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Appendix 1 State’S Share in Oil Production, 1994–2006 (As % of Total Oil Production)

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Appendix 1 State’S Share in Oil Production, 1994–2006 (As % of Total Oil Production) Appendix 1 State’s Share in Oil Production, 1994–2006 (as % of Total Oil Production) 90 80 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 10 0 1994 1995 19971996 1998 19992000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All state-owned companies Companies owned by federation Companies owned by regional governments Source: Julia Kuzsnir and Heiko Pleines, ‘The Russian Oil Industry between Foreign Investment and Domestic Interests in Russian Analytical Digest, 18 September 2007, p. 14. 131 Appendix 2 Results of Loans-for-Shares Privatization in the Oil Industry Trust auctions, 1995 Collateral auctions, 1996–1997 Stake Min. Name under Loan Organizer sale of oil auction provided Auction for Auction price Auction Price Auction company (%) (US$m) date auction winner (US$m) date paid winner Surgut- 40.12 88.3 Nov 95 ONEKSIM bank Surgutneftegaz 74 Feb 97 78.8 Surgutfondinvest neftegaz pension fund (linked to 132 Surgutneftegaz) LUKoil 5 35.01 Dec 95 Imperial Bank LUKoil Imperial 43 Jun 97 43.6 LUKoil (LUKoil affiliate) Bank Reserve-Invest YUKOS 45 159 Dec 95 Menatep Bank Laguna (Menatep 160 Nov 96 160.1 Monblan (Menatep affiliate) affiliate) SIDANKO 51 130 Dec 95 ONEKSIM bank MFK (part of 129 Jan 97 129.8 Interros Oil ONEKSIM bank) (part of ONEKSIM bank group) Sibneft’ 51 100.1 Dec 95 Menatep Bank NFK, SBS 101 May 97 110 FNK (offshoot (linked to of NFK) Sibneft’) Sources: Valery Kryukov and Arild Moe. The Changing Role of Banks in the Russian Oil Sector. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998; Nat Moser and Peter Oppenheimer. ‘The Oil Industry: Structural Transformation and Corporate Governance’. In Russia’s Post-Communist Economy, eds, Brigitte Granville and Peter Oppenheimer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; and Russian Economic Trends, 1997. Notes 1 Introduction to the Policymaking Process 1. During the last few years of the Soviet Union, kontserny or commercially managed state enterprises were formed, particularly from departments of ministries. 2. The data in this section are from ‘PIW’s Top 50: How the Firms Stack Up’, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 2003 (available at http://www.energyintel.com); OECD Economic Surveys 2004: Russian Federation (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004), pp. 85–86; and Russia Oil & Gas Yearbook 2004: Counting Barrels (Moscow: Renaissance Capital, July 2004), pp. 19, 34 and 81. The remaining volume of oil production and reserves is accounted for by over 100 independent oil producers and joint ventures. 3. See Appendix 1 for the state’s changing share in oil production. 4. See Marshall I. Goldman, The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum: Half-Full or Half- Empty? (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 21. For a brief period, Tsarist Russia even outranked the United States as the world’s largest oil pro- ducer (ibid., Table 2.1, pp. 14–15). For accounts of the development of the Tsarist and Soviet oil industry by senior industry leaders, see Lev Tchurilov, Lifeblood of Empire: A Personal History of the Rise and Fall of the Soviet Oil Industry (New York: PIW Publications, 1996); and Rasul Gouliev, Oil and Politics: New Relationships among the Oil Producing States – Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and the West (New York: Liberty Publishing House, 1997). 5. This was a typical characterization of the Soviet economy, as reflected in works by Goldman, The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum, p. 91; and Margaret Chadwick, Machiko Nissanke and David Long, Soviet Oil Exports: Trade Adjustments, Refining Constraints and Market Behaviour (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 81. 6. Data on oil and gas from Jennifer I. Considine and William A. Kerr, The Russian Oil Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002), Table 5.18, p. 138; and Chadwick, Nissanke and Long, Soviet Oil Exports, Table 5.9, pp. 82–83. It appears that Soviet oil exports to the West were deployed as a trade-balancing mechanism to finance imports of grain and technology from those coun- tries, rather than as a foreign policy tool. See ibid., pp. 67–97; and Thane Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty: The Politics of Soviet Energy under Brezhnev and Gorbachev (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 263–285. 7. Figures cited by Lyuba Pronina, ‘Weapons Sales: The Peace Dividend’s Evil Twin’, St Petersburg Times, 25 September 2001; and Aleksey Nikol’skiy, ‘Ne kazhdyy god SSSR polluchal takie summy v valyute’, Vedomosti, 24 October 2005. 8. Yuriy Shafranik and Valeriy Kryukov, Zapadno-Sibirskiy Fenomen (Moscow: Neftegazovaya vertikal’, 2000), p. 4. Shafranik is a former general manager of 133 134 Notes the Langepas oil production association (1988–1990), governor of Tyumen’ oblast’ (1991–1992) and Minister of Fuel and Energy (1993–1996). For a sim- ilar perspective, see Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia, trans. Antonina W. Bouis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 100–109. 9. Quote by a Soviet official as cited by Alexander Arbatov, Vladimir Feygin and Victor Smirnov, ‘Unrelenting Oil Addiction’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2 (April–June 2005, available at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/printver/914.html). 10. See William Tompson, ‘The Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing? Unravelling the Workings of Russia’s Virtual Economy’, Economy and Society 28, no. 2 (May 1999); Douglas B. Reynolds, ‘Soviet Economic Decline: Did an Oil Crisis Cause the Transition in the Soviet Union?’, The Journal of Energy and Development 24, no. 1 (2000): 65–81; Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Yegor Gaidar, ‘The Collapse of the Soviet Union: Lessons for Contemporary Russia’, Lecture delivered at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC, 13 November 2006. 11. From Goohoon Kwon, ‘Post-crisis Revenue Developments in Russia: From an Oil Perspective’, Public Finance and Management 3, no. 4 (2003), p. 508; Oil Sector Report (Moscow: Troika Dialog Research, May 2001), p. 88; and Russian Federation: Statistical Appendix (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, May 2003), Table 31, p. 37. 12. For an explanation of how the data on oil’s share in Russia’s GDP growth were derived, and why it differs from the 9% cited in official Russian sta- tistics, see Russian Economic Report (Moscow: World Bank Group, Russian Federation Country Office, February 2004). Estimates of the oil price elas- ticity of Russian GDP growth vary widely. The figure cited in the text is used by the World Bank, the basis of which is explained in From Transition to Development: A Country Economic Memorandum for the Russian Federation (Moscow: World Bank Group, Russian Federation Country Office, 2004), pp. 10–11. Russia’s Ministry of Finance calculates that the effect is less than half of the World Bank’s figures, whereas a report by the Bank of Finland claims that it is three times higher. See OECD Economic Surveys 2004: Russian Federation, p. 29; and Jouko Rautava, ‘The Role of Oil Prices and the Real Exchange Rate in Russia’s Economy’, in BOFIT Discussion Papers (Helsinki: Bank of Finland’s Institute for Economies in Transition, 2002), p. 18. 13. Figures on weapons sales are from Konstantin Makienko, ‘Financial Results of Russian Arms Trade with Foreign States in 2004’, Moscow Defence Brief, no. 1 (2005). 14. Lilia Shevtsova, ‘The Limits of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy 15, no. 3 (2004), pp. 71–72. 15. Today, 90% of coal in Russia is produced by privately owned companies, up from 5% in 1993. See Youri Bobylev and Jacek Cukrowski, ‘Russia: Bank Assistance for the Energy Sector’, in World Bank Operations Evaluation Department Working Paper (Washington DC: World Bank, 2002), p. 23; and Igor Artemiev and Michael Haney, ‘The Privatisation of the Russian Coal Industry: Policies and Processes in the Transformation of a Major Industry’, in World Bank Transition Economies Working Paper (April 2002), p. 6. Notes 135 16. In June 2005, the state agreed to increase its shareholding in Gazprom to just over 50% at a cost of US$10 billion. The transaction was carried out in stages and was finally settled in December 2005. 17. See Matthew J. Sagers, ‘The Russian Natural Gas Industry in the Mid-1990s’, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 36, no. 9 (1995), p. 524. 18. See ‘PIW’s Top 50’. 19. A profile of leading oil producing countries is available from the Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.doe.gov). 20. S. P. Peregudov, N. Yu Lapina and I. S. Semenenko, Gruppy interesov i Rossiyskoe gosudarstvo (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1999), p. 100. 21. Quote by Putin as cited in Bulat Stolyarov, ‘Kreml’ khochet zabrat’ nedra’, Vedomosti, 26 July 2002. 22. Philip Hanson and Elizabeth Teague, ‘Big Business and the State in Russia’, Europe–Asia Studies 57, no. 5 (July 2005), p. 662. For a literature survey of the overwhelmingly negative perception of the role of tycoons in Russia’s economic development, see Stephen Fortescue, Russia’s Oil Barons and Metal Magnates: Oligarchs and the State in Transition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 9–18. The term ‘oligarch’ (or rule by a few) is widely used in the popular press to refer to Russia’s richest businessmen. While the term may have been briefly applicable during the mid-1990s, its continued use in scholarly literature is less appropriate. For this reason, ‘tycoons’, ‘mag- nates’ or ‘leading businessmen’ are used instead in this book, except where the term ‘oligarch’ is part of a quotation. 23. A sample of works that focus on the role of big business includes David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2002); Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: The Inside Story of the Second Russian Revolution (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2000); Juliet Johnson, A Fistful of Rubles: The Rise and Fall of the Russian Banking System (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Marshall I.
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