Emerging Issues in Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: a Case of Arrested Development H
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Santa Clara Journal of International Law Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 8 4-12-2016 Emerging Issues in Compliance With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Case of Arrested Development H. Lowell Brown Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil Recommended Citation H. Lowell Brown, Emerging Issues in Compliance With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Case of Arrested Development, 14 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 203 (2016). Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol14/iss1/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Emerging Issues in Compliance With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Emerging Issues in Compliance With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Case of Arrested Development H. Lowell Brown* * H. Lowell Brown is a member of the bars of the District of Columbia and the States of California and Maine whose practice focuses on white collar criminal defense and corporate compliance. He has written law journal articles on compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, issues in white collar crime, corporate governance and ethics. He is the author of a treatise on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act entitled Bribery in International Commerce (published by Thomson-West), as well as books on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) (published by Thomson-West), money laundering (published by Lexis Nexis), and presidential impeachment (published by Palgrave Macmillan). Mr. Brown is a member of the adjunct faculty of the University of Maine Law School and has testified as an expert in corporate compliance programs. 203 14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (2016) Over the thirty-seven years that have passed since the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act1 (FCPA) was signed into law by President Carter in 1977, relatively few cases have been litigated in the federal courts. Instead, the overwhelming majority of cases have been resolved either through plea agreements; non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements; or through consented-to civil dispositions in which the accused neither admitted nor denied the allegations of wrongdoing made against them. Additionally, the Department of Justice has made its views of the Act known through the opinion procedure releases that have been issued in response to requests from persons subject to the Act regarding whether the Department would take enforcement action under certain specified circumstances.2 As a consequence, the government’s voice has dominated the interpretation of the Act, and individuals and entities together with their counsel have had to look to these sources for guidance. Recently, however, individual defendants have challenged the government’s interpretation of several of the central features of the Act in prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought in the United States Courts by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. These challenges have involved the applicability of the Act’s definition of “foreign official” to employees of commercial enterprises in which a foreign government has an ownership interest, and the requirement of a nexus between a corrupt payment and the obtaining or retaining of business with the foreign government by the payor or a third party. While these challenges have not always been successful, the resulting judicial resolution of these issues has been informative. Additionally, recent enforcement actions brought against public companies by the Securities and Exchange Commission have signaled that the absence of an effective program of compliance with the FCPA may be regarded as a failure to implement an effective system of internal financial controls as required by the Act.3 There may also be an issue whether an executive’s reliance on the corporation’s effective compliance program would evidence a lack of the requisite corrupt intent in the 1. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998). 2. The Act required the Attorney General to establish a procedure “to provide responses to specific inquiries [by affected persons and entities] concerning conformance of their conduct with the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy” regarding the anti-bribery provisions of the Act. Such responses create a rebuttable presumption “that conduct, which is specified in a request . for which the Attorney General has issued an opinion that such conduct is in conformity with the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy, is in compliance with” the anti-bribery provisions of the Act. This presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of evidence that the information submitted was not “accurate and complete,” and that conduct in fact was not within the scope of the conduct specified in the request for opinion. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e)(1)-1(f)(1). The Department of Justice procedures are codified at 28 C.F.R. § 80 (2015). Since 1980, there have been 59 opinion procedure releases. 3. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2012). 204 Emerging Issues in Compliance With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act event an improper payment were to be made by a subordinate.4 Definitive and authoritative resolution of these issues remains to be seen. Background of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act The prohibitions against the bribery of foreign government officials set forth in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act grew out of the revelation of widespread bribery by U.S. companies doing business abroad in the investigation of the 1972 burglary of the Democratic National Committee’s offices in the Watergate office building in Washington, D.C. The Special Watergate Prosecutor’s investigation exposed overseas corrupt payments that had been made in order to procure the sales of goods and services to foreign governments as well as to create off-book funds that were used to make illegal campaign contributions to the Nixon re-election campaign. The Watergate investigation resulted in the criminal prosecution of twenty-two corporations and twenty-one individuals.5 The Watergate Prosecutor’s findings concerning the activities of some of the largest publicly traded companies in the United States led to an inquiry by the Securities and Exchange Commission into “questionable payments” by U.S. public companies. This investigation and the SEC’s “voluntary disclosure program” resulted in enforcement actions against Ashland Oil Company, Boeing Company, Braniff Airways, General Tire and Rubber Company, Northrop Corporation, and United Brands Company, among others, and admissions by more than 400 companies (117 of which were among the Fortune 500 largest companies) of corrupt payments in excess of $300 million.6 Both houses of Congress held extensive hearings concerning overseas payments by U.S. companies that included testimony by senior corporate executives concerning the use of foreign subsidiaries, off-book “slush funds,” and foreign agents to make corrupt payments to foreign government officials.7 As a consequence, 4. This issue was litigated but not resolved in Mark A. Jackson & James J. Ruehlen, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 3564, 2014 WL 3101442 (July 7, 2014), in which the charges against Mr. Jackson were dismissed in exchange for his consent, without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, to the entry of an order enjoining him from violating the accounting provisions of the Act as a controlling person. 5. See Abuses of Corp. Power: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Priorities in Gov’t of the Joint Econ. Comm., 94th Cong. 91 (1976) [hereinafter Abuses of Corp. Power]; H. Lowell Brown, BRIBERY IN INT’L COMMERCE (Thomson-West), Ch. 1. 6. See The Activities of Am. Multinational Corps. Abroad: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l. Relations, 94th Cong. 36 (1975) [hereinafter The Activities of Am. Multinational Corps. Abroad]; Unlawful Corp. Payments Act of 1977: H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 95-640 at 4 (1977) [hereinafter Unlawful Corp. Payments Act of 1977]. 7. See The Activities of Am. Multinational Corps. Abroad, supra note 6; Multinational Corp. and U. S. Foreign Policy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corp. of the Comm. on Foreign 205 14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (2016) Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,8 which was signed into law by President Carter on December 19, 1977.9 Since its original enactment, the FCPA has been amended twice – first in 1988,10 and subsequently in 199811 to implement the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to which the United States was a signatory.12 Overview of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act The FCPA sought to address the problem of foreign bribery by individuals and entities subject to U.S. jurisdiction in two distinct but related ways. First, reflecting the concern of the SEC that the use of shareholder funds to make corrupt payments was being disguised by public companies through false accounting entries and the creation of off-book slush funds, the Act established for the first time federal requirements for corporate governance.13 To that end, the Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,14 and established requirements for accounting and internal financial controls that were applicable to all corporations whose shares were traded on U.S. exchanges and were registered with the SEC in accordance with the 1934 Exchange Act (i.e., corporations that are “issuers”).15 These requirements apply to all issuers regardless of whether the company engages in any overseas business.16 The accounting and controls requirements apply to foreign corporations Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong.