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Lawrence Sklar LAWRENCE SKLAR Born: June 25, 1938 in Baltimore, MD Married to: Elizabeth S. Sklar; one child Education Oberlin College, B.A., 1958 Princeton University, M.A., 1960; Ph.D., 1964 Fellowships, Awards and National Offices Held Undergraduate Ford Foundation Early Admission Scholarship Honors List (all years) Phi Beta Kappa (elected in junior year) Sigma Xi (associate member) Graduate Woodrow Wilson Fellowship, 1959-60 Chancellor Green Fellowship, 1960-61 Charlotte Elizabeth Proctor Advanced Fellowship (awarded to top ten students in third year graduate class), 1961-62 National Science Foundation Cooperative Fellowship, 1962-63 Post-Graduate American Council of Learned Societies Study Fellowship (held at Oxford University), 1965-66 John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 1974-75 Franklin J. Matchette Prize. Awarded by the American Philosophical Association to Space, Time, and Spacetime as outstanding philosophical book of 1973 and 1974 National Science Foundation Research Grants, 1977-78, 1979-80, 1982, 1984-85, 1986-87, 1988-89, 1998-2001, 2002-03 Rackham Foundation Summer Research Fellowship, 1983, 1994 2 Nelson Fellow, Philosophy Department, University of Michigan, l991-l994, 1995- James B. and Grace J. Nelson Professorship, Philosophy Department, University of Michigan, 1994-95 National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship, 1995-96 Faculty Recognition Award, University of Michigan, 1995-98 William K. Frankena Collegiate Professorship, University of Michigan, 1995-2002 Lakatos Award. Awarded to Physics and Chance as outstanding book in the philosophy of science for 1995. Physics and Chance selected by Choice Magazine as Outstanding Academic Book in philosophy of science for 1995 Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences John Locke Lectureship in Philosophy, 1998, Oxford University Visiting Fellowship, All Souls College, Oxford University, 1998 Michigan Humanities Award, 1998-99. Vice-President, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 1999- 2000 President, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 2000-01 Past-President, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 2001-02 University of Michigan LS&A Excellence in Research Award, 1999 Steelcase Research Professorship, Institute for the Humanities, University of Michigan, 2000-01 Carl G. Hempel and William K. Frankena Distinguished University Professorship, University of Michigan, 2002- University of California Irvine Chancellor’s Distinguished Fellow, 2003 President-Elect, Philosophy of Science Association, 2005-06 President, Philosophy of Science Association, 2007-08 Past-President, Philosophy of Science Association, 2009-10 LSA/OVPR Humanities Award, 2007-08 Titular Member, Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences Memberships American Philosophical Association Philosophy of Science Association Fullerton Club, 1962-66 Research Club of the University of Michigan Teaching Teaching Fellow Princeton University 1959-60 Instructor Swarthmore College 1962-65 Visiting Lecturer University of Illinois Summer 1963 Assistant Professor Swarthmore College 1965-66 3 Assistant Professor Princeton University 1966-68 Visit. Assist. Professor University of Pennsylvania Summer 1968 Associate Professor University of Michigan 1968-74 Visit. Assoc. Professor Harvard University Summer 1970 Visit. Assoc. Professor UCLA 1973 Professor University of Michigan 1974- Visiting Professor Wayne State University 1977 Nelson Professor University of Michigan 1994-95 Collegiate Professor University of Michigan 1995-2002 Distinguished University University of Michigan 2002- Professor Administration and Service Associate Chairman, Department of Philosophy, The University of Michigan, 1970-72, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1986-87, 1989-91 National Science Foundation, Committee on Graduate Awards, 1970-72 Delegate of the Philosophy of Science Association to the United States National Committee for the International Union of the History and Philosophy of Science, 1974-78 Program Committee, Philosophy of Science Association; 1976 meetings and 1980 meetings Alumni in Service to Oberlin College Member, Board of Editors, Philosophy of Science, 1977-81, 1984- Divisional Board for Humanities and Arts, Rackham School of Graduate Studies, The University of Michigan, 1977-78, 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981- 82, 1986-88, 1990 Reviewer, Mathematical Reviews, 1978- Nominating Committee, Rackham School, 1980 Member, Governing Board of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1981-84 Program Committee, American Philosophical Association, Western Division, 1982 meetings National Science Foundation, Research Grants Panel for the History and Philosophy of Science, 1984-87. Referee for the United States National Committee for the International Union for the History and Philosophy of Science, 1986. Grant Awards Panel, National Endowment for the Humanities, l988 Awards Panel, Lakatos Award, 1990-95, 1997-2013 Member, Editorial Advisory Board, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 1995-99. Advisory Board, Philosophical Essays Member, Executive Committee, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 1999-2002. External Review Panel, Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, 1999 Member, Board of Editors, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000- 4 2005. External Reviewer, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine, 2003 5 Publications 1967 1. "The Falsifiability of Geometric Theories," Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXIV, No. 8 (April 27, 1967) pp. 247-253. 2. "Types of Inter-Theoretical Reduction," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 1967) pp. 109-124. 3. Review of M. Bunge (ed.), Delaware Seminar in the Foundations of Physics, in American Scientist, (September 1967) p. 340. 4. Review of M. Bunge, Scientific Research, in American Scientist (December 1967) p. 507A. 5. Review of R. Schlegel, Completeness in Science, in Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXV, No. 6 (March 21, 1968) pp. 179-183. 6. Review of K. Przibram, Letters on Wave Mechanics, in American Scientist, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Spring 1968) p. 53A. 7. Review of A. Kitaigorodskiy, Order and Disorder in the World of Atoms, in Physics Today, vol. 21, No. 3 (March 1968) p. 93. 1969 8. "The Conventionality of Geometry," American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph Series, Vol. III, "The Philosophy of Science," pp. 42-60. 9. Review of R. B. Lindsay, The Nature of Physics, in American Scientist, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Summer 1969) p. 128A. 10. Review of A. Petersen, Quantum Physics and the Philosophical Tradition, in American Scientist, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Summer 1969) pp. 131A-132A. 11. Review of H. Bondi, Assumption and Myth in Physical Theory, in Physics Today, vol. 22, No. 8 (August 1969) p. 79. 1970 12. "Is Probability a Dispositional Property?," Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXVII, No. 11 (June 11, 1970) pp. 355-366. 6 1972 13. "Absolute Space and the Metaphysics of Theories," Nous, Vol. VI, No. 4 (November 1972), pp. 289-309. 14. Review of A. Grünbaum, Geometry and Chronometry in Philosophical Perspective, in Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXXI, No. 4 (October 1972) pp. 506- 509. 1973 15. "Unfair to Frequencies," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXX, No. 2 (January 15, 1973) pp. 41-52. 16. "Statistical Explanation and Ergodic Theory," Philosophy of Science, vol. 40, No. 2 (June 1973) pp. 194-212. 17. (with S. Stich and J. Tinnon) "Entailment and the Verificationist Program," Ratio, Vol. XV, No. 1 (June 1973) pp. 84-97. 18. (with S. Stich and J. Tinnon) "Die Logische Folge und das Programm der Verifikationsanhanger," (German version of the item immediately above), Ratio, German Edition, 15. Band, Heft 1, pp. 79-92. 1974 19. Space, Time, and Spacetime, xii + 423 pp., 57 illus., University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974. 20. "The Evolution of the Problem of the Unity of Science," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XI, R. Cohen and R. Seeger, (eds.), "AAAS Symposia on Philosophy of Science - 1969," Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974, pp. 153- 163. 21. "Incongruous Counterparts, Intrinsic Features and the Substantiviality of Space," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXI, No. 9 (May 16, 1974) pp. 277-290. 22. Review of D. H. Mellor, The Matter of Chance, in Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXI, No. 13, (July 18, 1974) pp. 418-423. 1975 23. "Methodological Conservatism," Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXXIV, No. 3 (July 1975) pp. 374-400. 7 1976 24. "Thermodynamics, Statistical Mechanics and the Complexity of Reductions," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XXXII, R. Cohen, C. Hooker, A. Michalos and J. van Evra, (eds.), "PSA 1974," Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976, pp. 15-32. 25. "Inertia, Gravitation and Metaphysics," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 43, No. 1 (March 1976) pp. 1-23. 26. (with M. Kaplan) "Rationality and Truth," Philosophical Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September 1976) pp. 197-202. 1977 27. Space, Time, and Spacetime. Paperback edition of item 19 above. With revisions and a new preface for the paperback edition. 28. "Facts, Conventions, and Assumptions in the Theory of Space-Time," in J. Earman, C. Glymour and J. Stachel, (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VIII, Foundations of Space-Time Theories, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press (1977) pp. 206-274. 29. "What Might Be Right About the Causal Theory of Time," Synthese, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1977) pp. 155-171. 30. Review of M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, in Philosophy of Science, vol. 44, No. 2 (June 1977) p. 332. 31. Review of A. Grünbaum, Philosophical
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