MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE

Minnesota Studies in the PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

RONALD N. GIERE, GENERAL EDITOR

HERBERT FEIGL, FOUNDING EDITOR

VOLUME XIV

Scientific Theories

EDITED BY

C. WADE SAVAGE

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA PRESS, MINNEAPOLIS Copyright © 1990 by the Regents of the All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo­ copying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Published by the University of Minnesota Press 2037 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, MN 55414. Printed in the of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Scientific theories/edited by C. Wade Savage. p. cm. -(Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science: v. 14) Some of these papers were originally presented at an institute conducted by the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science from 1985 to 1987. ISBN 0-8166-1801-1 I. Science-Philosophy. 2. Science-Methodology. 3. Science-Evaluation. I. Savage, C. Wade. II. Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science. III. Series. Ql75.M64 vol. 14 [Ql75.55] 501-dc20 90-32932 CIP The University of Minnesota is an equal-opportunity educator and employer. Contents

Preface vu Introduction 3 Seek and Ye Might Find Arthur L. Caplan 22 The Psychoanalytic Enterprise in Scientific Perspective Adolf Griinbaum 41 On the of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective Paul M. Church/and 59 Are Economic Kinds Natural? Alan Nelson 102 Foundational Physics and Empiricist Critique Lawrence Sklar 136 Theories as Mere Conventions Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. 158 and in Science, or Tom Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes Wesley C. Salmon 175 Bayesian Problems of Old Evidence Ellery Eells 205 Fitting Your Theory to the : Probably Not Such a Bad Thing After All Colin Howson 224 The Value of Knowledge Brian Skyrms 245 Demystifying Larry Laudan 267 Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation Thomas S. Kuhn 298 Scientific Revolutions and Scientific Rationality: The Case of the Elderly Holdout John Worrall 319 Realism, Approximate Truth, and Philosophical Method Richard Boyd 355 Contrastive Elliott Sober 392 Contributors 413 Consensus Institute Staff 417 Author Index 421 Subject Index 425 Preface

From the fall of 1985 through the spring of 1987 the Minnesota Center for Philos­ ophy of Science conducted an institute-an ongoing conference-whose focal question was: Is there a new consensus in the philosophy of science? The old con­ sensus was of course logical empiricism, or , the position forged during the first half of the century by Russell, Schlick, Carnap, Feigl, Reichenbach, Hempel, Nagel, and others, and dissolved during the third quarter by the criti­ cisms of Quine, Hanson, Feyerabend, Kuhn, and others. The explicit purpose of the conference was to ascertain whether, in the wake of this criticism and the resulting loss of focus and direction, some new consensus was emerging that might come to provide the same sort of structure and direction for the field as had the old consensus. For this purpose the field was initially divided into three tradi­ tional areas: scientific explanation, scientific theories, and scientific justification or evaluation. The present volume's predecessor and companion - Scientific Ex­ planation, volume 13, edited by Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon-contains papers in the first area. The present volume contains papers in the second and third areas. It is not a conference proceedings in the strict sense, for some par­ ticipants did not write papers and some wrote them afterward, and some papers were additionally solicited. Furthermore, at later stages two other areas were added to the agenda: the relation between history and philosophy of science, and recent developments in the philosophy of cognitive science. With few exceptions, these additional symposia are not represented in the two volumes. What then is our result? Is a new consensus emerging in the philosophy of science, either in general, or in the special areas represented by the two volumes? Comments here will be limited to the nature and acceptance of scientific theories. (Comments on scientific explanation can be found in volume 13.) The answer to the special question would seem to be negative. The syntactic view that a theory is an axiomatized collection of sentences has been challenged by the semantic view that a theory is a collection of nonlinguistic models, and both are challenged by the view that a theory is an amorphous entity consisting perhaps of sentences and models, but just as importantly of exemplars, problems, standards, skills,

vii viii Preface practices, and tendencies. Similarly, several views of theory confirmation com­ pete for allegiance. The best confirmed theory is variously held to be the one with the greatest number and variety of observed consequences, the one with the highest degree of confirmation (probability) on the observed evidence, or the one that best explains the observed evidence. Some theorists regard a decision­ theoretic approach as superior to those above. Still others hold that theories of confirmation beg the question of whether theories are, can be, or should be "confirmed" and recommend replacing them by accounts of how theories are dis­ covered, accepted, and developed. The answer to the general question is more complex, partly because it applies to more areas than the traditional three above, and partly because it includes second-order questions about the nature and scope of philosophy of science (which naturally complicate the first-order questions). Nonetheless, the answer here also seems to be negative. The once dominant conception of philosophy of science as the logical analysis and reconstruction of science is generally regarded to be moribund, and no comparably general conception has replaced it. Philoso­ phy of science has become exceedingly broad and diverse. It now attends to prac­ tical and experimental science in addition to theoretical science, and it examines a virtually unrestricted range of sciences and scientific practices. It is no longer simply the and methodology of science, but involves in addition the history, sociology, and psychology of science. These developments have been accompa­ nied by the growing view that philosophy of science should be scientific, naturalistic. This view regards previous theories of the structure and acceptance of scientific theories as idealizations, and recommends replacing them by ac­ counts of what science is actually, in its natural psychosocial setting. Such studies have led some to conclude that science is not an objective, rule-governed, rational activity, and that its development is not a rational process. On one suggestion, the development of science is a process comparable to Darwinian natural selec­ tion. Another view is that, although scientific rationality cannot be equated with logicality, science is rational in a sense philosophers are currently attempting to explicate. The welter of conflicting views has suggested to many that the only consensus in philosophy of science is that there is no consensus. Indeed, the pluralistic ideol­ ogy currently in favor is unsympathetic to attempts to achieve or even locate con­ sensus, for fear that some new and equally stifling dogma will replace the old. It seems that to seek now for anything so definite as consensus in philosophy of science-some set of doctrines to rival the positivist consensus of earlier years - is premature at best. The field seems to contain too much diversity and too much ferment to permit it. Most of the essays presented here reflect the concerns and themes of current philosophy of science, either by pursuing them, or by criticizing them, or by at­ tempting to harmonize them with others, occasionally with some of the old con- PREFACE ix

sensus. Although they do not constitute a new consensus, and perhaps do not even point toward one, they do provide a bridge between the old and the new. One goal of our institute was to survey current philosophy in a manner that would be useful to a general academic audience as well as to specialists in the field. As a consequence, most of the essays are relatively accessible, and the in­ troduction has been designed to increase their accessibility and usefulness to those who wish to sample the field. The volume should therefore be suitable for begin­ ning graduate and advanced undergraduate courses, as well as the more advanced contexts. We wish to acknowledge the support of institutions and individuals who made our institute on consensus possible. A major grant from the National of the Humanities provided most of the funds for the conference. (Philip Kitcher and Wade Savage were the principal investigators.) The College of Liberal Arts and the Office of the President of the University of Minnesota provided a substan­ tial supplementary grant. We thank them all. We also thank the faculty who staffed the institute; their names appear at the end of the volume. Finally, we thank the students and faculty who attended the lectures and contributed to the discussions. It was a stimulating experience for everyone involved.

CONTRIBUTORS

Contributors

Richard Boyd is a professor of philosophy in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. He is the author of a long series of papers defending , one of which appears in this volume. His other published works have been in the , the , semantic theory, the theory of natural kinds, and metaethics.

Arthur Caplan is a professor of philosophy and member of the Center for Philoso­ phy of Science at the University of Minnesota. He is also director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics and a professor of surgery at the University of Minnesota. Caplan received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Columbia University and has taught there and at the . He has written extensively on topics in the and medicine, medical ethics, and health policy. He is writing a book on the philosophy of medicine.

Paul M. Churchland is professor and chair of philosophy, a member of the Cognitive Science Faculty, and a member of the InStitute for Neural Computation, at the University of California, San Diego. His research addresses and the philosophy of science, perception and the philosophy of mind, and computational neuroscience and connectionist AI. He has authored Scientific Realism and the P!,asticity of the Mind (1979); Matter and Consciousness (1984); and A Neurocomputational Perspective: 1he Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (1989). He also serves as president of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology.

Ellery Eells is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He received his Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1980. Eells is author of Rational Decision and (1982) and a number of papers on decision theory, confirmation theory, probability, and causation. He has recently completed Probabilistic Causality (forthcoming from Cambridge University Press).

Adolf Griinbaum is Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy, research professor of psychiatry, and chairman of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University

413 414 Contributors of Pittsburgh. His writings deal with the , the theory of scientific rationality, and the . His books include Philosophi­ cal Problems of Space and Time (2d ed., 1973) and The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique (1984). He has contributed over two hun­ dred articles to anthologies and to philosophical and scientific periodicals. Griinbaum is president of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) and of the Philosophy of Science Association, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a laureate of the international Academy of Humanism. In 1985, he delivered the Gifford Lectures in Scotland, as well as the Werner Heisenberg Lecture to the Bavarian Academy of Sciences in Munich. He received a 1985 Senior U.S. Scientist Humboldt Prize and the 1989 Fregene Prize (Rome, Italy).

Colin Howson is a senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Logic, and at the London School of Economics, from which he graduated in 1%7 with first class honours. He has taught at universities in both the United Kingdom and the United States, and is a member of the organizing committee of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science. Howson has published extensively in philosophy of science journals, edited Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences (1986), and is the author with Peter Urbach of Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach (1989). Much of his recent work has been concerned with promoting the claim of personal probability to be regarded as the foundation of the logic of inductive inference.

Thomas S. Kuhn received his Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Harvard in 1949 and spent the.next three years as a junior fellow in the Harvard Society of Fellows, learning to be a historian of that field. Since then he has taught and philosophy of science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Princeton universities, and, since 1979, MIT, where he is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy. As a historian, Kuhn has published on topics ranging from The Copernican Revolution (1957), his first book, to Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity (1987), his most recent. He is best known, however, for a more theoretical, philosophical volume called The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970), and for an accompanying volume of essays, The Essential Tension (1979).

Henry Kyburg began his academic career as an engineer, with a degree in chemical from . He did graduate work in philosophy at Columbia University, but on receiving his Ph.D. became an assistant professor of mathematics at Wesleyan University. He has worked on both induction and probability in philoso­ phy of science and epistemology. He is author or editor of twelve books, ranging from the purely mathematical Probability Theory to the generally philosophical Epistemology and Inference. Kyburg's recent work has concerned the epistemic CONTRIBUTORS 4J 5 relation between theory and measurement (Theory and Measurement). It is perhaps his engineering background that leads him to take error as inevitable, and therefore to see an intimate connection between theoretical acceptance and observational error.

Larry Laudan is professor and chairman of philosophy at the University of Hawaii. He has written extensively on the problem of scientific change, including Progress and Its Problems (1977), Science and Hypothesis, and Science and Values (1984). He is completing a project that involves a critique of epistemological , out of which his contribution to this volume has grown. That study will be published as Science and Relativism. He has taught at London, Pittsburgh, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and has held visiting positions at Vienna, Konstanz, Melbourne, and Illinois-Chicago Circle.

Alan Nelson is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. His articles on topics related to "Are Economic Kinds Natural?" have appeared in or will soon appear in Philosophy ofScience, Nous, Pacific Philosophi­ cal Quarterly, Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Erkenntnis, and Midwest Studies in Philosophy. He is studying the debate about scientific realism and philo­ sophical issues in seventeenth-century science.

Wesley C. Salmon is University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. Among his books are Scientific F,xp/anation and the Causal Structure of the World (1984), Space, Time, and Motion: A Philosophical Introduction, and The Foundations of Scientific Inference (1967). He edited : Logical Empiricist (1979) and Zenos Paradoxes. He is co-editor, with Philip Kitcher, of Scientific F,xp/anation, volume 13 of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy ofScience. Salmon has taught at UCLA, Washington State College, Northwestern University, Brown University, Indiana University, and the University of Arizona, with visiting appointments at Bristol (England), Melbourne (Australia), Bologna (Italy), and the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science. He has served as president of the Phi­ losophy of Science Association and of the American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division). He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

C. Wade Savage is professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota and a member of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science. He was director of the Center from 1980 to 1984 and a codirector of its institute on consensus in philosophy of science during 1985-87. Savage is author of The Measurement of Sensation: A Study ofPerceptual Psychophysics. He is editor of Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology (1978) and senior editor of and contributor to Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russells and Epistemology (1989), both volumes in the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science series. 416 Contributors

Lawrence Sklar received his training in mathematics and physics at and in philosophy of science at . Major interests are in the phi­ losophy of physics, the philsosophy of science, and epistemology. Published work includes two books on the philosophy of space and time (Space, Time, and Spacetime, 1977, and Philosophy and Spacetime Physics, 1985). His current focus of interest is philosophical issues in the foundations of statistical mechanics and in the role of theories in science.

Brian Skyrms is professor of philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. He is the author of Choice & Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic (1986), Causal Necessity (1980), and Pragmatics and Empiricism (1984). A new book, Ihe Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, is forthcoming.

Elliott Sober is Hans Reichenbach Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. His two books on philosophical issues in evolutionary biology are Ihe Nature ofSelection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus (1984) and Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference. He also is interested in philosophical problems concerning causality, explanation, and confirmation.

John Worrall is reader in philosophy of science at the London School of Economics. He is especially interested in the general phenomenon of theory-change in science and is the author of several articles on rationality, theory-change, and scientific realism. He has made a special study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century physics, especially optics, and is the author of a forthcoming book on reason and revolution in science, which includes a detailed study of Fresnel's wave revolution in optics. Editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science from 1973 to 1982, he also edited (with Elie Zahar) lmre Lakatos's Proofs and Refutations (1976) and (with Greg Currie) Lakatos's Philosophical Papers (1978). Consensus Institute Sta.ff

Ned Block, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Richard Boyd, Cornell University Robert Butts, University of Western Ontario Christopher Cherniak, University of Maryland , University of California at San Diego Ellery Eells, University of Wisconsin at Madison Ronald Giere, University of Minnesota Clark Glymour, Carnegie-Mellon University Adolf Griinbaum, University of Pittsburgh Erwin Hiebert, Colin Howson, University of London David Hull, Northwestern University Paul Humphreys, University of Virginia , Massachusetts lnstinite of Technology Henry Kyburg, University of Rochester Larry Laudan, University of Hawaii Ernan McMullin, Alan Musgrave, University of Otago Alan Nelson, University of California at Irvine David Papineau, Cambridge University Peter Railton, Robert Richardson, University of Cincinnati Merrilee Salmon, University of Pittsburgh Wesley Salmon, University of Pittsburgh Lawrence Sklar, University of Michigan Bryan Skyrms, University of California at Irvine Paul Smolensky, University of Colorado at Boulder Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin at Madison Stephen Stich, Rutgers University Zeno Switink, State University of New York at Buffalo , Princeton University John Worrall, University of London

417

INDEXES

Author Index

Adee!, M., 267 Chihara, c., 221 Airy, G. B., 320--21, 323-25, 338, 340, Churchland, P. M., 3, 6, 60, 86 342-43, 347, 350--51 Churchland, P. S., 59 Allen, R., 107, 133 Clarke, S., 134 Allen, S., 298 Collins, H. M., 268, 293 Arago, D. F. J., 324 Cooter, R., 133 , 286, 299 Copernicus, N., 352 Arrow, K., 132 Craig, W., 159 Austin, J. L., 306 Crick, F., 59

Bacon, F., 225 Darwin, C., 367, 374 Barrett, M., 205 Davisson, C. J., 186 Bauder, M., 205 de Broglie, L., 186 Becker, G., 130 de Finetti, B., 14, 222, 227 Berkeley, G., 151 de Sitter, W., 237 Bettelheim, B., 43 Derrida, J.' 268 Biot, J.-B., 320, 344 Descartes, R., 151, 225, 286, 394, 404 Block, N., 298 Donkin, W. F., 252-53 Bloor, D., 268, 288, 289-91, 297, 319 Duhem, P., 158, 203, 267, 273, 289, 331, 334, Bohr, N., 299, 315, 327 340, 344, 348-49, 352 Boyd, R., 4, 18-20, 268, 375, 397, 408 Brahe, T., 190 Eagle, M., 42 Braithwaite, R. B., 175 Edgeworth, F. Y., 234 Breuer, J., 44-46, 48-49, 52 Eells, E., 3, 11-12, 257 Brewster, D., 17-18, 194-95, 203, 320--29, Einstein, A., 8-9, 139-41, 143, 146, 148, 153, 336, 338-48, 350--51 181-82, 327-28 Bromberger, S., 298 Eissler, K., 47 Brush, S. G., 184 Erikson, E., 50 Byrd, M., 205 Eysenck, H., 55

Caplan, A., 3-4 Feigl, H., vii, 175, 202 Carnap, R., vii, 169, 175, 177, 183, 202, 235, Feyerabend, P. K., vii, 11, 172, 268, 330, 341, 298, 393, 396, 407 352 Cartwright, D., 298 Field, H., 364 Cavendish, H., 188 Fine, A., 102, 397, 408-9

421 422 Author Index

Fisher, R. A., 230, 239 Holzman, P., 53 Fisher, S., 56 Horwich, P., 298 Ford, G., 46 Howson, C., 12-13, 15-16, 241, 243 Foucault, J. B. L., 194 Hubbard, L. R., 185 Fresnel, A. J., 324-25, 327, 330, 332, 336, Hubel, D. H., 76, 79 342, 352 Hume, D., 151, 272, 405 Freud, S., 5-6, 185-86, 203 Humphreys, P., 202 Friedman, M., 115-16 Huygens, C., 193

Galileo, 134, 190, 326, 333, 337-38 Januner, M., 134 Garber, D., 11-12, 206-8, 210-18, 220, 222 Jaspers, K., 43 Gardner, M., 185 Jaynes, E. T., 239 Garfinkle, A., 400 Jeffrey, R., 12, 210-12, 218-22, 246, 248-49, Gay, P., 42 253-55, 257 Gibbard, A., 255-56 Jeffi'eys, H., 225, 235 Giere, R. N., 63, 225, 228-30 Jones, E., 55 Glymour, C., 205-7, 211, 222, 229-30, 238, Joseph, G., 392 408 Good, I. J., 14, 245-46, 250, 253 Kahneman, D., 240 Goodman, N., 15, 225, 282-84 Kant, I., 128, 393 Gordon, S., 102 Kepler, J., 234, 326, 333, 337-38 Gonnan, R. P., 72 Keynes, J.M., 243 Gottschalk, C. W., 31 Kitcher, P., vii, ix, 59, 97, 102, 175, 234, 319, Graves, P., 249 352 Greenberg, R. D., 56 Kline, P., 55-6 Grimaldi, F. M., 345 Kolff, W., 28 Griinbaum, A., 3, 5, 42-43, 49, 53, 175, 197, Kripke, s., 17, 309 202-3, 267, 275, 294, 296, 319 Kuhn, T. S., vii, 3-4, 7, 10-11, 16-18, 62-63, 95, 97, 172, 175-77, 179, 185, 191, Habennas, J., 43 196-202, 268, 278, 294, 319-21, 326-37, Hacking, I., 213, 217, 222 339, 343-44, 348-49, 351-53 Hahn, F., 132 Kung, J., 392 Hamilton, W. R., 321, 325, 351 Kyburg, H. E. Jr., 3, 9-10, 159 Hanson, N. R., vii, 7 Hardin, c., 357 Lakatos, I., 268, 292-94, 331-32, 334, 341, Harper, w., 255-57, 259 352 Harsanyi, J. c., 261 Laudan, L., 3, 15-17, 275, 356 Hausman, D., 102 Lavoisier, A.-L., 319, 337 Hebb, D. 0., 90 Lehky, s., 76 Hegel, G. W. F., 392 Leibniz, G. W., 134, 151-52, 225, 242 Heisenberg, W., 148-49, 152 Leplin, J., 267 Hempel, C. G., vii, 175, 201, 295, 395, 408 Levi, I., 170 Henderson, J., 112-13 Lewis, C. I., 157 Herbart, J. F., 41, 56 Lewis, D., 160, 255-56 Hershel, J. F. W., 323 Lindley, D. V., 250 Hesse, M., 16, 165, 268, 218, 288-90, 294-95 Llinas, R., 86, 90 Hicks, J., 107, 133 Lloyd, H., 321, 325, 335, 351 Higginbothmn, J., 298 Locke, J., 363, 372 Hinton, G. E., 78 Loftus, E., 57 Holton, G., 184 Lxell, c., 406 AUTHOR INDEX 423

Mach, E., 151, 158, 394 Raiffa, H., 250 Mac1.aine, S., 46 Ramsey, F. P., 14, 183, 227, 250-52, 254 Malament, D., 146, 408 Rappaport, P., 133 Malcolm, J., 42 Redhead, M. L. G., 225, 228-31 Mann, T., 41 Reichenbach, H., vii, 175, 177, 202, 394, 401, Marx, K., 106 404 Masson, J., 42 Rescher, N., 319 Maxwell, G., 395 Richter, R., 257, 259 Maxwell, J. C., 142, 330 Ricoeur, P., 43 Mayo, D., 267 Robb, A., 145 Mendel, G., 229-31 Rosenberg, A., 102, 127, 133, 357 Michelson, A. A., 8 Rosenberg, C. R., 74, 80 Miller, D. W., 233, 241, 296 Rosenblatt, F., 78 Morley, E. W., 8 Rumelhart, D. E., 59, 78, 90 Motley, M. T., 185, 203 Russell, B., vii, 9, 341 Musgrave, A., 267 Salmon, W. C., vii, 3, 10-12, 16, 20, 180, Nagel, E., vii 184, 202-3 Nelson, A., 7-8 Samuelson, P., 107-8, 133 Newton, I., 122-25, 133-34, 151, 299, 315, Savage, C. W., ix, 102, 319 321, 333, 345, 351 Savage, L. J., 14, 226, 245-46, 250, 254-56 Newton-Smith, W., 268, 293 Schlaifer, R., 250 Nickles, T., 236 Schlick, M., vii Schopenhauer, A., 41 Oddie, C., 241 Schrooinger, E., 148-49 Oersted, H. C., 184 Scribner, 28-31 Sejnowski, T. J., 59, 72, 74, 76-77, 80, 84 Partee, B., 298 Shapin, S., 319 Pearson, K., 234 Sharvy, R., 259 Peirce, C. S., 282 Shirnony, A., 179, 184 Pellionisz, A., 86, 90 Sklar, L., 3, 8-9 Pinnick, C., 267 Skyrms, B., 3, 14, 206, 208-10, 255-56, 408 Plank, M., 299 Smith, V., 118 , 41 Sneed, J. D., 316 Poincare, H., 158, 161, 237, 331, 334, 343, Sober, E., 4, 19-21, 205 352, 394 Stalnaker, R. , 25 5-56 Polanyi, M., 268 Stegmiiller, W., 316 Popper, K., 5, 56, 157, 170, 174, 197, 224-25, Stich, S., 59 233, 235, 243, 278, 282, 296, 331 Strachey, J., 43, 47 Powell, B., 323-25, 338, 340, 342-43, 347, Suppes, P., 186 350-51 Swales, P., 42 Priestley, J., 319-21, 328 Putnam, H., 17, 20, 309-11, 375, 393-94, 396 Tarski, A., 356-57 Teller, P., 102 Quandt, R., 112-13 Thomson, J., 298 Quine, W. v. 0., vii, 9-10, 16, 21, 158, 160, Tiechy, 296 174, 267-68, 271-85, 288, 290, 292, Tiles, M., 267 293-96, 299-300, 370, 407 Tobin, J., 114 Quinn, P., 267, 275 Toulmin, S., 134 Quinton, A. M., 28-30 Tversky, A., 240-41 424 Author Index

Ullian, J. S., 158 Watkins, J., 235, 319 Urbach, P., 236 Watschinger, 28 Whewell, W., 282 Van Fraassen, B. C., 394-%, 404, 408 Wiesel, T. N., 76, 79 Varian, H., 132 Williams, R. J., 78 Velikovsky, I., 185 Wilson, G., 55 Volta, A., 183, 299 Wilson, M., 408 von Hartmann, E., 41 Wittgenstein, L., 268, 306, 316 von Kries, F. C., 243 Worrall, J., 4, 17-18, 225, 233

Wallace, N., 114 Zahar, E. G., 225, 228-29, 319, 352 Wallerstein, R., 42 Zamansky, H., 55 Wason, P., 240 Zipser, D., 59 Subject Index

Abduction, 20, 395, 397-98, 405 Coherence, 183, 290, 379-81; dynamic, 262; Aboutness, 396 local, 380; static, 262 Absorption, 401 Commodity: naturalistic foundation for, 130; Acceptance, 4, 33 pretheoretical concept of, 128; pretheoretical Accuracy, 10, 18, 176, 197, 285, 319, 326, notion of, 119, 133; refinement of, 125 333, 336-39, 352, 358, 396, 399 Computation, 60 Ad hoc, 3, 11-13, 15, 225, 234, 236-38, 349, Computer, digital, 62 353, 357-58, 378-79 Conceptual: categories, 315; evolution, units of, Advertising, 33 23; truths, 373; unification, 96-97 Al. See Confirmation, 3 Analogy, 151, 186, 198, 210 Confirmational virtues, 196, 198 Analytic/synthetic distinction, 141 Consequence condition, 233 Approximation, relevant respects of, 357-58 Consistency, 11, 18, 21, 176, 185, 197, 284, Artificial intelligence (Al), 60-61, 76-77 326, 333, 335-36, 388 Constructivism, 19, 361, 370-71, 388-89 Balmer's formula, 109-10 Constructs, theoretical, 117 Bayesianism: confirmation theory, 11-13, 15; Consumer: folk-economic concept of, 127; global, 212-13; local, 212-17 psychological facts about, 108 Bayes's theorem, 10, 12-14, 20 Continental drift, 408 Belmont Report, 37 Contrivance objection, 357, 380 Bode's law, 110, 133 Convention: arbitrary, 9, 160-62, 164, 173; Body, 122-25, 127-29, 134; pretheoretical mere, 9, 161, 164, 172-73 concept of, 128; refinement of, 125 , 140, 394 Brain, 6-7, 67, 76, 79, 83, 88-91, 94-95; Copernican revolution, 337 function, 64; functional persistence of, 83; Creationist, 320, 328, 341, 352 structure of, 62 Decision theory: causal, 14, 254-55, 257-59; Can openers, 178, 202-3 evidential, 14, 254-55, 257; foundations of, Catchall, 179, 184, 188-93, 195, 200 257 Causal theory, 16-17, 302, 311-14, 318 Deconstructionism, 268 Circularity objection, 358, 361, 369, 385 Defense mechanisms, 55 Clinical strategies, evolution of, 32 Definition, 303, 312; naturalistic, 364, 383 Cognition, nature of, 97 Degenerating program, 347-49 Cognitive: development, 82, 98; egalitarianism, Deliberation, 257-61; costs of, 260 thesis of, 270 Delta rule, 78-79, 89-91

425 426 Subject Index

Demand, 115; functions, 107 Experiment: cost-free, 249 Denotational refinement, 365, 372 Experimentation, 3, 36-38 Discovery, 4, 12, 32-33, 36-37, 39; context of, Experimentation-to-therapy continuum, 38 201 Explanation, vii; dialectical, 379-80; static, Distribution principle, 167 379-80 Dream theory, 5, 52-53, 55 Explanatory success, 341-42, 347 Dreams, 5, 43, 48, 50-56; counter-wish, 53-55 Duhem-Quine thesis, 273, 277, 289, 294 Facts, 352 Dutch book, 183, 203, 205, 216-17, 222, 262 Fair betting quotients, 227 Dynamic assumption, 227-28, 241 , 296 Filter condition, 230-31 Earth, shape of, 286 Firms, 104-5 Economic: folk theory, 128; virtues, 196-97 Force, 16-17, 301-6, 313-14, 316-17 Economics, 7-8; folk, 120; foundations of, 112 Formal criteria, 184-86 Economy, 290 Formalism, 392 Egalitarian thesis, 271, 277-78, 280, 292, 294, , 3, 6, 8, 92, 365, 383-84, 386; 296 inference, 365-66; premise, 365 Emission theory, 17-18, 323-25, 333, 335-36, Frame problem, 61 338-40, 344-47, 351 Free association, 5, 43, 46-52 Empirical: adequacy, 18, 20, 284, 394; Fruitfulness, 11, 18, 21, 176, 197-99, 285, 326, equivalence, 394, 396-97, 403, 408; 333-34 equivalence, engineering approach to, 403 Empiricism, 8, 10, 19-20, 366, 370-71, 388, Garden-path argument, 395, 406 392-96, 399, 402, 404, 407-9; constructive, Generalization, 85, 96 395-96, contrastive, 20, 392, 398, 402, GET (General Equilibrium Theory), 7, 103-6, 404-7; foundational, 9; logical, vii, 175, 118-19; stagnation of, 121 381, 404, 407; pragmatic, 408 Gold, 309, 311-14, 318 Entities, theoretical, 351 Good's theorem, 14-15, 246, 250, 253-61 Epistemology: autonomy of, 99; foundationalist, 365; naturalistic, 6, 98, 356, 365, 383, Hemodialysis, 28, 30-34, 36-38; access to, 32 388-89; normative, 268, 272-73; sentential, Heuristic power, 332 60 Hidden: layer, 69, 74, 79; motives, doctrine of, Equilibrium, 7, 103-6, 257-61 42; units, 68, 71, 75, 77, 79-85, 96-7; Error, 72-73, 75, 78-79, 82, 84, 89-90, 93, units, optimal number of, 84-85 95-97; global, 72-73, 78-79, 90, 95, 97; Historical objection, 357, 378 local, 78, 97 History and philosophy of science, relation Essence, 318, 366, 369; nominal, 363, 382 between, vii Essentialism, 382 History of science, viii, 4 Ether, 8, 139, 142, 144, 154, 322-25, 330-31, Holism, 271, 277, 285, 290, 293-94, 296 335, 339, 342-43, 351 Homeostasis, 373-74, 384 Evidence: independent, 210, 239, 335; new, Homosexuality, repressed, 55 206; new new, 222; new old, 12, 207; old, Hooke's law, 304, 306, 347 3, 11-13, 205-7, 210, 218, 220, 222; old, HUD (Humean underdetermination), 269-72, historical problem of, 206-7; old new, 12, 280, 288-89, 291, 294-96 206-9; old old, 12, 207 Hume's problem, 349 Evidential certainties: corpus of, 165, 170; Hypnosis, 5, 46-47 indistinguishability thesis, 363, 366, 381, 383 Evolutionary theory, 367-69, 374, 378 Identity of indiscemibles, 152 Examples, 95, 302-6, 314, 316 lncommensurability, 16-17, 172, 201, 299, 315 Exchangeability, 203 Incorrigibilia, corpus of, 163, 165 SUBJECT INDEX 427

Indifference: curves, 108, 132; map, 109, Methodology, viii; naturalistic, 356 112-14, 132; principle of, 243 Miller's paradox, 241 Induction, rationality of, 136 Mine, 6, 70-74, 79-80, 84-85 Inductive logic, 162-63, 165 Minimization principle, 167 Inference to the best explanation, 19-20, 141, Miracle argument, 19-20, 396-400 363, 379, 395, 397, 399-400 Money, 133; commodity, 114-15; fiat, 105, Information, free, 14, 256, 258-59 114-15 Informational: feedback, 257-61; virtues, 196-97 Moral rationality, naturalistic, 384 Insertability, 401 Mutual ratification, 382-83 Instrumental reliability, 360 Myth of the given, 248 , 3, 117-18, 173, 202, 343 Insufficient reason, principle of, 243 Names, proper, 309, 312 Intentions, 37-38 Natural selection, viii Intemeuron, 89 , 64, 405; realist, 8 Irrefutability, 160 Netput vector, 105-6 NETtalk, 74, 76, 79-80 Jeffreys-conditionalization, 241 Network, 6; training up, 72, 78 Justification, vii; context of, 201 Neuron, 6, 64-65, 67, 79, 86, 88-89, 93-94 Neuropsychology, 9; connectionist, 6 Kidney, 4-5; artificial, 28-30, 32, 37 Neuroscience, connectionist, 3 Kind, 314-15, 363-64, 370-75, 382, 384; folk­ Newcomb's: paradox, 14; problem, 254 theoretic, 124, 127; natural, 3, 7-8; 102-4, Newton's: first law, 303-4, 316; second law, 118-22, 127-33, 136-38, 312, 318; 305-6, 310, 315-17; third law, 304 sameness of, 311 Newtonian mechanics, 16, 122, 124-25, Knowledge, examiner's view of, 216 127-29, 301-2, 306 Kripke-Putnam theory, 132 Nonlinear response profile, 77 Kuhn loss, 337-38, 340, 352 Nonuniqueness thesis, 271, 280-81, 291-92, 293-94, 296 Law of gravity, 306-7, 310, 315, 317 Null-support thesis, 13, 225-26, 228-31, 233, Learning, 6, 14, 300, 302-4, 306-8, 314-15; 236 algorithms, 73, 77, 82, 85, 89-90, 97; Hebbian, 90-91 Objective factors, 326-28, 333, 335-37, 351 Lexical: accessibility, 316; change, 317 Observable/nonobservable distinction, 142 Lexicon: change of, 308, 314-15; local : language, 383, 402; reports, 10, adjustment of, 299; transmission of, 316 165, 167-68, 170-71, 403; sentences, 160; Logical: fallibility, 213; nonomniscience, 218, statement, 8, 10, 20-21, 165, 167, 172, 220; omniscience, 12, 211, 213, 215-16 402, 408; vocabulary, 10 Observation/theory distinction, 9 Marginalist revolution, 106 Observational: consequences, 159-60, 171, 173; Martingale, 263 vocabulary, addition to, 169; vocabulary, Marxian economics, 132 change of, 171 Mass, 16-17, 301-2, 304-7, 313-14, 316-17 Observational/nonobservational distinction, 149, Material criteria, 184-86. 153 Meaning accrual, 137-40, 147, 155-57 Observational/theoretical distinction, 160, 173 Mechanics, classical, 7 Ontology, thinned down, 143; thinning of, 147 Metaphor, 301, 308 Ostension, 316 Metaphorical extension, 307 Ostensive element, 302 Metaphysics, 317, 350, 366-69, 377, 383; experimental, 367; naturalistic, 356, 383 Parallel processor, 62 Methodological conservatism, 141, 144, 147 Parameters, undetermined, 239 428 Subject Index

Parametric specification, 360 Properties: essential, 309, 311-13; superficial, Parapraxes, 43, 51 312-13, 318; theoretical, 312-13 Parsimony, 20, 155, 395, 405-7 Property cluster, 19, 372-75, 383-84 Partial denotation, 364, 372, 375 Pseudomemories, 46 Perceptron, 77-7 8 Psychoanalysis, 3, 5; hermeneutic reconstruction Perceptual recognition, 63-64, 71 of, 43 Perrnissivism, 140 Psychohistory, 42 Personalism, tempered, 184 Psychology, 6, 8-9, 228, 239; cognitive, 5; Personalist-Bayesianism, 327-28 folk, 55, 120-21, 127; mob, 326-28; of Personality, theory of, 48--49 science, viii Phenomenalism, 156, 202 Psychosexual development, 49 Philosophical package, 360, 385-89 Philosophy: of biology, 23-24; of cognitive Quantum: mechanics, 9, 148-50, 152, 154; science, vii; of science, consensus in, vii; of theory, 18, 327, 367-69 science, nature of, viii; of science, scope of, QUD (Quinean underdetermination), 274-77, viii 280-81, 288, 294-95; compatibilist version Phlogiston, 352 of, 274-76; entailment version of, 274-75 Phoneme, 69, 72-74, 76, 79-80, 94 Questions, internal/external, 407 , 202 Placebo: effect, 45, 48--49; hypothesis, 5 Randomness, 189 Platonism, 392 Ratifiability, 257-58 Plausible scenario, 193-96, 199-200, 204 Rationality, viii, 3, 11, 16-18, 59, 61, 98-99, Point-valued theory, 241 173, 175-77, 196, 199-200, 216-17, 222, Poisson bright spot, 187-89, 194, 199 272-73, 276-77, 280, 294, 372, 375, 384; Popperian gambit, 272, 281 dynamic/kinematic, 200; static, 200 Positivism, vii, 202 Raven, 10, 165-68, 172; paradox of, 408 Possible worlds, 17, 300, 308, 310, 315-16 Realism, 3, 19-20, 117-18, 137, 141, 173, 202, Post hoc, 226, 334, 338, 340 268, 293, 317, 392-94, 396-97, 399--400, Practical certainties, corpus of, 164, 167-73 404, 407-9; abductive argument for, Pragmatic criteria, 184 358--{)1, 381; internal, 317; metaphysical, , 8, 137 375 Precapitalistic societies, 130 Reference, 4, 19, 298, 309, 317, 364, 375, 384; Prediction, independent, 226, 237 causal theory of, 4, 298, 309, 364, 383 Predictive: observational content, 167--{)8, Referential history, 310 170-72; observational content, principle of Refinement, 7, 124-29, 134, 171 maximizing, 168; success, 322, 325, Relativism, 269, 317 334-38, 340--42, 347' 350, 353 Renal: failure, 25, 27-35; function, 27 Preference, revealed, 108, 112-15, 133 Representation, 6-7, 60-64, 67, 69, 75, 77, 80, Prescientific given, myth of, 137 82, 84-85, 90 Price, 105-9 Repression, 5; sexual, 43, 49, 52-53, 56 Primitive denotation, 376 Research, 3--4 Priors, washing out of, 187, 192, 196 Retainment, 277 Probability: dynamic, 253, 262; kinematics, Rigid designation, 17, 298 belief change by, 249-50, 252-53; objective, 181, 183-84, 188; personal, 180-81, 184, SARP (Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference), 186-89, 200 107-8, 133 Production function, 105--{) Science: applied, 24-25; best available 137, 153; Projectability, 362, 377, 379, 382-83, 388 as cumulative, 329, 331; experimental, viii; Projectable vocabulary, 317 folk, 7; goals of, 394; practical, viii; Projection, 138 theoretical, viii SUBJECT INDEX 429

Scope, 11, 18, 21, 176, 1%-98, 285, 326, 333 Translatability, universal, 300 Scribner-Quinton shunt, 28-29, 32 Translation, 298, 300, 308, 315; indeterminacy Selective absorption, 194, 320, 322-23, 338-40, of, 299-300; radical, 174 347, 351 Translator, radical, 300 Semantic view of theories, vii, 63 Transplantation, 31-32 Shape from shading problem, 76 Triviality objection, 357-58 Simplicity, 9-10, 18, 20, 61, 83-85, 92, 96, 98, Truth, 18, 409; approximate, 19; as 141-42, 144, 147, 155, 161, 176, 182, correspondence, 408; exact, 356; nature of, 185-86, 197, 210, 225, 235, 279-80, 393 284-85, 290-91, 295, 319, 326, 333-34, Twin Earth, 310-11 336, 405-7; postulate, 235 Simultaneity, 9, 139-41, 146, 150, 153; distant, Unconscious: cognitive, 6, 41-42; dynamic, 41; 141; local, 141 psychoanalytic, 6 , 140-41, 152, 248, 405, 408 Underdetermination, 12-13, 15-16, 140-41, Slip, 5, 43, 48, 50-51, 55, 185 143, 150, 154, 174; ampliative, 271, 273, Social: construction, 369, 387-89; factors, 15, 279-83, 286, 288, 290, 295; causal, 289-90; 268, 288-89 deductive ("Humeanj, 269, 280, 288-90; Sociology, 288-89; of knowledge, 297; of descriptive, 280; global egalitarian, 286; science, viii, 4 normative, 280-81, 289-91, 296; practical, Solipsism, 393 296; theoretical, 296 Space-time, 9; causal structure of, 145-47; Unified science, 25 causal theory of, 9 , 406 Species, 367-69, 374 Uniformity, 406 Stellar parallax, 9, 190, 193, 203 Unity, 334 Stipulative description, 302-3, 305 Upper and lower probabilities, theory of, 241 Subjective factors, 18, 326-28 Utility, 8, 14-15; cardinal, 107-8, 112, 133; Subjectivism, 16 functions, psychological effects of, 118; Symmetry, 186 ordinal, 107-9, 133; as psychophysical Synaptic weights, 72-73, 90-94, 98 quantity, 106-7 Syntactic view of theories, vii Utility-as-Element-<>f-Commodity, 117 Synthetic a priori, 306, 317 Utility-as-Explanatory, 109-12, 114-15, 117-19, 131; implications for psychology, 117 Terms: central-kind, 122, 125, 131; interrelated, Utility-as-Revealed, 108-13, 115-18 298-99, 301, 308; kind, 127, 373, 375; natural-kind, 102-3, 119, 132, 309, 312; Verifiability, 395 observation, 159; theoretical, 159-60 Verificationism, 317, 366, 393, 396 Theories: acceptance of, vii; nature of, vii, 6; , 202 ontological pruning of, 144; structure of, viii, 5, 102 Warrant accrual, 147, 155-57 Theory, vii, 82, 92-94, 97; addition of, 169; Water, 309-14, 318 best available, 139, 154; confirmation, viii; Wave theory, 17-18, 193-95, 199, 320-25, deletion of, 169; global 82, 92, 94; global 327, 330, 332-33, 336, 338-43, 347, structure of, 141; replacement of one by an­ 350-52 other, 169-70 Waves, longitudinal, 324 , 18, 3-4, 11, 14-15; algorithm Web, 158-60; of belief, 274-76 for, 326-27, 331, 343 Weight, 16-17, 301-7, 314, 316 Theory/observation distinction, 395, 402, 407 Why-question, 400-402, 407 Therapy, 36-38 Wish-fulfillment theory, 53-54 Tracing procedure, 261 World views, alternative, 151 Training set, biased, 96