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Tim W. E. Maudlin Curriculum Vitae Tim W. E. Maudlin curriculum vitae Dep't of Philosophy 38 Cameron Ct. Davison Hall Princeton, NJ 08540 Douglass College Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ 08903 (732) 932-9861 (609) 430-9152 Education 1986 Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, History & Philosophy of Science 1982 M.A., University of Pittsburgh, History & Philosophy of Science 1980 B.A., Yale University, Physics & Philosophy 1976 Diploma, The Sidwell Friends School, Washington DC Employment and Teaching Experience 1996- present Professor, Rutgers University 1996 Visiting Associate Professor, Harvard University 1992- 96 Associate Professor, Rutgers University 1986-92 Assistant Professor, Rutgers University 1985-86 Visiting Lecturer, Carnegie-Mellon University 1984-85 Teaching Fellow, University of Pittsburgh 1982-83 Teaching Fellow, University of Pittsburgh Academic Awards, Honors, and Fellowships 1992 Rutgers University Board of Trustees Research Fellowship for Scholarly Excellence 1992 NEH Summer Stipend to complete book manuscript Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity 1989 Invited participant, Sixty-two Years of Uncertainty: Historical, Philosophical and Physics Inquiries into the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics , International School of History of Science,Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture, Erice, Italy 1988 Participant in National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Biology and Ethics 1986-88 Henry Rutgers Research Fellowship, Rutgers University 1984 Apple for the Teacher Award, College of General Studies, University of Pittsburgh 1980 B.A. awarded Summa Cum Laude and with honors in Physics and Philosophy 1979 Elected to Phi Beta Kappa Areas of Specialization Philosophy of Science, especially Physics; Metaphysics; Ancient Philosophy Areas of Competence 17th & 18th Century Philosophy; Logic; History of Science Publications Books Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity: Metaphysical Intimations of Modern Physics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1994); Second Edition, 2002 Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles; Oxford University Press, 2004 The Metaphysics Within Physics Under contract to Oxford University Press Articles "Causes, Counterfactuals and the Third Factor", forthcoming in Causes and Counterfactuals edited by N. Hall, L. Paul and J. Collins, MIT Press, June 2004 “Thoroughly Muddled McTaggart or How to Abuse Gauge freedom to Generate Metaphysical Monstrosities” Philosopher’s Imprint, vol. 2, #4 August 2002 <www.philosophersimprint.org/002004> “Distilling Metaphysics from Quantum Physics”, The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 461-487 “The Tale of Quantum Logic”, forthcoming in a book on the philosophy of Hilary Putnam edited by Yemima Ben Menahem, Cambridge University Press “Time Travel and Modern Physics” (With Frank Arntzenius), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu), republished in Time, Reality and Experience edited by C. Callender, Cambridge University Press, 2002 “Remarks on the Passing of Time”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society volume CII (part 3)., pp. 237- 252 "Dickson on Quantum Chance and Non-locality", , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51, December 2001, pp. 875-882 "Interpreting Probabilities: What's interference got to do with it?", in Chance in Physics, edited by J. Bricmont, D. Dürr, M.C. Galvotti, G. Ghiardi, F. Petruccione, and N. Zanghi, Springer-Verlag Heidleberg 2001 "The Element of Surprise: Novelty and Realism" (critical notice of Jarrett Leplin's A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism) Philosophical Books 1999, pp. 81-86 "Discussion: Healey on the Aharonov-Bohm Effect", Philosophy of Science 65 #2 (June 1998) pp. 361-368 "Part and Whole in Quantum Mechanics" in Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, E. Castellani ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 46-60 "Descrying the World in the Wavefunction" The Monist 80, pp. 2-23 (January 1997) "On the Impossibility of Lewis's Modal Realism" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, pp. 669-682 (December 1996) "On the Unification of Physics" Journal of Philosophy 93, pp. 129-144 (March 1996) "Kuhn édenté: incommensurabilité et choix entre théories" (Kuhn Defanged: Incommensuarability and Theory Choice) Revue Philosophique de Louvain 94, pp. 428-446 (August, 1996) "Space-Time in the Quantum World", in Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, J. Cushing, A. Fine and S. Goldstein eds. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996) pp. 285-307 "Between the Motion and the Act….” Psyche 2:40-51 "Why Bohm's Theory Solves the Measurement Problem" Philosophy of Science 62, pp. 479-483 (September, 1995) "Three Measurement Problems" Topoi 14 , pp. 7-15 (March 1995) "The Irrelevance of Incommensurability", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 26, pp. 113-120 (February, 1995) "The Unbuttoned Empiricist: van Fraassen Speculates on the Quantum World" (critical notice of Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View), Philosophical Books 35, pp. 94-101 (April 1994) "Buckets of Water and Waves of Space: Why Space-Time is Probably a Substance", Philosophy of Science 60, pp. 183-203 (June 1993) "Bell's Inequality, Information Transmission and Prism Models", In D. Hull, M. Forbes, and K. Okruhlik (eds) PSA 1992, vol. 1, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 404-17 "Time Travel and Topology", Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association Meeting, 1990, vol. 1, pp. 304-15 "Substances and Space-Time: What Aristotle Would Have Said to Einstein", Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 531-561 (also published in Biologie, Logique et Metaphysique chez Aristote, (ed. D. Devereux and P. Pellgrin) Paris: editions du CNRS, 1990) "Computation and Consciousness", Journal of Philosophy 86, pp. 407-432 "A Model of Classical Space-Times", The Physics Teacher 27, no. 7, pp. 540-544 "The Essence of Space-Time", Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, 1988, vol. 2, pp. 82-91 "Keeping Body and Soul Together: the Z.3 Puzzle and the Unity of Substances", The Dayton Review 19, no. 3, Winter 1988-89, pp. 121-133 (This is the first section of "Substances and Space-Time", listed above. "The Structure of Skepticism", Ancient Philosophy VI, pp. 177-193 "De Anima 3.1: Is Any Sense Missing?", Phronesis XXXI.1, pp. 51-67 Reviews Review of David Bohm and Basil Hiley's The Undivided Universe, Philosophical Books 36, pp. 281-83 (October 1995) Review of James Cushing's Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen Interpretation, American Journal of Physics 63, pp. 1155-56 (December 1995) Review of Lawrence Sklar's Physics and Chance and Philosophy of Physics, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46, pp. 145-49 (March 1995) Review of Nancy Cartwright's Nature's Capacities and their Measurement, Journal of Philosophy XC, pp. 599-603 (November 1993) Review of David Armstrong's A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility , Philosophy of Science 59, pp. 716- 718 (December 1992) Review of Deborah Modrak's Aristotle: The Power of Perception , The Philosophical Review , XCIX, no. 2, pp. 305-309 Works in Progress “Two Problems About Evaporating Black Holes” “Grading, Sorting, and the Sorites” Articles on Relativity, Quantum Theory, Gauge Theory, Non-Locality, and Bell’s Theorem for The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Presentations and Papers Read “On the Passing of Time” , Sydney, Australia, July 2004 Workshop presentations on the interpretation of quantum theory and non-loacality, Urbino Italy, July 2004 “Suggestions from Physics for Deep Metaphysics”, invited lecture, Society for Exact Philosophy, College Park Maryland, May 2004 “On the Passing of Time” University of Maryland, May 2004 “Two Problems About Evaporating Black Holes”, University of California, San Diego, June 2003 “On the Passing of Time”, The Einstein Forum, Potsdam, Germany, May 2003 “Logic and the Liar Paradox”, NYU, April 2003 “On the Albertian Demon” March 2003, Columbia University Participant in episode of No Dogs and Philosophers Allowed on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, recorded February 2003, aired beginning in September 2003 “On the Passing of Time”, Philosophy of Time Society, APA, Philadelphia, December 2002 “Logic and Liar Paradox”, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, September 2002 “Remarks on the Passing of Time”, The Aristotelian Society, London, June, 2002 "Suggestions from Physics for Deep Metaphysics", MIT, April 2001 "Suggestions from Physics for Deep Metaphysics", CUNY, March 2001 "The Character of Chaos", invited presentation, APA Eastern Division Meetings, New York, December 2000 "Suggestions from Physics for Deep Metaphysics", University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, October 2000 Organizer and participant in roundtable discussion on Philosophy of Probability, Chance in Physics: Foundations and Perspectives, Nov.-Dec. 1999, Naples, Italy "What Physics Can Teach Metaphysics", William Patterson University, October 1999 "Science, Pseudoscience, and Religion", Bergen County Community College, October 1999 Descrying the World in the Wave-Function", Columbia University, November 1998 "From Physics to Metaphysics", Johns Hopkins, October 1998 "Descrying the World in the Wave-Function", Conference on the Metaphysics of Quantum Theory, Rutgers, April 1998 "The Problem of Quantum Gravity", Dep't of Mathematics, Rutgers, February 1998 "Why Be Humean?", University of Minnesota, January 1998 "The Real Problems of Quantum Mechanics", Emory University, October 1997 "Solving the
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