Russia Beyond Putinrussia Samuel A

Dædalus Dædalus Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Spring 2017 Russia Beyond Putin George W. Breslauer & Timothy J. Colton, guest editors with Valerie Bunce · Henry E. Hale Fiona Hill · Brian D. Taylor Maria Popova · Elena Chebankova Marlene Laruelle · Stanislav Markus Samuel A. Greene · Keith A. Darden Russian Patronal Politics Beyond Putin Henry E. Hale Abstract: Russian politics from the tsars through Vladimir Putin has been shaped by patronalism, a social equilibrium in which personal connections dominate, collective action happens primarily through in- dividualized punishments and rewards, and trends in the political system reflect changing patterns of coordination among nationwide networks of actual acquaintances that typically cut across political parties, firms, nongovernmental organizations, and even the state. The “chaotic” Yeltsin era reflects low network coordination, while the hallmark of the Putin era has been the increasingly tight coordination of these networks’ activities around the authority of a single patron. In at least the next decade, Russia is unlikely to escape the patronalist equilibrium, which has already withstood major challenges in 1917 and 1991. The most promising escape paths involve much longer-term transitions through diversified economic develop- ment and integration with the Western economy, though one cannot entirely rule out that a determined new ruler might accelerate the process. While its seventy years of Communist rule often steals the limelight, Russia’s weightiest political legacy is arguably something even older and more stub- born: patronalism. Russian political actors experience patronalism as a particular kind of social environment in which they operate. In this environment, direct personal connections are not just useful, but absolutely vital to succeeding in politics and actually accomplish- ing anything once one secures office. These interper- sonal connections can involve long-term relationships HENRY E. HALE is Professor of Po- litical Science and International of diffuse exchange, as between close friends and rel- Affairs at the Elliott School of In- atives, but also elaborate systems of punishments and ternational Affairs at The George rewards that are meted out to specific individuals. The Washington University. He is the rule of law is typically weak, and what many call “cor- author of Patronal Politics: Eurasian ruption” or “nepotism” is the norm. People can and Regime Dynamics in Comparative Per- sometimes do rally for a cause with others with whom spective (2015), The Foundations of they share no personal connection, but this is the ex- Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World ception rather than the expectation. Indeed, when (2008), and Why Not Parties in Rus- push comes to shove for individual actors in the sys- sia? Democracy, Federalism and the tem, personal connections tend to trump issue po- State (2006). sitions, ideology, or even identity. This is a world of © 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00432 30 patrons and clients, patronage politics, and marily around the personalized exchange of Henry E. the dominance of informal understandings concrete rewards and punishments, and not Hale over formal rules–all features well docu- primarily around abstract, impersonal prin- mented by historians of Russia from its very ciples such as ideological belief or catego- origins.1 The rare disruptions in these pat- rizations that include many people one has terns have been just that: rare disruptions not actually met in person.”4 The centrality of an enduring normality. And the impli- of personalized, as opposed to impersonal, cations have been powerful for Russian exchange explains why phenomena like politics. These include cycles of authori- patron-client relations, patronage poli- tarian consolidation punctuated by “cha- tics, weak rule of law, nepotism, and cor- otic” moments of openness and competi- ruption all tend to be common in highly tion that are widely understood locally as patronalistic societies. Highly patronalis- “breakdowns.”2 True liberal democracy al- tic societies also tend to feature patrimo- ways seems out of reach somehow. nial (or neopatrimonial) forms of rule and But just because something has endured low levels of social capital in the sense pop- for a millennium does not mean it can never ularized by political scientist Robert Put- change. Vladimir Putin has proven to be a nam.5 It is unsurprising that Russia features master practitioner of patronal politics, but these things in generous measure, as gener- is it possible that he or a successor will even- ally do all post-Soviet states outside the Eu- tually break Russia’s legacy of patronal- ropean Union.6 ism? We must concede that this is possi- One central implication of patronalism ble. Even those states that are today seen as for politics is that the primary collective paragons of the rule of law, impersonal pol- political “actors” are usually not formal in- itics, and liberal democracy emerged out of stitutions like political parties or interest patronalistic origins not so long ago, argu- groups, but rather extended networks of ac- ably only in the last century or two.3 A few tual personal acquaintances. That is, collec- countries, such as Singapore, appear to have tive political action occurs mainly through made such a transition much more quickly chains of people who directly interact with in recent times. Could Russia in the late Pu- each other–regardless of whether the in- tin or post-Putin era chart a similar course? teraction occurs in a formal or informal The following pages discuss the impli- framework–with each link largely activat- cations of patronalism for Russian politics ed through expectations of personal bene- and explore different pathways through fit or sanction. These arrangements need which change is conceivable. The con- not be quid pro quo. In fact, actors can ben- clusions are sobering, at least in the near efit by establishing extended networks of term. Transforming society in the way that trust and long-term mutual benefit bound would be required takes not only the right by close personal relationships. In Russia, conditions, but also a great deal of time, at such relationships commonly involve fam- least a generation or two. Patronalism, it ily bonds (including marriage and godpar- would seem, is likely to remain a power- entage), growing up or living in the same ful environmental condition shaping Rus- neighborhood, being classmates in school sian politics for the rest of the Putin era (odnokashniki), regularly working together, and likely well into the next. friendship, or introduction by individuals who share such relationships with both par- In precise terms, patronalism is “a social ties. These relationships matter in all societ- equilibrium in which individuals organize ies, but they assume overwhelming impor- their political and economic pursuits pri- tance in highly patronalistic societies, typi- 146 (2) Spring 2017 31 Russian cally trumping formal rules or convictions so. This is the hallmark of a single-pyramid Patronal about policy issues as sources of expecta- system, in which a country’s most promi- Politics Beyond tions for how someone else will behave po- nent networks are generally coordinated Putin litically when the stakes are high. The long- around the authority of a single patron or term bonds by no means feel mercenary; become marginalized (or are liquidated). instead, individuals tend to feel them very At the same time, factors that complicate deeply, considering them a source of great network coordination around a single pa- personal enrichment and satisfaction (or tron tend to promote a robust but highly great emotional distress when they sour or corrupt pluralism as networks jockey for rupture). position and compete with each other for Russian politics can appear unstable, in- influence, each interested in providing po- cluding oscillations toward and away from litical cover for critics of their rivals–that authoritarianism and democracy, because a is, a competing-pyramid system.7 coordination problem governs how the ma- While myriad factors might complicate jor power networks in a society relate to one or facilitate networks’ coordinating around another. As personal connections are para- a single patron’s authority, two appear par- mount, political-economic networks need ticularly important in the post-Soviet re- direct, personal access to power to obtain gion. First, a presidentialist constitution the resources they require to survive and facilitates network coordination around a thrive. Indeed, because they are unable to single patron by creating a symbol of dom- rely on the rule of law or the impartial ap- inance (the presidency) that only a single plication of state power to protect their in- network can hold at any one time. Such terests, it becomes imperative for them to single-pyramid systems can be expected extend their own personal connections to to break down, however, when succession key centers of power or, at the very least, to looms and different networks in the pyr- avoid being on the losing side of any strug- amid start jockeying to influence the suc- gle for supreme power and to avoid alien- cession in the direction they most prefer. ating whichever other network wins. Of Second, networks that wield the most pop- course, these networks’ chief patrons do ular support are likely to have special advan- have preferences for different coalitional tages in a succession struggle because they arrangements, and the decisions of the big- can potentially mobilize more (and more gest networks regarding which coalition to ardent) supporters both at the ballot box join or how to hedge their bets impact each and in the streets. Recognizing this, net- coalition’s chances of winning and the dis- works trying to decide where to place their tributional arrangements within that coa- bets are more likely to support popular net- lition. The coordination problem occurs, works and less likely to support unpopular therefore, because all major networks are ones.

Load more