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Intermediate Philosophy of Physics Reading List Intermediate Philosophy of Physics Reading List James Read [email protected] This is James Read’s reading list for the Finals paper, Intermediate Philosophy of Physics. If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email me at the above address. 1 1 Special Relativity As preparation for the special relativity section of the paper, you might consider reading: (Warning: All of these books are stellar, but some of the later entries are very technical!) 1. N. David Mermin, It’s About Time: Understanding Einstein’s Relativity, Princeton: Prince- ton University Press, 2009. 2. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics Volume I: Space and Time, Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 2012. 3. Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, New York: Dover, 1957. 4. Harvey R. Brown, Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 5. Roberto Torretti, Relativity and Geometry, New York: Dover, 1996. 6. Michael Friedman, Foundations of Space-Time Theories, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 2 1.1 Newton’s laws State Newton’s laws of motion and define all terms therein. How (if at all) do the laws depend upon one another? Do the laws together imply that Newtonian mechanics is Galilean invariant? Core reading 1. Herbert Pfister and Markus King, Inertia and Gravitation, Heidelberg: Springer, 2015. xx1.1-1.3. 2. Roberto Torretti, Relativity and Geometry, New York: Dover, 1996. Ch. 1. 3. Harvey R. Brown, Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. xx2.2, 3.1, 3.2. 4. Michael Friedman, Foundations of Space-Time Theories, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1983. xIII.7. 5. Robert DiSalle, “Space and Time: Inertial Frames”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009. Further reading 1. Julian Barbour, The Discovery of Dynamics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Ch. 12. 2. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, In- dianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979. Ch. 7. 3. James Read, “An Iterative Operationalisation of Inertial Systems”, 2020. 4. Herbert Pfister, “Newton’s First Law Revisited”, Foundations of Physics Letters 17, 2004. 5. John S. Rigden, “Editorial: High Thoughts about Newton’s First Law”, American Jour- nal of Physics 55, 1987. 6. John Earman and Michael Friedman, “The Meaning and Status of Newton’s Law of Inertia and the Nature of Gravitational Forces”, Philosophy of Science 40(3), pp. 329- 359, 1973. 7. Robert DiSalle, “Spacetime Theory as Physical Geometry”, Erkenntnis 42(3), pp. 317- 337, 1995. 3 1.2 Einstein’s derivation of the Lorentz transformations Outline Einstein’s 1905 derivation of the Lorentz transformations, making clear all input assumptions and where they are used. Then answer the following: 1. Which of these input assumptions are empirical facts, and which are conventions? 2. What would happen if one were to drop the light postulate in this derivation? 3. What would happen if one were to replace the light postulate with a ‘sound postu- late’? Core reading 1. Albert Einstein, “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”, Annalen der Physik 17, pp. 891-921, 1905. 2. Harvey R. Brown, Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. x2.3, ch. 5, x6.4. 3. Bryan Cheng and James Read, “Why Not a Sound Postulate?”, 2020. 4. J. R. Lucas and P. E. Hodgson, Spacetime and Electromagnetism, Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1990. Ch. 5. Further reading 1. Andrea Pelissetto and Massimo Testa, “Getting the Lorentz Transformations Without Requiring an Invariant Speed”, American Journal of Physics 83, pp. 338-340, 2015. 2. Vittorio Berzi and Vittorio Gorini, “Reciprocity Principle and the Lorentz Transforma- tions”, Journal of Mathematical Physics 10, pp. 1518-1524, 1969. 4 1.3 The conventionality of simultaneity Is simultaneity conventional in special relativity? Core reading 1. Allen Janis, “Conventionality of Simultaneity”, in E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclo- pedia of Philosophy, 2018. 2. Harvey R. Brown, Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 95-105. 3. David B. Malament, “Causal Theories of Time and the Conventionality of Simultane- ity”, Nousˆ 11, pp. 293-300, 1977. 4. John D. Norton, “Philosophy of Space and Time”, in M. H. Salmon et al. (eds.), Intro- duction to the Philosophy of Science, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 179-231, 1992. 5. Sahotra Sarkar and John Stachel, “Did Malament Prove the Non-Conventionality of Simultaneity in the Special Theory of Relativity?”, Philosophy of Science 66(2), pp. 208- 220, 1999. 6. Nick Huggett, “Essay Review: Physical Relativity and Understanding Space-Time”, Phi- losophy of Science 76, pp. 404-422, 2009. x3.1. Further reading 1. Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, New York, NY: Dover, 1958. xx2.19-2.20. 2. Adolf Grunbaum,¨ “David Malament and the Conventionality of Simultaneity: A Re- ply”, Foundations of Physics 40, pp. 1285-1297, 2010. 3. R. Anderson, I. Vetharaniam and G. E. Stedman, “Conventionality of Synchronisation, Gauge Dependence and Test Theories of Relativity”, Physics Reports 295, pp. 93-180, 1998. 4. John Winnie, “Special Relativity Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions: Part I”, Phi- losophy of Science 37, pp. 81-99, 1970. And: John Winnie, “Special Relativity Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions: Part II”, Philosophy of Science 37, pp. 223-238, 1970. 5. Arthur Eddington, The Mathematical Theory of Relativity, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1924. xx1.4, 1.11. 6. Percy Bridgman, A Sophisticate’s Primer of Relativity, Middletown, CN: Wesleyan Uni- versity Press, 1962. Pp. 66ff. 5 1.4 The twin paradox What, if any, is the correct explanation of the proper time differential in the twin para- dox? Can appeal to the conventionality of simultaneity shed light on the twin paradox? Core reading 1. Michael Weiss, “The Twin Paradox”. Available at: http://math.ucr.edu/home/ baez/physics/Relativity/SR/TwinParadox/twin_paradox.html. 2. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. Ch. 4. 3. Talal A. Debs and Michael L. G. Redhead, “The Twin “Paradox” and the Convention- ality of Simultaneity”, American Journal of Physics 64, pp. 384-392, 1996. 4. Jeffrey R. Weeks, “The Twin Paradox in a Closed Universe”, The American Mathemat- ical Monthly 108(7), pp. 585-590, 2001. Further reading 1. Jean-Pierre Luminet, “Time, Topology, and the Twin Paradox”, in C. Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 6 1.5 Frame-dependent effects In what sense, if any, should frame-dependent effects be regarded as being physical? Core reading 1. John S. Bell, “How to Teach Special Relativity”, in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quan- tum Mechanics, second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 67-80, 2004. 2. Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. Ch. 5. 3. Michael Weiss, “Bell’s Spaceship Paradox”. Available at: http://math.ucr.edu/ home/baez/physics/Relativity/SR/BellSpaceships/spaceship_puzzle. html. 4. Martin A. Lipman, “On the Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity”, Philo- sophical Studies 117, pp. 21-37, 2020. Further reading 1. Harvey R. Brown and Roland Sypel, “On the Meaning of the Relativity Principle and Other Symmetries”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9(3), pp. 235- 253, 1995. 2. Kit Fine, “Tense and Reality”, in Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Ox- ford University Press, 2005. 3. Thomas Hofweber and Marc Lange, “Fine’s Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity”, Nousˆ 51(4), pp. 871-883, 2017. 4. James Read, “Geometric Objects, Natural Kinds, and Fragmentalist Philosophy”, 2020. 7 1.6 Dynamical and geometrical approaches to spacetime theories Geometry and dynamics: which is the cart and which is the horse? Core reading 1. Harvey R. Brown and Oliver Pooley, “Minkowski Space-Time: A Glorious Non-Entity”, in D. Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime pp. 67-89, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006. 2. Harvey R. Brown, Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Ch. 8. 3. Michel Janssen, “Drawing the Line Between Kinematics and Dynamics in Special Rel- ativity”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40, pp. 26-52, 2009. 4. Pablo Acuna,˜ “Minkowski Spacetime and Lorentz Invariance: The Cart and the Horse or Two Sides of a Single Coin?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 55, pp. 1-12, 2016. 5. James Read, “Explanation, Geometry, and Conspiracy in Relativity Theory”, in C. Beis- bart, T. Sauer and C. Wuthrich¨ (eds.), Thinking About Space and Time: 100 Years of Ap- plying and Interpreting General Relativity, vol. 15 of the Einstein Studies series, Basel: Birkhauser,¨ 2020. (Forthcoming.) 6. James Read, “Geometrical Constructivism and Modal Relationalism: Further Aspects of the Dynamical/Geometrical Debate”, International Studies in Philosophy of Sci- ence, 2020. (Forthcoming.) Further reading 1. Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen, “Presentism and Relativity”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54(2), pp. 327-346, 2003. 2. John D. Norton, “Why Constructive Relativity Fails”, British Journal for the Philoso- phy of Science 59, pp. 821-834, 2008. 3. Oliver Pooley, “Substantivalist and Relationist Approaches to Spacetime”, in R. Bat- terman (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, Oxford University Press, 2013. x6.3.2. 4. Harvey R. Brown and James Read, “The Dynamical Approach to Spacetime”, in E. Knox and A. Wilson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics, Oxford: Rout- ledge, 2018. 5. Wayne C. Myrvold, “How Could Relativity be Anything Other Than Physical?”, Stud- ies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2017. 6. Syman Stevens, “Regularity Relationalism and the Constructivist Project”, British Jour- nal for the Philosophy of Science 71, pp.
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