterizations do not conflict with one another. For example, one could accept some operational descriptions of the anomaly (such as group 3, U-M, in the chapter’s appendix) as well as mechanistic accounts of it (such as group 9, O-M, O-T, and O-TS).

In other words, a characterization that describes the anomaly’s empirical component as a

U-shaped dose-response curve could be compatible with a characterization that describes the empirical component as an overcompensation effect, because the overcompensation effect might result in a U-shaped dose-response curve. Two characterizations would also be compatible with one another if they apply to different instances of hormesis. For

example, one might conclude that some cases of hormesis (such as the effects of

phosphon on peppermint plant growth (Calabrese 1999)) constitute anomalous

overcompensation effects whereas other instances of hormesis (e.g., the effects of alcohol

on human mortality) are the result of multiple biological effects of a single chemical. Or,

if one employs a characterization of the hormesis anomaly that refers to it as any

occurrence of a U-shaped dose-response curve, one might also employ more specific

characterizations that refer only to U-shaped dose-response curves for endpoints that

reflect the entire process of carcinogenesis. The specific “sub-anomaly” of U-shaped

curves for endpoints related to carcinogenesis could turn out to be a significant characterization, because it has particularly important ramifications for public policy.

A third reason that researchers could employ multiple characterizations of the hormesis anomaly without being imprecise is that they might accept the different characterizations at different times (rather than at the same time). For example, researchers appear to have shifted their characterizations of the hormesis anomaly as different ones became plausible. Initially, Calabrese emphasized characterizations that employed the operational concept of low-dose-stimulation hormesis (see Calabrese and

Baldwin1998b). After further research, he started to emphasize characterizations that employed the mechanistic concept of overcompensation hormesis (Calabrese 1999).

Most recently, he has begun to downplay the concept of overcompensation hormesis in favor of broader characterizations that describe hormesis operationally (Calabrese and

Baldwin 2002b).39 Thus, even if it would be incoherent for one researcher to accept two

39 The reason for Calabrese’s shift back to an operational characterization of hormesis in his most recent work (Calabrese and Baldwin 2002) appears to be the consequence of his recent literature study (Calabrese 2001b), which indicated that not all hormetic effects involve overcompensation processes.

different characterizations of the hormesis anomaly at the same time, it might be reasonable for that scientist to shift from accepting the first characterization to accepting the second characterization after showing that the second one is more plausible than the first. Similarly, different researchers might employ distinct characterizations of the anomaly if they disagree about which ones have been adequately justified. For example,

Calabrese and Baldwin (1998b) concluded that their first literature study justified characterizing the hormesis anomaly as the production of low-dose-stimulation hormesis

(e.g., characterizations in groups L-M or L-T), but Crump (2001) argued that the anomaly could justifiably be described only as the production of an anomalous set of data (e.g., characterizations in group D-E).

In addition to the imprecision objection, however, a second, “distinction,” objection to the dissertation’s use of multiple characterizations for hormesis is that the chapter has not provided an adequate means for distinguishing characterizations of the same anomaly from characterizations of different anomalies. For example, an objector might argue that each anomaly characterization technically refers to a different anomaly, because an anomaly is defined in terms of its empirical component, its theoretical component, and the relation between them, and each characterization has a slightly different combination of empirical and theoretical components. In response, however, the dissertation presupposes that one can regard anomaly characterizations as referring to roughly the same anomaly if they refer to approximately the same empirical and theoretical components (even using somewhat different descriptions or concepts). As

Thomas Nickles claims with respect to scientific problems in general, “every little change

in constraints does not amount to an essential change of problem. Problem similitude is a matter of degree” (1988, 54).

In order to justify the dissertation’s approach of considering anomaly characterizations to refer to the same anomaly if they have approximately the same components, it is necessary to provide some criteria for considering components to be similar. Consider the following list of seven different factors, each of which would count in favor of considering two characterizations to be descriptions of the same anomaly. (a)

Both empirical components could be sets of data, and both data sets could include many of the same or very similar experimental results. (b) The empirical component of one characterization might be a phenomenon, P, and the empirical component of the other characterization might be a set of data that provides evidence for the occurrence of phenomenon P. (c) The empirical components of both characterizations could be phenomena, and the occurrence of each phenomenon could be supported by many of the same sorts of experimental data (even if each characterization employs somewhat different concepts for describing the phenomena). (d) The theoretical component of one characterization might be researchers’ expectations, and the theoretical component of another characterization might be a model or theory that predicts those expectations. (e)

The theoretical component of both characterizations might be a group of theories, and both theoretical components might include many of the same theories. (f) The theoretical component of one characterization could be a group of theories, and the other theoretical component could be a single theory from that group. (g) The theoretical component of one characterization might be a theory, and the other theoretical component might be a specific part of that same theory. This is a non-exhaustive list of the sorts of factors that

one could consider in determining whether two characterizations are sufficiently similar

to count as descriptions of the same anomaly.

Consider how one could use these seven factors to justify the claim that the

characterizations of hormesis previously discussed in this section refer to the same

anomaly. On the basis of factor (a) (namely, that two empirical components have the

same or similar data), groups 1 and 2 (both of which consist of experimental data that are

inconsistent with researchers’ expectations) arguably refer to the same anomaly.

Specifically, characterizations in groups 1 and 2 have the same theoretical components

(i.e., researchers’ expectation that chemicals do not produce opposite effects at different

dose levels) and very similar empirical components (namely, U-shaped data sets that vary

primarily in their magnitude and in the experimental systems from which they were

gathered). Based on factor (b) (i.e., that the data from one empirical component provide evidence for the phenomenon of another empirical component) and (d) (i.e., that a model from one theoretical component predicts researchers’ expectations from another component), the first two groups of anomaly characterizations also refer to the same anomaly as group 3 (which has as its components the phenomenon of U-shaped-dose- response-curve hormesis and the dose-response models that do not predict that phenomenon). Consider two reasons that group 3 arguably refers to the same anomaly as groups 1 and 2. First, the data that serve as the empirical component in groups 1 and 2 provide evidence for the occurrence of U-shaped-dose-response-curve hormesis, which is the phenomenon that is the empirical component of group 3. Second, the theoretical component from group 3 (namely, LNT dose-response models) predicts the research

expectations (i.e., a lack of opposite effects produced by a single toxin) that serve as the theoretical component of groups 1 and 2.

One could use similar reasoning to show that all sixteen characterizations of hormesis refer to roughly the same anomaly. Therefore, because one could use considerations such as the dissertation’s list of seven factors to provide a reasonable

argument that particular anomaly characterizations are very similar to one another, it does

not seem inherently problematic for the dissertation to claim that multiple

characterizations could refer to roughly the same anomaly. It is important to recognize,

however, that the decision that two characterizations refer to the same anomaly cannot be

reduced to an algorithm, because different people may give varying weight to different

factors or appeal to slightly different considerations in different cases.40

A third, “confusion,” objection to the chapter’s description of multiple hormesis

anomaly characterizations is that the terms ‘chemical hormesis’ or ‘the hormesis

anomaly’ are likely to create ambiguity and misunderstandings throughout the rest of the dissertation if a more specific definition for the anomaly cannot be supplied. This problem can be resolved, at least in part, by specifying the particular characterization of hormesis that is being discussed at any particular point in the dissertation. A further response to this worry is to provide a working definition of “hormesis” that can cover cases when a specific characterization has not been specified. The dissertation will tentatively define ‘chemical hormesis’ as a beneficial low-dose effect (on a biological endpoint) caused by a non-essential chemical that produces harmful effects on the

40 Because distinguishing characterizations of the same anomaly from those of different anomalies requires weighing multiple considerations, it resembles scientific theory choice, which is another scientific decision that appears to require weighing multiple values (see e.g., Brown 1977, Kuhn 1977b, and McMullin 1983).

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endpoint at higher doses. This definition is based on characterizations B-M, B-T, and B-

TS, which employ the concept of “beneficial hormesis,” It seems to be a valuable working definition, in the absence of more detailed empirical information about the phenomenon, for at least five reasons. (1) Many (and perhaps most) articles on hormesis employ it either implicitly or explicitly (see, e.g., Furst 1987, Teeguarden et al. 1998,

Turturro et al. 1998, Foran 1998, Paperiello 1998, Calabrese et al. 1999, Gerber,

Williams, and Gray 1999, Juni and McElveen 2000, Lave 2000, Chapman 2001). (2) The definition is straightforward and easy to understand. (3) It seems to cover the typical cases of hormesis that researchers have been pointing out (after all, researchers arrive at examples of hormesis by looking for toxic substances that have opposite (i.e., beneficial) effects at low doses). (4) It does not beg questions about the operational or mechanistic phenomena that underlie the beneficial effects that characterize hormesis. (5) Finally, it makes the potential policy-related ramifications of hormesis particularly clear.

Even though the dissertation will define chemical hormesis in terms of beneficial low-dose effects, however, it is important to emphasize that this is a working definition that may not be ultimately satisfactory. As Calabrese and Baldwin (2002b) point out, the fundamental problem with the definition is that it (like any operational concept of hormesis) both includes and excludes some cases that are questionable. For example, it would probably include the effects of alcohol as an example of hormesis, but some researchers are likely to insist that alcohol is not an example of hormesis.41 It would also

41 Those who deny that alcohol is an example of hormesis are likely to appeal to a mechanistic account of the phenomenon. For example, many researchers (e.g., Stebbing 1998, Calabrese 1999) believe that hormesis involves some sort of overcompensation effect. The effects of alcohol are probably not the result of overcompensation, however; they are a consequence of alcohol’s ability to affect different biological endpoints at different dose levels.

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exclude seemingly hormetic effects of chemotherapeutic drugs and antibiotics on cancer

cells and bacteria (i.e., increasing the reproduction of the cells or bacteria), because those

effects are harmful (at least from the perspective of the host organism). Because these

problems are not unique to the concept of “beneficial” hormesis, however, and because

no other definitions are fully satisfactory, it seems to be a valuable working definition.

One should keep in mind, though, that if researchers are able to isolate one or two mechanisms or related “families” of mechanisms that account for the vast majority of cases in which low doses of toxins produce beneficial effects, it would make sense for them to abandon the concept of “beneficial hormesis.” Researchers could then define

‘hormesis’ fairly precisely in terms of one or two specific mechanisms rather than in terms of an operational definition that is potentially arbitrary.

Argument for the Significance of the Analysis of Hormesis Characterizations.

Assuming that the preceding responses to the imprecision, distinction, and confusion objections are adequate, it appears reasonable to emphasize the multiple characterizations of hormesis as a philosophically significant feature of the anomaly. This part of the section argues that former accounts of anomaly do not emphasize this important aspect of the hormesis case. It begins by acknowledging one aspect of the hormesis characterizations that the former accounts do accurately describe. Namely, the general types of anomaly components and relations that each former account emphasizes do occur in the hormesis case. Nevertheless, this part argues that all five former accounts fail to emphasize the multiplicity of researchers’ characterizations for hormesis and the way they change those characterizations over time.

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Let us first consider the ways in which the former accounts accurately describe the components and relations in the hormesis case. According to each of the accounts, the empirical component of an anomaly consists of either experimental data or phenomena (see section 2.3 of the dissertation). Those general types also occur in characterizations of the hormesis anomaly. For example, groups D-E and D-A1 have sets of data as empirical components, whereas groups U-M, U-T, and many others have phenomena. Each former description of anomaly also stated that the theoretical component could be either theories or paradigms (see section 2.3 of the dissertation).

Those general types also occur in characterizations of the hormesis anomaly. For example, group U-T has theories as its theoretical component, and group H-P has paradigms. Finally, according to each former account, the relation between anomaly components consists of either inconsistency or inexplicability (see section 2.3). Those relations also occur in characterizations of the hormesis anomaly (see the list of characterizations in the appendix).

Despite these accurate descriptions of the components and relations in the hormesis case, however, all five previous accounts failed to emphasize a distinctive characteristic of the hormesis anomaly:

“Plural-Characterization” Characteristic: The hormesis anomaly admits of multiple characterizations that differ in the general and specific types of their components and the relation between them: (i) individual researchers employ more than one characterization at roughly the same time, (ii) different researchers employ different characterizations at roughly the same time, and (iii)researchers change their characterizations over time.

The plural-characterization characteristic is illustrated by the preceding description of hormesis anomaly characterizations in this section (3.3). Calabrese and Baldwin’s

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concluding description of their first literature search (1998b) provides an example of

individual researchers’ employing more than one characterization at roughly the same

time, because they employed characterizations in groups L-M (involving low-dose-

stimulation hormesis), O-T (involving overcompensation responses), and C-M (involving

hormetic effects on endpoints that reflect the process of carcinogenesis). The entire list

of characterizations (see the appendix) illustrates that different researchers are employing

different characterizations at roughly the same time. Finally, Calabrese and Baldwin

provide an example of the way that researchers change their characterizations over time.

They initially employed multiple characterizations for hormesis, especially those in

groups L-M and L-T (1997, 1998b), then began to focus on “mechanistic”

characterizations of it as an overcompensation phenomenon (1999), and most recently

have suggested “operational” characterizations of the anomaly (2002b).

One might object that, although previous accounts of anomaly do not employ the

dissertation’s exact terminology for describing anomalies, there are at least three ways in

which they partially acknowledge the plural-characterization characteristic. First, the

presence of multiple auxiliary characterizations (i.e., those that employ auxiliary

hypotheses as the theoretical component) for anomalies is already widely recognized by

philosophers of science (see e.g., Laudan 1997 and Mayo 1997). Second, Kuhn (1970)

partly acknowledges the plural-characterization characteristic, because he claims that scientists conceptualize an anomaly differently after they shift to a novel paradigm.

Third, Darden recognizes the characteristic to some extent, because she claims that during what she calls “anomaly localization,” researchers narrow the theoretical component of an anomaly to specific theory parts that are “responsible” for it. Fourth, it

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is likely that most philosophers of science have an implicit appreciation for the plural-

characterization characteristic, because they recognize that scientists often propose many

different hypotheses when they attempt to explain novel phenomena. As long as those

hypotheses are formulated so that they include an empirical anomaly component, a

theoretical component, and a relation between them, the hypotheses could be described as

what the dissertation calls multiple “anomaly characterizations.”

Although previous descriptions of anomaly may show some understanding of the

plural-characterization characteristic, however, they do so to a very limited extent. For example, although Kuhn shows some appreciation for the fact that anomalies can display multiple characterizations, his description is incomplete in at least three ways. First, he emphasizes only changes in the specific type of anomaly features (e.g., changes in the concepts used to describe the empirical component), not changes in their general type

(e.g., changes in the empirical component from sets of data to phenomena). Second, he discusses how scientists shift from one characterization to another as part of a gestalt switch to a new paradigm, but he does not emphasize that scientists may employ multiple characterizations for an anomaly while remaining within a single paradigm.42 Third, he gives the impression that researchers employ primarily two characterizations (one in the old paradigm and one in the new paradigm) rather than many characterizations.

Similarly, although Darden also shows some understanding of the plural-characterization characteristic, her description is incomplete in at least two ways. First, her discussion of

42 Although Kuhn acknowledges that researchers propose multiple potential alterations to a reigning paradigm during the period of crisis that precedes its demise, those proposals appear to be explanatory hypotheses that could conceivably explain the anomaly, not new characterizations of the anomaly. Thus, he does not appear to emphasize the occurrence of multiple anomaly characterizations within a reigning paradigm, before researchers shift to a novel one.

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multiple anomaly characterizations is implicit (based on the fact that researchers can

“localize” the anomaly within different parts of a theory, which involves different characterizations) rather than explicit. Second, she focuses mainly on the fact that the specific type of the theoretical component can vary (e.g., different researchers may isolate distinct parts of a single theory as the theoretical component of the anomaly). Thus, she does not emphasize the full variety of ways in which anomaly characterizations can vary, including changes in the general type of the theoretical components (e.g., from researchers’ expectations to models to theories to theory parts).

Finally, even if most philosophers of science show some implicit understanding of the plural-characterization characteristic, their vague impressions of it are likely to be incomplete in at least three ways. First, they are likely to emphasize explicitly the proliferation of scientific hypotheses in general in response to anomalies and only implicitly to recognize the proliferation of anomaly characterizations in particular.

Second, because they do not focus on the proliferation of anomaly characterizations in particular, philosophers of science are unlikely to emphasize the way those characterizations change over time (insofar as scientists’ descriptions of the empirical components, theoretical components, and the relation between them change). Third, even if most philosophers of science have a vague recognition that anomalies display multiple characterizations, that indistinct insight is unlikely to be accompanied by a detailed appreciation for the variety of reasons that anomalies display those many characterizations. For example, the hormesis case illustrates that those reasons include the occurrence of different concepts for describing the empirical component; different general types of components and the relation between them; and different specific types

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of models, paradigms, theories, or theory parts as the theoretical component. Thus, even

though the plural-characterization characteristic of the hormesis case is not entirely novel,

it does not appear that previous accounts of anomaly have emphasized it fully.

ConfirmationD of the Hormesis Anomaly

This second part of section 3.3 completes the chapter’s analysis of the hormesis

anomaly relative to the descriptive conclusions of previous accounts. Whereas the first

part focused on researchers’ characterizations of hormesis, this part considers the

confirmationD process. Recall that the dissertation defined anomaly confirmationD in chapter two as the process of showing that an ultima facie problematic relation holds between the empirical and theoretical components of an anomaly. The structure of this part’s analysis of this confirmationD process is very similar to the structure of the first

part of section 3.3. It begins by providing a novel examination of the process in the

hormesis case. It argues both that researchers employ multiple activities or “elements” of

confirmationD and that they apparently attempt to confirmD multiple characterizations of the anomaly at roughly the same time. This part of the chapter concludes by showing that previous accounts of anomaly accurately describe some elements of confirmationD in

the hormesis case but fail to emphasize the variety of confirmationD activities associated

with the anomaly.

Multiple Elements of ConfirmationD in the Hormesis Case. This section examines two features of the confirmationD process in the hormesis case. First, it briefly

argues that researchers have been attempting to confirmD multiple characterizations of the

anomaly at roughly the same time. Second, it provides a novel elucidation of seven

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EMPIRICAL COMPONENT:

Data (e.g., group 1 (D-E) in appendix one at the end of the dissertation) Phenomena (e.g., group 3 (U-M))

THEORETICAL COMPONENT:

Experimental expectation (e.g., group 1 (D-E) in appendix one) Model (e.g., group 3 (U-M)) Theory (e.g., group 4 (U-T)) Paradigm (e.g., group 13 (H-P))

Auxiliary hypothesis (e.g., group 15 (D-A1))

RELATION:

Inconsistency (e.g., group 1 (D-E) in appendix one) Inexplicability (e.g., group 4 (U-T))

ANOMALY CONFIRMATIOND:

(1) Providing evidence that the data sets that constitute the empirical component of an anomaly characterization are not the result of experimental or calculational errors. (2) Arguing that the data sets that constitute the empirical component of an anomaly characterization are not the result of random fluctuations in data (perhaps by using statistical or distributional analysis). (3) Defending the occurrence of particular phenomena that constitute the empirical component of an anomaly characterization. (4) Showing that previous researchers have failed to develop a justifiable alternative characterization that would explain away the anomaly, despite efforts over an extensive period of time to do so. (5) Performing further experiments or running statistical analyses in order to show that particular ceteris paribus clauses or auxiliary hypotheses (which render the empirical component problematic with respect to the theoretical component) are justifiable. (6) Showing that the anomaly could be eliminated by altering one or more current theories (thus providing evidence that the anomaly falls within the domain of those specific theories). (7) Showing that a rival, T’, to some current theory or paradigm, T, could explain the anomaly (thus providing evidence that the anomaly falls within the domain of T)

Figure 4: Summary of the different general types of anomaly components and of the relation between them in the hormesis case study, together with the elements of confirmationD in the hormesis case.

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strategies or activities that researchers have employed in order to confirmD the anomaly.

The dissertation will refer to these strategies as “elements” of the confirmationD process

(see Figure 4 on the next page for a list of these elements).

Given that individuals and groups of researchers have been characterizing the

hormesis anomaly in multiple ways, it is not surprising that they are also attempting to

confirmD multiple characterizations at roughly the same time. Two of the reasons that

researchers can characterize an anomaly in multiple ways without being imprecise or

incoherent can also be used to justify scientists who attempt to confirmD multiple

characterizations. Namely, two characterizations may seem plausible enough for

researchers to try to confirmD both of them (even though they are not compatible), or two

characterizations may be compatible, and therefore both can be confirmedD. Calabrese

(1999) provides the most notable example of a researcher who is attempting to confirmD

multiple characterizations at once. One example is that, by attempting to confirmD

characterizations in group O-M (namely, the occurrence of overcompensation hormesis),

he appeared to think that he could provide confirmationD for characterizations in groups

U-M and B-M (i.e., the occurrence of U-shaped hormesis and beneficial hormesis). In

other words, because these characterizations are all compatible, he was able to confirmD more than one at once. Another example is that, after Calabrese and Baldwin’s first large-scale literature study (1998b), they apparently attempted to confirmD a wide variety

of characterizations of hormesis, even though they were not all compatible. They

proposed multiple mechanistic characterizations to be plausible, including groups O-M

(involving an overcompensation phenomenon), OS-M (involving specific enzymatic

processes), and M-E (involving multiple biological effects of a single chemical).

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Although they subsequently looked most aggressively for evidence in favor of characterizations in group O-M, they also sought confirmatoryD evidence for other characterizations. Thus, in their summary of findings in favor of group O-M (Calabrese

2001b), they acknowledged that some of their evidence supported characterizations that seem to fit most closely with group M-E (namely, effects of toxins on multiple related receptor types).

Researchers have not merely attempted to confirmD multiple characterizations of the hormesis anomaly at roughly the same time; they have also employed a variety of elements of confirmationD in the process. The first involves the scrutiny of experimental results. When investigators initially obtained anomalous experimental results (such as the U-shaped dose-response curves in the original studies that Calabrese and Baldwin identified in their literature searches), they presumably reexamined (and perhaps replicated) their experimental procedures. For example, Jonas provides an extensive list of potential systematic sources of error that researchers must eliminate in order to render experimental evidence of hormesis convincing (2001, 628-629). In the hormesis case, these errors consist primarily of inaccurate control of experimental conditions, such as animal sex, nutrition, laboratory conditions, adaptation period, diluent, pharmacy or manufacturer of toxin, and contamination precaution. Thus, researchers have already engaged, at least to some extent, in a first confirmationD activity of showing that their anomalous sets of data are not the result of obvious experimental or calculational errors.

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This first element of confirmationD indicates that anomalous data should be considered

further and not summarily dismissed as fluke results.43

The studies that Calabrese and Baldwin identified in their literature searches also

illustrate a second element of confirmationD. Namely, they used techniques of statistical

or distributional analysis for providing evidence that particular low-dose data were farther from control levels than would be expected as the result of random fluctuations in data. This activity provided support for the notion that the anomalous data genuinely conflict with current dose-response models. This second element of confirmationD

appears to be significant, at least in the hormesis case, because Chapman (2001, 513)

notes that experimental results in toxicological experiments could acceptably vary from

controls by up to 20% without providing convincing evidence that the effects are

anything more than random variation (see also Crump 2001, Elliott 2000a).44 Calabrese’s

effort to defend the occurrence of overcompensation phenomena by looking at previous

studies that had a temporal component illustrates a third confirmationD activity (see

Calabrese 1999, 2001b). Specifically, he engaged in defending the occurrence of

particular phenomena (namely “overcompensation hormesis”) that constitute the

empirical component of some anomaly characterizations. Calabrese’s research also

suggests a fourth element of confirmationD. Namely, he has defended particular groups

of characterizations by showing that scientists have failed to develop justifiable auxiliary

43 This element of confirmationD provides support for characterizations of the anomaly as a problematic relationship between the data in a particular experiment and researchers’ expectations for that experiment. 44 This second element of confirmationD supports the characterization of the hormesis anomaly as a generalizable phenomenon (such as low-dose stimulation) that conflicts with current physiological theories. In other words, this sort of confirmationD enables one to argue that the anomalous data in a particular experiment are far enough from control levels to provide convincing evidence that the phenomenon of low- dose stimulation is actually occurring.

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characterizations that would explain away the anomaly, despite efforts over an extensive

period of time to do so. For example, although Calabrese was fairly confident about the

generalizability of hormesis from the beginning (e.g., Calabrese et al. 1987), he seems to

have gained increasing confidence over time (see e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 1998b,

2003). One factor may be that, as researchers have found more apparent instances of

hormesis and scientists have not provided convincing evidence that any particular

auxiliary hypothesis can explain it, characterizations of hormesis as a generalizable

phenomenon (e.g., groups U-M or U-T) have become increasingly more plausible.

Research by Calabrese and Baldwin (1997, 1998b, 1999) also illustrates a fifth

element of anomaly confirmationD in the hormesis case, namely, defending a number of ceteris paribus clauses and auxiliary hypotheses. The defense of ceteris paribus clauses is important, because researchers such as Davis and Svendsgaard (1990) and Giesy

(2001, 517) have argued that hormetic effects could be explained by a variety of cellular processes that are already known (e.g., interactive effects of multiple chemicals). In order to confirmD characterizations that employ dose-response models or physiological

theories as the theoretical component of the anomaly, one must defend ceteris paribus

clauses that maintain the absence of known processes that could explain away hormetic

effects. Calabrese and Baldwin (1997, 1998b, 1999) appear to argue for these clauses

implicitly, by showing that hormesis has occurred in many different experiments under a

wide variety of conditions. By showing that hormetic effects occur in a wide variety of

experiments, they provide evidence that the effects cannot be explained away by known

processes that might occur only in a limited number of cases.

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Calabrese and Baldwin’s third literature study (2001), which was designed to

provide evidence that hormesis is an overcompensation phenomenon, illustrates a sixth

element of anomaly confirmationD. Namely, his goal was showing that the hormesis anomaly could be resolved by altering particular former theories or groups of theories

(in this case, by increasing the predicted occurrence of defense mechanisms such as overcompensation). This activity confirmsD the anomaly by showing that the theoretical

component of the anomaly (i.e., the former theory or group of theories) should indeed be

altered. A seventh element of confirmationD has not yet occurred in the hormesis case

but could plausibly occur in the future. It would consist in showing that a new theory or model or paradigm could resolve the hormesis anomaly. For example, one might propose a novel theory of carcinogenesis that would predict hormetic effects caused by low doses of carcinogens. Or, if one were to characterize hormesis as a homeopathic phenomenon, one could conceivably develop a novel paradigm that would explain the apparent efficacy of homeopathy. This activity would confirmD the anomaly in the sense

of showing that the old theories that are being replaced were genuinely problematic.

Argument for the Significance of the Analysis of Hormesis ConfirmationD.

This part of of the chapter argues that the multiple elements of confirmationD in the hormesis case, like the multiple characterizations of the anomaly described earlier in section 3.3, appear to be a feature of anomaly that is not fully emphasized by previous accounts. It begins by acknowledging one way in which the former accounts do accurately describe the hormesis case. Namely, each of the elements mentioned by the former accounts (see section 2.3 of the dissertation) has occurred or plausibly could occur in the hormesis case. Nevertheless, this part argues that those previous descriptions of

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anomaly fail to emphasize the extent to which researchers may attempt both to confirmD

multiple characterizations of an anomaly and to employ many different elements of

confirmationD.

Consider first how the elements of confirmationD described by previous accounts are identifiable in the hormesis case. In anomaly account P (by Popper), for example, elements of confirmationD include either the corroboration of auxiliary hypotheses, which

matches element (5) in the hormesis case (see Figure 4 earlier in this section), or the

corroboration of falsifying hypotheses, which roughly matches element (3) in the

hormesis case. In anomaly account K, elements of confirmationD include showing that experimental results are not the consequence of errors (see element (1) in the hormesis case), or showing an anomaly to be present for extended period of time despite efforts to eliminate it (see element (4)), or resolving an anomaly via a new paradigm (see element

(8)). In account L1, the chief element of confirmationD is a rival paradigm’s being able

to explain the anomaly, which is element (7) in the hormesis case. In account L2, elements of confirmationD include either showing that experimental results are not flukes

or random errors (see elements (1) and (2) in the hormesis case) or showing that a rival

theory can solve the anomaly (see element (7)). Finally, in account D1, elements of

confirmationD include showing that experiments really do yield the anomalous data (see

element (1) in the hormesis case) or showing that the anomaly falls within the domain of

a particular theory (see elements (6) and (7)).

Despite the fact that the process of confirmationD in the hormesis case involves

many of the same elements that the previous anomaly accounts described, it appears to

display a further characteristic that they did not emphasize:

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Plural-ConfirmationD Characteristic: In the hormesis case, both individual researchers and groups of them attempt to confirmD multiple characterizations of the anomaly (at roughly the same time) via multiple “elements” of confirmationD.

The preceding description of the seven strategies by which researchers are confirmingD the hormesis anomaly illustrates the multiple elements of confirmationD that researchers

have pursued or could pursue. For example, Jonas (2001) and Menzie (2001) are

currently advocating further pursuit of elements (1), (2), and (3) (i.e., eliminating

experimental errors, arguing that anomalous data sets are not the result of random

fluctuations, and defending the occurrence of particular anomalous phenomena).

Meanwhile, Calabrese (1999, 2001b) and Stebbing (1998) appear to be more concerned

to pursue elements (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) (namely, showing that previous researchers

have not developed adequate auxiliary characterizations, justifying auxiliary hypotheses,

and identifying present or future theories that could be altered or developed to explain the

anomaly). And, as the beginning of this part (entitled “ConfirmationD of the Hormesis

Anomaly”) mentioned, Calabrese and Baldwin have been attempting to confirmD

multiple characterizations of the anomaly (e.g., characterizations U-M, O-M, and C-M)

ever since they performed their first literature search (Calabrese and Baldwin 1997,

1998b).

One might object that accounts P, K, L2, and D1 partly acknowledge the plural-

confirmationD characteristic, because they each describe more than one element of

confirmationD. Even though they show some understanding of the characteristic,

however, there are at least two ways in which they fail to emphasize it fully. First, they

each seem to focus on only two or three types of confirmationD rather than many elements. Second, they do not emphasize that researchers may simultaneously attempt to

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confirmD multiple characterizations of the anomaly rather than just one. Thus, it appears

that researchers’ strategies for confirmingD the hormesis anomaly, like the

characterizations of it described earlier in section 3.3, are largely compatible with

previous accounts of anomaly but also reveal a degree of complexity that former

descriptions of anomaly have not emphasized.

3.4: Analysis of the Hormesis Anomaly Relative to Previous Explanatory Conclusions

Section 3.3 examined the hormesis anomaly relative to the descriptive

conclusions of accounts P, K, L1, L2, and D1. This fourth section completes the chapter’s

analysis of the hormesis anomaly by determining its characteristics relative to the

previous accounts’ explanatory conclusions, all of which share the following claim:

Shared Explanatory Conclusion: Scientific anomalies are important stimuli for the development of novel scientific hypotheses.

Part of the motivation for examining the characteristics of the hormesis anomaly is that,

according to chapter two, the previous accounts’ individual explanatory conclusions

appear to be incoherent when they are compared to other accounts’ explanatory or

descriptive conclusions. For example, the explanatory conclusions of accounts P, K, L1, and D1 appear to be incoherent relative to the descriptive conclusion of L2, because P, K,

L1, and D1 state that the recognition of anomaly usually comes before the development of

novel theories or paradigms. In contrast, the descriptive conclusion of L2 states that a

rival theory is generally hypothesized before scientists recognize a problem as a genuine anomaly. The explanatory conclusions of accounts L2 and D1 also appear to be

incoherent with respect to each other’s explanatory conclusions as well as those of P, K,

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and L1, because they make conflicting claims about the elements of confirmationD that

precede the development of novel hypotheses.

In response to the incoherence of the previous descriptions of anomaly, this

section examines in the hormesis case the chief characteristic discussed by the former

accounts’ explanatory conclusions, namely, the relationship between the anomaly and the

development of novel hypotheses in response to it. The first part provides a wholly novel

analysis of four interactions that occur between the hormesis anomaly and the

development of novel hypotheses in response to it. The second part then argues that

previous descriptions of anomaly did not fully emphasize these interactions that occur in

the hormesis case. Section 3.5 argues that this novel analysis is significant not only

because it may improve philosophers’ descriptions of scientific anomalies but also

because it may yield increased understanding of scientific discovery and the role of value

judgments in scientific practice.

Interactions Between the Hormesis Anomaly and Novel Hypotheses

This part of the chapter provides an original analysis of the relationship between

the hormesis anomaly and researchers’ development of novel hypotheses in response to

it. It argues that one can find at least four sorts of interactions between the anomaly and

novel hypotheses in the hormesis case: “characterization,” “stimulation,” “feedback,” and

“research-project” influences. The elucidation of these four relationships (both in the

hormesis case and concerning anomalies in general) is a novel contribution of the dissertation, although this section will acknowledge that some previous accounts of anomaly have provided partial discussions of some of the interactions. The first,

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“characterization” relationship between the hormesis anomaly and the development of novel hypotheses is that the presence or absence of plausible hypotheses influenced scientists’ initial characterizations of the anomaly. Thus, whereas the shared explanatory conclusion of the previous accounts emphasizes that anomalies influence the development of novel hypotheses, the hormesis case illustrates that plausible hypotheses may initially influence characterizations of the anomalies instead. For example,

Calabrese and Baldwin suggest that a lack of plausible mechanistic hypotheses that could explain the hormesis phenomenon may have contributed to researchers’ initial preferences for auxiliary characterization such as D-A1 or D-A2, which dismiss the anomaly as a fluke result (1998b, VII-2). To take another example, Calabrese and

Baldwin argue that Arndt’s hypothesis (i.e., that the hormesis anomaly involves the same sorts of phenomena as homeopathy) also caused researchers to characterize it as a problem for auxiliary hypotheses or assumptions rather than for a primary theory or model (2000c, 92). In other words, because it seemed so unlikely that homeopathy constituted a genuine, replicable phenomenon, the association of hormesis with homeopathy encouraged researchers to dismiss hormesis as a fluke result as well. Thus, the observations of Calabrese and Baldwin illustrate that the presence or absence of novel hypotheses for explaining an anomaly can influence researchers’ characterizations of it.

A second, “stimulation,” influence between the hormesis anomaly and novel hypotheses is that particular characterizations of hormesis stimulated the development of hypotheses for explaining it. Specifically, researchers’ characterizations of hormesis as a generalizable phenomenon (e.g., groups U-M and U-T) have provided motivation for developing hypotheses to explain it. For example, Calabrese and Baldwin (1998b; see

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also Calabrese 2001b) and Stebbing (1998) have been proposing a wide variety of hypotheses for rendering the hormesis phenomenon compatible with current toxicological, physiological, evolutionary, or biochemical theories. Calabrese and

Baldwin initially proposed 12 different enzymatic mechanisms that could conceivably produce low-dose stimulation by inhibitory chemicals (1998b, VII-3-VII-11). By revising current physiological theories to reflect a frequent occurrence of these sorts of enzymatic mechanisms, they thought they could possibly explain the hormesis anomaly.

They also hypothesized that hormesis might be a biological defense mechanism established through natural selection (1998b, VII-13ff). Stebbing’s (1982, 1998) hypothesis (i.e., that hormesis is an overcompensation response to disruptions in homeostasis) is a particularly influential example of this approach. Currently, two sorts of hypotheses appear to be particularly promising as explanations for the hormesis anomaly (see Calabrese 2001b). First, one might hypothesize that the number of receptor groups that operate in a counterbalancing, concentration-dependent way may be greater than was formerly believed. Second, one might hypothesize that biological defense mechanisms overshoot the return to homeostasis to a greater frequency and extent than physiologists formerly thought. Thus, the hormesis case provides numerous examples of the anomaly serving as a “catalyst” for hypothesis formation.

A third, “feedback,” relationship between the hormesis anomaly and the development of novel hypotheses is that the proposal and investigation of hypotheses

“fed back” and affected researchers’ characterizations of the anomaly. One example is

Stebbing’s hypothesis that hormetic effects might be the result of an organism’s overcompensation response to stressors. Because this hypothesis is very plausible,

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researchers such as Calabrese (1999) and Roberts (2001) began to suggest that the

production of overcompensation effects might be a criterion for determining whether a

phenomenon is an instance of hormesis. For example, Roberts explicitly claims that one

of the conditions necessary for a dose-response curve to be considered hormetic is that it

“results from some disruption of homeostasis leading to overcompensation” (2001, 632).

Nevertheless, characterizations of the anomaly that describe it as an overcompensation

effect (i.e., groups O-M and O-T) are not the result of overwhelming experimental

evidence that hormesis is an overcompensation phenomenon;45 rather, they reflect

researchers’ tendency to characterize the anomaly in accordance with a plausible

hypothesis.

The hypothesis that hormesis represents an overcompensation phenomenon also

provides a second example of researchers’ hypotheses “feeding back” and altering their

initial characterizations of an anomaly. As section 3.2 of this chapter explained,

Calabrese (2001b) investigated the hypothesis that hormesis is an overcompensation

phenomenon by examining previous studies that included hormetic effects over an

extended period of time. In that study, he found evidence that the toxins in some studies

produced hormetic effects by affecting different receptor subtypes at different

concentrations. Furthermore, he acknowledged that the mechanism of affecting different

receptor subtypes might be somewhat different from a normal overcompensation

response (because the receptors could produce low-dose stimulation immediately,

without an initial period of inhibition). As a result, Calabrese seems to have altered his characterizations of the hormesis anomaly. He intimated earlier that it might be most

45 As Calabrese (2001b) acknowledges, very few studies of hormesis involve the sort of temporal component that provides convincing evidence for the occurrence of overcompensation.

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plausible to characterize the anomaly as an overcompensation phenomenon (Calabrese

1999). In more recent work, however, he has suggested that an operational characterization (e.g., U-M or U-T) that is compatible with the occurrence of multiple mechanistic processes is most plausible (see, e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 2002b). One plausible explanation for this shift in Calabrese’s characterization of the anomaly is that his investigation of a plausible hypothesis (i.e., that hormesis is an overcompensation phenomenon) “fed back” and convinced him to alter his earlier characterizations.

A fourth, “research project,” relationship between the hormesis anomaly and novel hypotheses is that characterizations of the anomaly have suggested research projects that provide ongoing guidance for the development of hypotheses. Perhaps the best example of this relationship in the hormesis case is the characterization of it as an overcompensation phenomenon (see groups O-M and O-T). Based on these characterizations, Calabrese recognized that temporal studies of the anomaly might provide deeper understanding of it. His investigation (2001b) of previous studies that included a temporal variable did indeed provide him with guidance for developing further hypotheses. In particular, it suggested the hypothesis that at least some instances of hormetic effects might be the result of other mechanisms (such as toxins’ differential affinity for different receptor subtypes) besides overcompensation. Furthermore, even in the cases in which hormesis does appear to be the result of overcompensation, further temporal studies are likely to provide more detailed information about the mechanisms by which it occurs. Thus, the characterization of the hormesis anomaly as an overcompensation phenomenon is providing Calabrese with a fruitful research strategy for developing further hypotheses that might explain it.

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Argument for the Significance of the Analysis

This second part of section 3.4 argues that the ways in which the hormesis anomaly has related to novel hypotheses are not fully emphasized by former descriptions of anomaly. Admittedly, previous accounts do describe some aspects of the characterization, stimulation, and feed-back influences. Nevertheless, this part argues that there are at least four ways in which the former accounts fail to capture these relationships in the hormesis case: (i) they provide fairly incomplete or vague acknowledgment of many of the four relationships, (ii) they do not emphasize the role of multiple characterizations in anomaly’s relationship to novel hypotheses, (iii) they do not focus on the dialectical way in which anomalies relate to novel hypotheses, and (iv) they fail to distinguish two different sorts of hypotheses that interact with the hormesis anomaly.

Consider first how the previous accounts of anomaly (that were analyzed in chapter two) do partially discuss at least three of the interactions between anomaly and novel hypotheses that this chapter identified (namely, the characterization, stimulation, and feedback relationships). For example, as chapter two argued, Laudan claims that the hypothesis of a rival explanatory theory encourages researchers to accept an anomaly as a legitimate, generalizable phenomenon (1977, 18-31). Thus, in accordance with the characterization influence, he appears to recognize that explanatory hypotheses can influence scientists to adopt particular characterizations of an anomaly (namely, those that identify it as a problem for a primary theory rather than for auxiliary hypotheses or assumptions). Nevertheless, he does not emphasize other ways in which explanatory hypotheses might influence anomaly characterizations, and it does not appear that the

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other accounts of anomaly emphasize the characterization influence (see section 2.3 of the dissertation).

Just as Laudan displayed at least partial appreciation for the characterization influence, previous accounts of anomaly appear to have shown some recognition of the stimulation and feedback influences. On one hand, the stimulation influence appears to be the one that they emphasize the most, because all five previous accounts state that anomalies stimulate the development of explanatory hypotheses (as their shared explanatory conclusion in section 2.3 reveals). On the other hand, account K is the only previous description of anomaly that provides significant emphasis on the third, feedback, influence that occurs in the hormesis case. Kuhn (1970, 1977) recognizes that the hypothesis of a novel paradigm causes researchers to characterize anomalies differently than they did previously (see section 2.3). His point is very similar to the feedback influence, but he gives the impression that researchers almost unconsciously

“see” an anomaly differently from within a new paradigm (Kuhn 1970, 63 and 1977a,

171). In contrast, the feedback influence can involve a conscious decision to alter one’s former characterizations of an anomaly. Kuhn (1970) also emphasizes the occurrence of a single shift from one paradigm to another, whereas the hormesis case reveals a variety of plausible hypotheses that could influence researchers’ characterizations of the anomaly.

Despite these ways in which the previous accounts do acknowledge the sorts of relationships that the first part of section 3.4 examined between the hormesis anomaly and novel hypotheses, however, the analysis in that part appears to be novel and significant in at least four ways. First, even when the preceding accounts do discuss the

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interactions described in the hormesis case, they provide fairly incomplete or vague

descriptions of them. For example, as the preceding descriptions of Laudan’s

acknowledgment of the characterization influence and Kuhn’s discussion of the feedback

influence make clear, they did not discuss these influences in full detail even when they

showed some recognition of them. A second source of novelty is that the previous

accounts of anomaly did not emphasize that multiple characterizations of an anomaly

could interact with multiple hypotheses. For instance, as section 3.3 of this chapter

argued, researchers are currently employing more than one characterization for hormesis

(e.g., groups O-M and M-E in the appendix). These different characterizations appear likely to interact with different sorts of novel hypotheses. To take the stimulation influence as an example, characterizations in group O-M (which associate hormesis with overcompensation processes) are likely to encourage the proposal of hypothetical mechanisms by which physiological processes can overcompensate to stressors, whereas characterizations in group H-P (which associate hormesis with homeopathy) are likely to stimulate hypotheses concerning the variety of physiological processes that toxins could affect.

A third source of novelty of this chapter’s analysis of hormesis relative to previous descriptions of anomaly is the dialectical relationship that the hormesis case reveals between anomaly characterizations and new hypotheses.46 This dialectical relationship consists of an ongoing, sequential process by which novel hypotheses influence researchers’ characterizations of an anomaly, followed by impacts of those

46 The term ‘dialectical’ is not employed to raise connotations of a Hegelian dialectic in which a thesis and antithesis ultimately result in a synthesis. Rather, it expresses only a “back-and-forth” interaction in which plausible hypotheses influence anomaly characterizations at some points in time and the characterizations influence hypotheses at other points.

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characterizations on the development of further hypotheses, which in turn affect other

characterizations of the anomaly once again. For example, the first part of this section

argued that researchers’ initial characterizations of the hormesis anomaly were plausibly

influenced by the presence or absence of hypotheses for explaining it (Calabrese and

Baldwin 1998b, 2000c). The resulting characterizations then suggested both new

explanatory hypotheses and research projects that could later lead to novel hypotheses.

These novel explanatory hypotheses then altered the characterizations that researchers

initially employed for describing hormesis. Thus, even though previous accounts of

anomaly have described some of the ways in which anomalies and novel hypotheses

influence one another, they have not emphasized the extent to which all four relationships

described in this section occur throughout the investigation of a single anomaly.

A fourth way in which the analysis in the first part of this section is novel and significant relative to the previous accounts of anomaly is that they failed to distinguish two different sorts of hypotheses that play a role in the hormesis case: (1) descriptive

hypotheses (i.e., hypothesized characterizations of the anomaly), and (2) explanatory hypotheses. The dissertation defines “hypothesized characterizations” as those hypotheses that propose plausible descriptions of the anomaly. It seems reasonable to call these descriptive hypotheses “characterizations,” because they consist of an empirical component, a theoretical component, and the relation between them. In the hormesis case, the hypotheses that hormesis is a homeopathic phenomenon (see the discussion of the characterization influence in the first part of this section) or an overcompensation phenomenon (see the elucidation of the feedback and research-project influences in the first part of this section) were hypothesized characterizations. The dissertation defines

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“explanatory hypotheses” as proposed explanations of the anomaly. For example, these

explanations might provide a causal account of mechanisms that produce the empirical

component of the anomaly or show how it is an instance of a general pattern of events

(see e.g., Kitcher 1981, Salmon 1984). In the hormesis case, the enzymatic mechanisms

that Calabrese and Baldwin (1998b) suggested in response to the anomaly (see the

preceding description of the stimulation influence in the first part of section 3.4) were explanatory hypotheses that provided causal explanations for the hormesis phenomenon.

In sum, whenever “hypotheses” are mentioned as part of any of the four relationships described in this section (i.e., the characterization, stimulation, feedback, and research-project influences), the hypotheses could consist either of novel descriptions of the anomaly or of novel explanations of the anomaly. These two sorts of hypotheses could sometimes be very closely related, however, if a hypothesized characterization is sufficiently detailed to suggest an explanatory hypothesis. Although one might object that a detailed description alone may not always be sufficient to identify one particular hypothesis for explaining an anomaly, it may be very helpful for developing explanatory hypotheses in many cases. For example, if a hypothesized characterization of hormesis as an overcompensation phenomenon included a detailed description of the empirical component (i.e., the phenomenon, P, that was occurring) and the theoretical component

(i.e., the specific theory, T, that failed to explain the phenomenon), it might be very easy to develop an explanatory hypothesis that could eliminate the anomaly. Specifically, one might begin looking for ways to alter T slightly in order to include mechanisms that could produce phenomenon P. In the hormesis case, the best example is the characterization of hormesis as an overcompensation phenomenon. If researchers

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determine more precisely what specific mechanisms produce the overcompensation, they

could plausibly explain the anomaly just by altering some physiological theory to

acknowledge that processes of that sort occur.

One might object, however, that it seems somewhat incoherent for this chapter to

argue that an anomaly could interact dialectically with hypothesized characterizations,

because the dissertation argues that anomalies themselves consist of characterizations.

Thus, the chapter appears to be claiming that anomaly characterizations can interact

dialectically with other anomaly characterizations. On closer examination, however, it

does not appear to be incoherent to claim that anomalies (i.e., particular

characterizations) can interact dialectically with other anomaly characterizations. For

example, at time T1, an anomaly (e.g., characterization X) could stimulate the

development of a novel hypothesis (e.g., a novel characterization, Y), in accordance with

the hypothesis influence. Characterizations X and Y could then both be plausible

characterizations of the anomaly. At time T2, the anomaly (i.e., either characterization X or characterization Y) might suggest, in accordance with the research-project influence, a research project that results in a novel hypothesis (e.g., a new characterization of the anomaly, Z). At time T3, that hypothesis (i.e., characterization Z) might “feed back” and suggest alterations in another characterization of the anomaly (e.g., characterization X).

Therefore, as long as one is willing to accept that a hypothetical characterization, such as

Y or Z, could initially play the role of a “hypothesis” but later play the role of “the anomaly,” the chapter’s description of the hormesis case does not appear to be incoherent.

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If the arguments in this section are correct, then there are at least three features of

the interaction between the hormesis anomaly and the development of novel hypotheses

that previous accounts have not emphasized. First, the anomaly admits of multiple

characterizations. Second, each of those characterizations has the potential to interact in

a dialectical fashion with novel hypotheses. Third, those hypotheses may either be new

descriptive characterizations or proposed explanations for the anomaly. The following

statement summarizes these features:

Dialectical-Explanatory Characteristic: The multiple characterizations of the hormesis anomaly interact in a dialectical fashion, throughout the confirmationD process, with at least two sorts of novel hypotheses: (1) novel hypothesized characterizations that describe the anomaly, and (2) novel hypotheses that explain the anomaly.

Thus, the hormesis case illustrates that even when researchers do not immediately develop successful explanations for an anomaly, they may be able to propose new characterizations that ultimately lead to explanations.

3.5: Significance of the Chapter’s Analysis of the Hormesis Case

This final section briefly argues that the chapter’s identification of the plural- characterization, plural-confirmationD, and dialectical-explanatory characteristics is

philosophically significant. (For a review of these characteristics, see the list of them in

the conclusion to this chapter, on page 134.) Specifically, it claims that the failure of

previous anomaly accounts to emphasize these characteristics could be the source of at

least two important weaknesses in the philosophy of science (namely, a “discovery”

deficiency and a “value” deficiency). The first, “discovery,” deficiency is that failure to

emphasize the characteristics of anomaly analyzed in this chapter has plausibly prevented

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advances in philosophical understanding of scientific discovery. Second, a “value” deficiency is that the same failure may have produced decreased awareness of important ways in which constitutive, contextual, and bias values can enter into scientific practice

(see e.g., Douglas 2000, Longino 1990, Shrader-Frechette 1991). It is important to note that the claims in this section are suggestions about the ways in which previous inattention to the plural-characterization, plural-confirmationD, and dialectical- explanatory characteristics may have hampered previous philosophical work. Until one develops a novel account of anomaly based on these characteristics and begins to explore their ramifications for philosophy of science in greater detail, it is difficult to identify all the ways in which failure to emphasize the characteristics has been detrimental. Chapter four begins the process of providing a more positive account of specific ways in which a novel account of anomaly can increase philosophical understanding of scientific discovery and the role of values in science.

The first, “discovery,” deficiency of previous philosophy of science is that its failure to emphasize the plural-characterization, plural-confirmationD, and dialectical-

explanatory characteristics may have weakened its descriptions of scientific discovery in

at least three ways. These ways include: (1) failure to recognize important influences on

scientific discovery, (2) decreased understanding of the process by which scientists decide whether to “take anomalies seriously,” and (3) inadequate appreciation for the gradual way in which anomalies contribute to novel discoveries. The first way is that philosophers may miss important influences on the scientific-discovery process. In particular, failure to emphasize the plural-characterization characteristic identified in this chapter may cause philosophers to miss the manner in which researchers’ choices to

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emphasize particular anomaly characterizations rather than others may guide the later

course of scientific investigation. For example, this chapter has emphasized that the characterization of hormesis as an overcompensation phenomenon provided Calabrese

(1999, 2001b) with fruitful hypotheses and research projects. It seems plausible, therefore, that the strategies by which researchers develop and choose characterizations could play a crucial early role in the discovery process. Because philosophers have not previously emphasized that anomalies can display multiple characterizations, however, they have not considered how the choice to emphasize particular characterizations influences the course of discovery.

A second way that inattention to the characteristics analyzed in this chapter may have inhibited full understanding of scientific discovery is that previous philosophers of science may have missed insights concerning how scientists decide whether to ignore anomalies or to examine them further. Specifically, philosophers would likely have greater insights concerning why scientists sometimes pay little attention to anomalies and sometimes vigorously alter former theories in response to them if they considered the plural-confirmationD characteristic in greater detail. For example, one might be able to

identify specific elements of confirmationD (such as the elimination of typical random and systematic errors associated with anomalous experimental data) that frequently play an important role in convincing researchers to take an anomaly seriously. Furthermore, failure to attend to these multiple different activities or elements of confirmationD may

have contributed to misleading impressions about why scientists pay special attention to

some anomalies. An example might be the social-constructivist view that researchers are

primarily influenced by social and political factors when they decide whether to take

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anomalies seriously (see e.g., Bloor 1991, Pickering 1984, Shapin and Schaffer 1985). If

one does not consider the full variety of strategies with which researchers evaluate

anomalies (especially the analysis of potential errors associated with experimental

results), one might conclude without adequate evidence that scientists steadfastly ignore particular anomalies largely for social or political reasons rather than for cognitive reasons.

A third way that previous descriptions of scientific discovery may have been weakened by failure to consider the characteristics described in this chapter is that philosophers may have underestimated the gradual manner in which anomalies guide researchers toward new insights. Specifically, the dialectical-explanatory characteristic emphasizes that anomalies and novel hypotheses may influence each other dialectically over an extended period of time. It seems plausible that these interactions between anomaly characterizations and novel hypotheses could lead to progressively more sophisticated descriptions of anomaly, which could in turn facilitate further discoveries.

For example, section 3.4 described how Calabrese has arrived at progressively more sophisticated descriptions of hormesis and hypotheses concerning it via the interplay between characterizations and novel hypotheses. Thus, philosophical understanding of scientific discovery may have been weakened by previous failures to examine the dialectical relationship between anomalies and hypotheses.

Besides the “discovery” deficiency of previous philosophy of science, a second,

“value,” deficiency is that inadequate attention to the plural-characterization, plural- confirmationD, and dialectical-explanatory characteristics may have prevented

philosophers from recognizing at least two ways in which values can enter into and affect

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scientific practice. These two ways are: (1) the potential for values to determine which

characterizations of anomalies researchers emphasize, and (2) the mechanisms by which

values can affect ongoing scientific investigations through the influence of anomaly characterizations. The first way in which inattention to the characteristics analyzed in this chapter may have impoverished previous philosophy of science is by preventing philosophers from recognizing how values can influence the characterization of anomalies. Because researchers employ multiple characterizations of anomalies, and because the choice between them is underdetermined by empirical evidence, scientists’ decisions to emphasize some characterizations rather than others requires the use of value judgments. These values may include what Longino (1990, 2002) calls “constitutive” ones, such as explanatory power and coherence with previous theories. They might also include what she calls “contextual” values (e.g., the coherence of particular characterizations with the ethical or political goals of researchers) or “bias” values (such as the tendency of a particular researcher to employ a characterization even though it does not accord well with the majority of evidence). The failure of philosophers to recognize the role for values in the choice of anomaly characterizations may have had negative consequences of a very practical sort. For example, philosophers have not investigated the extent to which researchers’ decisions to emphasize particular anomaly characterizations rather than others can ultimately impact the public good. Elliott

(forthcoming) argues, for instance, that the decision to emphasize a concept like

“beneficial hormesis” rather than alternative concepts of hormesis may at the very least increase public interest and funding for studying the phenomenon.

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A second way that the failure to emphasize the plural-characterization, plural-

confirmationD, and dialectical-explanatory characteristics may have impoverished

philosophical understanding of values in science is by preventing philosophers from

recognizing mechanisms by which the effects of value judgments can be transmitted

throughout subsequent scientific practice. For example, philosophers have not

considered how the dialectical interactions between anomalies and novel hypotheses

(described by the dialectical-explanatory characteristic) can “carry” the influences of

value judgments concerning the choice of anomaly characterizations into further

scientific work. For example, the “research-project” influence (by which particular

anomaly characterizations stimulate research projects that can yield fruitful hypotheses)

provides a way for the values associated with scientists’ choice of anomaly

characterizations to impact the future course of discovery. Consider a case, for instance,

in which researchers emphasize characterization A rather than characterization B,

because A is favored by particular ethical values of society (e.g., society may have an

attitude of aversion toward risks that are imposed on the public without its consent). By

recognizing that characterization A may suggest an ongoing research project, A′, that differs importantly from the project, B′, suggested by characterization B, one can track the ways that values can significantly alter the course of scientific discovery. In the

hormesis case, for example, Calabrese suggests that researchers’ decisions to emphasize

characterizations of hormesis as a fluke result or as a homeopathic phenomenon may

have inhibited further research concerning the phenomenon and resulted in needlessly

extensive regulation of at least some toxic chemicals during the twentieth century

(Calabrese, Baldwin, and Holland 1999, Calabrese and Baldwin 2003b).

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3.6: Conclusion

This chapter examined the case study of chemical hormesis in order to determine

what it could reveal about the nature of scientific anomaly. The first section summarized

the history of research on the phenomenon. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 then provided novel

analyses of the hormesis anomaly relative to the descriptive and explanatory conclusions

of previous theoretical accounts of scientific anomaly. The sections concluded that there

are three important characteristics of the hormesis case that previous descriptions of

anomaly have not emphasized:

“Plural-Characterization” Characteristic: The hormesis anomaly admits of multiple characterizations that differ in the general and specific types of their components and the relation between them: (i) individual researchers employ more than one characterization at a time, (ii) different researchers employ different characterizations at the same time, and (iii)researchers change their characterizations over time.

Finally, section 3.5 argued that the identification of these three characteristics is philosophically significant, because the failure of previous accounts to emphasize them may have contributed to impoverished descriptions of scientific discovery and weakened understandings of the role that values play in scientific practice. The next chapter attempts to develop a general account of scientific anomaly that draws upon the previous accounts that were described in chapter two but that also incorporates the three characteristics of the hormesis case.

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CHAPTER FOUR

A DIACHRONIC ACCOUNT OF ANOMALY

4.1: Introduction

The notion of “anomaly” has persisted for over 2,000 years, but its precise meaning and significance for philosophy of science remains unsettled.47 This chapter develops a novel description of anomaly (called account “D”) that provides a more complex understanding of the characteristics of anomalies and their roles in scientific discovery. The dissertation’s account is labeled “D,” as an abbreviation for the term

‘diachronic’, because much of the complexity of the account stems from its consideration of the way anomalies change over time. (In the context of the dissertation, the term

‘diachronic’ describes processes that occur over an extended period of time.)

Specifically, account D emphasizes that the characterizations with which researchers describe anomalies change, the strategies or “elements” of confirmationD vary over time, and the ways in which anomalies interact with novel hypotheses change. Section 4.2 performs three tasks. First, it reviews the five previous accounts that were described in chapter two (i.e., P, K, L1, L2, and D1). Second, it explains what the dissertation’s novel

47 The English word ‘anomaly’ comes from the Greek term ‘ανοµαλια’, which is derived from the root for “irregular” or “uneven.” Chapter two described some of the ongoing disagreements about the nature of scientific anomaly and its relationship to scientific discovery.

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description of anomaly adds to those accounts. Third, it describes the chapter’s methodology for creating its new understanding of anomaly.

The next two sections of the chapter then develop and defend account D. Section

4.3 employs insights from the dissertation’s analysis of the hormesis case (in chapter three) in order to develop its new description of anomaly. The section defends the resulting account by showing that it accords well both with other examples of anomaly and with theoretical work in the philosophy of science. Section 4.4 then argues that the chapter’s new description of anomaly is philosophically significant for at least three reasons. (1) It solves problems of incompleteness, ambiguity, and incoherence with previous accounts (see chapter two). (2) It provides significant insights that former accounts of anomaly have not emphasized. Specifically, it emphasizes that researchers may employ multiple characterizations for describing anomalies, that the anomaly confirmationD process may incorporate a variety of elements, and that anomalies may interact with novel hypotheses in a dialectical fashion.48 (3) Account D suggests promising research projects for gaining a better comprehension of scientific discovery and of the role that value judgments play in scientific reasoning.

4.2: Motivation and Methodology for Developing Account D

Section 4.2 contains three parts. The first part analyzes the relationship between account D and the five previous descriptions of anomaly presented in chapter two. It reviews the conclusions, the strengths, and the weaknesses of the previous descriptions.

48 As chapter three explained, the notion of a “dialectic” is not intended to raise Hegelian connotations of an ultimate synthesis between thesis and antithesis but rather only a “back-and-forth” interaction between anomalies and novel hypotheses.

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The second part describes what account D adds to those previous descriptions of

anomaly. The last part then clarifies how the chapter develops this novel account.

Review of Five Previous Accounts

This first part reviews previous descriptions of anomaly in three brief steps: (1) a

summary of the previous accounts’ conclusions, (2) an overview of their strengths, and

(3) a brief analysis of their weaknesses. Turning first to the previous accounts’

conclusions, chapter two argued that they appear to share both a “descriptive” and an

“explanatory” conclusion:

Shared Explanatory Conclusion: Scientific anomalies are important stimuli for the development of novel scientific hypotheses.

Consider, for example, how Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) description of anomaly accords with

these two conclusions. According to chapter two, he appears to claim that the empirical

component of an anomaly consists of statements that describe a phenomenon, that the

theoretical component consists of statements that describe a paradigm, and that the

relation between them is one of inconsistency. Concerning the process of anomaly

confirmationD, chapter two argued that, although Kuhn does not clearly distinguish the

epistemic elements of confirmationD from sociological or practical considerations, he

appears to think that the confirmationD process can be advanced in at least three ways.

First, researchers can argue that experimental results are not the result of experimental

49 See chapter two for a description of anomaly confirmationD; in brief, it consists in showing that an ultima facie problematic relation holds between an anomaly and a primary theory.

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errors or faulty instrumentation. Second, they can show that anomalous results cannot be

eliminated despite efforts to eliminate them over an extended period of time. Third, they

can argue that a rival paradigm can eliminate the anomaly (thereby supporting the

conclusion that the anomaly falls within the domain of the old paradigm). Finally,

regarding the explanatory conclusion of the previous accounts, Kuhn claims that, after an

anomaly has become adequately confirmedD, it convinces scientists to investigate

alternatives to their current paradigm.

Chapter two argued not only that each former account includes a descriptive and

an explanatory conclusion but also that each account has strengths associated with those

conclusions. The fundamental strength of all five previous understandings of anomaly

appears to be their ability to describe actual examples of scientific practice. For example,

Kuhn argues that his description of anomaly (in terms of phenomena that conflict with paradigms) fits the anomalies that Lavoisier and Roentgen investigated. Furthermore, in accordance with his explanatory conclusion, he recounts how anomalies associated with

Ptolemaic astronomy and phlogiston chemistry caused scientists to develop novel hypotheses. Chapter two was careful to note, however, that the five accounts are plausible only in the sense that they accurately describe at least some aspects of some scientific anomalies. Thus, although each account accurately describes particular examples of anomaly, it might also be possible for other, seemingly conflicting accounts to describe the same examples either at different times in the development of the anomaly or under different descriptions of the anomaly.

Chapter two also analyzed weaknesses with the five previous accounts. The first weakness is the following:

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Descriptive weakness: The previous accounts’ descriptive conclusions appear to be ambiguous and potentially incomplete when they are compared to one another, because they make different claims about the general and specific types of anomaly components and relations and about the elements of anomaly 50 confirmationD.

For example, Popper and Laudan and Darden appear to claim that the theoretical

component of most anomalies are theories, whereas Kuhn and Lakatos seem to

emphasize that paradigms are more typical theoretical components (see chapter two).

Thus, the previous accounts appear to be comparatively ambiguous, because they do not

clarify whether they intend to include only the general types of theoretical components to which they refer (i.e., theories or paradigms) or whether they merely overlooked the other general types mentioned by other accounts. The former descriptions of anomaly may also be incomplete, if the theoretical components of anomalies are sometimes theories,

sometimes paradigms, and sometimes even other general types such as models or

researchers’ experimental expectations.

Chapter two argued that the former accounts also face a second weakness:

Explanatory weakness: The previous accounts’ explanatory conclusions appear to be incoherent relative to other accounts’ descriptive and explanatory conclusions, because they make conflicting claims about the temporal relationship between the

50 As chapter two explained, the dissertation uses the terms ‘general type’ and ‘specific type’ in a technical way to describe the features of anomalies. The specific type is the particular anomaly feature under investigation in a particular case. For example, the specific type of a theoretical anomaly component would be a particular model or a particular theory, such as the LNT dose-response model or the initiation- promotion-progression theory of carcinogenesis. Furthermore, philosophers have identified particular kinds of components and relations of anomalies that occur in a number of cases. For example, Kuhn (1970) famously argues that the theoretical components of many anomalies are paradigms, even though different anomalies may have different particular paradigms as their theoretical components. Similarly, Darden (1991) claims that the theoretical components of many anomalies are theories, even though the specific theories in question vary from one anomaly to another. Both paradigms and theories appear to be kinds of theoretical anomaly components that many anomalies share. Therefore, the dissertation defines the general type of an anomaly component or relation as the kind of anomaly component or relation. For example, three general types of theoretical anomaly components would be models, theories, and paradigms. Three general types of empirical anomaly components would include largely uninterpreted experimental results, data, and phenomena.

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characterization of anomaly and the development of hypotheses that can explain the anomaly.

According to chapter two, the conflicting claims mentioned as part of the explanatory

weakness take at least two forms. First, Popper’s, Kuhn’s, Lakatos’s, and Darden’s

explanatory conclusions appear to be incoherent with respect to Laudan’s descriptive conclusion. Namely, Laudan claims that empirical problems generally become anomalous only after an alternative theory is available to explain them, whereas Popper,

Kuhn, Lakatos, and Darden claim that anomalies actually spur the development of the alternative theory. Second, Laudan’s and Darden’s explanatory conclusions appear to be incoherent with respect to each other’s explanatory conclusions as well as those of

Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos. The problem is that Laudan and Darden propose specific elements of confirmationD (namely, the development of a rival theory that can explain the

theory and the elimination of errors associated with the experimental data) as typical

prerequisites for developing novel explanatory hypotheses, but they disagree about those

prerequisite elements. Furthermore, Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos do not indicate that any

one particular element of confirmationD is a general prerequisite for developing novel

hypotheses in response to anomalies.

Relationship of Account D to Five Previous Accounts

The overview of former accounts of anomaly in the previous part of this section

(4.2) provides context for understanding how account D relates to them. The

dissertation’s description of anomaly contains a “descriptive” claim and an “explanatory”

claim, like the previous accounts, but the claims of account D are more complex than

those of the former descriptions. The descriptive claim of account D is divided into a

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“characterization” sub-claim and a “confirmationD” sub-claim. The characterization sub- claim describes the empirical and theoretical components of anomaly and the relation between them. Unlike the previous accounts, it emphasizes that researchers may describe an actual anomaly in terms of multiple characterizations (with each characterization

consisting of a particular empirical component, a theoretical component, and the relation

between them). Furthermore, it clarifies that the empirical and theoretical components of

those characterizations may differ in both their general and specific type. For example,

one characterization may describe the anomaly in terms of a phenomenon that conflicts

with a theory, whereas another may describe the same anomaly as a set of data that conflicts with researchers’ expectations. According to the “confirmationD” sub-claim of account D’s descriptive claim, there are multiple strategies or “elements” associated with the confirmationD process, and researchers often end up attempting to confirmD multiple

characterizations of the anomaly. Thus, in comparison with previous descriptions,

account D more explicitly emphasizes the multiplicity of ways in which researchers

attempt to describe and confirmD anomalies.

Just as the descriptive claim of account D extends the descriptive conclusions of

the previous accounts, its explanatory claim builds on the explanatory conclusions of

former anomaly descriptions. According to the explanatory claim of account D,

anomalies relate to novel hypotheses in multiple ways, in a dialectical fashion,

throughout the confirmationD process. For example, anomalies may not only stimulate the development of novel explanatory hypotheses (as the previous accounts emphasized), but those hypotheses may in turn change the way researchers characterize the anomaly.

The explanatory claim of account D also clarifies that anomalies can stimulate the

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development of at least two different sorts of hypotheses. First, they may spur the creation of novel hypotheses that can explain the anomaly. Second, they may stimulate the development of novel characterizations that do not actually explain the anomaly but rather serve as hypotheses for describing it. Thus, the explanatory claim of account D, like its descriptive claim, extends the five previous accounts by developing a more complex picture of anomaly. Section 4.4 argues that this added complexity is valuable, because it alleviates problems with previous descriptions of anomaly, provides significant insights in the philosophy of science, and suggests promising research projects.

Methodology for Developing Account D

This chapter develops its novel description of anomaly under five constraints, to be called the (1) strength, (2) hormesis, (3) empirical, (4) theoretical, and (5) significance constraints. First, according to the strength constraint, the chapter should attempt to retain as much as possible of the five previous accounts’ descriptive and explanatory conclusions, because chapter two argued that they already describe many instances of anomaly well. Second, the hormesis constraint is that account D should use its description of the hormesis anomaly in chapter three as a source of insights for altering the previous accounts, because hormesis constitutes a complex case study that can serve as a corrective to previous theoretical descriptions of anomaly. Third, according to the empirical constraint, account D should be tested against other actual cases of anomaly to ensure that it does not rely too heavily on unique features of the hormesis case. Fourth, the theoretical constraint is that account D should be compatible with (and hopefully supported by) other work in the philosophy of science. Finally, according to the

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significance constraint, account D should have the potential to make a significant

contribution to philosophy of science, because it does not seem worthwhile to add new complexity to previous descriptions of anomaly unless there is an important reason to do so.

The chapter operationalizes these five constraints in a five-step process for developing and evaluating account D. In accordance with the strength constraint, the first step is to start with the shared descriptive and explanatory conclusions of the previous accounts (as analyzed in chapter two), which enables account D to build on the fundamental descriptive success of the previous accounts. The second step is to modify those conclusions based on the characteristics of the hormesis case, thereby meeting the

“hormesis” constraint. The third step is to defend the resulting account by comparing it with other instances of anomaly (thus meeting the empirical constraint). In accordance with the theoretical constraint, the fourth step is to show that the account also meshes with current theoretical insights in the philosophy of science. The chapter performs these first four steps in section 4.3. Section 4.4 then turns to the fifth step for developing and evaluating account D, which is to show that it meets the significance constraint. The section argues that the account makes an important contribution to the philosophy of science, because it has the potential to alleviate problems with earlier descriptions of anomaly, because it suggests significant and novel insights relative to previous work, and because it supports a variety of promising research projects.

One potential objection concerning this methodology is that it appears to rely far too heavily on a single case study (i.e., chemical hormesis). For example, one might argue that the second step, which modifies the previous accounts on the basis of the

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hormesis case study, is likely to result in a novel understanding of anomaly that can

describe the characteristics of the hormesis anomaly but that fails to describe the features

of other cases. One response to this objection is that the third and fourth steps of the

methodology, which test the dissertation’s account against other cases of anomaly and

against other work in the philosophy of science, ensure that account D focuses on

characteristics of the hormesis case that are applicable to scientific anomalies in general.

Another response is that the hormesis case is a particularly good source of insights for

developing a novel account, because it is highly complex (i.e., it has been difficult for

researchers to characterize and to explain). Therefore, by formulating a description of

anomaly that retains the strengths of previous accounts but that adds insights from the complex hormesis case, the dissertation appears likely to describe both difficult cases of anomaly and more straightforward ones. A final response is that account D adds to the five previous accounts while retaining as many of their previous strengths as possible.

The resulting description of anomaly is therefore likely to be at least as generalizable as accounts P, K, L1, L2, and D1. Thus, even though one particular case study serves as the

locus of ideas for developing account D, the resulting description is likely to apply to a

wide array of anomalies.

A second objection against this chapter’s methodology is that it does not

guarantee the development of an account that is either novel or significant. For example,

one could conceivably fail to gain any insights for altering the previous accounts’

descriptive and explanatory conclusions by examining the hormesis case. And, even if

one did gain novel insights, they might not accord well with other examples of scientific

anomaly or with other theoretical developments in philosophy of science. Finally, it is

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possible that the resulting account would not prove to be of much philosophical interest.

In response, the remainder of this chapter argues that, in this particular case, the hormesis

anomaly has served as a valuable source of insights that are both novel and significant.

Thus, even though the dissertation’s methodology does not guarantee the development of

a successful new account, it is fortunate that the hormesis case does appear to have

provided a sufficient number of insights to develop a valuable new description of

anomaly.

4.3: Argument for Account D

Section 4.3 develops and defends account D in four parts. The first part starts

with the shared descriptive and explanatory conclusions of previous accounts and then

uses insights from the hormesis case in order to formulate the novel claims of account D.

It therefore shows that the dissertation’s new account meets the strength and hormesis

constraints mentioned in section 4.2. The second part uses further analysis of the

hormesis case to flesh out the details of this account that the first part has sketched. The

third part shows that account D meets the third constraint for developing a novel account,

which is that it should accord well with actual examples of scientific anomaly. Finally,

the last part argues that the account is also supported by other work in philosophy of

science, and it thereby meets the theoretical constraint mentioned in section 4.2.

Argument for Account D

This first part of section 4.3 initiates the five-step methodology described in section 4.2 for developing account D. It begins by reiterating the shared descriptive and

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explanatory conclusions of the previous accounts that were analyzed in chapter two and then proposes revised formulations of those two claims on the basis of the hormesis case.

The resulting descriptive and explanatory claims serve as the foundation of account D, and the next part of section 4.3 fleshes them out in greater detail.

Section 4.2 of this chapter reviewed the shared descriptive and explanatory conclusions of the previous accounts that were analyzed in chapter two:

Shared Explanatory Conclusion: Scientific anomalies are important stimuli for the development of novel scientific hypotheses.

The second step in developing the dissertation’s novel description of anomaly is to modify these claims by employing insights gleaned from the hormesis case study.

Chapter three already provided a systematic analysis of the hormesis case relative to former theoretical descriptions of anomaly. It summarized the distinctive features of the hormesis case in terms of a “plural-characterization characteristic,” a “plural- confirmationD characteristic,” and a “dialectical-explanatory” characteristic (see the following paragraphs for a review of them). The first two characteristics present ways in which the hormesis case is not described well by the former accounts’ descriptive conclusions, and the third characteristic provides ways in which the former accounts’ explanatory conclusions fail to describe the hormesis case. The rest of this section shows how one can develop a novel description of anomaly by revising the shared descriptive and explanatory conclusions of the previous accounts so that they incorporate the plural-

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characterization, plural-confirmationD, and dialectical-explanatory characteristics of the

hormesis case.

In order to develop an improved version of the shared descriptive conclusion of previous accounts, the relevant aspects of the hormesis case to examine are its plural- characterization and plural-confirmationD characteristics. These are:

Hormesis Plural-Characterization Characteristic: The hormesis anomaly admits of multiple characterizations that differ in the general and specific types of their components and the relation between them: (i) individual researchers employ more than one characterization at roughly the same time, (ii) different researchers employ different characterizations at roughly the same time, and (iii)researchers change their characterizations over time.

Hormesis Plural-ConfirmationD Characteristic: In the hormesis case, researchers simultaneously attempt to confirmD multiple characterizations of the anomaly via multiple “elements” of confirmationD.

Chapter three provided numerous illustrations to defend each of these claims. Regarding

the characterization characteristic, Calabrese and Baldwin (1998b) constitute an example

of individual researchers who employ more than one characterization at a time, because

they employed characterizations in what chapter three called groups L-M (involving low-

dose-stimulation hormesis), O-T (involving overcompensation responses), and C-M

(involving hormetic effects on endpoints that reflect the process of carcinogenesis).

Meanwhile, other researchers, such as Jonas (2001) and Menzie (2001), emphasize different characterizations, especially those in group D-E (involving experimental data that conflict with researchers’ expectations for their experiments). Finally, Calabrese and

Baldwin continue to alter their characterizations. They initially employed multiple characterizations for hormesis (1997, 1998b), then began to focus on “mechanistic” characterizations of it as an overcompensation phenomenon (1999), and most recently

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have suggested “operational” characterizations of the anomaly (2002b). Chapter three

also illustrated the multiple elements of confirmationD that have occurred or that are occurring in the hormesis case. These include arguing that experimental data were not the result of errors, defending the occurrence of particular phenomena, justifying ceteris paribus clauses and auxiliary hypotheses, and showing that novel theories or paradigms could eliminate the anomaly (see Figure 4 at the end of chapter three).

By adding descriptions of the two characteristics of the hormesis case to the shared descriptive conclusion of the previous accounts and then splitting the resulting claim into two sub-claims, one arrives at the following:

Account D, Descriptive claim:

Characterization sub-claim: A scientific anomaly consists of what the dissertation calls a “characterization,” namely, an empirical component, a theoretical component, and a problematic relation between them. An anomaly may admit of multiple characterizations that differ in the general and specific types of their components and the relation between them: (i) individual researchers may employ more than one characterization at roughly the same time, (ii) different researchers may employ different characterizations at roughly the same time, and (iii)researchers may change their characterizations over time.

ConfirmationD sub-claim: Researchers provide evidence for the problematic relation between the components of an anomaly via a process of anomaly confirmationD, during which researchers may simultaneously attempt to confirmD multiple characterizations of the anomaly via multiple “elements” of confirmationD.

This descriptive claim builds on the shared descriptive claims of previous accounts of

anomaly but acknowledges the complexity associated with anomalies such as hormesis.

The next part of this section fleshes out this descriptive claim in further detail.

The explanatory claim of account D, like its descriptive claim, is based on the

insights that the hormesis case can add to the shared explanatory conclusion of previous

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accounts of anomaly. According to chapter three, a dialectical-explanatory characteristic of the hormesis case is as follows:

Hormesis Dialectical-Explanatory Characteristic: The multiple characterizations of the hormesis anomaly interact in a dialectical fashion, throughout the confirmationD process, with at least two sorts of novel hypotheses: (1) novel hypothesized characterizations that describe the anomaly, and (2) novel hypotheses that explain the anomaly.

Chapter three argued that the hormesis anomaly has interacted with novel hypotheses in at least four ways. First, the development of plausible hypotheses that could explain the anomaly influenced researchers’ initial characterizations of it. For example, the lack of hypotheses for explaining hormesis throughout the twentieth century appears to have contributed to researchers’ characterization of the anomaly as a fluke result rather than as a generalizable phenomenon. Second, the hormesis anomaly served as a catalyst for researchers to develop novel hypotheses in response to it. For instance, after exploring the empirical evidence for hormesis in their first literature search, for example, Calabrese and Baldwin proposed twelve different enzymatic mechanisms that could conceivably produce low-dose stimulation by inhibitory chemicals (1998b, VII-3-VII-11). Third, the investigation of plausible hypotheses “fed back” and altered scientists’ characterizations of the anomaly. For example, Calabrese’s investigation of the hypothesis that hormesis is an overcompensation phenomenon apparently persuaded him to pursue an operational characterization of the hormesis anomaly rather than a mechanistic one (see, e.g.,

Calabrese 1999; Calabrese 2001b; Calabrese and Baldwin 2002b). Fourth, characterizations of the anomaly suggested research projects that could provide ongoing guidance for developing hypotheses. For instance, Calabrese investigated the temporal effects of hormetic chemicals in detail, because the interpretation of hormesis as an

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overcompensation phenomenon suggested that temporal studies would be illuminating.

Chapter three also illustrated that the hypotheses that interact with the anomaly could be either novel characterizations or new explanatory hypotheses. The next part of this section describes the differences between these characterizations and explanatory hypotheses in greater detail.

By adding a description of the dialectical-explanatory characteristic of the hormesis case to the shared explanatory conclusion of the previous accounts, one obtains the following:

Account D, Explanatory claim: The multiple characterizations of an anomaly may not only stimulate novel hypotheses but may also interact in a dialectical fashion, throughout the confirmationD process, with at least two sorts of novel hypotheses: (1) novel hypothetical characterizations that describe the anomaly, and (2) novel hypotheses that explain the anomaly.

This statement improves on the shared explanatory claim of the previous accounts by being more explicit about both the variety of ways in which anomalies relate to novel hypotheses and the different sorts of hypotheses with which they interact.

Before examining these descriptive and explanatory claims in greater detail in the next part of this section, it is important to recognize the extent to which they meet not only the hormesis constraint (i.e., gleaning insights from the hormesis case) but also the strength constraint (namely, maintaining the strengths of the former accounts). Not only are the claims of account D based on the shared descriptive and explanatory conclusions of the former accounts, but they also appear to retain many of the individual strengths of accounts P, K, L1, L2, and D1. Account D’s descriptive claim merely broadens each former account’s description of anomaly without rejecting the specific characteristics that each one emphasized previously. For example, one can accept the descriptive claim of

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account D while retaining Popper’s notion that the theoretical component of an anomaly is often a theory and Lakatos’s suggestion that it is often a paradigm. One merely needs to add that an anomaly can often be characterized in multiple ways and that other characterizations of the anomaly may employ different general types of theoretical components, such as models or researchers’ expectations. Similarly, the explanatory claim of account D also broadens the previous accounts while retaining many of their former claims. For example, one can both retain Laudan’s insight that anomalies frequently cause researchers to explore alternatives to their current theories and adopt the insights of account D’s explanatory claim (such as that the novel hypotheses proposed by researchers often “feed back” and influence their descriptions of anomalies).

Details of Account D

Account D’s descriptive and explanatory claims provide only a rough description of anomaly. This part elaborates on both claims, again using the hormesis case as the basis for its insights. Consider first the characterization sub-claim of account D:

Characterization sub-claim: A scientific anomaly consists of what the dissertation calls a “characterization,” namely, an empirical component, a theoretical component, and a problematic relation between them. An anomaly may admit of multiple characterizations that differ in the general and specific types of their components and the relation between them: (i) individual researchers may employ more than one characterization at roughly the same time, (ii) different researchers may employ different characterizations at roughly the same time, and (iii) researchers may change their characterizations over time.

One can develop account D further by elucidating three sorts of details about this claim:

(1) the reasons that researchers can coherently describe an anomaly in terms of multiple characterizations, (2) the ways in which those characterizations vary from one to another,

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and (3) the means by which researchers develop them. The hormesis case illustrates all

three of these details. Consider first the reasons that it is coherent for individual

researchers or groups of researchers to employ multiple characterizations of an anomaly

at roughly the same time. (a) A single researcher may pursue multiple characterizations

at the same time, because the multiple characterizations are compatible with one another.

For example, Calabrese and Baldwin (1998b) simultaneously employed both operational

characterizations of the hormesis anomaly (e.g., as a stimulatory low-dose effect) as well

as other characterizations that provided a mechanistic explanation (such as

overcompensation) for those operational effects. (b) A single researcher may tentatively

pursue multiple characterizations at the same time, because the characterizations

(although not compatible) all appear to be plausible at that particular time. Calabrese

(1999, 2001b) illustrates this strategy, insofar as he employs characterizations in groups

O-M (involving overcompensation processes) and M-E (involving multiple effects of a toxin) because both characterizations have some plausibility. (c) Different researchers may pursue different characterizations because they disagree about which characterizations are plausible. For example, Calabrese (1999, 2001b) emphasizes characterizations (e.g., group O-M) that describe hormesis as a generalizable phenomenon (such as an overcompensation effect). In contrast, researchers such as Jonas

(2001) and Menzie (2001) seem to prefer characterizations (such as those in group D-E) that focus on experimental data rather than on particular phenomena, because these scientists are not convinced that the anomalous data provide adequate evidence that any particular phenomenon is regularly occurring.

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A second way to fill out the characterization sub-claim of account D is to describe

the ways in which anomaly characterizations can vary from one to another. There are at least four ways that the hormesis case suggests. (a) The characterizations may incorporate different general types of empirical or theoretical components or relations between them. For instance, the characterizations listed in appendix one include some whose theoretical components consist of a theory (e.g., O-T), but others consist of a model (O-M) or researchers’ experimental expectations (D-E). (b) Even if multiple characterizations employ the same general type of empirical or theoretical components, they may differ in the specific type of the components. For example, even if they all employ a theory as the theoretical component, they may employ different parts of a single theory, different theories, or different groups of theories. Or, even if they all refer to the empirical concept as a phenomenon, they may employ different concepts for describing it. In the hormesis case, for example, some researchers in the hormesis case have conceptualized it as a stimulatory effect (most notably, of course, Southam and Ehrlich

1942), whereas others conceptualize it as a beneficial effect (e.g., Gerber, Williams, and

Gray 1999). (c) Some characterizations may describe the anomaly as a fluke result (with the theoretical component being the assumption that the experimental setup was operating properly and thus would not yield the fluke results), whereas others may characterize it as a problem for a primary theory or model. In the hormesis case, for instance, Jonas (2001) and Menzie (2001) think that one could plausibly characterize the anomaly as a fluke result, whereas Calabrese and Baldwin (2003) consider the anomaly to be in conflict with current toxicological dose-response models. (d) Some characterizations may describe particular “sub-anomalies” that focus on only some of the

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phenomena associated with the anomaly. For example, the hormesis anomaly could be

divided into different sub-anomalies that concern hormetic effects with particular

chemicals, in particular organisms, on particular endpoints. The division of an anomaly into “sub-anomalies” could be significant, because researchers might ultimately confirmD some sub-anomalies and “explain away” other sub-anomalies.

Finally, a third way to “fill out” the characterization sub-claim of account D is to consider briefly how researchers develop and alter the multiple characterizations of anomalies that they employ. The hormesis case suggests that the development process can include a variety of activities associated with either the empirical or the theoretical components of the anomaly. There are at least four processes by which researchers may

develop or alter the empirical component of an anomaly (and therefore arrive at new

characterizations). (a) Scientists may sort through a variety of data and choose a

particular set of data to serve as the empirical component (presumably because that set

appears to be trustworthy and free of error). For example, Calabrese and Baldwin’s

literature studies (1998b, 2001) were designed to sort out data that appear to provide

evidence for the anomalous phenomenon of hormesis from those that could merely reflect

random variations in toxicological data. (b) After reviewing a variety of data, researchers

may choose a particular concept for describing the phenomenon that serves as the

empirical component. For example, Calabrese (2002b) has recently chosen to

characterize the phenomenon of hormesis using the concept of low-dose stimulation

rather than alternative concepts, such as the production of beneficial effects or

overcompensation. (c) Scientists may develop new concepts for describing the empirical

component of an anomaly, perhaps via the processes of “exploratory experimentation”

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that Burian (1997), Gooding (1986, 1990) and Steinle (1997) describe. (d) Researchers may refine their concepts that they use for describing the empirical component. For example, chapter two argued that Calabrese and Baldwin (2002b) appeared to shift their preferred concepts of the hormesis anomaly from “mechanistic” ones (such as the production of overcompensation responses) to operational ones (such as stimulatory effects that meet particular specifications).

Continuing the analysis of ways in which researchers develop and alter anomaly characterizations, there appear to be at least three processes through which researchers arrive at new anomaly characterizations by adjusting the theoretical component of an anomaly. (a) They may find evidence that particular auxiliary hypotheses or assumptions could be in error and therefore that they should serve as theoretical components of the anomaly. For example, as Jonas (2001) emphasizes in the hormesis case, researchers may find problems with the design of particular experiments and therefore suggest that the anomaly should be characterized as a problem for an auxiliary hypothesis, such as the assumption that the experiments were properly controlled. (b) Scientists may find evidence that one particular theory among a group of theories should be characterized as the theoretical component of the anomaly. For example, based on the evidence that

Calabrese (2001b) has uncovered for the occurrence of overcompensation effects, one might conclude that former physiological theories that describe organismal defense mechanisms are the source of the anomaly (i.e., they do not properly acknowledge and explain the prevalence of overcompensation responses). (c) As researchers gain greater understanding of an anomaly, they may be able to identify specific parts of a theory as the theoretical component. Although it is not clear that researchers know enough about

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the hormesis anomaly to narrow the theoretical component to a specific part of a theory,

Darden (1991) has previously emphasized that researchers seek to “localize” the

problematic aspects of a theory within one specific part of it.

The confirmationD sub-claim of account D, like the characterization sub-claim,

merits further elaboration. It states:

ConfirmationD sub-claim: Researchers provide evidence for the problematic relation between the components of an anomaly via a process of anomaly confirmationD, in which one or more researchers may simultaneously attempt to confirmD multiple characterizations of the anomaly via multiple “elements” of confirmationD.

The following discussion of this claim provides further detail of three sorts. (1) It

clarifies the relationship between the confirmationD of an anomaly and the confirmationD of its individual characterizations. (2) It offers reasons that researchers can coherently

confirmD multiple characterizations of a single anomaly. (3) It reviews the multiple

elements of confirmationD that the hormesis case illustrates. Concerning detail (1), the

confirmationD sub-claim states that part of the process of confirmingD an anomaly is for

researchers to attempt to confirmD multiple individual characterizations of it. As chapter two explained, these individual characterizations are confirmedD by defending both (a) their empirical components and (b) the auxiliary hypotheses that render the empirical components problematic with respect to their theoretical components. It is important to distinguish the confirmationD of these individual characterizations of an anomaly from

the confirmationD of the anomaly itself. On one hand, account D considers the anomaly

itself to be “confirmedD” if researchers confirmD one or more characterizations that

identify a particular primary model, theory, or paradigm as the theoretical component.

On the other hand, account D considers the anomaly itself to be “explained away” if

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researchers confirmD a characterization that identifies an auxiliary hypothesis or low-

level assumption about an experiment as the theoretical component. For example, let us

say that researcher X were to provide convincing evidence that at least some instances of

the hormesis anomaly were the result of improper experimental controls of the sort that

Jonas (2001) describes (e.g., improper attention to the gender, feeding regimen, or

environment of experimental animals). It would seem reasonable to claim that X has

confirmedD a particular characterization of the anomaly (namely, the characterization of it as a conflict between empirical data and a low-level assumption that researchers previously held, such as that their toxicological experiment was properly controlled).

Nevertheless, it would also seems reasonable to claim that X has not confirmedD the

anomaly itself; rather, she has explained it away.

The second factor to emphasize concerning the confirmationD sub-claim is its

emphasis on the way researchers may attempt to confirmD multiple characterizations of an anomaly. There are at least three reasons that it could be reasonable for one or more researchers to attempt to confirmD multiple characterizations at roughly the same time.

These reasons correspond to the three reasons (discussed earlier in this section) that it is

coherent for individual researchers or groups of researchers to employ multiple characterizations at the same time. (a) First, two or more characterizations of an anomaly may be compatible with one another (i.e., all of them could ultimately be confirmedD).

For example, one characterization could provide an operational description of the empirical component, and another characterization could provide a compatible mechanistic description of the empirical component. In the hormesis case, for instance, one could ultimately confirmD both a characterization of the hormesis anomaly that

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describes it as a low-dose stimulatory effect of a toxin (i.e., an operational description)

and a characterization that describes it as a low-dose overcompensation effect (a mechanistic description). Two or more characterizations of an anomaly could also be compatible with one another if some characterizations represent “sub-anomalies” of other, more general characterizations. For example, Calabrese (1999) found that phosphon has a hormetic effect on the endpoint of growth in peppermint plants (see

Calabrese 1999). The confirmationD of Calabrese’s finding is compatible with

confirmationD of a more general anomaly, such as that a particular class of plant-growth

inhibitors (including phosphon) produce hormetic effects on a group of several endpoints

(e.g., growth, longevity, and reproduction rate). (b) Second, even if two characterizations

of an anomaly are not compatible with one another, a researcher may decide that it is

reasonable to attempt to confirmD both, because both are initially plausible. For example,

one characterization of the hormesis anomaly (i.e., O-M) describes it as an

overcompensation effect, whereas another characterization (namely, M-E) labels it as the

result of multiple biological effects of a chemical on different endpoints. Nevertheless, both mechanisms are sufficiently plausible that it makes sense for researchers to attempt to confirmD both characterizations at the present time. (c) Third, different researchers

may attempt to confirmD different characterizations of the anomaly at the same time,

because they disagree about the plausibility of the characterizations. For instance, as

mentioned earlier in this section, Jonas (2001) and Menzie (2001) seem to be more likely

than Calabrese and Baldwin (2003) to encourage efforts to confirmD “auxiliary”

characterizations of the anomaly that explain it away.

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The third feature of the confirmationD sub-claim to elaborate is its assertion that researchers may employ multiple “elements” of confirmationD. The hormesis case illustrated at least seven elements of anomaly confirmationD (see section 3.3 of the dissertation for examples). (a) Researchers can provide evidence that the data sets that constitute the empirical component of an anomaly characterization are not the result of experimental or calculational errors. (b) Scientists can argue that the data sets that constitute the empirical component of an anomaly characterization are not the result of random fluctuations in data (perhaps by using statistical or distributional analysis). (c)

Researchers can defend the occurrence of particular phenomena that constitute the empirical component of an anomaly characterization. (d) Scientists can show that previous researchers have failed to develop a justifiable alternative characterization that would explain away the anomaly, despite efforts over an extensive period of time to do so. (e) Researchers can perform further experiments or run statistical analyses in order to show that particular ceteris paribus clauses or auxiliary hypotheses (which render the empirical component problematic with respect to the theoretical component) are justifiable. (f) Scientists can show that the anomaly could be eliminated by altering one or more particular theories (thus providing evidence that the anomaly falls within the domain of those specific theories). (g) Researchers can show that a rival, T’, to some current theory, T, could explain the anomaly (thus providing evidence that the anomaly falls within the domain of theory T). Elements (a) through (c) provide support for the empirical component of an anomaly, whereas element (d) supports both the empirical component and auxiliary hypotheses that render the empirical component problematic

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with respect to the theoretical component. Elements (e) through (g) primarily support auxiliary hypotheses.

Turning finally to the explanatory claim of account D, it states:

Explanatory claim: The multiple characterizations of an anomaly may not only stimulate novel hypotheses but may also interact in a dialectical fashion, throughout the confirmationD process, with at least two sorts of novel hypotheses: (1) novel hypothetical characterizations that describe the anomaly, and (2) novel hypotheses that explain the anomaly.

One important feature of the explanatory claim that merits further elaboration is the particular sorts of dialectical interactions that occur between anomalies and novel hypotheses. However, the first part of section 4.3 already reviewed the four interactions that are exhibited by the hormesis case (i.e., the characterization, stimulation, feed-back, and research-project influences). Thus, there is just one other aspect of the claim that remains to be elaborated, namely, the two sorts of novel hypotheses that interact with anomalies. The hormesis case illustrated that the novel hypotheses with which anomalies interact could be either plausible explanations for the anomaly or hypothesized characterizations of it (see section 3.4 of the dissertation). The explanations could be, for example, descriptions of causal mechanisms that produce the empirical component of the anomaly or arguments that show how the anomaly fits within a regular pattern of events (see e.g., Kitcher 1981, Salmon 1984). In the hormesis case, the enzymatic mechanisms that Calabrese and Baldwin (1998b) suggested in response to the anomaly were explanatory hypotheses that provided causal explanations for the hormesis phenomenon. The hypotheses that interact with the anomaly need not be full-blown explanations, however; they could merely consist of hypothesized descriptive characterizations. These hypothetical characterizations have the same structure as other

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characterizations (i.e., they consist of an empirical component, a theoretical component,

and a problematic relation between them). For instance, the characterizations of hormesis

as a homeopathic phenomenon or as an overcompensation phenomenon (see chapter

three) were hypothesized as descriptions of the anomaly. Chapter three argued that it is

not incoherent to claim that anomalies (which the dissertation describes in terms of

characterizations) interact dialectically with novel hypotheses (which could be other

characterizations). One merely needs to acknowledge that characterizations can serve as

“hypotheses” in one instance and as the “anomaly” in other cases. For example, in one case, a particular characterization (Y) may serve as a “hypothesis” that is proposed in response to the “anomaly” (e.g., characterization X). At a later point in time, the new characterization, Y, may serve as the “anomaly,” perhaps suggesting a research project that produces new hypotheses.

Account D and Other Empirical Cases

The first part of section 4.3 developed account D of anomaly by adding insights from the hormesis case to the shared conclusions of the previous accounts. According to the account’s descriptive claim, anomalies may display multiple characterizations throughout a process that incorporates multiple elements of confirmationD. According to

the explanatory claim, the changing characterizations of an anomaly facilitate a

dialectical interaction between the anomaly and novel hypotheses. One might worry,

however, that account D may be based too heavily on insights drawn from a single case

study (i.e., chemical hormesis). This part of section 4.3 argues that account D accords

well not only with the hormesis case but also with other instances of scientific anomaly.

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It briefly considers both anomalies that previous philosophers have examined and also the contemporary multiple-chemical-sensitivity (MCS) and endocrine-disruption anomalies that were introduced in section 3.2 of the dissertation. By doing so, part C shows that account D meets the empirical constraint described in section 4.2.

Turning first to previously considered cases of anomaly, those described by Kuhn

(1970) provide an excellent example of other anomalies that accord well with the characterization sub-claim of account D, which emphasizes that researchers may employ multiple characterizations for anomalies. Kuhn points out that in the cases of oxygen and

X-rays, respectively, Lavoisier and Roentgen initially observed anomalous results that they were unsure how to conceptualize. As they investigated the results further, they developed increasingly detailed conceptual categories for characterizing their anomalies.

Similarly, Friedrich Steinle (1997) points out that Ampere performed extensive

“exploratory experimentation” in order to develop concepts for describing Oersted’s anomalous discovery of magnetic effects by an electrical current. Thus, it seems reasonable to claim that Lavoisier, Roentgen, and Ampere employed multiple different characterizations of their anomalies as they developed increasingly sophisticated concepts for describing their empirical components. Furthermore, the empirical components of the anomalies changed in both general and specific type as the researchers developed concepts that enabled them to describe the anomalies in terms of particular phenomena (like X-rays) rather than in terms of relatively “raw” experimental data (such as marks on film).

The confirmationD sub-claim of account D, which emphasizes that the confirmationD process incorporates multiple elements or activities, also accords well with

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previously studied anomalies. The nineteenth-century anomaly of researchers’ failure to

observe ether drift provides an excellent example of different elements of confirmationD

(see e.g., Collins and Pinch 1991, Mayo 1996). The anomaly was partially confirmedD

when experimentalists such as Michelson and Morley examined their experimental

apparatus and their data analysis and argued that they were justifiable. It received further

confirmationD when they failed to measure ether drift in new experiments with different

instruments. The anomaly received even greater confirmationD when Einstein was able

to explain the failure to observe ether drift with an alternative to Newtonian theory (thus

providing evidence that the anomaly fell within the domain of phenomena that

Newtonian theory could be expected to explain).

Careful investigation of other contemporary anomalies associated with low-dose

toxic chemical effects (namely, multiple chemical sensitivity and endocrine disruption)

yields even more illustrations of account D’s descriptive and explanatory claims.51 In support of the characterization sub-claim, appendices two and three (at the end of the dissertation) list multiple characterizations for the anomalies of multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS) and endocrine disruption. The characterizations on these lists include different general and specific types of empirical and theoretical anomaly components and of the relations between them. In defense of account D’s explanatory claim, one can also discern the “characterization,” “stimulation,” “feed-back,” and “research-project” influences in both the MCS and endocrine-disruption cases. As an illustration of the

“characterization” influence in the endocrine-disruption case, researchers were initially able to characterize the endocrine-disruption anomaly only as sets of seemingly distinct

51 See section 3.2 for a description of the MCS and endocrine-disruption anomalies.

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phenomena (see group P-E in appendix two), because they had no hypothesis that could unify them. For example, they noticed anomalous “loafing” behavior of bald eagles in

Florida, anomalous drops in the reproduction rates of mink near Lake Michigan, and exceptionally low hatching and survival rates for alligators near Lake Apopka in Florida.

These individual characterizations of anomalous phenomena spurred the development of explanatory hypotheses, however, which is an example of the “stimulation” influence.

The most influential hypothesis for explaining anomalies such as eagle, mink, and alligator reproduction problems has been Theo Colborn’s suggestion that all these phenomena are the consequence of “endocrine disruption” (see Colborn, Dumanoski, and

Myers 1996). In accordance with the “feed-back” influence, Colborn’s hypothesis has resulted in new characterizations of multiple anomalous environmental phenomena as instances of the general phenomenon of endocrine disruption rather than as distinct anomalies (see groups PS-T and PS-TS in appendix two). Finally, as an example of the

“research-project” influence, the characterization of multiple contemporary environmental anomalies as instances of endocrine disruption supports a particular set of research projects to gain further understanding of the anomaly. Examples of these projects include studies to explain how very different sorts of chemicals can bind to the same hormone receptors, efforts to systematize the ways in which normal endocrine function can be altered, and attempts to gain more detailed understanding of the mechanisms associated with endocrine disruption (e.g., Arnold and McLachlan 1996,

Brotons et al. 1995, Jobling et al. 1995).

The same four influences are apparent in the MCS case. In accordance with the characterization influence, characterizations of MCS as a “mass psychogenic illness”

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were initially quite common, because one of the few plausible hypotheses for explaining

the anomaly was that it was caused by psychological phobias or other psychological

disorders (see groups PP-T and PD-T in appendix 2; Ashford and Miller 1998, 113, 277,

Black et al. 1990, Staudenmeyer and Selner 1990). Illustrating the “stimulation”

influence, however, researchers have begun to propose multiple mechanistic hypotheses

in an attempt to provide alternative explanations for MCS (see Ashford and Miller 1998,

87ff). These hypotheses include the suggestion that it could involve enzymatic,

immunological, or neurological processes. As an example of the “feed-back” influence,

the exploration of these further hypotheses has resulted in increased evidence for

“physiological” characterizations of the MCS anomaly (as opposed to “psychogenic”

characterizations). For example, researchers have shown that chronic exposure of rats to

low doses of chlorinated pesticides can produce “kindling” (i.e., sensitization that can

contributes to the induction of seizures) in regions of the brain, such as the limbic system,

that other scientists hypothesize to be related to MCS (Ashford and Miller 1998, 257,

Gilbert 1995). Finally, the research-project influence is illustrated in the MCS case by a

set of characterizations (namely, groups DS1,M-E, DS2,M-E, DS3,M-E, etc., in appendix

three) that characterize MCS operationally as a phenomenon exhibited by individuals who are exposed to a particular experimental protocol. The experimental methodology involves isolating test volunteers by placing them in special “environmental units” for a period of time. Researchers then examine the volunteers’ subsequent responses to carefully controlled, individual chemical exposures (see Ashford and Miller 1998, 54ff,

Selner and Staudenmeyer 1985). This operational characterization of the anomaly suggests a research project of investigating the nature of MCS by performing randomized

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studies in which purported MCS sufferers are compared to control subjects in these environmental units.

Account D and Other Work in Philosophy of Science

This final part of section 4.3 argues that the dissertation’s description of anomaly meets the theoretical constraint described in section 4.2. Namely, account D accords well not only with many empirical examples of scientific anomaly but also with theoretical developments in the philosophy of science. Work by the “new experimentalists” (e.g.,

Hacking 1983, 1988, Galison 1987, Mayo 1996) and by scholars working in “science and technology studies” (STS) (e.g., Collins and Pinch 1982, Gooding 1986, 1990) provide independent confirmation for account D. Their studies of experimental practice provide particularly strong support for the descriptive claim of account D, which emphasizes both that anomalies admit of multiple characterizations and that the elements of anomaly confirmationD vary throughout the confirmationD process. Because the explanatory claim of account D presupposes the notion that anomalies consist of multiple characterizations that can interact with novel hypotheses, these studies also increase the plausibility of the explanatory claim.

Consider five examples of the recent work that supports account D; each of the following studies will be described briefly in the remainder of this section. (1) Hacking’s

(1988) and Mayo’s (1996) claims that data must be extensively interpreted support account D’s claim that the general or specific type of an anomaly’s empirical component may vary between different characterizations of it. (2) Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) distinction between data and phenomena provides further support for account D by

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showing that the general type of an anomaly’s empirical component may vary from

characterization to characterization. (3) Gooding’s (1986, 1990) analyses of the ways in

which scientists develop novel concepts also indicates that the general type of an

anomaly’s empirical component may vary among characterizations. (4) Collins and

Pinch’s (1991) examination of anomalous parapsychological phenomena supports the

claim of account D that an anomaly’s theoretical component may differ both in general

and specific type, resulting in multiple characterizations of it. (5) Finally, Hacking’s

(1988) “extended Duhem-Quine thesis” indicates, as the confirmationD sub-claim of

account D states, that the elements of anomaly confirmationD may vary as scientists

evaluate different sorts of auxiliary hypotheses associated with their anomalous

experiments.

The first example of work that strengthens account D is that Hacking (1988) and

Mayo (1996) support the account’s emphasis on the notion that the empirical component

of an anomaly may vary from one characterization to another. Hacking asserts that

scientists sometimes develop specific experimental data statements only after extensively

interpreting their results. According to the terminology of account D, the general or specific type of an anomaly’s “empirical” component may change throughout this interpretation process. Mayo (1996) illustrates this process with a discussion of

Eddington’s famous experimental test of Einstein’s general theory of relativity (GTR).

She describes four “levels” of experimental results from Eddington’s eclipse experiment,

reflecting increasing degrees of theoretical interpretation: (a) raw measurements of the

positions of stars before and after the eclipse; (b) estimates, resulting from data analysis

of the stars’ positions, of the deflection of light from the stars; (c) estimates, using data

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from (b), of the light deflection that would have been observed at the limb of the sun; (d)

estimates, using data from (c), of the deflection of starlight due to the sun’s gravitational

field (1996, 145). Therefore, because the precise results of an anomalous experiment

change, depending on the degree to which researchers have interpreted their experimental

findings, the general or specific type of the anomaly’s empirical component varies.

Bogen and Woodward (1988) provide a second example of philosophical work

that supports the notion of account D that anomalies display multiple characterizations.

Specifically, their study suggests that the general type of an anomaly’s empirical

component may vary between characterizations. They employ a distinction between

what they call “data” and “phenomena” in order to emphasize the difference between

“low-level” experimental results and the ways that scientists interpret those results. They

initially made this distinction in order to emphasize that scientific theories do not usually

directly explain the raw data that scientists obtain from experiments, because those data

are affected in numerous small ways by random factors that are beyond the scope of the

explanatory theory. They use the melting point of lead (327 degrees Celsius) as an

illustration. Bogen and Woodward suggest that lead’s melting at 327 degrees C (which

scientific theories attempt to explain) is a phenomenon that is inferred from observational

data. The observational data collected in any actual experiment includes a variety of melting temperatures that result from a wide variety of tiny causal influences that affect individual “runs” of the experiment. The factors involved in producing these data are so complex that scientists cannot use their theories to explain the data. Instead, the individual data sets are statistically analyzed to yield evidence for the “actual” phenomenon under investigation, the melting point of lead (1988; see also Woodward

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2000). Thus, Bogen and Woodward’s analysis of experimentation supports the notion

that the general type of the empirical anomaly component may change (e.g., from data to

a phenomenon) as scientists interpret their experimental results.52

Third, Gooding (1986, 1990) offers an account of scientific observation that

provides further support for account D’s claim that the general types of anomalies’

empirical components vary, resulting in multiple characterizations. He emphasizes that

researchers who explore novel phenomena sometimes have to develop new concepts for

describing their perceptual experiences, and he attempts to describe that development

process. He uses the nineteenth-century research on electromagnetism by figures such as

Faraday, Davy, and Ampere as case studies. One of his central claims is that, on the way to developing fully developed concepts for describing novel phenomena, researchers employ intermediate descriptions of their perceptual experiences that he calls

“construals.” These construals are “flexible, quasi-linguistic messengers between the perceptual and the conceptual” (1986, 209). A construal serves as a “provisional interpretation of effects which cannot be understood independently of the exploratory behavior that produces them” (1986, 215). He offers the example of “Davy’s disk,” which consisted of a cardboard disk mounted on an axle. By drawing arrows on the surface of the disk, Davy was able to create a construal of the magnetic effect surrounding a current-carrying wire. This construal enabled him to begin making sense

52 Admittedly, thinkers such as Glymour (2000) have criticized Bogen and Woodward by suggesting that it is unnecessary to make a distinction between comparatively low-level “data” and more interpreted “phenomena”; the criticism suggests that “phenomena” can just be described in terms of statistical manipulations of the “data” set. Contrary to Glymour, however, interpretation of experimental results does seem to be significant, because such interpretation does not always consist of mere statistical manipulations of experimental results. In the hormesis case study, for instance, the experimental results are treated as evidence for interpreted phenomena (e.g., mechanistic processes of overcompensation) that cannot be derived from the “raw” experimental results by mere statistical manipulation.

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of electromagnetic phenomena before he developed a more complete theoretical

understanding of it.

The significance of Gooding’s analysis for account D is that it supports the notion

that the empirical component of an anomaly changes as researchers attempt to develop

concepts for describing it. His work suggests that the empirical component of an

anomaly may begin as a privately experienced percept that researchers do not yet know

how to communicate coherently with others. It may then develop into what Gooding

calls a construal. Finally, the construal may give rise to an “interpretation” of the novel

phenomenon, which provides “an ascent from the immediate and concrete world of the

laboratory to a world of representations (words, images, symbols)” (Gooding 1986, 215).

To use Nickles’s (1989, 326) language, the empirical component of an anomaly may pass

from “original, inarticulate gropings” through semi-verbal construals and personally

satisfactory verbal results and only later to easily communicable results “which are

routinely replicable and demonstrable to and by other members of the community.”

Thus, although the description of account D in chapters two through four has emphasized

data and phenomena as the most common general types of anomaly components, the

dissertation’s account can also acknowledge the “inarticulate gropings” and quasi- linguistic construals described by Gooding as other general types of empirical anomaly components.

Collins and Pinch’s (1982) studies of parapsychological phenomena provide a fourth example of support for account D’s notion that anomalies can be characterized in multiple ways by different researchers (see 1982, 47ff). In particular, they support the notion that there may be multiple theories, paradigms, or theory parts that could fill the

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role of an anomaly’s theoretical component. For example, in the case of a parapsychological phenomenon such as metal-bending, they argue that the anomalous phenomenon could be characterized as a problem for a broad paradigm that holds for many of the sciences (e.g., paradigmatic assumptions such as materialism or the epiphenomenalism of mind on the brain). They claim, however, that the phenomenon could also be characterized as a problem for a paradigm or set of assumptions that is specific to the discipline of physics in particular (e.g., the notion that all natural phenomena can ultimately be explained in terms of physical mechanisms such as time- space-mass-energy relations). They also argue that the anomaly could be characterized as a problem for specific physical principles or models, such as the principle that all physical phenomena display relationships that vary in strength over physical distance.

Finally, they claim that the anomaly could be characterized as a conflict not with physics but rather with principles or paradigms associated with psychology, such as the mechanisms by which learning occurs. It is also noteworthy that Collins and Pinch

(1982) support one of the details of account D. Namely, the second part of this section

(4.3) argued that one reason that anomalies display multiple characterizations is that researchers may separate an anomaly into different “sub-anomalies” with their own unique characterizations. For example, Collins and Pinch argue that the specific parapsychological phenomenon of “precognition” may constitute a special “sub- anomaly” that conflicts with specific paradigmatic assumptions (e.g., that causality cannot work backward in time) that may not be in conflict with other parapsychological sub-anomalies.

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Finally, Hacking’s (1988) examination of the “extended” Duhem-Quine thesis

provides a fifth example of the ways that other philosophical work supports account D.

In particular, his work supports the notion that multiple elements contribute to the

anomaly confirmationD process, as researchers defend different sorts of auxiliary

hypotheses associated with anomalies. For example, Hacking (1988) notes that the

Duhem-Quine thesis originally emphasized that scientists could eliminate an anomaly not

merely by changing the primary theory under investigation but also by revising auxiliary

theories associated with the observation. Thus, the original Duhem-Quine thesis

primarily emphasized one particular element of confirmationD, namely, showing that the

auxiliary hypotheses associated with an anomalous result are defensible. (By doing so,

researchers show that the anomaly can not be eliminated merely by adjusting an auxiliary

hypothesis.)

Hacking points out, however, that experiments involve at least eight features: (1)

questions, (2) working theories, (3) materiel, (4) theories about the materiel, (5) data

generators, (6) data, (7) data processing, and (8) data interpretation. He suggests that the

Duhem-Quine thesis should be extended from its original focus on features (2) and (4) in

order to acknowledge that scientists can resolve anomalies by altering any of the eight features of experiments. For example, Pickering (1984) emphasizes that scientists sometimes alter both the theory of the materiel and the materiel itself in order to revise their interpretation of the experimental results. Similarly, Ackermann (1985) suggests that scientists can also alter the data and the interpretation of the data that they glean from experiments. Thus, there may be auxiliary hypotheses associated with many of the items in Hacking’s list, all of which are required to render the theoretical component

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problematic with respect to the empirical component. As a result, one is likely to employ many different “elements” or “activities” of anomaly confirmationD in order to determine the particular mistaken assumption or expectation that is responsible for an anomaly.

Therefore, Hacking’s list of the features of experiments supports account D’s claim that there are multiple elements of confirmationD (because different elements help researchers to look for potential problems with different features in Hacking’s list).

4.4: Significance of Account D

Section 4.3 performed the first four steps in developing the dissertation’s novel description of anomaly. It formulated account D using insights from previous accounts and from the hormesis case and then argued that the resulting description of anomaly is both empirically and theoretically promising. Section 4.4 performs the fifth step in developing and evaluating account D, namely, arguing that it constitutes a significant contribution to the philosophy of science. The section argues for three ways in which it is important. The first part shows that the account holds promise for alleviating the problems that chapter two identified with previous descriptions of anomaly. The second part defends the claim that the account provides insights that are novel relative to previous work in the philosophy of science. The third part argues that the account suggests a range of promising research projects both concerning scientific discovery and the role of values in science.

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Alleviating Previous Problems

One reason that account D is significant for the philosophy of science is that it appears likely to alleviate the problems of ambiguity, incompleteness, and incoherence that chapter two analyzed with previous accounts of anomaly (i.e., P, K, L1, L2, and D1).

As chapter two argued, one of the chief weaknesses with the previous accounts’ descriptive conclusions is their apparent ambiguity and incompleteness, because different accounts emphasize different general types of empirical and theoretical anomaly components and relations between them. For example, Kuhn and Lakatos both appear to describe the theoretical component of an anomaly as a paradigm, whereas Popper,

Laudan, and Darden appear to describe it as a theory. This apparent conflict between their accounts is alleviated by account D, because it emphasizes that different anomalies

(and different characterizations of a single anomaly) display varying general types of theoretical components. For example, scientists might initially describe the theoretical component of an anomaly as researchers’ expectations; later, some scientists might narrow the theoretical component down to a particular theory or even part of a theory.

Thus, one can alleviate the differences in the previous accounts’ descriptions of anomaly by claiming, in accordance with account D, that they each emphasized only some general types of empirical and theoretical components and the relations between them.

Account D also appears to alleviate the previous accounts’ explanatory weaknesses, which center on their conflicting claims about the temporal relationship

between the confirmationD of anomalies and the development of novel hypotheses in

response to them. Consider, for example, that Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Darden claim

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that the awareness of anomaly typically precedes the development of novel hypotheses,

whereas Laudan claims that problems usually do not become genuinely anomalous until

novel hypotheses are already available to explain them. If one accepts account D’s

emphasis on multiple elements of anomaly confirmationD, however, it appears that one

can alleviate this apparent conflict. One can acknowledge Laudan’s insight that the

development of novel explanatory hypotheses is a very important element of anomaly

confirmationD, in the sense that it makes scientists more likely to characterize anomalies

as problems for former theories rather than as fluke results. Nevertheless, one can also

argue that Laudan overemphasizes the importance of that particular element and does not

adequately emphasize other elements of confirmationD, such as the defense of

experimental protocols and auxiliary hypotheses that are responsible for the anomalous

results. By emphasizing these other elements of confirmationD, one can claim (with

Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Darden) that an anomaly can often be sufficiently confirmedD to stimulate the development of novel hypotheses even if researchers have not yet developed a rival theory that can explain it.

Chapter two also claimed that the previous accounts’ explanatory conclusions differed about which elements of anomaly confirmationD typically precede the

development of novel hypotheses. For example, Darden suggests that researchers usually

begin by defending the occurrence of the anomaly’s empirical component and the

localization of it within the domain of a particular theory. In apparent contrast, Laudan

claims that researchers typically start by developing a rival theory that can explain it.

Other accounts (by Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos) do not describe any particular elements

of confirmationD as typical prerequisites for developing novel hypotheses. Because

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account D emphasizes that there are many elements of anomaly confirmationD rather than

just one or two, it suggests that different elements are likely to precede the development

of novel hypotheses in different cases. Thus, one can alleviate the incoherence of the

previous accounts by claiming that they each focused too much on a limited set of

elements of confirmationD. For example, one can accept Darden’s insight that

researchers often “localize” an anomaly within a particular part of a theory before

developing novel hypotheses for explaining it, but one can presume that anomalies

probably achieve a high degree of confirmationD in other ways as well. (For instance, it

might be sufficient in some cases merely to show that the experimental procedures that

produced the anomalous results are highly trustworthy and free from error.)

Novel Insights of Account D

A second reason that account D is significant for the philosophy of science is that

it provides novel insights for the philosophy of science. This novelty is particularly

important to clarify, because the central points of account D (i.e., its descriptive and

explanatory claims) may not seem to be particularly surprising. Most philosophers of science are likely to find these claims to be plausible, and the thinkers mentioned in the last part of section 4.3 (i.e., Bogen, Collins, Gooding, Hacking, Mayo, Pinch, and

Woodward) have already hinted at many of the ideas associated with account D.

Nevertheless, this part of section 4.4 argues that the ways in which the dissertation has systematized and emphasized these ideas is novel and valuable. It argues that account D is importantly different from two previous bodies of thought: (1) the five accounts of anomaly that were described in chapter two; and (2) the studies by the “new

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experimentalists” and thinkers in the STS tradition that were presented in the last part of

section 4.3.

Consider first how account D appears to make a novel contribution to the

previous studies of anomaly provided by Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, and Darden.

One example is the dissertation’s emphasis on the way researchers characterize

anomalies in terms of multiple characterizations. The understandings of anomaly

described in chapter two do not encourage thinking about anomalies in terms of multiple

characterizations with different general and specific types of components and relations,

because each account focuses on a particular general type of empirical and theoretical

anomaly component. Thus, even if these thinkers would ultimately acknowledge that

anomalies display multiple characterizations, the language of their accounts does not

encourage describing anomalies that way. For example, Lakatos (1970, 159)

characterizes an anomaly as a problematic relation between a phenomenon and a

paradigm (or, in his own terms, a research programme). Such an account seems to

exclude (at least implicitly) the occurrence of other general types of anomaly components

(such as sets of data or models or theories). It also encourages the implicit assumption

that researchers can identify and agree on one particular empirical and theoretical

component that remain constant as scientists explore and confirmD each anomaly.

Admittedly, Kuhn probably acknowledges the multiple characterizations of anomalies to a greater extent than the other previous authors. For example, he recognizes that the empirical component of an anomaly may initially be very difficult for researchers to describe and may only later be described as a particular phenomenon, when scientists have developed a novel paradigm that makes sense of it (1977, 171). Nevertheless,

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account D is still more systematic and complete than Kuhn in its description of anomaly.

For instance, it explicitly emphasizes that the empirical component of an anomaly displays not only different specific types (e.g., different sets of data) but also varying general types (e.g., construals, sets of data, and phenomena). Furthermore, it also emphasizes that the theoretical component and relation between the components also vary in general and specific type.

The previous accounts of anomaly by Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, and

Darden also do not emphasize the dialectical interaction between anomalies and novel hypotheses that the explanatory claim of account D describes. Although they emphasize particular influences between anomalies and novel hypotheses, they do not emphasize that the anomaly confirmationD process incorporates multiple influences that interact

dialectically. For example, Laudan emphasizes that scientists often do not acknowledge

the occurrence of a genuine anomaly until a theory develops that can explain it. Thus, he

recognizes a sort of interaction very similar to the characterization influence (namely,

that the presence or absence of hypotheses can influence researchers’ initial characterizations of an anomaly). To take another example, Kuhn argues that scientists may have trouble conceptualizing anomalous results until after a new paradigm develops

(1970, 63). His insight accords with the feed-back influence (i.e., that plausible hypotheses can cause researchers to alter their initial characterizations of an anomaly).

Nevertheless, these accounts all appear to focus on individual sorts of interactions and do not emphasize that a single anomaly may interact dialectically, in multiple ways, with hypotheses that scientists propose in response to it. Therefore, the dissertation’s

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emphasis on the dialectical interaction between anomalies and novel hypotheses appears to provide another novel contribution to previous accounts.

Account D also appears to be novel relative to a second body of previous thought, namely, the claims of the new experimentalists and STS thinkers mentioned in section

4.3. Specifically, the dissertation’s description of anomaly is more systematic and detailed than their previous work. For example, although Bogen and Woodward,

Gooding, Hacking, and Mayo all recognized in some sense that the general or specific type of an anomaly’s empirical component could vary among characterizations, they did not emphasize that the types of the theoretical component and relation could also change.

Similarly, although Collins and Pinch suggested that the theoretical component of an anomaly could vary among different characterizations, they did not emphasize the way that the empirical component could change. These previous authors also failed to develop a systematic scheme of terminology, as the dissertation did in chapter two, for describing the varying types of anomaly components and elements of confirmationD.

Finally, none of these thinkers explicitly considered the fact that the changing characterizations of an anomaly could facilitate a dialectical interaction between an anomaly and the development of novel hypotheses. Thus, although the studies of the new experimentalists and the STS thinkers support the dissertation’s work, account D appears to be significantly novel both in its explicitness and detail.

Promising Research Projects

A final reason for the significance of account D is that it suggests a variety of promising research projects in the philosophy of science, both concerning scientific

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discovery and the role that values play in scientific practice. Chapter three concluded (in section 3.5) that previous philosophical studies of science were plausibly impoverished in their understandings of value judgments in science as well as scientific discovery,

because they failed to emphasize the plural-characterization, plural-confirmationD, and

dialectical-explanatory characteristics of the hormesis case. This chapter considers how

account D may be able to remedy those deficiencies, based on the fact that the dissertation’s description of anomaly does acknowledge the three characteristics of the hormesis anomaly. This part of the chapter provides only a very cursory description of the research projects that could be developed in the area of science and values, because chapter six of the dissertation already addresses some of these issues. Namely, it considers some of the strategies that scientific researchers and policymakers can employ in order to meet their ethical responsibilities for responding to scientific uncertainty about anomalies in ways that promote the public good (see also Elliott forthcoming). This chapter discusses potential research projects concerning scientific discovery in greater detail, because they are not developed elsewhere in the dissertation (but see Elliott 2004).

Even the dissertation’s discussion of scientific discovery, however, only “skims the surface” of the future work that could be performed in this area.

The dissertation sets the stage for future research concerning scientific discovery by suggesting a set of promising research projects. The basis for these projects is the emphasis in the explanatory claim on the way anomalies interact with novel hypotheses in a dialectical fashion throughout the anomaly confirmationD process. It seems plausible

that the dialectical interplay of the characterization, stimulation, feedback, and research- project influences could play a significant role in scientific discovery (namely, by

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gradually producing more sophisticated hypotheses for explaining anomalies). For example, scientists’ initial characterizations of an anomaly may be limited by their background knowledge concerning the phenomenon that they are investigating and by their creativity in developing preliminary hypotheses about it. These initial characterizations can serve, however, as a stimulus for the development of further characterizations and promising research projects. For instance, Stebbing’s (1982, 1998) proposal that the hormesis anomaly could be characterized as an overcompensation effect spurred Calabrese (2001b) to engage in a close examination of the temporal characteristics of hormetic effects. As chapter three (section 3.4) described, Calabrese’s investigation did not fully support Stebbing’s proposed characterization, but it provided new and valuable information about hormesis.

Given that the dialectical confirmationD process by which anomalies and hypotheses interact with one another could be a source of insights concerning the process of scientific discovery, at least three lines of investigation seem to be promising. (1) An

“interactions” research project is to provide a more detailed account of the interactions by which the characterizations of anomalies affect the development of novel hypotheses (as well as the ways in which novel hypotheses influence anomaly characterizations). The dissertation has already identified four of these relationships: the characterization, hypothesis, feed-back, and research-project influences. (2) An “initial-characterization” research project is to identify strategies by which scientists develop and provide preliminary support for their initial characterizations of anomalies. These strategies are likely to play a seminal role in the discovery process, because the resulting characterizations guide the subsequent development of hypotheses about the anomaly

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(through the stimulation and research-project influences). (3) Finally, a “discovery- impact” research project is to develop a “large-scale” account of the overall role that the dialectical confirmationD process described by account D plays in the course of scientific discovery. This project would provide a “big-picture” look at the extent to which the dialectical influences between anomalies and novel hypotheses actually influence the development of novel scientific theories. The remainder of this section examines two of these three research projects concerning scientific discovery. It seems difficult to make much progress with the first, interactions, project without examining some fresh case studies, because chapters three and four have already analyzed the four ways in which anomalies and novel hypotheses influenced one another in the hormesis, MCS, and endocrine-disruption cases. The analyses in the preceding chapters have not addressed the “initial-characterization” and “discovery-impact” projects, however, so the rest of this chapter sketches how one might use the hormesis case study to begin pursuing them.

Regarding the initial-characterization project, one can identify a variety of reasoning strategies for developing and defending preliminary anomaly characterizations in the hormesis case. These could complement the reasoning strategies that Darden

(1991) has already identified for facilitating other aspects of scientific discovery (such as theory generation, theory appraisal, and theory revision). Consider the following seven strategies associated with the hormesis case:

(a) replicating previous experiments that produced anomalous results,

(b) expanding previous experiments to include new variables,

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(d) exploring why past experimental work previously failed to produce evidence for the anomalous results that researchers are now characterizing,

(e) suggesting plausible mechanisms that might produce the anomalous results,

(f) comparing the anomalous results to established theories, and

(g) using informal error-statistical arguments (of the sort that Mayo (1996) discusses) both to support a proposed characterization of the anomaly and to question whether other characterizations would produce the observed results.

These strategies are significant, because they suggest that philosophers can study how researchers develop and provide support for anomaly characterizations during the early stages of the confirmationD process. For example, scientists can engage in strategic

experimentation to explore the anomaly, in accordance with strategies (a), (b), and (c).

They can also investigate the anomaly’s relationship to plausible mechanisms and

theories, as strategies (e) and (f) suggest. Thus, the strategies exhibited in the hormesis

case illustrate that the initial creation of anomaly characterizations, which in turn

influence the later course of discovery by affecting the development of novel hypotheses,

can be guided by reasonable approaches that are amenable to philosophical analysis.

First, the hormesis case study illustrates strategy (a), which involves performing

further error-statistical studies of an anomalous phenomenon. Although Calabrese and

Baldwin have not performed further experimental studies of their own, their fundamental

approach to confirming the hormesis hypothesis was the collection of hundreds of

previous studies. These experimental results initially enabled Calabrese and Baldwin to

support the legitimacy of hormesis, despite its anomalous relation to scientists’

expectations and dose-response models. Jonas (2001) provides further support for the

importance of stragegy (a) with his suggestion that researchers need to perform further

studies designed specifically to test the hormesis hypothesis.

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The hormesis case also illustrates three other strategies: (b) expanding the experiments that produce the anomalous results to include new variables, (c) suggesting plausible mechanisms that might produce the anomalous results, and (d) relating the anomalous results to established theories. An example of strategy (b) would be Calabrese and Baldwin’s attempts to study the time dependence of hormetic effects (1998b, IV-1;

Calabrese 2001b). Their interest in such time dependence is, of course, a result of the possibility that potential mechanisms for hormesis (e.g., overcompensation phenomena) would be expected to vary over time. Thus, Calabrese and Baldwin’s interest in other variables such as time also illustrates their interest in mechanisms, which is an example of strategy (c). Calabrese and Baldwin have suggested numerous mechanisms that might result in hormetic effects, including the removal or inactivation of enzyme inhibitors, the simultaneous actions of inhibitors as substrates in other reactions, dissociation of enzymes into active subunits, and alteration in cell permeability (1998b, VII-3-7; 2001).

Furthermore, in accord with strategy (d), researchers have attempted to associate hormetic effects with the theory of evolution by natural selection. Calabrese and Baldwin initially emphasized the work of Stebbing (1982), who argued that natural selection might have favored organisms that developed generalized adaptive strategies of mildly overcompensating for a variety of stressors (1998b, VII-15). More recently, Gerber,

Williams, and Gray (1999) and Parsons (2001) have suggested that scientists should expect evolutionary processes to equip organisms to make adaptive use of low-level toxins.

The hormesis research also illustrates the other strategies: (e) explaining why past experimental work failed to provide evidence for the phenomenon; (f) looking for

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evidence of the phenomenon under diverse circumstances; and (g) using informal error-

statistical arguments. First, in accordance with strategy (e), Calabrese and Baldwin

claimed that few previous studies of the effects of toxic chemicals examined the very

low-dose effects of the chemicals. Because the toxicologists designing the experiments

were primarily concerned to find statistically significant evidence that a toxic chemical

produced harmful effects at high doses, they did not bother to study low-dose effects

(Calabrese and Baldwin 1998b, IV-2). Therefore, Calabrese and Baldwin argued, in

effect, that most of these studies would not have been likely to display hormetic effects

even if the linear, no-threshold hypothesis were false.

Calabrese and Baldwin also looked for evidence of hormesis under diverse

circumstances (strategy f). A point that they emphasized in their initial literature search and in subsequent publications was the diversity of conditions under which hormetic effects have been observed:

Hormetic responses are observed in numerous species from a broad range of taxonomic groups including microbes, plants, and animals (including humans).... Chemicals shown to induce hormetic effects represent a broad range of chemical classes: the most studied agents were metals, followed by alcohols, antibiotics, auxin related compounds, and numerous biocidal agents.... The types of hormetic responses indicate that the principal endpoint studied has been growth, followed by metabolic/physiological changes (e.g., enzyme activity), longevity, and various reproductive endpoints. (Calabrese and Baldwin 1998b, 2)53

One way to think about this strategy is to view it as a technique for supporting the

characterization of hormesis as a problem for primary theories or models rather than as a

53One might question whether Calabrese and Baldwin actually succeeded in examining hormesis under diverse circumstances. They certainly observed hormesis with diverse subjects and diverse causes, but they may not have observed hormesis under very diverse circumstances. Most of the studies were under carefully controlled laboratory conditions, for example. Nevertheless, Calabrese and Baldwin’s attempt to observe hormesis under as many circumstances as possible provides a helpful illustration of this strategy, whether or not their use of the strategy is completely successful.

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problem for researchers’ auxiliary hypotheses or assumptions. Strategy (f) helps to

defend the characterization of hormesis as a problem for primary theories, because it

seems unlikely that an experimental artifact or fluke result would show up in many

different experiments, across a broad range of taxonomic groups, with a broad array of

chemicals, on a number of biological endpoints. The use of this strategy also appears to

be an example of strategy (g); Calabrese and Baldwin have made an informal argument

that their literature search constitutes what Mayo calls a severe test of the hormesis

hypothesis. They claim that it would have been exceedingly unlikely that toxicologists

would have observed U-shaped dose-response curves under so many conditions if the

hormesis hypothesis were false.

Although the preceding introduction to the initial-characterization research project

provides only a starting point for future work, it provides evidence that strategies for

developing anomaly characterizations in the earliest stages of anomaly confirmationD could provide philosophical insights concerning scientific discovery. The third,

“discovery-impact” research project suggested by account D is to examine how the dialectical anomaly-confirmationD process as a whole impacts scientific discovery. This

chapter concludes by sketching one proposal for pursuing this third research project.

Namely, one might analyze the dialectical confirmationD process as a source of heuristics

(i.e., strategies for narrowing the scope of scientists’ investigations). Herbert Simon

(1977) argued that heuristics are central to discovery in science, because they narrow the

range of hypotheses that researchers investigate. Shapere (1977, 532-533) also hinted

that anomalies could serve as heuristics, because he said that the readiness of a domain to

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be investigated depends on how clearly the problems (i.e., anomalies) concerning the

domain have been formulated.

More recently, Bechtel and Richardson (1993), Darden (1991), and Schaffner

(1993) have also argued (either explicitly or implicitly) that anomalies play a heuristic

role in discovery. For example, Schaffner claims that scientific problems (i.e.,

anomalies) help researchers to determine which facts are relevant for developing novel

theories. He claims that problems are often “sufficiently precise to evoke a domain and a

disciplinary matrix in a subarea of science” (1993, 53). The domain and disciplinary

matrix then provide constraints on the sorts of hypotheses that researchers propose.

Nevertheless, Schaffner (as well as Bechtel, Darden, and Richardson) has focused on the ways that anomalies guide the development of novel hypotheses once the anomaly confirmationD process is largely complete. In other words, his focus is on the way an

anomaly can guide researchers’ further development of hypotheses once researchers have

arrived at one specific characterization of the anomaly to emphasize. This final part of

the chapter advances previous studies by considering three ways in which the dialectical confirmationD process itself could play a heuristic role in scientific discovery before

researchers have decided to focus on one specific characterization of the anomaly.

A first way that the confirmationD process could play a heuristic role in discovery is by exerting a “development influence” (DI):

(DI) When the dialectical confirmationD process described by account D involves the activity of developing particular characterizations of an anomaly, the process narrows down the set of plausible hypotheses for researchers to explore.

Statement (DI) expresses a somewhat similar influence to what Bechtel and Richardson,

Darden, Schaffner, and Shapere already recognized, namely, that the characterization of

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an anomaly helps researchers to choose which hypotheses to explore. The novel

contribution of (DI) is its emphasis on the fact that some characterizations of an anomaly

may not be immediately apparent to researchers. Therefore, the process by which

scientists develop novel characterizations may ultimately play a significant role in

determining the hypotheses that researchers explore. For example, if the confirmationD process enables researchers to develop fruitful concepts for describing an anomaly’s empirical component and to identify a specific theory or theory part as the theoretical component, it may help them to develop promising hypotheses for explaining it.

The hormesis case illustrates the importance of the development influence.

Calabrese and Baldwin (2000) lament that the association of the hormesis anomaly with homeopathic medicine appeared to inhibit research interest in the phenomenon throughout much of the twentieth century. Part of the problem during this time period may have been that researchers were not sure how to characterize it as a specific phenomenon that conflicted with a particular theory. Rather, they merely speculated that it might somehow be associated with the already questionable medical practice of homeopathy. It was not clear whether the theoretical component of the hormesis anomaly was a faulty assumption concerning experimental design (resulting in a random or systematic experimental error), whether it was a general physiological theory about the effects of toxins on biological organisms, or whether it was a specific theory about the biological pathways by which individual toxins exert their effects. Thus, the vagueness in the characterization of hormesis plausibly influenced scientific discovery by preventing the exploration of specific explanatory hypotheses concerning hormesis. In contrast, Elliott (2000b) suggests that one of the factors contributing to recent interest in

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the hormesis phenomenon may be the characterization of hormesis as an

overcompensation effect. This characterization of hormesis suggests specific hypotheses

(e.g., that it is the result of adaptive biological defense mechanisms that “overshoot” the

return to homeostasis) that can be explored in ongoing research. Thus, the ability of the

dialectical confirmationD process to facilitate the development of promising anomaly

characterizations appears to play a significant role in guiding scientists’ later hypotheses.

A second, “choice influence” (CI) of the anomaly confirmationD process on

scientific discovery can be formulated as follows:

(CI) When the confirmationD process involves the activity of choosing between multiple characterizations of an anomaly, the process narrows down the set of plausible hypotheses for researchers to explore.

Once again, the choice influence builds on the previous insights of Bechtel and

Richardson, Darden, Schaffner, and Shapere, who recognized that the characterization of

an anomaly may help researchers choose which hypotheses to investigate. (CI) includes

the novel insight, however, that the characterization that researchers emphasize may be

the result of a choice between many different characterizations of it. Therefore, the

dialectical confirmationD process that determines which characterizations researchers

employ has an important influence on their later hypotheses.

The hormesis case illustrates the importance of the choice influence. Chapter

three argued that researchers have been employing multiple characterizations for the

hormesis phenomenon that use different concepts to describe the empirical component.

These concepts include “U-shaped-dose-response-curve hormesis,” “beneficial hormesis,” “overcompensation hormesis,” and “multiple-effects hormesis.” The hypotheses that one investigates in order to explain the anomaly depend significantly on

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which specific concepts one uses to describe it. For example, if one were to choose the concept of “multiple-effects hormesis,” then one would plausibly hypothesize that it is much more frequent than formerly supposed for chemicals to produce multiple biological effects that affect individual endpoints (such as growth) in opposite ways at different dose levels. If one were to choose the concept of “overcompensation hormesis,” however, then one would plausibly hypothesize that biological defense mechanisms frequently respond to stressors in a more intense manner (i.e., overshooting the return to homeostasis) than was previously supposed. Scientists’ further research depends greatly on the characterization of hormesis that they emphasize, which is in turn determined by the dialectical confirmationD process described in account D.

The third sort of influence exerted by the confirmationD process in the hormesis case is a “refinement influence” (RI):

(RI) When the confirmationD process involves the activity of refining characterizations of an anomaly, the process narrows down the set of plausible hypotheses for researchers to explore.

Statement (RI) focuses on the fact that researchers can often improve their characterizations of an anomaly throughout the dialectical confirmationD process.

Because the characterizations that researchers employ influence the novel hypotheses that they formulate, the refinement of characterizations also refines the further development of hypotheses in response to the anomaly.

The hormesis case illustrates the refinement influence particularly well. In their report on their first major literature search (1998b), Calabrese and Baldwin initially emphasized an operational interpretation of hormesis as a phenomenon characterized by low-dose stimulation and high-dose inhibition caused by a toxin. They hypothesized

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multiple mechanisms, including overcompensation, direct stimulation, and a variety of enzymatic processes, to explain the anomaly. However, Calabrese soon seemed to find the interpretation of hormesis as an overcompensation phenomenon particularly appealing (see Calabrese 1999). As a result, his hypotheses for explaining hormesis began to focus on the possibility that it could be the result of biological defense mechanisms temporarily “overreacting” to the effects of toxic substances. He began to evaluate this hypothesis by investigating the temporal effects of hormetic substances (to determine whether hormetic effects consistently began to appear only after defense mechanisms have time to start overreacting) (Calabrese 2001b). He found that many hormetic effects did fit his preliminary hypothesis (i.e., that they are the result of defense mechanisms that “overshoot” the return to homeostasis), but other hormetic effects did not. For example, some hormetic effects seemed to take place immediately after exposure to a toxin (Calabrese 2001b). Perhaps as a result of these findings, Calabrese and Baldwin have returned to an operational characterization of hormesis in more recent work (2002b), and they suggest that hormesis may be the result of multiple mechanisms.

Calabrese’s ongoing investigations illustrate how, by the time scientists reach a consensus characterization of the hormesis anomaly, they will already have significant insights into the promising hypotheses for them to explore. In other words, the process of refining their anomaly characterizations is enabling them to identify a precise set of hypotheses on which they can focus further research.

Although this section of the chapter has focused primarily on the ways that account D facilitates better understanding of scientific discovery, however, the dissertation also may contribute to improved analyses of the role that values play in

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scientific practice. Specifically, the characterization and confirmationD sub-claims of

account D’s descriptive claim suggest at least three research projects. The basis for these

projects is the emphasis in both sub-claims on the way that researchers employ multiple

characterizations for describing anomalies. Therefore, scientists and policymakers have to decide which characterizations to emphasize as they pursue further research and make policy decisions concerning the anomaly. For policy-relevant anomalies (such as hormesis or MCS or endocrine disruption), the decision to emphasize some characterizations over others could ultimately have a significant impact on the public good. For example, Calabrese and Baldwin (2000, 2003b) argue that the (largely tacit) decision by the scientific community in the early decades of the twentieth century to emphasize characterizations that described hormesis as a fluke result or as a homeopathic phenomenon have resulted in needlessly costly regulatory policies throughout the past thirty years. Because account D emphasizes that researchers have to choose which characterizations of anomalies to emphasize, it suggests at least three important questions

concerning the role of values in science. (1) In what ways can scientists’ decisions to emphasize some anomaly characterizations rather than others affect further scientific research, public policy, and ultimately the public good (see Elliott forthcoming)? (2)

How do constitutive, contextual, and bias values currently play a role in scientists’ choices to emphasize particular characterizations of an anomaly, and how should those values play a role (both from a purely epistemic perspective and also from an ethical perspective)? (3) Are there specific strategies that researchers and policymakers can employ in order to make more ethically and epistemically justifiable responses to the multiple characterizations of anomalies (see chapter six of the dissertation and Elliott

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forthcoming)? Even though there is not space to consider these three questions in this

chapter, it appears that account D is philosophically significant at least in part because it suggests these important research projects related to science and values.

4.5: Conclusion

Section 4.2 reviewed previous descriptions of anomaly and explained the dissertation’s five-step methodology for developing a novel account. Section 4.3 then developed the dissertation’s novel understanding of anomaly by extending the shared descriptive and explanatory claims of previous accounts with the plural-characterization, plural-confirmationD, and dialectical-explanatory characteristics of the hormesis anomaly.

The resulting description states:

Account D, Descriptive claim:

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Section 4.3 also fleshed out the details of this account and showed that it fit well with other cases of anomaly and with previous insights in the philosophy of science. Finally, section 4.4 argued that the account could play a valuable role in the philosophy of science, because (1) it solves problems with previous descriptions of anomaly, (2) it provides novel insights, and (3) it initiates promising research projects concerning scientific discovery and the role of values in science.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CLAIM R AND THE IS/OUGHT DISTINCTION

5.1: Introduction

Calabrese, Baldwin, and Holland (1999) argue that the standards that are currently

set by U.S. regulatory agencies for exposure to toxic chemicals may actually be harmful

to the public, because they prevent public exposure to levels of chemical agents that are

hormetic (i.e., beneficial):

If the agent produces a significant beneficial effect (such as enhanced longevity) at low doses, and such low-level exposures are not permitted, these conservative standards may, in fact, be more harmful than less stringent standards…. Moreover, if the standard, by preventing low-level exposure to a regulated agent, has eliminated the attainment of potentially beneficial effects, agencies need to recognize and justify this result to the public in future standard-setting activities. (1999, 276)

In the rest of their article, Calabrese, Baldwin, and Holland appear to conclude that policymakers face a previously unappreciated ethical responsibility. Roughly, they state that, all else being equal, government regulators should allow public exposure to levels of hormetic chemicals that produce beneficial effects.54 This chapter and the following

chapter attempt to evaluate and determine as precisely as possible the content of this

claim, which the dissertation will call “claim R.”

54 As the rest of the chapter clarifies, Calabrese, Baldwin, and Holland are somewhat ambiguous about whether it is acceptable to expose the public to hormetic chemicals that produce a benefit on any endpoints or only to chemicals that produce a net benefit on human health as a whole.

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Chapter five accomplishes two tasks. The first task is to elucidate claim R, which

Calabrese, Baldwin, Holland, and others appear to be making in recent articles

concerning hormesis. The second task of the chapter is to argue that, under at least one

interpretation of claim R, it requires further ethical justification than it has currently

received. (Chapter six completes the dissertation’s analysis of claim R by arguing that,

under the other potential interpretations of the claim, it still requires further defense.

Together, chapters five and six provide reason to question the use of claim R in the

formulation of policy until ethicists and policymakers can provide it with further

support.) Performing the two tasks in this chapter is important, because researchers’

claims concerning the policy ramifications of hormesis have received very little “second-

order” ethical evaluation,55 and yet Lave (2000) claims that hormesis could be the

foundation for the next stage in U.S. regulatory policy.

Section 5.2 accomplishes the chapter’s first task (i.e., elucidating claim R).

Besides clarifying the structure of this ethical claim that a number of proponents of

hormesis appear to be making, it develops what appear to be the three potential

interpretations of the claim. Under the first interpretation, the claim is a substantive

moral claim, under the second it is practical or prudential, and under the third

interpretation it is true by definition. Chapter six of the dissertation argues that claim R is problematic under the first two interpretations. The rest of this chapter addresses the third, “definitional,” interpretation. Section 5.2 argues that, under this third

55 Elliott (2000a, 2000b), Gentile and van der Schalie (2000), Joslyn (2000), Morris (2000), Weis (2000), Applegate (2001), Cross (2001), Menzie (2001), Christiani and Zhou (2002), Marchant (2002), and Rodricks (2003) are among the few publications to provide a “second-order” analysis of others’ claims concerning the policy ramifications of hormesis. Nevertheless, these works are fairly brief and focus primarily on the technical and legal difficulties of applying hormesis to public policy, whereas this dissertation provides a more explicitly ethical analysis of the phenomenon.

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interpretation, the proponents of hormesis appear likely to employ R in arguments that violate the is/ought distinction (IOD). Sections 5.3 through 5.6 then accomplish the chapter’s second task (i.e., showing that R requires further defense under the definitional interpretation) by arguing that, if claim R is interpreted in such a way that it contributes to arguments that violate the IOD, it requires further justification in order to provide a plausible contribution to public policy.

5.2: Reconstruction of Claim R

Section 5.2 elucidates claim R (concerning the regulatory ramifications of hormesis) in four steps. First, it justifies the dissertation’s choice of five articles from which it analyzes claim R. Second, it elucidates six issues concerning claim R about which the five articles are ambiguous. Third, it identifies the most defensible version of

R that all five articles would presumably share. Fourth, it clarifies the three potential interpretations of this version, one of which is evaluated in this chapter and the other two of which are evaluated in the next chapter.

The reconstruction throughout this section attempts to formulate explicitly both those positions that the five articles affirm and those that they seem to espouse implicitly.

Because the articles do not provide explicit arguments (i.e., premises plus conclusions) for their claims, and because most of their statements are somewhat ambiguous, the dissertation must attempt to reconstruct their positions and their justification. A disadvantage of a reconstruction project such as this one is that it may require some substantiated hypotheses concerning the claims that the articles leave partially implicit, and it may ultimately require the consideration of several different hypothetical positions,

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one or more of which they could be taking. Nevertheless, a significant advantage of the

present reconstruction is that the articles’ claims and justifications appear to be

ambiguous largely because the authors are at the very earliest stages of considering the

regulatory ramifications of hormesis. As a result, the dissertation’s present examination

of the authors’ stances regarding hormesis has the potential to prevent ethical errors in

regulation before those errors begin to play a role in regulatory practice. Therefore, with

the hope of promoting both sound and transparent science and clear, precise, ethically

justifiable regulation, the following discussion attempts to reconstruct at least one

plausible formulation of a claim (R) that proponents of hormesis are making concerning

the regulatory ramifications of hormesis. That formulation can still be interpreted in

multiple ways (e.g., as true by definition or as a substantive moral claim), however, so

this section concludes by elucidating the three potential interpretations of claim R for the

rest of the dissertation to evaluate.

Choice of Articles

The first step in elucidating ethical claim R is to defend the choice of five articles

from which this chapter develops the claim. This reconstruction examines quotations

from Foran (1998; hereafter referred to as F), Calabrese, Baldwin, and Holland (1999;

hereafter referred to as CBH), Paperiello (2000; hereafter referred to as P), Lave (2001;

hereafter referred to as L), and Poumadere (2002; hereafter referred to as PO). These

articles were chosen based on a two-step methodology. The first step was to identify a

“pool” of potentially relevant articles using a literature search. This step yielded a total of 95 publications, obtained using a search for articles containing the key word

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“hormesis” conjoined with the key words “regulation,” “regulatory,” or “implications.”56

The second step was to narrow this pool to a manageable number based on a set of

criteria that facilitated the dissertation’s goals. Specifically, the dissertation’s main goal

with respect to claim R is to evaluate critically the position taken by hormesis proponents

on the ethical issue of allowing public exposure to low levels of hormetic chemicals.

Whether or not it is justifiable to allow such exposures seems to be a particularly

important regulatory issue for at least two reasons. First, allowing public exposure to

hormetic toxins appears to be a dramatic reversal of former regulatory policies, which

focused on lowering public exposure to toxic chemicals to the greatest feasible extent

(see e.g., Foran 1998). A second reason for the significance of allowing public exposure to hormetic chemicals is that other proposed regulatory policies, such as altering the reference doses (RfD) that set limits for safe human exposure to toxic chemicals, seem to presuppose that it is justifiable to allow human exposure to hormetic toxins at low levels

(see e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 1999, Barnes 2000).

Given the goal of identifying articles that take a stance on the justifiability of allowing public exposure to hormetic chemicals and that provide a significant contribution to the literature on the regulatory ramifications of hormesis, three criteria were used to identify a manageable set of publications for analysis in the dissertation. (1)

The chosen articles had to focus on the hormesis phenomenon in general (rather than hormetic effects caused by specific chemicals, such as dioxin) as well as its regulatory

56 The author performed a search on the “Web of Science” database (including the science, social science, and humanities databases) on February 17, 2004, for articles published between 1997 and 2004. A search for the words ‘hormesis’ and ‘regulation’ in article titles, abstracts, or keywords yielded 12 articles. A search for ‘hormesis’ and ‘regulatory’ in the same fields yielded 31 publications. Finally, a search for ‘hormesis’ and ‘implications’ in those fields yielded 65 articles. After elimination of duplicate publications that were listed in more than one search, 95 articles remained.

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ramifications for public health (in contrast to the ramifications of hormesis in other contexts, such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, ecological risk assessment, or risk communication). (2) The chosen publications had to provide substantive regulatory suggestions, rather than merely mentioning regulation as an “aside” or as part of a commentary on another article. (3) The articles had to take a stance on the issue of allowing public exposure to hormetic toxins, rather than providing more basic suggestions that do not yield a particular stance. (For example, Lave (2000) suggests that one could use cost-benefit analysis to make regulatory decisions about hormesis, but the article does not take a specific stance on allowing public exposure to hormetic chemicals.)

The second step of the methodology (i.e., applying the three criteria to the articles) yielded the five publications analyzed throughout the rest of this section. Forty- one of the ninety-five articles were eliminated based on the first criterion (i.e., the rejected articles focused on specific chemicals or applications). Another 27 publications were removed based on the second criterion, because they mentioned regulatory ramifications primarily as an aside or in response to another article. Finally, the third criterion (i.e., taking a stance regarding allowing hormetic toxins) eliminated another 21 articles that failed to espouse a specific position on allowing public exposure to hormetic substances. Of the six articles that remained, one more (namely, Paperiello 1998) was removed because it took the same stance regarding public exposure to hormetic chemicals as a later publication by the same author (i.e., Paperiello 2000).

One might question whether the five articles analyzed throughout the rest of the dissertation provide representative views on the regulatory ramifications of hormesis,

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considering that they constitute only a small fraction of the original 95 publications identified in the literature search. One response is that representativeness is not a serious problem in the hormesis case, because few articles address this topic extensively and in detail. Of the 95 articles, 68 of them focused either on specific applications of the hormesis phenomenon or on brief commentaries of other publications (i.e., they failed either the dissertation’s first or second criteria). Of the remaining 27 publications, most

(i.e., 21) did not take a particular stance on allowing public exposure to hormetic chemicals. Therefore, if the final six articles (including Paperiello 1998) share a stance concerning the regulatory ramifications of hormesis, then that position is already fairly significant, considering the small body of publications on hormesis. Furthermore, even if these articles were to be unrepresentative of other publications, they would still be important to consider, because they represent the views of very influential thinkers. For example, Calabrese (the coauthor of article CBH) plays such an influential role in the literature on hormesis that he has been cited in roughly 60% of the recent articles on hormesis (see section 6.2). Furthermore, Lave (the author of article L) has played an important role in the public health community since the 1970’s, when he published a seminal article on the economic and human-health effects of air pollution (Lave and

Seskin 1970; see also Lave and Seskin 1977 and Davis 2002, 100ff). Therefore, it would be significant to evaluate these articles no matter what other publications claimed.

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Six Issues on Which the Articles Are Ambiguous

Turning to the five articles (i.e., F, CBH, P, L, and PO), the following quotations appear to express their ethical stances concerning the justifiability of allowing public exposure to hormetic chemicals:

[FQ] Regardless of their position, all parties involved in site remediation [currently] seem to agree that clean-up of most polluted sites should occur to the greatest level possible: that is to the lowest level of pollutant(s) possible…. Hormesis changes the playing field. No longer would the debate be around how much pollution should be removed, but rather, how much should be left to enchance [sic] human health or the environment: that is, how much pollution is healthy?” (1998, 43)

[CBHQ] The implications of the hormesis concept for cancer risk assessment is [sic] that it provides a biologically based foundation supporting the concept of thresholds for many, if not most, carcinogenic responses. It also suggests that the regulatory “goal” of exposure to carcinogenic agents should not be zero as has been the case (e.g., carcinogens in drinking water), but a “goal” aimed at achieving an optimized health-based response.” (CBH 1999, 276, italics added)

[PQ] Assuming … the LNT [linear, no-threshold] model were replaced with a hormetic model, what would happen? First, the threshold for transition from benefit to harm would have to be determined, along with the risk coefficient above that threshold. If the threshold were not high enough, there might be no practical value in hormesis. Alternatively, the threshold might be high enough to raise public and environmental limits [to toxic substances] but not affect occupational exposure standards. (2000, 148)

[LQ] [H]ormesis suggests that … lower exposure [to toxicants] is likely to worsen health or, at best, to have no beneficial effect. Hormesis squarely challenges the standard risk analysis model and thus the basis for regulation of toxicants at low concentrations. Rather than protecting people from low-level exposure to toxicants, hormesis suggests that public health officials should be encouraging or even mandating some toxicant discharges. (L 2001, 64)

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exposure, which is costly for industry (and, it can be argued, for society as a whole) is reversed; hormesis implies that some exposure and intake of low- doses of toxic substance is not only acceptable but ought to be sought after given its potentially positive impact upon public health. (PO 2002, 33-34)

These quotations all appear to express (either explicitly or implicitly) the ethical claim

that government regulation should allow public exposure to beneficial levels of hormetic

toxins.57

Unfortunately, these quotations (and the articles in which they appear) do not express their ethical claims very precisely. In an attempt to clarify their position, this section identifies six issues (presented in the next paragraph) about which the quotations’ claims are ambiguous. The general form of the ethical claim, R, that they would all accept appears to be a conditional of the form, “If (A&B), then C.” In other words, the articles all appear to be claiming that, if the public is exposed to a toxin that produces a hormetic effect, and if particular additional conditions are met, then government should allow public exposure to that toxin. “A” stands for the claim that the public is exposed to low-dose levels, L1…Ln, of one or more toxins, X1…Xn, that produce a hormetic (i.e.,

beneficial) effect one or more human biological endpoints. “C” stands for a claim about

appropriate government regulatory action in response to the hormetic effect produced by

toxins X1…Xn (e.g., that government regulators should allow public exposure to levels

L1…Ln of the toxins). “B” stands for a statement of additional sufficient (and perhaps

necessary) conditions for the effect mentioned in claim A to warrant the regulatory

actions described in claim C.

57 It is not entirely clear from the quotations whether the authors would claim that a hormetic exposure must involve a beneficial effect on only one endpoint or whether they must produce a net benefit in order to justify public exposure to them. The following paragraphs summarize a variety of these sorts of ambiguities that plague the quotations.

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The six issues about which the five articles remain ambiguous relate to specific

features of claims “A,” “B,” and “C.” The first, “toxin-scale,” issue addresses claim A:

(TI) Does claim A refer only to an individual toxin that produces a hormetic effect or also to groups of toxins that produce a hormetic effect in concert?

The second, “endpoint,” issue is a question about claim B:

(EI) In order to warrant the regulatory actions specified in claim C, is it sufficient for an individual to experience a beneficial effect on at least one endpoint, or must an individual’s entire exposure to a hormetic toxin result in a net health benefit?

Statement (EI) provides an important distinction between the beneficial effect described in claim A, on one hand, and a net benefit from an individual’s entire exposure to a hormetic toxin, on the other hand. An individual could experience one or more beneficial hormetic effects from a chemical, but the individual’s exposure to the toxin could result in a net harmful health effect (because, for example, of harmful side effects produced by the toxin). For example, Calabrese and Baldwin themselves note that “stimulation of detoxifying enzyme levels observed in the larval form of a species would be evaluated for its hormetic potential even though this increased metabolic activity, while beneficial in the short-term, may have a detrimental effect on other endpoints” (2000b, II-5).

Therefore, the dissertation will formulate claim R in such a way that it makes clear whether the production of a hormetic effect is sufficient to justify regulatory action or

whether the overall exposure of an organism to a hormetic toxin must result in a net

health benefit.

The third, “condition,” issue also addresses claim B:

(CI) In order to warrant the regulatory actions specified in claim C, precisely what additional conditions, including (1) side effects, (2) scale of effects

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(over time and groups of people),58 (3) environmental conditions, (4) practical feasibility of implementing a new regulatory policy, and (5) consent of those who experience hormetic effects, should accompany exposure to a hormetic chemical?

Statement (CI) lists five sorts of conditions, in addition to the condition of producing a net benefit on human health (which was already mentioned under the endpoint issue), that play a role in determining whether it is justifiable to allow public exposure to a hormetic chemical. (The chapter separates the endpoint and condition issues so that it can emphasize the production of a net benefit to human health (i.e., the endpoint issue) as a separate and particularly important condition for allowing hormetic effects.) The dissertation does not maintain that the five conditions mentioned in statement (CI) provide an exhaustive list of the factors that one would need to consider in order to determine whether public exposure to a hormetic toxin is justifiable; rather, these conditions are merely important examples of those that one might need to consider. For example, one could specify the side effects and scale of effects such that a necessary condition for the regulatory action of allowing public exposure to a toxin, X, would be that there are not serious side effects caused by exposure to low doses (L1…Ln) of X and that the benefits produced by X occur on the vast majority of human sub-populations over an indefinite period of time.

The fourth, “status” issue is also a question about claim B:

(STI) What is the status of the conditions for regulatory action mentioned under the endpoint and condition issues (e.g., are the conditions necessary for warranting the regulatory actions specified in claim C, or

58 For the purposes of the dissertation, there are two scales that are particularly important for determining the regulatory ramifications of hormetic effects. The first scale is the range of people on which hormetic effects occur. It might depend on factors such as people’s age, health, diet, behavior, stress level, genetics, and other chemical exposures. The other scale is the period of time during which hormetic effects occur. For example, these effects might occur for a short period of time and then be followed by adverse effects.

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are they sufficient for warranting those regulatory actions, and precisely which conditions are jointly sufficient)?

A fifth, “satisfaction,” issue relates to claim B as well:

(SAI) Does claim B state that all hormetic effects do satisfy the conditions that it specifies, or does claim B state only that some hormetic effects may satisfy its specified conditions?59

The sixth, “action,” issue addresses claim C:

(AI) Exactly what sort of regulatory action does claim C recommend?

For example, claim C might recommend that government ought to allow public exposure only to low levels of hormetic chemicals, or it might recommend that government ought to allow public exposure to low levels of toxic chemicals in general (based on the assumption that a large number of toxic chemicals are hormetic). Claim C might also recommend that government should not only allow public exposure to hormetic chemicals but that government ought to actively promote such exposures.

Just to illustrate the structure of the claim that one obtains after specifying the six issues mentioned in the preceding paragraph, consider the following sample claim (which serves only as an example and does not correspond to the assertions of any particular article analyzed in this chapter):

(Example) IF a toxic chemical, X, produces a hormetic (i.e., beneficial) effect on humans that are exposed to low doses (L1…Ln) of X, AND IF exposure to X results in a net benefit, over an indefinite period of time, for a majority of those exposed to X, which is a necessary and sufficient set of conditions for regulatory action, a set of conditions that all hormetic chemicals meet, THEN government regulation ought to allow public exposure to X.

59 The satisfaction issue addresses an empirical or possibly a conceptual question, not an ethical question. Namely, it considers whether the authors accept the claim that all hormetic effects meet the necessary conditions that they specify for ethically allowing public exposure to hormetic chemicals. The question appears to be empirical, because further research is needed to determine whether all hormetic effects do actually meet the conditions that the authors specify. It could also be a conceptual question, however, if researchers define ‘hormesis’ in such a way that effects count as hormetic only if they meet the authors’ conditions.

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The words or phrases that are placed in italics specify the positions taken on the six issues

in the example. Unfortunately, quotations [FQ], [CBHQ], [PQ], [LQ], and [POQ] do not

specify the authors’ positions on these issues very precisely, and the rest of the articles

provide little further clarification. Therefore, it would be very difficult to determine the precise position that each article takes on each of the six issues. Moreover, even if one attempted to determine each article’s most likely position, there would still be much potential for error, because the articles are so ambiguous.

The next section (C) attempts to resolve the problem of ambiguity in former articles by using two approaches. The first approach is to try to determine the most defensible form of the ethical claim, “R,” that the articles could be making. The section employs this approach when the articles provide some information about an issue but do not provide sufficient details to determine their precise position. For example, the articles do not provide enough information to determine with confidence whether they affirm that regulatory changes are justified if chemicals produce at least one beneficial effect or whether exposure to a hormetic chemical must produce net health benefits to justify regulatory changes. The second approach for resolving ambiguity in the articles is to formulate the structure of claim R but to leave the details unspecified. The dissertation will use this approach when the articles provide virtually no information about a particular issue. For example, the articles largely ignore the condition issue (i.e., the additional conditions, besides production of a benefit, that justify public exposure to a hormetic chemical).60 Therefore, the chapter will formulate claim R in such a way that it

60 One should note that some of the articles (e.g., Lave 2001, Poumadere 2002) do acknowledge that the decision whether or not to allow public exposure to hormetic chemicals must take into account whether

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identifies the conditions (e.g., the scale of hormetic effects over time and people) that

should ultimately be included in order to develop the most defensible version of claim R.

Nevertheless, because the articles provide little detailed information about those

conditions, the chapter does not specify the specific content of those conditions (e.g.,

whether some of the people exposed to a chemical must receive a net health benefit or

whether all people must receive the benefit). In the absence of more detailed

information about the positions held by the authors of the articles, one can then consider

the dissertation’s formulation of claim R as a starting point for analyzing the claims of

hormesis proponents. Even if the authors would actually defend less defensible or more

detailed claims about the regulatory ramifications of hormesis, an analysis of the major

ethical problems with claim R can provide a foundation for future evaluations of other

positions regarding the regulatory ramifications of hormesis.

Elucidation of Claim R

This section begins by suggesting what the most defensible version of the five

articles’ shared ethical claim, R, looks like. It then argues that they all appear to accept at

least that most defensible formulation of the claim. One of the simplest ways to develop

claim R is to consider, for each of the six issues mentioned in section B, what the most

defensible position on that issue would be. Recall that the structure of claim R appears to

be “If (A&B), then C,” where “A” states that hormetic effects occur, “B” states additional

sufficient (and perhaps necessary) conditions, and “C” states some form of regulatory

those toxins produce beneficial effects on all individuals or only on some. The articles do not provide a complete list of conditions for allowing hormetic effects, however, and they do not supply very detailed suggestions, however, on precisely what range of people must experience beneficial effects in order to justify allowing hormetic exposures.

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action that government should take. The “toxin-scale” issue concerns the question of

whether, in claim A, a hormetic effect is produced by an individual chemical or a group

of chemicals. With regard to this issue, however, it does not appear that one position is

significantly more defensible than others. As long as claim B includes appropriate additional conditions, it does not seem to matter whether individual chemicals or groups of chemicals cause hormetic effects. One might object that allowing hormetic effects caused by a single toxin appears to be more controversial than allowing hormetic effects caused by groups of toxins, because people are exposed to multiple chemicals at once under real-world conditions. Nevertheless, it seems just as defensible to allow public exposure to a single toxin that produces hormetic effects as long as claim B requires that the hormetic effects produced by an individual chemical must occur under the conditions to which people are actually exposed in the real world (including the presence of other toxins).

The second, “endpoint,” and third, “condition” issues concern the additional criteria provided in claim B for hormetic effects to justify the regulatory actions stated in claim C. The quotations from articles F, CBH, P, L, and PO do not appear to be very specific about these conditions; they merely emphasize that people should be exposed to the levels of hormetic chemicals that are “beneficial” or “optimal” from the perspective of human health. The notions of “beneficiality” or of “health” can be ambiguous, however, because chemicals could produce a beneficial or healthy effect on one endpoint

(e.g., increasing levels of a beneficial enzyme) while producing a harmful or unhealthy effect on other endpoints (e.g., increasing metabolic stress). Therefore, the most defensible position on the endpoint issue is probably that exposure to a hormetic

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chemical should produce a net benefit on human health as a whole rather than merely a beneficial effect on one or more particular endpoints. Regarding the additional criteria mentioned under the condition issue for allowing public exposure to hormetic chemicals

(namely, particular side effects, scales of effects, environmental conditions, implementability, and consent), the articles remain largely silent. Therefore, in order to be charitable, it seems wise to include a caveat that additional conditions, C1…Cn, are also required in order to justify regulatory action. Because the articles provide virtually no information about these conditions, the dissertation will identify the important sorts of conditions that should ultimately be specified, but it will not analyze them further in this chapter (see chapter six for further analysis).

The fourth, “status,” issue concerns whether the conditions described in claim B are necessary or sufficient for regulatory action (and precisely which conditions are jointly sufficient). The most defensible position on the status issue can be determined on the basis of the preceding analysis of the conditions issue. Given that other conditions not explicitly mentioned in the articles might be necessary in order to justify regulatory action, it appears most defensible to claim that the production of a net health benefit is sufficient for regulatory action only in conjunction with other conditions that remain currently unspecified. For example, the production of a net health benefit might be sufficient to justify regulatory action only if the benefit occurs over an extended period of time. Moreover, it seems wise to claim that the production of a net health benefit is not a necessary condition for regulatory action, because the authors of the articles might hold that under some very special conditions it would be possible to allow hormetic exposures even if they do not produce a net health benefit.

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The satisfaction issue addresses the question of whether all or only some hormetic

exposures meet the conditions stated in claim B. This question is an empirical one that

will require further investigation. Therefore, for the time being, it seems most ethically

defensible to assume that only some hormetic exposures may meet the conditions. In

other words, the most ethically justifiable position for the purposes of developing new

regulations is that some hormetic exposures may result not only in a beneficial effect on

one particular endpoint but may also produce a net benefit on human health as a whole

and meet the other conditions that the articles currently leave unspecified.

Finally, the sixth, action, issue concerns what regulatory actions claim C should

recommend in response to hormetic exposures. The main point of the four articles

appears to be that government agencies should allow the public to receive exposures that

meet the conditions stated in claim B. Although some quotations, such as [CBHQ],

suggest that government should even take an active role in promoting hormetic exposures

that are beneficial, it seems less controversial to claim that regulatory agencies merely

ought to allow these exposures. Furthermore, although the articles do not clearly state whether government regulation should adjust current standards for all toxic chemicals or merely for hormetic chemicals, it seems easier to justify the claim that regulations should be altered only for hormetic chemicals that meet the conditions mentioned in claim B.

Based on this analysis of the six issues, a reconstruction of the ethical claim R that all four articles appear to share is:

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(2) the exposure meets additional conditions, C1…Cn (perhaps including conditions that specify particular side effects that can or cannot be caused by the exposure, specific scales over which the hormetic effects must occur across time and on groups of people, particular environmental conditions under which the hormetic effects must occur, specific criteria for implementing new regulatory policies, and particular standards for obtaining consent to hormetic exposures), THEN government regulators ought to allow public exposure to low doses L1…Ln of X1…Xn.

Having developed a provisional formulation of claim R, the remaining portion of this section argues that all of the articles would accept it. Rather than examining every article in painstaking detail, the dissertation provides a particularly careful analysis of the first three publications (i.e., F, CBH, and P). After showing that the authors of those articles would accept claim R, it argues that the authors of L and PO would presumably accept the claim as well, because they make virtually the same claims as the first three publications. First, consider article F. Foran characterizes hormesis as “a dose response relationship that is stimulatory at low doses, but inhibitory at higher doses, and as the zone of a dose/response curve … where a beneficial effect exists relative to the background effect” (1998, 441). He then describes technical challenges to employing hormesis in risk assessment, such as the difficulty of quantifying precisely the dose range in which a chemical produces beneficial effects. Next, he elucidates social or regulatory challenges, such as the current societal focus on lowering pollution levels to the minimum levels possible. He claims, however, that hormesis changes the regulatory issues significantly:

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should be left to enchance [sic] human health or the environment: that is, how much pollution is healthy? (1998, 43)

In sum, quotation FQ appears to express the ethical claim that government regulation should not interfere with public exposure to levels of hormetic chemicals that enhance human health. (As the following paragraph clarifies, however, it is not entirely clear whether the beneficial effect on human health involves one endpoint or a net benefit to health.)

Based on quotation FQ, it appears that Foran would accept the chapter’s minimally controversial formulation of claim R. Regarding the endpoint, condition, and status issues, quotation FQ suggests that one can answer the question, “How much pollution should be left [i.e., allowed to remain in the environment under government regulatory statutes]?” by answering the question “How much pollution is healthy?”

Therefore, the quotation appears to specify that the production of a net benefit on human health is, in and of itself, a sufficient condition for the regulatory action of allowing hormetic exposures. This appears to be a less defensible (and more vague) position than the one taken in claim R, which states that the production of a net benefit is sufficient for regulatory action only if other conditions that remain unspecified in Foran’s article are met. (These conditions might include, for example, specification of whether the net benefit to health must occur on all exposed people or merely most of those exposed).

Concerning the next, satisfaction, issue, the article is not completely clear about whether all or only some hormetic exposures meet the conditions of producing net benefits to human health. Nevertheless, Foran would presumably not be claiming that hormesis

“changes the regulatory playing field” if he did not accept claim R’s minimally controversial position that at least some hormetic chemicals may meet those conditions.

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Finally, regarding the action issue, the article claims that pollution “should be left,” so

Foran would obviously accept the minimal position in claim R, namely, that it is acceptable to allow public exposure to hormetic chemicals that meet the appropriate conditions. He might even think that government should take active steps to promote leaving levels of pollution that support human health.

Calabrese, Baldwin, and Holland (1999) provide the second article that addresses the regulatory ramifications of hormesis. It makes at least three claims. First, it describes the evidence for hormesis that Calabrese and Baldwin found in their literature studies.

Second, it argues that part of the reason for scientists’ earlier lack of interest in the phenomenon is that previous studies frequently focused only on high-dose chemical effects. Third, it considers the regulatory ramifications of the hormesis phenomenon.

One quotation that summarizes the article’s conclusions is the following:

Based on the way the quotation addresses the condition, status, satisfaction, and action issues, it seems clear that the article would support the chapter’s formulation of claim R. Concerning the endpoint and condition issues, CBHQ states that the goal of regulation is to produce chemical levels that optimize health. Therefore, it appears that

CBHQ affirms, like claim R, that at least one condition for government to take the regulatory actions mentioned in the quotation is that hormetic chemicals produce a net benefit on human health. Unfortunately, the article does not provide detail concerning

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the other conditions for allowing hormetic exposures (such as the range of people on

which the net benefits must occur). With regard to the fourth (status) issue, the quotation

does not provide enough information to discern with confidence that the production of a

net benefit on human health is by itself sufficient to justify regulatory action. Therefore,

it seems most charitable to assume that Calabrese, Baldwin, and Holland would insist, as

claim R does, that the production of a net benefit is only sufficient to justify regulatory action in conjunction with other conditions that they have not made explicit. Concerning the fifth (satisfaction) issue, the authors appear to presuppose that at least some exposures to hormetic chemicals meet the condition of producing a net health benefit, just as claim

R states, because they assert that hormesis does have implications for risk assessment.

Finally, with regard to the action issue, the quotation states that government ought to set a goal of exposing the public to chemical levels that optimize health. Therefore, the authors might take the strong claim that government should promote policies (perhaps even including the liberalization of government regulation to toxic chemicals in general) that contribute to that goal. At any rate, they would certainly accept claim R’s minimal regulatory suggestion that government should allow hormetic exposures.

Paperiello, the author of the third article, P, also seems likely to affirm claim R.

The first part of the article describes the current linear no-threshold (LNT) models employed by regulatory agencies and argues that the evidence for those models is not compelling. The second part of the article examines what, if hormesis were accepted, the regulatory consequences would be. The article is addressed explicitly at radiation hormesis, but its conclusions appear to be applicable to chemical hormesis as well, because the LNT and hormetic models that Paperiello discusses are essentially the same

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for both radiation and chemical carcinogens. When he discusses the regulatory

consequences of hormesis, he claims:

Regarding the endpoint, condition, status, and satisfaction issues, Paperiello

merely says that regulatory limits could be changed as long as a “benefit” were produced

by toxic substances rather than a “harm.” It is particularly notable that quotation PQ

appears to express the notion that, as long as the threshold for the transition from benefit

to harm is high enough, hormetic effects produce benefits that justify regulatory changes.

In other words, Paperiello appears to assume that all hormetic dose-response curves produce the requisite benefits at some dose levels.61 Thus, it seems likely that the

“benefit” to which Paperiello refers is merely a benefit on at least one endpoint rather

than on human health as a whole, because all hormetic dose-response curves involve

beneficial effects on at least one endpoint, whereas it is less clear that they always involve net benefits for human health. Therefore, Paperiello may be taking the strong position that a sufficient condition for allowing hormetic effects is merely a benefit on at least one endpoint and that all hormetic exposures meet this condition. To be charitable, however, one should also consider an alternative interpretation of quotation PQ, namely,

61 The basis for thinking that Paperiello believes that all hormetic dose-response curves produce the requisite benefits for allowing public exposures (though sometimes at impractically low levels) is his claim, “If the threshold [from benefit to harm] were not high enough, there might be no practical value in hormesis. Alternatively, the threshold might be high enough to raise public and environmental limits but not affect occupational exposure standards” (2000, 148).

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that Paperiello was not being entirely precise and that he merely failed to specify some of

the conditions that he would require for changing current regulatory standards.

Nevertheless, it still seems likely that Paperiello would accept the positions on the

endpoint, condition, status, and satisfaction issues provided in claim R, because the claim

is formulated to be as defensible as possible. Regarding the action issue, he claims that government could raise public and environmental limits to toxins as long as people are exposed to levels of hormetic substances that are beneficial. Therefore, he appears to accept the position of claim R, which states that government should allow public exposure to hormetic chemicals under appropriate conditions. In sum, although

Paperiello might accept stronger positions, it appears that he would accept R as an acceptable minimal claim concerning hormesis.

Without providing a completely detailed analysis of articles L and PO, it seems clear that they would also accept claim R. Quotations LQ and POQ state:

[POQ] [T]hroughout the 20th century and in particular during the past 30 years, … studies … have repeatedly identified the hormesis effect, i.e., health benefits associated with exposure to low doses of toxic substances …. Should hormesis be borne out, the usual philosophy of continually minimizing exposure, which is costly for industry (and, it can be argued, for society as a whole) is reversed; hormesis implies that some exposure and intake of low- doses of toxic substance is not only acceptable but ought to be sought after given its potentially positive impact upon public health. (PO 2002, 33-34)

Like the previous three publications, articles L and PO appear to affirm that, given that a

hormetic chemical produces beneficial effects at low doses, government regulators

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should allow public exposure to that chemical. They are not entirely clear about such

issues as (i) whether the chemicals must produce a net benefit or only a benefit on one

endpoint (i.e., the endpoint issue), (ii) what additional conditions might be necessary for

allowing hormetic exposures (the condition issue), or (iii) whether government should

actually promote (rather than merely allow) such exposures (the action issue).

Nevertheless, as the dissertation’s detailed analysis of articles F, CBH, and P indicates, they would arguably accept R as a maximally defensible version of their claim.

In conclusion, it is worth reemphasizing that claim R is a very charitable interpretation of the regulatory positions taken in articles F, CBH, P, L, and PO. In order to be as complete as possible, one could also consider alternative forms of R that state other interpretations of the articles or claims that only some of them affirm. For example, the articles (except CBH) were ambiguous concerning whether the condition for allowing public exposure to hormetic toxins is the mere production of a beneficial effect on one endpoint or the production of a net benefit on human health as a whole. Furthermore, F

and P appear to claim that this condition (i.e., either a net benefit on health or a benefit on

one endpoint) is, in and of itself, a sufficient condition for altering current government

regulations. Thus, one could formulate alternative (arguably less defensible) versions of

claim R, according to which a toxin’s production of a benefit on at least one endpoint is

itself sufficient for justifying changes in government regulatory policy. In addition,

quotations CBHQ and LQ appear to affirm that government ought to promote (rather than

merely allow) public exposure to low-dose levels of chemicals that increase human

health. Therefore, one could also consider alternative (arguably less defensible)

formulations of claim R that encourage government to take positive steps to ensure that

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the public receives exposure to beneficial levels of hormetic toxins.62 The rest of the

dissertation focuses only on the version of claim R that is most defensible in terms of the

regulatory suggestions that it makes, but it might eventually be valuable to examine

variants of the claim that are more challenging to defend as well.

Interpretations of Claim R

Given that articles F, CBH, P, L, and PO all appear to accept claim R, this last

part of section 5.2 considers how they might interpret this claim. It appears that there are

three potential ways that one could interpret the notion in claim R that government

regulators “ought” to allow public exposure to hormetic chemicals: a “substantive”

interpretation, a “practical” interpretation, and a “definitional” interpretation. This

section briefly elucidates these three interpretations and describes how the dissertation

will address each of them in the course of this chapter and the following chapter.

One interpretation of claim R is that it is a substantive ethical claim. In other

words, the authors of articles F, CBH, P, L, and PO might be proposing a synthetic moral claim, namely, that government regulators ought to allow public exposure to hormetic chemicals under particular conditions. Under this interpretation, it appears that the authors either regarded claim R as fairly uncontroversial or were sloppy in their efforts to justify the claim, because they did not include any defense of claim R in their articles. It is possible that the authors thought that it is completely obvious that the employees of

62 If one were to evaluate this formulation of claim R, an important criticism would be that it appears to presuppose that people have welfare rights. In other words, it assumes that citizens have a positive claim on the government to provide them with basic goods like healthcare, food, and shelter. This presupposition of welfare rights may be problematic, however, because most proponents of weakened government regulations concerning toxins hold a more “libertarian” political philosophy, according to which government should interfere with citizen affairs as little as possible and thus should not be held responsible for providing its citizens with services like health benefits.

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government regulatory agencies have the ethical responsibility to protect the public from

harms but not to interfere with neutral or beneficial interactions between citizens. Thus,

the authors of articles F, CBH, P, L, and PO might have concluded that it is unnecessary

to justify the moral claim that government regulators ought to allow public exposure to

net beneficial effects of toxins. Therefore, as long as particular substances produce net

health benefits rather than harms, these thinkers would insist that one need not defend the

claim that government regulators should allow public exposure to such substances. In

opposition to the substantive moral position that it is acceptable to allow public exposures

to hormetic chemicals, however, chapter six will argue that claim R still requires further

justification if it is interpreted as a substantive ethical claim.

A second, “practical,” interpretation of claim R rejects the notion that it addresses

ethical questions about the regulation of toxic chemicals and instead portrays it as a

prudential or practical claim about the mission of government regulatory institutions.

Under this practical interpretation, those who employ claim R might state that, because

government regulatory agencies were instituted with the goal of protecting the public

from harms (and not for interfering with beneficial or neutral interactions between

citizens), government regulators have no reason to interfere with public exposure to

substances that produce beneficial effects.

The rest of the dissertation does not focus specifically on problems with the

practical interpretation of R, because the problems with the substantive interpretation are

sufficient to show that claim R is also problematic on the practical interpretation. There

are two reasons that the problems with the substantive interpretation also apply to the practical one. First, the four problems raised in chapter six against the substantive

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interpretation show that, unless claim R is specified further, policies that appeal to it in

order to allow public exposure to hormetic chemicals are likely to harm at least some

members of the public. For example, chapter six argues that, even if hormetic chemicals

appear to produce only beneficial effects, there are still dangers that they may produce harms as a result of side effects, long-term effects, or differential effects on different individuals. These problems also apply to the practical interpretation of claim R, because even if one interprets it as a purely prudential statement about the missions of government agencies, it is clear that those agencies are instituted with the goal of preventing harms from toxic chemicals. Therefore, they have a practical responsibility to avoid allowing public exposure to toxins that are likely to produce harms (even if the toxins appear at first glance to be beneficial). A second reason that the problems with the substantive interpretation also apply to the practical one is that the employees of government agencies have not only prudential responsibilities to fulfill the missions of their agencies but also prima facie ethical responsibilities to protect the public good.

Therefore, even if the proponents of claim R regard it primarily as a practical claim about the missions of government regulatory agencies, the employees of those agencies may not be ethically justified in allowing public exposures to hormetic chemicals unless an ethical form of claim R is also defensible.

A third possible interpretation of claim R is that it is neither a substantive ethical claim nor a practical one but is instead true by definition. This “definitional” interpretation accords well with the fact that the proponents of claim R do not attempt to justify it, because one does not need to defend claims that are true by definition. Both

Moore (1960, 49) and Shrader-Frechette (1980, 141) claim that, in cases when

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proponents of ethical arguments fail to argue for premises that attribute ethical significance to descriptive states of affairs, it is plausible that the proponents are either explicitly or implicitly defining those descriptive states of affairs as morally good. For example, in the case of claim R, the proponents of hormesis might regard it to be true by definition that one has a prima facie obligation not to interfere with states of affairs that are beneficial to others.63 Assuming that government regulators should abide by this moral obligation, it would be true by definition that government regulators ought to allow beneficial effects from toxins, and claim R would require no further defense.

A first difficulty with the definitional interpretation of claim R, however, is that it is not clear whether the meanings of a sentence’s terms can be so well delineated as to render the statement true by definition. For example, Quine questioned whether one can formulate a cogent distinction between analytic statements (which are supposedly true by definition) and synthetic statements (1953). If one were to accept Quine’s claims, then one would deny that it makes sense to interpret claim R as true by definition. The cogency of the analytic/synthetic distinction is a complex issue, however, that falls beyond the scope of the dissertation. Therefore, for the sake of providing a complete analysis of claim R, the dissertation will assume that statements can be analytically true and consider a second weakness of the definitional interpretation.

The rest of this chapter argues that, even if one ignores the Quinean difficulty with the definitional interpretation of claim R, it falls prey to a second problem. Namely,

63 Note that the term ‘beneficial’ in claim R refers to states of affairs that are measured by toxicologists in experimental tests, such as beneficial effects on particular biological endpoints (e.g., growth) or on a collection of endpoints that together make up an organism’s “healthiness.” Thus, the definitional interpretation of claim R states that one has, by definition, a prima facie ethical obligation not to interfere with states of affairs that are beneficial in this sense.

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any policy arguments concerning hormesis that employ the definitional interpretation of claim R are likely to violate the is/ought distinction (IOD). For the purposes of the dissertation, the IOD can be stated as follows:

(IOD) It is logically impossible to derive (soundly) a moral conclusion from premises that are solely non-moral.

To see how policy arguments are likely to violate the IOD, consider the following example, which seems likely to be representative of those that the proponents of hormesis would use:

Sample Policy Argument:

(1) Low-dose (L1…Ln) exposure to toxic chemical X produces a hormetic (i.e., beneficial) effect on humans that are exposed to low doses L1…Ln of X, AND this exposure results in a net benefit to human health and meets additional conditions, C1…Cn.

(2) Claim R: IF one or more toxic chemicals, X1…Xn, produce a hormetic (i.e., beneficial) effect on humans that are exposed to low doses (L1…Ln) of X1…Xn, AND IF human exposure to X1…Xn meets the following conditions (as some hormetic exposures may do): (1) the exposure results in a net benefit to human health, and (2) the exposure meets additional conditions, C1…Cn (including conditions that specify particular side effects that can or cannot be caused by the exposure, specific scales over which the hormetic effects must occur across time and on groups of people, particular environmental conditions under which the hormetic effects must occur, specific criteria for implementing new regulatory policies, and particular standards for obtaining consent to hormetic exposures), THEN government regulators ought to allow public exposure to low doses L1…Ln of X1…Xn.

(3) Therefore, government regulation ought to allow public exposure to low doses L1…Ln of X.

This sample argument illustrates that proponents of hormesis who employ claim

R (interpreted as true by definition) are likely to violate the IOD by attempting to derive a moral statement from solely non-moral premises. Section 5.6 of this chapter provides

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precise definitions of moral and non-moral statements. For the purposes of this section, it

is sufficient to recognize that premises (1) and (2) are plausibly non-moral, but the conclusion, (3), is plausibly moral. Regarding premise (1), the proponents of hormesis determine whether exposures to a toxin, X, are beneficial for particular biological endpoints and for human health as a whole by engaging in scientific studies of the toxin’s effects. Thus, the premise is plausibly a non-moral claim about the biological effects of toxin X. If claim R is interpreted as true by definition, then premise (2) is also plausibly non-moral, because claims that are true by definition are generally considered to be non- moral (see, e.g., Brink 1989). Under this interpretation of claim R, it states that it is true by definition that one has a prima facie obligation not to interfere with states of affairs that are beneficial to others.64 Nevertheless, premise (3) is plausibly a moral claim,

because it asserts the substantive moral conclusion that people should be allowed

exposure to a particular hormetic chemical.65 Therefore, if the proponents of claim R

interpret it as true by definition, it appears that the burden of proof rests on them to show

that their claim can play a justifiable role in public policy.

One might object, however, that the IOD is not directly violated by claim R itself

but rather by the entire argument in which R plays a part. In response, though, it seems

that, even if claim R does not violate the IOD by itself, the claim is still problematic if its

64 In order to avoid equivocating over the use of the term ‘beneficial’ in premises (1) and (2), it is important to note that premise (2) must use the term in the same, “descriptive,” sense that it is used in premise (1). Thus, if one holds that claim R is true by definition, one must accept the claim that it is true by definition that one has a prima facie obligation not to interfere with states of affairs that benefit particular biological endpoints or human health as a whole. 65 One might object that the conclusion, (3), could be a non-moral claim if the term ‘ought’ were used in a non-moral sense. Both the definitional and substantive interpretations of claim R presuppose that it employs the term ‘ought’ in a moral sense, however, so the conclusion must employ ‘ought’ in the same way in order to avoid equivocating. The “practical” interpretation considered later in this section addresses the possibility that claim R should not be interpreted in a moral sense.

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primary use is to serve in policy arguments that violate the IOD. Another objection is that the proponents of claim R could be accepting one or more additional, implicit premises, such as the following, from which claim R can be derived:

(1’) Whatever causes a net benefit to human health, all other things being equal, can be ethically allowed.

The proponent of this objection, however, falls prey to a dilemma, because the implicit premises that are used to justify claim R must themselves either be true by definition or be substantive moral claims. On one hand, if the implicit premises, such as (1’), are true by definition (and if claim R is derived solely from the implicit premises), then claim R remains true by definition and the problems for claim R developed in this section still apply to it. On the other hand, if the additional premises are substantive moral claims, and if claim R is derived from them, then it is no longer true by definition but is a substantive moral claim. But the objector is then no longer challenging the claims of this section. This chapter argues only that if one interprets claim R as true by definition, then it is problematic. The dissertation acknowledges that one could interpret claim R as a substantive moral claim (and one way to do so would be by elucidating implicit moral premises in the argument). If one thinks that the substantive interpretation is preferable, then one is not showing this chapter to be problematic but merely showing that chapter six (which analyzes the substantive interpretation) is also important.

A final way to try to defend the definitional interpretation of claim R (in addition to questioning the analytic/synthetic distinction or claiming that the proponents of the claim might be employing implicit moral premises) is to question whether the IOD really states a cogent distinction between moral statements and non-moral statements. After all,

Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1997) argue that contemporary meta-ethicists are deeply

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divided about the cogency of the IOD and the related naturalistic fallacy (NF).

Therefore, an objector might conclude that it is not very troubling if the proponents of

hormesis employ arguments (containing claim R interpreted as true by definition) that

violate the IOD. The following sections of chapter five respond to this objection by arguing that the burden of proof still appears to rest on those who propound arguments that seem to violate the IOD. Section 5.3 reviews G. E. Moore’s seminal description of the NF. Section 5.4 summarizes eight objections to Moore’s account of the NF. Section

5.5 then develops a novel account of the NF in response to these objections. Finally, section 5.6 argues that, on the basis of this novel account of the NF, the burden of proof still appears to rest on those who reject the IOD. Therefore, these sections suggest that, because policy arguments containing claim R (interpreted as true by definition) are likely to violate the IOD, claim R requires further defense if the definitional interpretation of it is employed.

5.3: Background on the NF and the IOD

In a review of late twentieth-century moral theory originally published in the

Philosophical Review, Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (1997 [1992])

claimed that two centenarians are still full of life. The first centenarian is the

Philosophical Review. The second one is the ethical controversy (concerning whether or

not the NF is a genuine fallacy) that G. E. Moore started in Principia Ethica (PE).

Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton continue:

Yet it has been known for the last fifty years that Moore discovered no fallacy at all. Moreover, Moore’s accident-prone deployment of his famous “open question argument” in defending his claims made appeal to a now defunct intuitionistic Platonism, and involved assumptions about the transparency of

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concepts and obviousness of analytic truth that were seen (eventually by Moore himself) to lead inescapably to the “paradox of analysis.” … Why, then, isn’t Moore’s argument a mere period piece? However readily we now reject as antiquated his views in semantics and epistemology, it seems impossible to deny that Moore was on to something.

Section 5.3 of this chapter provides background concerning the NF and the IOD

(including a review of Moore’s own description of them) and introduces sections 5.4 through 5.6. Next, section 5.4 analyzes the multiple problems with Moore’s description of the NF. Finally, sections 5.5 and 5.6 clarify exactly what Moore was “on to,” both concerning the NF and the IOD.

The fact that Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton made the NF the focal point of their review illustrates its importance in twentieth-century philosophy. According to Moore, anyone who identifies a moral property (such as good) with a natural property (e.g., what we desire to desire) commits the NF. Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton make the acceptance or rejection of this distinction between moral properties and natural properties the primary factor in their categorization of contemporary metaethical positions.66 Another reason the NF is crucially important is that a number of thinkers seem to believe that it is virtually identical to the IOD (see, e.g., Searle (1964), Flew (1970, 38), Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1997, 35)).67 The IOD, in turn, is very important for contemporary ethics and public policy, because it challenges any attempt to derive moral claims directly from scientific claims. For example, deriving moral conclusions directly from evolutionary

66 Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton label the metaethical positions that accept “continuity” between the natural and the moral “neo-aristotelianism,” “postpositivist nonreductionism,” and “reductionism.” They label the “discontinuity” positions “practical reasoning” theories, “constructivism,” “noncognitivism,” and “sensibility” theories. 67 As this chapter explains, however, the precise relationship between the NF and the IOD is a matter of debate; Frankena (1939), Baldwin (1990), Sylvester (1990), and Dodd and Stern-Gillet (1995) insist that the NF and the IOD are distinct.

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theory may violate the IOD and commit the NF (on at least some accounts of the IOD

and NF), because it confuses natural properties (e.g., adaptation) with moral properties,

such as goodness (see, e.g., Moore 1960, 40; Farber 1994).

Despite the significance of the NF and the IOD for contemporary ethical theory,

however, at least two general problems continue to plague descriptions of them. First, as

Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton explain in their aforementioned quotation, Moore’s

argument that the NF is a genuine fallacy appears to be problematic (see section 5.4).

Contemporary philosophers take two different responses to this weakness. On one hand,

those that Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton call “practical reasoning theorists,”

“constructivists,” “noncognitivists,” and “sensibility theorists” believe that Moore was

still “on to something.” They think that there is indeed a distinction between moral

properties and natural properties, even if Moore’s argument for the distinction is not

compelling. On the other hand, those that Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton call “neo-

Aristotelians,” “postpositivist nonreductionists,” and “reductionists” take the weaknesses

in Moore’s argument as one indication that there is not a legitimate distinction between

moral properties and natural properties. The second problem with Moore’s description of the NF is that its precise relationship is unclear with the closely related notion of the IOD, which states that one cannot validly derive a moral conclusion from premises that are solely non-moral (see, e.g., Dodd and Stern-Gillet 1995). Contemporary philosophers again take at least two different positions concerning the relationship between the NF and the IOD. On one hand, a number of influential thinkers, including Searle (1964), Flew

(1970, 38), Kohlberg (1971), and Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1997, 35), appear to consider the IOD and the NF to be virtually identical. On the other hand, many of those

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who have examined Moore’s description of the NF in detail, including Frankena (1939),

Baldwin (1990, 86), Sylvester (1990, 170ff), and Dodd and Stern-Gillet (1995), insist that

the IOD is distinct from Moore’s NF. In fact, Baldwin seems to suggest that Moore

actually rejects the IOD in certain cases!

Sections 5.4 through 5.6 address each problem facing the NF (namely, the disagreement concerning the cogency of Moore’s description and the confusion concerning the NF’s relationship to the IOD). In response to the first problem, section

5.4 systematizes the difficulties with Moore’s understanding of the NF. Next, section 5.5 develops a novel account of the NF, according to which one “commits the naturalistic fallacy” by rejecting a meta-ethical claim (namely, NF*). The account also includes a defense of claim NF*, consisting of a revised form of Moore’s open question argument, called OQA*. The section uses insights from Baldwin and Gampel and builds on the work of Darwall, Geach, Gibbard, Hutchinson, Lewy, Railton, and Rohatyn in order to develop the account. In response to the second problem (i.e., confusion about the relationship between the NF and the IOD), section 5.6 formulates two arguments (called

“IOD-From-NF*” and “No Bridges”). Using a wholly new analysis by the author, the section attempts to resolve the long-standing dispute between Flew, Hare, Searle,

Stevenson, Veatch, and others, versus Frankena, Snare, Baldwin, and others, over whether the NF is or is not distinct from the IOD (see e.g., Bruening 1971). Argument

IOD-From-NF* derives, from uncontroversial assumptions and one controversial premise, the claim that, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on those who reject the IOD. Using statement NF* as a premise, argument “No Bridges” defends the controversial premise in argument IOD-From-NF*. Therefore, the novel account

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clarifies that NF* is distinct from the IOD but that NF* plays a crucial role in at least one

defense of the IOD. Namely, NF* serves as a crucial premise in a pair of arguments that

employ otherwise fairly defensible premises in order to derive IOD. By doing so, NF*

supports metaethical positions that distinguish moral and natural properties. It also

challenges attempts to derive ethical conclusions directly from the results of scientific

investigations.

Before turning to sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, however, let us briefly review G. E.

Moore’s own description of the NF and of the open question argument (OQA) by which

he argued that the NF describes a genuine error in ethical reasoning (see Moore 1960

[1903]).68 Many philosophers, including Frankena (1939), Lewy (1970), Bruening

(1971), Soghoian (1979), Rohatyn (1987), Baldwin (1990), Sylvester (1990), and

Hutchinson (2001), have attempted to analyze Moore’s description of the NF and the

OQA. The goal of the dissertation is not to provide a detailed historical and logical description of Moore’s own work, however, but rather to address the main alleged problems with Moore’s NF and to develop an improved formulation of the NF, one that is less vulnerable to these criticisms. Therefore, this section does not exhaustively analyze

Moore’s own writings. Instead, it merely attempts to provide a preliminary, plausible description of his formulations of the NF and the OQA, which can then be employed as starting points for developing the dissertation’s new account of the NF and its relation to the IOD in sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6.

Turning first to the NF, this section employs Lewy’s (1970) account of Moore’s formulation of the NF. Lewy provides a particularly plausible reconstruction of the

68 Moore was not clear, however, about whether the NF was a logical fallacy or some other sort of error, and he later acknowledged that it was not a logical fallacy (see Lewy 1970).

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Principia, because it is based on Moore’s own later comments concerning it (see also

Baldwin 1990). According to Lewy, Moore himself claimed that he confused at least three different descriptions of the NF in the Principia (see Lewy 1970). According to his own later admission, Moore stated that to accuse someone of commiting the NF is to make one of the following three claims:

(1) So-and-so is identifying Good with some property other than Good;

(2) So-and-so is identifying Good with some analysable property;

(3) So-and-so is identifying Good with some natural or metaphysical property. (Lewy 1970, 296)

Besides this three-fold confusion, Moore acknowledges that his description of the NF involved at least one further problem. Namely, he confused two different claims that are actually quite different:

(A) The NF involves the view that a property of a particular kind, X, is identical with good;

(B) The NF involves the confusion of a property of a particular kind, X, with good.

Lewy concludes by summarizing Moore’s considered views on his former confusions:

[I]f he [i.e., Moore] still wished to use the term ‘naturalistic fallacy’, he would define it as follows: ‘So-and-so is committing the naturalistic fallacy’ means ‘He is either confusing Good with a natural or metaphysical property or holding it to be identical with such a property or making an inference based upon such a confusion’. (1970, 297)

In other words, Lewy claims that Moore would have resolved confusion (1) by focusing on the third formulation of the NF (i.e., the identification of Good with a natural or metaphysical property) and that he would have resolved confusion (2) by including both claim (A) and claim (B) in his considered formulation. In order to be as complete as

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possible, however, it seems reasonable to employ, for preliminary purposes, a formulation of the NF that does not beg questions about the best way to resolve Moore’s former ambiguities. Thus, until section 5.5 develops an improved and clarified account of the NF, the chapter will consider that one commits the NF if one accepts (either implicitly or explicitly) any of the following three claims, with the differences between them italicized:

(NF1) Good is not identical with any property other than good.

(NF2) Good is not identical with any analyzable property.

(NF3) Good is not identical with any natural or metaphysical property.

Turning now to the OQA, this section employs Hutchinson’s (2001) description of Moore’s argument, because it is a very recent analysis of Moore’s work that is virtually identical to most other analyses of the OQA (see e.g., Baldwin 1990, Darwall,

Gibbard, and Railton 1997, Gampel 1996, Rohatyn 1987, Sylvester 1990). Moore developed the OQA as an argument in favor of the claim that the NF does indeed refer to a genuine error in ethical reasoning. Although Hutchinson does not actually formulate it in terms of a deductive argument, one can summarize his analysis of Moore’s OQA in terms of two premises and a conclusion:

(1) For any property, A, that is a property other than good, the answer to the question, ‘Is A good?’, is significant (i.e., nontautologous).

(2) If (1), then good is not identical with any property other than good.

(3) Therefore, good is not identical with any property other than good. (based on premises (1) and (2))

In other words, the argument points out that, because any claim that identifies good with another property is nontautologous (whereas claims that identify good with good itself

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are tautologous), the claim must be synthetic, not an analytic definition of the property

good. According to Hutchinson, Moore used this argument to attack the error of thinking

that good can be analytically defined in terms of any other property. Instead, Moore

claimed (according to Hutchinson) that the statement “X is good” should be regarded as a

synthetic claim that X has the “further property of being good” (2001, 30).

Hutchinson’s formulation of the OQA (which will henceforth be called “OQA1”)

defends the first version of the NF that was developed earlier in this section (namely, statement NF1). One could also develop two variations of the OQA (labeled OQA2 and

OQA3) that defend NF2 and NF3. The phrases in these arguments that differ from OQA1

are placed in italics:

(OQA2):

(1) For any property, A, that is an analyzable property, the answer to the question, ‘Is A good?’, is significant (i.e., nontautologous).

(2) If (1), then good is not identical with any analyzable property.

(3) Therefore, good is not identical with an analyzable property. (based on premises (1) and (2))

(OQA3):

(1) For any property, A, that is a natural or metaphysical property, the answer to the question, ‘Is A good?’, is significant (i.e., nontautologous).

(2) If (1), then good is not identical with any natural or metaphysical property.

(3) Therefore, good is not identical with any natural or metaphysical property. (based on premises (1) and (2))

The dissertation will employ these three formulations of the OQA until section 5.5

develops an improved account of the argument.

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5.4: Eight Objections to Moore’s Description of the NF

Section 5.4 describes eight objections to Moore’s formulation of the NF and to his

argument that the NF is a genuine fallacy. The purpose of this section is to outline the

difficulties that must be overcome if the chapter’s novel account of the NF and OQA

(developed in section 5.5) is to succeed. The compilation and organization of the

objections in this section are novel, but each individual objection has been developed by

one or more previous thinkers throughout the twentieth century.69

One might call the first difficulty with Moore’s description of the NF the

“ambiguity objection.” It focuses on Moore’s ambiguity in Principia Ethica (PE)

concerning the precise nature of the NF. On the basis of Lewy’s (1970) and Baldwin’s

(1990) analyses of Moore’s views, for example, section 5.3 argued that one could

provisionally analyze his formulation of the NF in terms of at least three different claims:

(NF1) Good is not identical with any property other than good.

(NF2) Good is not identical with any analyzable property.

(NF3) Good is not identical with any natural or metaphysical property.

Moore suggested throughout PE that one could commit the NF in at least three different

ways, by rejecting any of these three different claims. Until section 5.5 develops a

clearer account of the NF, one can provisionally regard commission of the NF as the

rejection of either NF1, NF2, or NF3.

The second, or “fallacy,” objection to Moore’s account of the NF is that it does

not actually appear to be a logical fallacy (see e.g., Frankena 1939, Darwall, Gibbard, and

Railton 1997). For example, Frankena claims that the sorts of arguments Moore

69 The following discussions of each objection cite some of the most important thinkers who developed them.

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considered to be fallacious can be interpreted so that they are logically valid. He presents

the Epicurean argument, “Pleasure is good, since it is sought by all men,” as an example

(1939, 468). The Epicureans are obviously assuming an implicit premise, which states,

“What is sought by all men is good.” Therefore, the Epicurean argument is logically

valid. Because Moore believes that to accept the Epicurean argument is to commit the

NF (1960, 63ff), Frankena insists that the NF must not be a logical fallacy. As section

5.3 noted, Moore himself later acknowledged that his descriptions of the NF in PE did

not actually refer to a logical fallacy (see Lewy 1970). Instead, he claimed that one

“commits” the NF by accepting one or more substantive metaethical claims concerning

good (namely, claims NF1, NF2, or NF3).

The “predication objection” is a third alleged difficulty with Moore’s description

of the NF. Peter Geach (1956) famously argued that people typically use ‘good’

attributively rather than predicatively. In other words, he claimed that people do not

assert that entities are good simpliciter (a predicative use of ‘good’) but rather that they are good as particular sorts of entities (an attributive use of ‘good’). For example, when one asserts that a computer is good, one most likely means that it has a large memory and all the latest high-tech features. When one asserts that a table is good, one probably means that it is sturdy and constructed out of high-quality materials. These uses of

‘good’ are attributive, because the meaning of ‘good’ depends on the entity being described and expresses the fact that it has the properties that enable entities of that sort to be excellent or to function well. In contrast, Moore appeared to use the term ‘good’ predicatively (see, e.g., Baldwin 1990). In other words, he thought that ‘good’ referred to a single property, a property that does not vary based on the object of which it is

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predicated. To distinguish the use of ‘good’ in a predicative sense from its use in an

attributive sense, one can use the subscripted terms, ‘goodP’ and ‘goodA’. Because Geach argues that people generally predicate only goodA (rather than goodP) of objects or states

of affairs, Moore’s description of the NF appears to face at least three problems, each of

which constitutes a form of the predication problem. (1) If people generally predicate

only goodA of objects or states of affairs, then it is not entirely clear that ‘goodP’ refers to

any property at all. (2) Even if ‘goodP’ did refer to a particular property, it is not entirely

clear what that property would be, because people do not appear to employ the notion of

goodP. (3) Because people seemingly do not employ the notion of goodP, it is not clear

why humans should be motivated to pursue or promote it, even if it were a genuine

property.

A fourth alleged difficulty with the NF is what the dissertation calls the

“taxonomy objection” (see e.g., Baldwin 1990). In PE, Moore divided all properties into

three categories: natural, metaphysical, and non-natural. Furthermore, he claimed that

each category of properties has its own unique characteristics (Moore 1960, 110-112).

Natural properties (e.g., the property of being what humans desire to desire) exist in time.

Metaphysical properties (e.g., the property of being loved by God) exist timelessly. Non- natural properties (e.g., the property to which the term ‘good’ refers) have the peculiar characteristic of being but not existing.70 At least some variants of the NF appear to

presuppose Moore’s taxonomy. For example, claim NF3 states that good is neither a

natural nor a metaphysical property (and good must therefore be, as far as Moore was

concerned, a non-natural property). Unfortunately, Moore’s three-fold categorization of

70 According to Moore, numbers provide another example of non-natural properties. For example, Moore claims that two and two are four, but neither two nor four actually exist (1960, 111).

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all properties, as well as his description of each category, is quite speculative, because it is not clear that humans understand metaphysical and non-natural properties well enough to characterize them (if they even refer to real properties). Therefore, the taxonomy objection takes at least two forms. First, it is not clear whether there are actually such things as non-natural or metaphysical properties, because purported non-natural or metaphysical properties might either be illusory or reducible to natural properties. For example, one might think that the alleged metaphysical property of being loved by God does not refer to any instantiated property but is instead the product of mistaken beliefs in the existence of a personal God. A second form of the taxonomy objection is that even though there are presumably such things as natural properties, Moore’s description of the difference between natural properties and other properties could be inaccurate. For example, he claims that natural properties exist in time, whereas metaphysical properties exist timelessly and non-natural properties have “being” without existence. Baldwin

(1990) notes, however, that Moore’s claims are quite controversial. For instance, it is not at all obvious that there are properties that have “being” without existence, as Moore asserts with regard to non-natural properties.

The fifth, “analysis” objection involves at least two alleged difficulties with

Moore’s conception of philosophical analysis, both of which challenge the validity of the argument (i.e., the OQA) by which he attempted to justify the NF. The first difficulty has become known as the “paradox of analysis,” which consists in the assumption that an analysis must be trivial (i.e., tautologous) in order to be true (see Langford 1942; Baldwin

1990; Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 1997; Hutchinson 2001). Premise (2) of the provisional OQA (i.e., OQA1, OQA2, or OQA3) presupposes that one can determine two

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properties, A and B, to be non-identical by showing that the question, ‘Is A also B?’ is

significant or nontautologous. That presupposition is arguably problematic, however,

because it assumes that philosophical analyses must be trivial (i.e., tautologous) in order

to be true. As Hutchinson (2001, 31) explains, however, philosophical analyses of terms

like ‘horse’ do not merely assert trivial claims, such as that “A horse is a horse.”

Moreover, Hutchinson claims that Moore thought that his own analysis of the term

‘ought’ was far from trivial. Therefore, it is untenable to claim or presuppose, as premise

(2) of the provisional OQA does, that statements asserting an identity between two

properties must be tautologous in order for the statements to provide a legitimate

philosophical analysis.

The second alleged difficulty with Moore’s conception of philosophical analysis

is that it includes an arguably faulty, “distinctness” presupposition (see e.g., Lewy 1970,

Baldwin 1990). This presupposition is that a property that is distinct from any other property (or unanalyzable in terms of any other properties) cannot be identical to a natural or metaphysical property. The distinctness presupposition plays an important role in Moore’s formulation of the NF, because his primary motivation for proposing statements NF1 and NF2 was that he thought they could be used to defend NF3. As Lewy

(1970) and Baldwin (1990) explain (see section 5.3), Moore was primarily interested in defending NF3 (according to which good is distinct from any natural or metaphysical

property). He thought, however, that he could support NF3 by showing statement NF1 or statement NF2 to be true. It turns out, though, that the inference from the truth of

statements NF1 or NF2 to the truth of statement NF3 depends on the truth of the

distinctness presupposition. In other words, he assumes that the distinctness of a property

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from any other properties (or the unanalyzability of the property) is sufficient to show

that it is not identical to a natural or metaphysical property.71 The problem with this

presupposition is that a distinct (or unanalyzable) property could still be a natural or

metaphysical property. For example, good could be the same as pleasure. Such an

identification would not violate the distinctness or unanalyzability of good, because

‘good’ and ‘pleasure’ could merely refer to the same unanalyzable property, which

happens to be distinct from all other properties.

A sixth, or “intuition,” objection is that the OQA may depend on intuitions that

are questionable (see, e.g., Gampel 1996; Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 1997;

Hutchinson 2001). According to the intuition objection, like the analysis objection, the second premise of the provisional OQA (i.e., OQA1, OQA2, or OQA3) is unconvincing.

Nevertheless, the intuition objection attacks the premise for somewhat different reasons.

The premise states that if, for any property A of a particular sort (e.g., natural properties),

the answer to the question, ‘Is A good?’ is significant (i.e., nontautologous), then good is

not identical with any property of that sort. Whereas the analysis objection attacks the

premise’s specific presupposition that two properties cannot be identical if the analysis of one property in terms of the other is non-tautologous, the intuition objection attacks the premise’s general presupposition that people’s intuitions are a reliable indicator of the relationships between properties. In other words, the intuition objection asserts that two properties could be identical even though people intuitively believe that they are not. For

71 One might worry that the distinctness presupposition is also important for justifying premise two of OQA3, which states, “If, for any property, A, that is a natural or metaphysical property, the answer to the question, ‘Is A good?’, is significant (i.e., nontautologous), then good is not identical with any natural or metaphysical property.” It appears that this premise rests on the questionable assumption that if a property, X, is distinct from any other natural or metaphysical property, then X itself must not be natural or metaphysical. Although this questionable assumption is very similar to the distinctness presupposition, the dissertation addresses this difficulty as part of the seventh, “non-reduction” problem.

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example, it seems plausible that someone could consider the property of being the

morning star and the property of being the evening star to be distinct even though they

are actually identical.72 Therefore, as premise (2) of the provisional OQA stands, it is

questionable, because the significance of the question, “Is A good?” (where A is a

particular sort of property) does not provide conclusive evidence that good is distinct

from property A. The intuition objection shows that the intuitions that make the question

significant (i.e., the intuitions that good and A are distinct properties) are fallible.

Seventh, what the chapter calls the “non-reduction objection” is that, even if the

OQA did successfully prove that good is distinct from (or unanalyzable in terms of) any

other natural property, it would not follow that good is not natural (see e.g., Baldwin

1990 and Gampel 1996). Non-reductive naturalists such as Nicholas Sturgeon, David

Brink, and Richard Boyd maintain that ethical properties are natural properties that

supervene on lower-order natural properties (see, e.g., Sayre-McCord 1988). For

example, the ethical property of being morally wrong might be a natural property that

supervenes on the natural properties that constitute a group of kids’ torturing a helpless

puppy. Non-reductive naturalists insist, however, that the ethical properties play a role at some level of causal explanation and are therefore irreducible to the lower-order

72 One might object that the example of the distinction between the evening star and the morning star is not a good example of flawed intuition, because intuition is immediate, whereas people reason step-by-step to the relationship between the evening star and the morning star. Three responses are plausible. First, it is arguable that, even if people gradually reason to the conclusion that the evening star and the morning star are distinct, the initial belief that they are identical may be a fairly immediate intuition (following directly on observations of the evening star and the morning star). Therefore, the example does arguably illustrate the way that initial intuitions can be flawed. Second, even if one’s initial beliefs about the evening star and morning star were the result of step-by-step reasoning rather than immediate intuition, there are probably similar examples that do involve intuition. For example, one might have the immediate intuition that heat is distinct from any other physical property, even though it is actually identical to kinetic properties of an object’s component parts. Third, even if one insisted that all such examples actually involved reasoning rather than intuition, it still seems plausible that intuitions about properties can be just as fallible as reasoning about properties, so the evening star and morning star example still shows that intuitions can probably be flawed.

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properties. The possibility of such a “non-reductive naturalist” position about good

(which states that good is an irreducible but natural property) casts doubt on the truth of the provisional OQA’s premise (2). If non-reductive naturalism about good is a tenable position, then the significance of the question, “Is A good?” (where A is any natural property) fails to show that good itself is not a natural property. Good could be an irreducible property that is natural but that is not identical to any other natural property.

Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1997) identify what the dissertation will call an eighth, “meaning,” objection to Moore’s formulation of the NF, namely, that the provisional OQA may depend on an inadequate account of how words get their meaning.

Quine and the later Wittgenstein argue that terms get their meaning from the way they are used. Thus, if moral terms are consistently used in conjunction with particular descriptive features of the world, these thinkers would question whether moral terms have an analytic meaning that can be distinguished from these descriptive features.73 For example, if ‘courage’ is consistently used to describe people who risk harm in order to further a cause, then Quine and Wittgenstein would claim that those natural properties

(e.g., risking harm in support of a cause) are part of the term’s meaning. If these thinkers are right, then Moore’s OQA might be inadequate to show that good is distinct from any natural property. According to them, ‘good’ would refer to a particular natural property,

A, if ‘good’ were always used in conjunction with A. Therefore, they would find premise

(2) of the provisional OQA to be unconvincing. They would claim that ‘good’ refers to

A even if the question ‘Is A good?’ appears to be significant.

73 See Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1997, 33) for a presentation of this objection against Moore’s description of the NF.

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5.5: An Alternative Formulation of the NF

The goal of this section is to develop novel formulations of the NF and the OQA,

called NF* and OQA* respectively, which deviate as little as possible from Moore’s

original description of the NF and OQA but that eliminate the eight objections described

in section 5.4. In order to revise Moore’s account of the NF without altering the original

too significantly, it is helpful to review his fundamental point. According to Darwall,

Gibbard, and Railton, Moore’s core insight was to point to “certain characteristic features of ‘good’—and of other normative vocabulary—that seem to stand in the way of our accepting any known naturalistic or metaphysical definition [of them] as unquestionably right, as definitions, at least when fully understood, seemingly should be” (1997, 4).

Thus, Moore’s fundamental aim was to distinguish moral properties from natural or metaphysical properties; he affirmed that one cannot define the one in terms of the other.

Therefore, the goal of a revised account of the NF and OQA should plausibly be to maintain Moore’s distinction while responding to the eight objections from section 5.4.

One can further organize the eight alleged difficulties by grouping them into three categories: (a) “clarity” objections, (b) “concept” objections, and (c) “OQA” objections.

The ambiguity and fallacy objections both reflect the need to (a) clarify the NF and the

OQA. The predication and taxonomy objections show the importance of justifying or revising (b) concepts employed in Moore’s description of the NF. (In particular, the predication objection questions the concept of goodP, and the taxonomy objection

questions Moore’s three-fold division of all properties into natural, non-natural, and

metaphysical ones.) The analysis, intuition, non-reduction, and meaning objections fall

in the (c) OQA category of objections, because they suggest that the OQA should be

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defended or revised. This section begins by tackling the (b) concept and (c) OQA

categories of objections. It starts with the provisional accounts of the NF and OQA

(namely, NF1, NF2, NF3, and OQA1, OQA2, OQA3) and gradually modifies them in

response to each concept and OQA objection. The end of the section summarizes the

changes made to the provisional formulation of the NF and shows that the (a) clarity

objections disappear as a welcome side effect of solving the concept and OQA

objections.

The predication objection is the first alleged difficulty in the (b) concept category.

As section 5.4 explained, it questions how to make sense of the property goodP,

considering that people do not appear to refer to it but instead refer to goodA. Baldwin

(1990, 74-79) suggests a valuable compromise for resolving this difficulty. He notes that

Moore believed in a necessary connection between the property of goodP and that of being morally obligatory.74 For example, Moore believed that proposition (M1) is true if

and only if proposition (M2) is true (Moore 1942, 597):

(M1) X is intrinsically good.

(M2) If an action, which we can do, will produce X, that is some reason for thinking that we ought to do that action.

He also believed that proposition (M1) is true if and only if proposition (M3) is true:

(M3) If we had to choose between an action of which X would be the sole or total effect, and an action which would have absolutely no effect at all, it would always be our [moral] duty to choose the former, and wrong to choose the latter.

74 Note that Moore would not have explicitly affirmed that he was talking about the property of goodP. (He thought that he was merely talking about good in general.) As section III explained, however, Moore was plausibly discussing goodP when he wrote about good.

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Moore vacillated between thinking that the logical connection between propositions (M1)

and (M2) (and between propositions (M1) and (M3)) is analytic or thinking that the

connection is synthetic (Baldwin 1990). In other words, he was unsure whether to claim

that the one proposition actually means the same thing as the other (an analytic

connection) or that they have different meanings but are logically interchangeable (a

synthetic connection). Nevertheless, Baldwin argues that one could rationally

reconstruct Moore’s position as if the connection were analytic. Thus, one could

translate all of his statements about goodP into statements about moral obligation. For example, one could translate the sentence, “Human happiness is good,” into the sentence,

“If an action, which we can do, will produce human happiness, that is some reason for thinking that we ought to do that action.”

Baldwin’s idea of translating all of Moore’s statements about goodP into

statements about moral obligation suggests a promising compromise for resolving the

predication objection. Even if Moore accepted only that the connection between

propositions (M1), (M2), and (M3) is synthetic (rather than that it is analytic), it is clear that he believed the properties of goodP and moral obligation to be very similar moral properties. For example, he thought that either property would have to be distinct from every natural property. Thus, because the central point of the NF is to distinguish moral properties from natural properties, one could replace the term ‘good’ in NF1, NF2, or NF3

with the term ‘moral obligation’ without significantly altering his position. The

replacement would maintain the spirit of Moore’s original claims, according to which

moral properties (whether they be goodP or moral obligation) are distinct from natural or

metaphysical properties. Furthermore, because Moore believed that all moral properties

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are distinct from natural or metaphysical properties, one could make the NF even more complete by adding a set of related properties (such as moral praiseworthiness and moral value), such that all moral statements predicate at least one of the concepts mentioned in the NF.

The resulting forms of the NF would be:

(NF1’) Neither the property of being morally obligatory, nor of being morally praiseworthy, nor of being morally valuable is identical with any property other than itself.

(NF2’) Neither the property of being morally obligatory, nor of being morally praiseworthy, nor of being morally valuable is identical with any analyzable property.75

(NF3’) Neither the property of being morally obligatory, nor of being morally praiseworthy, nor of being morally valuable is identical with any natural or metaphysical property.

The properties of being morally obligatory, morally praiseworthy, and morally valuable are very familiar ones in moral discourse. Thus, the predication objection (which questions whether the property of goodP exists, what it is like, and why it should be motivating) is much less applicable to these properties than it is to goodP. For example, one might question whether it is coherent to say that an action, A, maximizes the quantity of goodP in the world (because it is unclear precisely what goodP is), but it presumably makes sense to say that one has a moral obligation to perform an action, A. Describing the NF in terms of properties such as moral obligation meets the dual goals of resolving a difficulty (namely, the predication objection) with Moore’s account while maintaining his

75 One might worry that Moore could have believed the property good and the properties of being morally obligatory, morally praiseworthy, or morally valuable to be significantly different in one very important respect. Namely, even though Moore thought that ‘good’ referred to a simple and unanalyzable property, he may not have thought that the property of being morally obligatory (or morally praiseworthy, or morally valuable) is simple and unanalyzable. Therefore, even though he accepted NF2, he might not have accepted NF2’. Although this is a complex issue, it is not ultimately very critical for the reformulation of the NF in this chapter, because NF2’ is later abandoned in favor of NF3’.

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fundamental goal of distinguishing moral properties from natural or metaphysical

properties.

The taxonomy objection (the other difficulty in the concept category) can also be

eliminated by altering Moore’s account. The taxonomy objection consists in the

uncertainty whether there are such things as non-natural and metaphysical properties, and

it also questions Moore’s description of natural properties. In order to resolve these

objections, one could either abandon or defend Moore’s account of these three property

categories. Evaluating and defending Moore’s taxonomy would require extensive

metaphysical argumentation. Therefore, it appears easier to revise his account so that it

employs less controversial notions, as long as the revision maintains his central goal of

distinguishing moral properties from other properties. NF1’ and NF2’ already seem to be unproblematic, because they do not directly refer to metaphysical or non-natural

76 properties. NF3’ does refer to metaphysical properties, but one can revise it to become

a slightly different claim, NF3’’, which eliminates that reference:

(NF3’’) Neither the property of being morally obligatory, nor of being morally praiseworthy, nor of being morally valuable is identical with any natural property.

The absence of any reference to metaphysical properties in NF3’’ is not a serious loss,

because contemporary metaethical debates focus on whether moral properties are

76 In principle, NF1’ and NF2’ could still fall prey to the taxonomy problem (e.g., if they presupposed a distinction between metaphysical and non-natural properties) even though they do not directly refer to metaphysical or non-natural properties. Nevertheless, the chapter ultimately abandons NF1’ and NF2’ in response to the analysis problem, so it is not worth investigating too deeply whether they might be problematic in some subtle way.

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identical to natural properties, not metaphysical properties (see, e.g., Sayre-McCord

1988, Gampel 1996).77

Turning to objections in the (c) “OQA” category, section III of this chapter

divided the analysis objection into two sub-problems: the paradox of analysis and the

distinctness presupposition. The paradox-of-analysis objection is that the provisional

form of the OQA presumes that philosophical analyses must be trivial in order to be true.

Once one rejects or questions this presupposition, premise (2) of the OQA appears to be

unconvincing. For example, if legitimate philosophical analyses can be non-trivial, then

two properties, A and B, could presumably be identical even though the question, ‘Is A

also B?’ is non-tautologous. In other words, the properties of being water and of being

H2O might be identical even though it could be a significant or non-tautologous question whether water is H2O. Nevertheless, Baldwin (1990), Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton

(1997), and Hutchinson (2001) all note that one can adjust Moore’s argument so that it

does not fall prey to the paradox-of-analysis objection. The key is to acknowledge that

the “openness” or significance of the question, ‘Is A also B?’ establishes only that, all

else being equal, the burden of proof rests against those who would claim that A and B

are identical. Thus, a revised form of the OQA would not have to depend on a particular

conception of philosophical analysis. Instead, it could rely only on the notion that, if two properties intuitively appear to be non-identical, then the burden of proof rests on those who would conflate them (as long as all other considerations for and against their identity

77 If one wished to argue against thinkers who claim that the property of being morally obligatory is identical to a metaphysical property, one could employ NF3’ (rather than NF3’’) to argue against them. Because the opponents would already be accepting the occurrence of metaphysical properties, it would not be controversial to employ a principle (i.e., NF3’) that mentions metaphysical properties. In general, however, claim NF3’’ appears to be less controversial (because it does not mention metaphysical properties), and section V argues that one can still employ it successfully (even without any reference to metaphysical properties) to defend the IOD.

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are roughly equal). The weakened form of the NF that this revised version of the OQA

could defend would be the following (with the primary alterations to previous versions of

the NF in bold type):78

(NFR3’’) All else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that either the property of being morally obligatory, or of being morally praiseworthy, or of being morally valuable is identical with any natural property.

The altered formulation of the OQA that could defend claim (NFR3’’) would be as

follows, with the chief alterations to premise (2) of the former OQA in bold type:

(OQAR3’’):

(1) For any property, A, that is a natural property, the answer to the question, ‘Is A morally obligatory (or morally praiseworthy, or morally valuable)?’, is significant (i.e., nontautologous).

(2) If (1), then, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that the property of being morally obligatory (or morally praiseworthy, or morally valuable) is identical with any natural property.

(3) Therefore, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that the property of being morally obligatory, or morally praiseworthy, or morally valuable is identical with any natural property. (based on premises (1) and (2))

OQAR3’’ establishes only that, all else being equal, the burden of proof is against those

who conflate moral obligation with any natural property, whereas argument OQA3 concludes that it is actually true that good is distinct from any natural property.

78 An explanation is in order for the name of this novel formulation of the NF (i.e., NFR3’’) and for the name of the following argument that defends it (i.e., OQAR3’’). This formulation of the NF is a revised form of NF3’’, and therefore the subscript ‘R’ is added to it. Because the argument defends NFR3’’, it is called OQAR3’’. One could alter the italicized phrases in order to defend revised versions of NF1’ or NF2’, and the resulting argument would be called OQAR1’ or OQAR2’.

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Nevertheless, unlike OQA3, argument OQAR3’’ does not fall prey to the paradox of

analysis, so it appears to be preferable.79

The distinctness presupposition is the second “sub-problem” of the analysis

objection. It consists in Moore’s questionable presupposition that, if a property is distinct

from any other property (or unanalyzable in terms of any other property), then it must be

a non-natural property. As section III explained, Moore thought that NF1 and NF2 were

significant primarily because they could be employed to defend NF3 (using the

distinctness presupposition). Therefore, considering that NF3 appears to have been his

main concern, and considering that NF1 and NF2 arguably cannot be used to support NF3

in the way that he thought, the easiest solution to the distinctness objection is to abandon

NF1 and NF2 (as well as their revised forms, NF1’ and NF2’). Moore himself later

claimed that, if he could reformulate his description of the NF, he would employ only

NF3 (see e.g., Baldwin 1990). Therefore, the novel account of the NF in this section

henceforth will deal only with statement NFR3’’ and with argument OQAR3’’.

The sixth, or intuition, objection is that speakers could think properties are distinct

(e.g., believing that good is distinct from every natural property) even though the

properties are not distinct. For example, people originally may have thought that the

property of being the morning star was distinct from the property of being the evening star, but further investigation revealed that the two properties were identical. One

79 One might object that evading the paradox of analysis is not alone sufficient to show that argument OQAR3’’ is preferable to argument OQA. One must also show that argument OQAR3’’ is sufficiently similar to OQA to be an adequate replacement. Moore originally intended for the OQA to prove that natural properties are distinct from moral properties, whereas argument OQAR3’’ merely places the burden of proof on those who conflate natural properties and moral properties. Considering that OQAR3’’ still supports the same claim as OQA (i.e., that natural properties are distinct from moral properties), just to a weaker extent (i.e., establishing the burden of proof rather than an actual proof), it seems plausible that OQAR3’’ is indeed sufficiently similar to OQA to be an adequate replacement.

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response is that, once one modifies the OQA (in response to the analysis objection) so that it merely establishes, all else being equal, the burden of proof against those who identify good with natural properties, the intuition objection dissolves. In other words,

OQAR3’’ does not fall prey to the intuition objection, because it makes a weaker claim than the provisional OQA (i.e., OQA1, OQA2, or OQA3). OQAR3’’ asserts that, if people intuitively believe that two properties are distinct, that is sufficient (all else being equal) for placing the burden of proof on those who conflate the properties. The intuition objection does not invalidate OQAR3’’, because it (unlike the provisional OQA) does not assume that people’s intuitions are unchallengeable.

A second response to the intuition objection is that one can supplement the

OQAR3’’ with “supplementary claims” that defend the main pre-philosophical intuition highlighted by it (i.e., the intuition that moral obligation is distinct from any natural property). For example, Hare (1952) and Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1997, 4) suggest that moral obligation is fundamentally conceptually associated with commending or guiding action. In other words, if person X has a moral obligation to perform action Y

(or if action Y would be morally praiseworthy or of moral value for X to perform), that provides person X with at least some reason to do Y. For any natural property, R, however, one can imagine human beings failing to find any conceptual linkage between that property’s obtaining and the motivation to act in a particular way.80 For example,

80 Two caveats should be added in order to defend the claim that there is no conceptual linkage between any natural property and the motivation to act. First, many natural properties may provide psychological reasons for action. For example, an action’s producing pleasure for oneself or others might provide some psychological motivation to pursue the action. Nevertheless, it is not clear that these natural properties (such as pleasure) are inherently conceptually linked to action. The second caveat is that this explanation for the intuitive distinctness of moral obligation from natural properties (namely, that moral obligation is inherently action-commending) may be convincing only for those who believe that assent to a moral proposition inherently includes motivation to act on the proposition. Those who believe that one can assent

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even though it is contingently the case that almost all human beings are motivated to

experience pleasure, it does not seem logically incoherent to claim that one ought never

to pursue pleasure. Therefore, it makes sense that no natural property, R, can be the same

property as moral obligation. This argument concerning the action-guiding features of

moral obligation can supplement the OQAR3’’ and support the burden of proof that it

places on those who conflate moral and natural properties. It is probably best, therefore, to regard OQAR3’’ as a starting point that can be supplemented by further explanations

and arguments. The supplementary claim provided by Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton,

and also by Hare, might be called the “commendation explanation” (CE):

(CE) One explanation for the intuition that moral obligation (or moral praiseworthiness, or moral value) is distinct from any natural property is that the notion of moral obligation (or moral praiseworthiness, or moral value) is conceptually linked with the guidance of action (so that being morally obligated to perform an action provides some reason to perform the action), whereas no natural property has that conceptual linkage.

Statement (CE) supports the pre-philosophical intuition that good is indeed distinct from any natural property.81

The technique of adding supplementary claims, such as (CE), to OQAR3’’

arguably provides a way to acknowledge and respond to the non-reduction and meaning

objections as well as the intuition objection. First, consider how argument OQAR3’’ could be defended against the non-reduction objection. The difficulty that the argument faces is that, even if moral properties are intuitively distinct from all other natural properties, it seems that moral properties could still be natural properties of a non-

to a moral proposition without being motivated to act on it might deny that the property of being morally obligatory is inherently action-commending. 81 Another way to think about the significance of statement (CE) is that it helps to show that “all else” is indeed equal, as premise (2) of OQAR3’’ and claim NFR3’’ state. In other words, statement (CE) helps to show that there are not convincing reasons to deny the intuitions on which argument OQAR3’’ rests.

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reducible sort. For example, the property of being morally good might be a natural

property that supervenes on other natural states of affairs (e.g., a state of affairs in which

someone helps an elderly woman across the street). Nevertheless, one can supplement

argument OQAR3’’ with further claims that challenge the cogency of non-reductive

naturalism (i.e., the position that moral properties can be natural but irreducible to any

other natural properties).82 By questioning the tenability of non-reductive naturalism

(NRN), one supports premise (2), which presupposes that those who accept a distinction

between moral properties and other natural properties should probably deny that moral

properties are natural at all.

A recent article by Gampel (1996) provides a good example of the sort of

argument that one might formulate against non-reductive naturalism (NRN). He presents

a dilemma: proponents of NRN either tie moral properties to social science (in order to

show that moral properties have a causal or explanatory role in the world) or they do not.

Either way, it seems unlikely that moral properties could be natural properties. First, if

proponents of NRN do tie moral properties to social science, then people are likely to insist on reflection that it should remain an open question whether those particular causal

(and purportedly moral) properties are actually identical with the properties of moral obligation, moral praiseworthiness, or moral value (1996, 208). For example, Gampel explains that “in most cases there will be someone who will reject any given claim about

[a natural property’s] moral status – even Nazism, a teacher’s recourse in refuting relativism, has its adherents” (1996, 207). Thus, he suggests that it is an open question

82 A complete evaluation of non-reductive naturalism would, of course, need to evaluate whether it even makes sense to talk about natural properties that supervene on lower-level natural properties without being reducible to them. Nevertheless, to be charitable, this section will assume that non-reductive naturalism is at least a coherent position.

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whether any particular causal property is morally valuable or not. If proponents of NRN do not tie moral properties to the social sciences, then it becomes highly questionable whether the properties are “natural” in any way comparable to other natural properties.

Gampel questions whether moral properties that are not tied to social science are likely to be natural, because moral properties have the characteristics that one would expect subjective properties, such as pleasure, to have. (In other words, perceptions of subjective properties, and also moral properties, vary from individual to individual, and it is difficult to access them independently of human experience). Therefore, unless one assigns causal status to moral properties (by tying them to social science), it is difficult to argue that they are objective in the way that natural properties typically are (1996, 206-

207).

One can employ Gampel’s argument against NRN to illustrate the development of supplementary claims in response to the non-reduction objection. Both forks of his dilemma raise significant problems for the non-reductive naturalist claim that moral properties are natural properties. Therefore, on the basis of his arguments, one might respond to the non-reduction objection by adding a supplementary claim that acknowledges the alleged problem (NR) and another claim that responds to it (~NR):

(NR) Even if moral obligation (or moral praiseworthiness, or moral value) is intuitively distinct from any other natural property, it would not follow that it is non-natural; it could be an irreducible natural property.83

83 It is debatable whether, if moral properties were both irreducible and non-natural, there would be any other examples of irreducible natural properties. (Some thinkers might regard biological properties such as “being a gene” to be both irreducible and natural, but such claims are highly debatable. For articles supporting the irreducibility of the gene concept, see Hull (1974) and Kitcher (1984). For a paper attacking the irreducibility of the gene concept, see Waters (1990). Furthermore, even if the debates about the irreducibility of the gene reached a decisive conclusion, they still might not be relevant to ethical debates, because the biological debates are primarily about theoretical reductionism. The debaters agree that the property of being a gene is ontologically reducible to other natural properties, whereas the debates in ethics are precisely about the possibility of ontological reduction.) Even if it is not possible to offer other

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(~NR) Proponents of non-reductive naturalism face a dilemma: they either tie moral properties to social science (in order to show that moral properties have a causal or explanatory role in the world) or they do not. If they do, then it is questionable whether those natural (and putatively moral) properties are actually moral. If they do not, then it is questionable whether those moral properties are actually natural (because the putatively natural properties do not appear to have objective causal status). Either way, it is questionable whether moral properties are actually natural.

Gampel’s argument (presented in ~NR) is, of course, not the only argument that one

could develop against NRN, but it provides at least one example of how one could

develop supplementary claims in response to the non-reduction objection.

Like the non-reduction objection, the meaning objection can be addressed by

formulating both a supplementary claim that acknowledges it and a supplementary claim

that responds to it. The alleged difficulty itself can be summarized with the following

claim:

(ME) Based on a Quinean or Wittgensteinian theory of meaning, the term ‘moral obligation’ (or ‘moral praiseworthiness’ or ‘moral value’) would refer to a particular natural property, A, if ‘moral obligation’ were always used in conjunction with A, whether or not the question ‘Is A morally obligatory?’ appears to be significant.

One could formulate several different responses to (ME). First, one could reject Quine

and Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning. Second, one could argue that, even given their

theory of meaning, argument OQAR3’’ still places the burden of proof on those who claim that ‘moral obligation’ (or ‘moral praiseworthiness’ or ‘moral value’) is a natural property. Third, one could significantly alter OQAR3’’ in order to remove its use of

questions such as ‘Is A morally obligatory?’ (and therefore the argument would not be

susceptible to the meaning objection). The second option seems particularly promising,

examples of irreducible, natural properties besides moral ones, however, one could merely insist that moral properties are unique in being both irreducible and natural.

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because it does not require one to reject Quine and Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning (as

84 the first solution does) or to alter OQAR3’’ drastically (as the third solution does).

Fortunately, it does appear possible to argue that OQAR3’’ is convincing, even if one accepts Quine and Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning. In particular, the meaning objection appears to be much more challenging to the original, provisional OQA (i.e.,

OQA1, OQA2, and OQA3, which respectively addressed NF1, NF2, and NF3) than to argument OQAR3’’ (which defends NFR3’’). The reason is that statement NF3’’ does not refer to good (as NF1, NF2, and NF3 did) but instead refers to the properties of being morally obligatory or morally praiseworthy or morally valuable. By referring to moral obligation rather than good, NFR3’’ arguably eliminates the meaning objection, because that problem is applicable primarily to “thick” ethical terms rather than to “thin” ones

(see Williams 1985). For example, people might use a “thick” ethical term such as

‘courage’ consistently to describe people who risk harm in order to further a cause.

Therefore, Wittgenstein or Quine might argue that those natural properties are part of the term’s meaning. Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1997, 33) claim, however, that there is widespread disagreement about the use of “thin” ethical terms such as ‘right’ or ‘ought’ or ‘morally obligatory’ (or ‘morally praiseworthy’ or ‘morally valuable’). If ethicists widely disagree about the use of terms such as ‘morally obligatory’, then the terms are not employed consistently in conjunction with any particular natural properties.

Therefore, even if Wittgenstein and Quine have a correct theory of meaning, OQAR3’’ is

84 Evaluation of Quine and Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning would require extensive consideration of arguments for and against their theory. Therefore, it seems preferable to solve the meaning problem in a manner that grants the truth of their theory.

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arguably justified in distinguishing the concept of moral obligation from natural properties. Supplementary claim (~ME) summarizes this argument:

(~ME) People disagree widely about the use of “thin” ethical terms such as ‘right’ or ‘ought’ or ‘morally obligatory’ (or ‘morally praiseworthy’ or ‘morally valuable’) to describe natural properties; therefore, even if Wittgenstein and Quine have a correct theory of meaning, their theory arguably fails to show that ‘morally obligatory’ (or ‘morally praiseworthy’ or ‘morally valuable’) refers to a natural property.

Having revised Moore’s description of the NF and the OQA in response to the (b) concept and (c) OQA categories of objections, it may be helpful to summarize the resulting account and to show how it already resolves the (a) clarity category of objections described in section III. In brief, section IV’s revisions to Moore’s description of the NF include:

• in response to the predication objection, transforming claims NF1, NF2, and NF3, respectively, into claims (i.e., NF1’, NF2’, and NF3’) about moral obligation (and moral praiseworthiness and moral value) rather than about goodP,

• in response to the taxonomy objection, revising claim NF3’ (to become NF3’’) so that it refers only to natural properties,

• in response to the paradox of analysis (part of the analysis objection), transforming OQA3’’ into OQAR3’’, which defends the weakened conclusion (namely, NFR3’’) that, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on those who identify moral obligation (or moral praiseworthiness, or moral value) with a natural property,

• in response to the distinctness presupposition (part of the analysis objection), abandoning claims NF1’ and NF2’ in favor of claim NFR3’’,

• in response to the intuition objection, formulating supplementary claim (CE)

• in response to the non-reduction objection, formulating supplementary claims (NR) and (~NR)

• in response to the meaning objection, formulating supplementary claims (ME) and (~ME).

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The resulting account of the NF consists of one fundamental statement, NFR3’’, which can be renamed NF* for simplicity:

(NF*) All else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that the property of being morally obligatory, or of being morally praiseworthy, or of being morally valuable, is identical with any natural property.

The account defends statement NF* using argument OQAR3’’, which can be renamed

OQA*:

(OQA*):

(1) For any property, A, that is a natural property, the answer to the question, ‘Is A morally obligatory (or morally praiseworthy, or morally valuable)?’, is significant (i.e., nontautologous).

(3) Therefore, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that the property of being morally obligatory, or of being morally praiseworthy, or of being morally valuable, is identical with any natural property. (based on premises (1) and (2))

OQA* provides a starting point for further discussion of NF*, because it summarizes people’s pre-philosophical intuitions in support of it. One can then add a series of supplementary claims to OQA* that challenge or defend NF*. The claims considered in this chapter include:

Challenges:

(ME) Quine and Wittgenstein say that ‘moral obligation’ (or ‘moral praiseworthiness’ or ‘moral value’) would refer to a particular natural property, A, if ‘moral obligation’ were always used in conjunction

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with A, whether or not the question ‘Is A morally obligatory?’ appears to be significant.

Defenses:

(~NR) Gampel (1996) presents a dilemma: proponents of non-reductive naturalism either tie moral properties to social science (in order to show that moral properties have a causal or explanatory role in the world) or they do not. Either way, their position is problematic.

The resulting account, consisting of NF*, OQA*, (CE), (NR), (ME), (~NR), and

(~ME), resolves not only the (b) concept and (c) OQA categories of objections but also the (a) clarity category of objections with Moore’s description of the NF. The new account solves the ambiguity objection, because its structure is very clear. It consists of one particular claim (i.e., NF*), one particular argument in support of the claim (i.e.,

OQA*), and five supplementary claims (which could be augmented by further claims that challenge or defend NF*). Furthermore, the account solves the fallacy objection, because it merely asserts a metaethical claim (namely, NF*) rather than claiming to describe a logical fallacy. Philosophers who reject NF* do not commit a logical fallacy. They do commit themselves, however, to the notion that it is possible to formulate more

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convincing supplementary claims that challenge argument OQA* than those that defend

OQA*.

One crucial, “over-simplification,” objection to this novel formulation of the NF

is that it seems unrealistic to think that a single chapter of a dissertation can adequately

resolve a controversy (namely, the cogency of the NF) that has spanned the twentieth

century. A response to this objection is that this chapter’s formulations of the NF and the

OQA are quite modest. They merely state that people’s pre-philosophical intuitions

(namely, that moral properties are distinct from natural properties) provide preliminary

grounds for rejecting the conflation of these properties unless good reasons can be

proposed to the contrary. The supplementary claims considered in this chapter (i.e., CE,

NR, ME, ~NR, ~ME) are designed to defend the notion that there are not yet convincing reasons to reject those pre-philosophical intuitions. Nevertheless, the proponent of the over-simplification objection could rightly respond that the supplementary claims considered in this chapter barely scratch the surface of current metaethical debates related to the NF. For instance, the present study has focused primarily on a semantic analysis of the meaning of moral terms, but one might suggest that more metaphysical approaches to metaethics constitute a large body of literature that should also be considered. Attempts by John McDowell (1994) and David Wiggins (1987) to analyze the metaphysical status of moral properties provide one example of this sort of approach (see also Sayre-McCord

1988). Therefore, the appropriate conclusions to this section appear to be three-fold.

First, the NF can be formulated as a plausible, albeit modest, claim (namely, NF*) that can be defended by a reasonable argument (i.e., OQA*) that appeals to pre-philosophical intuitions. Second, there is at least some reason to think that the intuitions on which

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OQA* depends are justifiable (based on the supplementary claims developed in this

section). Third, one would ultimately need to perform a much more extensive

metaethical analysis of the NF in order to decide whether the burden of proof truly

remains on those who conflate natural and moral properties.

5.6: Connection Between NF* and IOD

Section 5.6 shows how NF* supports attention to the IOD.85 Using a new analysis by the author, the section attempts to alleviate part of the long-standing dispute between Flew, Searle, Stevenson, Veatch, and others, versus Frankena, Snare, Baldwin,

Dodd and Stern-Gillet, and others, over whether the NF is or is not distinct from the IOD.

First, the section develops an argument (i.e., “IOD-From-NF*”) by which one can derive the claim that, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on those who reject the IOD.

The argument depends on a set of uncontroversial premises, together with one controversial premise, called the “no-bridge-principles” premise. This controversial premise asserts that, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that it is possible to derive a moral statement from a combination of non-moral statements, some of which are analytic and some of which are synthetic. Another argument, called “No-Bridges,” defends the no-bridge-principles premise by deriving it from a set of relatively uncontroversial claims, including NF*. Thus, arguments No-

Bridges and IOD-From-NF* together show how NF* supports attention to the IOD. In particular, they show that one can derive, from the conjunction of NF* and a set of relatively uncontroversial premises, a “no-bridge-principles” premise. Using the no-

85 Claim IOD, originally presented in section I, states, “It is logically impossible to derive (soundly) a moral statement as a conclusion from purely non-moral premises.”

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bridge-principles premise and other uncontroversial assumptions, one can then derive the claim that the burden of proof is on those who reject the IOD. The section concludes by responding to three objections, each of which attack a premise of the No-Bridges argument.

First, consider argument IOD-From-NF*, which follows this paragraph. It consists of six premises. The first premise lists, on the basis of a plausible definition of non-moral statements, the three mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories into which all sets of non-moral premises must fall. For the purposes of the dissertation, a statement is defined as non-moral if and only if it is either (a) a synthetic statement that does not contain a moral term used in a moral sense or (b) an analytic statement. A moral statement must be, therefore, a synthetic statement that contains a moral term used in a moral sense.86 Based on the definition of non-moral statements, any set of non-moral premises must consist either (1) entirely of synthetic statements that do not contain moral terms used in a moral sense, or (2) entirely of analytic statements, or (3) of a combination of analytic statements and synthetic statements that do not contain moral terms used in a

86 These definitions of moral and non-moral statements are employed, for example, by David Brink (1989, 147). One might object, however, that it may not be possible to distinguish between moral and non- moral terms and senses of terms. One could appeal, for example, to “thick” ethical terms (such as ‘courage’) that appear to include both moral and non-moral senses and meanings (see, e.g., Williams 1985). At least two responses seem appropriate. One response, employed by Brink, is that people do seem to recognize and apply the distinction between moral and non-moral senses of terms, and people even seem to be able to agree about hard cases. In the case of thick ethical terms, for example, one could insist that it is possible to distinguish in each individual case whether the terms are used in a moral or a non-moral sense. Moreover, one could acknowledge that, in many cases, they include both non-moral and moral meanings, and one could classify their use as moral in those cases. A second response, directed at those who are extremely skeptical about the possibility of distinguishing moral and non-moral statements that contain “thick” ethical terms, would be to qualify argument IOD-From-NF*. One could state that it applies only to statements containing terms that can be clearly classified as moral or non-moral. For example, one might be able to establish that “thin” ethical terms (e.g., ‘ought’) are clearly used in a moral sense in particular contexts, whereas other terms or phrases that refer to natural properties (e.g., ‘advantageous from the perspective of natural selection’) are clearly used in a primarily non-moral sense. (Therefore, for anyone who espouses a radical holism about the meanings of terms and statements, argument IOD-From-NF*might be unconvincing. The holist would deny that one can distinguish the meanings of any terms, phrases, or statements as moral or non-moral.)

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moral sense. The second, third, and fourth premises then argue, for each of the three

categories, that it is either logically impossible or unlikely that one could derive (soundly) a moral conclusion from premises in that category. The argument concludes, therefore, that the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that it is possible to derive (soundly) a moral conclusion from purely non-moral premises.

IOD-From-NF*Argument:

(1) If the premises of an argument, X, are exclusively non-moral, then they must fall in one of three categories: a. a set of premises consisting only of synthetic statements that do not contain moral terms used in a moral sense, or b. a set of premises consisting only of analytic statements, or c. a set of premises consisting of both analytic statements and synthetic statements that do not contain a moral term used in a moral sense.

(2) It is logically impossible to derive (soundly) a moral conclusion (i.e., a synthetic statement containing a moral term used in a moral sense) solely from premises of type (a), namely, those that consist only of synthetic statements that do not contain a moral term used in a moral sense.

(3) It is logically impossible to derive (soundly) a moral conclusion (i.e., a synthetic statement containing a moral term used in a moral sense) solely from premises of type (b), namely, those that consist only of analytic statements.

(4) All else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that one can derive (soundly) a moral conclusion (i.e., a synthetic statement containing a moral term used in a moral sense) solely from premises of type (c), namely, those that consist of both synthetic statements that do not contain a moral term used in a moral sense and analytic statements. (the no-bridge-principles premise)87

(5) If, for every possible combination of premises of some sort, Y, either (a) it is impossible to derive (soundly) a conclusion of type Z or (b) the burden of proof rests on those who claim that it is possible to derive (soundly) a conclusion of type Z, then the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims

87 Premise (4) is the controversial “no-bridge-principles” premise. It presupposes that there are no analytic “bridge principles” that define moral terms (used in a moral sense) in terms of non-moral terms. The following, “No-Bridges” argument attempts to justify this premise.

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that it is logically possible to derive (soundly) a conclusion of type Z from premises of type Y.88

(6) Therefore, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that it is logically possible to derive (soundly) a moral conclusion (i.e., a synthetic statement containing a moral term used in a moral sense) from purely non- moral premises. (from 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)

The truth of the first premise follows from the definition of non-moral statements.

Premise (2) is then plausible because of a dichotomy: synthetic statements that do not contain moral terms used in a moral sense must either not contain moral terms at all or not use the moral terms in a moral sense. If the premises do not contain moral terms at all, then one logically cannot derive a valid conclusion (let alone a sound one) containing moral terms. If the premises contain moral terms but the terms are not used in a moral sense (e.g., by referring to a “good” thief), then one would have to equivocate on the meaning of the terms in order to derive a conclusion that uses the moral terms in a moral sense. Therefore, the derivation of a moral conclusion from the non-moral premises would be neither valid nor sound. Premise (3) is also reasonable, because analytic statements are true simply based on the meanings of their terms. Thus, any conclusion derived solely from analytic statements must also be true based only on the meanings of its terms, which means that the conclusion is analytic and therefore non-moral.

Given the plausibility of premises (2) and (3), it appears that the only way to derive (soundly) a moral statement from non-moral premises is to employ a combination of synthetic and analytic premises. In order for one of these combinations to entail a

88 Premise (5) seems to be a reasonable claim about how one should place the burden of proof. (Consider how premise (5) applies to the rest of argument (IOD-From-NF*). The premises of type Y are non-moral premises. The conclusion of type Z is a moral conclusion. Premises 2 and 3 describe combinations of non-moral premises with which it is impossible to derive (soundly) a moral conclusion. Premise 4 describes a combination of premises for which the burden of proof rests against the derivation of a sound moral conclusion. Therefore, premise (5), together with premises (1), (2), (3), and (4), establishes that the burden of proof rests on those who derive a moral conclusion from non-moral premises.)

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moral conclusion, a necessary condition is that one or more analytic “bridge principles”

must define the moral terms employed in the conclusion using the non-moral terms of the

synthetic premises. The conclusion can then be synthetic (because some of the premises

are synthetic) and also employ moral terms in a moral sense (because the analytic

premises define the moral terms of the conclusion using only the non-moral terms of the

synthetic premises). The Epicurean argument cited in section III of this chapter provides

an example of a bridge principle between the moral term of its conclusion and the non-

moral terms of its premises, but it is doubtful that the bridge principle is analytic. The

argument starts with an arguably non-moral premise:

(E1) Pleasure is sought by all people.

From the non-moral premise, E1, one cannot directly derive (validly) the moral

conclusion,

(E3) Pleasure is good,

because the moral term, ‘good’, is not contained in the premise. Nevertheless, the

implicit premise,

(E2) What is sought by all people is good,

links the conclusion’s moral term, ‘good’, with the non-moral terms ‘what is sought by

all people’, which are in the explicit premise, E1. One can then validly derive the moral

conclusion, E3, from the conjunction of the two premises, E1 and E2. Therefore, if the implicit premise, E2, were analytic, it would serve as a non-moral bridge principle between the moral term ‘good’ and the non-moral terms, ‘what is sought by all people.’

The argument would then serve as an example of the derivation of a moral statement, E3, from two non-moral statements, E1 and E2.

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The role of premise (4) is to deny that any argument, including the Epicurean

argument, can legitimately derive a moral conclusion from combinations of synthetic and

analytic statements that are exclusively non-moral. Premise (4) states that, when

arguments contain only a combination of synthetic and analytic premises that are

genuinely non-moral, then one cannot derive a sound moral conclusion from them. Why

not? The following argument, No-Bridges, justifies premise (4) by arguing that it is

impossible to formulate true analytic bridge principles between all the terms of a moral statement and the terms of non-moral statements. In other words, No Bridges argues that purported bridge principles, such as the Epicurean claim, “What is sought by all people is good,” must always be synthetic rather than analytic in order to be true. Because these synthetic claims employ moral terms in a moral sense, they are moral claims. Thus, the attempt to derive a moral conclusion from premises that are true and purely non-moral fails. The bridge principles between moral and non-moral terms must be moral claims in order to be true, and therefore the premises cannot be exclusively non-moral. In other words, argument No Bridges supports premise (4) by arguing that a necessary condition for deriving moral claims from non-moral claims (namely, establishing true analytic bridge principles between all the terms of moral statements and the terms of non-moral statements) is impossible to achieve.

One might next question exactly how No-Bridges argues that it is impossible to formulate true analytic bridge principles between all the terms of a moral statement and the terms of non-moral statements. The argument depends on the distinction between moral and natural properties that claim NF* asserts. Premise (1) of the No-Bridges argument is statement NF*, which claims that, all else being equal, the burden of proof

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rests on those who claim that the properties of being morally obligatory, morally

praiseworthy, or morally valuable are identical to a natural property. Premise (2) then

asserts that non-moral statements predicate only natural properties. Because non-moral

statements predicate only natural properties, and because the burden of proof is against

the properties of moral obligation, moral praiseworthiness, and moral value being natural properties, the burden of proof is against non-moral statements ever predicating these properties. Premise (4) asserts, in contrast, that all moral statements predicate at least one of these properties. Therefore, the first four premises of the argument establish that every moral statement contains at least one term that predicates the property of moral obligation or moral praiseworthiness or moral value, but no terms of a non-moral statement ever predicate those properties. If at least one term of every moral statement predicates a property that non-moral statements do not predicate, however, one arguably cannot formulate analytic bridge principles between every term of a moral statement and the terms of non-moral statements. The reason is that analytic bridge principles assert an

identity of meaning between terms, and therefore such principles cannot be formed

between terms that have different meanings. Thus, the No-Bridges argument asserts that

the burden of proof is on those who claim that it is possible to formulate analytic bridge

principles between all the terms of a moral statement and the terms of non-moral

statements.

No-Bridges Argument:

(1) All else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that the property of being morally obligatory, or of being morally praiseworthy, or of being morally valuable, is identical with any natural property. (NF*)

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(2) Non-moral statements predicate only natural properties.89

(3) Therefore, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that the property of being morally obligatory, or of being morally praiseworthy, or of being morally valuable, is predicated by a non-moral statement. (from 1 and 2)

(4) All moral statements predicate either the property of being morally obligatory or of being morally praiseworthy or of being morally valuable.90

(5) If (a) all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who asserts that a class of statements, Y, ever predicate a particular property, X, and (b) all statements of another class, Z, predicate property X, then, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who asserts that one can formulate analytic bridge principles between every term of any statement of class Z and the terms of statements of class Y.91

(6) All else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who asserts that one can formulate analytic bridge principles between every term of any moral statement and the terms of non-moral statements. (from 3, 4, 5)

(7) If (6), then, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that one can derive (soundly) a moral conclusion (i.e., a synthetic statement containing a moral term used in a moral sense) solely from premises of type (c), namely, those that consist of both synthetic statements that do not contain a moral term used in a moral sense and analytic statements.92

(8) Therefore, all else being equal, the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims that one can derive (soundly) a moral conclusion (i.e., a synthetic statement containing a moral term used in a moral sense) solely from premises of type (c), namely, those that consist of both synthetic

89 Premise (2) is plausible but deserves further analysis. See the following evaluation of the argument. 90 Premise (4) is plausible but deserves further analysis. See the following evaluation of the argument. 91 Premise (5) depends on the very plausible presupposition that if one sort of statement (e.g., a moral statement) predicates a property (e.g., moral obligation) that the other sort of statement (e.g., a non-moral statement) does not predicate, then one cannot formulate analytic bridge principles between the terms of the two statements. In other words, if the statements predicate different properties, then some of their terms arguably must have different meanings, so those terms cannot be defined analytically in terms of one another. 92 Premise (7) is plausible, because a necessary condition for deriving (validly) a conclusion containing a moral term used in a moral sense from premises that do not contain a moral term used in a moral sense is for another premise to provide an analytic bridge principle between the moral terms used in a moral sense and non-moral terms.

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statements that do not contain a moral term used in a moral sense and analytic statements. (from 6 and 7)

Argument No-Bridges appears to contain three controversial premises (namely,

premises (1), (2), and (4)). Premise (1) states claim NF*. Although NF* is debatable,

argument OQA* and the supplementary claims developed in section IV defend it.

Therefore, unless one provides supplementary claims that challenge NF* and that are

more convincing than the supplementary claims that defend it, the premise appears to be

defensible. Premise (2) states that non-moral statements predicate only natural

properties. One might question whether the premise is justifiable; for example, one

might think that a non-moral statement could predicate numbers and that numbers are

non-natural properties. Two responses seem plausible. First, premise (2) is already

justifiable for anyone who accepts metaphysical naturalism (i.e., the claim that all

properties that actually occur are natural properties). Second, even if some non-moral statements did predicate properties that are not natural (e.g., the property of being a particular number), the properties that are likely candidates for being identical to moral properties (e.g., pleasure, adaptive success, what we desire to desire) are typically natural ones. Therefore, one could revise premise (2) so that it acknowledges the predication of non-natural properties by non-moral statements but also states that those non-natural properties are not the ones that are plausibly identical to moral properties:

(2*) Non-moral statements predicate either natural properties or non-natural properties (such as numbers) that are distinct from the properties of being morally obligatory, morally praiseworthy, or morally valuable.

Thus, if one questioned the truth of premise (2), one could replace it with premise (2*), which does not alter the validity of the rest of the argument.

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The third controversial premise in No-Bridges is premise (4), which states that all

moral statements predicate either the property of being morally obligatory, or of being

morally praiseworthy, or of being morally valuable. The problem with the premise is that

even though it intuitively appears that all moral statements predicate at least one of these

properties, there might be some unique sorts of moral statements that do not predicate

any of these properties. For example, although twentieth-century ethicists have focused

primarily on concepts such as moral obligation, one could also examine moral concepts

associated with commending, advising, approving, and evaluating (Foot 1967). It seems at least possible that there could be moral concepts that do not involve moral obligation, praiseworthiness, or value. One response is that a statement need not explicitly predicate a property like moral obligation or value in order to predicate it implicitly. For example, if one claims explicitly that it is morally advisable to read biographies of virtuous people from time to time, one seems to be claiming implicitly that it is morally valuable to do so.

Therefore, it is not clearly a problem if some moral statements do not make explicit mention of moral obligation, praiseworthiness, or value, as long as it is plausible that the statements are still predicating one or more of those properties. A second response is that

many moral claims do seem to predicate moral obligation, moral praiseworthiness, or

moral value, and argument No-Bridges successfully rejects the possibility of bridge

principles for those statements. Thus, a moral statement such as, “It is, prima facie,

morally obligatory to refrain from committing active euthanasia,” could not be derived

soundly from solely non-moral premises. A third response is that, if moral statements do

sometimes predicate another property besides moral obligation or moral praiseworthiness

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or moral value, one could presumably alter NF* so that it claims that the other property is also non-identical to any natural property.

Let us summarize, then, the relationship between NF* and the IOD. Argument

IOD-From-NF* attempts to derive, from reasonable premises, the claim that the burden of proof rests on those who reject the IOD. Nevertheless, the argument relies on two controversial presuppositions. First, premise (1), as well as the argument as a whole, presupposes the possibility of distinguishing between moral and non-moral terms and statements. Second, premise (4) states that the burden of proof rests on those who claim to be able to derive moral conclusions from combinations of non-moral synthetic statements and analytic statements. The first presupposition (namely, the distinction between moral and non-moral statements) is a fundamental feature of the analysis of the

IOD in this chapter. Therefore, this analysis will admittedly not convince those who deny that distinction. As David Brink (1989) argues, however, the distinction between moral and non-moral statements is intuitively plausible, so it is a reasonable presupposition from which to start. The second presupposition (i.e., the fourth premise of

IOD-From-NF*) is justified by argument No-Bridges, which employs NF* as a crucial premise. Thus, the role of NF* in supporting attention to the IOD is to defend a crucial premise in the argument that defends the IOD. In particular, NF* (via argument No-

Bridges) casts doubt on the possibility of formulating the analytic bridge principles that constitute a necessary condition for deriving a moral statement from non-moral statements. The IOD does not definitively follow from NF*, because NF* merely establishes, all else being equal, the burden of proof against the establishment of the analytic bridge principles. (Furthermore, argument No Bridges depends on other

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debatable premises, such as (2) and (4).) Nevertheless, NF*’s placing the burden of proof on those who reject the IOD does support attention to the IOD in moral reasoning.

5.7: Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to accomplish two tasks. First, section 5.2 elucidated ethical claim R, which states the shared conclusions of four articles concerning the regulatory ramifications of hormesis. The section also analyzed the three potential interpretations of claim R. Under one interpretation, the proponents of claim R consider it to be a substantive ethical claim that is nevertheless so obviously true that it requires no defense. The second interpretation casts it as practical or prudential. The next chapter

(six) evaluates the claim under these interpretations. Under the third interpretation, the proponents of claim R consider it to be true by definition and thus without any need for further justification. The problem with this understanding of the claim is that, if R plays a role in public policy, it then may be employed in arguments that violate the IOD.

Therefore, the use of claim R for policymaking requires further justification if it is interpreted as true by definition. Sections 5.3 through 5.6 of this chapter supported the need for this further defense, because they argued for the cogency of the IOD.

The account of the NF developed in sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 alleviates each of the two general problems mentioned in section 5.3 (i.e., the cogency of Moore’s description of the NF and its relationship to the IOD). First, the account provides a defensible way of maintaining Moore’s insight that moral properties appear to be distinct from natural properties. Despite the numerous objections facing Moore’s own description of the NF, it appears possible to reformulate his description in terms of the

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metaethical claim NF* and to defend that claim using OQA* and supplementary claims.

Second, the account clarifies that the IOD and the NF are distinct, but it also shows

exactly how (based on arguments IOD-From-NF* and No-Bridges) acceptance of NF*

supports attention to the IOD.

The development of a defensible, novel description of the NF in this chapter

provides at least four ramifications for ethical theory. First, because claim NF* places

the burden of proof on those who deny that moral properties and natural properties are

distinct, it supports metaethical positions (e.g., practical-reason, constructivist,

noncognitivist, and sensibility theories) that advocate this distinction. Second, claim NF*

encourages those who deny this distinction between moral properties and natural properties (e.g., proponents of neo-Aristotelianism, postpositivist nonreductionism, and reductionism) to develop supplementary claims explaining exactly why the intuitions highlighted by claim NF* are in error. Third, because arguments IOD-From-NF*and No-

Bridges clarify that claim NF* is distinct from the IOD, it encourages thinkers such as

Searle and Flew not to use the two notions interchangeably. At the same time, the arguments show that thinkers who distinguish the two notions (such as Frankena,

Baldwin, and Dodd and Stern-Gillet) could be misleading if they do not clarify the fact that it may be possible to derive, from claim NF*, the notion that the burden of proof rests on those who reject the IOD. Fourth, because claim NF* places the burden of proof on those who reject the IOD, it challenges attempts to derive ethics purely from non- moral scientific investigations, without additional moral claims (see also Elliott 2002).

According to claim NF*, scientific research may be applicable to moral reasoning, but

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the burden of proof rests on those (such as the proponents of a definitional interpretation of claim R) who use scientific investigations to replace moral reasoning.

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CHAPTER SIX

CHEMICAL HORMESIS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND CONSENT

6.1: Introduction

Lester Lave (2000) claims that U.S. regulatory policy for carcinogens has already

passed through three phases (i.e., a phase characterized by the Delaney amendment, a

“risk-assessment” phase, and a “mechanism-based” phase), and he argues that the

phenomenon of “chemical hormesis” could be the centerpiece of the fourth phase in

policy. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that the possibility of a “hormesis” phase raises

ethical concerns, because “A [hormetic] dose that might increase the health of a non-

compromised individual could kill an individual who has lost all immune system

response” (2000, 143). This chapter addresses some of those ethical concerns by

accomplishing two tasks. First, section 6.2 argues that, to the extent that a hormesis

phase in policy rests on claim R (elucidated in chapter 5), it cannot be ethically justifiable

until at least four problems (namely, “concept,” “scale,” “application,” and “consent”

problems) with claim R are ameliorated. Second, section 6.3 argues that the fourth,

“consent,” problem highlights a general ethical norm for scientific researchers and policymakers. This norm, called the “multiple-plausible-characterization” (MPC) conclusion, is that policymakers and researchers who study or disseminate information about policy-relevant anomalies have prima facie ethical obligations to take reasonable

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steps to identify, reveal, and provide representative93 information about all major,

plausible characterizations of those anomalies for the public or its representatives.

Both main sections of the chapter provide novel ethical insights concerning the

regulation of hormetic chemicals in particular and biomedical ethics in general. With

regard to section 6.2, relatively few studies have previously examined the regulatory

ramifications of chemical hormesis (see e.g., Foran 1998, Paperiello 1998, Juni and

McElveen 2000, Lave 2000, Chapman 2001, Cross 2001, Calabrese and Baldwin 2002a,

Jayjock and Lewis 2002, Poumadere 2002, Renn 2002, and Calabrese and Baldwin

2003b). Even fewer works have provided critical “second-order” ethical evaluations of these “first-order” policy arguments (see e.g., Davis and Farland 1998, Applegate 2001,

Christiani and Zhou 2002, Marchant 2002, and Rodricks 2003). Section 6.2 provides one of the first detailed ethical evaluations of recent claims concerning the regulatory ramifications of hormesis. Concerning the second main section of the chapter (6.3), previous authors have partially anticipated the MPC conclusion (which requires unbiased responses to scientific uncertainty about anomalies) in at least two ways. First, they have criticized misleading framing of disclosed information in general, because it hinders the public’s free, informed consent to hazards (e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Gert,

Culver, and Clouser 1997, NRC 1996, Shrader-Frechette 1991). Second, they have argued that scientists have a prima facie responsibility to respond to scientific uncertainty in ways that promote the public good (e.g., Cranor 1993, Resnik 1998, Shrader-Frechette

93 For the purposes of the dissertation, one provides “representative” information about an anomaly characterization if one acknowledges the main perspectives within the scientific community concerning that characterization. One can take reasonable steps to provide representative information about an anomaly characterization, however, without agreeing with the mainstream perspectives and while emphasizing alternative perspectives. One merely needs to provide those who receive information with some understanding of the main views in the scientific community.

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1991). Nevertheless, these authors have not focused on researchers’ ethical obligations for responding to uncertainty associated, in particular, with scientific anomalies.

6.2: Four Problems with Claim R

Section 6.2 is structured in five parts. The first part reviews claim R (originally elucidated in chapter five), presents a “problem” thesis that briefly states four problems with R, and considers a general objection to the thesis. The following four parts then present each of the four problems in detail.

Summary of Problems with Claim R

This section of the chapter continues the ethical evaluation of claim R begun in chapter five. That chapter analyzed five significant articles (i.e., Foran 1998, Calabrese,

Baldwin, and Holland 1999, Paperiello 2000, Lave 2001, and Poumadere 2002) that took stances concerning the regulatory ramifications of hormesis. The chapter argued that, even though the authors did not develop very clear arguments, one could charitably interpret them all as accepting the following claim:

Claim R: IF one or more toxic chemicals, X1…Xn, produce a hormetic (i.e., beneficial) effect on humans that are exposed to low doses (L1…Ln) of X1…Xn, AND IF human exposure to X1…Xn meets the following conditions (as some hormetic exposures may do): (1) the exposure results in a net benefit to human health, and (2) the exposure meets additional conditions, C1…Cn (perhaps including conditions that specify particular side effects that can or cannot be caused by the exposure, specific scales over which the hormetic effects must occur across time and on groups of people, particular environmental conditions under which the hormetic effects must occur, specific criteria for implementing new regulatory policies, and particular standards for obtaining consent to hormetic exposures), THEN government regulators ought to allow public exposure to low doses L1…Ln of X1…Xn.

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Chapter five, which proposed three potential interpretations of the claim (namely,

“substantive,” “practical,” and “definitional” interpretations), argued that the claim is unlikely to have convincing ramifications for policy if it is interpreted as true by definition, because policy arguments that employ it are likely to violate the is/ought distinction.

The thesis of this section is that the first and second (i.e., substantive and practical) interpretations of claim R are also problematic. Even though the proponents of the claim did not appear to think that it was controversial enough to require justification, it appears to face at least four difficulties:

Problem Thesis: Any use of claim R (as it was charitably interpreted in chapter five) to justify exposing people to hormetic chemicals is currently ethically questionable, because its proponents (e.g., Foran, CBH, Paperiello, Lave, and Poumadere) fail to defend it against at least four difficulties (namely, “concept,” “scale,” “implementation,” and “consent” problems).

These difficulties apply to a substantive ethical interpretation of claim R. Furthermore, because government regulators have ethical responsibilities to protect the public from harm, these problems apply to the practical or prudential interpretation of the claim as well. One might try to dismiss these difficulties with an “evasion” objection to the problem thesis. This objection would state that the defenders of claim R can evade most difficulties raised against it, because it was charitably interpreted in chapter five to include a generic caveat. Namely, claim R affirms that, in order to be ethically justifiable, hormetic exposures must meet additional necessary conditions, C1…Cn (such as occurring under particular environmental conditions), that are not explicitly mentioned in the articles. Therefore, most problems with claim R can be dismissed by claiming that an additional necessary condition, Cx, must be met before hormetic exposures can be

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justified. For example, the first, “concept,” problem with claim R is that the concept of

hormesis is so ambiguous that one cannot successfully identify hormetic chemicals. One

might dismiss the concept problem by claiming that an additional necessary condition (a

condition that is not explicitly mentioned in the articles) is that one must employ a

sufficiently specific concept of hormesis to facilitate the identification of chemicals that

produce hormetic effects.

A response to the evasion objection is that the problem thesis states only that

claim R is currently ethically questionable, not that it is false. Therefore, even if

proponents of claim R can ultimately defend it by proposing additional necessary

conditions for allowing hormetic exposures, the claim is ethically questionable until they

do so. Thus, the first part of this chapter can be regarded as constructive criticism of

claim R, rather than as a rejection of it, in that it identifies some of the necessary

conditions for allowing hormetic exposures in an ethically acceptable way. Chapter five

noted that the claim’s defenders currently assume its truth without argumentation.

Chapter six now argues that such an assumption is questionable, because one cannot

determine whether or not it is ethically acceptable until one fully specifies the necessary

conditions, C1…Cn, for justifying hormetic exposures. This chapter helps proponents of claim R to identify some of those necessary conditions that must be made explicit.

Concept Problem

According to the problem thesis, the first difficulty with claim R is the following:

Concept Problem: Any use of claim R to justify exposing people to hormetic chemicals is currently ethically questionable, because the concept of hormesis (as analyzed in terms of multiple characterizations of the hormesis anomaly in chapters two and three) is too ambiguous to identify either (a) the effects that

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qualify as instances of “hormesis” or (b) the ethical consequences of hormetic effects.94

For the purposes of the dissertation, one can define the “concept” of hormesis in terms of the behavior of essential variables. For example, the independent variable for virtually any concept of hormesis is likely to be the dose level of a toxic chemical to which an organism is exposed, but the dependent variable may vary from one concept to another.

For instance, the dependent variable could be defined as a “benefit,” a “net benefit,” or a

“stimulation” of a biological endpoint, or it could be any effect on which an “opposite” response is measured at low versus at high doses. According to part (a) of the concept problem, the concept of hormesis is currently too ambiguous to identify the effects that qualify as instances of hormesis. An argument that part (a) does indeed refer to a genuine problem for claim R is that the multiple concepts employed by current researchers in different characterizations of the anomaly (see chapter three) prevent determining the effects that qualify as instances of hormesis, because different effects qualify as hormetic depending on which concept one employs. For example, a harmful low-dose stimulatory effect of a toxin would qualify as an instance of “low-dose-stimulation hormesis” but not as an instance of “beneficial hormesis” (see chapter three).

According to part (b) of the concept problem, the concept of hormesis is too ambiguous to identify the ethical consequences of hormetic effects (specifically, the justifiability of allowing public exposure to hormetic toxins). An argument that part (b) refers to a legitimate problem is that the multiple concepts of hormesis employed by

94 The ethical consequences of hormetic effects could be very diverse, including such things as: (1) a new public mindset for thinking about pollution (namely, that small quantities of pollutants are not bad), (2) new cost-benefit calculations employed in regulatory policy, and (3) new models for calculating the biological effects of toxins. In the context of the concept problem, however, the dissertation will focus especially on one potential ethical consequence of hormetic effects, namely, the question whether it is justifiable to allow public exposure to low levels of toxins.

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current researchers (see chapter three) prevent determining the ethical consequences of hormesis, because hormetic effects have different ethical ramifications depending on which concept one uses. For example, all else being equal, it seems more ethically justifiable to allow public exposure to chemicals that produce “net-beneficial hormesis” than to chemicals that produce “low-dose-stimulation hormesis” (see chapter three), because a chemical could stimulate one or more biological endpoints but create a net harm for the organism.

One might object to the dissertation’s allegation that claim R is ambiguous, however, based on the fact that claim R (as it is charitably formulated in chapter five) specifies the concept of hormesis in two important ways. First, it stipulates that the concept of hormesis includes only beneficial low-dose effects. Second, it specifies that claim R addresses only hormetic exposures that result in net health benefits. (Thus, even if one does not include the production of net benefits as part of the hormesis concept itself, claim R adds it as an additional constraint in considering the ramifications of hormesis for policy.) The problem with this objection is that the specifications of the hormesis concept mentioned in the objection are necessary but not sufficient conditions for determining (a) which effects qualify as hormetic and (b) the ethical ramifications of hormetic effects. At least one additional necessary condition is for proponents of claim R to specify criteria for determining which effects qualify as beneficial and net beneficial.

For example, one must stipulate: (i) which endpoints must be affected (e.g., longevity, quality of life, or disease incidence) in order for an effect to be beneficial, and (ii) how to balance “tradeoffs” between effects on different endpoints. Without this specification of criteria for beneficial and net beneficial effects, the hormesis concept cannot be applied in

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practice, because one cannot determine whether any particular effect actually counts as

hormetic.

Scale Problem

A second difficulty with claim R is the following:

Scale problem: Any use of claim R to justify exposing people to hormetic chemicals is currently ethically questionable, because there is currently not adequate scientific information to specify the scale (i.e., range of people or temporal period) on which hormetic effects are likely to occur.

There are two “scales” that are particularly important for determining whether it is ethically justifiable to allow public exposure to hormetic effects. One scale is the range of people on which hormetic effects occur, and the other scale is the period of time during which those effects occur. First, the range of people who experience hormetic effects is important, because it seems much more justifiable to allow public exposure to those effects if they occur on the vast majority of the population rather than if they benefit only a limited group of people. Thus, researchers need to determine the extent to which people vary in their likelihood to experience hormetic effects, depending on factors such as their age, health, diet, behavior, stress level, genetics, and other chemical exposures.

Second, the period of time during which hormetic effects occur is important, because it seems more justifiable to allow public exposure to toxic chemicals if they produce hormetic effects that last an extended period of time than if they produce effects that are very short-lived (and possibly followed by detrimental effects). Claim R (as formulated in chapter five) does not specify the scales on which hormesis must occur in order to be justifiable. Even if it did specify them, however, the scale problem highlights the fact

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that there is not enough information to determine if hormetic effects would actually occur

on those scales.

One might object, however, that some proponents of hormesis do appear to be

aware of the scale problem and provide information that alleviates it. For example,

Calabrese and Baldwin (2002a) appeal to evidence that (a) hormesis can occur with

mixtures of toxins, and that (b) hormesis appears to be a temporary phenomenon in some

cases but perhaps not always. Thus, they provide some information concerning the scales

at which one could expect hormetic effects to occur. The problem with this objection is

that Calabrese and Baldwin provide only partial rather than sufficient information

concerning the scales of hormetic effects. In order to supply sufficient information, they

would need to identify the major factors that determine the scale of hormetic effects and then provide adequate information about each of those factors. Instead, Calabrese and

Baldwin provide only partial evidence about some of those factors. For example, they

provide virtually no information on the ways in which common variations in background

levels of chemicals, nutritional intake, activity levels, and illnesses would affect the

production of hormetic effects in typical members of the population. And, even though

they claim that hormetic effects can be produced by mixtures of toxic chemicals, they

provide only a limited degree of evidence for their claim. Namely, they appeal to four

studies that revealed hormetic effects produced by petroleum mixtures, four studies of wastewater effluent, and two other studies that yielded hormetic effects as a result of multiple chemical exposures (see Calabrese and Baldwin 2002a, 333). Although these studies suggest that chemicals can produce hormesis in mixtures, they do not provide

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sufficient information to determine precisely what conditions and mixtures of chemicals

are likely to produce hormesis.

Implementation Problem

A third difficulty is the following:

Implementation problem: Any use of claim R to justify exposing people to hormetic effects is currently ethically questionable, because it fails to include a necessary condition for ethically allowing hormetic exposures, and because it seems plausible that the necessary condition may be difficult to meet in the hormesis case. This “implementation” condition is that it must be feasible to implement the policy of allowing hormetic exposures, given actual social, cultural, and environmental conditions (including current knowledge, potential for human error, vested interests, and available financial resources), without causing an unreasonable amount of harm.95

The first two problems (i.e., concept and scope) with claim R addressed conceptual and

empirical confusions, respectively, surrounding hormetic effects. The implementation

problem deals with practical difficulties that arise from the social, cultural, and political

context in which regulations are implemented. This third problem focuses especially on

either difficulties that arise after the concept and scale of hormesis have already been

determined or with factors that prevent researchers from effectively determining the

concept and scale of hormetic effects.96

95 Concerning the notion of “unreasonable” harm mentioned in the implementation condition, different ethicists might propose different standards for what is unreasonable. Nevertheless, the following argument that the implementation condition is difficult to meet seems to be convincing for a wide range of standards of unreasonable harm. 96 One might suggest that the factors that prevent researchers from effectively determining the concept or scale of hormetic effects should be included under the concept or scale problems rather than the implementation problem. Nevertheless, the dissertation’s current definition of the implementation problem appears to be reasonable, because it groups similar issues under similar problems. The concept and scale problems currently address conceptual and empirical confusions, respectively, about the characteristics of hormesis. In contrast, the factors that prevent researchers from effectively elucidating the concept and scale of hormetic effects are practical problems related to the social, cultural, and political characteristics of society. For example, society may not have adequate resources for studying the scale of hormetic effects, or vested interests may design studies in such a way that they provide misleading information about

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Even though he has not specifically referred to what the dissertation calls the

“implementation problem,” Ian Hacking (1986) has provided indirect support for the notion that the implementation problem can be a significant difficulty when new technologies are introduced. Specifically, he argues that technologies often interact with one another in unexpected ways, and therefore it is difficult to predict whether new technologies will create harm under real-life conditions. In a similar way, it may be difficult to practice the novel policy of allowing public exposure to hormetic effects without producing unforeseen harms, because real-world conditions may produce unexpected complications. Consider two difficulties that could make implementing a policy of allowing hometic exposures problematic. First, it seems challenging to distinguish (given the level of funding available in our society) between chemicals that do and that do not produce hormetic effects under “real-life” conditions. The chief reason is that extensive and very time-consuming studies would be required to provide convincing evidence that a particular chemical produces hormetic effects under most people’s actual living conditions (taking into account age, diet, behavior, genetics, health, and other chemical exposures). Calabrese and Baldwin have appealed to many studies that provide evidence for hormetic effects in particular organisms, with particular chemicals, under particular conditions, but it is not clear that the same chemicals would produce hormetic effects on human beings under the typical array of real-life conditions to which humans are typically exposed. For example, Vichi and Tritton (1989) observed hormetic effects caused by the cytotoxic agent Adriamycin when cells were exposed to

the scale of effects. Therefore, it seems reasonable to group all these practical issues together under one “implementation” problem, whether they occur after the concept and scale of hormesis have been determined or during the determination process.

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sub-optimal nutrient levels. Further research would be needed to verify that those

hormetic effects could occur under the wider range of environmental and nutritional

conditions found in human societies.

A second reason that current social, environmental, and political conditions could

raise problems for implementing a policy of allowing hormetic chemicals is that vested

interests could plausibly corrupt the policy-making process and allow public exposure to

harmful chemicals (see Beder 2000, Fagin et al. 1999, Markowitz and Rosner 2002,

Wargo 1996). Specifically, because fully adequate research about the conditions under

which hormesis occurs would be very expensive to perform, it seems plausible that

vested interest groups could cause public exposure to particular chemicals by arguing on

the basis of insufficient evidence that those chemicals would probably produce hormetic

effects under particular circumstances. It is important to note that the implementation

problem expresses only the plausibility that society will not be able to enact the policy of

allowing hormetic exposures without causing unreasonable harm. Thus, to provide

evidence that the implementation problem is a legitimate difficulty, one need not argue

that vested interest groups will definitely or very likely corrupt the policy-making process

but only that it is plausible that they could do so.

Two pieces of evidence support the plausibility that interest groups could use

inadequate evidence to support policies that would benefit them. The first piece of evidence is that some thinkers who have received significant funding from industrial and military groups, such as Calabrese and Baldwin (2003b), are already claiming that regulatory agencies should use hormetic dose-response curves as default models for setting regulatory standards. Therefore, despite inadequate evidence about the number of

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toxins that would actually provide neutral or beneficial health effects for the public, the

representatives of interest groups are already calling for public exposure to low levels of

toxic chemicals. A second piece of evidence in support of the notion that interest groups could corrupt the policy-making process in the case of hormesis is that they have effectively done so in the case of most previous chemical regulation. For example, Beder

(2000), Fagin et al. (1999), and Markowitz and Rosner (2002) provide evidence that industry groups have withheld information, produced and appealed to biased scientific results, and used powerful public relations strategies in order to weaken regulatory policy for toxic chemicals without adequate scientific justification. Fagin et al. (1999) go so far as to say that interest groups have virtually paralyzed government regulatory agencies such as the EPA. Thus, it seems plausible that vested interests might use similar strategies to corrupt proposed policies that allow public exposure to hormetic chemicals.

One might develop an objection against the notion that claim R falls prey to the implementation problem, however, that is fairly similar to the previously discussed objection against the conclusion that the scale problem is a serious difficulty. Namely, even though claim R does not explicitly mention the implementation condition, at least some proponents of the claim appear to be aware of it and to argue that it can be met. In the same article in which Calabrese and Baldwin show some awareness of the scale problem (i.e., Calabrese and Baldwin 2002a), they provide partial evidence that the implementation condition can be met in the hormesis case. For example, regarding problem (1) for meeting the implementation condition (namely, expense), they argue that the cost of testing each chemical for its likelihood to produce hormetic effects can be eliminated by accepting hormesis as the default low-dose effect of toxins. (One might

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argue, however, that shifting the default is more an evasion of the problem than an adequate solution, as the later response to this objection suggests.) And, although

Calabrese and Baldwin do not address problem (2) (i.e., vested interests), one could argue that the mere possibility that vested interests could abuse the system is not an adequate reason to prevent hormetic exposures; after all, steps can be taken to limit such abuses.

For example, one could require strict conflict-of-interest disclosures for research related to hormetic effects (see e.g., Campbell 2003, Krimsky 2002). One could also demand careful federal oversight of laboratory studies (perhaps including government choice of the labs that perform the studies) and place the burden of proof on industry to show that particular toxic chemicals are beneficial at some dose levels (Fagin et al. 1999).

In order to alleviate the implementation problem, however, the proponents of claim R must not merely provide partial support for the possibility of meeting the implementation condition; they must offer sufficient evidence that it can be met. This requires performing at least two tasks. First, they must identify the major “sub- conditions” that are necessary in order to meet the implementation condition (e.g., the sub-condition that hormetic chemicals must be identifiable without unreasonable expense). Second, they must provide sufficient evidence that those sub-conditions can be met. Unfortunately, Calabrese and Baldwin (2002a) provide partial evidence that some sub-conditions can be met, but they do not systematically identify all major sub- conditions and offer sufficient evidence that they can be met. Concerning the sub- condition that hormetic chemicals be identifiable in an economically feasible way, for example, it seems problematic to claim that it can be met by accepting hormesis as the default low-dose effect of toxins. One difficulty is that Calabrese and Baldwin (2001)

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found evidence for hormesis in less than 50% of the cases that were adequately designed to exhibit it. Another problem is that it seems ethically questionable to shift the burden of proof from those who wish to show that a toxic chemical is beneficial onto those who wish to show that it is harmful. For example, Shrader-Frechette (1991) provides a number of arguments that it is ethically more important to protect the public from risk of harm than to protect industry from lost income. These arguments draw on individuals’ rights to due process and bodily security, the fact that protecting people from harm is a necessary condition for enabling them to enjoy other freedoms, and the notion that industry has more resources and information at its disposal than individual citizens.

Concerning the other sub-condition mentioned in this section (i.e., that abuses from vested interests be avoided), it seems premature to conclude that abuses can be avoided until specific solutions are actually put into practice (e.g., placing the burden of proof on industry to show that particular hormetic chemicals actually benefit an adequate proportion of the population). Otherwise, it seems plausible that industry groups will influence hormesis regulations in many of the same ways that they have manipulated previous policy concerning toxic chemicals such as alachlor, atrazine, formaldehyde, and perchloroethylene (see Fagin et al. 1999). Consider the tactics used by industry in just one case, namely, the regulation of dioxin (Beder 2000, 141-160). Monsanto and BASF

(a multi-national chemical company based in Germany) funded studies that purported to show no significant detrimental health effects from dioxins. When Peter Montague, editor of Rachel’s Hazardous Waste News (an environmental publication), reported allegations of fraud in the studies (revealed during a court case), a retired Monsanto scientist silenced him (and the rest of the media) by using a law firm that frequently

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represents Monsanto to sue Montague for libel for $4 million. The Chlorine Institute (an industry funded organization) later funded a scientific conference concerning dioxin and used a public relations firm to publicize the notion that “the conference had reached a consensus that dioxin was ‘much less toxic to humans than originally believed’” (Beder

2000, 148). Some of the scientists present who had not reached this conclusion were outraged and “felt that they had been manipulated by the Chlorine Institute” (2000, 148).

Furthermore, industry leaders used private meetings with the administrator of the EPA in the mid-1980’s and again in 1991 in order to obtain public statements that dioxin was not as harmful as was previously thought (despite the fact that many EPA scientists did not agree with these claims) (2000, 145-149). Because tactics like these are consistently employed in response to toxic-chemical regulations (see Fagin et al. 1999, Wargo 1996), it seems unreasonable to assume that abuses from vested interests can be avoided in the case of hormesis regulations until specific solutions have been put into practice.

Consent Problem

According to the problem thesis (introduced at the beginning of this section (6.2)), a final difficulty with claim R can be stated as follows:

Consent Problem: Any use of claim R to justify exposing people to hormetic chemicals is currently ethically questionable, because it fails to include a necessary condition for allowing hormetic exposures, and because that necessary condition is in danger of not being met. This “consent” condition is that the public has prima facie rights to provide some form of free, informed consent to its exposure to hormetic chemicals.97

97 As the following explication of the consent condition explains, one might be able to satisfy the public’s rights to provide free, informed consent to hormetic chemicals in a variety of different ways. For example, under at least some conditions, the public might be able to provide adequate free, informed consent by electing representatives who then make decisions about the regulation of hormetic chemicals for them.

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The following discussion of this problem provides: (1) an explication of the consent condition, (2) a defense of it as ethically necessary for allowing public exposure to hormetic chemicals, (3) an argument that it is in danger of not being met, and (4) objections to the dissertation’s formulation of the consent problem. This part of the chapter elucidates at least nine ways in which one might be able to obtain people’s consent to public-health risks. Nevertheless, it argues that the necessary conditions for informed consent to hormetic exposures are unlikely to be met in any of these ways, given how researchers such as Calabrese are currently revealing information about hormesis and the manner in which vested interests influence regulatory policy.

Explication of the Consent Condition. This section explicates the consent condition in two ways: (a) it provides an account of the necessary components of free, informed consent, and (b) it describes the ways in which this consent can be obtained.

The components of consent have already been analyzed by a number of thinkers (see e.g.,

Appelbaum et al. 1987, Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Gert, Culver, and Clouser 1997,

Faden and Beauchamp 1986, Wear 1993). There is widespread agreement that if any form of free, informed consent is to serve as an adequate mechanism for respecting people’s autonomy, at least four conditions must be met to an adequate extent: (i) disclosure of information, (ii) understanding, (iii) voluntariness, and (iv) competence.

The ways in which one can obtain this consent have not been examined previously in as much detail. Beauchamp and Childress (2001) and Faden and Beauchamp (1986) have summarized some of the different ways in which individuals can give their consent, and

MacLean (1986) and Shrader-Frechette (1991) have analyzed some ways in which people

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give their consent at a group level.98 Nevertheless, previous authors do not appear to

have developed a very systematic list of the ways in which free, informed consent to

health hazards can be obtained.

In order to alleviate this deficiency in previous accounts of consent, this section

provides a list of nine (neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive) ways in which one can

obtain free, informed consent to health risks. The list is schematized roughly from more

“direct,” individual forms of consent to more “indirect,” surrogate or group forms.

Previous authors have discussed many of the specific items in the list, but the dissertation

does not employ their precise terminology or categories. The analysis in this section indicates that, even though any adequate form of free, informed consent must satisfy the conditions of disclosure, understanding, voluntariness, and competence in some sense, consent can still be obtained in many different ways. The fact that consent can be obtained, in principle, in any of the following ways does not indicate that all nine ways

are equally desirable or reliable, however. The following discussion of the forms of

consent concludes with warnings about how particular ways of obtaining consent may be

preferable to others. The dissertation ultimately concludes, however, that because of the

claims that researchers such as Calabrese have been making about hormesis, and because

of the manner in which vested interests currently influence regulatory policy, the

98 For influential discussions of free, informed consent by individuals in clinical and research settings, see especially Beauchamp and Childress (2001) and Faden and Beauchamp (1986); see also Appelbaum et al. (1987), Brody (1998), Donnelly (2002), Gert, Culver, and Clouser (1997), May (2002), Smith (1999), and Wear (1993). For theoretical discussions of group consent to public-health risks, see Altham (1983), MacLean (1986), and Shrader-Frechette (1991). For discussions of public participation in particular as a mechanism for obtaining group consent, see Beierle (1998), EPA (2000), Fiorino (1990), Institutes of Medicine (1998), NRC (1996), and Renn, Webler, and Wiedemann (1995). Foster et al. (1998), Foster et al. (1999), and Mitchell and Happe (2001) provide recent discussions of group consent in response to risks from human genetic research.

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conditions for free, informed consent are unlikely to be met in the hormesis case using

any of these ways for obtaining consent.

Because the first four ways of obtaining consent focus primarily on the assent

given by individuals (rather than groups) to health risks, they are less applicable than the

final five ways to the consent process in the hormesis case (because the hormesis

situation involves decisions by society as a whole to accept chemical risks).

Nevertheless, the dissertation includes all nine forms of consent for the sake of completeness. It will refer to the first way of obtaining consent as “overt-personal consent.” This form occurs when a physician or researcher discusses the risks and benefits of an action or procedure with the individual and then obtains the individual’s explicit authorization (which is often “certified” by a signature on an official consent document). The second way is “tacit-personal consent,” which a physician or researcher is presumed to obtain from a single individual (after having discussed risks and benefits with that individual) based on the fact that the one giving consent does not raise objections to an action or procedure. Third, “indirect-personal consent” is provided by an individual who makes consent decisions that affect only herself (in contrast to the fourth way of obtaining consent that is discussed below) but who receives information about risks and benefits via a less direct process than the direct one-on-one contact involved in overt-personal and tacit-personal consent. For example, the decision to drink or to smoke or to receive amalgam dental fillings after reading warning notices on alcoholic beverages or on cigarettes or in dental offices would be an example of indirect-personal

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consent.99 A second example would be an informed-consent process in which a researcher reveals the risks and benefits of a study to a large group of subjects all at once, after which each individual has the opportunity to decline further participation in the study. (For further discussion of the first three forms of consent, see e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Donnelly 2002, Gert, Culver, and Clouser 1997, and Wear 1993).

The dissertation will refer to a fourth way of obtaining consent as “social consent.” It is provided by a relatively complete group of the people who are likely to be affected by a decision, all of whom have an equal opportunity to influence the choice of the group. The chief difference between social consent and the previous form in the dissertation’s list (i.e., indirect-personal) is that the decision of a majority (or perhaps some other percentage of the group) is binding on everyone in social consent. An example would be a voting process to elect a representative or to accept a constitutional amendment. A fifth form, “surrogate consent,” occurs when one person provides consent

(via either an “overt” or “tacit” process) for one other person (e.g., because the affected person is incompetent to make the decision). The dissertation places surrogate consent after the first four ways (thus indicating that they are more “direct” forms of consent than surrogacy), because the previous four forms all involve situations in which the people affected by a decision are able to influence it directly (by giving or withholding consent), without the intervention of another person.

Sixth, “representative consent” is obtained from a group of people (via either an overt or tacit process) in which a representative sample consisting of some affected people obtain information about the risks and benefits of a proposed action or policy and

99 See Kerns (2001, 170) for an account of warnings about amalgam dental fillings that are posted in dental offices in California.

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then make a decision for all affected people (see e.g., Kleinman 2000, NRC 1996,

Shrader-Frechette 1991). The difference between this form of consent and “social”

consent (the fourth form, discussed earlier) is that social consent requires a relatively

complete group of those who will be affected by a decision to provide consent, whereas

representative consent allows a relatively small number of individuals to make a decision

for a large group. Sample mechanisms by which representative consent could be obtained include citizen advisory councils, citizen juries, or negotiation proceedings.

Seventh, “representative-political consent” occurs when citizens elect government representatives who then receive information about the risks and benefits of proposed actions or policies and make decisions for their constituents.100

An eighth form, “assumed consent,” occurs when people’s revealed or expressed

preferences indicate that they would accept an action or policy, where revealed

preferences include people’s past actions and expressed preferences include their

responses to questionnaires or surveys (see e.g., MacLean 1986, Shrader-Frechette 1991).

The dissertation uses an original term, ‘assumed consent’, as an umbrella term for two

different sorts of consent that are sometimes considered separately, namely, “explicit”

consent based on expressed preferences and “implicit” consent based on revealed

preferences. The motivation for including explicit and implicit consent under the single

umbrella of “assumed consent” is that they both involve a presumption of consent based

100 Surrogate consent (the fifth form) is placed before representative and representative-political consent in this list (thus indicating that it is a more “direct” form of consent), because surrogate consent involves a decision for one individual person rather than for numerous people at once. Nevertheless, one should recognize that there are some senses in which surrogate consent actually appears to be less direct than the following two forms in the dissertation’s list. For example, those making the consent decision in representative and representative-political consent are at least among those who are likely to be affected by the decision’s consequences. In contrast, the one making the decision in a case of “surrogate” consent is not the one who directly experiences the consequences.

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on indications that people have previously given (either by action or communication).

Finally, a ninth form, “hypothetical consent,” is based on the decisions that ideally

rational people would make in response to information about the risks and benefits of an

action or policy. It differs from assumed consent in that it relies on a theory of human rationality rather than on the preferences indicated by actual people.

As one moves from more “direct” to less “direct” ways of obtaining consent in the preceding list, the consent that one obtains becomes increasingly unreliable as a source of information about people’s actual preferences. For example, the first three forms of consent (i.e., overt-personal, tacit-personal, and indirect-personal) appear to be preferable to the following six. Whereas the first three ways all allow individuals to decide for themselves whether to face risky experiences or behaviors, the following six forms

(beginning with social) allow the decisions or analyses of others to exert at least some influence over an individual’s own experiences.101 Furthermore, in the current U.S.

political climate, the sixth through ninth forms of consent (which involve decisions by

representatives or “experts”) are particularly problematic, for at least three reasons. First,

U.S. government representatives have so many constituents that it is difficult to represent faithfully the diversity of their values, and (at least in many cases) it would probably be impossible to formulate policies that would satisfy them all (Dietz 1995). Second, the members of U.S. administrative agencies are not directly elected by the public (Fiorino

1995). Third, U.S. administrative agencies either have, or are suspected by large

101 Admittedly, the first three forms of consent still require that one obtain information about risks and benefits from others, which allows other people to have some influence over the individual providing consent. Nevertheless, the actual consent decision is made solely by the individual who will be affected in the first three forms of consent, whereas the final six ways of obtaining consent allow other people to be involved in the actual giving of consent.

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members of the population to have, social and financial ties to vested interests (such as industry) that prevent them from acting as faithful representatives of all citizens’ interests

(Beder 2000, Beierle 1998, Fagin et al. 1999, Fiorino 1995, Shrader-Frechette 1991).

The eighth and ninth forms of consent (i.e., assumed and hypothetical) have further problems. With regard to assumed consent, it appears that expressed preferences can be misleading, because people may make unrealistic claims on surveys that they would not “back up” in actual practice. Furthermore, revealed preferences can be problematic, at least partly because they may express unfortunate necessities rather than actual preferences. For example, workers may accept risky jobs not because they value the high wages that are supposedly associated with the jobs but rather because they cannot obtain any other work (see e.g., Shrader-Frechette 2002). Concerning the ninth form (i.e., hypothetical consent), there is potential to abuse people’s rights by appealing to the likelihood that they would give their consent but without providing sufficient justification (e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Shrader-Frechette 1991). Based on these brief analyses of the nine forms of consent, it seems ethically preferable to obtain people’s consent in the most direct manner that is feasible. Nevertheless, the rest of section 6.2 argues that, no matter what form of consent one were to pursue in the hormesis case, it would be unlikely that all four conditions for free, informed consent

(i.e., disclosure, understanding, voluntariness, and competence) could be met.

Defense of the Consent Condition. One can appeal to two “levels” of justification in order to defend the consent condition, which was introduced as part of the consent problem and which affirms the public’s prima facie rights to provide consent to health risks. One can start by appealing to the public’s rights to consent to health risks in

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general, and one can then make a “deeper” appeal to the values that underlie those rights

to consent. On the “first” level, people arguably have prima facie rights to provide some

form of free, informed consent to their exposure to hormetic chemicals, because hormetic

exposures produce risks of harm, and people have prima facie rights to provide free,

informed consent to risks of harm that are imposed on them. Policies that allow

exposures to hormetic chemicals (even under the conditions described in claim R)

produce risks of harm in at least five ways:102

(1) Researchers may rely on faulty evidence to identify toxins that produce beneficial and net beneficial effects.

(2) Toxins may produce beneficial and net beneficial effects for some people but not for other people.

(3) Toxins may produce beneficial and net beneficial effects for a short period of time but not for an extended time period.

(4) Toxins may produce beneficial and net beneficial effects only under specific environmental conditions.

(5) Vested interests may influence research and public opinion in such a way that regulatory agencies treat harmful levels of chemicals as if they produced beneficial and net beneficial effects.

On a “deeper” level, the rights to free, informed consent are grounded on the values of beneficence and respect for autonomy and, in part, on the values of non-maleficence and privacy (see e.g., White and Zimbelman 1998). The dissertation does not examine the argument for free, informed consent based on these values in detail, because others have

102 The five reasons that public exposures to hormetic chemicals can produce risks of harm are not all unique to the hormesis case. For example, the first reason (i.e., the fact that researchers may rely on faulty evidence) is applicable to scientific research in general. It does not appear to be problematic that at least some of the reasons for risks of harm in the hormesis case are applicable to science in general, however, because the argument of this section is not that hormesis requires a special form of consent that other risks do not but rather that the consent that is required in the hormesis case appears unlikely to occur.

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already developed it extensively (see, e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001 and Faden and

Beauchamp 1986).103

Argument That the Consent Condition May Not Be Met. The chapter’s

argument that the consent condition is in danger of not being met includes two parts. The

first part argues that there is a danger that those who make decisions about hormesis will

not receive representative information about all major, plausible characterizations of the

anomaly. The second part of the argument concludes that three of the conditions for free,

informed consent (namely, disclosure, understanding, and voluntariness) are all in danger

of not being met, given that those who make decisions about hormesis may not receive

representative information about all major, plausible characterizations of the anomaly.

Throughout the rest of the chapter, the dissertation uses the terms ‘major’ and ‘plausible’

in specific ways. “Major” anomaly characterizations are those that could influence the

occurrence of significant diseases, disability, or death, depending on whether scientists

and the public at large accept or reject them. “Plausible” anomaly characterizations are

those that have a reasonable likelihood of being true, given current evidence about the

anomaly. It is not feasible to give a precise, quantitative definition for a “plausible”

anomaly characterization, because (as chapter three argued) scientists have to weigh

multiple considerations when they confirmD characterizations (compare, for example,

Kuhn’s (1977) and McMullin’s (1983) similar claims about scientific theory choice).

Therefore, the best course of action is probably to regard plausible characterizations as

103 The justification from beneficence can be traced historically to John Stuart Mill (1977) and was a primary motivation for the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki. The value of autonomy has its roots in Kant (1959; see Schneewind 1998); has been analyzed recently by Dworkin (1988), Feinberg (1986), and Hill (1991); and is emphasized by Faden and Beauchamp (1986) and Beauchamp and Childress (2001).

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those that have a reasonable likelihood of being true, based on the judgment of the

scientific community as it considers the multiple elements of confirmationD mentioned in

chapter three. (Those elements include, for example, eliminating random and systematic

errors, defending the occurrence of particular anomalous phenomena, and showing that

researchers have failed to develop alternative characterizations). The rest of this section

provides an example of the way that different members of the scientific community

consider different characterizations of the hormesis anomaly to be plausible. In sum,

major, plausible anomaly characterizations are those that have some degree of likelihood

as well as significant ramifications for the public welfare.

The argument that those who make decisions about hormesis may not receive

representative information about all its major, plausible characterizations is based on two main factors (each of which is exacerbated by additional considerations). The first factor is that a number of recent publications about hormesis fail to reveal all major, plausible characterizations of the hormesis anomaly (specifically, they fail to reveal characterizations that are unfavorable to the military and industry). The second factor is that industry groups have a successful track record of drawing inordinate attention to small, unrepresentative bodies of scientific information in order to fashion government policies that meet their interests (even if that information is not representative of the positions taken by the scientific community as a whole). Taken together (along with other exacerbating considerations), these two factors support the notion that vested interest groups will work very hard to ensure that those who make policy decisions about hormesis are exposed primarily to publications that emphasize only some plausible characterizations of hormesis (namely, those that would benefit them). The result is a

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danger that those who make decisions about hormesis will not receive representative

information about all its major, plausible characterizations.

The first factor that supports the existence of a danger that decision makers may

receive unrepresentative information about hormesis is that a number of recent

publications fail to reveal all major, plausible characterizations of the anomaly. These

studies, which emphasize only characterizations of hormesis according to which it is a

generalizable phenomenon that clashes with current government regulatory practice,

include Calabrese and Baldwin (1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 2003a, 2003b), Sielken and

Stevenson (1998), Gerber, Williams, and Gray (1999), and Renn (2002). The fact that

these articles do not reveal all major, plausible characterizations of hormesis is

exacerbated by three additional considerations. First, a number of these articles (namely,

Calabrese and Baldwin 1998a, 1998c, 2003a, 2003b) are co-authored by Edward

Calabrese, who exerts an extremely strong influence over the entire hormesis literature.

In a recent search, Elliott found that Calabrese has authored roughly 16% of the articles about hormesis that have been written since 1997. Furthermore, of the last 50 articles that others have written on this topic, Calabrese was cited by 62% of them.104 A second

exacerbating consideration is that at least one of the publications that fails to reveal all

the characterizations of hormesis (namely, Calabrese and Baldwin 2003b) is in a

particularly influential journal, Nature, that is likely to be read and respected by a particularly wide readership. A third aggravating consideration is that Nature does not

104 In a literature search in the Science Citation Index Expanded of the Web of Science database on January 30, 2004, Elliott found 66 total articles published between 1997 and 2004 that were listed under “Calabrese” as author and that had “hormesis” in the title, keyword, or abstract fields. The total number of articles published between 1997 and 2004 that had “hormesis” in the title, keyword, or abstract fields was 403; thus, authors other than Calabrese published 337 of those articles. By examining the citation lists in the most recent 50 of those 337 articles, Elliott found that 31 of them (62%) cited one or more articles written by Calabrese.

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publish responses to “commentary” articles (which was the classification of the Calabrese

article), so readers have not had an opportunity to read opposing perspectives.105

As an illustration of the way these articles fail to reveal all major, plausible

characterizations of hormesis, let us consider the influential article in Nature, entitled

“Toxicology Rethinks Its Central Belief” (Calabrese and Baldwin 2003b). In order to show that Calabrese and Baldwin (2003b) fail to reveal all major, plausible characterizations of the hormesis anomaly, consider the following four quotations:

(CB1) “The hormetic model is not an exception to the rule – it is the rule” (2003b, 691).

(CB2) “Now, we not only know that it [i.e., hormesis] exists but accept its dominance over other models” (2003b, 692).

(CB3) “Most notably it [i.e., hormesis] challenges the belief and use of low-dose linearity in estimating cnacer risks, and emphasizes that there are thresholds for carcinogens” (2003b, 692).

(CB4) “As both types of biological response [i.e., the biological responses to non- carcinogens and carcinogens] follow the hormetic paradigm and display similar quantitative features of the dose response, the EPA could use the hormetic model as default to assess risk in both non-carcinogens and carcinogens” (2003b, 692).

Based on quotations (CB1) through (CB4), which are representative of the article as a whole, Calabrese and Baldwin arguably disclose only one characterization of the hormesis anomaly. Specifically, they characterize it as the finding that U-shaped dose- response curves predominate over other (i.e., linear or threshold) dose-response curves for both toxic and carcinogenic chemicals.106

105 Kristin Shrader-Frechette, a professor of philosophy and biological sciences at the University of Notre Dame, submitted a response to Calabrese and Baldwin’s article, but the editorial staff would not accept it because the original article was a “commentary” piece. 106 The characterization given in the text does not explicitly state the empirical component, the relation, and the theoretical component of the anomaly. If one made these features explicit, they would be as follows:

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Although Calabrese and Baldwin provide only one characterization of the hormesis anomaly, however, there appear to be at least two other major, plausible characterizations of it that they fail to discuss. First, they fail to reveal the characterization of the anomaly as the occasional occurrence of U-shaped dose-response curves (the occurrence of which is inconsistent with researchers’ expectations that U- shaped dose-response curves would occur very rarely, if at all). For example, Jonas

(2001) argues that it is still plausible to characterize the hormesis anomaly as only an occasional occurrence of these U-shaped curves. He says: “Less than 1% of over 20,000 studies reviewed [by Calabrese and Baldwin] came close to true hypothesis testing of hormesis in experimental settings…. The criteria for rigorous ‘proof’ of hormesis will be different than those the authors [i.e., Calabrese and Baldwin 2001] have used simply to

‘identify’ hormesis [sic] may exist. In the former one would want to assure proper dose verification, randomization of samples, blinding of outcome measures, proper statistical analysis, and full reporting of all data” (2001, 626-627; see also Rodricks 2003).

A second characterization that Calabrese and Baldwin fail to disclose is that the anomaly may consist in the frequent occurrence of U-shaped dose-response curves for non-carcinogenic toxins but the occasional occurrence of U-shaped dose-response curves for carcinogens. For example, Elliott has previously argued that, even if one were to assume that U-shaped dose-response curves predominate for non-carcinogenic toxins, it would still be plausible to characterize the hormesis anomaly as only an occasional

Empirical component: the occurrence of U-shaped dose-response curves that predominate over other dose-response curves for both toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. Relation: inconsistency Theoretical component: current toxicological models, which predict only linear or threshold dose- response curves

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occurrence of U-shaped dose-response curves for carcinogens (Elliott 2000a). For one thing, Calabrese and Baldwin’s literature searches include effects on only a very small number of carcinogenic endpoints. Second, many of the carcinogenic endpoints for which U-shaped dose-response curves occurred in the literature searches were endpoints related to carcinogenesis (e.g., cell division or DNA-repair enzyme activity) that nevertheless do not provide very direct evidence for the occurrence of U-shaped dose- response curves on endpoints that reflect the entire process of carcinogenesis (e.g., cancer-related illness or mortality).

Although this argument has focused on Calabrese and Baldwin’s (2003b) article in Nature, it is important to keep in mind that a number of other articles also fail to reveal all major, plausible characterizations of the hormesis anomaly. In other articles written by Calabrese and Baldwin, they make very similar claims to those in Nature. For example, they state that “the concept of hormesis (i.e., low-dose stimulation/high-dose inhibition) is counter to the cancer risk assessment practices by U.S. regulatory agencies”

(1998b, 230). The title to another of their articles states, “The Hormetic Dose-Response

Model Is More Common than the Threshold Model in Toxicology” (2003a, 246). In these works, they provide very little (if any) acknowledgment of alternative interpretations and perspectives on the data that they present (see e.g., Davis and

Svendsgaard 1990, Jonas 2001, Roberts 2001, Rodricks 2003). Sielken and Stevenson

(1998) claim that, in response to the evidence concerning hormesis collected by

Calabrese and Baldwin, “Low-dose risk characterization will need to reflect the likelihood of beneficial effects at a dose and the likelihood that sufficiently small dose levels may have a reasonable certainty of having no adverse effects…. The authors

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believe that these changes are needed and long overdue” (1998, 259). Renn also claims

that “The articles in this volume indicate that the evidence collected so far on the

hormesis hypothesis [e.g., the evidence provided by Calabrese and Baldwin] justifies a thorough revision of the present paradigms in regulatory philosophy and actions” (2002,

19). Sielken and Stevenson and Renn, like Calabrese and Baldwin, do not acknowledge critical evaluations of their preferred characterizations of the hormesis anomaly.

The argument that decision makers are in danger of not receiving representative information about hormesis depends not only on the claim that a number of articles fail to provide adequate information but also on the notion that vested interests have successfully used small, unrepresentative bodies of scientific information to influence government policy. Otherwise, one could argue that, as long as some researchers emphasize alternative characterizations of hormesis (i.e., characterizations that do not benefit industrial groups), then those who make policy decisions can successfully obtain representative information about hormesis by consulting multiple articles that express different perspectives. Therefore, it is important to show that, because of the money and

“inside” connections employed by industry groups (see e.g., Fagin et al. 1999), they can effectively emphasize particular pieces of scientific information to such an extent that decisionmakers are in danger of receiving unrepresentative information.

Before providing evidence for the ability of industry to emphasize information that benefits them, let us consider three exacerbating considerations that make the power of industry a particular matter of concern in the hormesis case. The first aggravating consideration is that, because industrial groups (most notably, the Texas Institute for the

Advancement of Chemical Technology (TIACT)) have already provided Calabrese with

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extensive funding, they are very familiar with his work and therefore particularly likely to try to use it to further their interests.107 A second exacerbating factor is that the industry groups affiliated with Calabrese’s work have already begun appealing to his research in order to change regulatory policy. For example, Kaiser (2003) reports that TIACT “put out a flyer in 1998 citing examples of hormesis such as dioxin, mercury, and the pesticide lindane; the brochure declared sunnily that hormesis could allow ‘society to enjoy the benefits of many chemicals that have been banned’” (2003, 377). A third aggravating consideration is that U.S. policy regarding toxic chemicals in particular is an issue on which industry groups have been very successful in manipulating government agencies.

Beder (2000), Fagin et al. (1999), Markowitz and Rosner (2002), and Wargo (1996) have documented the ability of industry to bring the regulatory process for chemicals such as alachlor, atrazine, formaldehyde, and perchloroethylene to a virtual standstill, arguably without evidentiary justification for such regulatory policies.

In order to defend the dissertation’s claim that industry groups have successfully employed small, unrepresentative bodies of scientific information to influence government regulations, let us consider two concrete examples provided by Sharon Beder

(2000). The first example illustrates industry’s ability to affect government policy in general, and the second one shows how vested interests have influenced the regulation of toxic chemicals in particular. Beder’s first example is that industry groups who oppose

regulatory actions to slow global warming have successfully “drowned out” the scientific consensus on the issue. She notes that even though the general scientific consensus is

107 TIACT provided the funding for Calabrese and Baldwin’s original literature search of hormesis. For information about their funding sources, see their website, at http://cheweb.tamu.edu/research/centers/tiact/. The Biological Effects of Low-Level Exposures (BELLE) advisory council, which Calabrese chairs, is also funded primarily by industry groups (see http://www.belleonline.com).

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that global warming is a significant danger, the oil, gas, automotive, and chemical

industries funded front groups and public relations firms to emphasize the small,

unrepresentative body of scientific work that questioned the hazards of global warming.

According to Beder:

In September 1995 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which involves 2,500 climate scientists, issued a landmark statement representing a level of consensus that had not previously been achieved on the issue of global warming. The panel stated that ‘the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate’ and that climatic instability was likely to cause ‘widespread economic, social and environmental dislocation over the next century’. (2000, 236)

One strategy that industrial groups have employed in order to oppose the

scientific consensus on global warming is to pour money into disseminating scientific

views that are favorable to them. According to Beder, the New York Times reported in

1998 that internal documents from the American Petroleum Institute indicated that vested interest groups planned to raise $5 million to establish a center that would emphasize uncertainties in climate-science research. The National Coal Association already spent

$700,000 in 1992 and 1993 to promote public awareness of uncertainties in climate science, and the American Petroleum Institute paid the public-relations firm Burson

Marsteller $1.8 million in 1993 alone to pursue similar goals (Beder 2000, 237). Beder claims that, with these monetary expenditures, a few researchers who oppose the general scientific consensus on global warming (and who already had ties to industry that may have influenced their scientific judgment) have “had their voices greatly amplified by fossil fuel interests” (Beder 2000, 239). These scientists include Patrick Michaels (who received funds from industrial sources), Richard Lindzen (who has earned up to $2,500 a day as a consultant to fossil-fuel interest groups), Robert Balling (who received $700,000

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from coal and oil interest groups for research over a five-year period), and Sallie Baliunas

(whose scientific expertise was not central to global warming but who had a media tour

funded by an industry group).

A second approach that industry has used to oppose the scientific consensus on

global warming is to contribute money to political campaigns or lobbyists in the hope of

making policymakers pay attention primarily to the information that industry wants them

to hear. For example, the coal industry contributed $3.8 million to the 2000 U.S. election

campaign, with 90% going to the Republicans. The oil industry gave $14 million to the

same election campaign, with Republicans receiving $10 million of the funds (Beder

2000, 233). These industry efforts ultimately appear to have paid off, as the Bush

administration withdrew from the 1997 Kyoto protocol in 2001.

Beder’s description of debates over dioxin regulation (partially described earlier

in this section) provides another example of the ways that vested interests emphasize scientific information that advances their interests. Dioxins are a family of chemicals that are produced by any process in which chlorine and organic materials are brought together at high temperatures. Because of the apparent toxicity of dioxins, groups such as the

Governing Council of the American Public Health Association (one of the leading scientific and medical associations in the U.S.) have urged U.S. industries to phase out their use of chlorine. Nevertheless, industry organizations have waged a fierce battle that

illustrates at least three ways in which they have been able to place inordinate emphasis

on scientific claims that serve their interests. First, Beder claims that “A handful of

studies funded by Monsanto and BASF [a multi-national chemical company based in

Germany], which purported to show no health effects from dioxin exposure apart from

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chloracne [a skin condition], proved disproportionately influential, not withstanding their dubious methodology” (2000, 142). The studies by both Monsanto and BASF were later shown to involve partially falsified data, but the problems with the studies were not heavily publicized. The lack of publicity was partly the consequence of Monsanto’s suing the editor of an environmental publication $4 million for libel, merely because he reported the falsifications (which had been uncovered during a court case). Amazingly, when secret collusion was later uncovered (in 1986) between the EPA and the American

Paper Institute (a front group organized by industry), one of the strategies that the

Institute suggested to its contributing members was to keep referring to one of the

Monsanto studies as evidence that dioxin was indeed less toxic than previously thought.

A second approach employed by industry groups in order to emphasize scientific information that supported their interests was to fund a conference that could help “shift the scientific consensus concerning dioxin” (2000, 147). They ultimately publicized a

“consensus report” from the conference, despite the fact that a number of the attending scientists disagreed with it. A third strategy used by the paper industry was to re- examine the previous scientific studies that had been used to support dioxin regulations.

In 1990, they hired their own set of scientists, who reexamined the slides that had provided data for a seminal study of dioxin in 1978 (Beder 2000, 147). They found 50% fewer rat tumors on the slides than the previous study did. They subsequently used this evidence, along with studies of their own, to convince EPA administrator William Reilly to reassess the toxicity of dioxin and to spread the word that dioxin was less harmful than previously thought, even though many EPA scientists disagreed. One EPA insider claimed that the motive for demanding a reassessment of dioxin was so that the paper

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industry could win several court cases in the early 1990’s before the reassessment was

completed. The definitive EPA report that came out in 1994 implicated dioxin in

numerous health problems (Beder 2000, 149-150).

So far, this section has argued that there is a danger that those who make

decisions about hormesis will have unrepresentative information about the major,

plausible characterizations of the anomaly. The second part of the argument that the

consent condition may not be met in the hormesis case is to show that the danger of

unrepresentative information prevents three of the conditions for free, informed consent

from being met. The following “No-Consent” argument concludes that the disclosure,

understanding, and voluntariness conditions for consent are all in danger of not being

met, given that those who make decisions may not receive representative information

about all major, plausible characterizations of hormesis. Specifically, the argument

appeals to the notion of material information in order to show that the lack of

representative information about all major, plausible characterizations of hormesis jeopardizes informed consent. Premise one merely reiterates the claim that has already been defended in this section, namely, that there is a danger that those who make policy decisions about hormesis will not have representative information about all major, plausible characterizations of the hormesis anomaly. The second premise states that representative information about all major, plausible characterizations of an anomaly is arguably material to policy decisions about it. Premise three claims that, if a body of disclosed information does not include everything that is material to policy decisions about it, then the information is unlikely to satisfy the conditions for free, informed consent. Thus, the argument concludes that there is a danger that the conditions for free,

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informed consent will not be met in the hormesis case. Following is a presentation of the argument, followed by a detailed justification of the premises.

“No-Consent” Argument:

(1) There is a danger that those who make decisions about hormesis will not receive representative information about all major, plausible characterizations of the anomaly.

(2) All else being equal, representative information about all major, plausible alternative characterizations of an anomaly is arguably material to policy decisions concerning the anomaly.

(3) If a body of information does not include everything that is material to the decision under consideration, then (all else being equal) the information is unlikely to satisfy the “disclosure” or “understanding” components for any form of free, informed consent; furthermore, if those who disclose the information deliberately and successfully influence a decisionmaker by their incomplete disclosure, then the information is unlikely to satisfy the voluntariness component.

(4) Therefore, there is a danger that the conditions for free, informed consent will not be met in the case of policy decisions concerning hormesis (from 1, 2, and 3).

The justifications for the first and second premises of the “No-Consent” argument are much more straightforward than the justification for the third premise. This section has already defended premise one, based on two considerations. The first consideration is that a number of articles concerning hormesis do not reveal representative information about it. The second factor in defense of premise one is the success with which vested interests have previously emphasized scientific information that benefits them. Premise two, which states that information about all major, plausible characterizations of an anomaly is arguably material to policy decisions concerning it, also seems to be quite reasonable. The dissertation defines major characterizations of an anomaly as those that would have significant ramifications (i.e., affecting the occurrence of serious disease, disability, or death) on public policy or behavior if they were widely accepted. The

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dissertation follows Faden and Beauchamp (1986, 302ff), and Keyes (1995, 207) in

claiming that material information is that which is relevant to deciding whether to take a

particular action (rather than taking another action or doing nothing at all). Anomaly characterizations that could affect the occurrence of serious disease, disability, or death are arguably relevant to deciding what policy decisions to make in response to anomalies, and they are therefore material to those decisions.

The justification for premise three (i.e., the claim that the disclosure, understanding, and voluntariness components of consent are all unlikely to be met, given the failure to reveal material information) requires a closer look at each of the conditions for free, informed consent. First, let us consider the disclosure condition. In order to determine whether disclosed information is adequate for consent, bioethicists and judges have primarily appealed to three different sets of criteria, namely, the professional- practice standard, the subjective standard, and the reasonable-person standard (see e.g.,

Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Mazur 2003, May 2002, Wear 1993). Each of these standards faces significant difficulties, but the reasonable-person standard appears to be the least problematic for the purposes of this dissertation. The professional-practice standard appears to be a seriously insufficient condition for adequate disclosure, because it equates ethical obligations with typical patterns of behavior (May 2002, 17ff).

Although the subjective standard may be an excellent guide for some cases in the clinical setting (May 2002), it is impractical as a general test for determining the information that must be disclosed (because it may require providing different sorts of information depending on what particular patients or subjects find pertinent).

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The reasonable-person standard faces at least two problems of its own, but it

appears that it can provide justifiable guidance about disclosure for the purposes of the

dissertation. The first problem is that the standard may not require adequate

consideration of individual differences between patients. A second problem is that the

notion of a “reasonable person” may be difficult to specify. A response to the first

problem is that this chapter claims only that failure to meet the reasonable-person standard is a sufficient condition for preventing adequate disclosure, not that meeting the reasonable-person standard is a sufficient condition for achieving adequate disclosure.

Second, it seems likely that, under any justifiable definition of a “reasonable person,” that person would want to receive all material information about his or her decisions. Thus, based on the reasonable-person standard of disclosure, it appears that (in accordance with premise three of the No-Consent argument) one fails to meet the disclosure component of free, informed consent if one does not supply all material information.

Regarding the “understanding” component for free, informed consent, it seems quite plausible that it cannot be met apart from the disclosure of all material information about the decision under consideration. Donnelly (2002, 22), Faden and Beauchamp

(1986, 302ff), and Keyes (1995, 207) all argue that one must receive all material information about a decision in order to have substantial understanding of it. They claim that material information is that which is relevant to deciding whether to take a particular action (rather than taking another action or doing nothing at all). Without that relevant information, they insist that one cannot have substantial (i.e., sufficient) understanding of a decision.

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Finally, consider the “voluntariness” component of free, informed consent (see e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Gert, Culver, and Clouser 1997, and Donnelly

2002). Faden and Beauchamp (1986) provide a particularly influential analysis of voluntariness, which rests on a description of three ways in which people can be influenced: (1) coercion (deliberate and successful influence by a credible threat of harm that the influenced person cannot resist), (2) persuasion (deliberate and successful influence by appeals to reason), and (3) manipulation (any deliberate and successful influence that is neither coercive nor persuasive). They claim that consent is not voluntary if it is the result of coercion or of informational manipulation that prevents substantial understanding of a decision situation. (Thus, voluntary consent must involve only persuasion or informational manipulation that is sufficiently minor to be compatible with substantial understanding.) The previous paragraph already argued that withholding material information prevents decisionmakers from achieving substantial understanding of their decision. Therefore, if those who disseminate information deliberately and successfully influence those who make decisions by preventing them from having all material information, then the disseminating groups arguably meet Faden and

Beauchamp’s (1986, 362) criteria for manipulating information in such a way as to violate the voluntariness component of free, informed consent. Thus, the conclusion of the “No-Consent” argument appears to be justifiable: the conditions for free, informed consent may not be met in the case of policy decisions concerning hormesis, because decisionmakers may not have all available material information. This argument shows that the “consent” condition does indeed appear to be in danger of not being met in the hormesis case, as the consent problem states.

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Objections. One might propose at least two potential objections to the

dissertation’s formulation of the consent problem (namely, an “everyday-life” objection

and a “greater-good” objection). The first, “everyday-life,” objection is that it seems

unreasonable to demand that the public provide consent to hormetic exposures, because

the conditions for free, informed consent are rarely met in most aspects of everyday life.

For example, people engage in numerous activities, such as making purchases, without

having their competence evaluated or receiving adequate information about the risks and

benefits of their activities (see e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001).

In response to the everyday-life objection, one might first note that the burden of proof is arguably on those who reject the importance of free, informed consent in response to health hazards, because it is generally accepted as one of the best practical means for protecting privacy and promoting the values of autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence (see, e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001, White and Zimbelman 1998).

A second response is that the lack of free, informed consent in everyday life does not appear to undermine the legitimacy of consent to medical and health risks, because medical decisions are especially important to people’s well-being. For example, having a reasonable degree of health is a prerequisite for most other fulfilling activities that people choose to pursue. A third response to the everyday-life objection is that medical patients and those who face health risks are often in particular need of support for their autonomy, so it is particularly important that they provide free, informed consent. One reason that medical patients and those who face health risks need assistance to maintain their autonomy is that they may be traumatized or confused by their illnesses (Wear 1993).

Another reason is that a disproportionate number of those who face health risks are

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disadvantaged members of society who have less education and political power than

other groups (Bullard 2000, Shrader-Frechette 2002). A fourth response to the everyday-

life objection is that the impossibility of meeting the conditions for informed consent

perfectly in all aspects of life does not invalidate the importance of meeting them

adequately (or at least to the greatest extent feasible) in particularly important aspects of

life.108

Besides the “everyday-life” objection, one might also raise a “greater-good” objection against the dissertation’s formulation of the consent problem:

Greater-good objection: Rights to provide free, informed consent to hazards can plausibly be overridden under some circumstances, such as when (a) other important rights (e.g., rights to life) are at risk, (b) no plausible alternative solutions (that violate less serious rights) are available, (c) rights violations are distributed equitably, and (d) compensation is provided to those whose rights are violated.109

Thus, one might suggest that even if the public does have prima facie rights to provide

consent to hormetic exposures, those rights can be justifiably overridden for the “greater good,” such as public-health and economic benefits. For example, it seems plausible that people’s objections to vaccination can be overridden for the sake of public health.

Although it does seem plausible that rights to consent can be overridden under some circumstances, however, there are at least two reasons that the greater-good

108 It may be illuminating to compare autonomy with objectivity. Just as free, informed consent requires only an adequate, rather than a perfect, display of autonomy, so Scheffler (1967) argues that objectivity requires only an adequate, rather than a perfect, ability to appeal to criteria that are independent of the topic under consideration. 109 For discussions of the possibility of overriding rights, see Feinberg (1980), Sen (1986), and Thomson (1990). For general discussions of the conditions under which the requirement of obtaining free, informed consent can be overridden in biomedical ethics, see Beauchamp and Childress (2001), Brody (1998), Gert, Culver, and Clouser (1997), and May (2002). For an example of a case in which it might be justifiable to override consent for the public good, see Hall (1993), who argues that the “greater good” can justify the failure to disclose clinical options when that disclosure could cause patients to choose options that waste scarce resources. (See Appelbaum 1993, Faden 1997, McCormack 1996, and Miller 1992 for discussion of Hall’s suggestion.)

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objection does not appear to be convincing in the hormesis case. First, the use of claim R

remains currently ethically questionable, because its proponents have not yet argued for specific conditions under which hormetic exposures would benefit the majority sufficiently to override the minority’s rights to provide consent to hormetic exposures.

Second, the cases in which it seems to be acceptable to override individuals’ rights to consent, such as overriding rights to decline vaccinations, are those cases in which it is possible to meet the four conditions stated under the greater-good objection. In the

hormesis case, however, it appears quite unlikely that these conditions can all be met, as

the following analysis of each condition indicates. Condition (a) (i.e., other significant

rights at risk) is probably not met in the hormesis case, because the rights that are preserved by allowing hormetic exposures (i.e., rights to pursue economic growth and possibly to obtain moderate increases in health) are unlikely to be as significant as others’ rights to provide consent to health risks caused by hormetic chemicals. They are unlikely to be as significant, because the potential risks from hormetic chemicals (e.g., cancer, neurological disorders, immune problems) have a much more serious effect on one’s well-being than minor economic or health benefits (e.g., slight increases in longevity).

Condition (b) (i.e., lack of alternatives) is also probably not met in the hormesis case, because it seems feasible to pursue adequate economic and physical well-being while requiring the public to consent to hormetic exposures. Condition (c) (i.e., equitable distribution) is very unlikely to be met in the hormesis case, because poor and disadvantaged groups are disproportionately likely to be exposed to toxic chemicals (see, e.g., Agyeman et al. 2003, Bullard 2000, Shrader-Frechette 2002). Condition (d) (i.e., providing compensation) is also very unlikely to be met in the hormesis case, because it

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would be difficult to “track down” those who were significantly harmed by hormetic

chemicals.

If the dissertation’s formulations of the four problems described in this section is

convincing, therefore, it appears that claim R requires further support of at least four sorts

before it can be employed successfully to justify public exposures to hormetic chemicals.

First, the concept of hormesis needs to be clarified. Second, the scale of hormetic effects

(including the range of people on which hormesis occurs and the time periods during

which it occurs) needs to be determined. Both of these clarifications are required before

ethicists can determine whether it is justifiable to allow public exposure to hormetic

chemicals. Third, proponents of hormesis must show that it is feasible to implement the

policy of allowing hormetic exposures without causing unreasonable harm. Finally, the

public must be able to provide some form of free, informed consent to the hazards

associated with allowing public exposure to hormetic effects.

6.3: Ethical Lessons from the Hormesis Case

Section 6.2 of this chapter provided a detailed analysis of the specific ethical issues associated with the hormesis case. This third section takes a broader perspective

and considers what general ethical lessons one can learn from the hormesis case study.

The section consists of two main parts. The first part analyzes an ethical “multiple-

plausible-characterization” (MPC) conclusion that the hormesis case illustrates. The

second part then describes a set of rules of thumb that may help researchers to fulfill the

ethical responsibilities stated in the MPC conclusion. The following analysis of this

ethical norm in the first part involves four steps: (1) a statement of the MPC conclusion,

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(2) an ethical argument in favor of the dissertation’s formulation of the conclusion, (3)

two additional arguments (a “substantive” one and a “practical” one) that supplement the

main ethical argument for the MPC conclusion,110 and (4) responses to a set of objections

against the dissertation’s claims in this section.

The “MPC” Conclusion

Statement of the Conclusion. The hormesis case provides an illustration of the

following ethical norm:

MPC Conclusion: Scientists and policymakers who study and disseminate information about policy-relevant anomalies have prima facie ethical obligations to take reasonable steps to identify, reveal, and present representative information about all major, plausible characterizations of those anomalies for the public or its representatives.

Three clarifications of this norm may make it easier to analyze it throughout the rest of

this section. First, it refers not only to those who study anomalies but also to those who

disseminate information about those anomalies, because much of the scientific

information used by decisionmakers at federal agencies is supplied by intermediaries who

“digest” the scientific information and pass it on to others (Powell 1999). Second, the

conclusion employs the terms ‘major’, ‘plausible’, and ‘representative’ in specific ways.

“Major” anomaly characterizations are those that would have significant ramifications

(i.e., affecting the occurrence of serious disease, disability, or death) on policy or public

110 By providing three arguments (namely, an ethical one, a substantive one, and a practical one), the chapter follows the example of Fiorino (1990) and NRC (1996), who argue for public participation in science policy using three similar types of arguments: (1) normative arguments (e.g., public participation provides public consent via democratic decisionmaking), (2) substantive arguments (e.g., public participation results in better-informed, more cost-effective decisions and more competent citizens), and (3) instrumental arguments (e.g., public participation promotes social cohesion by increasing public acceptance of decisions).

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behavior if they were widely accepted. “Plausible” anomaly characterizations are those that have a reasonable likelihood of being true, given current evidence about the anomaly. As section 6.2 argued, an anomaly characterization is reasonably likely to be true if the scientific community judges it to be so after considering elements of anomaly confirmationD such as the elimination of error and failure to develop alternative characterizations. In difficult cases, researchers and policymakers might need to balance these two characteristics of anomalies against one another in order to determine which characterizations to disclose. For example, researchers might not have a responsibility to reveal a characterization that has a low degree of plausibility if it is not very major, but the characterization might be important to disclose if it were quite major. The dissertation uses the notion of “representative information” to refer to the primary views in the scientific community about a characterization. For example, if a significant portion of the community believes that there is a plausible alternative, Y, to an anomaly characterization, X, then those who reveal information about X should take reasonable steps to acknowledge the lack of scientific agreement about X. One final clarification of the MPC conclusion is that the chapter will refer to the responsibilities to identify, reveal, and present representative information about all major, plausible anomaly characterizations as the “MPC responsibilities” throughout the subsequent analysis.

Ethical Argument for the MPC Conclusion. The chapter’s main ethical argument for the MPC conclusion consists of four premises and a conclusion. In brief, the first premise states that failure to fulfill the MPC responsibilities is likely to prevent the disclosure of material information. According to premise two, failure to disclose material information about a decision threatens informed consent. Premise three

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concludes (on the basis of premises one and two) that failure to fulfill the MPC responsibilities is likely to threaten informed consent. The fourth premise asserts that scientists and policymakers have ethical obligations to take reasonable steps to facilitate the public’s free, informed consent to policy-relevant anomalies. Therefore, the conclusion states (on the basis of premises three and four) that policymakers and researchers have ethical obligations to take reasonable steps to fulfill the MPC responsibilities.

Ethical Argument for the MPC Conclusion:

(1) If one does not identify, reveal, and provide representative information about all major, plausible characterizations for an anomaly, then the disclosed information about the anomaly is unlikely to include all material information for making policy decisions about the anomaly.

(2) If those who disclose information to the public or their representatives do not include everything that is material to the decision under consideration, then there is a danger that the disclosure and understanding components of free, informed consent will not be met, and (if they deliberately and successfully influence a decisionmaker by their incomplete disclosure) they violate the voluntariness component.

(3) Therefore, if those who disclose information to the public or their representatives do not identify, reveal, and provide representative information about all major, plausible characterizations for anomalies, then they threaten the public’s ability to provide free, informed consent to policy decisions concerning those anomalies (from premises 1 and 2).

(4) Policymakers and researchers who produce or disseminate information about a particular policy-relevant topic have a prima facie ethical obligation to take reasonable steps to provide the public or its representatives with information that enables them to provide some form of free, informed consent to policy decisions about that topic.

(5) Therefore, policymakers and researchers who study or disseminate information about particular anomalies have prima facie ethical obligations to take reasonable steps to identify, reveal, and provide representative information about all major, plausible characterizations of those anomalies for the public or its representatives (from premises 3 and 4).

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The first premise of the argument, which states that one must meet the MPC

responsibilities in order to provide all material information about an anomaly, seems to

be quite plausible at first glance. Nevertheless, one can provide further evidence for the premise by considering how, in cases of recent policy-relevant anomalies, representative information about all the major, plausible characterizations is material to policy decisions. Consider three examples, with the first coming directly from section 6.2 of this chapter. Calabrese and Baldwin (2003b) arguably fail to reveal all material information about hormesis, because they claim that it is a phenomenon that occurs more regularly than threshold low-dose effects but fail to reveal alternative characterizations of the anomaly. For example, they do not acknowledge that researchers such as Jonas

(2001), Menzie (2001), and Rodricks (2003) continue to warn that one could reasonably characterize the hormesis anomaly as an occasional phenomenon or perhaps even the result of random fluctuations in experimental data or unique experimental conditions. By revealing only their preferred characterization, Calabrese and Baldwin arguably fail to provide all material information for making decisions about the anomaly, because they provide incomplete information about its potential risks and benefits.

A second example of the way in which representative information about all major,

plausible characterizations of an anomaly is material to decisionmaking comes from

research on multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS) (see section 3.2 of the dissertation for

background on MCS). Those who characterize the anomaly primarily in terms of

psychological problems, such as panic attacks in response to toxic chemicals (e.g., Black

et al. 2000, Escobar et al. 2002, Tarlo et al. 2002, Van den Bergh et al. 1999), arguably

fail to reveal all material information about the phenomenon. By failing to acknowledge

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that many scientists are more convinced by other characterizations of MCS (e.g., that it is

a consequence of limbic-system kindling or an example of a novel disease paradigm),

they confuse the public about the potential risks of MCS and the most effective means for

eliminating it. Endocrine-disruption phenomena provide a third example. In their

popular book Our Stolen Future (1996), Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers focus primarily

on characterizations of the anomaly as a threat to human health. As Krimsky (2000)

explains, however, some reviewers argued that the book failed to provide all material

information for decisionmaking, because they gave insufficient attention to the positions

of those who characterize the anomaly as a hazard for wildlife but who question the

extent to which it is a hazard for humans. In all three of these examples (i.e., hormesis,

MCS, and endocrine disruption), the failure to reveal representative information about all

the major, plausible characterizations of the anomalies arguably prevents the recipients of information from knowing everything that is material for making policy decisions.

The second premise (which states that failure to disclose all material information threatens informed consent) appears to be defensible based on the same justifications that were given in support of the “No-Consent” argument at the end of section 6.2. That section argued that it is very difficult to meet the disclosure, understanding, and voluntariness components of free, informed consent without revealing all material information about the decision to be made (see Faden and Beauchamp 1986). One might object that, as long as different researchers disclose different perspectives and pieces of information, decisionmakers might be able to obtain all the material information for their decisions by piecing together the claims of multiple scientists. This approach of piecing together the views of different scientists appears to be an unreliable way of obtaining

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representative information about all major, plausible anomaly characterizations in the current political climate, however, because of the way that multiple interest groups strive to manipulate and advertise scientific information (see the discussion of vested interest groups later in this section). The third premise of the argument follows deductively from premises one and two, so it does not require further defense.

The fourth premise, however, requires justification for its claim that researchers and policymakers have prima facie responsibilities to facilitate the public’s free, informed consent. It does seem fairly obvious that the job of being a policymaker includes the ethical responsibility to provide the public or its representatives with adequate information for providing free, informed consent to public-policy decisions. It is somewhat more debatable that scientific researchers in general have responsibilities to facilitate public consent. Nevertheless, the responsibility to take reasonable steps to provide the public with representative information concerning one’s area of specialization

(at least when it impacts public policy) is a fairly standard tenet of scientific research ethics (see e.g., Black 2002, Kitcher 1985, 2001, Resnik 1998, Shrader-Frechette 1994).

This responsibility is based on at least five considerations. (1) Researchers often pursue their work with public funds that are intended to benefit the public. (2) Most researchers benefit throughout their careers from public education, grants, and state-sponsored benefits, so they have a responsibility to give back to their community. (3) Scientists are accorded specialized authority and respect by society, so it seems reasonable to think that they have reciprocal responsibilities to society. (4) The scientific community plausibly has an implicit contract with society to supply relatively unbiased, representative

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information. (5) Scientific researchers, like all moral agents, have a responsibility to take reasonable steps to protect others from potential harms.

Two Further Arguments for Meeting the MPC Responsibilities. Although the preceding argument focuses on ethical considerations, one might also offer at least two other arguments (one substantive and one practical) for the conclusion that researchers and policymakers should fulfill what the dissertation has called the “MPC (i.e., multiple plausible characterization) responsibilities.” The first, substantive, argument is that it is advisable to fulfill the MPC responsibilities because that promotes substantively better policy decisions in at least three ways: (1) it is likely to produce recognition of public- health hazards more frequently and more quickly, (2) it is likely to decrease the frequency with which legitimate anomalies are unfairly dismissed as the result of “junk science,” “pseudoscience,” “pathological science,” “quack science,” or “voodoo science,” and (3) it is likely to promote funding for worthwhile studies that might otherwise be ignored because of the epistemically “conservative” ethos of science. Each of the three ways in which fulfillment of the MPC responsibilities promotes substantively better policy decisions merits further discussion.

First, fulfillment of the MPC responsibilities is likely to produce recognition of health hazards both more frequently and more quickly. Whenever multiple perspectives

(including multiple characterizations of anomalies) can be elicited concerning a particular policy issue, it is likely to promote more informed and sophisticated analyses that identify hazards more frequently (Beierle 1998, Fiorino 1990, Michaels et al. 2002, NRC 1996).

The consideration of multiple anomaly characterizations is also likely to speed up the process by which policymakers recognize health hazards that are initially dismissed as

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scientific anomalies. For example, many public-health hazards, including MCS and

endocrine disruption, are initially identified by scientists as anomalies that can be characterized in multiple ways. According to some of the characterizations, the anomalies consist of fluke results that are incompatible with researchers’ expectations.

According to other characterizations, the anomalies consist of generalizable phenomena that are incompatible with current theories or models and that pose a significant, previously unexpected health risk. Because science tends to have an epistemically

“conservative” ethos that promotes making false-negative errors rather than false positives (Cranor 1993, 1999, Krimsky 2000, Shrader-Frechette 1991), scientists are likely to require extensive evidence before accepting characterizations of anomalies that challenge current theories. Therefore, it is likely to take an extended period of time before scientists accept these anomalies as legitimate health risks rather than as fluke results. By encouraging scientists and policymakers to identify and reveal all major, plausible characterizations for policy-relevant anomalies, however, one can identify characterizations that could have significant ramifications for policy but which scientists might not fully accept until they have eliminated most other characterizations. Therefore, identifying and revealing these characterizations could speed up the process of recognizing health hazards.

Second, fulfilling the MPC responsibilities seems likely to decrease the frequency with which legitimate anomalies are unfairly dismissed as some form of “pseudoscience.”

Krimsky (2000, 182ff) provides a useful summary of the notion of “junk science,” which is frequently employed as a means to discredit scientific information that has policy ramifications that one dislikes (see e.g., Huber 1991, Milloy 2001). Similar terms, such

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as “pseudoscience,” “pathological science,” “quack science,” and “voodoo science,” are sometimes employed for the same anti-regulatory purposes, but they are sometimes also used more broadly to criticize any claims that are regarded as being of very questionable scientific merit (Park 2000). By relegating a set of evidence to the status of “junk science,” one questions the wisdom of making policy decisions in response to that evidence. However, at least two serious problems face those who employ the label of

“junk science” to criticize scientific findings. (1) The label can be applied to scientific hypotheses or studies that are reasonable and methodologically satisfactory but that have not yet been adequately confirmed or replicated. (2) The label may beg important policy questions by suggesting that a very high level of scientific evidence is required in order to justify actions against hazards (Cranor 1993, 1999). Anomaly characterizations that challenge reigning theories and assumptions seem particularly susceptible to being unfairly dismissed as “junk science.” For example, Park includes anomalous effects of electromagnetic fields (2000, 149) and leaking silicone breast implants (2000, 165) in his discussions of voodoo science. Therefore, the requirement to reveal and provide representative information about all major, plausible characterizations acts as a helpful corrective. It helps show that multiple anomaly characterizations are not only a standard component of scientific research (rather than a sign of “pseudoscience”), but that all major, plausible characterizations ought to be given fair consideration when formulating policy responses to anomalies.

A third reason that fulfilling the MPC responsibilities is likely to produce substantively better policy decisions is that it may promote funding to examine policy- relevant anomalies that might otherwise receive little attention. Ashford and Miller

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(1998, 310), Elliott (2004), and Krimsky (2000) claim that the cases of MCS, hormesis, and endocrine disruption (respectively) illustrate how difficult it can be for researchers to obtain funding to investigate anomalous results. Until researchers obtain a significant degree of information about an anomalous phenomenon, it is hard for them to obtain money to study it. Nevertheless, it is difficult to get that initial information without research funds. Part of the problem is arguably that researchers and funding agencies initially emphasize characterizations of the anomalies as fluke results that are of little significance. Although it may initially be most likely that the anomalies consist of fluke results, policy makers and granting agencies may be more likely to be aware of an anomaly’s potential policy significance and to provide funding to study it if they are at least familiar with other major, plausible characterizations. Therefore, careful identification and revelation of multiple major, plausible characterizations of policy- relevant anomalies (such as the work performed by Ashford and Miller (1998) in the

MCS case) may alleviate some of the funding difficulties surrounding them.

Another argument for fulfilling the MPC responsibilities (in addition to the ethical and substantive ones) is that meeting those obligations promotes more practical policy decisions in at least three ways. (1) Meeting those responsibilities is likely to make all sides of disputes more likely to accept subsequent public-policy decisions concerning the anomaly. (2) Satisfying the obligations may help scientists to maintain respect both as sources of trustworthy information and as predictors of potential public health hazards. (3) Fulfilling those responsibilities may enable industry, and industry- sponsored scientists, to alleviate their reputation for dragging their feet concerning the

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acknowledgment of public-health hazards. Each of these three ways merits further discussion.

The first way in which meeting the MPC responsibilities is likely to promote more practical policy decisions is that it makes all sides of disputes more likely to accept subsequent policy decisions. For example, Beierle (1998), Fiorino (1990), NRC (1996), and Shrader-Frechette (1991) emphasize that people are more likely to accept public- policy decisions when they play a role in the decision and when there is evidence that the decision reflects a diversity of values rather than the goals of special interests. By acknowledging multiple plausible characterizations for policy-relevant anomalies, researchers and policymakers are likely to produce this diversity of opinion that promotes policy acceptance.

A second reason that fulfilling the MPC obligations promotes more practical policy decisions is that it helps scientists to balance their responsibilities to the scientific community and to the general public. Cranor (1993, 1999), Krimsky (2000), Resnik

(1996), and Shrader-Frechette (1991, 1994) all emphasize that researchers face significant tension when addressing public-policy issues. On one hand, they want to avoid the error of making false-positive claims, which is a central part of the scientific

“ethos” and which has promoted public respect for science as a source of trustworthy information. On the other hand, they want to fulfill their ethical responsibilities to the public, which include identifying important public-health risks. Taking reasonable steps to identify and reveal all major, plausible anomaly characterizations (while acknowledging variations in evidence for different characterizations) appears to be one

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way to acknowledge public-health risks without departing too far from the traditional,

“conservative” ethos of science.

Third, fulfilling the MPC responsibilities may help industry-sponsored scientists to alleviate their reputation for foot-dragging concerning the acknowledgment of public- health hazards. Currently, they are commonly viewed as being overly skeptical of public-health risks caused by industrial activities or products (Beder 2000, Fagin et al.

1999, Krimsky 2000, Shrader-Frechette 1991). If industry-sponsored scientists were to acknowledge and provide representative information about all major, plausible characterizations for anomalous results, however, they would be more likely to be taken seriously as sources of scientific information.

Objections. Despite the ethical, substantive, and practical arguments for fulfilling the MPC responsibilities, there are at least three objections to the dissertation’s claim that researchers and policymakers have ethical obligations to take reasonable steps to reveal all major, plausible characterizations of policy-relevant anomalies. These include an “overly-burdensome objection, a “necessity” objection, and an

“insignificance” objection.

“Overly-burdensome” objection: There are at least four reasons that it seems overly burdensome to claim that researchers and policymakers are ethically required to take reasonable steps to fulfill the MPC responsibilities. (a) There may be significant pressure on those who disclose information to “simplify” what they disclose so that it is not overly complex (Powell 1999, Schneider 2000). (b) Researchers and policymakers are trained to analyze scientific information, not to determine the information that is required for facilitating free, informed consent. (c) It seems exceptionally demanding to claim that scientists could be morally culpable not only for failing to reveal the known anomaly characterizations but also for failing to identify previously unknown anomaly characterizations. (d) It may be unreasonable to expect scientists to reveal information about anomaly characterizations with which they strongly disagree.

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A general response to the objection is that one can develop a small number of rules of thumb, some of which can even be established in the form of institutional procedures, that help scientists to meet their MPC responsibilities. The next part of the chapter discusses three of these rules that seem to be particularly promising.

One can also criticize each part of the overly-burdensome objection individually.

Regarding part (a), the pressure to simplify information, the MPC conclusion requires only that those who disclose information take reasonable steps to fulfill the MPC responsibilities. Admittedly, some contexts (e.g., press conferences) may not provide as extensive opportunities for revealing multiple anomaly characterizations as others (e.g., journal articles). Nevertheless, it seems plausible that researchers should still meet the

MPC responsibilities to the greatest reasonable extent, given the context. Concerning part (b), scientists’ lack of training in ethics, the MPC conclusion focuses only on researchers’ and policymakers’ ethical responsibility to provide representative and complete information about the anomalies that they are studying. Even if one is not an expert in ethics, one arguably can identify the important differences of opinion about one’s area of specialization that might be relevant to the public. Therefore, although it might be hard for researchers to reveal adequate information about areas of science with which they are not very familiar, they likely can identify the major, plausible characterizations that should be revealed to the public or its representatives about the anomalies with which they are experts.

Concerning part (c), responsibility for being ignorant of characterizations, it seems acceptable to hold scientists accountable for being culpably ignorant of policy- relevant anomaly characterizations that they could be expected to identify if they took

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reasonable steps to do so.111 For example, policymakers could be held morally

responsible if they fail to identify an important anomaly characterization as a result of

negligently failing to discuss the anomaly with a wide range of representative interest

groups. Similarly, industry-sponsored researchers and their supervisors could be morally

responsible for intentionally avoiding research that might uncover evidence for

characterizations that would harm the interests of their sponsors (Brown 2002).

Nevertheless, if scientists could not be expected to identify a particular anomaly

characterization even if they took reasonable steps (e.g., because the characterization is

obscure or difficult to develop), then the MPC conclusion does not hold them to be

culpable for failing to disclose it (in other words, “ought” implies “can”). Finally,

regarding part (d) (i.e., revealing information with which one disagrees), it seems

important to recognize that individual scientists are often wrong. Therefore, it seems

plausible that they should acknowledge major alternative views even when they strongly

disagree with them. Furthermore, revealing major alternative views does not preclude

offering criticisms of those alternatives (see e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 2002a), as long

as those criticisms are not biased.

A second potential difficulty with the MPC conclusion is:

“Necessity” objection: For at least two reasons, the requirement that researchers and policymakers fulfill their MPC responsibilities may be unnecessary for facilitating the public’s free, informed consent to hazards. (a) Demanding that researchers and policymakers disclose all major, policy-relevant characterizations of an

111 For historically influential accounts of culpable ignorance, see Aquinas 1920, 1995 and Doolan 1999; for more recent discussions, see Hacking 1986 and Montmarquet 1995, 1999. Admittedly, some contemporary philosophers, such as Zimmerman (1997, 2002), argue that the concept of “culpable ignorance” may not be coherent. Nevertheless, even if these thinkers criticize the specific concept of “culpable ignorance,” they do acknowledge that one can be culpable for failing to take reasonable steps to gain knowledge that one had a responsibility to gain. Thus, they need not challenge the dissertation’s claim that scientists and policymakers can be culpable for failing to take reasonable steps to identify major, plausible anomaly characterizations.

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anomaly may actually produce “information overload” and thereby decrease people’s understanding of the decisions that face them. (b) Even strong proponents of obtaining free, informed consent (e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001) recognize that complete disclosure and understanding of information is neither possible nor necessary.

One might provide further support for part (a) of the necessity objection by noting that

the revelation of too much information can produce either “information overload” or

irrational, paranoid decisions. For example, Thompson (1982) suggests that research

subjects’ understanding might actually be decreased if they receive disclosed information

about having cancerous cells injected into them during an experiment, because they

would erroneously assume that the experiment is more dangerous than it really is (see also Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Brody 1998, 47, Donnelly 2002, 23). Many would also cite the Alar case in the late 1980’s as an example of irrational decisionmaking as a

result of disclosing too much information to the public (see Fumento 1993, Whelan

1993).

Despite the initial plausibility of the necessity objection, both parts of it seem to

be problematic. With regard to part (a), the potential for decreasing the public’s

understanding, one response is that the chapter does not take a definitive stand on how

the public ought to provide free, informed consent to health hazards. Thus, even if one

were to insist on the questionable claim (see the following paragraph) that the public

could not make intelligent use of the multiple anomaly characterizations disclosed by

researchers, one could argue for more “indirect” ways of obtaining public consent to

health hazards. For example, under the “representative-political” form of consent

described in section 6.2, scientists could provide information about anomaly

characterizations directly to elected government officials, who could make consent

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decisions for the public. The discussion in section 6.2 of different forms of consent did argue, however, that more “direct” forms of consent (i.e., employing greater public participation) are preferable, partly because they are less prone to abuse from vested interests.

A second response to the claim that people are likely to make irrational decisions if researchers supply them with multiple anomaly characterizations is that the public or its representatives can process information over an extended period of time and receive the help of expert evaluations of anomaly characterizations. For example, the literature on public participation in science policy offers numerous examples of citizen groups that have made intelligent contributions to debates concerning science policy. Consider just two examples. First, Richard Sclove (2000) claims that consensus conferences, in which groups of laypeople develop position papers on debated scientific or technological issues that face society, have been quite successful. He reports that they have been used since the late 1980’s in Denmark (with enthusiastic responses by legislators), and he argues that a pilot trial of a consensus conference in the U.S. on “telecommunications and democracy” worked well. Epstein (2000) provides a second example of successful public participation in science policy. He reports that between 1987 and 1992, many AIDS activists became highly educated concerning the scientific details of the disease and the clinical trials designed to produce AIDS drugs. Some activists became respected participants on the NIH board designed to oversee federally funded clinical AIDS research (Epstein 2000, 15). Thus, both information overload and irrational, paranoid decisions appear to be avoidable. If the public still makes decisions based on characterizations that experts regard as unlikely, then it is very difficult to dismiss the

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public’s decision as irrational, because such a dismissal depends on the questionable

presupposition that one can distinguish the public’s irrational “perceived risk” from experts’ understanding of “actual risk” (see e.g., Faden and Beauchamp 1986, 321,

Shrader-Frechette 1991).

Concerning part (b) of the necessity objection (i.e., the adequacy of partial disclosures), the dissertation’s formulation of the MPC conclusion already acknowledges that partial disclosure of anomaly characterizations can sometimes be ethically adequate.

Specifically, the MPC conclusion includes two crucial caveats. (1) It demands that researchers and policymakers take only reasonable steps to fulfill their MPC

responsibilities. (2) It claims that they have only a prima facie ethical obligation to do so.

Furthermore, it does not require attempts to reveal all characterizations simpliciter but only all major, plausible characterizations.

Consider a final alleged difficulty with the MPC conclusion:

“Insignificance” objection: Even if all other objections to the dissertation’s formulation of the MPC conclusion can be overcome, it does not appear to be very new or important, for at least two reasons. (a) Previous writers have already criticized misleading framing of disclosed information because of the way it threatens free, informed consent (see, e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Gert, Culver, and Clouser 1997, NRC 1996, Shrader-Frechette 1991).112 (b) It is well known that uncertainty pervades scientific practice and that scientists have a prima facie responsibility to respond to that uncertainty in ways that promote the public good (see Cranor 1993, Resnik 1998, Markowitz and Rosner 2002, Shrader-Frechette 1994).

In response, however, it seems that even though many previous writers have recognized that scientists have general ethical responsibilities both to avoid misleading framing and

112 For an example of how questionable framing and evaluative assumptions can result in the disclosure of misleading information that threatens the public’s free, informed consent to a policy decision, see Shrader-Frechette’s (1991, 63) description of a hazard analysis by Herbert Inhaber (1979). For a detailed example in a clinical setting of how the framing of a decision can affect patient understanding and consent, see the following articles concerning circumcision (Christensen-Szalanski et al. 1987, Ciesielski-Carlucci et al. 1996, Enzenauer et al. 1986).

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to promote the public good when dealing with uncertainty, the fact that anomaly

characterizations in particular are an important source of uncertainty and framing

difficulties is novel to the dissertation. For example, the National Research Council

(1996) and Shrader-Frechette (1991) focus on the ways that inadequate framing can

prevent risk characterization from being ethically and practically justifiable; they do not

emphasize the role that framing plays in scientists’ responses to anomalies. Similarly,

Cranor (1993) and Markowitz and Rosner (2002) claim that government policies should

place the burden of proof for showing that industrial chemicals are non-toxic on industry

rather than on the public. Nevertheless, they do not consider how researchers’

characterizations of anomalies can contribute to placing the burden of proof on one

interest group rather than another group. Thus, the MPC conclusion focuses researchers’

attention on a particular area of responsibility that they might otherwise have overlooked.

In fact, the three concrete illustrations (namely, hormesis, MCS, and endocrine

disruption) provided in the next part of this section yield further evidence that the MPC responsibilities are relevant to current scientific practice but easy to overlook.

Meeting the MPC Responsibilities

This second part of section 6.3 presents three rules of thumb that may help researchers and policymakers to meet their MPC responsibilities. This part of the chapter accomplishes four tasks. First, it describes the three rules of thumb. Second, it provides background concerning each rule, together with an argument that it is likely to help scientists and policymakers to fulfill their MPC responsibilities. Third, it offers objections and responses to the rules of thumb. Fourth, it analyzes three concrete

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examples (from the hormesis, MCS, and endocrine-disruption cases) that provide further evidence that the rules of thumb could promote researchers’ fulfillment of the MPC responsibilities. Thus, this second part of section 6.3 provides a first step toward helping researchers and policymakers to meet the ethical responsibilities presented in the first part of the section.

Three Rules of Thumb. Consider the following three suggestions for helping researchers and policymakers to meet the MPC responsibilities:

(1) Deliberation rule: Policymakers and researchers should examine policy-relevant anomalies via recursive, analytic-deliberative processes that include at least three features (see e.g., NRC 1996). (a) They should provide an initial, working diagnosis of the anomalies’ potential relevance for policy. (b) They should obtain a flow of input from as broad a range of representative, relevant sources as possible. (c) When appropriate, they should establish default rules (and procedures for departing from the rules) for responding to the anomalies.

(2) Conflict-of-interest rule: During all deliberative stages, researchers and policymakers should recognize, disclose, and (to the greatest extent possible) eliminate all sources of financial support, political influences, and any other conflicts of interest that might affect analyses of policy-relevant anomalies.

(3) Awareness rule: Courses in scientific-research ethics (as well as conferences and other avenues for disseminating ethical information) should include a major component on scientists’ responsibilities to society, perhaps including attention to at least two of this dissertation’s conclusions concerning policy-relevant anomalies. (a) First, anomalies frequently display multiple plausible characterizations that vary in evidential support both across time and in the judgment of different researchers (see chapters three and four). (b) Second, by taking reasonable steps to meet their MPC responsibilities concerning these characterizations, researchers and policymakers make an ethically, substantively, and practically advisable choice (see section 6.3).

Each rule merits further discussion both of its provenance and of its likelihood to help policymakers and researchers to meet their ethical responsibilities.

Argument for Each Rule. The first, “deliberation,” rule is largely based on suggestions for risk characterization presented in the National Academy of Science documents Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (NRC 1994) and especially

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Understanding Risk (NRC 1996). This chapter suggests that, because anomalies often

can be plausibly characterized in multiple ways, the strategy of employing analytic-

deliberative processes is applicable not only to risk characterization but also to the

investigation of policy-relevant anomalies. Although Understanding Risk describes these

processes in a particularly clear and influential format, other discussions can be found

throughout the science-policy literature, including in Beierle (1998), EPA (2000), Fiorino

(1990), Institutes of Medicine (1998), Jasanoff (1990), Kleinman (2000), Shrader-

Frechette (1991), and Webler and Renn (1995). These authors present a variety of

examples of deliberation and numerous specific mechanisms for facilitating deliberation,

including public hearings, citizen advisory committees, consensus conferences, citizens’

juries, mechanisms for negotiation or mediation, surveys, and interactive technology-

based approaches.

The deliberation rule appears likely to help researchers and policymakers to fulfill

their MPC responsibilities (i.e., identifying, revealing, and providing representative

information about alternative anomaly characterizations). Specifically, there are at least

three ways that deliberative processes have the potential to help researchers in fulfilling

their responsibilities to recognize and reveal alternative points of view, especially

alternative characterizations of anomalies. One way is that an initial, working diagnosis

of an anomaly’s political significance is likely to promote recognition of major characterizations that should be investigated or revealed. For example, in the case of multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS), the industry and the military have significant financial interests (in order to avoid lawsuits and worker’s compensation claims) in characterizing MCS as a psychologically caused illness (Ashford and Miller 1998, Kerns

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2001). In contrast, victims’ groups have a financial stake in showing that MCS has physiological links to chemical exposures. By recognizing the political significance of

anomaly characterizations in the MCS case, researchers and policymakers can be alerted

to the importance of carefully evaluating the claims and concepts that other researchers

employ with respect to MCS. One of the three concrete cases described later in this

section illustrates how researchers with vested interests have employed concepts of MCS

that serve their interests.

A second way that the deliberation rule may help researchers and policymakers to

recognize alternative anomaly characterizations is that different interest groups are

particularly likely to recognize how particular anomaly characterizations could benefit or

harm their own interests. Therefore, deliberative input from a representative sample of

these groups is likely to promote the identification, revelation, and disclosure of

representative information about all major, plausible anomaly characterizations. For

example, the National Academy of Sciences seeks to obtain a wide variety of scientific

perspectives on its review boards. This strategy was helpful when it developed its report

on endocrine disruption (NRC 1999), because the members of the committee recognized

that even the term used for describing the anomaly could benefit some interest groups

over others. They eventually replaced the term ‘endocrine disruptor’ with that of a

‘hormonally active agent’ (HAA), because “the term [endocrine disruptor] is fraught with

emotional overtones and was tantamount to a prejudgment of potential outcomes” (NRC

1999, 21).

A third way that the deliberation rule may help researchers and policymakers to

recognize multiple anomaly characterizations is that it encourages the development of

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default rules for addressing anomalies (see NRC 1994). Default rules, in turn, provide a coherent framework for developing further research concerning an anomaly. The

Endocrine Disrupter Screening and Testing Advisory Committee (ESDTAC), established by the EPA in 1996, exemplifies the ways that default rules can be helpful (see Krimsky

2000). The EDSTAC established a preliminary plan for testing potential endocrine disruptors. The screening program included testing for estrogenic, androgenic, and thyroid-related endocrine disruptors, even though the committee did not have definitive evidence for which hormonal systems were most important to test. They also suggested further research concerning endocrine-disrupting effects involving multiple hormones, multiple species, and long-term or interactive situations. Thus, their preliminary testing framework provided a coherent plan to provide further information about endocrine- disrupting chemicals, with the possibility of developing better policies for responding to these chemicals in the future. Therefore, the establishment of default rules concerning anomalies seems likely to promote consideration of: (1) the preliminary evidence for particular characterizations of an anomaly, (2) plausible alternative characterizations, and

(3) the sort of research that could help to justify employing characterizations that researchers do not currently emphasize.

Turning to the second, conflict-of-interest rule, it reflects a growing precedent for requiring investigators to eliminate or at least to disclose ways in which their allegiances may be pulled in multiple directions. During the past twenty years, many authors have raised concerns about the way conflicts of interest (especially financial ones) can adversely impact both the safety of biomedical research subjects and the framing and interpretation of scientific results in journal articles and by advisory panels (e.g., Angell

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2000, Association of American Universities 2001, DeAngelis 2000, Fagin et al. 1999,

Jasanoff 1990, Korn 2000, Krimsky 1996, 1999, 2002a, Shalala 2000). For example, in a relatively early study, Davidson (1986) examined 107 articles that compared rival drugs in studies funded by the maker of one of the medicines. He found that the drug produced by the research sponsor was found to be superior in every single article. More recently, a group of researchers analyzed 70 articles that studied the effects of calcium-channel blockers on high blood pressure (Stelfox et al. 1998). They divided the studies’ conclusions about the drugs that they examined into three categories: favorable, neutral, or critical. Of the articles that made “favorable” conclusions about the drugs examined,

96% were authored by individuals with financial ties to the makers of those drugs. In contrast, 60% of the “neutral” articles and 37% of the “negative” articles had authors with financial ties to the drug makers. Another recent study showed that only 5% of pharmaceutical-company sponsored studies of new drugs used in oncology provided unfavorable qualitative evaluations of those medicines, whereas 38% of independently sponsored studies of the same drugs provided unfavorable conclusions (Friedberg et al.

1999).

In response to concerns about the ways private funding is affecting the medical enterprise, an increasing number of journals are requiring authors to disclose conflicts of interest (Campbell 2003, Krimsky 2002), and some biomedical ethicists are urging researchers to reveal as much relevant background information about themselves as possible (Wilkinson 2001). One might object that the privacy rights of researchers may override their responsibility to disclose some sorts of personal information, but there are at least three reasons that potential conflicts of interest appear to be sufficiently important

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to justify disclosing them in most cases. First, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, a growing body of research indicates that conflicts of interest can influence scientists’ conclusions (see e.g., Stelfox et al. 1998; Friedberg et al. 1999). Second, the conclusions of scientists can have significant ramifications on the public good, especially in the area of biomedical research. Third, conflicts of interest are not intensely personal pieces of information, and thus it seems unreasonable to protect such information at the expense of potential harms to the public (Furrow 1996, Wilkinson 2001).

The conflict-of-interest rule appears likely to help researchers and policymakers to fulfill their MPC responsibilities, for at least two reasons. The first reason is that the requirement to eliminate conflicts of interest (if it is feasible) is likely to inhibit researchers and policymakers from providing crude, one-sided advocacy of particular anomaly characterizations that promote their personal or institutional interests. For example, psychologists argue that the elimination of conflicts is the most effective way to avoid bias caused by researchers’ multiple interests. Research performed by Cain,

Loewenstein, and Moore (2003) indicates that disclosure alone may be somewhat inadequate as a solution, both because people have difficulty adequately adjusting their beliefs in response to the disclosure and because those who disclose conflicts of interest become less likely to eliminate their biases (see also Monin and Miller 2001, Mussweiler and Strack 1999). Therefore, these psychologists propose that researchers attempt, to the greatest possible extent, to eliminate conflicts (either by divesture or recusal) as an important method for dealing with them.

A second reason that the conflict-of-interest rule may help researchers to meet their MPC responsibilities is that, by reinforcing society’s concern about these conflicts,

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it may provide scientists with increased appreciation for the moral seriousness of their

multiple interests. Psychological research indicates that this increased moral awareness

may, in turn, motivate researchers to address these conflicts (e.g., by eliminating them or

at least scrutinizing how they may affect their work). For example, the research of Tom

Tyler (2003) suggests that people are much more likely to engage in a particular act, A, that works against their personal interests if they are convinced that act A is just or moral.

Thus, he suggests that a promising solution for resolving conflicts of interest is to arouse the conflicted parties’ moral concerns about those conflicts (see also Fiske and Tetlock

1997, Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, and Huo 1996). The conflict-of-interest rule is one preliminary attempt to make researchers more aware of the moral significance of conflicts of interest in their research on anomalies. (In order to implement Tyler’s advice successfully, however, it would probably be important to explain the rationale behind the conflict-of-interest rule, so that researchers become convinced of the moral significance of their multiple interests and do not merely follow the rule because they are forced to do so.)

Finally, the active-awareness rule builds on recent work in scientific-research ethics, which emphasizes the importance of increased education for scientists concerning their social roles and responsibilities. Organizations such as the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) and U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) have recently begun to require that scientists who work under their grants should receive training in research ethics.

Federal guidelines for courses in the ethics of scientific research currently focus primary attention, however, on ethical issues that are internal to the scientific community, such as the responsibility to disseminate research results for other scientists (Pimple 2002).

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Thinkers such as Kenneth Pimple (2002), Sheila Slaughter (2002) and Vivian Weil

(2002) emphasize that future courses in research ethics should begin to explore the social

roles of scientists, including their responsibilities to promote societal welfare. The

active-awareness rule supports Pimple’s, Slaughter’s and Weil’s claim that research-

ethics courses should include consideration of the roles that scientists play in society and

the responsibilities that are related to those roles. In particular, the rule emphasizes two

pieces of information (namely, information about the multiple characterizations of

anomalies and about the benefits of disclosing those characterizations) that could help

scientists to meet their social responsibilities for addressing scientific anomalies.

According to the active-awareness rule, scientists should be informed of at least

two features of scientific anomalies when they take courses in scientific research ethics.

Each feature seems likely to promote the identification, revelation, and disclosure of

representative information about anomaly characterizations. The first feature that the active-awareness rule encourages scientists to know is that anomalies frequently display multiple plausible characterizations that vary in evidential support both across time and in the judgment of different researchers (see chapters three and four). By encouraging researchers to recognize the potential for multiple characterizations of anomalies, the active-awareness rule draws on psychological research concerning the optimal ways to reduce biases. According to MacCoun (2003), psychologists have found that considering alternative points of view is a hallmark of three of the most successful ways to overcome

biases: “devil’s advocacy” approaches, “consider-the-opposite” strategies, and attempts

to promote accountability to audiences of mixed viewpoints (see also Lord, Lepper, and

Preston 1985, Schwenk 1990, Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Therefore, by emphasizing to

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researchers that anomalies can be characterized in multiple ways, the active-awareness rule tries to maximize the likelihood that scientists will consider alternative ways to characterize the anomalies that they study (and thereby reduce their biases).

The second feature of anomalies that the active-awareness rule encourages scientists to know is that researchers and policymakers make an ethically, substantively, and practically advisable choice when they reveal multiple anomaly characterizations

(see the earlier part of this section (6.2)). Social-scientific findings again indicate that this information should help scientists to avoid bias in their use of anomaly characterizations. Psychologists have recognized for some time that considerations of personal benefit and morality together play a significant role in determining people’s actions (Tyler 1990, MacCoun 1993). Tyler (2003) recently added to this work by arguing that considerations of morality and justice act as a sort of filter that plays an especially significant role in determining individual actions. For example, when people believe that an act is immoral or unjust, they are much less likely to engage in the act, even if it would be to their benefit. The active-awareness rule takes advantage of both of these motivating factors (i.e., self-interest and morality), because it informs researchers that it is both ethically and practically advantageous to consider multiple anomaly characterizations in an unbiased fashion. Therefore, it seems likely to provide significant motivation for researchers and policymakers to meet their MPC responsibilities.

Objections. These rules of thumb face at least two potential objections, however: an “impracticality” objection and an “insignificance” objection. The impracticality objection is that they may be unduly impractical to implement. In particular, the objector might insist that the deliberation rule is problematic, because it seems too bureaucratic

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and expensive to develop analytic-deliberative processes in response to every policy-

relevant anomaly. One response to this objection is that policy-relevant anomalies could

be initially “screened” via uncomplicated and inexpensive analytic-deliberative

approaches. For example, a few employees of an appropriate government agency could

survey current research concerning a policy-relevant anomaly and then decide if further

deliberation is warranted. Or, if government agencies are too influenced by vested

interests to provide a representative screening committee (see e.g., Beder 2000, Fagin et

al. 1999), an independent, representative committee of scientists could perform the initial

screening. By employing this strategy, highly “resource-intensive” approaches to

deliberation (e.g., citizen juries) could be reserved for very significant anomalies.

Another response to the impracticality objection is that, even when an anomaly

warrants extensive analytic-deliberative investigation, the degree of financial and

bureaucratic effort involved in those investigations can be adjusted so that it correlates

with the anomaly’s social importance. For example, it might not be worth pursuing

expensive deliberative approaches, such as citizen juries, in response to anomalies that

affect only minor policy decisions. Understanding Risk (NRC, 1996) refers to these

minor policy choices (e.g., policies regarding individual hazards in isolated locations) as

“routine, narrow-impact decisions.” Anomalies such as chemical hormesis or MCS or

endocrine disruption, however, have the potential to influence large groups of the public

in significant ways, so they may merit analysis via more expensive deliberative

processes. A third response to the impracticality objection is that, even when analytic- deliberative investigations do create a great deal of expense, the cost may be less than the expenses from litigation, civil disobedience, and protest that often accompany a lack of

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due process and deliberation in science policymaking (see Crosby 1995, NRC 1996,

Shrader-Frechette 1991). Fourth, even if costs do occasionally end up being greater as a

result of the chapter’s proposed rules of thumb, it seems plausible that ethical concerns

must sometimes trump concerns of mere practicality.

The second, “insignificance” objection to the rules of thumb is that, even if their

other problems can be eliminated, they seem to be of minimal significance, because they

are all partly based on recommendations that have already been suggested by others (e.g.,

Cameron 2001, NRC 1994, NRC 1996, Pimple 2002, Shalala 2000). One response to

this objection is that, even though the rules are not completely original to the dissertation,

the importance of extending their employment, in response to policy-relevant anomalies

(rather than to risk characterization or to science policymaking in general) is novel to the

dissertation.113 A second response to the non-novelty objection is that, even though ethicists and policy analysts have already begun to emphasize the importance of deliberation, conflict-of-interest disclosures, and more socially sensitive ethics training, these suggestions are not yet consistently implemented. To take one example, Sheldon

Krimsky (2003) found that, in an examination of 1,396 of the most high-impact scientific and medical journals in 1997, only 16% had policies requiring conflict-of-interest disclosures. Furthermore, only about 0.5% of the articles in the journals that required disclosures actually provided information about conflicts of interest. In sharp contrast to

113 Consider, for example, the novelty of the dissertation’s deliberation rule. As previously mentioned, Fiorino (1990) and NRC (1996) both divide arguments for deliberation and public participation in science policy into three groups (i.e., normative, substantive, and instrumental arguments). The dissertation’s argument for analytic-deliberative processes is different from these previous arguments, because it focuses specifically on the normative issue of consent to anomaly characterizations. In contrast, the previous substantive and instrumental arguments appeal to considerations other than consent. Previous normative arguments do appeal to the importance of consent in general but not to the way consent is threatened by multiple plausible anomaly characterizations (see e.g., Fiorino 1990, Kitcher 2001, Shrader-Frechette 1991, Webler and Renn 1995).

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this very low level of disclosure, Krimsky (2003) found in another study that 34% of the

lead authors in 800 scientific articles had a financial interest in the topic about which they

were publishing (see also Krimsky et al. 1996). In other words, Krimsky’s research

suggests that, although many scientists appear to have financial conflicts of interest, they

are not reliably disclosing those conflicting interests. The three concrete illustrations

(related to the hormesis, MCS, and endocrine-disruption anomalies) that conclude this

chapter provide further evidence that recent science policymaking has been “spotty” in

the application of the dissertation’s rules of thumb to policy-relevant anomalies. Thus,

whether or not the rules are completely new, it seems valuable to reemphasize their

importance.

Three Examples. In order to provide further evidence that the dissertation’s

proposed rules of thumb can contribute to researchers’ success at fulfilling the MPC

responsibilities, this chapter concludes by briefly considering three concrete illustrations.

They are based on the three anomalies that the dissertation has studied the most, namely,

hormesis, MCS, and endocrine disruption. The examples provide not only two examples

of researchers’ lack of success at meeting the MPC responsibilities (in the cases of hormesis and MCS) but also an example of researchers’ success at meeting the MPC responsibilities (in the case of endocrine disruption). The hormesis and MCS examples include analysis of the ways that researchers failed to meet the MPC responsibilities and the manner in which the rules of thumb could have helped them. The endocrine- disruption case includes a discussion of the ways that scientists succeeded in meeting the

MPC responsibilities and considers how the rules of thumb may have helped them.

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The claims in this section (namely, that the rules of thumb could have or may have contributed to meeting the MPC responsibilities) are primarily hypothetical.

Without much more analysis of these cases, it would be difficult to show convincingly that the rules of thumb did contribute to meeting those responsibilities or that they definitely would have contributed to meeting the responsibilities if they had been employed. Instead, the dissertation is suggesting the plausible hypothesis that the rules of thumb may have played a role (in the case of successes) or could have played a role (in the case of failures) in helping scientists to meet their ethical obligations. Previous research already supports the dissertation’s suggestion, however, that (1) analytic- deliberative processes, (2) minimization of conflicts of interest, and (3) ethics education is likely to promote consideration of alternative points of view and reduction in bias. For example, Lerner and Tetlock (1999) provided evidence for decreased bias as a result of deliberation that includes multiple viewpoints. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2003) argue that minimizing conflicts of interest is likely to reduce bias. Finally, Tyler (2003) provides evidence that ethics education about the importance of considering multiple anomaly characterizations would likely motivate researchers to consider those different characterizations in their work.

The first concrete case is Calabrese and Baldwin’s revelation of information about hormesis in their recent article in Nature (2003b). Calabrese and Baldwin arguably failed to take reasonable steps to disclose all major, plausible characterizations of the hormesis anomaly, because they disclosed only one characterization of it in their article.

Specifically, they claimed that U-shaped dose-response curves predominate over other

(i.e., linear or threshold) dose-response curves for both toxic and carcinogenic chemicals.

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As the discussion of the consent problem in section 6.2 emphasized, however, they did

not reveal that the anomaly could plausibly consist only of the occasional occurrence of

U-shaped dose-response curves (especially for carcinogens). It does not seem

unreasonable to expect them to acknowledge that their preferred characterization of the

anomaly is underdetermined and controversial.

The rules of thumb developed in this chapter arguably could have helped

Calabrese and Baldwin to meet their MPC responsibilities in this case. First, as the

deliberation rule suggests, if hormesis had already been analyzed via a representative,

deliberative process, it probably would have helped Calabrese and Baldwin to consider

other major, plausible characterizations of the hormesis anomaly, such as those suggested

by Jonas (2001) or Elliott (2000a).114 Based on the author’s own interaction with

Calabrese and Baldwin, it seems somewhat unlikely that they intended to withhold

information about plausible characterizations of the anomaly from the public.115

Nevertheless, as MacCoun (2003) argues, scientific researchers are consistently faced with problems of unintentional, unconscious bias, despite their best intentions.

Therefore, based on the psychological finding that exposure to opposing viewpoints is an effective way of addressing these unconscious biases (see Lord, Lepper, and Preston

1985, Schwenk 1990), the deliberation rule would appear to provide a promising way to

114 Calabrese has organized several conferences and elicited a number of invited papers concerning hormesis, but they have been limited in the extent to which they promote representative deliberation from as many perspectives as possible. For example, the strength of industry-oriented perspectives appears to be much greater than the strength of environmentalist input in the Belle newsletter edited by Calabrese (see e.g., vol. 2, no. 1; vol. 5, no. 2; vol. 6, no. 3; vol. 7, no. 1; vol. 11, no. 2). 115 Elliott has interacted with Calabrese and Baldwin at a conference (“Chemical and Radiation Hormesis”, January 2000, University of Massachusetts, Amherst) and through occasional e-mail correspondence. They have consistently seemed open to criticism of their positions and to concerns about over-generalizing the hormesis hypothesis.

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help scientific researchers such as Calabrese and Baldwin to address alternative anomaly

characterizations.

Following the conflict-of-interest rule also arguably would have helped Calabrese

and Baldwin to meet their MPC responsibilities and to reassure the public that they are

trying to meet them. For example, if they had clarified their ties to industry and the

military in their 2003 publication in Nature, or (better yet) convinced someone with less

conflict of interest to play a role in writing or responding to the article, they would have

allayed fears about the ways in which their funding may have impacted their conclusions.

Their first large literature search was sponsored by the Texas Institute for Advancement

of Chemical Technology (TIACT) (see Calabrese and Baldwin 1998b), which is a non-

profit corporation with an almost exclusively industry-oriented membership.116 As

Calabrese puts it in one publication: “The main factor underlying the new focus on

hormesis, as briefly noted, stems from the original decision of TIACT to provide the funding to initiate a serious assessment of hormesis. The follow up funding by the NRC and the Air Force has been key to the necessary continuation [of research]” (2002, 640).

He acknowledges earlier in the paper that the Air Force sponsored at least three conferences concerning hormesis, and Kaiser (2003) clarifies that the military was motivated by the desire to limit their responsibility for cleaning up fuel spills.

Calabrese’s leadership of the “Biological Effects of Low-Level Exposures”

(BELLE) advisory board is another source of industrial ties. The BELLE board is a group of scientists organized to develop a better understanding of biological responses to low doses of chemical and physical agents. Although it receives some funding from the

116 Their website (http://cheweb.tamu.edu/research/centers/tiact/), accessed on 12/8/03, reports members that include BASF, BP Amoco Chemical, Celanese, Dow Chemical, Georgia Gulf, Shell, and Shintech.

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EPA, most of its sponsors appear to be industry groups (e.g., Canadian Electric Utilities,

Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology, Dow Chemical, the Electric Power Research

Institute, Exxon, the GE Foundation, Gillette, Ontario Hydro, and RJReynolds).117

Whether or not these industrial ties have actually affected Calabrese and Baldwin’s conclusions, they could arguably reduce fears of bias by finding creative ways to minimize or at least to disclose more explicitly those conflicts of interest.

Lastly, as the active-awareness rule suggests, Calabrese and Baldwin might have been more likely to discuss alternative characterizations of hormesis in their article if they were actively aware of the ethical, substantive, and practical advantages of doing so.

Once again, the author’s own interaction with Calabrese and Baldwin suggests that they would likely be responsive to moral considerations, and Tyler’s (2003) research indicates that most people are. Therefore, if research ethics courses, seminars or other fora provided more emphasis on scientists’ social responsibilities (including their responsibilities to reveal representative information about multiple anomaly characterizations), it might help researchers like Calabrese and Baldwin to meet their ethical obligations more fully.

A second concrete case that illustrates the value of the dissertation’s rules of thumb is related to the anomaly of MCS. In 1996, the International Programme on

Chemical Safety (IPCS) held a meeting in Berlin that was designed to promote European discussion of the MCS phenomenon. Unfortunately, the participants at the meeting arguably failed to take reasonable steps to reveal and provide representative information about all major, plausible characterizations of MCS, because they replaced the concept of

117 See the BELLE website, at http://www.belleonline.com.

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MCS with a new concept (namely, “idiopathic environmental intolerance,” or IEI). The

problem with the IEI concept is that it frames subsequent debate about the phenomenon

in a manner that facilitates the disclosure of some characterizations of the anomaly and

the exclusion of other characterizations (Ashford and Miller 1998, 284). Specifically, the

concept of IEI does not explicitly incorporate the notion of chemical sensitivity, so it

facilitates characterizations of the phenomenon as a disorder that is self-caused or caused

by psychological or unknown factors. For example, Ashford and Miller note that, after

the meeting, some attendees claimed that idiopathic, in the context of IEI, means “self-

originated” (1998, 284).118

A number of researchers continue to think that it is reasonable to characterize

MCS as a psychologically based response to chemicals, because no mechanistic pathways

have been conclusively shown to cause the disorder and because many of the afflicted

individuals exhibit psychological disturbances (e.g., Black et al. 2000, Escobar et al.

2002, Tarlo et al. 2002, Van den Bergh et al. 1999). Nevertheless, the IEI concept,

especially as employed by researchers who claim that idiopathic means “self-caused,”

hinders acknowledgment of other major, plausible characterizations of the anomaly. One

such characterization is that MCS consists of a “kindling” of the brain (i.e., a

sensitization that can often lead to seizures) that is caused by toxic chemicals and that

results in a wide range of sensitivities to low-dose chemicals. To take just one example

of research that supports such a characterization, Gilbert (1995) has shown that exposure

118 If one wished to provide a precise, formal account of the sort of characterization of the MCS anomaly that the IEI concept facilitates, it might be something like the following: Empirical component: occurrence of symptoms S1…Sn, caused by self-originated psychological processes, under conditions C1…Cn Relation: inconsistency Theoretical component: current assumptions about the sorts of symptoms produced by psychological processes under conditions C1…Cn

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of rats to low doses of chlorinated pesticides can “kindle” the components of the brain’s limbic system that other scientists have hypothesized to be associated with MCS.

The Berlin meeting provides an excellent illustration of the value of the dissertation’s rules of thumb, because the misleading notion of IEI would arguably have been much less likely to be developed and influentially disseminated if the deliberation and conflict-of-interest rules had not been flagrantly violated. First, representative input at the meeting was hindered in at least three ways, in opposition to the deliberation rule.

(1) All four invited NGO representatives were from industry-oriented NGO’s. (2) “[N]o representatives of MCS patients, environmental groups, or labor unions were present”

(Ashford and Miller 1998, 283). (3) The person invited to present the “U.S. perspective” on MCS was Ronald Gots, the director of both a corporate-sponsored research institute and a service that “provides medical experts to corporate defendants involved in litigation over MCS” (Ashford and Miller 1998, 284). Second, the conflict-of-interest rule was violated in at least two ways. (1) The chair of the workshop did not initially know that the four NGO representatives were full-time employees of BASF, Bayer, Monsanto, and

Coca-Cola; that the first three representatives were affiliated with an industry-funded research institute; and that the person providing the U.S. perspective on MCS (namely,

Ronald Gots) was closely tied to industry (see the preceding description of his affiliations). (2) The consensus recommendations from the conference were later published anonymously in Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, in a supplement funded by Gots’s corporate-sponsored research institute. However, the institute was described only as “a charitable, non-profit, scientific, and educational organization dedicated to the open exchange of objective scientific information and data among

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physicians, scientists, industry, the government, and the general public” (Ashford and

Miller 1998, 285).

A third concrete case that is related to the endocrine-disruption anomaly provides a more encouraging example of how the chapter’s rules of thumb might contribute to meeting the MPC responsibilities. The Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) of 1996 mandated that EPA develop a screening program for potential endocrine disrupters. In

1998, the resulting Endocrine Disrupter Screening and Testing Advisory Committee

(EDSTAC) published a final report that provided recommendations for screening and testing chemicals (see EPA 1998). The EDSTAC arguably took reasonable steps to promote fulfillment of the MPC responsibilities, because the committee developed a screening and testing program that was sensitive to many different characterizations of the endocrine-disruption anomaly. This sensitivity was reflected in at least four ways.

(1) The committee ultimately decided to provide a general description of endocrine disruption but to avoid providing a precise definition for the phenomenon. This compromise was a response to disagreement about whether a chemical must cause adverse effects in order to be considered an endocrine disruptor or whether it need only alter endocrine function (EPA 1998, 3-4). (2) They designed testing and screening for both human and wildlife endocrine disrupters. (3) They decided that the testing and screening should cover estrogenic, androgenic, and thyroid-related endocrine effects. (4)

They suggested testing for multiple-hormone interactions, effects on multiple species, and long-term or delayed effects.119

119 If one wished to provide a precise account of the different characterizations that the EDSTAC considered, one would find that their variation (which is provided below in brackets) is in their empirical components:

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Just as the chapter’s rules of thumb probably could have helped researchers in the

hormesis and MCS cases, it appears plausible that they did play at least some role in the

success with which researchers in the endocrine-disruption case met their MPC

responsibilities. Perhaps most notable is the analytic-deliberative structure of the

committee’s decisionmaking, which included at least four features that accord with the deliberation rule. (1) The committee’s meetings were open to the public and located in different parts of the country. (2) The committee’s membership included a wide array of representative and relevant sources: “EPA, other federal agencies, state agencies, various sectors of industry, water providers, worker protection, national environmental groups, environmental justice groups, public heatlh groups, and research scientists” (EPA 1998,

1-2). (3) The committee’s deliberations included public-comment sessions that incorporated input from numerous constituents. (4) The committee was able to make initial recommendations, with suggestions for revisions that could be implemented after

obtaining further information (EPA 1998, 1-2; NRC 1999, 411-413).

In sum, the rules of thumb suggested in this chapter appear to provide valuable

approaches for researchers and policymakers to employ in response to policy-relevant

anomalies. This part of the chapter argued that the rules are likely to help researchers to

meet their MPC responsibilities and that they are ethically important to implement

despite the objections that they might cause extra expenses and that they are not

Empirical component: occurrence of [adverse] effects as a result of chemical C’s causing an alteration in endocrine [and/or androgen and/or thyroid] activity on humans [and/or wildlife] [including effects that occur with chemical mixtures M1…Mn over time periods T1…Tn] Relation: inconsistency Theoretical component: biochemical and physiological theories or expectations, which state or assume that chemical C does not affect the endocrine [or androgen or thyroid] system

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completely novel. It concluded by showing how they could apply to three real-world

instances of scientific anomaly.

6.4: Conclusion

This chapter argued for two main conclusions, both of which are significant for

public policy. Section 6.2 argued, in the “problem thesis,” that any use of claim R to

justify exposing people to hormetic chemicals is currently ethically questionable, because

claim R faces “concept,” “scope,” “implementation,” and “consent” problems. The

significance of the problem thesis is that it discourages efforts to apply the hormesis

phenomenon to public policy until the four problems with claim R are adequately

addressed. Section 6.3 then argued that the consent problem in the hormesis case illustrates a general ethical norm (called the “MPC” conclusion) for science policy. It also argued that three rules of thumb may help researchers to fulfill their ethical responsibilities described in the MPC conclusion. The significance of this norm and the chapter’s three rules of thumb is that they may not only improve public-policy responses

to the hormesis, MCS, and endocrine-disruption anomalies, but they may also make

current and future discussions of other policy-relevant anomalies more ethically and

epistemically sophisticated.

The dissertation’s advice for responding to anomalies appears to be particularly

valuable at present, because policymakers currently face numerous anomalies that have

the potential to be quite important for public policy. Some examples include anomalous

health problems such as chronic fatigue syndrome (e.g., Mawle et al. 1997); anomalous

adverse health effects allegedly caused by amalgam dental fillings (e.g., Takahashi et al.

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2001), electromagnetic fields (e.g., NRC 1996a), or vaccines (e.g., Iizuka et al. 2000,

IOM 2001); and anomalous therapeutic effects allegedly caused by magnets (e.g.,

Collacott et al. 2000, Vallbona et al. 1997), acupuncture (e.g., Allchin 1996), and homeopathy120 (e.g., Benveniste 1988, Davenas et al. 1988, Linde et al., 1997, Maddox et al. 1988). These health problems, effects, and therapies are anomalous in the sense that they all involve a set of phenomena on one hand that are problematic with respect to researchers’ expectations, assumptions, theories, or paradigms on the other hand. For example, researchers do not expect individuals who are free of normal illnesses to exhibit the sorts of health problems that those with chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) display.

Furthermore, they do not have an accepted theory that explains the health effects associated with CFS. Similarly, the biological effects allegedly caused by amalgam fillings, electromagnetic fields, vaccines, magnets, acupuncture, and homeopathic remedies such as Galphimia glauca either run counter to many researchers’ expectations or fail to be explained by current scientific theories. Although there are no easy ways to decide when to alter public policy in response to these anomalies, the ethical responsibilities and rules of thumb described in this chapter may provide researchers and policy makers with a starting point for addressing the challenging decisions that they face.

120 The research of Linde et al. (1997) provides a good example of the evidence for anomalous homeopathic effects. A meta-analysis of 89 studies that both met inclusion criteria and had adequate data for analysis yielded results that were “incompatible with the hypothesis that the clinical effects of homoeopathy are completely due to placebo” (Linde et al. 1997, 834). One example of a highly reproducible effect was an improvement in nasal and ocular symptoms of allergy patients who took homoeopathic doses of the remedy Galphimia glauca (1997, 839).

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

7.1: Introduction

This dissertation began (in the introduction to chapter one) by noting the

significant disagreement that currently divides, on one hand, those who think that toxic

chemicals have minimal harmful effects on humans at low doses and, on the other hand,

those who think that there is significant cause for concern about low levels of toxins (see

e.g., Krimsky 2000, Milloy 2001). Although a single study cannot resolve this conflict, the dissertation has attempted to provide increased understanding of the role that scientific anomaly (and especially the anomalous phenomenon of chemical hormesis) plays in this dispute and throughout science in general. This chapter concludes the dissertation by considering how its analysis of anomaly has contributed to two areas of research in philosophy (namely, philosophy of science and ethics) and one topic of research in the natural sciences (i.e., the study of chemical hormesis). For each subject, it briefly summarizes: (1) the state of research prior to the dissertation, (2) this study’s contributions to the topic, and (3) promising directions for future work.

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7.2: Philosophy of Science

Previous work in the philosophy of science has emphasized that anomalies play a

crucial role in the process of scientific discovery and theory change. The second chapter

of the dissertation analyzed some of the most important earlier studies of anomaly. It

argued that the accounts of anomaly by Popper (1959), Kuhn (1970, 1977a), Lakatos

(1970), Laudan (1977, 1996), and Darden (1991) can be summarized in terms of two

conclusions that they appear to share. The first one describes the characteristics of

scientific anomalies:

Shared Descriptive Conclusion: Scientific anomalies display an “empirical” component, a “theoretical” component, and a problematic relation between them. Researchers provide evidence for the problematic relation between the components via a process of “anomaly confirmationD.”

The other conclusion of the previous accounts recounts the relationship between

anomalies and the development of novel scientific hypotheses:

Shared Explanatory Conclusion: Scientific anomalies are important stimuli for the development of novel scientific hypotheses.

The primary contribution of the dissertation to the philosophy of science is to

argue for a novel account of anomaly (in chapter four) based largely on a close analysis

of the chemical-hormesis case study (in chapter three). This new understanding of

anomaly is based on an altered version of the previous accounts’ descriptive and

explanatory conclusions. The descriptive claim of account D is divided into two parts,

one that addresses the characterizations of anomalies and one that concerns the process

by which researchers confirmD them. The descriptive claim differs from previous accounts of anomaly primarily by emphasizing that researchers employ multiple

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characterizations of anomalies and multiple activities or “elements” for confirmingD them:

Descriptive claim:

Characterization sub-claim: A scientific anomaly consists of what the dissertation calls a “characterization,” namely, an empirical component, a theoretical component, and a problematic relation between them. An anomaly may admit of multiple characterizations that differ in both the general and specific type of their components and the relation between them: (i) individual researchers may employ more than one characterization at roughly the same time, (ii) different researchers may employ different characterizations at roughly the same time, and (iii)researchers may change their characterizations over time.

The explanatory claim of account D emphasizes not only that anomalies stimulate the development of novel hypotheses but also that those hypotheses themselves alter researchers’ initial characterizations of the anomalies in an ongoing, dialectical fashion:

The final section of chapter four argued that this novel account of anomaly provides a starting point for future research in the philosophy of science, especially concerning scientific discovery and the role of value judgments in scientific practice.

The dissertation itself has provided only a sketch of these potential ramifications of account D, however. Following is a brief summary of future work that could be done, organized in relation to each claim of the dissertation’s account. Taking the

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characterization sub-claim first, it could be expanded in at least two ways. First, one

could provide a more complete account of the important general types of empirical and

theoretical anomaly components and relations between them. For example, the

dissertation has identified data and phenomena (and perhaps Gooding’s “construals”) as

important general types of empirical components; further analysis of anomalies could

indicate whether there are other significant types. Second, one could provide a more

complete account of the ways in which the characterizations of an anomaly may differ.

For example, account D placed particular emphasis on three ways in which

characterizations could vary. First, the concepts by which researchers describe the

empirical component could be different. Second, the theories or theory parts that make

up the theoretical component could vary. Third, the general types of the components and

relation could be different. It would be helpful to determine if there are other prevalent

ways in which the characterizations of a single anomaly differ.

The confirmationD sub-claim of account D could be expanded in at least three

ways. First, one could provide a more complete account of the “elements” or “strategies”

associated with anomaly confirmationD. Chapters three and four identified seven elements associated with the hormesis case, but one could presumably elucidate many more by examining other instances of anomaly. Second, one could investigate whether there are strategies or clues that might help researchers to predict whether an anomaly is ultimately likely to be confirmedD or instead dismissed as a fluke result. These clues

would be extremely valuable to policymakers, because they often have to decide how

seriously to “take” anomalies without having very complete information. A third way to

expand the confirmationD claim would be to develop a more complete account of the

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strategies that researchers employ during the very early stages of confirmationD for developing characterizations and providing preliminary evidence that they are plausible.

Section 4.4 provided a list of these strategies that are visible in the hormesis case. For example, Calabrese and Baldwin expanded previous experiments to include new variables and looked for evidence of the anomalous results under diverse conditions. A more complete list of these strategies would presumably provide philosophers of science with greater information about the early processes by which researchers make discoveries and advances in science.

Finally, the explanatory claim of account D could presumably be extended in at least two ways. First, one could provide a more detailed list of the dialectical ways in which anomalies and novel scientific hypotheses relate. Chapters three and four identified characterization, stimulation, feedback, and research-project influences in the hormesis, MCS, and endocrine-disruption cases, but one could presumably identify further ways in which anomalies and novel hypotheses relate. Second, one could provide a more complete account of the ways in which scientific discovery is influenced by the dialectical anomaly confirmationD process. For example, chapter four emphasized that the confirmationD process acts as a heuristic for developing, choosing, and refining further hypotheses. By studying the dialectical confirmationD process further,

philosophers could perhaps gain significant insights concerning scientific discovery.

7.3: Ethics

The dissertation’s contributions to ethics will be divided in this section into three

“sub-topics”: (1) the naturalistic fallacy (NF) and the is/ought distinction (IOD), (2) the

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regulatory ramifications of hormesis, and (3) general ethical issues associated with science policy. The section briefly describes previous work, the dissertation’s contributions, and the potential for further study in each of the three areas. Turning first to the NF, section 5.3 provided background information concerning the NF and the IOD.

Moore (1903) first developed a famous description of what he called the “naturalistic fallacy”, and he used an “open-question argument” (OQA) to argue that his formulations of the NF described a genuine error in ethical reasoning. After Moore’s groundbreaking work, philosophers such as Flew, Hare, Searle, Stevenson, Veatch, Baldwin, and

Frankena have debated both (a) the cogency of Moore’s formulations of the NF and (b) the relationship between the NF and the IOD.

In chapter five, the dissertation attempted to clarify both of these formerly debated issues, namely, the extent to which Moore’s formulations of the NF are cogent and the relationship between the NF and the IOD. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 elucidated eight objections against Moore’s formulations of the NF and then developed a novel version of it (called NF*) that appears to avoid those problems. Section 5.6 then clarified the relationship between the NF and the IOD by arguing that, although NF* and IOD are distinct claims, NF* can serve as a crucial premise in an argument that supports attention to the IOD.

The dissertation’s analysis of the NF and the IOD suggests at least two further ethical research projects. First, its analysis of the NF and the IOD supports continued attention to the ethical positions of those whom Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1997) call

“neo-Aristotelians,” “postpositivist nonreductionists,” and “reductionists,” all of whom question the cogency of the NF and the IOD. One goal of increased appraisal of these

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positions should be to examine how they might counter the dissertation’s improved

formulation of Moore’s NF. Second, because the dissertation’s analysis was based

largely on a “linguistic” or “semantic” approach to metaethics, it would be valuable to

consider the extent to which more “metaphysical” or “ontological” approaches would

challenge or support the dissertation’s arguments concerning the NF (see e.g., McDowell

1994, Sayre-McCord 1988, Wiggins 1987).

A second ethical “sub-topic” addressed by the dissertation is the justifiability of exposing the public to levels of toxins that produce hormetic effects. A number of scientists, risk assessors, or policymakers have suggested that it might be acceptable to allow public exposure to low doses of hormetic chemicals (see e.g., Foran 1998,

Calabrese, Baldwin, and Holland 1999, Paperiello 2000, Lave 2001, Poumadere 2002).

In chapters five and six, the dissertation provided a “second-order” evaluation of these proposals to allow public exposure to hormetic chemicals. It isolated a crucial regulatory

claim, R, that they all appear to accept:

(R) IF one or more toxic chemicals, X1…Xn, produce a hormetic (i.e., beneficial) effect on humans that are exposed to low doses (L1…Ln) of X1…Xn, AND IF human exposure to X1…Xn meets the following conditions (as some hormetic exposures may do): (1) the exposure results in a net benefit to human health, and (2) the exposure meets additional conditions, C1…Cn (perhaps including conditions that specify particular side effects that can or cannot be caused by the exposure, specific scales over which the hormetic effects must occur across time and on groups of people, particular environmental conditions under which the hormetic effects must occur, specific criteria for implementing new regulatory policies, and particular standards for obtaining consent to hormetic exposures), THEN government regulators ought to allow public exposure to low doses L1…Ln of X1…Xn.

Chapter five then argued that, if claim R is interpreted as true by definition, it is

problematic because it is likely to be employed in policy arguments that violate the IOD.

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Chapter six argued that, if claim R is interpreted either as a substantive moral claim or as

a prudential claim, it faces “concept,” “scale,” “implementation,” and “consent”

problems.

The analysis of these four problems with claim R in chapter six leaves room for

further research. The claim of chapter six was not that the concept, scale,

implementation, and consent problems show claim R to be false but rather that they

indicate that the sufficient conditions (C1…Cn) for allowing hormetic exposures currently

remain unspecified. Thus, ethicists could pursue at least two further tasks. First, they

could attempt to formulate a complete list of conditions that are jointly sufficient for

allowing public exposure to hormetic chemicals. For example, the conditions might

include the “implementation” and “consent” conditions proposed in chapter six together

with other conditions, perhaps including some that specify the required scales of hormetic effects. Second, ethicists could develop a list of “sub-conditions” that must be met in order to meet the primary conditions for allowing hormetic exposures. For example, chapter six indicated that sub-conditions for arguing that the implementation condition can be met include: (1) showing that hormetic chemicals can be identified in an economically feasible way, (2) providing adequate evidence that abuses from vested interests can be avoided, and (3) showing that sensitive sub-populations can avoid undue harm.

The third ethical issue addressed in the dissertation is science policy. Even though previous ethicists and policy analysts have not directly examined the significance of anomaly for science policy, chapter six noted that some authors have already made ethical suggestions that are helpful for dealing with scientific anomalies (e.g., Beauchamp

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and Childress 2001, Cranor 1993, Shrader-Frechette 1991). Specifically, these thinkers

have argued that researchers and policymakers should (1) frame disclosed information in

an unbiased fashion that takes all representative perspectives into account, and (2)

address scientific uncertainty in ways that promote the public good.

Chapter six extended these previous insights by making two specific suggestions

pertaining to scientific anomalies in particular. First, the chapter proposed an ethical

norm:

Second, the chapter suggested three rules of thumb that may help researchers and

policymakers to meet the responsibilities listed in the MPC conclusion. In brief, those

rules of thumb are that researchers should (i) analyze anomalies via analytic-deliberative

processes, (ii) eliminate and disclose conflicts of interest when dealing with anomalies,

and (iii) receive ethical instruction concerning their social responsibilities in general and

concerning anomalies in particular.

An important theme of the dissertation’s ethical analysis of anomalies and science

policy was that the multiple characterizations of anomalies are ethically important in

policy debates (see section 6.3), because incomplete disclosure of information about

those characterizations jeopardizes the public’s free, informed consent to policy

decisions. Based on this insight (i.e., that the multiple characterizations of anomalies are

ethically important in science policymaking), at least four further research projects appear to be promising. First, it could be valuable to determine in what ways the decisions by

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researchers and policymakers to emphasize particular characterizations rather than other

characterizations can impact further scientific research and public policy (see Elliott forthcoming). Second, it could be helpful to identify guidelines for distinguishing characterizations that are plausible (and should therefore be revealed) from those that are not very plausible (and thus need not be revealed). Third, it could be beneficial to examine how constitutive, contextual, and bias values can and should play a role in the choices of researchers and policymakers to emphasize particular characterizations.121

Fourth, it could be valuable to determine whether there are other ways (besides fulfilling the MPC responsibilities and following the three rules of thumb in chapter six) in which scientific researchers and policymakers could ethically respond to the multiple characterizations of policy-relevant anomalies.

7.4: Chemical Hormesis

Although the main focus of the dissertation has been to examine the nature of anomaly and its significance for philosophy of science and ethics, its analysis may also be helpful for future scientific investigation of the hormesis phenomenon. Even though some other scientists have investigated chemical hormesis (e.g., Stebbing 1982, 1998,

Davis and Svendsgaard 1990), the vast majority of current information concerning hormesis comes from Calabrese and Baldwin’s work (described in chapter three). The dissertation has not provided further empirical information about hormesis, but it has

121 It is important to recognize that epistemic and ethical principles of rationality may yield different conclusions about which values should play a role in the choice to emphasize particular anomaly characterizations (see Shrader-Frechette 1994). For example, epistemic rationality might require only considering “epistemic” values in the choice of anomaly characterizations, whereas ethical rationality might require that one incorporate values associated with protecting the public health as well (see e.g., Douglas 2000).

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supplied at least two sorts of conceptual clarifications concerning the phenomenon. First, in section 3.3, it elucidated multiple plausible characterizations of the hormesis anomaly that are already employed or that could be employed by contemporary researchers.

Second, in section 6.2, it clarified the empirical features of hormesis that arguably need to be investigated in order to determine whether it is ethically justifiable to allow public exposure to hormetic chemicals. For example, these empirical characteristics of the phenomenon include the range of people that are likely to experience hormetic effects and the temporal scale of hormetic effects.

The dissertation’s analyses in chapters three and six indicate that future research concerning hormesis should plausibly pursue at least two goals. First, given that multiple characterizations of hormesis have been employed by contemporary scientists (see chapter three), research should aim to determine more precisely which characterizations are more plausible than others. For example, scientists should work to identify the particular mechanisms that produce hormetic effects, the concepts that are most appropriate for describing them, the conditions under which those effects occur, and the frequency with which they occur. Second, research should probably aim to clarify the scales on which hormetic effects take place, given that they are currently not well known but are important for determining whether public exposure to hormetic chemicals is justifiable (see chapter six). For example, scientists should aim to clarify both the temporal scale of hormetic effects and the underlying variables that determine which people are likely to experience those effects.

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7.5: Conclusion

In sum, the dissertation appears to have made at least five contributions to

philosophy and science, and it has identified a number of avenues for future research.

First, it has argued for a new and significant account of anomaly, which emphasizes that

researchers characterize anomalies in multiple ways, that they employ multiple activities

for confirmingD them, and that anomalies interact with novel hypotheses in a dialectical

fashion. Second, the dissertation has provided a novel analysis of the naturalistic fallacy

and its relation to the is/ought distinction. Third, the current study has argued that

exposure of the public to hormetic levels of toxic chemicals is currently unjustifiable, and

the precise conditions under which hormetic exposures could be justified in the future

need to be clarified further. Fourth, the present work has developed a general ethical

“MPC” norm (together with three rules of thumb for meeting it) that applies to scientific

researchers and policymakers who work with anomalies. Finally, the dissertation has

elucidated a variety of empirical features of chemical hormesis that remain inadequately

specified (especially the variables that determine when and where it is likely to occur),

and it therefore charts a course for further scientific investigation of the phenomenon. As a whole, this study illustrates how the philosophy of science can contribute to improving scientific practice both methodologically and ethically.

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APPENDIX ONE

CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE HORMESIS ANOMALY

(1) Group D-E, namely, characterizations that involve a relation (R) of inconsistency between statements that describe data points (EC, the empirical component) and statements that describe researchers’ expectations for those data (TC, the theoretical component) (see e.g., Davis and Svendsgaard 1990):

R EC TC

inconsis. statements that describe several data statements that describe researchers’ points above control levels in experiment expectations for those data points E (which indicates beneficial effects EF (e.g., fewer points above controls) associated with dose D of chemical C in organism O)

inconsis. statements that describe several statements that describe researchers’ statistically significant data points expectations for those data points above control levels in exp’t E (e.g., fewer statistically significant points above controls)

inconsis. statements that describe several statements that describe researchers’ statistically significant data points expectations for those data points above control levels in experiments (e.g., fewer statistically significant E1, E2, … En (which test for effects points in those experiments) EF with dose D of C in O)

inconsis. statements that describe statistically statements that describe researchers’ significant data points that occur in expectations for those data points N % of all toxicol. experiments that (e.g., fewer exp’ts that display those test for EF with dose D of C in O data points)

(2) Groups DS1-E, DS2-E, DS3-E, etc.:

Group D-E can be specified (thus the subscript “S”) in multiple ways (thus the subscript “1,” “2,” “3,” etc.) to describe anomaly characterizations that involve different

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experiments other than those described in group D-E. For example, other experiments might test different chemicals (C1…Cn), for different effects (EF1…EFn), in different organisms (O1…On).

(3) Group U-M, namely, characterizations that involve a relation of inconsistency between the phenomenon of U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis (i.e., opposite effects of a toxin on an endpoint at low versus at high doses) and dose-response models (see e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 1997, 1998, 1999):

R EC TC

inconsis. statements that describe occurrence of statements that describe an LNT U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis dose-response model for effect EF for effect EF at doses D1…Dn of chemical at D1…Dn of chemical C in O1…On C in organisms O1…On inconsis. statements that describe occurrence of statements that describe an LLNT U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis dose-response model for effects for effects EF1…EFn at doses D1…Dn of EF1…EFn at D1…Dn of chemical C chemical C in organisms O1…On in organisms O1…On

inconsis. statements that describe occurrence of statements that describe an LNT U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis dose-response model for effects for effects EF1…EFn at doses D1…Dn of EF1…EFn at D1…Dn of chemicals chemicals C1…Cn in organisms O1…On C1…Cn in O1…On

(4) Group U-T, namely, characterizations that involve a relation of inexplicability between the phenomenon of U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis and a group of physiological theories (see e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 1997, 1998, 1999):

R EC TC

inexplic. occurrence of U-shaped dose-response- the group of physiological theories curve hormesis for effect EF at doses that explain toxins’ effects and that D1…Dn of chemical C in organism O do not predict U-shaped hormesis for EF at doses D1…Dn of C in O

inexplic. occurrence of U-shaped dose-response- the group of physiological theories curve hormesis for effects EF1…EFn that explain toxins’ effects and that at doses D1…Dn of chemical C in O do not predict U-shaped hormesis for EF1…EFn at D1…Dn of C in O

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inexplic. occurrence of U-shaped dose-response- the group of physiological theories curve hormesis for effects EF1…EFn that explain toxins’ effects and that at doses D1…Dn of chemicals C1…Cn do not predict U-shaped hormesis in organism O for C1…Cn under those conditions

inexplic. occurrence of U-shaped dose-response- the group of physiological theories curve hormesis for effects EF1…EFn that explain toxins’ effects and that at doses D1…Dn of chemicals C1…Cn do not predict U-shaped hormesis in organisms O1…On for C1…Cn under those conditions

(5) Group U-TS, namely, characterizations that involve a relation of inexplicability between the phenomenon of U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis and a specific physiological theory, with the “S” subscript symbolizing that these characterizations are subsets of those in group U-T, with a particular theory specified:

R EC TC

inexplic. occurrence of U-shaped dose- a specific physiological theory, T, response-curve hormesis in which is responsible for the failure experiment E to predict U-shaped hormesis in experiment E

inexplic. occurrence of U-shaped dose- a specific physiological theory, T, response-curve hormesis in which is responsible for the failure experiments E1, E2, … En to predict U-shaped hormesis in those experiments

inexplic. occurrence of U-shaped dose- a specific physiological theory, T, response-curve hormesis in which is responsible for the failure N % of all toxicol. experiments to predict U-shaped hormesis at that frequency

(6) Groups L-M, L-T, and L-TS (see e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 1998b, Foran 1998):

Same as groups U-M, U-T, and U-TS, but with the phenomenon of “low-dose- stimulation-high-dose-inhibition hormesis” (i.e., low-dose stimulatory effects of a chemical that produces inhibitory effects at higher doses) replacing the phenomenon of “U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis”

(7) Groups B-M, B-T, and B-TS (see e.g., Gerber, Williams, and Gray 1999):

Same as groups U-M, U-T, and U-TS, but with the phenomenon of “beneficial hormesis” (i.e., beneficial low-dose effects of a toxin on an endpoint for which it produces harmful

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effects at higher doses) replacing the phenomenon of “U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis”

(8) Groups BN-M, BN-T, and BN-TS (see e.g., Gerber, Williams, and Gray 1999):

Same as groups U-M, U-T, and U-TS, but with the phenomenon of “net-beneficial hormesis” (i.e., net beneficial low-dose effects of a toxin that produces harmful effects at higher doses) replacing the phenomenon of “U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis”

(9) Groups O-M, O-T, and O-TS (see e.g., Stebbing 1982, 1998, Calabrese and Baldwin 1999):

Same as groups U-M, U-T, U-TS, but with the phenomenon of “overcompensation hormesis” (i.e., opposite effects of a toxin at low versus at high doses, caused by an overcompensation effect) replacing the phenomenon of “U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis”

(10) Group OS-T, namely, characterizations that involve a relation of inexplicability between an overcompensation phenomenon produced by a specific enzymatic mechanism on one hand and a group of physiological theories on the other hand, with the subscript “S” symbolizing that this is a subset of group O-T, with the type of overcompensation phenomenon specified (see e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 1998):

R EC TC

inexplic.. occurrence of an overcomp. the group of physiological theories effect, produced by enzymatic that explain toxins’ effects and mechanism M1, in exp’t E that do not explain occurrence of mechanism M1 in that experiment

inexplic.. occurrence of an overcomp. the group of physiological theories effect, produced by enzymatic that explain toxins’ effects and mechanism M1, in experiments that do not explain occurrence of E1, E2,…En mechanism M1 in those experiments

inexplic.. occurrence of an overcomp. the group of physiological theories effect, produced by enzymatic that explain toxins’ effects and mechanism M1, in N% of all that do not explain that frequency of toxicology experiments occurrence for mechanism M1

(11) Groups OS-M and OS-TS:

Same as group OS-T, but with a specific physiological theory specified as the one that is responsible for the failure to explain the overcompensation effect produced by enzymatic mechanism M1. The “S” subscript symbolizes that these characterizations are subsets of those in group OS-T, but with a particular theory specified.

373

(12) Group M-E (see e.g., Stebbing 1982, 1998, Calabrese and Baldwin 1999):

R EC TC

inconsis. statements that describe the frequency of statements that describe researchers’ multiple-effects hormesis for effect EF expectations for the frequency of caused by chemicals of type C effect EF caused by chemicals of at doses D1…Dn in organism O type C at doses D1…Dn in O inconsis. statements that describe the frequency of statements that describe researchers’ multiple-effects hormesis for effect EF expectations for the frequency of caused by chemicals of type C effect EF caused by chemicals of at doses D1…Dn in organisms O1…On type C at doses D1…Dn in O1…On

inconsis. statements that describe the frequency of statements that describe researchers’ multiple-effects hormesis for effects expectations for the frequency of EF1…EFn caused by chemicals of type effects EF1…EFn caused by C at doses D1…Dn in organisms O1…On chemicals of type C at doses D1…Dn in organisms O1…On

(13) Group H-P, namely, characterizations that involve a relation of inconsistency between the phenomenon of Homeopathy and current paradigms

inconsis. statements that describe the statements that describe the current occurrence of the phenomenon paradigms, P1…Pn, of chemistry, of homeopathy in exp’t E physics, and toxicology inconsis. statements that describe the statements that describe the current occurrence of the phenomenon paradigms, P1…Pn, of chemistry, of homeopathy in experiments physics, and toxicology E1…En

inconsis. statements that describe the statements that describe the current occurrence of the phenomenon paradigms, P1…Pn, of chemistry, of homeopathy in N% of all physics, and toxicology toxicology experiments

(14) Group C-M, namely, characterizations that involve a relation of inconsistency between the phenomenon of hormetic effects on endpoints that reflect the entire process of carcinogenesis (i.e., opposite effects of a toxin on an endpoint at low versus at high doses) and statements that describe linear-no-threshold dose-response models (see e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 1998):

374

R EC TC

inconsis. statements that describe occurrence of statements that describe an LNT hormetic effects on endpoint EP (which dose-response model for endpoint EP represents the entire process of at doses D1…Dn of chemical C in O carcinogenesis) at doses D1…Dn of chemical C in organism O

inconsis. statements that describe occurrence of statements that describe an LNT hormetic effects on endpoint EP at doses dose-response model for endpoint EP D1…Dn of chemical C in organisms at doses D1…Dn of chemical C in organisms O1…On organisms O1…On inconsis. statements that describe occurrence of statements that describe an LNT hormetic effects on endpoints EP1…EPn dose-response model for endpoints (all of which represent the entire process EP1…EPn at doses D1…Dn of of carcinogenesis) at doses D1…Dn of chemical C in organisms O1…On chemical C in organisms O1…On

inconsis. statements that describe occurrence of statements that describe an LNT hormetic effects on endpoints EP1…EPn dose-response model for endpoints EP1…EPn at doses D1…Dn of chemicals EP1…EPn at doses D1…Dn of C1…Cn in organisms O1…On chemical C1…Cn in organisms O1…On

(15) Group D-A1, namely, characterizations that involve a relation of inconsistency between statements that describe U-shaped data from a particular experiment and statements that describe the assumption that the experiment has been properly controlled (see e.g., Jonas 2001):

R EC TC

inconsis. statements that describe U-shaped data statements that describe researchers’ in experiment E, which tests for assumption that the experiment has beneficial effects EF associated with been properly controlled dose D of chemical C in organism O)

inconsis. statements that describe U-shaped data statements that describe researchers’ in experiment E, which tests for assumption that the experiment has beneficial effects EF associated with dose been properly controlled D of chemical C in organisms O1…On

inconsis. statements that describe U-shaped data statements that describe researchers’ in experiment E, which tests for assumption that the experiment has beneficial effects EF associated with dose been properly controlled D of chemicals C1…Cn in organisms

375

O1…On

(16) Group D-A2, namely, characterizations that involve a relation of inconsistency between statements that describe U-shaped data from a particular experiment and statements that describe the assumption that the organisms under investigation were not unwittingly exposed to substances that interfered with the effects of the toxin being studied (see e.g., Davis and Svendsgaard 1990):

R EC TC inconsis. statements that describe U-shaped data statements that describe researchers’ in experiment E, which tests for assumption that the organisms under beneficial effects EF associated with investigation were not unwittingly dose D of chemical C in organism O) exposed to substances that interfered with the effects of the toxin studied inconsis. statements that describe U-shaped data statements that describe researchers’ in experiment E, which tests for assumption that the organisms under beneficial effects EF associated with dose investigation were not unwittingly D of chemical C in organisms O1…On exposed to substances that interfered with the effects of the toxin studied inconsis. statements that describe U-shaped data statements that describe researchers’ in experiment E, which tests for assumption that the organisms under beneficial effects EF associated with dose investigation were not unwittingly D of chemicals C1…Cn in organisms exposed to substances that interfered O1…On with the effects of the toxin studied

376

APPENDIX TWO

CHARACTERIZATONS OF THE ENDOCRINE-DISRUPTION ANOMALY

(1) Group D-E: characterizations that involve an inconsistency relation between, on one hand, experimental data (which involve harmful effects on the hormonal system associated with exposure to toxic chemicals) and, on the other hand, researchers’ expectations for those data

R EC TC

inconsis. statements that describe several data statements that describe researchers’ points above control levels in exp’t E expectations for those data points (which tests for harmful symptoms S (e.g., fewer points above controls) associated with level L of chemical C in organism O)

inconsis. statements that describe several statements that describe researchers’ statistically significant data points expectations for those data points above control levels in exp’ts E1…En (e.g., fewer statistically significant (which test for harmful symptoms points in those experiments) S associated with level L of C in O)

inconsis. statements that describe statistically statements that describe researchers’ significant data points that occur in N% expectations for those data points of all exp’ts that test for symptoms S (e.g., fewer experiments that display associated with level L of C in O those data points)

(2) Groups DS1-E, DS2-E, DS3-E, etc.:

Group D-E can be specified (thus the subscript “S”) in multiple ways (thus the subscript “1,” “2,” “3,” etc.) to describe anomaly characterizations that involve different

377

experiments (e.g., experiments that test different chemicals (C1…Cn), for different symptoms (S1…Sn), in different organisms (O1…On))

(3) Group P-E: characterizations that involve an inconsistency relation between phenomena on one hand and expectations for those phenomena on the other hand; note that these phenomena were originally regarded as independent anomalies and only later viewed as instances of endocrine disruption (see Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1996, Broley 1958, Aulerich et al. 1973, Hunt and Hunt 1977, Woodward et al. 1993, Carlsen et al. 1992)

R EC TC

inconsis. bald eagles in Florida that “loafed” researchers’ expectations that the rather than engaging in their normal eagles would engage in typical mating rituals (in the 1950’s) mating rituals

inconsis. mink reproduction rates that initially researchers’ expectations that the dropped from four to two and soon reproduction rates would remain resulted in many mink that had no fairly constant surviving children (near Lake Mich. in the 1960’s)

inconsis. female western gulls that occupied researchers’ expectations that gulls nests together in southern California would not nest together with the (in the 1970’s) same sex

inconsis. exceptionally low hatching and researchers’ expectations for survival rates for alligator eggs in higher hatching and survival rates Lake Apopka, FL (in the 1980’s)

inconsis reduction in average human male researchers’ expectations for sperm counts by 50% between 1938 more constant sperm counts and 1990 during that time period

(4) Group PS-T: characterizations that involve an inexplicability relation between the specific phenomena of non-hormonal chemicals bonding to hormone receptors on one hand and theories of the endocrine system and of biochemistry on the other hand

R EC TC

inexplic. binding of chemical C to receptor R theories of the endocrine system at dose D in organism O and of biochemistry that do not predict such binding

378

inexplic. binding of chemical C to receptors theories of the endocrine system R1…Rn at dose D in organism O and of biochemistry that do not predict such binding

inexplic. binding of chemicals C1…Cn to receptor theories of the endocrine system R at doses D1…Dn in organism O and of biochemistry that do not predict such binding inexplic. binding of chemicals C1…Cn to receptors theories of the endocrine system R1…Rn at doses D1…Dn in organism O and of biochemistry that do not predict such binding

inexplic. binding of chemicals C1…Cn to receptors theories of the endocrine system R1…Rn at doses D1…Dn in organisms and of biochemistry that do not O1…On predict such binding

(5) Group PS-TS: characterizations that involve an inexplicability relation between the specific phenomena of non-hormonal chemicals bonding to hormone receptors on one hand and a specific theory on the other hand

R EC TC

inexplic. binding of chemical C to receptor R theory X of biochemistry at dose D in organism O

inexplic. binding of chemical C to receptors theory X of biochemistry R1…Rn at dose D in organism O

inexplic. binding of chemicals C1…Cn to receptor theory X of biochemistry R at doses D1…Dn in organism O inexplic. binding of chemicals C1…Cn to receptors theory X of biochemistry R1…Rn at doses D1…Dn in organism O

inexplic. binding of chemicals C1…Cn to receptors theory X of biochemistry R1…Rn at doses D1…Dn in organisms O1…On

(6) Groups PS,NH-T, PS,NH-TS: Same as groups PS-T and PS-TS, but with the organisms specified as non-human.

(7) Groups PS,H-T, PS,H-TS: Same as groups PS-T and PS-TS, but with the organisms specified as human.

379

APPENDIX THREE

CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE MULTIPLE-CHEMICAL-SENSITIVITY ANOMALY

(1) Group D-E: characterizations that involve an inconsistency relation between, on one hand, experimental data (which appear to involve toxic effects correlated with very low doses of toxic chemicals) and, on the other hand, researchers’ expectations for those data

R EC TC inconsis. statements that describe several statements that describe researchers’ data points above control levels expectations for those data points in exp’t E (which tests for symptom (e.g., fewer points above controls) S correlated with dose D of chemical C in organism O) inconsis. statements that describe several statements that describe researchers’ statistically significant data points expectations for those data points above control levels in exp’t E (e.g., fewer statistically significant data points above control levels) inconsis. statements that describe several statements that describe researchers’ statistically significant data points expectations for those data points above control levels in exp’ts (e.g., fewer statistically significant E1…En (which test for symptom points in those experiments) S with dose D of C in O)

inconsis. statements that describe statistically statements that describe researchers’ significant data points that occur in N% expectations for those data points of all exp’ts that test for symptom S with (e.g., fewer experiments that display dose D of C in O those data points)

(2) Groups DS1-E, DS2-E, DS3-E, etc.:

Group D-E can be specified (thus the subscript “S”) in multiple ways (thus the subscript “1,” “2,” “3,” etc.) to describe anomaly characterizations that involve different

380

experiments (e.g., experiments that test different chemicals (C1…Cn), for different symptoms (S1…Sn), in different organisms (O1…On))

(3) Groups DS1,M-E, DS2,M-E, DS3,M-E, etc.:

Groups DS1-E, DS2-E, DS3-E, etc., can be specified in an additional way, stating that the anomaly consists of anomalous phenomena that occur in experiments performed with a particular Methodology (thus the subscript “M”) (e.g., the methodology proposed by Ashford and Miller (1998) to distinguish MCS from other chemical effects, in which test volunteers are isolated from a number of chemicals in “environmental units” for a period of time before they are exposed to individual chemical(s) in the experimental test)

(4) Group P-E: characterizations that involve an inconsistency relation between, on one hand, phenomena correlated with exposure to toxic chemicals and, on the other hand, researchers’ expectations

R EC TC inconsis. phenomenon of symptom S correlated researchers’ expectations for that with dose D of chemical C in organism O symptom at dose D of C in O

inconsis. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn researchers’ expectations for those correlated with dose D of C in O symptoms at dose D of C in O

inconsis. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn researchers’ expectations for those correlated with doses D1…Dn of symptoms at doses D1…Dn of chemicals C1…Cn in O chemicals C1…Cn in O

inconsis. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn researchers’ expectations for those correlated with doses D1…Dn of symptoms at doses D1…Dn of chemicals C1…Cn in organisms O1…On chemicals C1…Cn in O1…On

(5) Group P-T: characterizations that involve an inexplicability relation between, on one hand, phenomena correlated with exposure to toxic chemicals and, on the other hand, physiological theories that fail to explain the correlation between exposure to toxic chemicals and those effects

R EC TC inexplic. phenomenon of symptom S correlated physiological theories that fail to with dose D of chemical C in organism O explain symptom S at dose D of C inexplic. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn physiological theories that fail to correlated with dose D of C in O explain symptoms S1…Sn at D of C

381

inexplic. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn physiological theories that fail to correlated with doses D1…Dn of explain S1…Sn at doses D1…Dn of chemical C1…Cn in O chemicals C1…Cn in O

inexplic. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn physiological theories that fail to correlated with doses D1…Dn of explain S1…Sn at doses D1…Dn of chemical C1…Cn in organisms O1…On chemicals C1…Cn in O1…On

(6) Group PP-T: characterizations that involve an inexplicability relation between, on one hand, phenomena correlated with exposure to toxic chemicals (and specified as the result of psychological phobias or panic attacks) and, on the other hand, physiological theories that fail to explain the correlation between exposure to toxic chemicals and those effects (e.g., Black et al. 1990, Staudenmeyer and Selner 1990, Tarlo et al. 2002)

Same as group P-T, but with the addition that the symptoms that occur in the presence of the chemical(s) are caused by psychological phobias.

(7) Group PD-T: characterizations that involve an inexplicability relation between, on one hand, phenomena associated with exposure to toxic chemicals (and specified as the result of depression) and, on the other hand, physiological theories that fail to explain the correlation between exposure to toxic chemicals and those effects (e.g., Ashford and Miller 1998, 141, Simon et al. 1990)

Same as group P-T, but with the addition that the symptoms that occur in the presence of the chemical(s) are caused by depression.

(8) Group PC-T: characterizations that involve an inexplicability relation between, on one hand, phenomena that are specified as the causal effect of toxic chemicals (thus the subscript “C”) and, on the other hand, physiological theories that fail to explain that causal effect

R EC TC inexplic. phenomenon of symptom S caused by physiological theories that fail to dose D of chemical C in organism O explain the causation of symptom S by dose D of C inexplic. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn physiological thories that fail to caused by dose D of C in O explain the causation of symptoms S1…Sn by dose D of C in O

inexplic. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn physiological theories that fail to caused by doses D1…Dn of chemicals explain the causation of S1…Sn C1…Cn in O by doses D1…Dn of C1…Cn in

382

Inexplic. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn physiological theories that fail to caused by doses D1…Dn of chemicals explain the causation of S1…Sn by C1…Cn in organisms O1…On doses D1…Dn of C1…Cn in O1…On

(9) Group PCL-T: characterizations that involve an inexplicability relation between, on one hand, phenomena produced by chemicals’ kindling of the limbic system and, on the other hand, physiological theories that fail to explain that kindling (Ashford and Miller 1998, 91ff, Bell 1982, 1990)

R EC TC inexplic. phenomenon of symptom S caused current physiological theories by a kindling of the limbic system that do not explain limbic-system produced by dose D of chemical C kindling by C at dose D in O in organism O inexplic. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn current physiological theories caused by dose D of chemical C that do not explain limbic-system in organism O kindling by C at dose D in O inexplic. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn researchers’ expectations for the caused by doses D1…Dn of chemicals effects of chemicals C1…Cn at C1…Cn in organism O doses D1…Dn in O inexplic. phenomenon of symptoms S1…Sn researchers’ expectations for the caused by doses D1…Dn of chemicals effects of chemicals C1…Cn at C1…Cn in organisms O1…On doses D1…Dn in O1…On

(10) Group PCT-T: characterizations that involve an inexplicability relation between, on one hand, phenomena produced by chemicals’ damaging of the immune system and, on the other hand, physiological theories that fail to explain that damage (Ashford and Miller 1998, 98ff, Levin and Byers 1987)

Same as group PL-T, but with the mechanism of chemicals’ damaging the immune system replacing the mechanism of chemicals’ kindling the limbic system.

(11) Group PCE-T: characterizations that involve an inexplicability relation between, on one hand, phenomena produced by chemicals’ damaging of enzymatic detoxification processes and, on the other hand, physiological theories that fail to explain that damage (Ashford and Miller 1998, 107ff, Rogers 1990, Scadding et al. 1988)

Same as group PL-T, but with the mechanism of chemicals’ damaging of enzymatic detoxification processes replacing the mechanism of chemicals’ kindling the limbic system.

383

(12) Groups PC,TILT-T, PCL,TILT-T, PCT,TILT-T, PCE,TILT-T (Ashford and Miller 1998, 172ff, Miller 1996):

Same as groups PC-T, PCL-T, PCT-T, and PCE-T, but with the chemicals’ effects specified as the consequence of a “Toxicant-Induced Loss of Tolerance” (TILT) as Miller (1996) suggests.

(13) Groups PC,TILT,G-T, PCL,TILT,G-T, PCT,TILT,G-T, PCE,TILT,G-T (Ashford and Miller 1998, 246ff):

Same as groups PC,TILT-T, PCL,TILT-T, PCT,TILT-T, and PCE,TILT-T, but with those suffering from the symptoms specified as Gulf-War veterans.

(14) Groups PC,TILT,SB-T, PCL,TILT,SB-T, PCT,TILT,SB-T, PCE,TILT,SB-T (Ashford and Miller 1998, 237ff):

Same as groups PC,TILT-T, PCL,TILT-T, PCT,TILT-T, and PCE,TILT-T, but with those suffering from the symptoms specified as people who reside or work in “Sick Buildings.”

(15) Groups PC,TILT,P-T, PCL,TILT,P-T, PCT,TILT,P-T, PCE,TILT,P-T (Ashford and Miller 1998, 235ff):

Same as groups PC,TILT-T, PCL,TILT-T, PCT,TILT-T, and PCE,TILT-T, but with those suffering from the symptoms specified as people who received acute exposure to one or more Pesticides.

(16) Groups PC,A-T, PCL,A-T, PCT,A-T, PCE,A-T, PC,TILT,A-T, PCL,TILT,A-T, PCT,TILT,A-T, PCE,TILT,A-T (Ashford and Miller 1998, 34ff, Randolph 1962, 1987):

Same as groups PC-T, PCL-T, PCT-T, PCE-T, PC,TILT-T, PCL,TILT-T, PCT,TILT-T, PCE,TILT-T, but with the symptoms specified as displaying “Adaptive” characteristics (i.e., the symptoms gradually disappear after individuals are exposed to the toxic chemicals for an extended period of time, but the symptoms reappear if individuals are separated from the chemicals for a period of time and then re-exposed to them).

384

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