Russian Patronal Politics Beyond Putin

Henry E. Hale

Abstract: Russian politics from the tsars through Vladimir Putin has been shaped by patronalism, a social equilibrium in which personal connections dominate, collective action happens primarily through individualized punishments and rewards, and trends in the political system reflect changing patterns of coordination among nationwide networks of actual acquaintances that typically cut across political parties, firms, nongovernmental organizations, and even the state. The “chaotic” Yeltsin era reflects low network coordination, while the hallmark of the Putin era has been the increasingly tight coordination of these networks’ activities around the authority of a single patron. In at least the next decade, Russia is unlikely to escape the patronalist equilibrium, which has already withstood major challenges in 1917 and 1991. The most promising escape paths involve much longer-term transitions through diversified economic development and integration with the Western economy, though one cannot entirely rule out that a determined new ruler might accelerate the process.

While its seventy years of Communist rule often steals the limelight, Russia’s weightiest political legacy is arguably something even older and more stub- born: patronalism. Russian political actors experience patronalism as a particular kind of social environment in which they operate. In this environment, direct personal connections are not just useful, but absolutely vital to succeeding in politics and actually accomplish- ing anything once one secures office. These interper- sonal connections can involve long-term relationships HENRY E. HALE is Professor of Po- litical Science and International of diffuse exchange, as between close friends and rel- Affairs at the Elliott School of In- atives, but also elaborate systems of punishments and ternational Affairs at The George rewards that are meted out to specific individuals. The Washington University. He is the rule of law is typically weak, and what many call “cor- author of Patronal Politics: Eurasian ruption” or “nepotism” is the norm. People can and Regime Dynamics in Comparative Per- sometimes do rally for a cause with others with whom spective (2015), The Foundations of they share no personal connection, but this is the ex- Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World ception rather than the expectation. Indeed, when (2008), and Why Not Parties in Rus- push comes to shove for individual actors in the sys- sia? Democracy, Federalism and the tem, personal connections tend to trump issue po- State (2006). sitions, ideology, or even identity. This is a world of

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00432 by guest on 30 September 2021 patrons and clients, patronage politics, and marily around the personalized exchange of Henry E. the dominance of informal understandings concrete rewards and punishments, and not Hale over formal rules–all features well docu- primarily around abstract, impersonal prin- mented by historians of Russia from its very ciples such as ideological belief or catego- origins.1 The rare disruptions in these pat- rizations that include many people one has terns have been just that: rare disruptions not actually met in person.”4 The centrality of an enduring normality. And the impli- of personalized, as opposed to impersonal, cations have been powerful for Russian exchange explains why phenomena like politics. These include cycles of authori- patron-client relations, patronage poli- tarian consolidation punctuated by “cha- tics, weak rule of law, nepotism, and cor- otic” moments of openness and competi- ruption all tend to be common in highly tion that are widely understood locally as patronalistic societies. Highly patronalis- “breakdowns.”2 True liberal democracy al- tic societies also tend to feature patrimo- ways seems out of reach somehow. nial (or neopatrimonial) forms of rule and But just because something has endured low levels of social capital in the sense pop- for a millennium does not mean it can never ularized by political scientist Robert Put- change. Vladimir Putin has proven to be a nam.5 It is unsurprising that Russia features master practitioner of patronal politics, but these things in generous measure, as gener- is it possible that he or a successor will even- ally do all post-Soviet states outside the Eu- tually break Russia’s legacy of patronal- ropean Union.6 ism? We must concede that this is possi- One central implication of patronalism ble. Even those states that are today seen as for politics is that the primary collective paragons of the rule of law, impersonal pol- political “actors” are usually not formal in- itics, and liberal democracy emerged out of stitutions like political parties or interest patronalistic origins not so long ago, argu- groups, but rather extended networks of ac- ably only in the last century or two.3 A few tual personal acquaintances. That is, collec- countries, such as Singapore, appear to have tive political action occurs mainly through made such a transition much more quickly chains of people who directly interact with in recent times. Could Russia in the late Pu- each other–regardless of whether the in- tin or post-Putin era chart a similar course? teraction occurs in a formal or informal The following pages discuss the impli- framework–with each link largely activat- cations of patronalism for Russian politics ed through expectations of personal bene- and explore different pathways through fit or sanction. These arrangements need which change is conceivable. The con- not be quid pro quo. In fact, actors can ben- clusions are sobering, at least in the near efit by establishing extended networks of term. Transforming society in the way that trust and long-term mutual benefit bound would be required takes not only the right by close personal relationships. In Russia, conditions, but also a great deal of time, at such relationships commonly involve fam- least a generation or two. Patronalism, it ily bonds (including marriage and godpar- would seem, is likely to remain a power- entage), growing up or living in the same ful environmental condition shaping Rus- neighborhood, being classmates in school sian politics for the rest of the Putin era (odnokashniki), regularly working together, and likely well into the next. friendship, or introduction by individuals who share such relationships with both par- In precise terms, patronalism is “a social ties. These relationships matter in all societ- equilibrium in which individuals organize ies, but they assume overwhelming impor- their political and economic pursuits pri- tance in highly patronalistic societies, typi-

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00432 by guest on 30 September 2021 Russian cally trumping formal rules or convictions so. This is the hallmark of a single-pyramid Patronal about policy issues as sources of expecta- system, in which a country’s most promi- Politics Beyond tions for how someone else will behave po- nent networks are generally coordinated Putin litically when the stakes are high. The long- around the authority of a single patron or term bonds by no means feel mercenary; become marginalized (or are liquidated). instead, individuals tend to feel them very At the same time, factors that complicate deeply, considering them a source of great network coordination around a single pa- personal enrichment and satisfaction (or tron tend to promote a robust but highly great emotional distress when they sour or corrupt pluralism as networks jockey for rupture). position and compete with each other for Russian politics can appear unstable, in- influence, each interested in providing po- cluding oscillations toward and away from litical cover for critics of their rivals–that authoritarianism and democracy, because a is, a competing-pyramid system.7 coordination problem governs how the ma- While myriad factors might complicate jor power networks in a society relate to one or facilitate networks’ coordinating around another. As personal connections are para- a single patron’s authority, two appear par- mount, political-economic networks need ticularly important in the post-Soviet re- direct, personal access to power to obtain gion. First, a presidentialist constitution the resources they require to survive and facilitates network coordination around a thrive. Indeed, because they are unable to single patron by creating a symbol of dom- rely on the rule of law or the impartial ap- inance (the presidency) that only a single plication of state power to protect their in- network can hold at any one time. Such terests, it becomes imperative for them to single-pyramid systems can be expected extend their own personal connections to to break down, however, when succession key centers of power or, at the very least, to looms and different networks in the pyr- avoid being on the losing side of any strug- amid start jockeying to influence the suc- gle for supreme power and to avoid alien- cession in the direction they most prefer. ating whichever other network wins. Of Second, networks that wield the most pop- course, these networks’ chief patrons do ular support are likely to have special advan- have preferences for different coalitional tages in a succession struggle because they arrangements, and the decisions of the big- can potentially mobilize more (and more gest networks regarding which coalition to ardent) supporters both at the ballot box join or how to hedge their bets impact each and in the streets. Recognizing this, net- coalition’s chances of winning and the dis- works trying to decide where to place their tributional arrangements within that coa- bets are more likely to support popular net- lition. The coordination problem occurs, works and less likely to support unpopular therefore, because all major networks are ones. In other words, high popularity pro- facing this same situation simultaneously. motes network coordination around an in- One very important implication, then, cumbent chief patron while low populari- is that the factors that facilitate networks’ ty tends to undermine such coordination. coordinating around a single patron tend Periods when unpopularity coincides with to promote political closure. Would-be succession struggles are likely to be most regime opponents will find it hard to ob- conducive to the breakdown of single-pyr- tain financing or media coverage since the amid politics. most powerful networks are likely to avoid activities that might irritate the patron Macrolevel Russian political history even without being explicitly told to do since the breakup of the ussr can largely

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00432 by guest on 30 September 2021 be understood as successive periods of betting money favoring Communist Par- Henry E. movement toward and away from single- ty leader Gennadii Zyuganov. Hale pyramid and competing-pyramid systems. After Putin was elected president in 2000, From this bird’s-eye perspective, Putinite Russia entered a new period of gradual clo- Russia is not fundamentally different from sure of the political space. This involved not Yeltsinite Russia; the country during these only eliminating some networks that had two periods just happened to be at differ- initially opposed his rise (as with oligarch ent stages of regime cycles that are typical Vladimir Gusinsky’s network), but also by of countries with presidentialist constitu- co-opting others (such as Yurii Luzhkov’s tions and varying degrees of public support Moscow machine) and then steadily find- for the incumbents. ing them all niches in the system that simul- Overall, the dominant dynamic in post- taneously gave them room to prosper while Soviet Russia’s regime, ever since Boris also limiting their ability to engage in un- Yeltsin defeated his parliament in the vio- wanted spheres of activity (for example, Pu- lent clashes of fall 1993 and then installed tin’s reported 2000 deal with the oligarchs a presidentialist constitution in the De- and the elimination of direct elections for cember 1993 referendum, has clearly been governors in 2004–2005, while reappoint- a slow, net slide toward greater political ing most of them). By 2007, when Putin an- closure. Russia’s most powerful networks, nounced he would leave the presidency for all well represented in the spheres of both the prime ministership, his Kremlin had business and politics and cutting across for- developed an elaborate system to regulate mal institutions like parties or branches of oligarch participation in elections and had government, have generally come in three brought the three most influential televi- types: “oligarchs” (those growing mainly sion stations almost entirely under de fac- out of the corporate world), regional polit- to state editorial control. Putin’s return to ical machines (typically led by governors), the presidency in 2012 resumed the trend of and state-based networks (extending pri- political closure, with an expansion of his marily out of state structures). These were own personal networks’ role in controlling highly uncoordinated in the aftermath of mass media and more aggressive use of the the ussr’s demise,8 but Yeltsin pulled out criminal justice system to selectively perse- all the presidential stops to cobble together cute those who dared oppose him. With the a (barely) winning coalition for his 1996 seizure of Crimea and the start of the war reelection, persuaded to do so rather than in the Donbas in 2014, the political screws cancel the election by “privatization tsar” tightened still further. His 2016 decision to Anatolii Chubais.9 This coalition includ- create a National Guard reporting to him ed a motley mix of state-based networks, personally, and binding to it the brutal some key regional machines (such as vote- network of Chechnya strongman Ramzan rich Bashkortostan and Tatarstan), and Kadyrov, is perhaps the latest major step in most oligarchs (who supplied slanted me- this process of increasingly tight coordina- dia coverage that gave Yeltsin a major ad- tion of Russia’s major networks around Pu- vantage). Indeed, this feat was arguably the tin as chief patron. first to demonstrate the power of the pa- That said, the gaps in the chronology just tronal presidency to generate an elector- presented (in particular 1997–1999 and al win through network coordination be- 2007–2012) belie the notion that Russia’s cause he had so little else upon which to path to political closure has been mono- rely, with his support in the single digits tonic. Indeed, these periods all reflect mo- just months before the election and the ments when uncertainty regarding presi-

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00432 by guest on 30 September 2021 Russian dential succession underpinned periods of ty services resorted to tactics that includ- Patronal pronounced political ferment in Russia that ed arresting each other’s representatives Politics Beyond involved certain sorts of political opening. and exposing each other’s misdeeds in me- Putin The period leading up to the 1999–2000 dia outlets.10 Once Putin made clear that election cycle was a classic competing pyr- he would retain a hold on formal power as amid situation brought about by Yeltsin’s prime minister and leader of the United expected departure from politics, with the Russia Party but cede the presidency itself primary battle being fought by two roughly to a close associate with a more “liberal” equal coalitions of oligarchs, regional ma- reputation, Dmitrii Medvedev, the result- chines, and state officials angling to succeed ing uncertainty as to where future power Yeltsin: the Fatherland-All Russia coalition would rest fostered a noticeable opening led by Luzhkov and former prime minister of the political space (some called this pe- Yevgenii Primakov versus the Kremlin’s riod a “thaw”)11 even as Medvedev presid- coalition in support of Putin. It is impor- ed over a continued contraction of ballot- tant to remember that Putin was not ini- eligible alternatives, replaced some of the tially considered a favorite in this race. He most powerful governors, and lengthened became the presumptive winner only af- presidential terms from four to six years ef- ter his strong military response to a series fective in 2012. of deadly apartment building bombings in When Putin and Medvedev once again September 1999 led to a surge in his popu- put succession on the table by declaring larity, and after the pro-Putin Unity bloc’s they would switch positions for the 2011– strong second-place finish in the December 2012 election cycles as their popularity was 1999 Duma election proved that he could weakening in the wake of the 2008–2009 convert his popularity into officially count- financial crisis, a new political opening ed votes. emerged when slapdash efforts to boost Acute tensions among networks again the United Russia Party’s vote through emerged with the 2007–2008 election cy- fraud and crude pressure in the Decem- cle, when Putin fostered expectations that ber 2011 Duma election sparked massive he would leave the presidency without giv- protests in Moscow and other major cities. ing a clear idea as to whether the succession The regime’s initial response, interestingly would lead to a real transfer of power. The enough, was not an immediate crackdown key difference between this first “succes- but instead a retreat. Controls on media sion” from Putin and the succession from were relaxed, and opposition figures pre- Yeltsin is that Putin (unlike Yeltsin) was in viously denied coverage appeared as com- robust health and at the height of his pop- mentators or even the subjects of neutral ular support. Because polls throughout news coverage. Video cameras were in- 2007–2008 showed that large shares of the stalled in virtually all polling places for the electorate would vote for whomever Putin 2012 presidential election. Direct contest- endorsed, Russia’s political-economic net- ed elections, at least of some sort, were re- works had little incentive to mobilize pop- stored for governors. And rules for register- ular opposition and push for more democ- ing parties were relaxed, resulting in many racy, instead struggling both overtly and opposition forces gaining official recog- covertly to influence Putin’s decision and nition. Once Putin was safely reelected to better position themselves for whatev- and the “new” old patron once again firm- er new arrangement would emerge. It was ly in place, the regime took a decidedly during this period, for example, that com- more authoritarian turn. Those who had peting networks with roots in rival securi- ventured the furthest in flirting with op-

34 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00432 by guest on 30 September 2021 position politics from 2008 to 2012, such as al connections and personalized rewards Henry E. oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, increasingly and punishments.12 Thus, if Russia were Hale found themselves under pressure to fall to make such a transition from patronal- more firmly back into line, especially after ism, its prospects for full democratization 2014, when Putin’s popularity soared into would radically improve. the stratosphere. What are the chances that Russia could It is not impossible for Russia to escape realize such a transition? The chief prob- the social equilibrium of patronalism in lem is that patronalism is not simply a habit the foreseeable future. What might a non- that a good media campaign could get peo- patronal or “low-patronalism” Russia look ple to kick. Instead, it is much better unlike? In general, it would be a country where derstood as a complex, deeply entrenched individuals coordinated their activities equilibrium in how people relate to one an- around formal rules and laws as a matter other when it comes to political activity. Ac- of course; where violators would routinely cordingly, it can be very difficult to shift the suffer either legal or social sanction regard- realm of politics to a different equilibrium. less of their personal connections; where Let us reflect a little more on why this is people’s personal convictions on broad pol- the case. People everywhere generally op- icy issues would normally trump the inter- pose things like “corruption” and “nepo- ests of their networks; where merit accord- tism” and want to be able to rely on the ing to formalized criteria would typically law to protect them. But what drives the overrule personal or family ties when a val- equilibrium is the pervasive expectation that ued position is at stake; where revelations these behaviors are the norm rather than of corruption are shocking rather than wry- the rare exception in important spheres of ly accepted as the norm; and where people life. And when they expect virtually every- would frequently join and contribute mon- one to practice corruption and nepotism ey to organizations led by people to whom and believe that they cannot rely on others they have no extended personal connection to obey or enforce the law, then they face but with whom they share certain values or very strong incentives to engage in the very valued characteristics. same practices themselves if they want to This would certainly be a very different get anything done–even good things. Russia, though it would not necessarily be A few examples help illustrate the force– a democratic one. Nazi Germany, to take and morality–behind patronalism’s endur- perhaps the most extreme example, was ance. A mayor who completely eschews not organized on patronalistic principles. such practices–refusing to make any pay- And to offer a much more benign exam- offs, to maintain a “favor bank” with pow- ple, Lee Kuan Yew successfully broke Sin- erful higher-ups, or to pressure the right gapore’s patronalistic equilibrium, mak- people using the resources at her disposal ing it one of the least corrupt countries in –might well find herself unable to get a the world, but the regime he created shows company to build a factory in her city that how formal rules and policy commitments would create much-needed jobs. Without can underpin authoritarianism. The ma- some connection to the mayor, this facto- jority of low-patronalism countries from ry would likely just go to another city where Canada to Sweden, however, are liberal the mayor “plays ball.” While the honest democracies. Indeed, to be a fully liberal mayor might be considered a hero in West- democracy surely requires that formal ern societies for standing up to her corrupt procedures trump the politics of person- surroundings, to her constituents who de-

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00432 by guest on 30 September 2021 Russian pend on her to land jobs for their city, she pervasive patron-client relations, were the Patronal would likely be considered ineffective and norm centuries before the Bolsheviks came Politics Beyond even incompetent. Ironically, these same to power in 1917; so this cannot be blamed Putin constituents might all the while feel angry on Communist rule.16 The 1917 Bolshevik at the rampant corruption in their society. Revolution can, in some sense, be under- Moreover, when people do not expect oth- stood as an antipatronalist revolution, an ers to observe the rule of law, appointing attempt to replace the old “corrupt” poli- one’s relatives as your deputies or award- tics with a new future governed by socialist ing a state contract to a close friend makes principles and formal organization, treat- sense as a way of ensuring you are not cheat- ing people not according to who they knew ed, which can better position you to do your but who they were and what they believed job effectively. Or, at least, it guarantees that and valued. But it was not long before a if you are cheated, the lost resources go to new leader emerged who realized he could someone you like who might do you a sol- undermine the true reformers like Nikolai id later. Bribe-taking can also be useful for Bukharin and Leon Trotsky by resorting to something other than satisfying greed since the old, hard practice of patronal politics, participation in elaborate rent-seeking crushing them with the Communist Par- schemes can signal one’s loyalty to the sys- ty machine he constructed based on per- tem, while also giving its practitioners re- sonal connections in the 1920s and 1930s. sources that can be used to achieve what- Hope was likewise dashed with the defeat ever goals that individual needs to achieve, of Mikhail Gorbachev’s effort to create a including the goals of the organization the democratic and prosperous socialism, and person represents.13 Of course, coercion is the choices that post-Soviet leaders made also frequently part of such arrangements, to consolidate power through the tempt- and a weak rule of law has long been argued ingly available tools of patronalism; this to facilitate companies’ turning to mafias to was essentially the lesson that Chubais enforce contracts. These mafias, of course, taught Yeltsin in the course of winning are also widely known for generating their reelection in 1996. own demand for “protection.”14 Overall, in highly patronalistic societies, such things The key to successfully and significantly are frequently seen as “just the way things reducing the degree of patronalism in pol- work here,” words often accompanied by itics is to somehow create a pervasive and an ironic smile and a sigh. And so the equi- durable expectation across the whole of so- librium is continuously reproduced. ciety (though especially elites) that people This helps explain why patronalism has will no longer engage in the same practic- been so tenacious in Russia over centuries, es as before. And this belief must be sus- not just decades. Arguably emerging with tained not only during a moment of revo- the first human communities that were lution, but throughout the initial years of small enough for everyone to know each a new regime when disillusionment can other and in which the most natural way arise and a leader can be sorely tempted to to govern was through personal connec- resort to patronal politics to stay in power. tions, patronalism is best thought of as the For this reason, not only have very few world historical norm, with the West be- leaders anywhere in the world seriously ing a highly contingent exception.15 Even tried it, but even fewer have stuck with it a cursory look at works on politics and so- and succeeded. ciety in precommunist Russia makes quite Only in Georgia after the Rose Revolution clear that patronalistic practices, including did a post-Soviet leader make a notewor-

36 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00432 by guest on 30 September 2021 thy effort to reduce the scope of patronal- ry that feels revolutionary (the latter being Henry E. ism in politics. But most now agree that de- less painful for Russians). There is a strong Hale spite certain impressive reforms, includ- case to be made that this is what happened ing ridding the traffic police of corruption, in Georgia, with Saakashvili’s party-build- Mikheil Saakashvili’s efforts did not go ing strategy being key to his credibility as a nearly far enough, with his regime retain- reformer.21 But too many revolutions have ing and vigorously engaging a solid (if less had their patronalistic Thermidors to in- outwardly visible) patronalistic core. One spire much optimism in Russia. can also find a few limited spheres where It is at least conceivable that certain patronalism is firewalled out in a highly pa- more gradual changes could begin and ac- tronalistic society, as political scientist Ju- cumulate in the next decade or two that liet Johnson has shown occurred with Kyr- could weaken patronalism. One could be gyzstan’s central banking system under the robust economic growth, as has arguably pressures and incentives supplied by the in- facilitated the transition from the stron- ternational financial community. Johnson gest forms of patronalism in much of also shows, however, how difficult such Western Europe and North America. Eco- bubbles of formality can be to sustain.17 In nomic development holds the potential a country where it dominates the highest to help individuals feel less dependent on levels of politics, patronalism abhors a vac- more powerful patrons for their well-be- uum. For such reasons, Lee Kuan Yews– ing, encouraging them to engage in more and even Mikheil Saakashvilis–are rare. activities based on their beliefs in spite of Russia’s prospects for true antipatronal pressures that might be applied to them. transformation, therefore, seem slim in- The rebellion of Russia’s “creative classes” deed in the next decade or two. Its direct that was part of the massive street protests involvement in conflicts from Ukraine to against election fraud and Putin’s return to Syria could create pressures to improve ef- the presidency indicates that this path is fectiveness by reducing the degree of pa- not completely unrealistic for Russia. In- tronalistic practices in the military.18 But deed, these protesters were not simply ex- history suggests it would be unlikely to pressing their dislike of a particular indi- spread to other spheres without concert- vidual or even their objection to a partic- ed leadership effort. Perhaps Putin could ular instance of election fraud. They were one day wake up and decide to use his im- also expressing their hope for a new kind mense authority to truly remake Russian of future for Russia, one without corrup- society.19 But it is hard for leaders to break tion or political manipulations. up and rebuild anew the very boat on which For economic development to bring that they float, and there are strong arguments kind of change, it would have to come not that he would face a great risk that an im- simply from a rise in energy prices, which partial legal system could put him (or at would leave individuals as dependent as be- least his close friends) in danger of impris- fore on higher-ups linked to the state, but onment.20 If his successor comes from in- from a broad diversification of the econo- side his system, he or she would likely face my that empowers something like an inde- the same risks. pendent middle class. The problem is that An antipatronal transformation, there- those who hold resources today have incen- fore, may be most likely if oppositions come tive to prevent this from happening, pri- to power who are somehow credibly com- marily by seeking to control any “diversi- mitted to thoroughgoing reforms, either in fication” themselves either from the outset an actual revolution or in an election victo- or through predatory “raiding” practices.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00432 by guest on 30 September 2021 Russian Whether emerging independent economic patronalistic practices. And even when such Patronal actors will be able to form the alliances nec- an effort initially succeeds, as was arguably Politics Beyond essary to protect themselves from such en- the case one century ago when the Bolshe- Putin croachment on a large scale remains to be viks seized power and attempted to impose seen, and will be difficult given the strength ideological rather than patronalistic prac- of their foes. At best, it would probably re- tices of rule, history suggests that it is like- quire more than a generation for this pro- ly to succumb before long to the temptation cess to take a sufficiently sturdy hold to to resort to patronalism, as with Stalin’s create expectations of a new social norm rise to power. emerging.22 The path of economic devel- We should also not rule out that Russia opment may in fact be Russia’s most prom- could chart a path away from patronalism ising, but it is a very long and contingent through democracy. For example, if Rus- one at best. sia were to experience some kind of reform It is also possible that patronalism could that systematically complicated the coordi- become overwhelmed by the emergence of nation of its highly patronalistic networks strong political partisanship or the devel- around a single chief patron, the resulting opment of deep ideological commitments political competition could over time pro- that could start to overpower the pull of pa- vide at least some incentive for politicians tronal networks. That is, perhaps people in actually to follow through on campaign Russia will start to buy into certain belief promises to combat corruption. One such systems so deeply that they become (en reform could be a shift to a nonpresidential- masse) more willing than before to break ist constitution, a shift that sometimes oc- with the demands of their own friends and curs when an outgoing president does not family and withstand individualized re- trust his or her likely successors and thus wards and punishments. Political scientist tries to weaken the office they would inher- Stephen Hanson, for example, shows how it, or when a coalition takes power and de- initially marginalized ideologues have often cides to cement a power-sharing deal with gone on to create the most powerful parties, constitutional change. One problem is that since their deeply held personal commit- research into the causes of corruption indi- ments lead them to adopt a long time-hori- cates that it can take many decades for dem- zon until the point at which their time ar- ocratic competition to noticeably dampen rives and they expand their base to trans- corruption.23 And other research has found form society. To be sure, almost since the that democratic competition in highly pa- beginning, Russia could boast brave indi- tronalistic societies can actually increase viduals willing to take on enormous risks demand for corrupt practices as politicians and pay the highest of personal prices in seek to use every tool in their arsenal to win order to stand up for their beliefs, rang- struggles for power.24 ing from tsarist-era revolutionaries to So- One final possibility deserves mention. viet dissidents to hard-core street protest- Russia might one day integrate far more ers in the late Putin era. They have rare- strongly into the international political ly, however, managed to get the buy-in of economy than it has so far. Since this inter- large numbers, remaining marginalized national political economy is still dominat- and sometimes even ridiculed by average ed by the West, such integration could grad- citizens. It would seem likely to take a ma- ually serve to weaken Russian patronalism jor national trauma to generate the kind by providing increasingly important and of competing belief-systems necessary to lucrative environments for surviving and completely restructure politics away from thriving without patronalistic practices.

38 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00432 by guest on 30 September 2021 And even if this integration primarily goes Overall, at least for the next decade or Henry E. not through the West but via Asia-Pacific two, it would appear that the Russian Fed- Hale centers of growth where patronalism is the eration is unlikely to escape the social equi- norm, this could still mean that Russia’s big- librium of patronalism that has shaped gest patronal networks would gain strong politics in that part of the world for cen- interests outside of Russia. In this case, even turies. By no means does this imply Rus- if these international centers of growth sian politics will be static. To the contrary, do not insist on democratization, the ef- while patronalism itself is stable, its poli- fect could be liberalizing because it would tics are highly dynamic and sometimes vol- weaken the dependence of Russia’s chief atile, with seeming authoritarian stabili- economic actors on their patrons back at ty often masking a deeper fragility. Where home. From the vantage point of 2017, how- exactly Russia will be in its regime cycles ever, this seems very unlikely to happen in at any given moment ten or twenty years the next decade. Russia has been sanctioned down the road is hard to say. But a con- by the international community for its sei- servative prediction based on the signs as zure of Crimea and support for an insurgen- of 2017 would hold that Russia is likely to cy in the Donbas, and the recent trend has continue to experience the same patterns been toward Russia’s isolation from, rather of constant change in how its political-eco- than integration with, the world economy. nomic networks are arranged, with specif- While reversal is quite possible in the next ics governed by lame duck syndromes, the ten years, the process is likely to be slow and ebbs and flows of public support, and lead- nowhere near extensive enough in the next ers’ own innovations in how to manage the decade to translate into a significant reduc- whole process in a changing environment. tion in Russian patronalism.

endnotes 1 See, for example, Edward L. Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways,” The Russian Review 45 (1986): 115–181; John P. LeDonne, “Ruling Families in the Russian Political Order, 1689– 1825,” Cahiers Du Monde Russe et Sovietique 28 (3) (1987): 233–322; Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Collier, 1974); and David Ransel, “Character and Style of Patron-Client Relations in Russia,” in Klientelsysteme Im Europa Der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Antoni Maczak (Mu- nich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 211–231. 2 Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 3 Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 4 Hale, Patronal Politics, 20. 5 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Tran- sitions in Africa,” World Politics 46 (4) (July 1994); and Mounira M. Charrad and Julia Adams, “Introduction: Patrimonialism, Past and Present,” The Annals of the American Academy of Politi- cal and Social Science 636 (July 2011): 6–15. 6 See, for example, Mikhail N. Afanas’ev, Klientelizm i rossiiskaya gosudarstvennost’ (Moscow: Mos- cow Public Science Foundation, 1997); Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014); Oleksandr Fisun, “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00432 by guest on 30 September 2021 Russian a Neopatrimonial Perspective,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 20 (2) Patronal (Spring 2012): 87–96; Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Politics Gabor Toka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation Beyond Putin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Alena Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance (Prince- ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). 7 Hale, Patronal Politics, 10. 8 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000, 2nd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 9 On Yeltsin and the Yeltsin period more generally, see Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (New York: Basic Books, 2008). 10 For an excellent forensic analysis of the complex network struggles during this period, see Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism, and the Medvedev Suc- cession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 11 See, for example, the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “The Medvedev Thaw: Is It Real? Will It Last?” June 23, 2009, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. https://www.csce.gov/ sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/The%20Medvedev%20Thaw%20-%20Is%20it%20 Real,%20Will%20it%20Last_Compiled.PDF (accessed May 24, 2016). 12 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, 1st ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000). 13 Keith Darden, “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution,” Pol- itics & Society 36 (1) (March 2008): 35–60. 14 Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002). 15 North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders. 16 See, for example, Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways”; LeDonne, “Ruling Families in the Russian Political Order, 1689–1825”; Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime; and Ransel, “Character and Style of Patron-Client Relations in Russia.” 17 Juliet Johnson, Priests of Prosperity: How Central Bankers Transformed the Postcommunist World, 1st ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2016). 18 Brian Taylor, State-Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 19 On the challenges leaders face effecting reform on even a lesser scale, see George W. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 20 Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy; and Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013). 21 Bret Barrowman, The Reformer’s Dilemmas: The Politics of Public Sector Reform in Clientelistic Political Systems (Ph.D. diss., The George Washington University, 2015). 22 Stanislav Markus, Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 23 Daniel Treisman, “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Public Eco- nomics 76 (3) (June 2000): 399–457. 24 Maria Popova, “Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine,” Comparative Political Studies 43 (10) (October 2010): 1202–1229; and Gul- naz Sharafutdinova, Political Consequences of Crony Capitalism inside Russia (South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 2010).

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