The Influence of the Nominalist Movement on the Scientific Thought of Bacon, Boyle? and Locke
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The Influence of the Nominalist Movement on the Scientific Thought of Bacon, Boyle? and Locke by John Richard Milton A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of London, Department of Humanities, Imperial College of Science and Technology September 1982 - 2 - Abstract This thesis is an investigation of the influence of the nominalist philosophy of the later Middle Ages on the natural philosophy (including metaphysics) and epistemology of Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle and John Locke. Because of the general reluctance of any of these thinkers to quote or make other references to any medieval or modern authors it is impossible to establish with any useful degree of probability which nominalist philosophers they had read. It can, however, be shown that Bacon, Boyle and Locke all accepted the kind of basic nominalist principles which William of Ockham and his successors had enunciated, and moreover that their acceptance of these principles influenced many of their other philosophical and scientific beliefs. Chapter 1 contains a general discussion of the traditional problem of universals and its philosophical implications. Chapter 2 is concerned with ancient and medieval nominalist theories and with their subsequent influence. Chapters 3 and 4 deal respectively with Bacon and Boyle; the former shows the connection between Bacon's inductive theory of method and his nominalist metaphysics; the latter discusses the influence of nominalist and voluntarist ideas on Boyle's conception of nature. Chapter 5 discusses nominalist influences in Locke's early work, up to and including the Drafts for the Essay written in 1671. Chapter 6 is concerned with the develop- ment of Locke's thought between 1671 and 1690, and with the general question of Locke's sources. Chapters 7 and 8 are concerned with the metaphysics and epistemology of the Essay, and show how Locke's nominalist rejection of real universals influenced his belief that we cannot acquire real certain universal knowledge. The final two chapters contain a detailed analysis of Locke's criticisms of three of his realist contemporaries: Malebranche, Norris and Stillingfleet. - 3 - Contents Acknowledgements 4 Abbreviations 5 1. The Historical Significance of the Problem of Universals 6 2. Nominalism 35 30 Francis Bacon 56 4. Robert Boyle 91 5. Locke's Early Thought 143 6. The Composition and Sources of the Essay 172 7. The Metaphysics of the Essay 223 8. The Problem of Universal Knowledge 257 9. Locke's Late Polemics: Malebranche and Norris 285 10. Locke's Late Polemics: Bishop Stillingfleet 308 Bibliography 345 - 4 - Acknowledgements I wish in the first place to thank Professor David Raphael, who acted as my supervisor, for reading all the draft chapters of this thesis, and for his valuable advice, guidance and encouragement. I owe much to conversations with Professor Rupert Hall and Dr Marie Boas Hall in connection with Robert Boyle and his place in seventeenth-century science. 1 am also very grateful to my brother, Philip, for reading the draft versions of chapters 5 to 9, and for long discussions on the interpretation of Locke's ethical thought; and to my parents for proof-reading the final typescript. For any mistakes that remain I am entirely responsible. I would also like to express my thanks to the authorities of the Bodleian Library for allowing me access to the Locke manuscripts in the Locke Room, and to the staff of the Bodleian Library and of Dr. Williams's Library for their helpfulness in all my transactions with them. Finally I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my wife, for typing both the draft and the final versions of this thesis, for invaluable advice on matters both large and small, and for constant encouragement. A Note on Dates All dates mentioned are Old Style, unless the contrary is specifically indicated. - 5 - Abbreviations I have used the following abbreviations for books and journals frequently quoted: Bacon, Works The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. J. Spedding, RoLo Ellis and D.D. Heath. Boyle, Works The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle (London, 1772). Correspondence The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E.S. De Beer. Essay An Essay concerning Human Understanding. A Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bishop First Letter of Worcester. Mr Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord First Reply Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Letter. Journal for the History of Ideas. JHI The Works of John Locke (London, 1812). Locke, Works Mr Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Second Reply Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Second Letter. Stewart M.A. Stewart (ed.), Selected Philosophical Writings of Robert Boyle. The catalogue numbers of books in Locke's library are those given in J. Harrison and P. Laslett, The Library of John Locke. There are no reliable modern editions of a number of Locke's works, notably the Examination of Malebranche, the Remarks upon some of Mr Norris's Books, The Reasonableness of Christianity, the First Letter, the First Reply and the Second Reply. When quoting from these works I have given the readings of the first editions, including (where necessary) the appropriate page numbers. Since copies of these books are rare I have also given page references to the 1812 edition of Locke's Works, the pagination of which appears to be the same as that in the 1823 and 1824 editions. - 6 - Chapter 1 The Historical Significance of the Problem of Universals I The philosophical problems which "arise in connection with the existence and nature of universals have a long history. Since the time of Plato an immense quantity of material has been written about universals — both about the philosophical problems which they have generated and about the treatment which these problems have received in the past. The result of all this activity has been a body of writing which could perhaps be mastered in a lifetime, but scarcely in anything less. Any survey made much more briefly must therefore necessarily be either limited in scope or more-or-less superficial or both. The present dissertation is intended to be an investigation of one of the less well-understood parts of the history of this subject, namely the influence of nominalist ideas on English philosophy from the early fourteenth to the late seventeenth century. It is not intended to be a full history of nominalist thought in England during this period. Such a history is badly needed, but much of the groundwork necessary for it has scarcely been commenced. The history of scholastic philosophy in the English universities from 1400 until its demise in the early eighteenth century is still almost entirely unknown. The map of learning contains in this region a large terra incognita, and the generally accepted reports about its nature have not been - 7 - such as to encourage widespread attempts at investigation. One aim of this present study is to suggest the probable value of such investigations by demonstrating the important continuities which exist between philosophical thought in the fourteenth and in the seventeenth centuries. English philosophy in the seventeenth century cannot adequately be understood if it is considered without reference to what preceded it. The various problems relating to universals have not always been at or near the centre of philosophical discussion in the way that they were in.the fourth century BC or during much of the Middle Ages. At other times fashion has changed, the focus of discussion has shifted, and all the problems involving universals have moved towards the margin of debate, or have even been ignored altogether. It would be unwise to assume that the problems of universals have at such times become irrelevant in reality as well as in appearance. When any philosophical controversy has proceeded without any open discussion of some topic, then on closer enquiry it will often be found that the contending parties have explicitly or implicitly concurred in accepting one particular account of the topic in question. One example may illustrate this. The problem of induction in its modern form presupposes the non- existence of the kind of universal natures or essences postulated by realists in the Aristotelian tradition. If real universals exist and are capable of being the objects of some kind of intellectual intuition, then in principle universal truths can become known with certainty. Aristotle's account of induction is founded on a realistic theory of universals; it is the coming to rest in the soul of a universal in its entirety that provides - 8 - the starting point for scientific (i.e. universal) knowledge.^ Without a realist theory of universals the transition in the final chapter of the Posterior Analytics between the acquisition of universal concepts and the acquisition of universal knowledge would be wholly inexplicable, and Aristotle would be guilty of the most elementary kind of confusion. In fact Aristotle's confusions, though not infrequent, are seldom if ever elementary. The connect- ion between the formation of general concepts and the establishment of general truths is to be found in the theory of real universals. Knowledge of such universals provides simultaneously an ability to use general words and a knowledge of primary general truths — the propositions stating the essences of things which serve as the 2 premises for demonstration. I1 There are a number of different views among present-day philosophers as to the nature of the problem of universals. In post-war Oxford it was fashionable to suppose that the traditional problem of universals was a pseudo-problem resulting from a mis- guided attempt to produce a general answer to a question for which no general answer can exist. On this view, advocated most force- fully by J.L.