Philosophy of Physics Part B, Elsevier
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Deduction Systems Based on Resolution, We Limit the Following Considerations to Transition Systems Based on Analytic Calculi
Author’s Address Norbert Eisinger European Computer–Industry Research Centre, ECRC Arabellastr. 17 D-8000 M¨unchen 81 F. R. Germany [email protected] and Hans J¨urgen Ohlbach Max–Planck–Institut f¨ur Informatik Im Stadtwald D-6600 Saarbr¨ucken 11 F. R. Germany [email protected] Publication Notes This report appears as chapter 4 in Dov Gabbay (ed.): ‘Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Volume I: Logical Foundations’. It will be published by Oxford University Press, 1992. Fragments of the material already appeared in chapter two of Bl¨asis & B¨urckert: Deduction Systems in Artificial Intelligence, Ellis Horwood Series in Artificial Intelligence, 1989. A draft version has been published as SEKI Report SR-90-12. The report is also published as an internal technical report of ECRC, Munich. Acknowledgements The writing of the chapters for the handbook has been a highly coordinated effort of all the people involved. We want to express our gratitude for their many helpful contributions, which unfortunately are impossible to list exhaustively. Special thanks for reading earlier drafts and giving us detailed feedback, go to our second reader, Bob Kowalski, and to Wolfgang Bibel, Elmar Eder, Melvin Fitting, Donald W. Loveland, David Plaisted, and J¨org Siekmann. Work on this chapter started when both of us were members of the Markgraf Karl group at the Universit¨at Kaiserslautern, Germany. With our former colleagues there we had countless fruitful discus- sions, which, again, cannot be credited in detail. During that time this research was supported by the “Sonderforschungsbereich 314, K¨unstliche Intelligenz” of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). -
2008. Pruning Some Branches from 'Branching Spacetimes'
CHAPTER 10 Pruning Some Branches from “Branching Spacetimes” John Earman* Abstract Discussions of branching time and branching spacetime have become com- mon in the philosophical literature. If properly understood, these concep- tions can be harmless. But they are sometimes used in the service of debat- able and even downright pernicious doctrines. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the pernicious branching and prune it back. 1. INTRODUCTION Talk of “branching time” and “branching spacetime” is wide spread in the philo- sophical literature. Such expressions, if properly understood, can be innocuous. But they are sometimes used in the service of debatable and even downright per- nicious doctrines. The purpose of this paper is to identify the pernicious branching and prune it back. Section 2 distinguishes three types of spacetime branching: individual branch- ing, ensemble branching, and Belnap branching. Individual branching, as the name indicates, involves a branching structure in individual spacetime models. It is argued that such branching is neither necessary nor sufficient for indeterminism, which is explicated in terms of the branching in the ensemble of spacetime mod- els satisfying the laws of physics. Belnap branching refers to the sort of branching used by the Belnap school of branching spacetimes. An attempt is made to sit- uate this sort of branching with respect to ensemble branching and individual branching. Section 3 is a sustained critique of various ways of trying to imple- ment individual branching for relativistic spacetimes. Conclusions are given in Section 4. * Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA The Ontology of Spacetime II © Elsevier BV ISSN 1871-1774, DOI: 10.1016/S1871-1774(08)00010-7 All rights reserved 187 188 Pruning Some Branches from “Branching Spacetimes” 2. -
Domain Theory and the Logic of Observable Properties
Domain Theory and the Logic of Observable Properties Samson Abramsky Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen Mary College University of London October 31st 1987 Abstract The mathematical framework of Stone duality is used to synthesize a number of hitherto separate developments in Theoretical Computer Science: • Domain Theory, the mathematical theory of computation introduced by Scott as a foundation for denotational semantics. • The theory of concurrency and systems behaviour developed by Milner, Hennessy et al. based on operational semantics. • Logics of programs. Stone duality provides a junction between semantics (spaces of points = denotations of computational processes) and logics (lattices of properties of processes). Moreover, the underlying logic is geometric, which can be com- putationally interpreted as the logic of observable properties—i.e. properties which can be determined to hold of a process on the basis of a finite amount of information about its execution. These ideas lead to the following programme: 1. A metalanguage is introduced, comprising • types = universes of discourse for various computational situa- tions. • terms = programs = syntactic intensions for models or points. 2. A standard denotational interpretation of the metalanguage is given, assigning domains to types and domain elements to terms. 3. The metalanguage is also given a logical interpretation, in which types are interpreted as propositional theories and terms are interpreted via a program logic, which axiomatizes the properties they satisfy. 2 4. The two interpretations are related by showing that they are Stone duals of each other. Hence, semantics and logic are guaranteed to be in harmony with each other, and in fact each determines the other up to isomorphism. -
(0) 625307185 Home A
Work address: University College Groningen, Hoendiepskade 23/24, NL-9718 BG Groningen, The Netherlands, +31 (0) 625307185 Home address: ‘t Olde Hof 43, NL-9951JX Winsum, The Netherlands Dr. Dr. Simon Friederich born 30/08/1981 in Heidelberg, Germany http://simonfriederich.eu Email: s.m.friederich @ rug.nl AREAS OF RESEARCH General philosophy of science, philosophy of physics Philosophy of mathematics Epistemology AREAS OF COMPETENCE Philosophy of mind; effective altruism EDUCATION 2019 Habilitation (German qualification for full professorship) in philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany 2014 PhD in philosophy, Institute for Philosophy, University of Bonn, Germany; grade: “summa cum laude” 2010 PhD in physics, Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of Heidelberg, Germany; grade: “magna cum laude” 2008 Magister in philosophy Philosophisches Seminar, University of Göttingen, Germany; grade: “with distinction” 2007 Diploma in physics Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of Göttingen, Germany; grade: “very good” CURRENT POSITION Since September 2019 Associate professor of philosophy of science, University of Groningen, University College Groningen (UCG) and Faculty of Philosophy, The Netherlands, Interim Academic Director of Humanities at UCG October 2014 – August 2018, Assistant professor of philosophy of science, University of Groningen, University College Groningen and Faculty of Philosophy, The Netherlands In addition, since August 2015, external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) PREVIOUS POSITIONS 2012 – 2014 substituting for a full professorship in theoretical philosophy, University of Göttingen 2011 – 2012 PostDoc at University of Wuppertal University, research collaboration “Epistemology of the Large Hadron Collider”, funded by the German Academic Foundation (DFG) RESEARCH VISITS July 2019 visiting scholar at the Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario (Canada) Host: Prof. -
John Hayden Woods, FRSC Curriculum Vitae
John Hayden Woods, FRSC Curriculum Vitae Personal Information Date of Birth: March 16, 1937 Place of Birth: Barrie, Ontario Citizenship: Canadian Degrees B.A. Hon. Philosophy University of Toronto 1958 M.A. Philosophy University of Toronto 1959 Ph.D. Philosophy University of Michigan 1965 LL.D. (Honoris Causa) Mount Allison University 1997 D. A. (Honoris Causa) University of Lethbridge 2003 Doctoral Thesis Entailment and the Paradoxes of Strict Implication, vi, 308, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1965. Current Appointments 1. Director, The Abductive Systems Group, University of British Columbia, 2002 and, since 2010, The UBC Honorary Professor of Logic 2. President Emeritus and Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Lethbridge, 2002. Past Appointments (Regular) 1. University of Toronto, 1962 – 1971 2. University of Victoria, 1971 – 1976 3. University of Calgary, 1976 – 1979 4. University of Lethbridge, 1979 – 2002 5. Charles S. Peirce Professor of Logic, King’s College London, 2000-2012 Past Appointments (Visiting) 1. Visiting Associate Professor, The Summer Institute of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 1965 2. Visiting Associate Professor, University of Michigan, 1967 3. Visiting Professor, Stanford University, 1968-69, 1971, 1994 4. Visiting Professor, Laurentian University, 1969 5. Regular Visiting Professor, Department of Discourse Analysis, University of Amsterdam (third trimester), 6. 1987-2001 7. Visiting Professor, University of Groningen, 1987, 1988 8. Fellow, The Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, 1990 9. Vonhoff Professor of Humanities, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, 2001 1 List of Publications BOOKS l969 1. Necessary Truth, edited, vi, 266, New York: Random House, 1969 (with L.W. Sumner). 1974 2. Proof and Truth, xiv, 192, Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1974. -
Are Dogs Logical Animals ? Jean-Yves Beziau University of Brazil, Rio De Janeiro (UFRJ) Brazilian Research Council (Cnpq) Brazilian Academy of Philosophy (ABF)
Are Dogs Logical Animals ? Jean-Yves Beziau University of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) Brazilian Research Council (CNPq) Brazilian Academy of Philosophy (ABF) Autre être fidèle du tonneau sans loques malgré ses apparitions souvent loufoques le chien naît pas con platement idiot ne se laisse pas si facilement mener en rat d’eau il ne les comprend certes pas forcément toutes à la première coupe ne sait pas sans l’ombre deux doutes la fière différance antre un loup et une loupe tout de foi à la croisade des parchemins il saura au non du hasard dès trousser la chienlit et non en vain reconnaître celle qui l’Amen à Rhum sans faim Baron Jean Bon de Chambourcy 1. Human beings and other animals In Ancient Greece human beings have been characterized as logical animals. This traditional catching is a bit lost or/and nebulous. What this precisely means is not necessarily completely clear because the word Logos has four important aspects: language, science, reasoning, relation. The Latinized version of “logical”, i.e. “rational”, does not fully preserve these four meanings. Moreover later on human beings were qualified as “homo sapiens” (see Beziau 2017). In this paper we will try to clarify the meaning of “logical animals” by examining if dogs can also be considered logical animals. An upside question of “Are dogs logical animals?” is: “Are human beings the only rational animals?”. It is one thing to claim that human beings are logical animals, but another thing is to super claim that human beings are the only logical animals. -
Lost in the Tensors: Einstein's Struggles with Covariance Principles 1912-1916"
JOHN EARMAN and CLARK GL YMOUR LOST IN THE TENSORS: EINSTEIN'S STRUGGLES WITH COVARIANCE PRINCIPLES 1912-1916" Introduction IN 1912 Einstein began to devote a major portion of his time and energy to an attempt to construct a relativistic theory of gravitation. A strong intimation of the struggle that lay ahead is contained in a letter to Arnold Sommerfeld dated October 29, 1912: At the moment I am working solely on the problem of gravitation and believe 1 will be able to overcome all difficulties with the help of a local, friendly mathemat- ician. But one thing is certain, that I have never worked so hard in my life, and that I have been injected with a great awe of mathematics, which in my naivet~ until now I only viewed as a pure luxury in its subtler forms! Compared to this problem the original theory of relativity is mere child's play.' Einstein's letter contained only a perfunctory reply to a query from Sommerfeld about the Debye-Born theory of specific heats. Obviously disappointed, Som- merfeld wrote to Hilbert: 'My letter to Einstein was in vain . Einstein is evidently so deeply mired in gravitation that he is deaf to everything else? Sommerfeld's words were more prophetic than he could possibly have known; the next three years were to see Einstein deeply mired in gravitation, sometimes seemingly hopelessly so. In large measure, Einstein's struggle resulted from his use and his misuse, his understanding and his misunderstanding of the nature and implications of covariance principles. In brief, considerations of general covariance were bound up with Einstein's motive for seeking a 'generalized' theory of relativity; mis- understandings about the meaning and implementation of this motivation threatened to wreck the search; and in the end, the desire for general covariance helped to bring Einstein back onto the track which led to what we now recognize *Present address c/o Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn, U.S.A. -
Maurice Finocchiaro Discusses the Lessons and the Cultural Repercussions of Galileo’S Telescopic Discoveries.” Physics World, Vol
MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO: CURRICULUM VITAE CONTENTS: §0. Summary and Highlights; §1. Miscellaneous Details; §2. Teaching Experience; §3. Major Awards and Honors; §4. Publications: Books; §5. Publications: Articles, Chapters, and Discussions; §6. Publications: Book Reviews; §7. Publications: Proceedings, Abstracts, Translations, Reprints, Popular Media, etc.; §8. Major Lectures at Scholarly Meetings: Keynote, Invited, Funded, Honorarium, etc.; §9. Other Lectures at Scholarly Meetings; §10. Public Lectures; §11. Research Activities: Out-of-Town Libraries, Archives, and Universities; §12. Professional Service: Journal Editorial Boards; §13. Professional Service: Refereeing; §14. Professional Service: Miscellaneous; §15. Community Service §0. SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS Address: Department of Philosophy; University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Box 455028; Las Vegas, NV 89154-5028. Education: B.S., 1964, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D., 1969, University of California, Berkeley. Position: Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus; University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Previous Positions: UNLV: Assistant Professor, 1970-74; Associate Professor, 1974-77; Full Professor, 1977-91; Distinguished Professor, 1991-2003; Department Chair, 1989-2000. Major Awards and Honors: 1976-77 National Science Foundation; one-year grant; project “Galileo and the Art of Reasoning.” 1983-84 National Endowment for the Humanities, one-year Fellowship for College Teachers; project “Gramsci and the History of Dialectical Thought.” 1987 Delivered the Fourth Evert Willem Beth Lecture, sponsored by the Evert Willem Beth Foundation, a committee of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences, at the Universities of Amsterdam and of Groningen. 1991-92 American Council of Learned Societies; one-year fellowship; project “Democratic Elitism in Mosca and Gramsci.” 1992-95 NEH; 3-year grant; project “Galileo on the World Systems.” 1993 State of Nevada, Board of Regents’ Researcher Award. -
A Mistake on My Part, Volume 1, Pp 665-659 in We Will Show Them!
A Mistake on My Part Melvin Fitting 1 The Background I first met Dov at a logic conference in Manchester, in August 1969, though we had begun a mathematical correspondence the previous year. Here are a few photos from the conference. As I recall, Dov planned to get married shortly after the conference. I found a letter in my files mentioning that I sent Dov a copy of the pictures in 1969, so this is for everybody else. Figure 1 shows Dov at Jodrell Bank, the huge radio telescope complex run by the University of Manchester. Figure 1. 2 Melvin Fitting Figure 2 shows, from left to right, Saul Kripke, Dov, Michael Rabin, and someone I can’t identify. Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the following. Back row: David Pincus, Miriam Lucian, Dov, Saul Kripke; front row: George Rousseau, and me. It was also at this conference that a mistake I made got straightened out. I don’t know if it had an effect on Dov’s work, but it may have. But let’s discuss that in a section of its own. 2 Where I Went Wrong Kripke’s semantics for intuitionistic logic came along in [Kripke, 1965], and prompted a considerable amount of research. It was a possible worlds se- mantics, and in it domains for quantifiers varied from world to world, though subject to a monotonicity condition. It was a natural question: what would a restriction to constant domain intuitionistic models impose. In my dis- sertation, [Fitting, 1969], I had shown in passing that, for formulas without universal quantifiers, constant domain and monotonic domain semantics validated the same formulas (unlike in classical logic, the two quantifiers are not interdefinable intuitionistically). -
Advice on the Logic of Argument†
Revista del Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de Valparaíso, Año 1, N° 1. Junio 2013. Pags. 7 – 34 Advice on the Logic of Argument† John Woods Resumen Desde su creación moderna a principios de la década de los 70, la lógica informal ha puesto un especial énfasis en el análisis de las falacias y los esquemas de diálogo argumentativo. Desarrollos simultáneos en los círculos que se ocupan de los actos de comunicación de habla exhiben una concentración en el carácter dialéctico de la discusión. PALABRAS CLAVE: Lógica informal, argumento, diálogos Abstract Since its modern inception in the early 1970s, informal logic has placed a special emphasis on the analysis of fallacies and argumentative dialogue schemes. Concurrent developments in speech communication circles exhibit a like concentration on the dialectical character of argument. KEYWORDS: Informal logic, argument, dialogues “But the old connection [of logic] with philosophy is closest to my heart right now . I hope that logic will have another chance in its mother area.” Johan van Benthem “On [the] traditional view of the subject, the phrase ‘formal logic’ is pleonasm and ‘informal logic’ oxymoron.” John Burgess 1. Background remarks Logic began abstractly, as the theoretical core of a general theory of real-life argument. This was Aristotle’s focus in Topics and On Sophistical Refutations and a † Recibido: abril 2013. Aceptado: mayo 2013. The Abductive Systems Group, Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia 8 / Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, Año 1, N° 1 dominant theme of mediaeval dialectic. In our own day, the intellectual skeins that matter for argument-minded logicians are the formal logics of dialogues and games and on the less technical side of the street informal logic. -
Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Logic
Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Logic: Inductive Logic Volume 10 edited by Dov M. Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods CONTENTS Introduction vii Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartman and John Woods List of Authors ix Induction before Hume 1 J. R. Milton Hume and the Problem of Induction 43 Marc Lange The Debate between Whewell and Mill on the Nature of 93 Scientific Induction Malcolm Forster An Explorer upon Untrodden Ground: Peirce on Abduction 117 Stathis Psillos The Modern Epistemic Interpretations of Probability: Logicism 153 and Subjectivism Maria Carla Galavotti Popper and Hypothetico-deductivism 205 Alan Musgrave Hempel and the Paradoxes of Confirmation 235 Jan Sprenger Carnap and the Logic of Induction 265 Sandy Zabell The Development of the Hintikka Program 311 Ilkka Niiniluoto Hans Reichenbach’s Probability Logic 357 Frederick Eberhardt and Clark Glymour 4 Goodman and the Demise of Syntactic and Semantics Models 391 Robert Schwartz The Development of Subjective Bayesianism 415 James Joyce Varieties of Bayesianism 477 Jonathan Weisberg Inductive Logic and Empirical Psychology 553 Nick Chater, Mike Oaksford, Ulrike Hahn and Evan Heit Inductive Logic and Statistics 625 Jan-Willem Romeijn Statistical Learning Theory 651 Ulrike von Luxburg and Bernhard Schoelkopf Formal Learning Theory in Context 707 Daniel Osherson and Scott Weinstein Mechanizing Induction 719 Ronald Ortner and Hannes Leitgeb Index 773 PREFACE While the more narrow research program of inductive logic is an invention of the 20th century, philosophical reflection about induction as a mode of inference is as old as philosophical reflection about deductive inference. Aristotle was concerned with what he calls epagoge and he studied it, with the same systematic intent with which he approached the logic of syllogisms. -
Lawrence Sklar
LAWRENCE SKLAR Born: June 25, 1938 in Baltimore, MD Married to: Elizabeth S. Sklar; one child Education Oberlin College, B.A., 1958 Princeton University, M.A., 1960; Ph.D., 1964 Fellowships, Awards and National Offices Held Undergraduate Ford Foundation Early Admission Scholarship Honors List (all years) Phi Beta Kappa (elected in junior year) Sigma Xi (associate member) Graduate Woodrow Wilson Fellowship, 1959-60 Chancellor Green Fellowship, 1960-61 Charlotte Elizabeth Proctor Advanced Fellowship (awarded to top ten students in third year graduate class), 1961-62 National Science Foundation Cooperative Fellowship, 1962-63 Post-Graduate American Council of Learned Societies Study Fellowship (held at Oxford University), 1965-66 John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 1974-75 Franklin J. Matchette Prize. Awarded by the American Philosophical Association to Space, Time, and Spacetime as outstanding philosophical book of 1973 and 1974 National Science Foundation Research Grants, 1977-78, 1979-80, 1982, 1984-85, 1986-87, 1988-89, 1998-2001, 2002-03 Rackham Foundation Summer Research Fellowship, 1983, 1994 2 Nelson Fellow, Philosophy Department, University of Michigan, l991-l994, 1995- James B. and Grace J. Nelson Professorship, Philosophy Department, University of Michigan, 1994-95 National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship, 1995-96 Faculty Recognition Award, University of Michigan, 1995-98 William K. Frankena Collegiate Professorship, University of Michigan, 1995-2002 Lakatos Award. Awarded to Physics and Chance as outstanding book in the philosophy of science for 1995. Physics and Chance selected by Choice Magazine as Outstanding Academic Book in philosophy of science for 1995 Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences John Locke Lectureship in Philosophy, 1998, Oxford University Visiting Fellowship, All Souls College, Oxford University, 1998 Michigan Humanities Award, 1998-99.