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City Research Online City, University of London Institutional Repository Citation: Karpanos, I. (2017). The political economy of organised crime in Russia: The state, market and criminality in the USSR and Post-Soviet Russia. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City, University of London) This is the accepted version of the paper. This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/19172/ Link to published version: Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to. Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ [email protected] This thesis is dedicated to my beloved parents, Sophia and Genady. For their endless love, support and encouragement THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ORGANISED CRIME IN RUSSIA: THE STATE, MARKET AND CRIMINALITY IN THE USSR AND POST-SOVIET RUSSIA ILONA KARPANOS A dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy City University London Department of International Politics October 2017 2017 Ilona Karpanos All Rights Reserved 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES .................................................... 5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................. 9 ABSTRACT .......................................................................................... 11 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 12 PART 1 APPROACHES TO ORGANISED CRIME CHAPTER 1 ORGANISED CRIME: A COMPLEX PHENOMENON IN CAPITALISM ........................................... 33 The American School ............................................................................................. 33 The European school .............................................................................................. 53 CHAPTER 2 ORGANISED CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY ............................................................................................................. 62 Institutional failures in state-market interaction ................................................ 63 Globalisation and the development of transnational organised crime .............. 78 Structural factors in the political economy of organised crime ......................... 83 2 CHAPTER 3 RUSSIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ORGANISED CRIME ................. 94 Approaches to organised crime in Russia ............................................................ 95 Russian organised crime as the crystallisation of older problems ................... 106 Organised crime in Russia: beyond corruption and the ‘Russian Mafia’ ...... 115 PART 2 CHAPTER 4 NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP): THE GENESIS OF ORGANISED CRIME IN SOVIET RUSSIA .................. 119 War Communism, 1918 – 1921 ........................................................................... 120 New Economic Policies (NEP), 1921-1926 .......................................................... 130 The illegal accumulation of private assets: state officials and entrepreneurs 137 CHAPTER 5 THE SPREAD OF THE NETWORK: ORGANISED CRIME AS AN INSTITUTION OF THE COMMAND ECONOMY, 1935 – 1985 ..................................................................................... 154 Collectivisation and Industrialisation, 1929-1941; 1952 ................................... 155 Stagnation, 1975-1985 .......................................................................................... 169 The Network .......................................................................................................... 179 3 CHAPTER 6 PERESTROIKA AND THE CHANGE OF THE SYSTEM, 1985-1991/2 ..... 185 The structural crisis of the USSR ....................................................................... 186 Gorbachev, reforms and the legalisation of organised crime ........................... 194 Arbitrage and institutional deficits: reforms bring opportunities ................... 207 CHAPTER 7 THE OLIGARCHS, POWER ‘VERTIKAL’, AND VLADIMIR PUTIN (1995-) ................................................................................. 216 The 1990s: from organised crime to oligarchy .................................................. 216 The absorption of organised crime into the state ‘Vertikal’ ............................. 228 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................... 237 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 247 4 LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figure Page number Figure 1.1.1. American disciplinary approaches 51 Figure 3.2.1 Oil and Gas Income and Russia’s Political Regime, 1985 107 Figure 4.1.1 The dynamics of the development of large-scale industry in 126 Russia between 1914-1923 Figure 4.1.2. The progress of state grain procurements by districts of the 129 U.S.S.R. Figure 4.2.1 Executive personnel of the district party committees in 132 provinces Figure 4.2.2 The dynamics of gross output of the main industries 135 between 1917 – 1925/27 Figure 5.2.1. Growth of the legal and illegal income of the population of 176 the USSR between 1955 and 1974 Figure 6.1.1 Share of the production of the main branches of industry in 187 the total volume of industrial products Figure 6.1.2 Price of Saudi Arabia oil 188 Figure 6.1.3 Average export prices 189 Figure. 6.1.4 Population and crime dynamics in the U.S.S.R between 191 1956 – 2001 Figure. 6.1.5 Increase in registered crimes and in numbers of the 192 population Figure. 6.1.6. Number of registered crimes and criminals in Russia 192 between 1985 and 2003 Figure. 6.2.1 Change in criminal activity 198 Figure 6.2.2. The process of legalisation and organisational change of 201 criminal structure as a direct response to government's three stages of legislation of illegal economy under Gorbachev reign, 1985-1989 5 Figure 6.2.3 Inflation 207 Figure 6.3.1. Seizure of legal businesses by criminal gangs through 209 criminal activities Figure 6.3.2 New banks 213 Figure 6.3.3. Outflow of capital from Russia 215 Figure 7.2.1 Vertical control system 233 Figure 7.2.2 Russian GDP and Brent crude oil price 236 Tables Page number Table 1.1.1 A content analysis of dimensions of selected definitions of 46 organized crime Table 1.1. 2 The organized crime continuum model 47 Table 3.2.1 Fossil Fuel Reserves, Production and Consumption in 106 Russia (2001) Table 4.1.1 The decline in the size of sown area and harvests and numbers 122 of livestock Table 4.1.2 The economic collapse 122 Table 4.1.3 The decline in industrial production between 1917 and 1919 123 Table 4.1.4 Changes in crop capacity between 1917 and 1920 124 Table 4.1.5 Production of cast iron, steel, rolling and steel pipes between 125 the years 1913 and 1922 Table 4.1.6 Gross output of the Russian industry in 1913 and 1921 125 (comparison) Table 4.1.7 Net national income of Russia (comparison) 126 6 Table 4.1.8 Key indicators of dynamic the entire industry between 127 1917-1920 Table 4.1.9 Bagging transportation 128 Table 4.2.1 Social Background of State representatives 131 Table 4.2.2 Senior officials of the supreme council of national economy, 132 1918 Table 4.2.3 Appointments of members and member’s candidates into 133 the central election commission of the USSR of the I, II and III convocations Table 4.2.4 Cooperatives in Russia between 1920 and 1926 134 Table 4.3.1 Criminality in the USSR between 1923 and 1924 141 Table 4.3.2 Entrepreneurial debts 151 Table 5.1.1 Decline in livestock and in the grain harvest 155 Table 5.1.2 Constitutional change in social classes in the USSR, 1913- 156 1937 Table 5.1.3. Production assets by types of ownership 157 Table 5.1.4 Gross Industrial Output 1926/27 157 Table 5.1.5 Index of sales volume on the collective farm market 159 Table 5.1.6 Retail turnover including public catering between 1940 and 159 1954 Table 5.1.7 Share of Farm Market in the Sale of Foodstuff 160 Table 5.1.8 Official prices vs market prices 161 Table 5.1.9 State officials and state workers involved in criminal 162 activity Table 5.1.10 Illegal Private Capital accumulated during 1946 - 1947 165 7 Table 5.2.1 Official Convictions and the Soviet Criminal Code, 1995 – 172 1990 (by Republic) Table 5.2.2 Monthly salary vs spending and savings 177 Table 5.2.3 Correlation between crime growth rates and growth of 177 economic indicators in the USSR, 1970s-1980s Table 6.1.4 External debt of the U.S.S.R. between 1975 and 1991 189 Table 6.1.5 Key indicators of economic and social development of the 190 USSR between 1980 – 1985 Table 6.1.6 Free Market Prices of food 190 Table 6.1.7 Savings Bank deposits 191 Table 6.1.8 Crime rates in Russia 193 Table 6.2.1 Recorded speculations 199 Table 6.2.2 The classification of sold state enterprises 204 Table 6.3.1. Bank Ownership (Percent of share capital) in February 1995 214 8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Writing this thesis has been simultaneously the hardest and most rewarding thing I have ever done. It would be dishonest not to acknowledge that
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