Maine State Library Maine State Documents Academic Research and Dissertations Special Collections 6-2012 To Begin at the Beginning: Wittgenstein and the Problem of Metaphysics Michael R. Smith Jr. IDSVA Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalmaine.com/academic Recommended Citation Smith, Michael R. Jr., "To Begin at the Beginning: Wittgenstein and the Problem of Metaphysics" (2012). Academic Research and Dissertations. Book 2. http://digitalmaine.com/academic/2 This Text is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Collections at Maine State Documents. It has been accepted for inclusion in Academic Research and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Maine State Documents. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TO BEGIN AT THE BEGINNING: WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS Michael R. Smith, Jr. Submitted to the faculty of The Institute for Doctoral Studies in the Visual Arts in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy June, 2012 Accepted by the faculty of the Institute for Doctoral Studies in the Visual Arts in partial fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ______________________________ George Smith, Ph.D. Doctoral Committee ______________________________ Simonetta Moro, Ph.D. ______________________________ Sigrid Hackenberg, Ph.D. June 15, 2012 ii © 2012 Michael R. Smith, Jr. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED iii It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back. –LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, On Certainty Dedicated to the memory of my grandfather. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Giving thanks is at once a humbling and precarious activity. Humbling because one realizes how little one can achieve on one’s own; precarious because one cannot possibly acknowledge all those who deserve one’s recognition. My professional thanks go to all those who have, at one time or another, helped me along my way at IDSVA. To George Smith, whose far-flung vision made this possible. To Seth Kim-Cohen, whose guidance and honesty was invaluable. To Margot Anne Kelley, whose wisdom knows no bounds. To Amy Curtis, whose hard work and determination is matched only by a generosity of spirit rarely found amongst mere mortals. My personal thanks go especially to my parents, family, and friends, whose love and support has been unwavering. Special thanks go to Andrew Ranallo, who is as good a friend as he is an editor. Finally, to Laura, because I couldn’t have done this without you. v ABSTRACT: Michael R. Smith, Jr. TO BEGIN AT THE BEGINNING: WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS This text is concerned with the exposition and interpretation of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein in light of what is here called the “problem of metaphysics.” This problem is based on the claim that philosophers throughout history have approached metaphysics from one of two broadly flawed positions. Firstly, there are those who have tended towards the belief that various metaphysical suppositions are self-evidently true. Secondly, there are those who have attempted to deny the possibility of metaphysics altogether by an appeal to various “non-metaphysical” methodologies. The first of these assumptions is rejected based on the conclusion that any self-evident truth requires the universal assent of everyone, which prima facie has never happened. The second of these assumptions is likewise rejected for the reason that every methodology—anti- metaphysical or not—suggests a metaphysics. As this relates to Wittgenstein, it will be seen that we can read his philosophical development as simultaneously encompassing both of these disparate views. These problems are dissolved, however, in much of the work that Wittgenstein did in the last years of his life, especially in On Certainty. There he dismisses the possibility of absolute certainty while acknowledging that some concepts must be fixed in place in order for any description of the world to be possible at all. The question then arises: vi How do we decide between various possible modes of description? The answer, it will be suggested, is that every mode of description is predicated on an aesthetic predilection alone. This inclination can be given no further justification, nor can it be described. It simply admits that we are free to choose whatever metaphysical construct we see fit and that there is no reason to adopt one metaphysical supposition as opposed to another save our aesthetic proclivity for one thing and not another. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction: The Problem of Metaphysics ................................................................ 1 Chapter 1: Metaphysics and Silence..................................................................... 38 Chapter 2: Metaphysics and the Ordinary ........................................................... 89 Chapter 3: Metaphysics and Certainty............................................................... 143 Chapter 4: Metaphysics, Aesthetics, and Ethics................................................. 182 Chapter 5: The Metaphysical Subject and the Work of Art................................ 222 Bibliography..................................................................................... 300 Notes................................................................................................. 306 viii INTRODUCTION: The Problem of Metaphysics Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy; around the demigod everything becomes a satyr-play; and around God everything becomes—what? perhaps a ‘world’? –FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil “Here I have arrived at a foundation of all my beliefs.” “This position I will hold!” But isn’t that, precisely, only because I am completely convinced of it?—What is ‘being completely convinced’ like? –LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, On Certainty A good deal of what follows in this text will depend on two central philosophical voices. The first, and most prominently featured of these will be that of Ludwig Wittgenstein, about whom much will be said in the proceeding pages. The second of these philosophical voices belongs to Friedrich Nietzsche, featured less prominently in terms of exposition, but no less centrally. Two concepts of Nietzsche’s in particular will figure most importantly here. The first of these is the “metaphysics of art” which Nietzsche describes in The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music; and the second is the concept of “perspectivism,” which informs a good deal of Nietzsche’s philosophical writings, although it is one that he rarely discussed directly. Both of these notions will figure prominently here, especially in regards to one of the central themes of this text: the “problem of metaphysics.” This problem is, in many respects, related to the “problem of the criterion” in epistemology. Whereas the latter must contend with questions such as “What do 1 we know?” and “How do we know it?” the former deals with the separate but related questions, “What is the fundamental basis of our knowledge?” and “How do we discover what it is?” Philosophers have often been tempted to answer these questions by resorting to the claim that some principles are self-evidently known to our intuition because if there were no such principles then we would be faced with the likely prospect of an infinite regress. The problem with such “self- evident” metaphysical principles is that they resist the kind of universal agreement that seem to be required of them. This then is one aspect of the problem of metaphysics: the inability to give indubitable first principles coupled with the desire to avoid regress. It should also be stressed that this problem is fundamentally inseparable from the problem of the criterion. Every principle of metaphysics is always subject to epistemological consideration. Whenever any principle is advanced as fundamental, we must always ask how it is that we know it is fundamental. Regardless of how one chooses to answer this question, it is important to point out that any treatment of metaphysics must also be a treatment of epistemology. What follows is no exception. The “problem of metaphysics”—unlike the “problem of the criterion”—is not a phrase widely used in philosophical parlance. It is used, however, by Hartley Burr Alexander in his dissertation of 1902, The Problem of Metaphysics and the Meaning of Metaphysical Explanation: An Essay in Definitions. The “problem of metaphysics,” as he sees it, May be variously stated: it may be a quest for the essence of things, or for a reality within things themselves, or for their truth. But in every case the real object of the inquiry is the discovery of a 2 ground or raison d’être which shall seem to us a sufficient reason why reality is what it is. Such a ground . can only be satisfying when it embodies a motive or a purpose intelligible to us in terms of our motives and our purposes. It is only as revealing design that we consider any action to be reasonable. The problem of metaphysics is thus par excellence the problem of teleology.1 While we will be content with Alexander’s summation of the problem of metaphysics as the inquiry into why reality is what it is, we will differ from him by insisting that metaphysics can in no way be intelligible to us in terms of our motives or purposes. In fact, we will go so far as to suggest that metaphysics is what makes intelligibility possible and as such cannot be intelligible itself. Thus, instead of characterizing the “problem of metaphysics” as “the problem of teleology” par