Intermediate Philosophy of Physics Reading List

Home , David Malament, John Earman, Roberto Torretti, Tim Maudlin

This is James Read’s reading list for the Finals paper, Intermediate Philosophy of Physics. If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email me at the above address.

1 1 Special Relativity

As preparation for the special relativity section of the paper, you might consider reading: (Warning: All of these books are stellar, but some of the later entries are very technical!)

1. N. David Mermin, It’s About Time: Understanding Einstein’s Relativity, Princeton: Prince- ton University Press, 2009. 2. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics Volume I: Space and Time, Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 2012. 3. Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, New York: Dover, 1957. 4. Harvey R. Brown, Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 5. Roberto Torretti, Relativity and Geometry, New York: Dover, 1996. 6. Michael Friedman, Foundations of Space-Time Theories, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

2 1.1 Newton’s laws

State Newton’s laws of motion and deﬁne all terms therein. How (if at all) do the laws depend upon one another? Do the laws together imply that Newtonian mechanics is Galilean invariant?

Core reading

1. Herbert Pﬁster and Markus King, Inertia and Gravitation, Heidelberg: Springer, 2015. §§1.1-1.3. 2. Roberto Torretti, Relativity and Geometry, New York: Dover, 1996. Ch. 1. 3. Harvey R. Brown, Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. §§2.2, 3.1, 3.2. 4. Michael Friedman, Foundations of Space-Time Theories, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1983. §III.7. 5. Robert DiSalle, “Space and Time: Inertial Frames”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009.

Further reading

1. Julian Barbour, The Discovery of Dynamics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Ch. 12. 2. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientiﬁc Explanation, In- dianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979. Ch. 7. 3. James Read, “An Iterative Operationalisation of Inertial Systems”, 2020. 4. Herbert Pﬁster, “Newton’s First Law Revisited”, Foundations of Physics Letters 17, 2004. 5. John S. Rigden, “Editorial: High Thoughts about Newton’s First Law”, American Jour- nal of Physics 55, 1987. 6. John Earman and Michael Friedman, “The Meaning and Status of Newton’s Law of Inertia and the Nature of Gravitational Forces”, Philosophy of Science 40(3), pp. 329- 359, 1973. 7. Robert DiSalle, “Spacetime Theory as Physical Geometry”, Erkenntnis 42(3), pp. 317- 337, 1995.

3 1.2 Einstein’s derivation of the Lorentz transformations

Outline Einstein’s 1905 derivation of the Lorentz transformations, making clear all input assumptions and where they are used. Then answer the following:

1. Which of these input assumptions are empirical facts, and which are conventions? 2. What would happen if one were to drop the light postulate in this derivation? 3. What would happen if one were to replace the light postulate with a ‘sound postulate’?

Core reading

1. Albert Einstein, “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”, Annalen der Physik 17, pp. 891-921, 1905. 2. Harvey R. Brown, Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. §2.3, ch. 5, §6.4. 3. Bryan Cheng and James Read, “Why Not a Sound Postulate?”, 2020. 4. J. R. Lucas and P. E. Hodgson, Spacetime and Electromagnetism, Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1990. Ch. 5.

Further reading

1. Andrea Pelissetto and Massimo Testa, “Getting the Lorentz Transformations Without Requiring an Invariant Speed”, American Journal of Physics 83, pp. 338-340, 2015. 2. Vittorio Berzi and Vittorio Gorini, “Reciprocity Principle and the Lorentz Transforma- tions”, Journal of Mathematical Physics 10, pp. 1518-1524, 1969.

4 1.3 The conventionality of simultaneity

Is simultaneity conventional in special relativity?

Core reading

1. Allen Janis, “Conventionality of Simultaneity”, in E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclo- pedia of Philosophy, 2018. 2. Harvey R. Brown, Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 95-105. 3. David B. Malament, “Causal Theories of Time and the Conventionality of Simultane- ity”, Nousˆ 11, pp. 293-300, 1977. 4. John D. Norton, “Philosophy of Space and Time”, in M. H. Salmon et al. (eds.), Intro- duction to the Philosophy of Science, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 179-231, 1992. 5. Sahotra Sarkar and John Stachel, “Did Malament Prove the Non-Conventionality of Simultaneity in the Special Theory of Relativity?”, Philosophy of Science 66(2), pp. 208- 220, 1999. 6. Nick Huggett, “Essay Review: Physical Relativity and Understanding Space-Time”, Phi- losophy of Science 76, pp. 404-422, 2009. §3.1.

Further reading

1. Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, New York, NY: Dover, 1958. §§2.19-2.20. 2. Adolf Grunbaum,¨ “David Malament and the Conventionality of Simultaneity: A Re- ply”, Foundations of Physics 40, pp. 1285-1297, 2010. 3. R. Anderson, I. Vetharaniam and G. E. Stedman, “Conventionality of Synchronisation, Gauge Dependence and Test Theories of Relativity”, Physics Reports 295, pp. 93-180, 1998. 4. John Winnie, “Special Relativity Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions: Part I”, Phi- losophy of Science 37, pp. 81-99, 1970. And: John Winnie, “Special Relativity Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions: Part II”, Philosophy of Science 37, pp. 223-238, 1970. 5. Arthur Eddington, The Mathematical Theory of Relativity, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1924. §§1.4, 1.11. 6. Percy Bridgman, A Sophisticate’s Primer of Relativity, Middletown, CN: Wesleyan Uni- versity Press, 1962. Pp. 66ff.

5 1.4 The twin paradox

What, if any, is the correct explanation of the proper time differential in the twin paradox? Can appeal to the conventionality of simultaneity shed light on the twin paradox?

Core reading

1. Michael Weiss, “The Twin Paradox”. Available at: http://math.ucr.edu/home/ baez/physics/Relativity/SR/TwinParadox/twin_paradox.html. 2. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. Ch. 4. 3. Talal A. Debs and Michael L. G. Redhead, “The Twin “Paradox” and the Convention- ality of Simultaneity”, American Journal of Physics 64, pp. 384-392, 1996. 4. Jeffrey R. Weeks, “The Twin Paradox in a Closed Universe”, The American Mathemat- ical Monthly 108(7), pp. 585-590, 2001.

Further reading

1. Jean-Pierre Luminet, “Time, Topology, and the Twin Paradox”, in C. Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

6 1.5 Frame-dependent effects

In what sense, if any, should frame-dependent effects be regarded as being physical?

Core reading

1. John S. Bell, “How to Teach Special Relativity”, in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quan- tum Mechanics, second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 67-80, 2004. 2. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. Ch. 5. 3. Michael Weiss, “Bell’s Spaceship Paradox”. Available at: http://math.ucr.edu/ home/baez/physics/Relativity/SR/BellSpaceships/spaceship_puzzle. html. 4. Martin A. Lipman, “On the Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity”, Philo- sophical Studies 117, pp. 21-37, 2020.

Further reading

1. Harvey R. Brown and Roland Sypel, “On the Meaning of the Relativity Principle and Other Symmetries”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9(3), pp. 235- 253, 1995. 2. Kit Fine, “Tense and Reality”, in Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Ox- ford University Press, 2005. 3. Thomas Hofweber and Marc Lange, “Fine’s Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity”, Nousˆ 51(4), pp. 871-883, 2017. 4. James Read, “Geometric Objects, Natural Kinds, and Fragmentalist Philosophy”, 2020.

7 1.6 Dynamical and geometrical approaches to spacetime theories

Geometry and dynamics: which is the cart and which is the horse?

Core reading

1. Harvey R. Brown and Oliver Pooley, “Minkowski Space-Time: A Glorious Non-Entity”, in D. Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime pp. 67-89, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006. 2. Harvey R. Brown, Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Ch. 8. 3. Michel Janssen, “Drawing the Line Between Kinematics and Dynamics in Special Rel- ativity”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40, pp. 26-52, 2009. 4. Pablo Acuna,˜ “Minkowski Spacetime and Lorentz Invariance: The Cart and the Horse or Two Sides of a Single Coin?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 55, pp. 1-12, 2016. 5. James Read, “Explanation, Geometry, and Conspiracy in Relativity Theory”, in C. Beis- bart, T. Sauer and C. Wuthrich¨ (eds.), Thinking About Space and Time: 100 Years of Ap- plying and Interpreting General Relativity, vol. 15 of the Einstein Studies series, Basel: Birkhauser,¨ 2020. (Forthcoming.) 6. James Read, “Geometrical Constructivism and Modal Relationalism: Further Aspects of the Dynamical/Geometrical Debate”, International Studies in Philosophy of Sci- ence, 2020. (Forthcoming.)

Further reading

1. Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen, “Presentism and Relativity”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54(2), pp. 327-346, 2003. 2. John D. Norton, “Why Constructive Relativity Fails”, British Journal for the Philoso- phy of Science 59, pp. 821-834, 2008. 3. Oliver Pooley, “Substantivalist and Relationist Approaches to Spacetime”, in R. Bat- terman (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, Oxford University Press, 2013. §6.3.2. 4. Harvey R. Brown and James Read, “The Dynamical Approach to Spacetime”, in E. Knox and A. Wilson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics, Oxford: Rout- ledge, 2018. 5. Wayne C. Myrvold, “How Could Relativity be Anything Other Than Physical?”, Stud- ies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2017. 6. Syman Stevens, “Regularity Relationalism and the Constructivist Project”, British Jour- nal for the Philosophy of Science 71, pp. 353-372, 2020.

8 1.7 Presentism and relativity

Is presentism compatible with relativity?

Core reading

1. Mark Hinchliff, “A Defence of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting”, Philosophy of Science 67, pp. S575-S586, 2000. 2. Hilary Putnam, “Time and Physical Geometry”, Journal of Philosophy 64, pp. 240-247, 1967. 3. Simon Saunders, “How Relativity Contradicts Presentism”, in C. Callender (ed.), Time, Reality & Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 4. Steve Savitt, ”There’s No Time Like the Present (In Minkowski Spacetime)”, Philoso- phy of Science 67, pp. S563-S574, 2000. 5. James Read and Emily Qureshi-Hurst, “Getting Tense About Relativity”, Synthese, 2020. (Forthcoming.)

Further reading

1. Howard Stein, “On Einstein-Minkowski Space-Time”, Journal of Philosophy 65, pp. 5- 23, 1968. 2. Nicholas Maxwell, “Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?”, Philoso- phy of Science 52, pp. 23-43, 1985. 3. Oliver Pooley, “Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113, pp. 321-363. 2013. 4. Howard Stein, “On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future”, Philosophy of Science 58, pp. 147-167, 1991. 5. Robert Weingard, “Relativity and the Reality of Past and Future Events”, British Jour- nal for the Philosophy of Science 23, pp. 119-121, 1972. 6. Nicholas Maxwell, “On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future”, Philosophy of Science 60, pp. 341-348, 1993. 7. Rob Clifton and Mark Hogarth, “The Deﬁnability of Objective Becoming in Minkowski Spacetime”, Synthese 103, pp. 355-387, 1995. 8. Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen, “Presentism and Relativity”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54, pp. 327-346, 2003.

9 1.8 The equivalence principle and gravitational redshift

Disambiguate different versions of the equivalence principle, and explain how they can be used to derive the results of gravitational redshift experiments. Does a full explanation of gravitational redshift effects require appeal to spacetime curvature?

Core reading

1. Dennis Lehmkuhl, “The Equivalence Principle(s)”, in E. Knox and A. Wilson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics, London: Routledge, 2020. (Forthcom- ing.) 2. Harvey R. Brown and James Read, “Clarifying Possible Misconceptions in the Foun- dations of General Relativity”, American Journal of Physics 84(5), pp. 327-334, 2016. 3. Dennis Lehmkuhl, “Why Einstein Did Not Believe that General Relativity Geometrizes Gravity”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46, pp. 316-326, 2014.

Further reading

1. Michel Ghins and Tim Budden, “The Principle of Equivalence”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32, pp. 33-51, 2001. 2. Eleanor Knox, “Effective Spacetime Geometry”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44, pp. 346-356, 2013.

10 2 Quantum Mechanics

As vacation reading for the quantum mechanics section of the paper, you should read:

1. David Albert, Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1994. 2. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics Volume II: Quantum Mechanics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. 3. Tim Maudlin, Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity, third edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. 4. John S. Bell, “Against Measurement”, in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechan- ics, second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 5. David Wallace, “Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics”, in D. Rickles (ed.), The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics, London: Routledge, 2008.

11 2.1 The measurement problem

What is the measurement problem of quantum mechanics?

Core reading

1. John S. Bell, “Against Measurement”, in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechan- ics, second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 2. David Albert, Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992. Pp. 73-92. 3. David Wallace, “Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics”, in D. Rickles (ed.), The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics, London: Routledge, 2008. §1. 4. Tim Maudlin, “Three Measurement Problems”, Topoi 14, pp. 7-15, 1995. 5. Simon Saunders, “What is the Problem of Measurement?”, Harvard Review of Philos- ophy, pp. 4-22, Spring 1994. 6. David Wallace, “What is Orthodox Quantum Mechanics?”, forthcoming in Ontology Studies: Outstanding Papers from the San Sebastian International Congresses of Ontology, 2016. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.05973.

Further reading

1. Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Ch. 6. 2. Michael Redhead, Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism: a Prolegomenon to the Philos- ophy of Quantum Mechanics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Ch. 2.

12 2.2 Dynamical collapse theories

What are dynamical collapse theories, and how do they profess to solve the measurement problem of quantum mechanics? How serious is the problem of tails for dynamical collapse theories?

Core reading

1. David Albert, Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992. Ch. 5. 2. GianCarlo Ghirardi, “Collapse Theories”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016. 3. John S. Bell, “Are There Quantum Jumps?”, in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 4. David Wallace, “Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics”, in D. Rickles (ed.), The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics, London: Routledge, 2008. §5. 5. David Wallace, “Life and Death in the Tails of the GRW Wave Function”, 2014. Avail- able at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.4746. 6. Kelvin J. McQueen, “Four Tails Problems for Dynamical Collapse Theories”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 49, pp. 10-18, 2015.

Further reading on dynamical collapse theories

1. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics Volume II: Quantum Mechanics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. Ch. 4. 2. David Albert, and Barry Loewer, “Tails of Schrodinger’s Cat”, in R. Clifton (ed.), Per- spectives on Quantum Reality: Non-Relativistic, Relativistic, Field-Theoretic, Kluwer, 1996. 3. Peter Lewis, “Interpreting Spontaneous Collapse Theories”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36, pp. 165-180, 2004. 4. Tim Maudlin, Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity, third edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. Ch. 7. 5. Wayne Myrvold, “On Peaceful Co-Existence: Is the Collapse Postulate Incompati- ble With Relativity?”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33, pp. 435-66, 2002. 6. Angelo Bassi and GianCarlo Ghirardi, “Dynamical Reduction Models”, Physics Re- ports 379, pp. 257-426, 2003. 7. G. C. Ghirardi, R. Grassi, J. Butterﬁeld and G. N. Fleming, “Parameter Dependence and Outcome Dependence in Dynamical Models for State Vector Reduction”, Foun- dations of Physics 23(3), 1993.

13 2.3 The Everett interpretation

Can we go it alone with the wavefunction?

Core reading

1. David Wallace, The Emergent Multiverse, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Chs. 2- 3. 2. David Wallace, “Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics”, in D. Rickles (ed.), The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics, London: Routledge, 2008. §4. 3. Simon Saunders, “Many Worlds: An Introduction”, in S. Saunders et al. (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 4. Richard Dawid and Karim Thebault,´ “Many Worlds: Decoherent or Incoherent?”, Syn- these 192(5),pp. 1559-1580, 2015. 5. Emily Adlam, “The Problem of Conﬁrmation in the Everett Interpretation”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 47, pp. 21-32, 2014.

Probability in Everett

1. David Wallace, The Emergent Multiverse, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Chs. 4- 6. 2. David Wallace, “How to Prove the Born Rule”, in S. Saunders et al. (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 3. Hilary Greaves, “On the Everettian Epistemic Problem”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38, pp. 120-152, 2007. 4. Hilary Greaves and Wayne Myrvold, “Everett and Evidence”, in S. Saunders et al. (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 5. Adrian Kent, “One World Versus Many: The Inadequacy of Everettian Accounts of Evolution, Probability, and Scientiﬁc Conﬁrmation”, in S. Saunders et al. (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 6. David Albert, “Probability in the Everett Picture”, in S. Saunders et al. (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 7. Huw Price, “Decisions, Decisions, Decisions: Can Savage Salvage Everettian Proba- bility?”, in S. Saunders et al. (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 8. Harvey R. Brown, “Curious and Sublime: The Connection Between Uncertainty and Probability in Physics”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A 369, pp. 1-15, 2011.

14 9. Richard Dawid and Karim Thebault,´ “Against the Empirical Viability of the Deutsch- Wallace-Everett Approach to Quantum Mechanics”, Studies in History and Philoso- phy of Modern Physics 47, pp. 55-61, 2014. 10. James Read, “In Defence of Everettian Decision Theory”, Studies in History and Phi- losophy of Modern Physics 63, pp. 136-140, 2018.

Further reading

1. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics Volume II: Quantum Mechanics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. Ch. 6. 2. David Albert and Barry Loewer, “Interpreting the Many Worlds Interpretation”, Syn- these 77, pp. 195-213, 1998. 3. David Wallace, “Decoherence and Ontology, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love FAPP”, in S. Saunders et al. (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 4. Tim Maudlin, “Can the World Be Only Wavefunction?”, in S. Saunders et al. (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

15 2.4 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and the Bell inequalities

Does the EPR thought experiment tell us that quantum mechanics is incomplete?

Core reading

1. Michael Redhead, Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism: A Prolegomenon to the Philos- ophy of Quantum Mechanics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. Chs. 3 and 4. 2. John S. Bell, “Bertlmann’s Socks and the Nature of Reality”, in Speakable and Unspeak- able in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 3. Tim Maudlin, “What Bell Did”, Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical 47, 424010, 2014. 4. David Wallace, The Emergent Multiverse, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Ch. 8, esp. §§8.5-8.7.

Further reading

1. Harvey R. Brown and Christopher Timpson, “Bell on Bell’s Theorem: The Changing Face of Nonlocality”, in S. Gao and M. Bell (eds.), Quantum Nonlocality and Reality—50 Years of Bell’s Theorem, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 2. Jeremy Butterﬁeld, “Bell’s Theorem: What it Takes”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43, pp. 41-83, 1992. 3. Lorenzo Maccone, “A Simple Proof of Bell’s Inequality”, American Journal of Physics 81, pp. 854-859, 2013. 4. Tim Maudlin, Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Chs. 1, 5 and 7. 5. David Albert, Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1994. Ch. 4. 6. Huw Price, Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Ch. 9. 7. Wayne Myrvold, “Lessons of Bell’s Theorem: Nonlocality, yes; Action at a Distance, Not Necessarily” In S. Gao and M. Bell (eds.), Quantum Nonlocality and Reality—50 Years of Bell’s Theorem, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 8. Nicholas Harrigan and Robert W. Spekkens, “Einstein, Incompleteness, and the Epis- temic View of Quantum States”, Foundations of Physics 40, pp. 125-157, 2012.

16 2.5 De Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory

Can the pilot wave theory solve the measurement problem?

Core reading

1. David Albert, Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1992. Ch. 7. 2. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics Volume II: Quantum Mechanics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. Ch. 5. 3. David Wallace, “Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics”, in D. Rickles (ed.), The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics, London: Routledge, 2008. §6. 4. Harvey R. Brown, C. Dewdney and G. Horton, “Bohm Particles and Their Detection in the Light of Neutron Interferometry”, Foundations of Physics 25, pp. 329-347, 1995. 5. Harvey R. Brown, and David Wallace, “Solving the Measurement Problem: De Broglie- Bohm Loses Out to Everett”, Foundations of Physics 35, pp. 517-540, 2005.

Further reading

1. Michael Redhead, Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism: A Prolegomenon to the Philos- ophy of Quantum Mechanics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 118-138, 1987. 2.D.D urr,¨ S. Goldstein and N. Zanghi, “Bohmian Mechanics as the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics”, in J. T. Cushing et al., (eds.), Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, Kulwer Academic Publishers, 1996. 3. Antony Valentini, “Hidden Variables, Statistical Mechanics and the Early Universe”, in J. Bricmont et al. (eds.), Chance in Physics: Foundations and Perspectives, Berlin: Springer, 2001. 4. Antony Valentini, “Pilot Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?”, in S. Saunders et al. (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2010. 5. Harvey R. Brown, “Commentary: Reply to Valentini”, in S. Saunders et al. (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

17 2.6 The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem and ψ-epistemic models

Describe the PBR theorem. What is the status of ψ-epistemic models, in light of this theorem and related results?

Core reading

1. Matthew F. Pusey, Jonathan Barrett and Terry Rudolph, “On the Reality of the Quan- tum State”, Nature Physics 8, pp. 475-478, 2012. 2. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics Volume II: Quantum Mechanics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. Pp. 83-89. 3. M. Leifer, “Is the Quantum State Real?” Quanta 3, pp. 67-155, 2014.

Further reading

1. Jonathan Barrett, Eric Cavalcanti, Raymond Lal and Owen Maroney, “No ψ-Epistemic Model can Fully Explain the Indistinguishability of Quantum States”, Physical Review Letters 112, 250403, 2014. 2. Peter Lewis, David Jennings, Jonathan Barrett, and Terry Rudolph, “Distinct Quantum States Can be Compatible with a Single State of Reality”, Physical Review Letters 109, 150404, 2012.

18 2.7 Wavefunction realism

Should the wavefunction of quantum mechanics be interpreted as some kind of ﬁeld on a physically-realised, very-high-dimensional space?

Core reading

1. David Albert, “Wave Function Realism”, in A. Ney and D. Albert (eds.), The Wave Function: Essays on the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 2. Alyssa Ney, “Fundamental Physical Ontologies and the Constraint of Empirical Co- herence: A Defense of Wave Function Realism”, Synthese 192, pp. 3105-3124, 2015. 3. David Wallace, “Against Wavefunction Realism”, in S. Dasgupta and B. Weslake (eds.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Science, London: Routledge, 2016. 4. David Wallace and Christopher Timpson, “Quantum Mechanics on Spacetime I: Space- time State Realism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61, pp. 697-727, 2010.

Further reading

1. Peter Lewis, “Dimension and Illusion”, in A. Ney and D. Albert (eds.), The Wave Func- tion: Essays on the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 2. David Wallace, The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum Theory According to the Everett Inter- pretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Ch. 8. 3. Frank Arntzenius, Space, Time, and Stuff, Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press, 2012. §3.13.