Spring 2017

guest editors Henry E. Hale Brian D. Taylor Taylor Brian D. · · Keith A. Darden · Stanislav Markus Stanislav · Elena Chebankova · Fiona Hill

Valerie Bunce Valerie

Maria Popova with Russia Beyond PutinRussia Samuel A. Greene Marlene Laruelle Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Journal of the American Academy

George W. Breslauer & Timothy J. Colton, J. Breslauer & Timothy George W. Dædalus

Dædalus Russian Patronal Politics Beyond Putin

Henry E. Hale

Abstract: Russian politics from the tsars through Vladimir Putin has been shaped by patronalism, a so- cial equilibrium in which personal connections dominate, collective action happens primarily through in- dividualized punishments and rewards, and trends in the political system reflect changing patterns of co- ordination among nationwide networks of actual acquaintances that typically cut across political parties, firms, nongovernmental organizations, and even the state. The “chaotic” Yeltsin era reflects low network coordination, while the hallmark of the Putin era has been the increasingly tight coordination of these networks’ activities around the authority of a single patron. In at least the next decade, Russia is unlikely to escape the patronalist equilibrium, which has already withstood major challenges in 1917 and 1991. The most promising escape paths involve much longer-term transitions through diversified economic develop- ment and integration with the Western economy, though one cannot entirely rule out that a determined new ruler might accelerate the process.

While its seventy years of Communist rule often steals the limelight, Russia’s weightiest political leg- acy is arguably something even older and more stub- born: patronalism. Russian political actors experience patronalism as a particular kind of social environment in which they operate. In this environment, direct per- sonal connections are not just useful, but absolutely vital to succeeding in politics and actually accomplish- ing anything once one secures office. These interper- sonal connections can involve long-term relationships HENRY E. HALE is Professor of Po- litical Science and International of diffuse exchange, as between close friends and rel- Affairs at the Elliott School of In- atives, but also elaborate systems of punishments and ternational Affairs at The George rewards that are meted out to specific individuals. The Washington University. He is the rule of law is typically weak, and what many call “cor- author of Patronal Politics: Eurasian ruption” or “nepotism” is the norm. People can and Regime Dynamics in Comparative Per- sometimes do rally for a cause with others with whom spective (2015), The Foundations of they share no personal connection, but this is the ex- Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World ception rather than the expectation. Indeed, when (2008), and Why Not Parties in Rus- push comes to shove for individual actors in the sys- sia? Democracy, Federalism and the tem, personal connections tend to trump issue po- State (2006). sitions, ideology, or even identity. This is a world of

© 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00432

30 patrons and clients, patronage politics, and marily around the personalized exchange of Henry E. the dominance of informal understandings concrete rewards and punishments, and not Hale over formal rules–all features well docu- primarily around abstract, impersonal prin- mented by historians of Russia from its very ciples such as ideological belief or catego- origins.1 The rare disruptions in these pat- rizations that include many people one has terns have been just that: rare disruptions not actually met in person.”4 The centrality of an enduring normality. And the impli- of personalized, as opposed to impersonal, cations have been powerful for Russian exchange explains why phenomena like politics. These include cycles of authori- patron-client relations, patronage poli- tarian consolidation punctuated by “cha- tics, weak rule of law, nepotism, and cor- otic” moments of openness and competi- ruption all tend to be common in highly tion that are widely understood locally as patronalistic societies. Highly patronalis- “breakdowns.”2 True liberal democracy al- tic societies also tend to feature patrimo- ways seems out of reach somehow. nial (or neopatrimonial) forms of rule and But just because something has endured low levels of social capital in the sense pop- for a millennium does not mean it can never ularized by political scientist Robert Put- change. Vladimir Putin has proven to be a nam.5 It is unsurprising that Russia features master practitioner of patronal politics, but these things in generous measure, as gener- is it possible that he or a successor will even- ally do all post-Soviet states outside the Eu- tually break Russia’s legacy of patronal- ropean Union.6 ism? We must concede that this is possi- One central implication of patronalism ble. Even those states that are today seen as for politics is that the primary collective paragons of the rule of law, impersonal pol- political “actors” are usually not formal in- itics, and liberal democracy emerged out of stitutions like political parties or interest patronalistic origins not so long ago, argu- groups, but rather extended networks of ac- ably only in the last century or two.3 A few tual personal acquaintances. That is, collec- countries, such as Singapore, appear to have tive political action occurs mainly through made such a transition much more quickly chains of people who directly interact with in recent times. Could Russia in the late Pu- each other–regardless of whether the in- tin or post-Putin era chart a similar course? teraction occurs in a formal or informal The following pages discuss the impli- framework–with each link largely activat- cations of patronalism for Russian politics ed through expectations of personal bene- and explore different pathways through fit or sanction. These arrangements need which change is conceivable. The con- not be quid pro quo. In fact, actors can ben- clusions are sobering, at least in the near efit by establishing extended networks of term. Transforming society in the way that trust and long-term mutual benefit bound would be required takes not only the right by close personal relationships. In Russia, conditions, but also a great deal of time, at such relationships commonly involve fam- least a generation or two. Patronalism, it ily bonds (including marriage and godpar- would seem, is likely to remain a power- entage), growing up or living in the same ful environmental condition shaping Rus- neighborhood, being classmates in school sian politics for the rest of the Putin era (odnokashniki), regularly working together, and likely well into the next. friendship, or introduction by individuals who share such relationships with both par- In precise terms, patronalism is “a social ties. These relationships matter in all societ- equilibrium in which individuals organize ies, but they assume overwhelming impor- their political and economic pursuits pri- tance in highly patronalistic societies, typi-

146 (2) Spring 2017 31 Russian cally trumping formal rules or convictions so. This is the hallmark of a single-pyramid Patronal about policy issues as sources of expecta- system, in which a country’s most promi- Politics Beyond tions for how someone else will behave po- nent networks are generally coordinated Putin litically when the stakes are high. The long- around the authority of a single patron or term bonds by no means feel mercenary; become marginalized (or are liquidated). instead, individuals tend to feel them very At the same time, factors that complicate deeply, considering them a source of great network coordination around a single pa- personal enrichment and satisfaction (or tron tend to promote a robust but highly great emotional distress when they sour or corrupt pluralism as networks jockey for rupture). position and compete with each other for Russian politics can appear unstable, in- influence, each interested in providing po- cluding oscillations toward and away from litical cover for critics of their rivals–that authoritarianism and democracy, because a is, a competing-pyramid system.7 coordination problem governs how the ma- While myriad factors might complicate jor power networks in a society relate to one or facilitate networks’ coordinating around another. As personal connections are para- a single patron’s authority, two appear par- mount, political-economic networks need ticularly important in the post-Soviet re- direct, personal access to power to obtain gion. First, a presidentialist constitution the resources they require to survive and facilitates network coordination around a thrive. Indeed, because they are unable to single patron by creating a symbol of dom- rely on the rule of law or the impartial ap- inance (the presidency) that only a single plication of state power to protect their in- network can hold at any one time. Such terests, it becomes imperative for them to single-pyramid systems can be expected extend their own personal connections to to break down, however, when succession key centers of power or, at the very least, to looms and different networks in the pyr- avoid being on the losing side of any strug- amid start jockeying to influence the suc- gle for supreme power and to avoid alien- cession in the direction they most prefer. ating whichever other network wins. Of Second, networks that wield the most pop- course, these networks’ chief patrons do ular support are likely to have special advan- have preferences for different coalitional tages in a succession struggle because they arrangements, and the decisions of the big- can potentially mobilize more (and more gest networks regarding which coalition to ardent) supporters both at the ballot box join or how to hedge their bets impact each and in the streets. Recognizing this, net- coalition’s chances of winning and the dis- works trying to decide where to place their tributional arrangements within that coa- bets are more likely to support popular net- lition. The coordination problem occurs, works and less likely to support unpopular therefore, because all major networks are ones. In other words, high popularity pro- facing this same situation simultaneously. motes network coordination around an in- One very important implication, then, cumbent chief patron while low populari- is that the factors that facilitate networks’ ty tends to undermine such coordination. coordinating around a single patron tend Periods when unpopularity coincides with to promote political closure. Would-be succession struggles are likely to be most regime opponents will find it hard to ob- conducive to the breakdown of single-pyr- tain financing or media coverage since the amid politics. most powerful networks are likely to avoid activities that might irritate the patron Macrolevel Russian political history even without being explicitly told to do since the breakup of the ussr can largely

32 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences be understood as successive periods of betting money favoring Communist Par- Henry E. movement toward and away from single- ty leader Gennadii Zyuganov. Hale pyramid and competing-pyramid systems. After Putin was elected president in 2000, From this bird’s-eye perspective, Putinite Russia entered a new period of gradual clo- Russia is not fundamentally different from sure of the political space. This involved not Yeltsinite Russia; the country during these only eliminating some networks that had two periods just happened to be at differ- initially opposed his rise (as with oligarch ent stages of regime cycles that are typical Vladimir Gusinsky’s network), but also by of countries with presidentialist constitu- co-opting others (such as Yurii Luzhkov’s tions and varying degrees of public support Moscow machine) and then steadily find- for the incumbents. ing them all niches in the system that simul- Overall, the dominant dynamic in post- taneously gave them room to prosper while Soviet Russia’s regime, ever since Boris also limiting their ability to engage in un- Yeltsin defeated his parliament in the vio- wanted spheres of activity (for example, Pu- lent clashes of fall 1993 and then installed tin’s reported 2000 deal with the oligarchs a presidentialist constitution in the De- and the elimination of direct elections for cember 1993 referendum, has clearly been governors in 2004–2005, while reappoint- a slow, net slide toward greater political ing most of them). By 2007, when Putin an- closure. Russia’s most powerful networks, nounced he would leave the presidency for all well represented in the spheres of both the prime ministership, his Kremlin had business and politics and cutting across for- developed an elaborate system to regulate mal institutions like parties or branches of oligarch participation in elections and had government, have generally come in three brought the three most influential televi- types: “oligarchs” (those growing mainly sion stations almost entirely under de fac- out of the corporate world), regional polit- to state editorial control. Putin’s return to ical machines (typically led by governors), the presidency in 2012 resumed the trend of and state-based networks (extending pri- political closure, with an expansion of his marily out of state structures). These were own personal networks’ role in controlling highly uncoordinated in the aftermath of mass media and more aggressive use of the the ussr’s demise,8 but Yeltsin pulled out criminal justice system to selectively perse- all the presidential stops to cobble together cute those who dared oppose him. With the a (barely) winning coalition for his 1996 seizure of Crimea and the start of the war reelection, persuaded to do so rather than in the Donbas in 2014, the political screws cancel the election by “privatization tsar” tightened still further. His 2016 decision to Anatolii Chubais.9 This coalition includ- create a National Guard reporting to him ed a motley mix of state-based networks, personally, and binding to it the brutal some key regional machines (such as vote- network of Chechnya strongman Ramzan rich Bashkortostan and Tatarstan), and Kadyrov, is perhaps the latest major step in most oligarchs (who supplied slanted me- this process of increasingly tight coordina- dia coverage that gave Yeltsin a major ad- tion of Russia’s major networks around Pu- vantage). Indeed, this feat was arguably the tin as chief patron. first to demonstrate the power of the pa- That said, the gaps in the chronology just tronal presidency to generate an elector- presented (in particular 1997–1999 and al win through network coordination be- 2007–2012) belie the notion that Russia’s cause he had so little else upon which to path to political closure has been mono- rely, with his support in the single digits tonic. Indeed, these periods all reflect mo- just months before the election and the ments when uncertainty regarding presi-

146 (2) Spring 2017 33 Russian dential succession underpinned periods of ty services resorted to tactics that includ- Patronal pronounced political ferment in Russia that ed arresting each other’s representatives Politics Beyond involved certain sorts of political opening. and exposing each other’s misdeeds in me- Putin The period leading up to the 1999–2000 dia outlets.10 Once Putin made clear that election cycle was a classic competing pyr- he would retain a hold on formal power as amid situation brought about by Yeltsin’s prime minister and leader of the United expected departure from politics, with the Russia Party but cede the presidency itself primary battle being fought by two roughly to a close associate with a more “liberal” equal coalitions of oligarchs, regional ma- reputation, Dmitrii Medvedev, the result- chines, and state officials angling to succeed ing uncertainty as to where future power Yeltsin: the Fatherland-All Russia coalition would rest fostered a noticeable opening led by Luzhkov and former prime minister of the political space (some called this pe- Yevgenii Primakov versus the Kremlin’s riod a “thaw”)11 even as Medvedev presid- coalition in support of Putin. It is impor- ed over a continued contraction of ballot- tant to remember that Putin was not ini- eligible alternatives, replaced some of the tially considered a favorite in this race. He most powerful governors, and lengthened became the presumptive winner only af- presidential terms from four to six years ef- ter his strong military response to a series fective in 2012. of deadly apartment building bombings in When Putin and Medvedev once again September 1999 led to a surge in his popu- put succession on the table by declaring larity, and after the pro-Putin Unity bloc’s they would switch positions for the 2011– strong second-place finish in the December 2012 election cycles as their popularity was 1999 Duma election proved that he could weakening in the wake of the 2008–2009 convert his popularity into officially count- financial crisis, a new political opening ed votes. emerged when slapdash efforts to boost Acute tensions among networks again the United Russia Party’s vote through emerged with the 2007–2008 election cy- fraud and crude pressure in the Decem- cle, when Putin fostered expectations that ber 2011 Duma election sparked massive he would leave the presidency without giv- protests in Moscow and other major cities. ing a clear idea as to whether the succession The regime’s initial response, interestingly would lead to a real transfer of power. The enough, was not an immediate crackdown key difference between this first “succes- but instead a retreat. Controls on media sion” from Putin and the succession from were relaxed, and opposition figures pre- Yeltsin is that Putin (unlike Yeltsin) was in viously denied coverage appeared as com- robust health and at the height of his pop- mentators or even the subjects of neutral ular support. Because polls throughout news coverage. Video cameras were in- 2007–2008 showed that large shares of the stalled in virtually all polling places for the electorate would vote for whomever Putin 2012 presidential election. Direct contest- endorsed, Russia’s political-economic net- ed elections, at least of some sort, were re- works had little incentive to mobilize pop- stored for governors. And rules for register- ular opposition and push for more democ- ing parties were relaxed, resulting in many racy, instead struggling both overtly and opposition forces gaining official recog- covertly to influence Putin’s decision and nition. Once Putin was safely reelected to better position themselves for whatev- and the “new” old patron once again firm- er new arrangement would emerge. It was ly in place, the regime took a decidedly during this period, for example, that com- more authoritarian turn. Those who had peting networks with roots in rival securi- ventured the furthest in flirting with op-

34 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences position politics from 2008 to 2012, such as al connections and personalized rewards Henry E. oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, increasingly and punishments.12 Thus, if Russia were Hale found themselves under pressure to fall to make such a transition from patronal- more firmly back into line, especially after ism, its prospects for full democratization 2014, when Putin’s popularity soared into would radically improve. the stratosphere. What are the chances that Russia could It is not impossible for Russia to escape realize such a transition? The chief prob- the social equilibrium of patronalism in lem is that patronalism is not simply a habit the foreseeable future. What might a non- that a good media campaign could get peo- patronal or “low-patronalism” Russia look ple to kick. Instead, it is much better un- like? In general, it would be a country where derstood as a complex, deeply entrenched individuals coordinated their activities equilibrium in how people relate to one an- around formal rules and laws as a matter other when it comes to political activity. Ac- of course; where violators would routinely cordingly, it can be very difficult to shift the suffer either legal or social sanction regard- realm of politics to a different equilibrium. less of their personal connections; where Let us reflect a little more on why this is people’s personal convictions on broad pol- the case. People everywhere generally op- icy issues would normally trump the inter- pose things like “corruption” and “nepo- ests of their networks; where merit accord- tism” and want to be able to rely on the ing to formalized criteria would typically law to protect them. But what drives the overrule personal or family ties when a val- equilibrium is the pervasive expectation that ued position is at stake; where revelations these behaviors are the norm rather than of corruption are shocking rather than wry- the rare exception in important spheres of ly accepted as the norm; and where people life. And when they expect virtually every- would frequently join and contribute mon- one to practice corruption and nepotism ey to organizations led by people to whom and believe that they cannot rely on others they have no extended personal connection to obey or enforce the law, then they face but with whom they share certain values or very strong incentives to engage in the very valued characteristics. same practices themselves if they want to This would certainly be a very different get anything done–even good things. Russia, though it would not necessarily be A few examples help illustrate the force– a democratic one. Nazi Germany, to take and morality–behind patronalism’s endur- perhaps the most extreme example, was ance. A mayor who completely eschews not organized on patronalistic principles. such practices–refusing to make any pay- And to offer a much more benign exam- offs, to maintain a “favor bank” with pow- ple, Lee Kuan Yew successfully broke Sin- erful higher-ups, or to pressure the right gapore’s patronalistic equilibrium, mak- people using the resources at her disposal ing it one of the least corrupt countries in –might well find herself unable to get a the world, but the regime he created shows company to build a factory in her city that how formal rules and policy commitments would create much-needed jobs. Without can underpin authoritarianism. The ma- some connection to the mayor, this facto- jority of low-patronalism countries from ry would likely just go to another city where Canada to Sweden, however, are liberal the mayor “plays ball.” While the honest democracies. Indeed, to be a fully liberal mayor might be considered a hero in West- democracy surely requires that formal ern societies for standing up to her corrupt procedures trump the politics of person- surroundings, to her constituents who de-

146 (2) Spring 2017 35 Russian pend on her to land jobs for their city, she pervasive patron-client relations, were the Patronal would likely be considered ineffective and norm centuries before the Bolsheviks came Politics Beyond even incompetent. Ironically, these same to power in 1917; so this cannot be blamed Putin constituents might all the while feel angry on Communist rule.16 The 1917 Bolshevik at the rampant corruption in their society. Revolution can, in some sense, be under- Moreover, when people do not expect oth- stood as an antipatronalist revolution, an ers to observe the rule of law, appointing attempt to replace the old “corrupt” poli- one’s relatives as your deputies or award- tics with a new future governed by socialist ing a state contract to a close friend makes principles and formal organization, treat- sense as a way of ensuring you are not cheat- ing people not according to who they knew ed, which can better position you to do your but who they were and what they believed job effectively. Or, at least, it guarantees that and valued. But it was not long before a if you are cheated, the lost resources go to new leader emerged who realized he could someone you like who might do you a sol- undermine the true reformers like Nikolai id later. Bribe-taking can also be useful for Bukharin and Leon Trotsky by resorting to something other than satisfying greed since the old, hard practice of patronal politics, participation in elaborate rent-seeking crushing them with the Communist Par- schemes can signal one’s loyalty to the sys- ty machine he constructed based on per- tem, while also giving its practitioners re- sonal connections in the 1920s and 1930s. sources that can be used to achieve what- Hope was likewise dashed with the defeat ever goals that individual needs to achieve, of Mikhail Gorbachev’s effort to create a including the goals of the organization the democratic and prosperous socialism, and person represents.13 Of course, coercion is the choices that post-Soviet leaders made also frequently part of such arrangements, to consolidate power through the tempt- and a weak rule of law has long been argued ingly available tools of patronalism; this to facilitate companies’ turning to mafias to was essentially the lesson that Chubais enforce contracts. These mafias, of course, taught Yeltsin in the course of winning are also widely known for generating their reelection in 1996. own demand for “protection.”14 Overall, in highly patronalistic societies, such things The key to successfully and significantly are frequently seen as “just the way things reducing the degree of patronalism in pol- work here,” words often accompanied by itics is to somehow create a pervasive and an ironic smile and a sigh. And so the equi- durable expectation across the whole of so- librium is continuously reproduced. ciety (though especially elites) that people This helps explain why patronalism has will no longer engage in the same practic- been so tenacious in Russia over centuries, es as before. And this belief must be sus- not just decades. Arguably emerging with tained not only during a moment of revo- the first human communities that were lution, but throughout the initial years of small enough for everyone to know each a new regime when disillusionment can other and in which the most natural way arise and a leader can be sorely tempted to to govern was through personal connec- resort to patronal politics to stay in power. tions, patronalism is best thought of as the For this reason, not only have very few world historical norm, with the West be- leaders anywhere in the world seriously ing a highly contingent exception.15 Even tried it, but even fewer have stuck with it a cursory look at works on politics and so- and succeeded. ciety in precommunist Russia makes quite Only in Georgia after the Rose Revolution clear that patronalistic practices, including did a post-Soviet leader make a notewor-

36 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences thy effort to reduce the scope of patronal- ry that feels revolutionary (the latter being Henry E. ism in politics. But most now agree that de- less painful for Russians). There is a strong Hale spite certain impressive reforms, includ- case to be made that this is what happened ing ridding the traffic police of corruption, in Georgia, with Saakashvili’s party-build- Mikheil Saakashvili’s efforts did not go ing strategy being key to his credibility as a nearly far enough, with his regime retain- reformer.21 But too many revolutions have ing and vigorously engaging a solid (if less had their patronalistic Thermidors to in- outwardly visible) patronalistic core. One spire much optimism in Russia. can also find a few limited spheres where It is at least conceivable that certain patronalism is firewalled out in a highly pa- more gradual changes could begin and ac- tronalistic society, as political scientist Ju- cumulate in the next decade or two that liet Johnson has shown occurred with Kyr- could weaken patronalism. One could be gyzstan’s central banking system under the robust economic growth, as has arguably pressures and incentives supplied by the in- facilitated the transition from the stron- ternational financial community. Johnson gest forms of patronalism in much of also shows, however, how difficult such Western Europe and North America. Eco- bubbles of formality can be to sustain.17 In nomic development holds the potential a country where it dominates the highest to help individuals feel less dependent on levels of politics, patronalism abhors a vac- more powerful patrons for their well-be- uum. For such reasons, Lee Kuan Yews– ing, encouraging them to engage in more and even Mikheil Saakashvilis–are rare. activities based on their beliefs in spite of Russia’s prospects for true antipatronal pressures that might be applied to them. transformation, therefore, seem slim in- The rebellion of Russia’s “creative classes” deed in the next decade or two. Its direct that was part of the massive street protests involvement in conflicts from Ukraine to against election fraud and Putin’s return to Syria could create pressures to improve ef- the presidency indicates that this path is fectiveness by reducing the degree of pa- not completely unrealistic for Russia. In- tronalistic practices in the military.18 But deed, these protesters were not simply ex- history suggests it would be unlikely to pressing their dislike of a particular indi- spread to other spheres without concert- vidual or even their objection to a partic- ed leadership effort. Perhaps Putin could ular instance of election fraud. They were one day wake up and decide to use his im- also expressing their hope for a new kind mense authority to truly remake Russian of future for Russia, one without corrup- society.19 But it is hard for leaders to break tion or political manipulations. up and rebuild anew the very boat on which For economic development to bring that they float, and there are strong arguments kind of change, it would have to come not that he would face a great risk that an im- simply from a rise in energy prices, which partial legal system could put him (or at would leave individuals as dependent as be- least his close friends) in danger of impris- fore on higher-ups linked to the state, but onment.20 If his successor comes from in- from a broad diversification of the econo- side his system, he or she would likely face my that empowers something like an inde- the same risks. pendent middle class. The problem is that An antipatronal transformation, there- those who hold resources today have incen- fore, may be most likely if oppositions come tive to prevent this from happening, pri- to power who are somehow credibly com- marily by seeking to control any “diversi- mitted to thoroughgoing reforms, either in fication” themselves either from the outset an actual revolution or in an election victo- or through predatory “raiding” practices.

146 (2) Spring 2017 37 Russian Whether emerging independent economic patronalistic practices. And even when such Patronal actors will be able to form the alliances nec- an effort initially succeeds, as was arguably Politics Beyond essary to protect themselves from such en- the case one century ago when the Bolshe- Putin croachment on a large scale remains to be viks seized power and attempted to impose seen, and will be difficult given the strength ideological rather than patronalistic prac- of their foes. At best, it would probably re- tices of rule, history suggests that it is like- quire more than a generation for this pro- ly to succumb before long to the temptation cess to take a sufficiently sturdy hold to to resort to patronalism, as with Stalin’s create expectations of a new social norm rise to power. emerging.22 The path of economic devel- We should also not rule out that Russia opment may in fact be Russia’s most prom- could chart a path away from patronalism ising, but it is a very long and contingent through democracy. For example, if Rus- one at best. sia were to experience some kind of reform It is also possible that patronalism could that systematically complicated the coordi- become overwhelmed by the emergence of nation of its highly patronalistic networks strong political partisanship or the devel- around a single chief patron, the resulting opment of deep ideological commitments political competition could over time pro- that could start to overpower the pull of pa- vide at least some incentive for politicians tronal networks. That is, perhaps people in actually to follow through on campaign Russia will start to buy into certain belief promises to combat corruption. One such systems so deeply that they become (en reform could be a shift to a nonpresidential- masse) more willing than before to break ist constitution, a shift that sometimes oc- with the demands of their own friends and curs when an outgoing president does not family and withstand individualized re- trust his or her likely successors and thus wards and punishments. Political scientist tries to weaken the office they would inher- Stephen Hanson, for example, shows how it, or when a coalition takes power and de- initially marginalized ideologues have often cides to cement a power-sharing deal with gone on to create the most powerful parties, constitutional change. One problem is that since their deeply held personal commit- research into the causes of corruption indi- ments lead them to adopt a long time-hori- cates that it can take many decades for dem- zon until the point at which their time ar- ocratic competition to noticeably dampen rives and they expand their base to trans- corruption.23 And other research has found form society. To be sure, almost since the that democratic competition in highly pa- beginning, Russia could boast brave indi- tronalistic societies can actually increase viduals willing to take on enormous risks demand for corrupt practices as politicians and pay the highest of personal prices in seek to use every tool in their arsenal to win order to stand up for their beliefs, rang- struggles for power.24 ing from tsarist-era revolutionaries to So- One final possibility deserves mention. viet dissidents to hard-core street protest- Russia might one day integrate far more ers in the late Putin era. They have rare- strongly into the international political ly, however, managed to get the buy-in of economy than it has so far. Since this inter- large numbers, remaining marginalized national political economy is still dominat- and sometimes even ridiculed by average ed by the West, such integration could grad- citizens. It would seem likely to take a ma- ually serve to weaken Russian patronalism jor national trauma to generate the kind by providing increasingly important and of competing belief-systems necessary to lucrative environments for surviving and completely restructure politics away from thriving without patronalistic practices.

38 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences And even if this integration primarily goes Overall, at least for the next decade or Henry E. not through the West but via Asia-Pacific two, it would appear that the Russian Fed- Hale centers of growth where patronalism is the eration is unlikely to escape the social equi- norm, this could still mean that Russia’s big- librium of patronalism that has shaped gest patronal networks would gain strong politics in that part of the world for cen- interests outside of Russia. In this case, even turies. By no means does this imply Rus- if these international centers of growth sian politics will be static. To the contrary, do not insist on democratization, the ef- while patronalism itself is stable, its poli- fect could be liberalizing because it would tics are highly dynamic and sometimes vol- weaken the dependence of Russia’s chief atile, with seeming authoritarian stabili- economic actors on their patrons back at ty often masking a deeper fragility. Where home. From the vantage point of 2017, how- exactly Russia will be in its regime cycles ever, this seems very unlikely to happen in at any given moment ten or twenty years the next decade. Russia has been sanctioned down the road is hard to say. But a con- by the international community for its sei- servative prediction based on the signs as zure of Crimea and support for an insurgen- of 2017 would hold that Russia is likely to cy in the Donbas, and the recent trend has continue to experience the same patterns been toward Russia’s isolation from, rather of constant change in how its political-eco- than integration with, the world economy. nomic networks are arranged, with specif- While reversal is quite possible in the next ics governed by lame duck syndromes, the ten years, the process is likely to be slow and ebbs and flows of public support, and lead- nowhere near extensive enough in the next ers’ own innovations in how to manage the decade to translate into a significant reduc- whole process in a changing environment. tion in Russian patronalism.

endnotes 1 See, for example, Edward L. Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways,” The Russian Review 45 (1986): 115–181; John P. LeDonne, “Ruling Families in the Russian Political Order, 1689– 1825,” Cahiers Du Monde Russe et Sovietique 28 (3) (1987): 233–322; Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Collier, 1974); and David Ransel, “Character and Style of Patron-Client Relations in Russia,” in Klientelsysteme Im Europa Der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Antoni Maczak (Mu- nich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 211–231. 2 Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 3 Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 4 Hale, Patronal Politics, 20. 5 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Tran- sitions in Africa,” World Politics 46 (4) (July 1994); and Mounira M. Charrad and Julia Adams, “Introduction: Patrimonialism, Past and Present,” The Annals of the American Academy of Politi- cal and Social Science 636 (July 2011): 6–15. 6 See, for example, Mikhail N. Afanas’ev, Klientelizm i rossiiskaya gosudarstvennost’ (Moscow: Mos- cow Public Science Foundation, 1997); Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014); Oleksandr Fisun, “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from

146 (2) Spring 2017 39 Russian a Neopatrimonial Perspective,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 20 (2) Patronal (Spring 2012): 87–96; Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Politics Gabor Toka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation Beyond Putin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Alena Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance (Prince- ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). 7 Hale, Patronal Politics, 10. 8 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000, 2nd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 9 On Yeltsin and the Yeltsin period more generally, see Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (New York: Basic Books, 2008). 10 For an excellent forensic analysis of the complex network struggles during this period, see Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism, and the Medvedev Suc- cession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 11 See, for example, the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “The Medvedev Thaw: Is It Real? Will It Last?” June 23, 2009, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. https://www.csce.gov/ sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/The%20Medvedev%20Thaw%20-%20Is%20it%20 Real,%20Will%20it%20Last_Compiled.PDF (accessed May 24, 2016). 12 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, 1st ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000). 13 Keith Darden, “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution,” Pol- itics & Society 36 (1) (March 2008): 35–60. 14 Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002). 15 North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders. 16 See, for example, Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways”; LeDonne, “Ruling Families in the Russian Political Order, 1689–1825”; Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime; and Ransel, “Character and Style of Patron-Client Relations in Russia.” 17 Juliet Johnson, Priests of Prosperity: How Central Bankers Transformed the Postcommunist World, 1st ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2016). 18 Brian Taylor, State-Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 19 On the challenges leaders face effecting reform on even a lesser scale, see George W. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 20 Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy; and Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013). 21 Bret Barrowman, The Reformer’s Dilemmas: The Politics of Public Sector Reform in Clientelistic Political Systems (Ph.D. diss., The George Washington University, 2015). 22 Stanislav Markus, Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 23 Daniel Treisman, “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Public Eco- nomics 76 (3) (June 2000): 399–457. 24 Maria Popova, “Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine,” Comparative Political Studies 43 (10) (October 2010): 1202–1229; and Gul- naz Sharafutdinova, Political Consequences of Crony Capitalism inside Russia (South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 2010).

40 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Putin-Style “Rule of Law” & the Prospects for Change

Maria Popova

Abstract: In Putin’s Russia, the regime uses the law and legal institutions to fulfill political goals, to com- municate them to society, and to manage the authoritarian coalition that helps the president govern. As a result, the law is highly consequential and important, but its use tends to be arbitrary, expedient, and in- strumental, rather than predictable and principled. Can we expect any major shifts in the role of law and the courts over the next ten years? Russia’s legal regime is unlikely to undergo major evolutionary change and may outlive Putin’s tenure: both foreign and domestic pressures for change toward constitutionalism are limited. If a positive shift were to take place, Russia would inch toward authoritarian constitutional- ism. But negative change is also possible. If Putin’s regime weakens, the politicized use of the courts against both dissidents and political competitors within the authoritarian coalition will increase.

Listen, all our opponents clamor for the rule of law. What is the rule of law? It is compliance with existing legislation. What does existing legislation say about marches? You need to obtain authorization from the local authorities. You got one? Go ahead and demon- strate. If you didn’t–you don’t have the right to demon- strate. If you do anyway–you will get a baton to the noggin’ [poluchite po bashke dubinoi]. End of story! –V. V. Putin, August 30, 20101

Ever since his ascent to power in the late 1990s, Pu- tin has pledged his commitment to develop Russia into a law-based state (pravovoye gosudarstvo). Howev- MARIA POPOVA is Associate Pro- er, his liberal opposition at home and critics abroad fessor of Political Science at Mc- routinely decry Russia’s rule-of-law deficit. Why does Gill University. She is the author this gap exist and will it narrow or widen in the near of Politicized Justice in Emerging Democ- future? The gap could signal Putin’s disingenuous racies: A Study of Courts in Russia and Ukraine (2012) and has published appeal to pravovoye gosudarstvo or the loss of mean- articles in such journals as Compar- ing in translation between the term rule of law and its ative Political Studies, Europe-Asia Stud- potential Russian equivalents. But it is also the case ies, and Democratizatsiya. that both Putin and his critics are right even if they

© 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00435

64 are talking past each other. Putin’s Russia tice as well. Liberal constitutionalism also Maria is far from the liberal constitutionalism as- requires a set of substantive laws that pro- Popova sociated with the rule of law. Neither does vide for fundamental rights. A politically it have the authoritarian constitutionalism independent and impartial judiciary is cru- sometimes called rule by law. But the Pu- cial because independent courts can better tin regime does not pursue legal nihilism ensure that all litigants, regardless of their while trying to hoodwink domestic and for- political, material, or legal resources, are eign audiences into believing that law mat- equally bound by the law. ters. Law does matter, but it serves a differ- Putin’s Russia is far from the liberal con- ent purpose than it does in a constitutional- stitutional ideal. While its constitution ist context. In Putin’s Russia, the sovereign does provide many fundamental rights– uses the law and legal institutions to fulfill freedom of speech, freedom of associa- political goals, to communicate them to so- tion and assembly, and freedom of move- ciety, and to manage the authoritarian coa- ment, to name a few–ordinary legislation lition that helps the president govern. As a has hollowed each of them out. The for- result, the law is highly consequential, but eign agents laws and antiextremism laws its use tends to be arbitrary, expedient, and undermine freedom of association; hate instrumental, rather than predictable and speech legislation and a 2014 amendment principled. Russia’s legal regime is unlike- to the Criminal Code, which outlaws public ly to undergo major evolutionary change calls for violation of Russia’s territorial in- and may outlive Putin’s tenure; both for- tegrity, limit freedom of speech; onerous eign and domestic pressures for change to- administrative provisions for registering ward constitutionalism are limited. If a pos- in one’s place of residence restrict freedom itive shift were to take place, Russia would of movement; and the 2016 Yarovaya anti- inch toward authoritarian constitutional- terrorism law stifles freedom of assembly ism (that is, rule by law), either because an and conscience by introducing harsh sen- increasingly professional judiciary starts to tences for organizers of unsanctioned pro- assert itself or because the current author- tests, requiring Internet service providers itarian coalition attempts to use the law to and phone companies to store customers’ entrench its interests and ensure the sur- communication data logs, and making it vival of the regime beyond Putin. But nega- a crime not to report information about tive change is also possible. If Putin’s regime other crimes. Whatever rights do exist de weakens, the instrumental and arbitrary use jure are undermined de facto by the Russian of the courts against both dissidents and po- courts, which do not uphold them consis- litical competitors within the authoritarian tently or predictably. coalition will increase. Russia’s authoritarianism does not com- pletely account for its weak constitutional- The liberal constitutionalism associated ism, since constitutionalism is not always with the rule of law rests upon two main incompatible with autocracy. Autocrats can principles: equal responsibility and pro- govern within a constitutional framework, tection under the law, and substantive and even if they are not fully constrained by it. procedural guarantees for fundamental in- In an ideal type authoritarian constitution- dividual rights. This means that everyone, al regime, the autocrat sets the substantive including high-ranking members of the law, often in negotiation with his govern- regime and its sovereign, is equally con- ing coalition. The opposition does not have strained by the constitution and ordinary the opportunity to shape substantive law, legislation, not just on paper, but in prac- either through the legislative process or

146 (2) Spring 2017 65 Putin-Style by appealing to the Constitutional Court. gime and its adherence to constitution- “Rule of Law” Many fundamental rights are not provided. alism. As any authoritarian government & the Prospects for Change Substantive law is biased against the op- does, the Singaporean regime went after position and imposes sanctions on it. For dissidents and did so effectively. When one example, it may limit its ability to contest route to detaining them failed, the author- elections or its right to criticize the govern- itarian sovereign pursued another and was ment.2 However, once in place, the law is ultimately successful in asserting the re- applied predictably rather than arbitrarily gime’s dominance. However, the regime to individual cases by functionally indepen- achieved its goals by respecting the con- dent courts.3 Oppositionists are sanctioned stitutional process, the ordinary legisla- in accordance with the laws that limit op- tion that it had put in place, and, to some position activity, rather than imprisoned on extent, the independence of the judiciary. other charges. The courts are sufficiently re- The highest court was sufficiently inde- moved from direct political influence and pendent to call out the government for the constitution serves as a coordinating failing to adhere to statutory procedure, institution between the autocrat and the and the government complied with the elites with whose help he governs. When court decision and made a better effort at the autocrat and his governing coalition respecting the law. While it prevented fur- reach agreements about how power is dis- ther encroachment by the independent ju- tributed and enshrine those agreements in diciary into its discretionary power, the re- the constitution or in ordinary legislation, gime did not discipline the judiciary either there is enough expectation that commit- formally or informally. Instead, using its ments are honored and enforced in good dominance over the legislature, the sover- faith by the judiciary.4 eign changed the constitution to empha- Currently Russia does not have author- size his unfettered power to make law. itarian constitutionalism. Consider the The Bolotnaya Square cases–in which contrast between the treatment of dissi- protestors were charged with counts of dents in Singapore, the prime example of mass riots and violence against police– authoritarian constitutionalism, and in illustrate Russia’s deviation from authori- Russia. In 1988, Singapore’s highest court tarian constitutionalism. Unlike in Singa- ordered the release of four dissidents ar- pore, Russian courts at all levels of the hi- rested under the Internal Security Act. The erarchy failed to stop the government from court found that the government had not violating defendants’ rights to liberty and followed the proper statutory procedures fair trial, despite the existence of reasonable and, in addition, argued that the govern- protection for those rights in the Russian ment’s excessive discretionary power un- Constitution. The courts actively partici- der the Internal Security Act was contrary pated in the rights violations by holding the to the rule of law. The government com- protesters in pretrial detention well beyond plied with the decision and released the the statutory provisions. They also failed to dissidents, but immediately charged them note violations of the right to freedom of as- again and rearrested them, this time scru- sembly, which resulted from police conduct pulously following the letter of the law. It during the authorized protest on May 6, then passed a constitutional amendment, 2012. Some Bolotnaya defendants won re- which forbade the judiciary from curtail- dress when they appealed to the European ing the sovereign’s power to make law.5 Court of Human Rights (echr), which af- This episode underscores both the au- firmed the violations and ordered Russia thoritarian nature of the Singaporean re- to pay compensation. To prevent further

66 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences encroachment on its ability to use the law Khodorkovsky’s case is a bit less straight- Maria against regime opponents, the Russian re- forward; legal analysts believe that the evi- Popova gime did not introduce any changes that dence of malfeasance against him and his oil would have made the behavior of police company, Yukos, was stronger than in Naval- and the prosecution strictly legal. Instead, ny’s case.8 However, even if Khodorkovsky in late 2015, the Duma passed a law that au- and Yukos engaged in large-scale tax eva- thorizes the Russian Constitutional Court sion, fraud, and embezzlement, as the to deem echr decisions “unenforceable.” echr concluded in 2013, Yukos’s business Given the Constitutional Court’s record of practices were more the norm than the ex- deference to the regime, this effectively al- ception in the murky 1990s. By singling out lows Russia to arbitrarily disregard individ- Khodorkovsky but turning a blind eye to sim- ual echr decisions. The proponents of the ilar activities pursued by oligarchs who toed law explicitly identified its purpose as the the Putin regime’s line, the Kremlin used the protection of Russia’s “legal sovereignty” law selectively and arbitrarily to achieve the (pravovoi suverenitet) vis-à-vis international politically expedient goal of sidelining a bud- institutions.6 ding political opponent. The prosecutions of opposition activist The Pussy Riot case provides another ex- Aleksei Navalny and billionaire oil tycoon ample of the arbitrary and selective appli- Mikhail Khodorkovsky demonstrate that cation of the law for political goals: that is, the Putin regime does not adhere to author- similar acts produced different outcomes itarian constitutionalism, but uses law ar- in court. The punk rockers’ performance in bitrarily to sideline potential political op- the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was con- ponents. Both Putin critics were indicted strued as a crime under Article 213 of the not for any opposition activities, but on un- Criminal Code, which punishes premedi- related fraud and embezzlement charges. tated hooliganism (a planned disturbance Navalny was accused of embezzling funds of public order). After a highly publicized from the state-run Kirovles timber com- trial, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Maria Al- pany, and the indictment of his brother yokhina, and Yekaterina Samutsevich re- Oleg, which further increased the person- ceived two-year effective sentences. But al stakes for the opposition leader, under- Pussy Riot’s performance was far from scores the instrumental use of criminal law the first example of an antiregime art per- by the sovereign. The timing of the case, formance. Tolokonnikova had long been a prior to Moscow’s mayoral election, and member of the radical art collective Voina, the decision to give Aleksei Navalny a sus- which from 2007 to 2011 engaged in about a pended sentence, but Oleg an effective one, dozen actions that similarly used the shock support the impression that the embezzle- value of obscenity to criticize Russia’s po- ment investigation was a tool used to sup- lice state and to challenge public morality. press Aleksei Navalny’s political activities. Voina’s main targets were Putin, Dmitrii In its ruling against Russia in the Kirovles Medvedev, the siloviki, and the Orthodox case, the echr explicitly argued that crim- Church. Most of Voina’s actions involved inal law was arbitrarily used against Naval- some kind of law violation–its members ny. In echr’s words: “Moreover, the Rus- shoplifted, drew graffiti, flipped over and sian courts had found the applicants guilty burned police cars, and disrupted court of acts indistinguishable from regular com- proceedings by releasing three thousand mercial activities. In other words, the crim- cockroaches in a courtroom. In February inal law had been arbitrarily construed to 2008, Voina (and Tolokonnikova) staged the applicants’ detriment.”7 their most notorious stunt: four couples

146 (2) Spring 2017 67 Putin-Style had sex in a public area of the Biological These high-profile cases suggest that “Rule of Law” Museum while other members of the group Russian legal outcomes, while unpredict- & the Prospects for Change held protest signs and filmed. The perfor- able if one goes by the content of the law, mance, called “Fuck for the Heir Puppy are entirely predictable if one knows the Bear”–a play on words in that Medvedev’s preferences of the political sovereign: the name derives from the Russian word med- Kremlin always wins. However, this pre- ved, or bear–drew significant media at- dictability is exaggerated. Outside a few tention and was widely condemned as very salient cases, the Kremlin either does extremely offensive. Several of Voina’s not reveal its preferences or simply has no performances resulted in criminal inves- preferences. When the Kremlin’s position tigations against individual members, in- is uncertain, lower-level political actors, cluding some indictments under the same the prosecution, and judges try to guess Article 213 of the Criminal Code. Howev- the politically correct outcome and this er, all cases were eventually dropped by the guessing game introduces significant un- prosecution or dismissed by the courts. Pri- predictability into the legal regime. In ad- or to the Pussy Riot convictions, the most dition, when political actors vie for relative serious legal consequence suffered by power within the regime, they often seek members of the art collective was a three- to demonstrate that power by influenc- month detention from November 2010 to ing court decisions in politically relevant February 2011 while the prosecution inves- cases. Consider the frequent conflicts be- tigated their involvement in a police car – tween mayors of major cities and regional flipping incident. That incident produced governors. These conflicts are often fought significant media coverage, both in Russia vicariously through court cases, with each and abroad, prompting Banksy to contrib- side attempting to mobilize enough politi- ute 4.5 million rubles to Voina’s legal de- cal resources up the power ladder to secure fense fund. Eventually, the court dismissed a victory in court. Judges face the tough the charges. task of interpreting the signals that come The contrast in outcomes suggests that from judicial superiors and the extrajudi- Pussy Riot’s punk performance resulted in cial actors to deliver a decision that would convictions not because it was more critical be acceptable to whoever represents power of the regime or Putin, more shocking to the (vlast’) in that concrete case. public, better publicized, or more clearly il- In legal areas with low political salience, legal than Voina’s performances. The dif- either because they are politically inconse- ference was timing. In 2012, the Putin re- quential or because there is broad politi- gime had decided to turn to “morality pol- cal consensus over how such cases should itics” and promote public commitment to be adjudicated, the Russian judiciary func- traditional values.9 Within this context, the tions reasonably well. Freed from direct Pussy Riot performance attracted the atten- external interference or from the burden tion of the regime, which used the case to of trying to guess the preferences of polit- publicize and sell its new morality politics ically powerful actors, judges decide cases to the Russian electorate. The prosecution in accordance with their bona fide interpre- and the courts acted in line with this goal tation of the law. Companies that use the and delivered convictions. Offering further arbitrazh courts to resolve disputes report evidence of the policy shift, in 2013, three of that they expect acceptable judicial deci- Voina’s leading members fled Russia with sions if vlast’ is not involved.11 Ordinary their families, reportedly to avoid impend- citizens who have experience with going ing criminal prosecution.10 to court report that the decision in their

68 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences case was fair and the judge professional, difference. This would be a decades-long Maria even against the backdrop of report- process, which could unfold only under Popova ed lack of trust in the Russian judiciary conditions of political and economic sta- overall.12 In the early 2000s, when Unit- bility and could take Russia closer to an au- ed Russia comfortably won elections and thoritarian constitutionalist legal regime. the regime had not yet moved toward sup- The prospects for short-term positive pression of political dissent, the courts ad- change, on the other hand, are low because judicated electoral registration cases with- the status quo serves the interests of Pu- out overwhelming bias toward progov- tin’s regime. In contrast to constitutional- ernment candidates.13 In the late 2000s, ism, which constrains the sovereign, Rus- Russians filed over half a million admin- sia’s current legal regime allows the Krem- istrative lawsuits against the state, de- lin to pursue political goals through the manding compensation for wrongful de- courts unfettered. As already discussed, cisions by federal agencies, and won most Russia’s politically pliable judiciary is an of them. Rather than a sign of the judicia- effective instrument for suppressing polit- ry effectively constraining state agencies ical opposition. The Kremlin has already through law, the high win rate in such cases used it to threaten, jail, or force into exile arguably reflects the regime’s policy goal numerous political opponents: from cred- of providing an outlet for popular discon- ible competitors to far-fetched ones, from tent with the bureaucracy.14 declared oppositionists to potential ones, from dissidents with high name recogni- How likely is it that, in the near future, tion to the regular citizen protester. Russia would transition away from the cur- The reliable dependence of Russia’s ju- rent legal regime, based on the politicized diciary also makes it a useful tool, through use of the law and a reliably dependent judi- which the regime can communicate politi- ciary, toward constitutionalism? Are those cal goals to society. In the 2000s, the crim- chances better if authoritarianism persists inal cases that drove businessman Boris or if a major democratic breakthrough took Berezovsky and media tycoon Vladimir place? If constitutionalism were to be estab- Gusinsky into self-imposed exile told the lished, would it happen through an evolu- public that the Yeltsin era of politically ac- tionary process or through a momentous tive oligarchs was over and the Putin re- act? Or should we expect further entrench- gime had set out to wrest control over the ment of politicized justice and its increased economy from them. The imprisonment arbitrary use against dissidents and within- of Khodorkovsky, believed to have been regime competitors? the richest man in Russia, and the destruc- In the best case scenario, sustained in- tion of his company emphasized the tri- vestment in the judiciary, which Putin’s umph of the state over private business. regime has pursued since the mid-2000s, In 2012, the Pussy Riot case ushered in the may lead to ever increasing professional- Kremlin’s “morality politics” and signaled ization. A more professional judiciary may to society that traditional values were back be less prone to petty judicial corruption, en vogue.15 The Bolotnaya Square cases in- which would increase popular trust in the dicated that individuals who take part in courts. As trust rises and judges develop political protests could pay a steep price, more pride in their profession, they may even if they are not visible leaders of the start pushing the boundaries of nonpoliti- opposition. And the terrorism conviction cized adjudication beyond the pockets that of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov and now exist only by virtue of the regime’s in- the murder conviction of Ukrainian poli-

146 (2) Spring 2017 69 Putin-Style tician Nadiya Savchenko helped make the from the international community are also “Rule of Law” Kremlin’s argument that Ukrainian ex- pressured to adopt constitutions and show & the Prospects for Change tremist nationalists were responsible for that they abide by the constraints in them. the conflict in Donbas and sought to sub- Civilian authoritarian regimes that lack the vert Russia’s newly acquired sovereignty brute force of military dictatorships or the over Crimea. A post-2012 anticorruption historically or religiously based legitimacy campaign has been used to neutralize one of monarchies are purportedly more likely of the main rallying points for the oppo- to adopt a constitutional legal regime.18 In sition: endemic bureaucratic and politi- the near future, Russia is unlikely to move cal corruption. toward constitutionalism as a result of ex- The frequent use of presidential pardon ternal pressure. Russia is a major recipi- or amnesty to release political prisoners ent of fdi (ranked fourth globally) and it underscores the information-delivering is hardly dependent on foreign aid.19 Even role of high-profile political trials. Mikhail though per capita fdi is low and could in- Khodorkovsky and Nadiya Savchenko were crease significantly if guarantees against ex- released directly by Putin and, in both cas- propriation were stronger, there is an ide- es, he cited mercy and compassion as the ational obstacle to domestic reforms in- drivers behind his decision. The pardons spired by external pressure. Russia’s return reiterate to the Russian public that, though to self-perceived great power status makes granted mercy, the prisoners deserved to be it reluctant to pander to the international prosecuted and convicted. It also emphasiz- community. Over Putin’s tenure, Russian es the power of the political sovereign over foreign policy has shifted gradually yet de- the legal process and, as a bonus, shows him cisively away from Yeltsin’s attempts to win as magnanimous. praise from the West. The “reset” with the But if all autocrats benefit from a depen- United States failed. The Crimean annex- dent judiciary and instrumental use of the ation triggered a standoff with Europe and law, why do some accept some constitu- the United States through reciprocal sanc- tional constraints? For some autocrats, tions. Interpretations of Putin’s motives in the balance tips toward constitutionalism the Ukrainian intervention vary. Some pre- through external pressure. Authoritarian dict that as a resurgent expansionist great regimes with economies heavily depen- power, Russia will continue trying to push dent on foreign direct investment (fdi) the West out of its former backyard. Others have an incentive to credibly constrain see the Kremlin pursuing “aggressive isola- themselves at least in the area of proper- tionism”: a policy aimed at isolating Russia ty rights in order to reassure investors that from Western influence to protect against they would not be expropriated arbitrarily. a meddling color revolution.20 Whether Singapore may owe its authoritarian consti- Putin’s reaction to the Euromaidan revo- tutionalism to this mechanism.16 Author- lution of 2014 was out of strength or weak- itarian regimes that need and expect sig- ness, both scenarios signal Russia’s rejec- nificant foreign aid from democracies that tion of Western conditionality. In this con- care about the rule of law also have an in- text, it is unlikely that Russia would accept centive to accept some of the constraints constitutional or judicial constraints in or- that come from having an independent der to placate the West or the broader in- judiciary. This is part of the story behind ternational community. Both the flaunt- the gradual empowerment of the judicia- ing of international law through the Crime- ry in Mubarak’s Egypt.17 Authoritarian re- an intervention and the 2015 law spelling gimes that seek legitimacy and recognition out Russia’s intention to disregard certain

70 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences echr decisions underscore the limits of ex- In November 2016, even an incumbent Maria ternal pressure. member of the government–economy Popova There could be domestic reasons for minister Aleksei Ulyukayev–was arrest- autocrats to choose to bind themselves ed, allegedly in the act of taking a $2 mil- through a credible constitution and an lion bribe. As the shock of Ulyukayev’s de- independent judiciary. They may use the tention reverberated through Russian so- constitution and the courts as tools to en- ciety, commentators focused on guessing hance legitimacy. Civilian and party-based why Ulyukayev lost political favor with the authoritarian regimes like Russia’s are pur- president, which faction pushed for his portedly more likely to choose this route downfall, and who could have protected toward power consolidation, because they him. The case underscores the widespread cannot rely on sheer force like military re- belief that, in Russia, legal repercussions gimes or on religion/tradition like monar- stem from loss of political status, rather chies.21 Autocrats may also use the consti- than vice versa. tution and an independent judiciary as a The problem with this form of manage- coordinating device. An independent ju- ment is that it creates significant uncertain- diciary can be used to keep the bureaucra- ty within the authoritarian coalition; it is cy in line. A credibly enforced constitution hard to know before a case plays out in the can clarify how power is allocated with- courts which faction has the upper hand. in the authoritarian governing coalition, High uncertainty makes the regime more which would reduce the potential for in- brittle. Factions are likely to pledge outward traelite conflict and political instability.22 allegiance to the autocrat, when in fact their Putin’s regime has used criminal law to support for his rule may be eroding. As suc- manage membership of the authoritarian cession time approaches, the lack of a cred- governing coalition. But since law is ap- ible coordination device is likely to lead to plied arbitrarily by a judiciary that lacks de significant political instability.23 facto independence, the legal process does As Putin’s age advances, the issue of au- not function as a coordination device, but thoritarian succession will loom ever larg- as a political instrument. The post-2012 er for Russia’s authoritarian elites. Some wave of criminal indictments of mayors, may try to pursue a policy toward the em- regional governors, and high-level federal powerment of the judiciary as an indepen- officials for malfeasance, corruption, and dent enforcer of the constitution in order abuse of office is a case in point. Members to pave the way for an orderly transition of the authoritarian elite who lose their of power. The inception of the rule of law political standing can expect to come un- and an independent judiciary is often at- der criminal investigation. They become tributed to an intertemporal bargain: cur- scapegoats in a public campaign orches- rent powerholders bind their own hands trated by the regime to gain public legiti- through an independent court in order macy. When different factions fight each to guarantee that their successors are other, each seeks to get the upper hand constrained as well.24 To be successful, by provoking a criminal case against the though, these elites will need either the opponent. Whoever does get indicted is indifference or the tacit support of the widely seen as having lost a political fight. Kremlin. The likelihood of the emancipa- Usually, the criminal investigation and the tion of the judiciary is closely linked to Pu- indictment follow, rather than precede, a tin’s (and his faction’s) view of the mode presidential decree dismissing the gover- of regime succession. If Putin intends to nor for loss of confidence (utrata doveriya). die in office or has a credibly loyal suc-

146 (2) Spring 2017 71 Putin-Style cessor up his sleeve, the Kremlin will re- only gradually, rather than through one or “Rule of Law” frain from ceding any discretionary pow- two major decisions. In the history of the & the Prospects for Change er to an independent judiciary. In theory, American judiciary’s emancipation from if Putin decides to retire without designat- political influence,Marbury v Madison is of- ing a successor and wants to guarantee im- ten seen as a momentous decision. How- munity from prosecution for himself and ever, its importance is clear only in hind- his faction, he may pursue judicial empow- sight. The U.S. Supreme Court was in a po- erment. In practice, however, such a sce- litically precarious position throughout nario is far-fetched. Yeltsin’s transfer of the nineteenth century.25 And in Ukraine, power to Putin and the former’s protec- Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia, what looked like tion from prosecution through personal, major breakthroughs when the supreme rather than institutional, guarantees is a courts ruled against political incumbents precedent that works against the institu- at the height of the color revolutions failed tionalization of an independent judiciary. to usher in eras of judicial independence. More broadly, Putin seems to favor per- What about the possibility of a demo- sonal, ad hoc, behind-the-scenes bargains cratic breakthrough ushering in constitu- over formal institutional solutions. Un- tionalism in Russia? If the Putin regime like Lee Kuan Yew, the Singaporean patri- fell amidst prodemocratic social mobili- arch who directed his country’s spectac- zation, rule of law and an independent ju- ular transformation in part by guarantee- diciary may crystalize as one of the dem- ing the security of property rights through ocratic revolution’s main goals. That does an impartial judiciary, Putin has overseen not mean this goal is easy to achieve, how- several rounds of property expropriation ever. Post-Euromaidan Ukraine offers a and redistribution. cautionary tale. As unlikely as it is, what would a policy Three years after former Ukrainian presi- aimed at moving Russia toward consti- dent Viktor Yanukovych’s ouster, the Euro- tutionalism look like? Russia has the ba- maidan’s objective of fundamental chang- sic formal institutions that are associated es to the judiciary remains elusive, despite with a constitutional regime and an inde- strong societal demand for it. The Ukrainian pendent judiciary, so no major institution- judiciary continues to be both de jure and al reforms are necessary. Still, some legis- de facto dependent on incumbent politi- lative initiatives that bolster the self-gov- cians. After a few months of struggle with ernance mechanisms for the judiciary and entrenched judicial elites, the new Porosh- remove formal channels for executive in- enko administration established control fluence over the courts may signal a com- over the courts by muscling in some new mitment to change. What is even more appointees and getting old elites to pledge necessary is a clear demonstration that allegiance. In early 2015, the parliamenta- the courts will not be used instrumental- ry assembly and its point man for the judi- ly and arbitrarily to achieve politically ex- ciary, Aleksei Filatov, outmaneuvered judi- pedient goals. This means, at a minimum, cial independence champions in the Rada– a moratorium on the use of criminal law led by the Samopomich-appointed deputy against leaders of the opposition. It also Rada speaker, Oksana Syroyid–and wa- means that the courts should be kept at tered down a bill that was going to increase arm’s length from major political contro- the formal independence of the judiciary.26 versies, so that they could start building The lower-levels of the judiciary have re- a track record of political impartiality. A frained from pushing for greater indepen- transition to constitutionalism can happen dence. Rank-and-file judges across Ukraine

72 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences demonstrated during the April 2014 judicial approach by politicians has put the judi- Maria chair elections that they were afraid to rock ciary in the precarious and humiliating Popova the boat: they overwhelmingly reelected position of being pressured and criticized their incumbent administrative superiors.27 from all sides. Judges have become scape- The outsiders who Poroshenko initially ap- goats for much of the pre- and post-Euro- pointed to clean up the prosecution were maidan dysfunction in the Ukrainian poli- pushed out by early 2016. David Sakvarelidze, ty. Their legitimacy has plunged below even a veteran of former Georgian president Yanukovych-era levels, as has their self-per- Mikheil Saakashvili’s judicial reform team, ception of autonomy. A 2015 survey by the was fired from his post as deputy prosecu- Center for Policy and Legal Reforms shows tor general for “grave violations of prosecu- that less than 10 percent of judges believe torial ethics.”28 Vitalii Kas’ko, another dep- that the Ukrainian judiciary is independent. uty prosecutor general, resigned and faced Even more damningly for the current gov- criminal charges for the alleged illegal pri- ernment, 46 percent of judges believe that vatization of a Kyiv apartment. His support- political pressure on judges is now just as ers view his prosecution as political revenge strong as under Yanukovych and 29 percent by entrenched elites within the prosecution of judges believe that political pressure has who were threatened by his investigation increased under Poroshenko!30 into prosecutorial corruption.29 The first Ukrainian lesson for Russia is At the same time, civil society organiza- that a transition to constitutionalism and tions, including the Lustration Commit- judicial independence is harder to pull off tee, Maidan Self-Defense, and the Rean- than a transition to competitive politics, imation Package of Reforms (rpr), have free and fair elections, and a free press. been closely monitoring the performance The second Ukrainian lesson is that ju- of the judiciary. Some organizations, such dicial independence cannot be achieved as rpr, have engaged in advocacy and leg- through civil society pressure and moni- islative lobbying for changes to the institu- toring. Civil society activists become yet tional structure of the judiciary that would another source of extrajudicial interfer- increase its independence. Others, howev- ence in the judicial decision-making pro- er, have blurred the line between civil ac- cess. The result is an even more cowering tivism and vigilantism, especially through judiciary, rather than an emancipated one. “trashcan lustration” actions, in which ac- tivists physically attacked judges who were In short, it is unlikely that Russia will be- perceived as stooges of the Yanukovych re- come a rule-of-law or a rule-by-law state gime and forced them into trashcans. Ac- after Putin. Whether Putin plans to die in tivists who “monitored” judicial elections, office, loses power in a color revolution, in which rank-and-file judges voted for the or is replaced after the disintegration of chair of their court, often disrupted the his authoritarian coalition, the prospects election and tried to intimidate judges into for a transition to constitutionalism and voting for or against a certain candidate. an independent judiciary are slim. Both All this civic engagement happened against domestic and external pressures on Pu- the backdrop of numerous public opinion tin’s regime to abandon its instrumental polls that showed that an overwhelming use of the law are weak. Ironically, the po- majority of Ukrainians perceive radical ju- tential agents of change are Putin himself dicial reform as a top priority. and members of his authoritarian coali- The combination of societal demand for tion, rather than civil society. A gradual radical reforms and a business-as-usual move to authoritarian constitutionalism is

146 (2) Spring 2017 73 Putin-Style theoretically possible if Putin and his close is easier to imagine. If a credible challenge “Rule of Law” associates plan to leave politics and need to the Kremlin’s dominance emerges, & the Prospects for Change guarantees that the future political incum- the regime will reach for the courts as an bents would not use law and the pliable ju- instrument to suppress dissent. If the dan- diciary to prosecute them. Alternatively, ger rises through civil society mobiliza- a group of major business owners could tion, the regime will use administrative push for the rule of law as a way of protect- and criminal law to deal more harshly with ing their assets. In practice, however, Pu- ngos, social movement activists, and in- tin’s demonstrated preference for informal dividual protestors. The fines will get big- bargains over formal institutions as coor- ger, the verdicts longer, and the procedur- dination devices makes the first scenario al violations more blatant. If a charismat- unlikely. And the robber-barons-for-rule- ic politician with broad appeal emerges, of-law transformation has been expected either within or outside the authoritarian for the past two decades; but we have yet coalition, and harnesses ethnic Russian to see any indication that it will happen.31 nationalism, even show trials could make While positive change toward the rule a comeback. In that scenario, Russia could of law is unlikely, negative change toward veer into the legal nihilism characteristic even greater politicization of the judiciary of previous periods of its history.

endnotes 1 Vladimir Putin cited in “Vladimir Putin: dayu vam chestnoye partiinoye slovo,” Kommoer- sant.ru, August 30, 2010, http://kommersant.ru/doc/1495411. 2 For more on the concept of authoritarian constitutionalism, see Mark Tushnet, “Authoritar- ian Constitutionalism,” Cornell Law Review 100 (2) (2014): 391. 3 For more on judicial independence in authoritarian regimes, see Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, eds., Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 4 For more on the relationship between the autocrat and authoritarian elites, see Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). For more on con- stitutions and the courts as a coordinating institution, see Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, eds., Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 5 Gordon Silverstein, “Singapore’s Constitutionalism: A Model, but of What Sort?” Cornell Law Review 100 (1) (2015): 15. 6 “Putin Has Allowed the Constitutional Court to Ignore the Decision of the echr,” bbc, De- cember 15, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/russian/news/2015/12/151215_putin_constitutional_ court_echr. 7 The echr decision is available at European Court of Human Rights, “Opposition Activist’s Conviction of Embezzlement: Result of Arbitrary Application of the Law,” press release, echr 071, February 23, 2016, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf?library=EC HR&id=003-5307101-6607285&filename=Judgment%20Navalnyy%20and%20Ofitserov%20 v.%20Russia%20-%20conviction%20of%20opposition%20activist%20.pdf. 8 See Jeffrey Kahn, “Report on the Verdict Against M. B. Khodorkovsky and P. L. Lebedev,” Jour- nal of Eurasian Law 4 (3) (2011): 321. 9 See Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, “The Pussy Riot Affair and Putin’s Démarche from Sovereign Democracy to Sovereign Morality,” Nationalities Papers 42 (4) (2014): 615–621.

74 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 10 5th Column, “The War (Art Group),” http://xn--80aa3aekaebe4a6lc.xn--p1ai/orgs/org32.html. Maria Popova 11 Timothy Frye, “The Two Faces of Russian Courts: Evidence from a Survey of Company Man- agers,” East European Constitutional Review 11 (2002): 125. 12 Kathryn Hendley, “Justice in Moscow?” Post-Soviet Affairs 32 (6) (2016). 13 See Maria Popova, “Watchdogs or Attack Dogs? The Role of the Russian Courts and the Cen- tral Election Commission in the Resolution of Electoral Disputes,” Europe-Asia Studies 58 (3) (2006): 391–414; and Maria Popova, Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies: A Study of Courts in Russia and Ukraine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 14 Alexei Trochev, “Suing Russia at Home,” Problems of Post-Communism 59 (5) (2012): 18–34. 15 Sharafutdinova, “The Pussy Riot Affair and Putin’s Démarche from Sovereign Democracy to Sovereign Morality.” 16 Gordon Silverstein, “Singapore: The Exception that Proves Rules Matter,” in Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, ed. Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 73–101. 17 Tamir Moustafa, The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 18 David Law and Mila Versteeg, “Constitutional Variation among Strains of Authoritarianism,” in Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, ed. Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 171. 19 Kalman Kalotay, “The Impact of the New Ruble Crisis on Russian fdi,” Baltic Rim Economies– Bimonthly Economic Review 1 (2015): 31–32. 20 Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, “Russia’s Aggressive Isolationism,” The American Interest 10 (3) (2014). 21 Law and Versteeg, “Constitutional Variation among Strains of Authoritarianism,” 174. 22 Ginsburg and Simpser, eds., Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, 10. 23 Henry E. Hale, “Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics 63 (4) (2011): 581–617. 24 Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” The Journal of Eco- nomic History 49 (4) (1989): 803–832. 25 For a discussion of the slow process of building an independent and powerful judiciary in the United States, see Justin Crowe, Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012). 26 Maria Popova, “Ukraine’s Judiciary After Euromaidan: Continuity and Change,” Comparative Politics Newsletter 25 (2) (2015): 29–32. 27 Maria Popova, “Ukraine’s Judicial Reforms,” VoxUkraine, December 15, 2015. 28 “Ukraine’s Deputy Prosecutor General David Sakvarelidze Fired,” Ukraine Today, March 29, 2016, http://uatoday.tv/politics/ukraine-s-deputy-prosecutor-general-david-sakvarelidze -fired-620102.html. 29 “‘Housing Problem’: Why the gpu is Investigating the Case against Vitali Kaska,” Segodnya, April 14, 2016, http://www.segodnya.ua/politics/pnews/intervyu-s-vitaliem-kasko-707496.html. 30 “Judicial Reform: Public Opinion Poll, Judges and Experts Surveys,” Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, http://pravo.org.ua/en/news/20871053-judicial-reform-public-opinion-poll,-judges -and-experts-surveys. 31 In his contribution to this volume, Stanislav Markus discusses why Russian oligarchs have accepted the high-risk/high-reward environment of Russia’s current politicized legal regime.

146 (2) Spring 2017 75

The Atlas That has Not Shrugged: Why Russia’s Oligarchs are an Unlikely Force for Change

Stanislav Markus

Abstract: There is demand among Russia’s oligarchs for systemic change, but not for the rule of law proper. Instead, it is the de facto accountability of political elites and improved relations with the West that the Rus- sian oligarchs want from the Kremlin. However, the oligarchs currently lack the capacity to effect change. Their insufficient leverage vis-à-vis Putin is rooted in their competition for rents, which prevents them from confronting the Kremlin as a united force. In addition to analyzing the lack of systemic pressure for change from the oligarchs, this essay considers the prospects of individual oligarchs who have nevertheless pushed openly for liberalization or tried to effect incremental change. It also draws on comparisons with other countries to chart the political behavior of Russia’s business elites in the future.

Will Russia’s super rich change the political status quo? To start, we must recognize the diversity of the Russian business elites, also referred to here as the oligarchs. In terms of their proximity to power in to- day’s Russia, three groups stand out: Putin’s friends, silovarchs, and outsiders. Putin’s personal friends are connected to him through the Ozero dacha cooperative, his hobbies, STANISLAV MARKUS is Associate and his career; this is the most exclusive network. Professor of International Business at the Moore School of Business at The so-called silovarchs (a portmanteau of siloviki and the University of South Carolina. oligarchs) are business elites who have leveraged His book Property, Predation, and Pro- their networks in the fsb (Russian Federal Securi- tection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia ty Service) or the military to amass extreme person- and Ukraine (2015) was awarded the al wealth.1 While the circles of Putin’s friends and the 2016 Stein Rokkan Prize for Com- silovarchs partly overlap, the silovarchs make up a larger parative Social Science Research. group, most of whom are not Putin’s friends. An even He has published articles in such journals as World Politics, Compar- larger number of the super rich in Russia are outsiders ative Political Studies, Socio-Economic who are not personally connected to Putin, the mil- Review, Studies in Comparative Interna- itary, or the fsb. Despite their lack of direct connec- tional Development, and Polity. tion to Putin, however, they are still deeply embedded

© 2017 by Stanislav Markus doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00438

101 Why Russia’s in the Russian state; their outsider status is the oligarchs possess sufficient leverage to Oligarchs are only in reference to the two other groups. shift Russia’s trajectory? an Unlikely Force for While none of these three groups is The lack of oligarchic demand for sys- Change monolithic, these categories are useful to temic change toward the rule of law highlight the distinct power resources at seems a foregone conclusion; “overde- the oligarchs’ disposal. Putin’s friends pos- termined” in social scientists’ parlance. sess the highly prized “access to the body” Let us analyze it in terms of economist (dostup k telu): the privilege to be heard by– Albert Hirschman’s conceptualizations and possibly to sway–the most powerful of responses to adversity: exit (opting out individual in Russia via informal conversa- of future transactions), voice (communi- tions. Quantitative analysis suggests that cating a complaint, grievance, or propos- being Putin’s friend increases an oligarch’s al for change), and loyalty.5 wealth significantly, and that this increase Consider exit. Unlike trapped constitu- is particularly pronounced in times of high encies, such as the uneducated labor force, oil prices.2 Meanwhile, the silovarchs have Russia’s business elites have ample possi- direct access to coercion, either through bilities to retire not only their capital, but their current appointments in the power also themselves, abroad.6 Would they risk agencies (the police, fsb, military, and oth- demanding institutional change at home er security services), or through their close when they can so easily change their in- personal contacts there. More than other dividual circumstances? The data on in- groups, the silovarchs possess the power of vestor visas show that Russian business (c)omission: they can implement Putin’s elites are increasingly purchasing foreign orders–or refuse to do so. Since 2003, Pu- residence permits.7 The top issuers of in- tin’s friends and the silovarchs have steadily vestor visas for Russian big capital are, in risen to control crony sectors of the econ- descending order, the United Kingdom, omy and to hold important positions in Portugal, the United States, and Austria. the executive branch. These groups are In these countries, investor visas lead to disproportionately represented on corpo- permanent residence or citizenship and rate boards of the so-called state corpora- involve a minimum $1–3 million invest- tions, and they often own large stakes in ment and, in some cases, proof of job cre- firms from sectors in which profitability ation. The United States and the United depends on government favor (including Kingdom, in particular, have experienced oil, utilities, telecommunications, defense, a sharp rise in the number of investor vi- and construction).3 However, compared sas issued to Russian nationals since 2010. with Putin’s friends and the silovarchs, the In terms of loyalty, it pays to support influence of outsiders is much more medi- a system that allows one to prosper. For ated. Some outsiders have held seats in the the oligarchs, it may be precisely the lack Duma, while others have lobbied via the of rule of law that facilitates the expan- Russian Union of Industrialists and Entre- sion of riches,8 such as through a variety reneurs (ruie), a business association rep- of corrupt schemes commonly referred to resenting large capital.4 as “raiding.”9 To be sure, the environment of constant danger is not for the faint of Our main issue–the pressure for change heart. According to Russian entrepreneur –generates two questions. Is there any Mikhail Gutseriyev, who left Russia in 2007 demand for change on the part of the oli- after being pressured to sell his company garchs (and if so, in which direction)? Russneft, “only in London did I realize And to the extent such demand exists, do that . . . back in Russia I had spent 20 per-

102 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences cent [of my time] on business, and 80 per- petitive and honest elections, plus legis- Stanislav cent on confrontation [protivostoyanie].”10 lative and judiciary independence). But Markus And yet, when given a chance in 2010, Gut- there is likely to be demand for de facto seriyev returned to Russia, suggesting that elite accountability. From the oligarchs’ the risks of “confrontation” may be well perspective, the latter could theoretically worth the rewards. In a 2007 survey of the be achieved in several ways, including 1) executives at 396 Russian manufacturing a relatively impartial elite arbiter, such as enterprises, 24 percent of the respondents Soviet-era Brezhnev or Ukraine’s Kuchma agreed with the statement: “the poor pro- before the Orange Revolution; 2) an em- tection of property rights presents not only powered oligarch-controlled parliament, a threat but also an opportunity for busi- such as the Ukrainian Rada after the Or- ness growth.”11 ange Revolution; 3) Singapore-style author- Finally, even when business elites voice itarian legality guaranteeing property rights their disagreement with the system, they without competitive politics; or 4) power- may press the state for de facto account- ful associations of large businesses that can ability at the firm level via stakeholder al- check the state, as in Porfirian Mexico. liances with labor, the community, or for- The demand for such de facto elite ac- eign investors.12 Such alliances serve as er- countability, in whatever form, is rising. satz institutions, allowing business owners The conditional nature of oligarchic own- to protect their specific firms while avoid- ership in Russia has long been acknowl- ing the need for country-level rule of law. edged, the local joke being that there are no Taken together, the above factors imply billionaires in Russia, only people working that business elites are partly complicit in as billionaires. Yet the conditionality im- the persistence of Putinism, their complic- posed on the oligarchs by Putin early in his ity being not only self-fulfilling, but also first tenure (“stay out of politics, keep your self-serving. Trends among the Russian property”) is becoming unreliable. The billionaires suggest as much.13 According contrast between the 2003 case of Mikhail to The Economist’s crony capitalism index Khodorkovsky and the 2014 case of Vladi- for 2016, billionaire wealth from the cro- mir Yevtushenkov, both business oligarch ny sectors in Russia is the highest in the targets of Putin’s Kremlin, is telling. One world as a percentage of gdp (18 percent), could easily argue that Khodorkovsky flout- followed by Malaysia (13 percent) and the ed Putin’s “rules” by financing opposition Philippines (11 percent); it has also risen parties and threatening to interfere with since 2014 (from 16 percent).14 Meanwhile, Russia’s foreign policy (via plans for Yu- most of the unfortunate Russian billion- kos’s pipelines and asset sales to U.S. firms). aires who lost their billionaire status from Yevtushenkov, however, epitomizes oligar- 2006 to 2015 were not victims of the state, chic loyalty to Putin. Yevtushenkov aban- but rather of market conditions or of un- doned his patron Yurii Luzhkov, the ex- scrupulous rivals.15 mayor of Moscow to whom Yevtushenkov owes his fortune, when Luzhkov’s relations Yet to conclude that the oligarchs are with the Kremlin grew tense in 2010. (Yev- content with the status quo is premature. tushenkov, it so happens, is married to Luz- To identify what the oligarchs want, let us hkov’s wife’s sister, which must have made move beyond the rule of law as the bench- for some tense dinner conversations.) But mark. no matter: Yevtushenkov’s oil company, Russia’s super rich may not want institu- Bashneft, was expropriated, decimating tionalized accountability writ large (com- the oligarch’s wealth, despite the fact that

146 (2) Spring 2017 103 Why Russia’s Yevtushenkov’s progressive buy-up of sian government entities as plaintiffs suing, Oligarchs are Bashneft shares from 2005 to 2009 had been in Britain, the self-exiled oligarchs who re- an Unlikely Force for meticulously coordinated with the Krem- side in London (as in the case of Deposit In- Change lin. Igor Sechin, Putin’s favored silovarch in surance Agency v. Pugachev). charge of Rosneft, reportedly mastermind- Overall, there is demand for greater pre- ed the 2014 attack on Bashneft. The fact that dictability in business-power relations on Putin let a loyal oligarch (Yevtushenkov) be the part of the oligarchs, but no vision on devoured by Sechin raises the question of how to achieve it. Given Putin’s erratic what exactly loyalty to Putin is worth. decisions, the oligarchs have no reason to Recently, another apolitical oligarch, trust him with the role of stabilizer or en- Sergei Pugachev, has faced the Kremlin’s forcer, even if he plays that role by default. wrath. In exile since 2012, Pugachev fac- A more institutionalized form of authori- es criminal charges in Russia and claims tarian legality is also unpalatable to many that the Kremlin had expropriated about oligarchs, given how diligently the fsb has $15 billion of his business assets. Former- been collecting kompromat (evidence of le- ly referred to as the “Kremlin’s banker,” gal wrongdoing that can be used for black- Pugachev was notably a member of Putin’s mail) on business elites, including the si- inner circle in the early 2000s. lovarchs.17 Meanwhile, popular resentment The irregular application of unwritten of the super rich in Russia makes honest rules must make Russia’s business elites and competitive elections a risky propo- nervous. A careful observer may note that sition. Russian business elites have close- Putin’s group of friends is rather fluid. By ly watched the instability in Ukraine in the 2010, Putin distanced himself from friends wake of democratization, including both of the late 1990s and his first presidency the reprivatization attempt after the 2004 (including Pugachev), reaching out instead Orange Revolution and some anticorrup- to friends from his younger years: that is, tion initiatives after the 2014 ouster of Ya- from the early to mid-1990s (such as from nukovych.18 Finally, the oligarchs’ experi- the Ozero dacha cooperative) and even ence with the ruie and its mixed record from childhood (as in the case of Arkadii in improving state-business relations has Rotenberg). Is there a guarantee that Pu- cooled business elites’ enthusiasm for as- tin will not “unfriend” some of them, too? sociation building.19 ruie’s requests on The tide of commercial litigation by the behalf of Khodorkovsky and Yevtushen- Russian business elites in Western juris- kov were ignored by the Kremlin. At the dictions suggests that, for the oligarchs, end of the day, the question facing the Rus- Putin is not living up to the role of arbi- sian oligarchs is urgent but unanswered: ter or enforcer of authoritarian legality.16 which way from here? One would expect the expatriates to sue the In addition to greater predictability, an- Russian state from abroad, since the very other vector of implicit oligarchic demand reason for their self-exile is persecution at for change aims at a more West-friendly home and/or distrust of the Russian sys- foreign policy. This demand is conditioned tem. More interestingly, however, many both by tangible personal losses from West- lawsuits adjudicated abroad nowadays are ern sanctions experienced since 2014 by Pu- between Russia-based claimants. In other tin’s friends and some of the silovarchs, as words, even oligarchs who are comfortable well as the desire by all categories of oli- in Putin’s Russia are not satisfied with the garchs to keep the West as a viable exit op- dispute resolution in their home country. It tion. The latter implies that the Russian su- gets better: some lawsuits now involve Rus- per rich want to prevent the reputational

104 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences damage abroad from spiraling entirely out To be sure, oligarchic clans offer a form Stanislav of control. The twenty-one richest Russians of collective action, but they appear frag- Markus lost a total of $61 billion in 2014, one quar- mented, overlapping, and ever changing.23 ter of their total fortune, leading some ana- Putin’s closest friends are not above mutu- lysts to predict a “chilly fallout between Pu- al sabotage, including that of their patron: tin and his oligarch pals.”20 One caveat here consider analysis by The Economist show- is that new fault lines may emerge between ing that a state-linked Russian oil trad- a subset of the silovarchs who profit directly er, Gunvor Group, was regularly driving from the defense industry (and are there- down the price for Urals, a Russian export fore interested in a continued standoff with oil mixture, for the private profit of Gen- the West) and the rest of the business elites. nadii Timchenko, a supposed Putin loy- alist.24 When nominal loyalty yields to Most Russian oligarchs would benefit predatory temptations, group cohesive- from a shift in Russia’s trajectory toward ness suffers. Pugachev, Putin’s former St. greater de facto elite accountability and Petersburg friend, has embezzled oligar- lower hostility vis-à-vis the West. But is chic donations to Putin’s election cam- this implicit demand matched by the oli- paigns, including a $50 million donation garchs’ capacity to achieve it? from Lukoil alone, according to the chief The answer is no. The key reason is a col- editor of Russia’s independent tv chan- lective action problem. While in smaller nel Dozhd’.25 economies the actions of a single larger- The outsider tycoons, too, are anything than-life oligarch (such as Bidzina Ivan- but cohesive. This was most vividly demon- ishvili in Georgia) may change the status strated by the five-year struggle for Norilsk quo, the sheer number of Russia’s super Nickel between Vladimir Potanin (famous rich, all equipped with their own power for engineering the loans-for-shares scheme resources, implies that sustainable lever- in the 1990s) and Oleg Deripaska (affiliated age requires cooperation. with Dmitrii Medvedev, Aleksandr Volosh- Cooperation, however, is not the Rus- in, and the vestiges of Yeltsin’s “family”). sian oligarchs’ strong suit. For Putin’s Potanin initially outsmarted Deripaska, friends and the silovarchs, the problem re- who, in turn, vowed to fight Potanin “to sides in the competitive nature of the Rus- the death” as both oligarchs engaged their sian kleptocracy. Russia’s piranha capital- massive administrative resources at home ism is defined as much by a “bully in the while also suing each other abroad in a se- penthouse” as it is by “termites in the base- ries of battles between 2008 and 2012. ment”: individual state employees at all In addition to wars within the groups of levels of the executive hierarchy view the Putin’s friends, silovarchs, and outsiders, rents they can extract from the economy these groups also appear to be at each oth- as a zero-sum game.21 Even if Putin wanted er’s throats. Four oligarchic clans, in partic- to be a trusted arbiter among the oligarchs, ular, are currently competing for decreas- the implementation of Putin’s decisions ing rents under economic decline: Putin’s would be a challenge in a system whose ex- friends (including Timchenko, the Roten- ecutive branch is pulled apart by compet- bergs, and the Koval’chuk brothers); the ing kleptocrats, not least the silovarchs who fsb-affiliatedsilovarchs headed by Rosneft’s have effectively undermined a number of Sechin; the army-connected silovarchs head- Putin’s priorities, including internation- ed by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu; and al defense contracts, Gazprom’s strategy the Gazprom clan headed by ex-president in Europe, and electoral manipulation.22 Medvedev and Aleksei Miller. Interestingly,

146 (2) Spring 2017 105 Why Russia’s Putin’s friends have lost some key battles Instead of counteracting capital flight Oligarchs are over the production of oil pipelines and the by improving the investment climate, the an Unlikely Force for control of main tv channels. Kremlin has tried to force capital back, for Change Public knowledge of oligarchic rivalries example through the “deoffshorization” likely constitutes only the tip of the ice- campaign launched in 2013. Until recently, berg, making collective leverage by the su- individual oligarchs could decide sepa- per rich in Russia an unlikely proposition. rately on whether to 1) keep their physical But collective lobbying is not the only path profit-generating assets in Russia; 2) reg- to leverage for the super rich. ister their assets and cash flows in Russia Let us reconsider exit. As noted above, or offshore; 3) personally reside in Russia from the oligarchs’ perspective, their op- or abroad; or 4) let their family members portunities to leave Russia may reduce reside in Russia or relocate them abroad. their demand for change. However, from The winning formula for many oligarchs Putin’s perspective, capital flight or its im- has been to keep their physical productive plicit threat as such can put pressure on assets in Russia but register them offshore the system by depriving the Russian econ- while also securing foreign residence per- omy of investment, jobs, and tax revenue. mits for oneself and/or one’s family. The In other words, an exit may reduce the oli- deoffshorization campaign may indicate garchs’ explicit demand for better arrange- a shift in the Kremlin’s attitude regarding ments from the state while simultaneously these possibilities of exit. At the unlikely ex- increasing the oligarchs’ implicit leverage treme, Putin may push the oligarchs to de- to get such arrangements. Exit as a form cide: either keep your business in Russia of leverage does not depend on collective and register it there–or liquidate your as- action, since every oligarch can exercise sets in Russia and leave the country alto- it individually. gether. So far, many top companies such In Russia, it is more difficult for individ- as RusAl, Metalloinvest, mts, RusHydro, ual silovarchs and friends of Putin–as com- and Kamaz have pledged to stop registering pared with outsider oligarchs–to rely on businesses offshore and to repatriate their exit as an implicit threat, due to the inti- physical productive assets held abroad. mate connections to the state apparatus If the oligarchs’ reaction to Western of Putin’s friends and the silovarchs, as well sanctions and economic decline is any in- as the progressive tightening of (Putin- dication, then the oligarchs’ influence on inspired) legislation restricting state em- Russia’s trajectory will remain limited. ployees’ foreign asset ownership. The ruie has pointedly kept silent on In any case, Putin has been starkly in- Russia’s economically ruinous foreign pol- sensitive to the implicit exit threat of Rus- icy since the conflict in Ukraine has unfold- sia’s individual capital owners. As one oli- ed. Despite their massive financial losses in garch noted in his comment on the Bash- 2014, Putin’s friends paraded their readi- neft attack: ness to sacrifice even more for their lead- er in various interviews. Said Timchenko: The Kremlin certainly would understand “If need be, I will transfer everything to that it was going to hurt the stock market; the state tomorrow. Or to charity. . . . My that it’s going to add to the whole econom- wife and I have discussed this many times. ic situation; that it was going to frighten the Personally, we do not need billions.”27 Of business community. . . . They went ahead course, the propaganda aspect of such state- anyway . . . because they wanted to deliver ments aside, the oligarchs care deeply about a message: “Behave yourself.”26 their billions. Yet their strategy of wealth

106 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences defense has been indirect: instead of push- by the Russian state, left the country, and Stanislav ing Putin to change course, the oligarchs then invested in opposition to Putin’s re- Markus have sought compensation from the state. gime from abroad. In September 2014, the Duma adopted a law Prior to his 2013 (apparent) suicide, stating that Russian citizens who lost assets Berezovsky had conducted a broad infor- abroad due to sanctions would be compen- mational campaign against Putin, includ- sated from the Russian treasury. The law ing financing a film that implicated thefsb sparked a popular outcry, as Russian taxpay- in the 1999 apartment bombings in Russia. ers balked at the prospect of bailing out the Berezovsky also wrote open letters to Pu- oligarchs. Vladimir Ponevezhskii, the Unit- tin (“Volodya, . . . as a typical dictator, you ed Russia deputy who formally initiated the are not ready to surrender power through law proposal, laughably defended it as po- elections”), to the Patriarch Kirill (“Your tentially benefitting ordinary citizens who Saintness, . . . help Putin come to his senses may own apartments in Bulgaria.28 Mean- . . . take power from his hands and peace- while, Arkadii Rotenberg’s property (four fully, wisely, Christian-like, give that pow- villas, one apartment, and one hotel) hap- er to the people”), and to George W. Bush, pened to be seized in Italy hours before the among others. proposal’s initiation in the Duma, which Mikhail Khodorkovsky was pardoned by some analysts interpreted as more than co- Putin in 2013 after a politically motivated incidental. ten-year imprisonment. The oligarch has Putin’s reaction to these attempts at per- since reanimated his foundation Open sonal compensation by the oligarchs was Russia, which provided logistical back- negative (both the Russian government ing to hundreds of independent and op- and the supreme court rejected the Duma position candidates in the 2016 Duma elec- law), although some strategically impor- tions. Khodorkovsky has forcefully criti- tant companies, particularly Rosneft, have cized Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. received ample help from the state. As for He has also hired a substantial staff of pro- the conflict in Ukraine, it fell to professional fessional journalists to fuel his growing on- technocrat and former minister of finance line presence. Aleksei Kudrin to speak the truth (econom- Yevgenii Chichvarkin, the flamboyant ic decline) to power (Putin). Meanwhile, erstwhile owner of Evroset (Russia’s larg- the oligarchs bit their tongue–again. est mobile phone retailer), fled to London The bottom line: absent greater coopera- in 2008 after losing his business in a series tion by the oligarchs, or higher responsive- of raids by the police. Though the fabri- ness of the Russian leadership to the threat cated criminal cases against Chichvarkin of capital exit, Russia’s business elites have in Russia were closed in 2011 (the oligarch little leverage to shape the country’s devel- personally appealed to Medvedev on the opment. matter), he chose to stay in London and engage in opposition activity. Eppur si muove! While the oligarchs’ lever- In 2016, Chichvarkin joined forces with age in Russia is systemically limited, cases Khodorkovsky. The oligarchs conducted of vocal–if so far inconsequential–oppo- an online press conference in April 2016 sition by business elites do exist. Two types from London, streaming live to the Mos- of instances come to mind. cow offices of Open Russia. By video, First, the renegade oligarchs, such as Kho- Chichvarkin suggested that color revolu- dorkovsky, Chichvarkin, or Boris Ber- tions “should not be feared.” According ezovsky, have experienced persecution to Khodorkovsky, Chichvarkin’s experi-

146 (2) Spring 2017 107 Why Russia’s ence in mass communications would ben- Lebedev is a banker, media owner (he Oligarchs are efit the “political-educational” mission of co-owns Novaya gazeta with Mikhail Gor- an Unlikely Force for Open Russia. Despite their diverging po- bachev, plus several British papers), and Change litical visions–Khodorkovsky calls him- former kgb officer. Lebedev ran for may- self a statist (gosudarstvennik) while Chich- or of Moscow in 2003, but lost to Luzhkov. varkin identifies as a libertarian–both oli- He also sought to run for mayor of Sochi in garchs agreed at the conference that the 2009, but his candidacy was disqualified. current Russian power is, as Chichvarkin Lebedev successfully ran for the Duma, said, “hurtling toward a dead end.” When where he was a deputy from 2003 to 2007, the Putin regime hits that dead end, the switching his party affiliations from Rodi- renegades plan to oversee a two-year “tem- na to United Russia to independent during porary administration” in Russia in order his term. Lebedev has devoted resources to to ensure subsequent honest elections. exposing high-level corruption in the Rus- The renegade oligarchs face significant sian bureaucracy, and though he once co- challenges in their quest to democratize operated with Aleksei Navalny, he has dis- Russia: they lack the support of the Rus- tanced himself from the prominent oppo- sian population at large and they are dis- sition activist since 2012. connected from influential elites at home. Mikhail Prokhorov has owned major as- If a political opening occurred in Russia, sets in mining, finance, and media (as well the renegades could potentially return and as the Brooklyn Nets of the National Bas- help steer the country, but they are unlike- ketball Association). He ran as an inde- ly to be the cause of that opening. So far, pendent candidate in the 2012 presiden- the renegades’ strategy has been to invest tial elections. In 2011, Prokhorov had be- heavily in communications capacity; nur- come the leader of the Right Cause Party. ture and showcase a cadre of young politi- After losing the presidential elections to cians in the Duma elections; and wait for Putin, the oligarch launched a new party, the Kremlin to make a mistake. Civic Platform. Putin has not been prone to mistakes, Prokhorov’s political involvement is the however–not when it comes to pow- most high-profile to date by a Russian oli- er preservation. But the Russian pres- garch. His respectable 8 percent vote share ident may well become more vulnera- in the 2012 presidential elections, despite ble as he ages. This appears also to be the domination of the media by Kremlin- Khodorkovsky’s timeline, given the oli- friendly outlets, suggests that the Tro- garch’s prediction of significant change jans are better connected to Russian cit- in Russia around the presidential elec- izens and elites than the renegades. Fur- tions of 2024. thermore, it demonstrates that divisions Second, oligarchs such as Aleksandr among Kremlin insiders can help the Tro- Lebedev and Mikhail Prokhorov have en- jans. Prokhorov’s political rise would have gaged in the formal political process while been impossible without the intensifying living in Russia; I refer to such oligarchs as competition between the teams of Prime the Trojans. Like the renegades, the Tro- Minister Putin and President Medvedev jans advocate for democratization and rule at the time. However, Prokhorov’s expe- of law. However, they have stopped short rience also demonstrates two limitations of criticizing Putin directly, focusing on of the Trojans. systemic shortcomings instead. More so First, the Trojans are no match for the than the renegades, the Trojans emphasize Kremlin’s political technologists when it gradual, evolutionary changes. comes to strategy in the Byzantine world

108 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences of authoritarian populism. Prokhorov was en worldwide.) Unlike the renegades, the Stanislav defeated twice: by Putin and Volodin from Trojans seem to play politics rather than to Markus without, and also by Vladislav Surkov and live politics. Opposition activity as a hobby Medvedev from within. As the Right Cause –even when pursued by talented, charis- Party was searching for leaders among the matic, and wealthy individuals–will not Russian establishment, Putin and his chief unsettle Russia’s political equilibrium. of staff Volodin sent signals to key figures (including German Gref, Aleksei Kudrin, Regardless of their proximity to power, and Igor Shuvalov) to stay away from the most Russian oligarchs have been quies- party, and they mostly did.29 When Pro- cent amidst attacks by the Kremlin, West- khorov took the helms of Right Cause, the ern sanctions, and economic decline. Those party had already been drained of human who have pushed for change remain mar- capital at the top; its lack of professional ginalized. Will this situation last? Two over- leaders was barely compensated by celebri- arching lessons can be gleaned from other ties like Alla Pugacheva, a Soviet-era sing- countries to forecast the political behavior er whom Prokhorov recruited into the par- of Russia’s business elites. ty. The next stage of Prokhorov’s defeat in- First, oligarchs have good reasons to fear volved his conflict with Surkov. Medvedev, democracy, but this fear can be overcome. interested in developing his own quasi- For the oligarchs, democratization involves liberal party at the time so as to counter- multiple threats that have materialized to balance Putin’s influence, had outsourced some extent across the world after the in- this task to Surkov. (This is not without troduction of greater political competition. irony, since Surkov had also been the ideo- These threats include trust-busting and de- logical godfather of United Russia, the pre- monopolization reforms (South Korea); sumed target of Medvedev’s planned lib- pressure for higher taxes and redistribution eral force.) Surkov decided to take over an (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico); collapse of or- existing party, Right Cause, and pushed der and spiraling violence (Indonesia); and out Prokhorov from its leadership by cut- revision of privatization results (Ukraine). ting deals with other members of the par- However, democratization is by no means ty’s governing organ. Medvedev watched anathema to the super rich. They are more from the sidelines and did not intervene. likely to accept it or push for it when some Second, the Trojans have shown a lim- of the following conditions hold: econom- ited commitment to political life. After ic prosperity (South Korea); declining de- defiantly declaring war on Surkov, Prok- pendence of business profits on govern- horov traveled to Turkey for a one-month ment connections (Western Europe, Mex- vacation. By the time of the 2014 St. Pe- ico, Brazil); high dependence of political tersburg International Economic Forum, elites on big business for political finance an annual event promoted by Putin, Prok- (Ukraine); or a sharp increase in the auto- horov was entertaining Russia’s elite with crat’s attacks on business elites (Kyrgyz- his traditional dance reception, complete stan, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan). with striptease dancers. His war on the es- Of course, just because the oligarchs tablishment seems to have been forgotten. voice their support for democratization The message emerging from the Trojans’ does not mean that political change fol- utility curves often spells hedonism, not lows. This brings us to the second point. political work. (Like Prokhorov, Lebedev To effect change, the oligarchs need the is known to enjoy the company of intel- people. Mikhail Prokhorov may empathize lectuals, celebrities, and beautiful wom- with Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyun-

146 (2) Spring 2017 109 Why Russia’s dai, who established a new political party propaganda and the financial support of Oligarchs are and ran for president in 1991–1992 in a bid vulnerable population layers at home. In an Unlikely Force for to challenge the ruling Democratic Justice budget terms, this policy paradigm is too Change Party and the incumbent. Chung ran on a expensive amidst economic recession. Yet platform stressing competence and pro- while the oligarchs pick up the bill–in the fessionalism, just like Prokhorov. But he form of new taxes on oil revenue, Western suffered a humiliating defeat, despite the sanctions, and lost trade–citizens at large fact that South Korea’s business elites had applaud Putin. closed ranks behind the need for change. The oligarchs understand Putin’s game. Though fed up with economic incompe- The fugitive oligarch Pugachev cannot tence of the regime, the chaebols–large be alone in thinking that “today, person- family-run business conglomerates–re- al friendship and loyalty don’t mean any- mained alienated from the population at thing. . . . Why does Putin need friends when large. Collective action by the oligarchs is 85 percent of Russians support him?”31 The not enough. billionaire Yurii Koval’chuk, Putin’s friend The importance of popular support who replaced Pugachev in his informal ca- should be self-evident for the renegades and pacity as the president’s personal banker, the Trojans: that is, for all oligarchs who captured the prevalent mood best in his openly advocate liberalization. But if the reaction to Western sanctions: “Put your- Ukrainian experience is any guide–even self in my place. If I start annoying him, for the Russian business elites who care like Kudrin does, telling him what he does more about their material interests than not like, arguing back [perechit’]–how will any political vision–popular support is cru- that end for me? I will reduce my access cial. Quantitative analysis of the Ukrainian to the body, punishing myself even stron- super rich suggests that business wealth is ger than the Europeans did. What for? For more resilient against various shocks (in- whom?”32 cluding authoritarian expropriation) for In Ayn Rand’s libertarian manifesto Atlas oligarchs who pursue “flexible” strategies Shrugged, which has inspired generations aimed at legitimacy (via media and politi- of teenagers worldwide as well as wealthy cal parties) than for oligarchs who rely on entrepreneurs like Yevgenii Chichvarkin, direct power or asset mobility.30 large capitalists pull out of a state-domi- While the gulf has always been enor- nated economy, forcing its collapse, and mous between Russia’s business elites then take over leadership. Although some and the general population, the Kremlin’s of the Russian oligarchs have resorted to economic (since 2009) and foreign (since an exit, it has not been sufficient for the 2011) policies have driven a further wedge Kremlin to change course. Meanwhile, di- between the tiny fraction of Russia’s “one visions among the oligarchs as well as be- percent” and the rest. The Kremlin’s mil- tween the oligarchs and the population itary-economic populism has combined have prevented effective oppositional an aggressive stance abroad with patriotic voice. The Russian Atlas just won’t shrug.

endnotes 1 Daniel Treisman, “Putin’s Silovarchs,” Orbis 51 (1) (2008): 141–153. 2 Natalia Lamberova and Konstantin Sonin, “They are Rich Who Have True Friends: The Value of Political Connections in Russia,” working paper, 2016.

110 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 3 In 2007, a fundamental revision of the law on state corporations granted these conglomerates Stanislav tax preferences, wide-ranging regulatory exemptions, and operational independence from local Markus state bodies. The associated soft-budget constraints and “political capitalists” emerging from such arrangements have been shown to undermine reforms in the post-Soviet context. See Neil A. Abrams and M. Steven Fish, “Policies First, Institutions Second: Lessons from Esto- nia’s Economic Reforms,” Post-Soviet Affairs 31 (6) (2015): 491–513. 4 While politically impotent, the Russian parliament provides deputies with immunity from legal prosecution, which is attractive for some business elites. 5 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). 6 Gulnaz Sharafutdinova and Karen Dawisha, “The Escape from Institution-Building in a Glo- balized World: Lessons from Russia,” Perspectives on Politics (2016). 7 Olga Gulina, “Russia’s Investments in the West,” Intersection, April 27, 2016, http://intersection project.eu/article/economy/russians-investments-west. 8 Konstantin Sonin, “Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003): 715–731. 9 Stanislav Markus, Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 54–64. 10 Irina Reznik, “Ya nikogda ne torgoval Rossiyei,” Vedomosti, May 19, 2010, http://www.vedomosti .ru/newspaper/articles/2010/05/19/biznes-po-urovnyu-razvitiya-operezhaet-pravoohran itelnuyu-i-sudebnuyu-sistemy. 11 For a full analysis of determinants of business aggressiveness in Russia and Ukraine, see Markus, Property, Predation, and Protection, 111–112. 12 Stanislav Markus, “Corporate Governance as Political Insurance: Firm-Level Institutional Creation in Emerging Markets and Beyond,” Socio-Economic Review 6 (1) (2008): 69–98; and Stanislav Markus, “Secure Property as a Bottom-Up Process: Firms, Stakeholders, and Pred- ators in Weak States,” World Politics 64 (2) (2012): 242–277. 13 Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 14 See “Comparing Crony Capitalism Around the World,” The Economist, May 5, 2016, http:// www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/05/daily-chart-2. 15 Daniel Treisman, “Russia’s Billionaires,” American Economic Review 106 (5) (2016). 16 Delphine Nougayrède, “Outsourcing Law in Post-Soviet Russia,” Journal of Eurasian Law 3 (6) (2013). 17 Alana V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press 2013), 38. 18 Stanislav Markus, “Sovereign Commitment and Property Rights: The Case of Ukraine’s Or- ange Revolution,” Studies in Comparative International Development 51 (4) (2016). 19 Interestingly, the association of midsize enterprises, Business Russia (Delovaya Rossiya), has been much more successful in Russia since the financial crisis, as compared with theruie , which unites large capital. Lacking the individual political resources of the oligarchs, mid- size firms felt greater pressure to unite and, through their association, have pushed through amendments to the criminal code aimed at decriminalizing business; the institutionalization of the office of the “federal ombudsman for the protection of business people”; and the im- plementation of regulatory impact assessment; among other charges. See Stanislav Markus, “Capitalists of All Russia, Unite! Business Mobilization Under Debilitated Dirigisme,” Polity 39 (3) (2007): 277–304; and Markus, Property, Predation, and Protection.

146 (2) Spring 2017 111 Why Russia’s 20 Henry Meyer and Irina Reznik, “The Chilly Fallout Between Putin and His Oligarchic Pals,” Oligarchs are Bloomberg, January 22, 2015, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-22/putin an Unlikely -said-to-shrink-inner-circle-as-ukraine-hawks-trump-tycoons. Force for Change 21 Markus, Property, Predation, and Protection, 2. 22 Ibid., 89–97. 23 Some of the oligarchic formations suggested by observers over time include: 1) piterskiye chekisty (fsb associates from St. Petersburg) around Sechin; 2) piterskiye chekisty around Patrushev; 3) piterskiye fiziki (physicists from St. Petersburg); 4) Orthodox chekisty; 5) Voloshin’s group; 6) Medvedev’s group; and 7) Leonid Reiman’s group. 24 “Gunvor: Riddles, Mysteries and Enigmas,” The Economist, May 5, 2012, http://www.economist .com/node/21554185. 25 Mikhail Zygar’, Vsya kremlovskaya rat’ (Moscow: Intellektual’naya Literatura, 2016), 21, 37. 26 Steven L. Myers and Jo Becker, “Even Loyalty No Guarantee Against Putin,” The New York Times, December 26, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/world/even-loyalty-no-guarantee -against-putin.html?_r=0. 27 tass (Russian News Agency) interview with Gennadii Timchenko, Project “Pervye Litsa,” August 4, 2014, http://tass.ru/ekonomika/1357928. 28 Ekho Moskvy interview with Vladimir Ponevezhskii, September 30, 2014, http://echo.msk .ru/programs/razvorot/1409024-echo/. 29 Zygar’, Vsya kremlovskaya rat’. 30 The darker side of the Ukrainian lesson is that adaptability and deniability, which these flex- ible strategies assure, can make the oligarchs immune to democratic pressures. See Stanislav Markus and Volha Charnysh, “The Flexible Few: Oligarchs and Wealth Defense in Develop- ing Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies (forthcoming), http://journals.sagepub.com/ doi/full/10.1177/0010414016688000. 31 Meyer and Reznik, “The Chilly Fallout Between Putin and His Oligarch Pals.” 32 Zygar’, Vsya kremlovskaya rat’, 370.

112 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Images of the Future

George W. Breslauer

Abstract: This concluding essay outlines several alternative futures for Russia in the coming decades, build- ing upon the perspectives and information in the preceding essays in this volume and relating these to my own thinking about the future of Russia. Hence, this essay does not represent a consensus of the issue’s twelve authors, but rather a meld of their thoughts and my own.

After the collapse of Communism and the disso- lution of the Soviet Union, most Western observers were hoping that Russia would eventually evolve into a liberal democracy. Nobody thought it would be either quick or easy, but the fascination of the time was to speculate about the steps that would need to be taken to bring about, first, a “democratic break- through” and, later, “democratic consolidation.” We all thought and wrote a great deal about indicators of, and strategies for, such a transition. We applied those insights or presuppositions to a continuous tracking of changes under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. As the Yeltsin years rolled on, contention intensified over whether the first post-Soviet president of Rus- sia was leading the country through a difficult transi- tion or was regressing toward authoritarianism and poisoning the nascent shoots of liberal democracy. Putin’s actions during the early 2000s were less GEORGE W. BRESLAUER, a Fellow ambiguous and helped to rebuild consensus among of the American Academy since most Western analysts. But this time, the consensus 2014, is Professor of the Graduate was that the Putin regime represented “de-democra- School and Executive Vice Chan- tization,” or authoritarian consolidation. It became cellor and Provost Emeritus at the increasingly difficult to imagine how this might be University of California, Berkeley. reversed. Indeed, in the collection of essays in this He is the author of Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (2002), Soviet Strat- volume, no author predicts a democratic break- egy in the Middle East (1990), and through toward the rule of law, a flowering of civ- Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders il society, or liberal democracy over the next ten to (1982). fifteen years. Transition to liberal democracy is now

© 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00441

142 viewed, at least within the stipulated time or an international security failure, could George W. frame, as somewhat chimerical. Moreover, conceivably lead to the ascendance of a re- Breslauer there is widespread agreement among our gime that is pogromist at home and milita- authors on how to characterize the cur- ristically revanchist abroad. rent regime. Steeped in the comparativ- With liberal democracy and Russite or ist literature on varieties of authoritarian imperialist fundamentalism at the two ex- regimes, they would all define Putin’s re- tremes, a middling alternative to the cur- gime as some adjectival version of authori- rent regime is what Maria Popova calls “au- tarianism, be it “competitive,” “electoral,” thoritarian constitutionalism”: not rule “kleptocratic,” “autocratic,” “patronal,” of law (an attribute of liberal democracy), or “statist.” These adjectives are not mu- but rule by law. This intriguing possibility tually exclusive; indeed, most authors in –to which Popova lends credence but this volume would agree that they all cap- does not assign high probability–might ture some important feature of the system. be driven by the urge on the part of busi- Our authors differ, though not sharply, on ness elites and their political and minis- what it would take to break out of this re- terial patrons to gain stable expectations gime type, but none of them effuses opti- about how they and their property rights mism that such a breakout is likely. will be treated in the political and legal are- So we have gone from guarded optimism nas. Popova calls this authoritarian consti- about liberal-democratic futures to thinly tutionalism because, while it would pro- qualified pessimism about the ability to es- vide stable expectations to business elites, cape a situation that, borrowing from polit- it would retain an authoritarian and ex- ical scientist Richard Rose and colleagues’ clusionary posture vis-à-vis the masses of observation about a different set of issues, the population. Brian Taylor’s evidence of we might refer to as a “low-level equilib- the military and security services only as- rium trap.”1 serting themselves to avoid a breakdown What might be considered possible al- of the state speaks indirectly to this possi- ternatives to this type of regime (see Figure bility, since it leaves room for statist elites 1)? Having eliminated liberal democracy as to renegotiate the terms of intraelite reci- a likelihood, we can look to the other end procity behind the scenes, with confidence of the political spectrum. There we might that the siloviki will prevent a breakdown imagine a “Russite” or imperialist-funda- of the state’s authority vis-à-vis the broad- mentalist reaction: a reversion to some er population. This accords with Stanislav kind of revanchist fascism, which is the Markus’s observation that some business nightmare of moderates and liberals along elites have a material stake in remaining the political spectrum in Russia today, and open to the global capitalist economic or- which now looks like only a possibility, der, which, in my opinion, could become though a decidedly more likely possibility part of such an intraelite pact. Thus, even than a successful transition to liberal de- though Popova emphasizes how difficult it mocracy. None of the essays in this issue as- is to effect a breakthrough even toward rule signs this fascist scenario a high probabili- by law, her essay introduces into our imagi- ty in the next decade or two. But given Rus- nation an intermediate image that contains sia’s travails at home and abroad and the some degree of plausibility. Thinking about escalation of revanchist and Russite-funda- this possibility may be a useful antidote to mentalist political rhetoric in the past five thinking that the only alternatives to Pu- years, it is not difficult to imagine that a po- tinism are a breakthrough far to the right litical-economic breakdown of some sort, or far to the left.

146 (2) Spring 2017 143 Images Figure 1 of the Images of the Future Future

Authoritarian Patronal Russite or Imperialist Liberal Democracy Constitutionalism Authoritarianism Fundamentalism

Rule of Law Rule by Law Expedient Use of Law Legal Nihilism

Patronal Authoritarianism (The Spectrum) Competitive Pyramidal

Statist Economic Modernizers———Nationalist-Statist Consolidators /‹——— D. Medvedev V. Putin V. Putin ———›⁄ (2008–2012) (2000–2008) (2012–2016)

Whether one anticipates systemic al- Chebankova, “a hegemonic discourse of ternatives to Putinism hinges in part on state-centered conservatism.” And as Hale how one understands the regime current- and many of our authors argue, the center ly in place. Most scholars would depict it as of gravity of this networked, patronal re- electoral authoritarianism, led by a strong gime is Vladimir Putin, the patronal net- presidency, in which the formal institutions work he heads, and the extended networks that might check the power of the presiden- that compete for access to resources and in- cy, including presidential elections, have fluence on the president. been neutered and hollowed out, but re- Marlene Laruelle usefully distinguishes main under the control of competing and among state, parastate, and nonstate ac- interlacing patron-client networks that tors, and their respective conceptions of owe their allegiance to entities and indi- Russian nationalism. Many state and para- viduals outside those hollowed-out insti- state actors are networked into this regime, tutions. A major feature of this “patronal” even as they compete among themselves regime, as Henry Hale aptly calls it, is its for resources. And because the ideological ideological signature. It is supported by a signature of the regime is so broad, Putin, broad, centrist coalition that marginalizes as the ultimate arbiter in this political sys- both the radical liberals or democratizers tem, is able to tack back and forth among on the left and the most intolerant national- networks and among points on the broad ist-chauvinists or fascists on the right. Ele- ideological spectrum as circumstances dic- na Chebankova expounds on the breadth of tate. He can make side payments that keep this ideological spectrum, depicting a con- people under the umbrella, even as he cur- dition of “paradigmatic pluralism”: a mul- ries support from the other side. And as titude of paradigms that all stay within the the ultimate arbiter among competing net- parameters that Putin has defined as legit- works, he is able to play them off against imate discourse. The center of gravity of each other. He may not always get his way, this ideational pluralism is, according to but he chooses his battles and has the re-

144 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences sources to define the general course and to ing the Russian economy will require its George W. punish defiance. greater integration into the capitalist in- Breslauer This strategy has clearly manifested it- ternational economic order, which in turn self during the past five years. After taking could be incompatible with a neoisola- back the presidency from Dmitrii Medve- tionist, Russia-first mentality. In princi- dev in 2012, Putin shifted the balance with- ple, one could imagine neoisolationist, na- in this coalition decidedly to the right, en- tionalist-consolidating economic reform- forcing further restrictions on civil soci- ers, though you would have to look hard ety, a more defiant posture abroad, and for them. Thus, the coalition has a built-in increasingly chauvinistic and xenophobic tension, since most economic reformers are doctrinal formulations. This peaked after skittish about the prospect that nationalist the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and the Russian consolidators would constrict both political seizure of Crimea, when Putin explicitly in- and economic freedoms, and would inhib- voked romantic Russian nationalism to jus- it Russia’s integration into the internation- tify his policies in Ukraine. But while he has al economy through confrontational poli- remained defiant of Kiev and the United cies abroad. In turn, many nationalist con- States, he soon backed off from using his solidators are apprehensive that economic most chauvinistic rhetoric and distanced reformers would unleash forces that might himself from spokespersons, emboldened weaken political controls, reduce opportu- by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, who nities for rent-seeking through corruption, urged that he go still further. He had test- and appease adversaries abroad in pursuit ed the edges of this paradigmatic pluralism of economic integration. When Medvedev and decided that it could be destabilizing was president from 2008 to 2012, the rhet- in a multiethnic society to push the center oric he endorsed was more in the direction of gravity too far to the right. Indeed, more of the economic reformers. That rhetoric recently, and in the wake of Western eco- was marginalized after Putin returned to nomic sanctions, Putin has granted great- the presidency. er leeway to talented economic reformers like Aleksei Kudrin to devise plans for mod- What factors might drive change with- ernizing the Russian economy, though it re- in this broad coalition? And what would mains to be seen whether those plans will determine whether the Putin pendulum be granted a fair hearing in the corridors of swings to the moderate left or to the moder- power. In the wake of the arrest of Putin’s ate right? International events and the state economics minister in November 2016, it of the international environment are cer- also remains to be seen whether econom- tainly among those factors. On this score, ic reformers will retain such influence as the contrast between Keith Darden’s essay they currently enjoy. here and Stephen Kotkin’s recent work in Within this broad coalition there is a Foreign Affairs on the same subject is stark.2 spectrum that ranges from internationalist Putin’s post-2012 shift to the right within economic reformers, at one end, to “Russia- this coalition could be viewed as an expres- first” nationalist-statist consolidators, at sion of his preexisting personality and pref- the other. These are not necessarily mu- erences in the face of protests at home. Or tually exclusive viewpoints; they focus on it could be viewed as a reaction to perceived different types of issues and therefore do provocation abroad. If Putin’s revanchist not necessarily compete along the same initiatives are a product of political-cul- dimension. But, in practice, they are in tural predisposition, then a Western strat- tension with each other, since moderniz- egy of containment and deterrence might

146 (2) Spring 2017 145 Images be called for (depending upon one’s values by building “socialist democracy” within of the and aversion to risk). But if it is a reaction the and a peaceful global partner- Future ussr to provocation–which Moscow defines as ship between reformed socialism and cap- nato expansion, U.S. and eu democracy italism. Hence, faced with Reagan’s recal- promotion in the former Soviet Union, and citrant posture, Gorbachev became con- the United States’ self-serving dictation and ciliatory, rather than defiant; faced with redefinition of the norms of international opposition from conservatives and reac- relations–then a Western strategy of reas- tionaries at home, he became still more surance and flexible negotiation might be radical in his domestic political reforms. called for. Putin, by contrast, has built his politi- One could argue that Gorbachev’s re- cal authority by playing to the themes of forms at home and his “new thinking” constructing a strong, centralized, author- abroad validate the containment approach. itarian state and recovering Russia’s for- Ronald Reagan held firm on his policies of mer status as a great power that adversar- deterrence and provocation (the Strategic ies will be forced to respect and deal with Defense Initiative, or “star wars,” among as an equal. He is not steeped in an ideolog- others) and Gorbachev soon decided that ical tradition suggesting that a conciliato- he could not win this game. His “new think- ry posture abroad and a loosening at home ing” about foreign relations broke decisive- might effect a desirable and stable equilib- ly with the Leninist paradigm that had pre- rium, either domestically or internation- viously informed Soviet foreign (and do- ally. He views the United States as a revi- mestic) policy. Why should we not expect sionist superpower that is seeking to trans- the same from Putin or his successor, as form the world order to its advantage and long as the West stands firm against Rus- in its image. He, in turn, calls for spheres sian adventures abroad? of influence based on mutual respect for One could argue against the desirabili- how the other defines its security interests, ty of such a strategy, whatever its theoret- without attempting to transform the oth- ical persuasiveness as a feasible “game” in er’s political order. Thus, a contemporary international relations, by citing the risks variant of “idealist” American Wilsonian and dangers of accidental military clashes thinking confronts a contemporary vari- with Russia resulting from tit-for-tat esca- ant of “realist” Russian balance-of-power lations on several fronts. On this score, the thinking. The historical irony is that, forty- current situation may be more dangerous five years ago, the reverse obtained: Amer- than during the early and mid-1980s. But ican balance-of-power thinking (Nixon putting aside the risks, the differences be- and Kissinger) confronted Soviet think- tween Gorbachev and Putin predict less- ing committed to “making the world safe er success for a Western strategy of con- for anti-imperialism.” tainment today. For one thing, Gorbachev Hence, Putin’s nationalist-statist, spheres- was a democratizer who built his author- of-influence ideology predisposes him to ity by promising to liberalize the politi- believe that reinforcement of controls at cal order at home and reduce internation- home, and defiance of provocation abroad, al tensions abroad. And he was steeped in is the only route through which Russia “will a socialist ideological tradition, recast in be great again.” Such nationalism also pre- his mind by the influence of Eurocommu- disposes him to believe that the Russian nism, that led him to believe–chimerically, people will sooner suffer economic auster- it turned out–that he could engineer a ity than another loss of national pride. And stable equilibrium at home and abroad it has predisposed him, most recently, to de-

146 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences fine the relationship with the West in civi- Missile Crisis.) Beyond the military realm, George W. lizational and confrontational terms, with the international environment puts con- Breslauer the “postmodern” values of the West (gay/ stant, albeit incremental, pressures on Rus- transgender rights, for example) meeting a sian business interests to engage in adjust- hostile reception from both Russian elites ments to global markets. Putin, in his rhet- and the broad population. Hence, a U.S. oric, may be expressing his disillusion with strategy of active containment and Western the United States and the European Union, aversion to a “grand bargain” based on sig- and he has been talking more about integra- nificant Western concessions are less like- tion with the Asia-Pacific region. But inte- ly to induce Putin to become conciliatory gration with Asia-Pacific economies would than was the case with Gorbachev. Rath- still generate international pressures for ra- er, what we have seen thus far is that Putin tionalization and greater transparency of has moved decidedly to the right within the the Russian economy, which economic re- broad coalition in response to his percep- formers within Putin’s coalition would wel- tion of Western provocation. Some of his come. economic-reformist advisers have unsuc- cessfully urged him to reduce internation- Shifting our attention from external to al tensions (such as by not responding to internal factors that might induce shifts of provocations tit-for-tat) as a prerequisite emphasis within Putin’s expansive coali- for Russia’s further integration into, and tion, let us focus on society, civil or not. Sam- benefit from, the international economy. uel Greene’s essay reminds us that, beyond Putin has thus far rejected such advice, in- the educated urban middle class (which voking great-power prerogative and argu- predominated in protests against Putin in ing that the first conciliatory moves must 2011–2012 following rigged parliamentary originate in the West. At the same time, he elections), the Russian people–while con- has given his economic reformists the task servative in orientation, viewing the state as of devising plans for the modernization of “simultaneously dysfunctional and yet le- the Russian economy despite internation- gitimate, unjust and yet worthy”–are not an al tensions. In one respect, though, Putin inert mass. They can be activated by circum- has tried to exercise a moderating influ- stances. What might be the consequences of ence. He appears to remain committed to anomic outbursts (like the “wildcat” labor “internationalism” within Russia, appar- strikes of the late 1980s), shocks to the econ- ently believing that a pogromist posture to- omy (like a budget crisis that compromis- ward ethnic minorities within Russia would es wage payments in state enterprises), sus- prove both destabilizing and unworthy.3 tained austerity that becomes increasingly Of course, Russia is not insulated from difficult to blame on some plot hatched in pressures in the international environ- Washington, a drop in the president’s pop- ment. Putin’s “team” cannot but fear that ularity, or growing popular anger about cor- a military accident could spiral out of con- ruption at local and regional levels? How trol, which could make them receptive to would a Russia beyond Putin respond to ef- Western suggestions of accident-preven- forts by Russia’s regions–especially those tion measures. (Under President Kennedy in the Far East, the Lower Volga region, and and First Secretary Khrushchev, for exam- the North Caucasus–to seize back great- ple, the telephonic “hotline” between the er autonomy from Moscow and/or fur- White House and the Kremlin was one such ther integrate their economies with neigh- measure that gained traction after the mutu- boring countries, regardless of Moscow’s al fright induced by the October 1962 Cuban wishes. Although this issue of Dædalus does

146 (2) Spring 2017 147 Images not explore in-depth the centrifugal poten- dignation”; the words have the same root.) of the tial within Russia’s regions, it seems apt to Russia’s population, even beyond the ur- Future imagine how a messy political succession ban middle class, is quite educated and could intensify such forces. therefore susceptible to indignation about All these kinds of issues and triggers may levels of corruption and inequality that re- not lead to a breakout toward either liber- strict their life chances and insult their in- al democracy or Russite-fundamentalism, telligence and dignity. Is the current level of but they are likely to lead to shifts of em- corruption and inequality in Russia, during phasis within the elite coalition, and grow- a prolonged economic contraction, politi- ing contradictions (and intraelite politi- cally sustainable in a high-income, highly cal struggle) if those shifting emphases educated country? And if so, for how long? prove ineffectual. For example, to buy off This disjuncture between Russia’s high-in- such anger, Putin could dictate that local come status and its deficit of democracy is elections be made more democratic, at- one of the “paradoxes of Putinism” that tempting to deflect anger away from Mos- Timothy Colton highlights in his contri- cow and toward local incumbents. Absent bution to this volume. loosened restrictions on civil liberties, this If the issue of corruption becomes a fo- might not make those elections “free and cal point of political competition, the ini- fair,” but it could make them more com- tiative for response could come from the petitive and less rigged. Or a would-be suc- top as well, not just from disaffected por- cessor could try to push things still further tions of the broader population. Anticor- to the right, as a means of mobilizing sen- ruption campaigns are mechanisms for timent for a “Fortress Russia” mentality. consolidating one’s authority. They were The issue of corruption, both petty and Yurii Andropov’s signature initiative in grand, is also likely to become a matter 1983; they are a key feature of Communist of public contention in a post-Putin suc- Party leader Xi Jinping’s policies in Chi- cession context. In times of economic ex- na today. Whether they would work to the pansion, such as Putin’s first two terms benefit of economic reformers or of na- as president (2000–2008), popular gall tionalist-consolidators might depend on about inequality and corruption could be the motivations of the leader who is pros- muted and offset by a perception of eco- ecuting the effort. As Popova notes, in No- nomic betterment at both the personal vember 2016, Putin’s minister for the econ- and societal levels. Under such circum- omy, Aleksei Ulyukayev, was arrested on stances, individuals can rationalize that corruption charges. it is worth taking advantage of opportu- nities for personal economic betterment There are other circumstances that could and upward social mobility than to dwell induce shifts along the political-ideologi- on, much less protest, the injustices of pet- cal spectrum. Elections, political succes- ty and grand corruption. But in times of sion, and incapacitation of the leader all economic contraction, the so-called inert are moments during which people–both mass can be activated by this issue, in both state actors and nonstate actors–start the regions and the center. Eruptions like thinking about alternatives and perhaps the Arab Spring or the color revolutions begin acting in pursuit of them. They are are often triggered by economic austerity moments for the mobilization of pressure, and a sense of indignation about the exist- both within the political elite and within ing political order. (A demand to be treated the broader society. Of course, shocks like with “dignity” is driven by a sense of “in- domestic terror attacks could, depending

148 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences on their scale, location, and intensity, shift blocked) remains up for grabs in future sce- George W. the political calculus, more likely than not narios. Under Yeltsin, the choice of Putin Breslauer to the right. Or, during a political succes- first as prime minister and then as acting sion, there could be publicized splits with- president was highly personalized: Yeltsin in the elite–ministerial officials, the se- made the choice and his right to do so was curity services, and the military–as com- not challenged. Conceivably, Putin could peting patron-client networks seek to choose his successor in this manner as well, position themselves to protect their privi- though today there are many more en- leges, which are often in conflict with those trenched and competing patron-client net- of other networks. The essays by Henry works that have a lot at stake in that choice. Hale, Stanislav Markus, Fiona Hill, Val- Fiona Hill reports that there are signs that erie Bunce, and Brian Taylor amply sug- Putin’s team is seeking to preempt the pos- gest the possibility, indeed likelihood, of sibility of a messy succession by exploring splits or struggles within the elite at mo- mechanisms that have been employed else- ments of high political uncertainty. And where for containing the intensity and visi- therein lies a connection between elite di- bility of political conflict during succession. vision and popular mobilization, for polit- This could provide incentives for Putin to ical activists are more likely to take risks retire gracefully at some point, and perhaps when they perceive that divisions within allow him to retain his wealth, his privileg- the political elite make change not only de- es, behind-the-scenes power, or–should an sirable, but also feasible. Bunce’s essay lays anticorruption campaign be launched by a out the many ways in which the situation successor–his freedom. in Russia is similar to, as well as different As we ponder the possibilities, we must from, the situation in countries of Eastern bear in mind that the absence of a break- Europe and the former Soviet Union that out to either liberal democracy or revan- experienced color revolutions. On balance, chist fascism does not mean that no sig- Putin appears to have learned from those nificant change has taken place. By this experiences and has, largely through coer- definition, none of our authors expects sys- cion and countermobilization, prevented temic change; even “authoritarian consti- the similarities of circumstance from be- tutionalism” remains within the “author- coming predominant. But in the context itarian” genus. But the essays in this vol- of a “messy” post-Putin succession, his ume do lend credence to the possibility would-be successors may not be as clever of significant change that is not systemic, or potent in anticipating challenges. which could entail significant shifts along The prospect of a messy succession is the spectrum of the currently regnant para- heightened by Putin’s strategy of hollow- digmatic pluralism. There is a human cog- ing out the political and societal institutions nitive tendency to project continuity into that might check his power. This has left the future, which some critics might char- Russia without an institutionalized means acterize as a failure of imagination. But of regulating the succession process, a point whether the projection constitutes conti- that several authors in this issue make, and nuity or not depends on one’s definition of that Fiona Hill emphasizes especially. Presi- significant change. In the present case, the dential elections remain as the prime mech- very breadth of the reigning coalition, and anism for the formal expression of public the possibility of an intraelite bargain such will about who should govern the coun- as authoritarian constitutionalism, mean try. But who gets to compete in the elec- that Russia beyond Putin might be marked tions, and how those people are chosen (or by any number of significant changes.

146 (2) Spring 2017 149 Images Putin has tacked along the political spec- likely in the context of a political succes- of the trum while firmly–some might say brutally sion, and could contribute to the “mess- Future –policing the boundaries of this coalition. iness” and open-endedness of that pro- This has required no small measure of polit- cess. (To the extent that competing pyr- ical skill and instinct on his part. If he seeks amids check each other’s powers during to remain president through 2024, and if the a succession, a stalemate might increase international environment does not freeze the chances of a move toward authoritar- him into a preference for the right of the ian constitutionalism.) The system would spectrum, we may see him tack back to the still constitute patronal authoritarianism, left when and if he decides that modern- but would presumably open up new pos- ization of the manufacturing and service sibilities for shifts along the current politi- sectors of the economy has become an im- cal spectrum. Tacking along that spectrum perative. Such a switch would compete, of may constitute insignificant change in the course, with rent-seekers within the pa- eyes of those who prefer a breakout to the tronal pyramid who would be most atten- far left or far right. But it may constitute sig- tive to protecting their access to opportuni- nificant change in the eyes of those who see ties for self-enrichment. Were the balance a multitude of possibilities within the cur- among competing patron-client networks rent spectrum, some of them normatively to shift, this could result in a shift toward repulsive and some normatively attractive, what Hale calls a “competing-pyramid” depending on the values of the observer– (as opposed to the current “single-pyra- or of the Russian citizens who must live un- mid”) patronal system. This is especially der that regime.

endnotes 1 Richard Rose, Neil Munro, and Stephen White, “How Strong is Vladimir Putin’s Support?” Post-Soviet Affairs 16 (4) (2000): 287–312. 2 Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern,” Foreign Affairs 95 (3) (2016): 2–9. 3 A thought experiment comes to mind. Suppose Yurii Andropov had lived for five to ten more years, instead of dying within sixteen months of his selection as General Secretary of the Com- munist Party. Would Andropov’s initially hard-line reaction to Reagan have been sustained throughout Reagan’s presidency?

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