Painful Past, Fragile Future the Delicate Balance in the Western Balkans Jergović, Goldsworthy, Vučković, Reka, Sadiku Kolozova, Szczerek and Others

No 2(VII)/2013 Price 19 PLN (w tym 5% VAT) 10 EUR 12 USD 7 GBP ISSN: 2083-7372 quarterly April-June www.neweasterneurope.eu

Painful Past, Fragile Future The delicate balance in the Western Balkans Jergović, Goldsworthy, Vučković, Reka, Sadiku Kolozova, Szczerek and others.

Strange Bedfellows: A Question Ukraine’s oligarchs and the EU of Solidarity Paweï Kowal Zygmunt Bauman

Books & Reviews: Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Mykola Riabchuk, Robert D. Kaplan and Jan Švankmajer

Seversk: A New Direction A Siberian for Transnistria? Oasis Kamil Caïus Marcin Kalita Piotr Oleksy

Azerbaijan ISSN 2083-7372 A Cause to Live For www.neweasterneurope.eu 2(VII)13/ Emin Milli Arzu Geybullayeva Nominated for the 2012 European Press Prize

Dear Reader, In 1995, upon the declaration of the Dayton Peace Accords, which put an end to one of the bloodiest conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the Bosnian War, US President, Bill Clinton, announced that leaders of the region had chosen “to give their children and their grandchildren the chance to lead a normal life”. Today, after nearly 20 years, the wars are over, in most areas peace has set in, and stability has been achieved. And yet, in our interview with Blerim Reka, he echoes Clinton’s words saying: “It is the duty of our generation to tell our grandchildren the successful story of the Balkans, different from the bloody Balkans one which we were told about.” This and many more observations made by the authors of this issue of New Eastern Europe piece together a complex picture of a region marred by a painful past and facing a hopeful, yet fragile future. Bosnian writer, Miljenko Jergović, while analysing Croatia’s entry into the European Union, compares the countries in the region to a bazaar, claiming that his fellow countrymen have “behaved like utter fraudsters in the way they have sold Europe falsely-declared goods”. Polish journalist Ziemowit Szczerek draws attention to the remaining conflict-prone areas and shows that borders still matter – even on a continent that is so proud of having broken them. Skopje-based Artan Sadiku and Katerina Kolozova show their city as divided to the point of being schizophrenic. Other articles in the issue explore the promises and challenges of Serbia’s new government, the slow process of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Yugo-nostalgia, a phenomenon of longing for the old system. In addition, philosopher and sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, asks whether the idea of Solidarity, so important in the 20th century, is relevant today? If not, does this mean that there is a qualitative change in the way we will create foreign policy? This could include, for example, thinking outside the box, as suggested by Polish politician and member of the European Parliament, Paweł Kowal, when he argues that the EU should start working with Ukraine’s oligarchs. It is also a great pleasure for us to announce that in early January our magazine was nominated in the Editing category for the prestigious European Press Prize 2012, with the jury of the award writing that: “New Eastern Europe quarterly is an extremely good and ambitious publication. It combines own reporting and analysis with thoughtfully selected pieces from the media in the region it covers, and outside contributions.” As always, we invite you to join us on our website, Facebook and Twitter and also encourage you to take a look at our new mobile edition for iPads and Androids. The Editors 4

Contents

Opinion and Analysis

7 A Word in Search of Flesh: Solidarity 71 Yugo-nostalgia Zygmunt Bauman Dorota Majkowska-Szajer and Tomasz Szajer The world in which we live in is not particularly hospitable to solidarity. But 79 A Pact with the Oligarchs this does not mean that the spirit of and Paweł Kowal hunger for solidarity will give up. The fate of Ukraine lies in the hands of a group of the richest families, and any sensible policy 16 Balkan Poets towards Ukraine must take this into account. Vesna Goldsworthy 93 The Illusion of Elections 17 The Merchants of Europe Volodymyr Ariev Miljenko Jergović Presidents and prime ministers of Balkan countries have been convincing Europe 98 Expectations and Reality Collide that they represent the only guarantee that in Tiraspol the Balkans won’t descend back into war. Kamil Całus and Piotr Oleksy In January 2013, Yevgeny Shevchuk, the 25 The Yugo Aftershock president of Transnistria, completed his first Ziemowit Szczerek year as head of this unrecognised state. But has the young politician managed to fulfil any of the domestic or international expectations 37 The Struggles of Skopje during his first year in office? Artan Sadiku and Katerina Kolozova 106 Power Politics and Identity 46 Towards a Balkan Benelux in Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations A conversation with Blerim Reka Anar Abdullayev “The countries of the Balkans have no choice apart from the EU. Euro-Atlantic integration is our destiny. Peace in the Interviews Balkans can only be maintained under the security umbrella of NATO, and only under the EU as an institutional export towards 112 Life After Nazarbayev aspiring countries.” A conversation with Dosym Satypajev “Everyone is waiting for Nazarbayev’s decision 57 The Long Road towards Reconciliation on who his successor will be. Nobody would Sevan Pearson dare to question the president’s choice, as long as he is alive. But what happens afterwards is anybody’s guess.” 64 Solving the Unsolvable Zoran Vučković 118 Remembering Sasha A conversation with Marina Litvinenko 5

Reports Books and Reviews

125 An Oasis in the Siberian Desert 158 Lana Ravel – Listening to Bosnia’s Ghosts Marcin Kalita On Selvedin Avdić’s Seven Terrors This is a city where there is hot and cold water in every house all year round; a city 160 Maia Lazar – Complicated Diplomacy where the central heating is turned on in On Branislav Radeljic’s Europe and the flats in September, and not switched off Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State until the end of May. This is a city which Actors and European Diplomacy boasts the biggest monument to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in western Siberia. This city is called Seversk. 162 Zośka Papużanka – Lessons Not Learnt On Joanna Bator’s Ciemno, prawie noc (Dark, Almost Night) 131 The City Built on Gold Gani Nasirov 166 Grzegorz Nurek – Behind Poland’s Success History On Tadeusz Mazowiecki Rok 1989 i lata następne (1989 and the Following Years). 136 History Goes to the Movies Łukasz Wojtusik 169 Maryana Prokop – At the Until recently, Polish cinematography has Crossroads of Democracy been moderately successful at presenting On Mykola Riabchuk’s Від “хаосу” до historical narratives. While large “стабільності”. Хронікаавторитарноїко productions were meant to stir patriotic нсолідації (From “Chaos” to “Stability”. feelings, the more ambitious directors A chronicle of an authoritarian system). stayed away from history. This has recently changed. 171 Ziemowit Szczerek – The Revenge of Kaplan People, Ideas, Inspiration On Robert D. Kaplan’s The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the 144 A Cause to Live For Battle against Fate. A conversation with Emin Milli and Arzu Geybullayeva “In Azerbaijan, we don’t just need good 174 Piotr Oleksy – International politicians to change our society. We (In)significance? need even more good journalists, creative On Moldova: Arena of International writers, courageous businessmen and Influences, eds. M. Kosienkowski responsible citizens.” and W. Schreiber

152 The Hidden Fruit of the Underground 177 Michael Stein – The Last Evgeny Kaprov of the Great Surrealists Jan Švankmajer: Dimensions of Dialogue – Between Film and Fine Art. October 26th 2012 to February 3rd 2013. www.neweasterneurope.eu

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European Solidarity Centre ul. Doki 1 80-958 Gdańsk tel.: +48 58 767 79 71 [email protected] A Word in Search of Flesh: Solidarity

Zygmunt Bauman

The world in which we live in is not particularly hospitable to solidarity. But this does not mean that the spirit of and hunger for solidarity will give up.

To practise solidarity means to base one’s thinking and actions on the principle “one for all and all for one”. Respecting this principle of mutual responsibility (of the group for the individual, and the individual for the group) was labelled as the state of solidarité by the French Encyclopédie in 1765; a name coined from the adjective solidaire – “mutually dependent”, “complete”, “whole”; meaning a quality derived in its turn from the word “solide”: from the features of “solidity”, “completeness”, “massiveness”, and “permanence” it implies. A group with members who display the attributes of solidarity is marked by permanence and resistance to the hardships caused by the widespread human vices of jealousy, mutual distrust, suspicion, conflicts of interests and rivalry. The attitude of solidarity successfully prevents the emergence of opposition between private interests and the common good. It is solidarity which transforms a loose aggregate of individuals into a community; it supplements their physical coexistence with a moral one raising thereby their interdependence to the rank of a community of fate and destiny… At least such were the hopes attached and pursued when solidarity started to be promoted, cultivated and groomed around the middle of the 18th century: in the years which saw the breakdown of the ancien regime; and the start of the era of modern nation-state-building.

Explosion of solidarity

One of the first initiatives of the organisers of “Occupy Wall Street” was to invite Lech Wałęsa, the legendary leader of the Polish Solidarność (Solidarity Movement) 8 Opinion and Analysis Zygmunt Bauman, A Word in Search of Flesh: Solidarity

to Zuccotti Park in Manhattan so that he could, in a manner of speaking, pass on the baton in the “power for the people” relay race. The occupiers of Wall Street saw themselves as brethren of the social movement which labelled itself Solidarność and later became an embodiment of everything that managed to unify the Polish people against the political power violating its rights and ignoring their will. In a similar vein, the Wall Street occupiers intended to transcend class, ethnic, religious, political and ideological discords, dividing Americans and making them prey to egoism, greed, pursuing private interests and The occupation of Wall indifference to the resulting human misery, Street was an example of an with the Wall Street bankers embodying these plagues in their eyes. “explosion of solidarity”. The occupiers regarded themselves as representatives or rather the vanguard of “ninety nine per cent of Americans”. The proponents of the occupation could not have been unaware of the fact that the “occupiers” arrived in Zuccotti Park from quite divergent nooks and crannies of a notoriously feuding and divided society; but they hoped they would be able to suspend the arguments and tone down antagonism for a period necessary to purge the nightmare which haunted all or almost all Americans to an equal extent (just as the dictatorial communist regime haunted the Poles, the tyranny of Mubarak haunted the Egyptians and the terror of Qaddafi haunted the Libyans). They avoided engaging in issues on which they differed at all cost – and they specifically avoided discussions on the shape of America after this richest one per cent of Americans, entrenched in the Wall Street banks, would no longer be allowed to capture 93 per cent of the national wealth. The “occupiers” boasted to journalists crowding in the park that their movement was truly popular, spontaneous and not manipulated by anyone – as proven by the lack of leaders aspiring to hijack them in their actions. And they really had no leader – and they could not. For a leader worthy of this name is by definition someone with a vision and a programme; and if visions and programmes were worked out in Zuccotti Park, issues previously put aside and cautiously passed over in silence, glaring and not easily resolvable conflicts of interests and preferences would instantly come to the surface. Then, the tent city built in the park would become a ghost town in an instant – as it had frequently happened before, for example on Kyiv’s Independence Square or Cairo’s Liberation Square. The several million strong movement, whose aim was to unify the otherwise opposed camps and factions, and all the reasons for a continuation of the temporary alliance, would cease, immediately. Just as other “movements of the indignant”, the occupation of Wall Street was so to speak an “explosions of solidarity”. Explosions, as we know, are sudden and shocking, but also short lasting. And sometimes these movements were (and are) Zygmunt Bauman, A Word in Search of Flesh: Solidarity Opinion and Analysis 9

“carnivals of solidarity”. As Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin taught, carnivals are breaks in the monotony of the mundane, bringing a momentary relief from the all-powerful, overwhelming and revolting day-to-day routine. They suspend, declare the routine null and void albeit for the duration of festivity. Once the energy is spent and the poetic exultation subsides, the revellers return to the prose of quotidianity. Routine needs periodic carnivals as a safety valve – to release the pressure; dangerous emotions need to be from time to time discharged, bad blood drained off, repugnance and aversion to routine unloaded so that its debilitating and disabling might could be restored. In short, the chances of solidarity are defined less by the passions and One cannot speak about hubbub of the “carnival” than by the silence of a solidarity of fate when there the dispassionate routine. Do you want solidarity? If so, face and come to grips with the routine of is no solidarity of actions. the mundane; with its logic or its inanity, with the powers of its demands, commands and prohibitions. And measure your strength against the patterns of daily pursuits of those people who shaped history while being shaped by it.

Devaluation

To put it mildly, at least in our part of the world, the day-to-day drudgery is inhospitable to solidarity. It is this way now, but has not always been like that. For within the society of builders, which formed on the eve of the modern era, there was a veritable factory of solidarity. It was built by the vigour and density of human bonds and the obviousness of human interdependencies. Many aspects of contemporary existence taught us a lesson about the solidarity of human fate and encouraged us to close ranks and march arm in arm: the teeming platoons of workers within factory walls, uniformity of the working routine regulated by the clock and imposed by the production line, omnipresence of intrusive supervision and standardisation of disciplinary demands – but also the conviction of both sides of the class divide, that is the managers and the managed, that their mutual dependence was inevitable and didn’t leave any room for evolution, so it was sensible to work out a permanent modus covivendi and self-imposed restraint which this compromise inescapably demanded. The benefits of solidarity were also highlighted by the practice of the trade unions, collective bargaining and negotiations, collective work contracts, cooperatives of producers, consumers or lodgers, various kinds of fraternities and mutual aid societies. Conducive to solidarity was the logic of state-building within the territorially defined sovereignty of national authorities. And finally the slow but 10 Opinion and Analysis Zygmunt Bauman, A Word in Search of Flesh: Solidarity

sure expansion of the institutions of the welfare state (Sozialstaat, état providence) demonstrated the communal nature of human coexistence, based on the ideal and experience of solidarity. Our profoundly individualised (“late modern”, as it is now often but baselessly called1) society of consumers is the very opposite of a factory of solidarity, namely it produces mutual suspicion and competition. A Time after time, very common side-effect of the workings of this stealthily but stubbornly, factory is the devaluation of human solidarity: a the spirit of solidarity refusal or even denial of its utility in the pursuance of personal desires and achieving personal goals. returns from exile. The devaluation of solidarity has its roots in the withering of care for the common good and quality of the society in which the life of the individual takes place. As Ulrich Beck, one of the most perceptive researchers of contemporary cultural transformations, puts it, it is the separate human individual, in his or her distinct nature and lonely struggle for self-determination, rather than a consensual community at any level, that is today burdened with searching for and finding, in an individual way and within the limits defined by the size of its individual resources, “individual” solutions for “socially produced” problems (in its efficiency and absurdity this task is akin to the building of a family bomb-shelter in order to avoid the consequences of nuclear war). In contrast to societies where the dominant attitude was that of a “gamekeeper” (protection of the common heritage of divine creation entrusted to human care) or a “gardener” (assuming responsibility for the shape of social order and its preservation), the attitude of a “hunter” is today relentlessly and insistently recommended; this attitude is mainly or perhaps even exclusively about the number and size of hunting trophies and the capacity of the hunting bag. Caring for the abundance of animals in the hunting area, that is the success of future hunts, remains outside the remit of the huntsman. In a society of consumers treating the world as a repository of potential objects of consumption, the recommended life strategy is to carve out a relatively comfortable and safe niche for exclusively private use within the public space, which is hopelessly, for incurably, inhospitable to people, indifferent to human troubles and misery, riddled with ambushes and booby-traps. In this world, solidarity is of little use.

1 It is baselessly called this because “lateness” is an attribute we can ascribe to a period only when looking back, after an era of which there were stages and has ended. And the end of the modern era does not seem to be in the cards. Zygmunt Bauman, A Word in Search of Flesh: Solidarity Opinion and Analysis 11

New truths It is difficult to ascertain what the cause is and what the result is here – but going on in parallel to the withering of the interest in the quality of the common good (society itself being the most important among them) and the tendency to exhibit solidarity with the problems and strivings of one’s neighbours, is the demise and dismantling of traditional “factories of solidarity”: institutions encouraging attitudes of solidarity. The “deregulation of the labour market” and the resultant fluidity of workplace communities characterised by a decreasing – less and less protected by law – stability strongly disfavours forming tighter bonds with “colleagues from work”. The philosophy of management in its current form transfers the responsibility for financial results of a given company from the superiors to the subordinates, thus putting every employee in a situation of competing with everyone else. This philosophy imposes measuring the utility of every employee by his or her personal contribution to Every stranger in today’s the profitability of the company and forcing him or world is suspected her to compete with the rest of the working team. In essence, forcing the workers to fight for their chance of evil intentions. to survive another round of dismissals, a move often disguised by such “politically correct” cryptonyms as “contracting out” or “outsourcing”. In a clearly zero-sum game, joining and closing ranks will be of little use and will not help much in surviving – on the contrary, it is becoming dangerously close to a suicidal urge. And even more ominously, the formerly mutual dependence of the management and the workforce, with the resultant mutuality of duties and responsibilities, has been unilaterally revoked. If the potential employees find it difficult to move on, their potential employers may transfer themselves (or their capital) from place to place without much trouble; so in the marriage of the bosses with their subordinates, a divorce initiated by the former and dictated by their interests is possible at every turn. We can hardly speak here about a solidarity of fate while a solidarity of actions cannot be expected; the bonds are too loose for that, the responsibilities too fragile and too easy to revoke. Jobs may disappear, alongside with their bosses and owners, at any moment, leaving even the most loyal, useful and merited employees without work and means. Efforts at inventing a mutually attractive and long-term modus covivendi do not make much sense in these conditions; and mutual solidarity does not stand much chance. These new truths are vividly demonstrated and inculcated by the popular reality television shows. And these truths promoted by the media announce that participants in these shows are enemies; that making good and surviving the battle must be at the cost of your neighbour. Everyone’s primary goal is to survive and get the others kicked out first; and so this should be your aim too. Coalitions 12 Opinion and Analysis Zygmunt Bauman, A Word in Search of Flesh: Solidarity

(if built at all) are ad hoc and temporary, they do not outlast their usefulness in promoting one’s own interest and undermining the interest of others; nobody vows fidelity here and nobody takes up the burden of long-term (let alone eternal) responsibilities. Banishment, pronounced every week in the case of most of these shows, is an absolute law. The only unknown being who will outsmart who and designate him or her for expulsion. There is no room here for a “common cause” or the responsibility for others – it is everyone for themselves. As if the authors and producers of reality TV conspired to provide additional arguments for the sad conclusion of Sigmund Freud that the injunction to “love your neighbour as yourself” is the most difficult to fulfil and the most risky in its consequences among God’s commandments contained.

Evil intentions

The threat haunting contemporary urban life and the tendency of spatial separation and isolation is also not conducive to solidarity. Armed bodyguards watch entrances to offices and “gated communities”, where those who can afford it – among them people setting the tone of urban life – look for (hugely expensive) shelter from the dangers supposedly swarming the city streets. In the cities we see more and more architectural solutions which hamper access or passage instead of facilitating it. Closed circuit television cameras stare at us with glassy eyes from behind every corner and from every entrance. In similar vein to the overseers once sitting in the watchtowers of Panopticon (invented by Jeremy Bentham and considered by Michel Foucault as the archetype of modern technology of power, an architectural solution to the problem of controlling the subordinates by the superiors), they spy on us in order to stop us from “entering” rather than “escaping”. They are instruments not so much of Panopticon but of Banopticon – keeping undesirable people at a (theoretically) safe distance from your own backyard and from mischief which is (by definition) expected of them. Every stranger (and in a city, especially a big one, we are strangers to each other with very few exceptions) is suspected of evil intentions. And all the above-named ways of preventing real or illusionary threats to the body and possessions do not assuage the sense of danger and do not suppress the fear of strangers; on the contrary, they are the most visible proof of the reality of the threat and the justified nature of the fear generated by the view of the “stranger”. The more elaborate the locks, padlocks and chains we install by day, the more terrifying are the nightmares with break-ins and lootings haunting us by night. It becomes even more difficult for us to communicate with those behind the door and to open this door. The deepening of our mutual physical and mental isolation, the loss of common language and Zygmunt Bauman, A Word in Search of Flesh: Solidarity Opinion and Analysis 13 the ability to communicate with and understand each other – these processes no longer need to receive external stimuli; as if they were guided by the “do it yourself principle” in an exemplary, model way, they feed on themselves, spur themselves on and have their own momentum. It is tempting to see in them the first perpetuum mobile that humankind ever succeeded in constructing. So yes, it is true that quite a lot of evidence (much more than I managed to list here) has accumulated, illustrating to us that the world in which we happen to live in and which we recreate daily – wittingly or not – through our actions is not particularly impressive as far as hospitality to solidarity is concerned. But there is also no lack of evidence showing us that the spirit of and hunger for solidarity in the world frustrated with this inhospitality will not give up. Time after time, stealthily but stubbornly, this spirit may return from exile. Successive episodes of “explosive solidarity” and ever more frequent “carnivals of solidarity” (for carnivals celebrate what we most glaringly and painfully miss in our daily drudgery) testify to that. Local initiatives such as ad hoc cooperative undertakings are mushrooming – even if they are usually modest and often ephemeral. In multiple ways the word “solidarity” is patiently looking for flesh which it could become. And it won’t stop seeking eagerly and passionately until it succeeds. In this search of flesh by a word we, the inhabitants of the 21st century, are both agents and objects of the quest. We are the point of departure and the final destination, but also wanderers following this route and tracing it with our footsteps. With our footsteps, this route will ultimately emerge – but it is difficult to draw its exact course on the map before it happens. Despite this difficulty it is impossible to resist the temptation of designing such a map. Designs of such maps are countless. But out of those I am familiar with, one design seemed to be sketched with an incomparably greater responsibility for the word solidarity, because its understanding of the limitations in predicting the course of history by humans is much better than in the case of most “road maps”. This design, a work of one of the most powerful minds of our times, sociologist Richard Sennett, is not a map of a yet untraveled route but a collection of positioning instructions regarding the technique of planning the route when it is travelled in the future. Sennett’s heuristic formula (defined by him as a “contemporary form of humanism”, but outlined with a journey towards a humanity guided by solidarity in mind) is three-fold: “informal, open-ended, cooperation”. Each of the three parts of this formula is equally important. “Informality” warns us that we should join the common action without any predetermined agenda and code of conduct – allowing both to emerge gradually and crystallise in the course of cooperation. “Open-endedness” recommends that we should not assume that our own view of things is correct but we should accept the possibility of discovering its wrongness; 14 Opinion and Analysis Zygmunt Bauman, A Word in Search of Flesh: Solidarity

we should not burden the future interaction with the aim of imposing our opinion on other participants or persuading them that our view is right and their view is wrong; we should aim at both teaching and learning – combine the role of a teacher with that of a student. And to define the nature of the interaction Sennett chooses the concept of “cooperation” rather than “dialogue” or “negotiation”, for it is not about establishing whose arguments win and whose arguments lose. In the “informal open-ended cooperation”, just as in humanity based on solidarity, there are no winners or losers: from the “informal, open-ended cooperation together”, just as from the effort of building the ties of solidarity, every participant comes out wiser, richer and more resourceful than they were before. They know more, they are capable of more – and so they want to and can undertake more ambitious and important tasks. Whatever you could say about the “informal open-ended cooperation”, it definitely is not a zero-sum game.

Translated by Tomasz Bieroń

Zygmunt Bauman is a sociologist and philosopher, Emeritus Professor at the University of Leeds and the author of many books on contemporary society, including Liquid Modernity (2000).

This text was originally published in the Polish Weekly Tygodnik Powsczechny Nr 37 (3296) Sept. 9th 2012. It is translated and republished here with the kind permission of Tygodnik Powszechny and the European Solidarity Centre. PAINFUL PAST, FRAGILE FUTURE

The Merchants of Europe Miljenko Jergović The Yugo Aftershock Ziemowit Szczerek The Struggles of Skopje Artan Sadiku, Katerina Kolozova Towards a Balkan Benelux A conversation with Blerim Reka The Long Road towards Reconciliation Sevan Pearson Solving the Unsolvable Zoran Vučković Yugo-nostalgia Dorota Majkowska-Szajer and Tomasz Szajer Balkan Poets For otto and alexandra

In exile, we sleep side by side Which stole the shape of our lives, With half-packed suitcases by the door: We dream of suburban streets A comb; a toothbrush; a change In London, Erlangen, or Florence, Of clothing; a handful No matter. Somewhere Of photographs; the knowledge Where the lime trees will ooze That staying at home carried the greater Their honeyed lymphatic fluid -- Risk. A memory of mother’s voice remains Not shrapnel but summer Locked in the double helix of vowels Stirring in the bark. Somewhere In our names. The echo Where you can whistle and walk Lingers in abandoned rooms To the same desk in the same In the southern Habsburg provinces Untorched library, every morning, Like the smell of coal and cinnamon. Forget that in your native language Death consists of consonants alone, Before the dawn light greets Watch the clouds sailing, think Calcifications of shell and bone, How wonderful a life just The tidal marks of imperial retreats Like that.

Vesna Goldsworthy 7 January 2013.

Vesna Goldsworthy is a Serbian writer and poet who lives in the United Kingdom. Her most recent work, The Angel of Salonika (2011), is a collection of poems which won the Crashaw Prize for a debut of poetry in English. The Merchants of Europe Miljenko jergović

Presidents and prime ministers of Balkan countries have been convincing Europe that they represent the only guarantee that the Balkans won’t descend back into war. It is through this kind of counterfeit politics that Croatia has arrived at the threshold of the European Union.

Last autumn I was at a flea market somewhere in the suburbs of the Polish city of Wrocław. The day before I was due to return to Croatia and the Balkans, I unexpectedly found myself in need of an extra travel bag. I didn’t want to pay much for it; I have enough bags and suitcases in Zagreb as it is. I only needed it for the trip home, and would probably throw it away once I got there. The best way to find a bag like this is to head to a flea market; some squalid place piled high with cheap clothes and smuggled accessories. It is at open-air markets like these that the The Balkans can be compared marginalised transitional citizenry of Eastern to a worthless pile of cheap Europe comes together every weekend. clothes, without history, In Western Europe, it is the migrant Balkan and Eastern-European population that gathers memory or true identity. in such places, eager to feel at home amongst their own, or to satisfy their own consumer needs without too much financial outlay. While much of European life revolves around department stores and shopping centres, the European poor, the marginalised and the immigrants, remain dependant on these suburban markets. It rarely enters your head to visit these places when you first arrive in a major city like Milan, Frankfurt, Berlin, Vienna or Prague. But if you find yourself at one of them by chance, the things you see there will probably prove more interesting and more instructive than any number of cultural and historical sights recommended by the guidebooks. These flea markets might not provide you with a true and accurate picture of today’s Europe – you’d have to be a left-wing romantic or a writer to believe they did. But it is at these internal boundaries of Europe, on the peripheries of the continent’s great cities, that you will get some idea of what the geographical margins of Europe – whether in Moldova, Romania or the Balkans – 18 Opinion and Analysis Miljenko Jergović, The Merchants of Europe

actually look like. And you may well recognise some of the sicknesses from which contemporary Europe suffers. You might even identify the starting point of a new plague which, although different from its medieval predecessors, will go on to ravage the continent. Memory for sale

I didn’t have such great ambitions in Wrocław, however: I just wanted to find a cheap bag. With my homeward journey approaching, I had amassed too many things for my red Samsonite suitcase to cope with. Even so, as I drove towards the outskirts – a journey which took a long time, and which made Wrocław appear larger, more spread out than it really was – all Croatian leaders have behaved like kinds of other things passed through my utter fraudsters, selling falsely- mind. I thought about how flea markets weren’t just places where cheap clothes, declared goods to Europe. smuggled goods, Far Eastern electronics and broken radios were sold. They were also places where the memory of the city was on sale, whether in the form of worthless bric-a-brac, kitschy memorabilia, family photographs, stamp albums or old magazines. It is from these things that a conscientious and patient observer might uncover the memory of a particular place. For many years, at least until I had become sick to death of the Croats and their literature, I had been a participant in Frankfurt’s autumn book fair, and each time I was there I made a compulsory visit to the opposite bank of the river Main. Here, spread across a broad meadow beside the river, Frankfurt’s flea market offered a kaleidoscopic picture of the city. Despite the fact that Frankfurt had been levelled by Allied bombing in 1945, you could still find surviving examples of Belle-Époque china, and soup bowls bearing an ominous black swastika on the reverse side (where nowadays, as a rule, it says “Made in China”). The market also offered up a surprisingly thorough documentary account of the events of 1968, with periodicals, magazines, newspaper cuttings, even the police’s photo albums of student demonstrators, together with all manner of other rubbish that told you a great deal more about Frankfurt’s past than any guidebook ever could. I discovered a lot more about the city at the flea market than in the endless, neon-lit exhibition halls that hosted assemblies of the Gutenberg Galaxy every October. I would frequently be seized by depression at the book fair, aware of the unimportance of my language and the inferiority of my culture, and the severely limited possibility of me learning anything new there. At Frankfurt’s flea market, however, I felt perfectly at home. All this passed through my mind during the drive towards Wrocław’s suburbs. I had known in advance that Wrocław would actually be much more interesting, and much closer to me, than Frankfurt. Not only because this was Eastern Europe – and Miljenko Jergović, The Merchants of Europe Opinion and Analysis 19

I am an Eastern European myself – but also because Wrocław was a border city, a city on the margins. Things had happened here that the rest of Europe wanted to forget, or at least pretend it hadn’t seen. For a start, it was here that ethnic cleansing took place in the immediate aftermath of 1945, regardless of the fact that the victory of the anti-fascist coalition was supposed to bring such things to an end. I fully expected to find evidence of German Breslau at the flea market, not to mention fragments of Polish communist history, as well as all kinds of other things. Spread out for over a kilometre on both sides of an uprooted former railway line was an endless row of market stalls selling cheap clothes and consumer goods, mostly of unknown provenance. On Saturdays and Sundays you can buy almost anything you want here. Not only can you kit yourself out with a whole new wardrobe at very little cost, you can also find winter sports gear, buy a swimming costume together with diving goggles, or acquire an entire set of domestic appliances from a washing machine to a television (the latter boasting a screen of frighteningly large and thin proportions). You can also buy fresh bread, and cheese made in the Polish mountains – or perhaps made in Holland and given a Polish-mountain make-over. It is hard to think of anything that you couldn’t buy there; except for memory. The one thing you can’t find at the Wrocław flea market is memory.

Rubbish and not much else It took me about 100 metres of walking and ten minutes of looking around to find the bag I needed, a bag that will probably serve me well for years to come. Although very cheap, it is sufficiently sturdy to allow any number of hard-hearted airport workers to throw it around the cargo hold, jump up and down on it, or crush it beneath the coffins in which Eastern European migrants are journeying homeward. Having solved the problem of the bag, I set about searching for objects from the past, objects which might tell me something about the city and the country. I suspected that I would have to force my way to the outer reaches of the flea market in order find the things I was looking for. Just as flea markets themselves tend to be on the peripheries of large cities, so memorabilia and antiques are always found on the periphery of the flea market. However, as I made my way through the endless crowds and neared the end of Wrocław’s enormous, bazaar-like market, I realised that instead of getting more interesting, more select, more redolent of the past, the goods simply became cheaper and tattier, until finally they just turned into rubbish. In among this rubbish were a few items from the socialist period: the odd Soviet badge bearing the profile of Lenin, a broken Romanian water heater, and piles of vinyl records featuring the kind of second-rate Western pop that had probably meant something to someone in the Poland of the 1970s and 1980s. But there was nothing of local provenance, 20 Opinion and Analysis Miljenko Jergović, The Merchants of Europe

nothing original, nothing that bore the stamp of the city or its collective memory. It was as if Frankfurt had preserved more of itself in the wake of the air-raids of 1945 than Wrocław could muster for the entire period prior to 1990. I was disappointed, but not exactly surprised. I felt as if I was at home in the Balkans. Our own open-air markets frequently look pretty similar: a mountain of cheap clothes, but very little in the way of history or memory. In essence, that is what the Balkans are today: a worthless pile of cheap clothes, without history, memory or true identity. It is from this basic pattern that all of today’s Balkan nationalisms have been cut. And it is only by means of these bloodthirsty and mindless nationalisms that politics and culture in the Balkans can be recognised. Although they can only be recognised if you peer a little more closely and listen a little more carefully to those smoothly-ironed people in Hugo Boss suits, those presidents and prime ministers of Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Kosovo. These people have a tendency to talk total nonsense in (frequently very good) English about the thousand-year history of their small nation, during which, of course, they were mistreated by their immediate neighbours; neighbours from whom they might differ only in terms of religious faith, or in the minor nuances of verb declensions in an otherwise common language. Presidents and prime ministers of these Balkan countries, who are as a rule nationalistic scoundrels and good-for-nothings, can frequently be seen jetting off in recently purchased government aeroplanes to sell their policies to Europe. And they always do it in the same way, regardless of whether we’re talking about the new prime minister of Serbia, or the old president of Croatia. As soon as they arrive in Europe, they set about convincing their hosts that they represent the only guarantee that the Balkans won’t descend again into war and massacre. But if Brussels doesn’t give them its support, or if European banks don’t provide them with sufficient credit, then their political opponents will come to power instead. And when this happens, Europe will see what trouble and strife really looks like.

Political smugglers

It is through this kind of politics, and this alone, that Croatia has arrived at the threshold of the European Union. Croatian presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers and cabinet members have achieved this historic success through the same mixture of fraud and deceit that is also used by their colleagues from Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. In place of the serious diplomacy that our TV screens seem to tell us is the European norm, the Croats have achieved their transition from communism to democracy, from the Balkans to the European Union, by employing the strategies of the worst flea-market traders: the traders who come only once and Miljenko Jergović, The Merchants of Europe Opinion and Analysis 21 never again, because they sell the kind of goods that look like the genuine article but subsequently turn out to be rubbish. Luckily for me, I didn’t come across traders like that in Wrocław. The bag I bought there is of very good quality indeed, and not only survived the trip to Zagreb but will probably survive all my future travels around Europe as well. The person who sold me the bag is a In the Balkans, nationalism is based far more serious trader than Croatian on fictional history, in which the president Ivo Josipović or Croatian foreign minister Vesna Pusić. Or perhaps he whole of society has to believe. differs from them in the substance of his work. That is to say, traders at the flea market and smugglers of goods from the East will probably be back again the following week, so if they do sell you a load of rubbish then at least you can come back and seek them out. Mr Josipović and Mrs Pusić, on the other hand, will be able to breathe easy once they sell their fake policies to Brussels, as there will be no future opportunity for the disappointed customer to get their money back. Croatian leaders have behaved like utter fraudsters in the way they have sold Europe falsely-declared goods. To take one example: in order to begin EU accession negotiations, Croatia was obliged as early as 1997 to enact a constitutional law guaranteeing the rights of national minorities. One provision of the new law was that the Serbian national minority – a minority that was three times smaller than it had been during the pre-war years, as most of them had fled to Serbia either under pressure from the Croatian government or because of some other reason – should have the right use Cyrillic. Even though Croats and Serbs both use the Latin script on the whole, the Cyrillic remains part of the Serbian cultural tradition. Serbs, especially those who live outside Serbia, see the Cyrillic script as a confirmation of their identity. A little complicated, and also a little odd, perhaps, but a reasonably typical example of nationality issues in the Balkans. Anyway, the important thing is that Croatia adopted a law guaranteeing its Serbs the right to use Cyrillic, and this happened as early as 1997. When this right finally came into effect a few months prior to the country’s entry into the European Union in 2013, however, the law was opposed by Croatian war veterans. Their protest was supported by state television and by the overwhelming majority of the media, by all strands of the parliamentary opposition, as well as by some members of the government. Croatian president, Ivo Josipović, told the protesters that if they wanted to change the law then they should launch an initiative to campaign for it, as if the re-banning of Cyrillic was okay if it was done via constitutional means. He said it in all seriousness, but calculated that outside Croatia his voice wouldn’t be heard. When news arrived from Brussels the next day that some lowly official had warned the Croatian government that the law on national minorities had to be 22 Opinion and Analysis Miljenko Jergović, The Merchants of Europe

respected, Josipović suddenly changed his tone. He claimed that his comments of the previous day had been uttered in jest, and that he had been poking fun at those campaigning against the law. The truth, however, is that he behaved like a fraudster at the bazaar, or like a smuggled-goods trader at the flea market, who has been collared by a dissatisfied customer after passing off fake goods. And of course he is ready to return the customer’s money; after all, it was only a joke.

Destroying the memory In the Balkans, myths and legends serve those ends which are elsewhere served by history, whether we are talking about the official history taught in schools, or the unofficial history of everyday life. Which is why the destruction of every kind of individual and collective memory is so important in the Balkans of today. Important, that is, to the rulers, nationalist fraudsters that they are, and their cultural elites. Memory contains the roots of subversion and the potential to overturn the ruling order, which is why memory has to be forbidden. Elsewhere in Europe, nationalism is oriented towards the past, and is put to use by political conservatives who are eager to hold up change and reform. In the Balkans, and especially in Croatia and Serbia, nationalism is based on falsified, counterfeited, fictional history, on things which never even happened, but in which the whole of society has to believe. The non-believer has to be excluded, driven out and eliminated. The non-believer is more dangerous than any enemy. Elimination of the non- believer is not, however, carried out by the police or the courts. People are not sent to concentration camps – that is another piece of the Croatian past which people are not supposed to remember. Instead of state repression, those excommunicated from the collective fiction are subjected to a collective, social repression. Those who don’t believe that Croats are better than other nations, that they have been innocent victims throughout their history, and that a Croat can’t be a war criminal even if he kills a hundred Serbs, those who don’t believe in the falsification of memory, will be persecuted by their own neighbours and friends, by the whole social community, in full view of a peaceful and tame Europe, while President Josipović and Foreign Minister Pusić sell Europe a false picture of Croatia. So there you are. That is why, when visiting a Wrocław flea market last autumn, I briefly felt as if I was back in the Balkans. But as soon as I set off towards the city centre, I felt a very long way away from the Balkans indeed.

Translated by Jonathan Bousfield

Miljenko Jergović is an award winning Croatian writer whose books have been translated into many languages including English, French, Italian, Polish and German. Jergović currently lives and works in Zagreb, Croatia. ADVERTISEMENT

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www.kliczkow.com.pl The Yugo Aftershock Ziemowit SZcZerek

Almost no country in the post-Yugoslav world is happy with its borders. Only the will of the West keeps the region in shape. But after the earthquake which shook the Balkans in the 1990s, there are still risks of aftershocks.

The Serbian-inhabited area of North Kosovo is a hole in the political map of the Balkans; a no man’s land. Of course, countries that have recognised the independence of Kosovo also recognise its sovereignty over North Kosovo; while for the rest of the world it is still a part of Serbia. Both sides of this debate, however, are quite wrong. North Kosovo is neither a part of Serbia (although it very much would love to be) nor is it part of the Republic of Kosovo. Travellers (lost ones, usually) entering North Kosovo from Central Serbia, feel as if they were entering a world unlike any other. An odd, yet obviously noticeable sign is the fact that most cars here don’t have licence plates on them. In fact, the only vehicles that do, belong to international peacekeeping forces. It is not easy for someone living in North Kosovo to get a Serbian licence plate, while no one wants a plate issued by the Kosovan authorities.

Stagnation

The police of the Republic of Kosovo rarely visit the Serbian-majority region of North Kosovo. And if they do, they often find themselves, at best, in a very uncomfortable position, even if escorted by the European Union (EULEX) forces stationed there. One Kosovo police patrol in the autumn of 2012 was attacked by masked gunmen near Zubin Potok. A policewoman was wounded. In essence, Pristina has no effective power in North Kosovo: the inhabitants vote in Serbian elections, they pay in dinars rather than euros (the official currency in Kosovo), their kids attend Serbian schools, healthcare is Serbian, and they try to live as if 26 Opinion and Analysis Ziemowit Szczerek, The Yugo Aftershock

nothing has happened. Stagnation and improvisation seem to define this area more than anything else. In the sleepy towns of Leposavić and the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica one can witness the deep depression. It is almost as if a time machine has taken you back to the early 1990s. The cities are made up of concrete-grey blocks of flats, shattered sidewalks, miserable looking bars and apathetic people. Apart from the omnipresent grey, the only other colours are white, Pristina has no effective blue and red – the colours of the Serbian flag, which are everywhere. Blue spray paint even adorns the red power in the Serbian and white street signs in the centre, making Serbian district of North Kosovo. symbols out of them. Unemployment among the Serbs in North Kosovo is unbelievably high (77 per cent in 2006). Some people try to run their own illegal businesses. Street vendors trade Chinese clothes and sneakers, while others, with bundles of dinars in their hands, sell gasoline from a petrol pump off the back of a truck. “Beirut,” sighs an older gentleman, sipping beer in the small pub located on the bank of the Ibar, the border river which divides the Serbian and Albanian parts of Mitrovica. He stares numbly at the Albanian side. He looks at the new and vibrantly painted buildings on the other side, at that other world, which used to be a part of his own city not so long ago. “We live in Beirut,” he repeats. “A divided city. I used to watch those poor Lebanese guys on television back in the old times and felt sorry for them. I never thought I’d be the one on the news myself one day.” The city is truly divided; in both linguistic and civilisational terms. One might say it is the real life illustration of Samuel Huntington’s thesis on the clash of civilisations. And yes, the Albanian part of the town actually does resemble Beirut. It is almost hard to believe that only ten years ago it was one city. The Albanian Mitrovicë is Middle Eastern and chaotic-looking. It buzzes with energy and provides a stark contrast to the depression so clearly seen on the Serbian side. A few years ago, after it gained independence in 2008, Kosovo experienced a real estate boom. And just as in London or New York, here too everyone had the same idea: make a killing in real estate. The rush for quick profits was frantic and led people to disregard the architectural beauty of the projects. Many of them were never completed or collapsed before they were even finished. Kosovans say that their economic initiatives flourished after the country gained independence: “Our entrepreneurship just erupted, like removing the cork from a shaken bottle of champagne,” a young Kosovan Albanian told me once. However, I also heard the other side of the story, from a Serb on the other part of town: “Their entrepreneurship erupted mainly in the usual mafia-style of business.” Ziemowit Szczerek, The Yugo Aftershock Opinion and Analysis 27

Russia is too far, Belgrade is too weak The road south from Mitrovica takes us to Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. Pristina gives the impression that it wanted to build itself into a western city as quickly as possible, using the cheapest building materials available. The city also looks as if it lacks any sort of comprehensive urban planning. Just ten kilometres beyond its borders, one is taken back in time again; by about 20 years. Gračanica is the name of a Serbian village, clustered around an old Serbian monastery. Here One may have the impression that too cars have no licence plates and the local Serbs seem to live as if they are on there are two Macedonian capitals: an island in an Albanian sea. The Serbs Slavic Skopje and Albanian Shkup. in Gračanica, just as in North Kosovo, are protected by the soldiers of the international peacekeeping forces. They write “KFOR go home” on the walls, but it is hard to believe that they actually mean it. They know all too well that if KFOR went home, no one would be able to separate them from the Albanians. Russia is too far. Belgrade is too weak. The Serbs in Kosovo don’t want to hear about any kind of subjection to Pristina. In mid-February 2012 they organised a referendum. The question was: “Do you accept the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo?” The answer was “no”, by over 99 per cent. “No” is also the word the West utters in response to any form of separation of North Kosovo from the rest of the country. The European Union and NATO are against any more border changes in the Balkans. However, many agree privately that the simplest way to solve the problem would be to give North Kosovo back to Belgrade. In exchange, the Serbs would recognise Pristina. But the problem is not only limited to North Kosovo. In the Balkans there are many more regions which are still left on the wrong side of a border. The effect of Pandora’s box is plausible and scary. Autonomy is probably the most North Kosovo can have; and also the only thing Belgrade is still fighting for. Ivica Dačić, the prime minister of Serbia, supports the idea of autonomy for the region, resembling the autonomy of Catalonia in Spain, with separate courts and police forces. It seems like a good first step towards full independence from Kosovo, but neither Pristina nor the West would accept this solution.

The Middle East in Eastern Europe

The Preševo Valley sits on the Serbian side of the border with Kosovo and resembles the opposite case from North Kosovo. It is an Albanian inhabited territory within Serbia’s borders. Until the end of the Second World War, it was a part of Kosovo, 28 Opinion and Analysis Ziemowit Szczerek, The Yugo Aftershock

and every time the government in Belgrade raised the issue of North Kosovo, the government in Pristina countered it with the Preševo Valley. Visually, the Preševo Valley resembles Kosovo far more than the rest of Serbia. Local Albanians are linked to their compatriots from Kosovo, just as Serbs living in North Kosovo stay in touch with “mainland” Serbia. Goods produced in Preševo are often ignored on the Serbian market. Young Albanians are afraid to study in Serbian universities so they usually choose The Dayton Agreement may the university in Pristina. Kosovan diplomas, have brought peace to Bosnia however, are not recognised in Serbia (just like any other document issued in Kosovo), and Herzegovina, but the so many graduates can’t come back. ruins and divisions remain. In Macedonia, Albanians also stay away from their Slavic countrymen. One even has the impression that there are two Macedonian capitals: Slavic Skopje and Albanian Shkup. The stone bridge that crosses the Vardar River from the European centre of Skopje immediately leads to another world: an oriental maze of narrow streets lined with minarets, with cafes serving sugary tea and coffee along the way. Young people dress differently on this side of the Vardar. The Slavic Skopjans dress like people from any other European city, while the Albanians dress more like youngsters from the Islamic world – not only Albania, but also Turkey and North Africa. Macedonians complain that the city is becoming more and more divided. Local Albanian political parties, however, demand wider participation in Macedonian politics (there are a number of Albanian ministers in the Macedonian government), as well as in the country’s identity. Some of them have been lobbying for the Albanian eagle to be added to Macedonian flag and coat of arms. They want their elements of identity to be included in the Macedonian national anthem, although most Macedonians believe that this is too much. From one perspective, it is easy to see that the Albanians have established a parallel reality inside Macedonia. Buses from Skopje/Shkup to western Macedonia have their destinations written in two languages and two alphabets. Albanians have their own university, and intellectuals function in a pan-Albanian debate. There are regions in which Macedonian Albanians can live their whole lives without ever having to utter a word in Macedonian. The Slavic Macedonians fear that the Albanians, which already constitute about 25 per cent of society, with their higher birth rate, will become strong enough to split the country in two. What disturbs Macedonians the most is the fact that radical Islamist slogans are sometimes shouted during protests. TheSE Times (a news source for the Balkans) quote security experts who claim that there is an “estimated 5,000 battle-hardened Ziemowit Szczerek, The Yugo Aftershock Opinion and Analysis 29

radical Islamist” fighters who may be willing to internationalise the conflict and force the international community to support them in Macedonia. The tension grows when Kosovo’s gets involved in the Albanian situation in Macedonia. Jakup Krasniqi, the speaker of Kosovos parliament, has reminded other states to “be careful” in their treatment of Albanians because “their position is not what it was in the past”. However, Pristina is also not happy with the hard- line Islamists finding ground in Macedonia. Albanians are rather moderate Muslims: No nationality that exists within unlike Sandžak or some parts of Bosnia, the common state of Bosnia young Kosovo Albanians party in bars serving alcohol like their peers in Western and Herzegovina is content. countries. There is no traditional Muslim anti-Americanism either. In fact it is quite the opposite: Kosovans are grateful to the West for granting them their independence and American flags fly throughout the country; not to mention the only monument to Bill Clinton in the world, which greets visitors entering Pristina. In Montenegro, Albanians live in the south-eastern region of the country named Malesia. Ulcinj, a sea resort town on the border with Albania, is the only city in Montenegro where the number of Albanians exceeds 70 per cent. Unlike other Montenegrin towns, it looks Middle Eastern with its buzzing streets, urban chaos and tangles of wires between its houses.

Photo: US Government Archive (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

The Signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 brought peace but also stagnation to most of the conflict zone. 30 Opinion and Analysis Ziemowit Szczerek, The Yugo Aftershock

The radicalism of Albanians in Montenegro is rarely mentioned in the media. Even Albanian and Kosovan politicians admit that Albanians in Montenegro are in a relatively good position. In 2006, Montenegrin Albanians even voted in a national referendum for the independence of Montenegro.

A mini-Yugoslavia

Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country often called a “mini-Yugoslavia”, consists of two federal republics, the Bosnian-Croat, but Muslim-dominated, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serbian Republika Srpska. Here, the situation is different: it is the Serbs who don’t want to live in one state with the Bosniaks. Milorad Dodik, the president of the Serbian republic in Bosnia, is somewhat of a schizophrenic politician. On one day he claims his respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as established by the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, while on another day he openly states that Republika Srpska will be an independent state. Dodik, once supported by both the West and also by Bosniaks and Croats and seen as an open-minded politician and a man of dialogue, now names Bosnia and Herzegovina as an “outdated” state that relies solely on international aid. Its existence, he claims, is “fiction”. According to opinion polls, almost every citizen of Republika Srpska would vote for independence in a referendum; something which the Srpska authorities desire. Anti-Bosniak and anti-Muslim attitudes are common in Republika Srpska. Portraits of Radovan Karadžić, the first president of the republic who is now on trial for war crimes in The Hague, are everywhere, along with other Serbian nationalists proclaimed as heroes in Serbia (and as war criminals by most of the West). But even now, within the framework of one state, there isn’t too much that the two federal territories have in common. A common currency, yes, but with different national heroes printed on each states’ banknotes. A common army, yes, although Serb recruits refuse to take the oath. Everything else is separate, from national symbols, the police and the courts, to airlines and railways. Driving through Herzegovina, the ruins of burnt out churches and mosques, remnants of the Croat-Bosniak war that ravaged this area 20 years ago, can still be seen. Time passed, the Dayton Agreement created a new reality, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged; but the ruins and divisions remain. Mostar, a city in Herzegovina, is divided in a similar way to Mitrovica and Skopje. The division may be not that visible, but it is deep and long lasting. The city’s trademark, the historical Ottoman Stari Most (Old Bridge), joins the banks of the Neretva River. Ziemowit Szczerek, The Yugo Aftershock Opinion and Analysis 31

The west bank of the Neretva is Croatian. Bosniaks live on the east side. Traces of ethnic clashes can still be seen on the eastern side of town. Both communities have separate universities. Classes in schools are arranged by the nationality of the pupils. Mostar has two telephone companies and two postal services. And the tourists who gather on the Stari Most rarely know that they are actually standing between two cities. Southwest of Mostar lies Neum, a city situated on a narrow strip of land and Bosnia’s only access to the sea. Here the locals tend to remind travellers that the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina is fictional. “Don’t forget,” I was told on numerous times, “you are in Croatia, not in Bosnia.” The currency is indeed Bosnian marks, not Croatian kunas, but it also seems to be the only noticeable difference (maybe it’s a bit cheaper here than the rest of the Dalmatian coast). There is a road connecting Neum with the rest of Bosnia, but it is narrow, mountainous and dangerous. Even the Bosnians coming to Neum on holiday tend to rather use Croatian roads to get there. Croatia, which will join European Union in July 2013, also has its issues, which will be carried into the EU along with its membership. Vukovar, situated on the Danube River, marking the Croat-Serbian border, is a city which still serves as a monument to war. It was the only city in Europe to be destroyed on such a mass scale since the end of the Second World War. The siege of the city by Serbian forces left so many scars that even the mass restoration of the city hasn’t been able to conceal them all. Bullet-shattered buildings neighbour renovated ones. Despite the recent bloodshed, there are still Serbs living in eastern Croatia. At times they clash with their Croatian neighbours. Recently, the idea of adding Cyrillic names to street signs in Vukovar, which the significant Serbian minority (35 per cent) favours, sparked protests throughout the whole country, especially among the veterans. “War wounds are fresh,” their representatives say. “Cyrillic is unacceptable in Vukovar.”

Western glue

The situation in many parts of the former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Southern Serbia, is stable mainly because of two things: Western supervision and the prospects of integration with the EU. If we try to imagine the borders in the former Yugoslavia ethnically, they would look quite different. Sandžak and the Muslim part of Bosnia would constitute one state, the Croatian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be attached to Croatia, and Republika Srpska would be in Serbia, along with North Kosovo. The Preševo Valley with north-western Macedonia would go to Kosovo. 32 Opinion and Analysis Ziemowit Szczerek, The Yugo Aftershock

There would be no “Greater Albania”. Kosovans are not eager to join Albania proper, which is perceived by them as a backward and rather strange country. The differences between post-Yugoslav Albanians and their kinsmen from Albania “proper” are deep, even if both Kosovans and Albanians speak a great deal about pan-Albanianism. However, the “Greater Kosovo” idea is quite attractive to some people. The problem is, such borders can’t be drawn without another conflict; most likely a bloody one. And redrawing the borders lie at the very bottom of the Balkan Pandora’s Box. It is very difficult to imagine what would happen in Kosovo if the western peacekeeping forces withdrew and all the hopes for European integration failed. The conflict between Kosovo and the Serbs would flare up, and Belgrade would most likely intervene militarily. The Albanians from Serbia and Macedonia would also join the uprising. Bosnia and Herzegovina would probably collapse, since the country would be, as Dodik once described it, ineffective and somewhat artificial. The only thing that can be said for sure is that no nationality sharing a common state with Bosnia and Herzegovina is happy with the situation. Bosnia rests on the tectonic plates of Balkan civilisation. The fact that the rest of the whole world has become used to the people of former-Yugoslavia pretending to speak three different official languages, only shows how deeply rooted these divisions really are. Even integrating post-Yugoslav states within the EU won’t remove the threat completely. And as the examples of Poland and Hungary show, nationalists can raise their ugly heads even after integration.

Ziemowit Szczerek is a Polish journalist who works for the web portal www.Interia.pl, covering Central and Eastern European issues. He is completing his PhD at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The European Solidarity Centre in numbers 1 ﬁrst ever national sociological survey in Poland aimed at answering the question ‘what do Poles really think about Solidarność?’ 16 documentaries produced 18 special exhibitions

36 books published 190 coferences organised 600 projects dedicated to young people 745 ﬁlmed narratives of oppositions

13 500 European Solidarity Centre ECS publications in library resources ul. Doki 1 80-958 Gdańsk Poland 36 000 e-mail: [email protected] archival pictures tel.: +48 58 767 79 71 www.ecs.gda.pl 80 000 facebook.com/solidaritycentre archival documents, leaflets, posters 200 000 visitors to the ‘Roads to Freedom’ Exhibition ADVERTISEMENT THE EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY CENTRE The European Solidarity Centre (ECS) is an institution of a new form: it is not only a museum, but also an educational and scientific establishment aimed at providing a greater understanding of Solidarność and the anti-communist movements in Poland and Europe. The objective of its founders was to create a Central European agora, a meeting place for citizens, who feel responsible for the development of democracy in Europe. The European Solidarity Centre supports reflection on the state of an open society, the role of a country, the identity of democratic communities and the issue of social justice.

ECS was created in 2007 by the Minister of Culture and National Heritage, the City of Gdańsk, the self- governing body of the Pomorskie Voivodeship, NSZZ Solidarność and the Solidarity Centre Foundation. The ﬂoor space of the newly-built building of ECS covers nearly 26 thousand square meters. A permanent exhibition dedicated to the history of Solidarność will be the heart of the centre. There will also be a library and reading room, a media library, archives, a scientiﬁc-research centre, an educational training centre, creative youth workshops as well as space for special exhibitions.

ADVERTISEMENT THE MISSION of the European Solidarity Centre We aspire to ensure the ideals of Solidarność – democracy, an open solidary society and the culture of dialogue – maintain a modern perspective and appeal. We want to preserve, in the memory of Poles and Europeans, the experience of Solidarność as a peaceful revolution, so that Solidarność, throughout European democracies, is remembered as a key part of the story of the establishment of Europe. We want Solidarność to be a source of inspiration and hope for those who do not live in open and democratic societies. THE WEIGHT of responisbility Iryna Sheiko-Ivankiv, 25 years old, works at the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative in Kiev in the Ukraine. She is writing her PHD thesis on solidarity and is also a social activist. - The Solidarity Academy in Gdańsk uncovered some very important details of the Polish road to real freedom, which I was previously unaware of. Having taken part in the workshop dedicated to leadership, I have begun to feel the weight of responsibility of a social leader. Thanks to the Solidarity Academy my understanding of Solidarność has broadened not only theoretically, but also with a view to its practical application.

THIS IS WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT Adam Pypan, an 12 year-old pupil from primary school No 12 in Elbląg, last year winner of the ‘My Little Solidarity’ competition. Solidary means that everyone gets together To clean, play and help, With the diﬃculties we do not tackle on our own. Because when people love each other, they give solidary support to each other, And this is what it is all about, that solidary are the old and the young.

UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE of Solidarność Basil Kerski, director of ECS -For the past ﬁve years ECS has carried out an extensive programme promoting the heritage of Solidarność throughout Poland and Europe. I feel that the most important task of ECS is to work with the young generation. We will not reach this generation through forceful monologue; instead we need to undertake arduous educational work. ADVERTISEMENT 2014 ECS moves into the new building The building is currently under construction close to the Monument to the Fallen Shipyard Workers, the historical gate No 2 of the Gdańsk Shipyard and the BHP Hall where on 31 August 1980, the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee signed an agreement with the communist government in Poland (PRL). The heart of the building will house a permanent exhibition, dedicated to the phenomenon of Solidarność and the changes which it inﬂuenced in the Central and Eastern Europe.

ADVERTISEMENT The Struggles of Skopje artan Sadiku and katerina koloZova

Once at the crossroads between East and West, the Macedonian capital of Skopje is a city suffering from schizophrenia. Revealing itself in the tensions between the majority of citizens living in the city beyond the ethnic divide forced upon them by politics, Skopje is a battle of the traditional vanguards against the new reactionaries.

Skopje is not a film, not a thriller where we guess the chief event. It is a concentration of man’s struggle for freedom, with a result which inspires further struggles and no acceptance of defeat – Jean-Paul Sartre

We do not write this text in regret of our experience of our city, nor in praise of what it means to us. We are rather putting into words here the joy, the fear and reflections that we encounter day to day as we simultaneously taste and cook up the mash of Skopje’s social, political and cultural grains. We must note at There are at least two cities of Skopje: the very beginning the impossibility of dividing the visions and dreams the city of critique, vibrance and for oneself, from the concepts and imagination; and the shiny city of substance of the city; and thus we must turbo-culture and turbo-politics. recall the right to the city as coined by Henri Lefebvre (a French Marxist philosopher and sociologist who introduced the concepts of the right to the city and the production of social space – editor’s note) as a demand for a transformed and renewed access to urban life, which is the foundation stone of our tale about Skopje. It is a tale because it is neither real nor imaginary; it becomes a tale by way of recognising and seeing what has remained of Skopje’s past, by that which is written about and spoken of the city, and by what we demand and fight for the city to be. 38 Opinion and Analysis Artan Sadiku and Katerina Kolozova, The Struggles of Skopje

Virtual separation Once known as the Balkan crossroads between East and West, a mosaic of different walks of life and a lively museum of the architectural heritage of its many rulers, today Skopje stands for the contemporary setting of a city’s struggle with its own self. Its panoramic Stone Bridge represents the epicentre around which different rulers from the past and the present have struggled and still struggle to establish their own eternal cultural mark, making Skopje, as two authors recently named it, a bastard city. In their book Skopje, The World’s Bastard: Architecture of the Divided City, Milan Mijalkovic and Katerina Urbanek give us a taste: “The bastard is a heterogeneous and multi-layered character. It can choose its identity according to actual circumstances. Of course, the term signifies an anomaly but on the other hand it speaks of strength and independence. Skopje has the freedom to have many identities.” With the intensification of the ethnocentric political discourse during the 1990s in the former Yugoslav republics and the ultimate break-up of the federation, Macedonia progressed along the same lines of ethnic state Lasting for more than two building as the other states did, generating tension throughout the country, especially in Skopje. decades, the post-socialist Composed of many ethnic groups, predominantly transition has depleted the Macedonians and Albanians, and a city of two social fabric of the city. main religions, Skopje became hostage to different claims during the 1990s. A social process of claiming neighbourhoods by way of concentration of one or another ethnic group divided the city along the Vardar River. This separation was, however, a virtual one: Skopje was still a vibrant city with people moving freely in different areas and streets; and even more so, Skopje was still a traditional city – people in the different neighbourhoods maintained their traditional bonds and lifestyle beyond how the politics of the day defined their ethnic interests. However, the political “dark years” of the 1990s resulted in several ethnic incidents including large nationalistic protests and wide public and political segregation. After the 2001 conflict in Macedonia, in the manner of a real city hero, and against all the odds and the heavy burden of the conflict, Skopje revived its true spirit and colours. The virtual lines of separation were blurred off the map by a new enthusiasm of its citizens. The main achievement of these years was the revival, after almost a complete dereliction during the 1990s, of the Old Bazaar of Skopje, which for centuries had been the historic, cultural, religious and commercial heart of the city. The Charshija, as it is known locally, is now the main challenge within the city: it is the site of a concentration of centuries of history, and at the same time the site of new modern Artan Sadiku and Katerina Kolozova, The Struggles of Skopje Opinion and Analysis 39 cultural and artistic undertakings and events which push the vision of Skopje forward into the future. The long dead Charshija, the beautiful Old City of the Ottoman period, devoid of cultural events and nightlife for more than a decade, has been resuscitated in the last couple of years by the opening of spaces which serve for debate, artistic events and clubbing on the alternative scene. This cultural process has spontaneously caused the removal of the invisible border separating the city since the late 1990s into an Albanian and Macedonian part, like an invisible ethnic Berlin Wall; artistic and intellectual behaviour has induced a transgression of the hidden laws of inter-ethnic division and respective seclusion.

Skopje 2014

The word and concept of “turbo”, borrowed from engine technology, is used to describe socio-cultural phenomena in the Balkans which are injected into society by way of perverse correlation with traditional cultural values or practices. The most common turbo genre is turbo-folk, a musical genre made available at a time of crippling economies, the revival of nationalism and the failure of a common social Skopje is a monstrous city vision, as the easiest, cheapest and most banal entertainment. Turbo-folk inscribes the tragedy with no single identity which of the Balkans in folk music, travestying it into accepts all that is given to it. a newly composed song without any musical or textual criteria. The government project called Skopje 2014 is the latest turbo genre that Skopje is contributing to the Balkan turbo collection. Aiming to inject antiquity and affiliation into the present, as a mode of reinforcing Macedonian identity, it leads to a bizarre architectural and cultural mutation of the future. Dozens of statues in a tight square represent a conglomerate of kitsch descending straight from the government offices, put in full motion by trying to transform the visual experience of Skopje. The city, especially its main square, now offers an experience of brutality on a daily basis. You wake up to a new statue, erected on the way you had just walked the night before. Your memories of the square, the stairs where you used to drink beer with friends, the hidden corner where you had a romance, are shattered both day and night. The neo-national ideology is produced and fortified by tonnes of concrete giving shape to a dozen buildings which attempt to look antique or baroque, but fatally occur in the most miserable neo-classical form. The turbo manner in which the construction of antiquity is carried out in central Skopje has failed to produce an essential identification of the people, as was intended in the Skopje 2014 programme. The site of the square, even before its completion, already 40 Opinion and Analysis Artan Sadiku and Katerina Kolozova, The Struggles of Skopje

Photo: European Commission

The Stone Bridge in Skopje represents the epicentre around which different rulers from the past and present have struggled to establish their own eternal cultural mark.

resembles a dead zombie that is so huge that no one has any idea how it will fit into the future of the city. Well inside the binary ethno-political context, the Albanian party of the ruling coalition have undertaken a “less scandalous” architectural activity. As a response to the failure of the political negotiations of implanting a few “Albanian statues” within the framework of Skopje 2014, it moved on, in the established schizophrenic manner, towards the construction of Skanderbeg Square on the other side of the Stone Bridge. The square which is currently being constructed around the statue of George Kastrioti Skanderbeg, one of the main medieval Albanian heroes, a king who heroically fought the Ottoman Empire, is the Albanian pin on the city’s map, a response to the events on the other side of the bridge. The disturbing division at the heart of the city takes place on the temporal plane and operates with symbols creating two disparate cultural universes. The city of Artan Sadiku and Katerina Kolozova, The Struggles of Skopje Opinion and Analysis 41 socialist and post-socialist Yugoslavia, a city of grey concrete and dirt in the streets, of brutal, unrefined urbanism of the late 1980s and early 1990s, in which the post- punk scene ruled and alternative theatres sprung up in cultural havens, such as the Youth Cultural Centre – that city is now gone. And this is not simply the result of the natural course of time, of lost practices, people replaced by new people and new cultural practices. Material traces of the previous urban landscape have been wiped out, and the alternative cultural practices have been minimised thanks to the transformation of spaces which enabled them to enter the mainstream 10 or 20 years ago, as corporatised, yet state funded and owned, institutions of culture. The future of the main square of Skopje might look quite ridiculous as a result of the turbo-past/forward meshing of styles in time. Just one glance at the enormous statue of Alexander the Great, named “warrior on horse”, at night offers quite a psychedelic view. Angry soldiers and lions guard the enormous statue, being washed by a programmed fountain and a variety of disco-like lights to a classic by Richard Wagner – a real result of ideology forcing itself in a time and space which refuses to accommodate its proper projections, grotesquely transfiguring them into unknown styles.

The future struggle with the past

The soundtrack for an omnibus movie about Skopje called Skopje Remixed, which tells the stories of nine young directors in the city, speaks of the contradictions inherent to Skopje, as well as its unique blend:

“This city is light green, this city is light grey, This city half-dead, this city almost alive This city we defend, this city we build… … different crosses and crescents Our unity is a natural pleasure.”

The John – Nie sme od Skopje

The only bridge of memory and continuity of the marginal history of progressive cultural and political practices in the city has been the radio station Kanal 103. The events organised by this radio station, the people affiliated to it – some of them old members of the founding team from the early 1990s, some of them new and young – who participate in and create activist initiatives, represent the backbone of the profound critique of mainstream culture and politics in the country today. 42 Opinion and Analysis Artan Sadiku and Katerina Kolozova, The Struggles of Skopje

Nevertheless, the space is small – both physical and discursive – for this enclave, and it houses the vanishing voice of an epoch which produced the loudest sound of both music and debate. In the last couple of years, this vanishing voice has merged with the noise of the small shops, of the craftsmen’s workshops, Turkish teashops and the call to prayer from the mosques in the Old Bazaar, Skopje’s Charshija. The artistic-political scene at issue is opposed to the aesthetic-political majority of the country. The latter is marked by a frozen political logic of alleged ethnic tension which is constantly controlled by the major political parties, and is supposed to determine all other political choices implying the sacrifice of major social concerns in the name of maintaining the stability of inter-ethnic relations. The sacred position of the theme of ethnic identity overshadows all other issues in the cultural-political and aesthetic majority culture – the culture of turbo-pop-folk, turbo-sexuality and turbo-nationalism anesthetised through the multiculturally massive consumption of Balkan-produced soap operas. Political debate in the media is non-existent, which is yet again, another inter-culturally shared issue. There are at least two cities of Skopje: the city of critique, vibrance and imagination, nostalgically lulled in the beautiful escape of the Old Bazaar, on the one hand; and the shiny city of turbo-culture and turbo-politics, on the other, symbolised through the numerous monuments of turbo-baroque style which have sprung up all over the city centre in the last couple of years.

Schizophrenic Skopje

The struggle of the city with itself represents the struggle of the alternative, of the urban against the new-old; indeed, it is a battle of the traditional vanguards against the new reactionaries. But Skopje exists in its different vibes. While one is exalted with the enthusiasm of the struggles, which range from street protests to aesthetic projects, raging concerts of politically engaged bands to graffiti outcries, Skopje also has a sadly dark image to offer in the heart of its circle. A post-socialist transition lasting for more than two decades has depleted the social fabric of the city, leaving many to struggle on the brink of existence, throwing them into deep endemic misery and depression. A walk through the neighbourhoods of Shutka, Topana and Gazi Baba rarely leaves us untroubled. It is an everyday affliction of our Skopje, the stark contrast of colours which in the streets not far from the square turn into the brown of the mud. Skopje has thousands of people whose parachutes don’t open, whose lives are embedded within their social tragedy. These are the people for whom Skopje does not exist, their relation to the neoclassical square, to the new shopping malls, to the Artan Sadiku and Katerina Kolozova, The Struggles of Skopje Opinion and Analysis 43 artistic and intellectual transgressions is empty; it is a relation that doesn’t indeed exist. But, these neighbourhoods are not separated from the city in the manner of slums or ghettos, they are rather moulded into the stream of Skopje making it a city faithful to its schizophrenic attitude. Schizophrenic Skopje thus reveals itself in the tensions between the majority of citizens thinking and living in the city beyond the ethnic divide forced upon them by the politics of the day, which remain well within the nationalistic binary mode of competition spanning the bastardism in its architecture, and which being forced into the past resembles a shortcoming to Kenzo Tnage’s futuristic vision of the city. It was after the earthquake of 1963, which destroyed most of the city, that the Japanese architect was given the role of putting up a new Skopje, which according to his vision was to be a city of future. Thus, Skopje has the future implanted in its heart, while its face is being transformed into a bad taste image of an ancient city. This is the experience of every visitor to Skopje; one sees something which doesn’t correspond to what one feels. Skopje is a monstrous city, has no single identity, and accepts all that is given to it. It is a city that knows that it doesn’t know its own self, and in this struggle, doesn’t want to know. It struggles within, in its neighbourhoods, in the bars, in the streets, but never reveals it on the outside. This city adapts to all that it receives and so escapes from any claim to captivate it entirely. Everybody occupies a part of Skopje: Macedonians and Albanians occupy its neighbourhoods, artists occupy its parks and bars, politicians occupy its public spaces, Muslims and Christian Orthodox occupy its history, beggars occupy portions of its pavements, and pensioners occupy its public buses; students, children, activists, tourists and workers all make their claims, leaving Skopje to remain fundamentally indestructible and free. With as much freedom as Skopje releases for us to be captivated by the idea of our city, we are at the same time giving meaning to Skopje, because this city invites us into its turbulent present and messy past to construct a vision of the streets we want to walk down, and the people we want to meet. While we live the contradictions and inner confrontations of this city, we are at the same time witnesses of a historic becoming of Skopje; a becoming that is returning the gift to the mosaic of the broken dreams of its rulers, as it rises again in its full capacity of being ungraspable. Our dream of Skopje is that it is the city we will never fully understand; the city which catches up with its future and suddenly retreats into its past. Skopje is to us, a promise of freedom and a challenge for struggle, while it was once burned down by the Austrian general Enea Silvio Piccolomini (known for leading a campaign against the Ottomans in Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia, and for setting Skopje 44 Opinion and Analysis Artan Sadiku and Katerina Kolozova, The Struggles of Skopje

on fire – editor’s note) in 1689 and is now being decorated in marble by its current rulers, Skopje gives us the future here and now, while it blackmails us with its embedded marvellous past.

Artan Sadiku is a doctoral student of political philosophy and columnist in the fields of critical theory, cultural theory, feminism and radical political ideas. He researches and teaches at the Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities in Skopje, and is an activist of the Solidarnost (Solidariteti) movement.

Katerina Kolozova is a professor of philosophy and gender studies in Skopje, as well as other universities in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. She is also the director of the Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities in Skopje. Her writings cover such topics as feminism, philosophy and political sciences, and her latest book The Cut of the Real is due to be published by Columbia University Press in 2013. ADVERTISEMENT

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www.pism.pl/eksiegarnia www.pism.pl/ebookstore Zamówienie prenumeraty / Subscription order for Prenumerata Subscription2013 PLN +90 koszty przesyłki / shipping Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych /The Polish Institute of International Affairs ul.Warecka 1a, 00-950 Warszawa tel. 22 556 80 51, 22 556 80 00, faks 22 556 80 99 e-mail: [email protected], www.pism.pl/eksiegarnia / www.pism.pl/ebookstore Towards a Balkan Benelux

A conversation with Blerim Reka, Pro-Rector for Research and International Relations at South East European University in Tetovo, and former Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia to the European Union. Interviewer: Ida Orzechowska

IDA ORZECHOWSKA: You have said that from the European Union for aspiring the Balkan states have two options for Balkan countries) have deteriorated to the a better future: the creation of ethnic point where everyone is against everyone states, or the establishment of a system in the region. Borders have become of Benelux-like states with formal the priority of the Balkan countries. boundaries. Has the project of a multi- New geographies were drafted and re- ethnic Balkans already failed? drafted, and new states have been created. BLERIM REKA: With the outbreak But this limited geography wasn’t able of the Balkan Wars a century ago (1912- to overcome the heavy burden of its 1913), the Balkans entered turbulent and complicated history. destabilising waters; and the start of the In the 20th century, we began to see 21st century hasn’t brought the region a permanent clash between geography into calmer waters. A consequence of and history in the Balkans. The London the Balkan Wars was the experiment Conference of 1913 created a one-border with nation states, expanded through regime; Versailles of 1919 brought a territorial annexations to the detriment different one; Yalta-Potsdam inaugurated of neighbouring countries. This is a third one; and Helsinki of 1975 and why the Balkans have continued to the post-Cold War era once again saw operate national policies for the last changes in geography. Although each of century, whereas new borders with these border regimes in Europe claimed violent territorial expansions remain a to support the status-quo and a non- source of instability. Relations between change of the borders, it was actually neighbours (a key condition required quite the opposite. Towards a Balkan Benelux, A conversation with Blerim Reka Opinion and Analysis 47

A century of wars for territory in (which make up a quarter of the overall the Balkans have proved that the population) did in Macedonia. Despite tendencies to create pure nation states the Ohrid Agreement, the Albanians in cannot be achieved. Only graves and Macedonia didn’t achieve the same status human tragedy, the forceful displacement that the Serbs received in Kosovo. of populations, genocide and ethnic Based on experience, I believe the first cleansing remain from such failed ideas. model of pure ethnic states, as mentioned The wars in the former Yugoslavia in the earlier, is difficult to achieve in the same 1990s were a consequence of unsolved way as the model of multi-ethnic states. national questions, and a result of self- In order to avoid a repetition of the determination aimed at breaking free “border story” in the 21st century, in 1998 from the Yugoslav communist prison. As I proposed a concept which I call the these wars were ending, the international Balkans Area of Free Trade Agreements community offered another model: the (BAFTA). In my proposal I’ve attempted model of multi-ethnic states. However, to offer a new model: where borders exist even two decades after the Dayton as such, without any changes, but in which Accords, the model of multi-ethnic they will become relative, open and free states hasn’t functioned: from Bosnia for citizens, products, money and services and Herzegovina, to Macedonia. I’m not of all four countries in the Southern saying that this model created 20 years Balkans: Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and ago through the peaceful agreements Montenegro. This would be something of Dayton, Ohrid and Ahtisaari has similar to a Balkan Benelux. failed; I am simply saying that it hasn’t functioned. How different would the Balkans look in the Benelux model from the design Why not? inherent in the Dayton Accords? On the one hand, there was an The Southern Balkan reality is different imposition of the federal principle (in from that of the Northern Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina with the creation The economies of the four Northern of a new entity: Republika Srpska), and on Balkan countries have a significant the other, an imposition of the functional orientation towards the Adriatic Sea model (in Macedonia with the Ohrid and their business communities face Framework Agreement and in Kosovo the same challenge: a small market. with the Ahtisaari Plan). In Bosnia and Coordinating and addressing topics Herzegovina, the Dayton Agreement such as trade and customs facilitation, guaranteed the Serbs the right to veto cooperation against organised crime, central state decisions, while in Kosovo, local development of border regions, four per cent of Serbs (constitutionally) infrastructure cooperation, development gained more rights than the Albanians of a common airspace, and energy 48 Opinion and Analysis Towards a Balkan Benelux, A conversation with Blerim Reka

and financial markets, would enable How different are the four countries the creation of an economic growth you call the Southern Balkans, from agenda which is missing in the region. the other Balkan states? Successful examples of regional Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and cooperation within the European Union Montenegro are four small and rather (such as Benelux, Visegrad and the young states with a combined population Nordic Council) provide models which of slightly over eight million inhabitants. could be applicable in the Balkans. They share a common history and As I mentioned earlier, BAFTA is a population patterns between them when model for the new union of four countries compared to the Northern Balkans. from our region. But because of the From a geographical perspective, all circumstances of war, this idea was left four capitals are situated within a 200 for the future. After the independence of kilometre radius and are the same Montenegro in 2006 and the Republic of distance from Rome, Athens, Istanbul, Kosovo in 2008, the Balkan geopolitical Vienna and Budapest. All four countries situation has changed. In March 2012, constitute a seriously underinvested and in Tirana, a group of thinkers from the neglected region since the times of the region established the Action Group Ottoman Empire. Even though all four for Regional Economic and European countries have had experiences of major Integration (AGREEI) as a regional and unprecedented progress in all sectors platform for the creation of the Balkan during the last five years, they still face Benelux. AGREEI was created with the a serious lack of infrastructure in terms aim of supporting the economic and of roads, energy and hospitals. They European integration of the four countries face a human capital shortage related of the Southern Balkans (SB4C). One to high emigration outflows, especially main strategic objective of AGREEI is by young people. to support the creation of a market of The four countries have a history of eight million consumers with a free war, mistrust and animosity related movement of goods, services, capital and to external relations, and at the same people, and cross-border cooperation, time face internal problems related which could be a short-term solution to the lack of institutional capacities, actually supporting the EU integration contentious politics, and both a lack process of this region and maybe even of tradition of a responsible governing expediting the process. Similar to the culture and a lack of respect toward the successful experience of Benelux, the authorities as legitimised actors on behalf four countries of the Balkans in this of the common good. The concept of the cross-border model would strengthen Western Balkans, introduced relatively each other in their common effort to recently, is a concept which (given the succeed in the global economy. historical and geographical realities Towards a Balkan Benelux, A conversation with Blerim Reka Opinion and Analysis 49 of the region) is facing few challenges. Croatia will soon be a new member of the European Union. Serbia and Bosnia have separate open issues. Meanwhile, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania are ready to cooperate with each other. A decade after launching BAFTA, this philosophy of creating a Balkan Benelux or “mini-Schengen”, has gradually started to be implemented through various regional initiatives, such as the cross-border movement of people with ID cards (rather than passports). Surely, these concrete steps are still symbolic. This sub-regional integration needs to be further developed and is in need of more political support. This is why a group of enthusiasts within AGREEI Photo: European Commission are working on the creation of a Balkans Blerim Reka is a former Ambassador of the Benelux for these four countries, to push Republic of Macedonia to the European Union. the philosophy of free borders and free movement of people, goods, services and capital further. programmes, these four countries will jointly prepare themselves for the long What consequences will the further journey towards Brussels. A Balkan deconstruction of the Western Balkans Benelux would be created because of bring to the Southern and Northern geopolitics: the southern part of the Balkans? Balkans is linked with the Adriatic and To be clear, integration into the the Ionian Sea. The northern part is more European Union is not intended to oriented towards the Danube. But if other deconstruct the Western Balkans. This countries from this northern part want region will remain a geopolitical area in relation to the EU. The model of to participate in this Balkan Benelux, the Balkan Benelux, likewise, is not they would be welcome to do so. a replacement of the existing track of the EU enlargement policy towards How could the concept of the Balkan the Western Balkans. On the contrary, Benelux help overcome the crucial through joint efforts and common problems in the region? 50 Opinion and Analysis Towards a Balkan Benelux, A conversation with Blerim Reka

To answer this question it is important the future. How will your exclusive to look at other groups with similar goals. project face this challenge? Benelux (in Western Europe), Visegrad (in As I said at the beginning, the countries Central Europe) and the Nordic Council of the Balkans have two choices: to (in Northern Europe) were created under continue the tragic century-old history the supervision and support of the EU and started by the Balkans Wars (with a the United States. The Balkan Benelux permanent cycle of war for territory project could support the creation of and borders); or, to forget about borders, higher living standards allowing faster EU making them relative through a process accession, making European integration of reconciliation and regional integration, more feasible and realistic. The Balkans as a precondition for EU integration. Benelux aims to strengthen economic, Brussels won’t accept new member states cultural and political cooperation; to with unresolved borders disputes. undertake and support initiatives in On the ground, the borders would different fields of the economy, security, remain real; however in everyday life, international relations, education, etc., they would become virtual borders. aimed at the regional integration of the National philosophy would be replaced SB4C; to harmonise the integration with a post-national one. I’m pleased that processes in the European Union and at least parts of this regional integration Atlantic Community; to harmonise inter- policy between the four countries have ethnical relations; and finally to support been accepted and already implemented the drafting, signing and ratification in the last five or six years as the first process leading to a cooperation treaty steps towards a Balkan Benelux. among the SB4C. After a treaty is signed The embryonic form of a Balkan “mini- among the four countries, the objectives Schengen” started to be realised with the of AGREEI would be to support the ratification of bilateral agreements for creation of an SB4C state secretariat crossing borders only using identification which would implement the signed treaty cards, between Albania and Montenegro, among the countries. Albania and Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, John Galtung a Norwegian scholar (with the announcement that the same and founder of the discipline of peace would be implemented between Kosovo and conflict studies, agrees, to a certain and Montenegro). Parallel to this process, extent, that only internal drivers of the first infrastructural steps were made regional cooperation can bring peace with the construction of a highway to the Balkans. However, he also between Tirana and Pristina, and with emphasises broad reconciliation in the the announcements from Pristina that wider region, even including Moldova the construction of a highway between and Turkey, as absolutely critical for Pristina and Skopje would begin at Towards a Balkan Benelux, A conversation with Blerim Reka Opinion and Analysis 51 the beginning of next year. A railway states will still remain within the same line between Albania and Macedonia borders, which won’t crumble, but will is also under discussion. This whole become relativised. The alleged monster development would have seemed unreal of “Great Albania” has never left the in 1998. However, 15 years have been Balkan mentality over the last century. sufficient for this vision of the Balkans However, the idea of the Balkan Benelux to become real. Undoubtedly, these are doesn’t dissolve existing countries but only the first and very symbolic steps of relativises the borders, becoming, free this regional integration philosophy, but and open for the free movement of the process is moving forward. people, goods, services and capital, as well as culture, language, science and How you respond to those who refer research. Thus, if you live in Skopje, you to this project as being a substitute can study in Tirana, work in Pristina for a “Greater Albania”? How can this and own a business in Podgorica. This perception be overcome? is how Benelux functioned six decades In our real world nothing is “great” ago and this is how the EU functions and everything is relative. First of all, today, as a union of 27 member states. the concept of a “Greater Albania” was If we continue to try and solve Balkan not created by the Albanians but by their issues with models from the past, this enemies, a century ago, in order to prevent would re-open a Pandora’s box for the the natural integration of Albanians Balkan borders. This has been proven in the Balkans. So a “Greater Albania” many times to be unfortunate, as well doesn’t exist; just as a “Greater Europe” as extremely costly. doesn’t exist. What does exist is an integrated Europe, thus Albanians would You once wrote: “Europe is our fate, wish to create the same: an integrated not just our choice.” What role would Albania. the Balkan Benelux countries play Because all these four countries within the EU? experienced the same triple transition I wrote this in my last book, The model: from communist rule towards Geopolitics and the Techniques of EU democratic society, from a central Enlargement (Brussels, 2010). I still think and state-run economy towards a free that the countries of the Balkans have no market economy, and from war to peace, choice apart from the EU. Euro-Atlantic I contemplated that such a sub-regional integration is our destiny. Peace in the integration would prevent war and Balkans can only be maintained under conflict. Free trade was thought to be the security umbrella of NATO, and only a facilitator of opening up the Balkan under the EU as an institutional export mind. A change of borders is not implied, towards aspiring countries. All other but rather a flexibility of them. The four choices from the Euro-Atlantic platform 52 Opinion and Analysis Towards a Balkan Benelux, A conversation with Blerim Reka

could end up being a repetition of the economically prosperous and ready for full century of tragic history of the Balkans. membership into Euro-Atlantic structures. The Balkan Benelux is a sub-regional It is the duty of our generation to integration model in line with the general tell our grandchildren the successful Euro-Atlantic integration process, as story of the Balkans, different from the a model for a reconciled, integrated bloody Balkans one which we were told and peaceful Balkans, which is also about.

Blerim Reka is the Pro-Rector for Research and International Relations at South East European University in Tetovo, and founding director of the Max van der Stole Institute for Preventive Diplomacy. He is also the former Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia to the European Union, and the author of 18 books, including The Geopolitics and the Techniques of EU Enlargement (Aspect: Brussels, 2010).

Ida Orzechowska is a Polish researcher and PhD candidate at the Institute of Political Science of the University of Wrocław, Poland. Swedish soldiers stand guard on a street in Gračanica – a city with a large Serbian population in central Kosovo.

Photo: Ziemowit Szczerek A road sign in Kosovo reminds drivers that they are not the only ones on the roads.

Photo: Ziemowit Szczerek A poster in Kosovo thanks former President Bill Clinton and the United States for their role in a free Kosovo.

Photo: Ziemowit Szczerek Life in Bosnia and Herzegovina has returned somewhat back to normal, but reminders of the war are omnipresent.

Photo: Photo by Adam Jones, Ph.D./Global Photo Archive (CC) www.flickr.com The Long Road towards Reconciliation

Sevan PearSon

On April 6th 2012, 11,541 empty red chairs were placed on the main street of Sarajevo. Each chair represented an identified victim of the long siege. Twenty years ago, the Bosnian War broke out and lasted for more than three years. Today, there is peace, but are there any visible signs of reconciliation?

For many in the Balkans, it is still easy to conjure up the memory of people running through the streets of Sarajevo, trying to escape the terrorising shots of snipers. We still remember the TV reports of besieged Bosnian towns being shelled; and no one can forget the testimonies about the camps, massacres, mass rape and “ethnic cleansing”. From 1992 to 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina was torn by a very bloody war. Slogans like “Brotherhood and Unity”, the leitmotif of the national policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, was quickly forgotten. In 1990 the first free elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only officially multinational republic in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, led to three nationalist parties coming to power. The Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA – the Party of Democratic Action) represented the interests of the Muslims.1 Most Serbs gathered around the Srpska Demokratska Stranka (SDS – the Serbian Democratic Party), whereas the Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ – the Croatian Democratic Community) became the Croats’ main party. These three political formations formed a coalition at the end of 1990 but couldn’t agree on a common programmatic platform. Bosnia and Herzegovina began to split into

1 During the 1960s, the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided to recognise all Muslims whose native language was Serbo-Croatian as a nation. In the local language, there was a distinction between muslimani (people of Islamic faith) and Muslimani (members of the Muslim nation). As this denomination led to misunderstandings and confusion, an Assembly of Bosnian Muslim intellectuals decided to rename the Muslims (in the national sense), Bosniaks in 1993. 58 Opinion and Analysis Sevan Pearson, The Long Road towards Reconciliation

three parallel national societies, each led by one of these three parties, creating paramilitary structures and promoting nationalist sentiments.

Independence

The situation worsened after the secession of neighbouring Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991: war broke out there and tensions grew inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. The SDA and the HDZ advocated the independence of the republic, whereas the SDS insisted on the right The Dayton Peace Agreement of the Bosnian Serbs to stay in what was left of reinforces the divisions Yugoslavia. Both views seemed irreconcilable, within the society. especially since the three main national groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Muslims, Serbs and Croats – lived intermingled throughout the republic. A division along ethnic lines was impossible: it would have brought new borders within towns, buildings and even within families. On October 15th 1991, the Bosnian parliament voted on a declaration on sovereignty; the SDS deputies boycotted the decision and left the Bosnian capital. At the same time, Serbian autonomous regions were created and united on January 7th 1992 in the form of Republika Srpska. The international community accepted the principle of the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but demanded a referendum on the question. On February 29th and March 1st, a republic-wide vote was held, which most Serbs boycotted. About 99 per cent of those who voted (with 66 per cent participation) accepted the separation from Yugoslavia and the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Immediately after the referendum, barricades appeared around Sarajevo. The situation became tense, although negotiations began between the three nationalist parties returning a sense of hope. The plan was then to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into ethnic cantons. No agreement was reached, however, and violence broke out all over the country. Some paramilitary and extremely violent groups from Serbia massacred Muslim civilians in Bijeljina, in north-eastern Bosnia. On April 5th and 6th 1992, about 100,000 people – Muslims, Croats, Serbs and others – demonstrated in Sarajevo to oppose the violence and the looming possibility of an all-out war. At some point during the demonstrations, snipers from the Serbian Nationalist Party fired on the crowd, blowing the conflict wide open. A few weeks later, the Bosnian capital was besieged and the violence spread to many other Bosnian towns including Srebrenica, Goražde, Bihać and Mostar. Civilians became the systematic target of violence with mass rape, “ethnic cleansing” and massacres. At the beginning of the war, the Bosnian and Herzegovinian army – despite being composed of a large majority of Muslims and an important minority of Sevan Pearson, The Long Road towards Reconciliation Opinion and Analysis 59

Croats – was multi-ethnic. Some ethnic Serbs, such as General Jovan Divjak, fought on the side of the government. On the other side of the conflict was the Army of Republika Srpska, which forced Serbian men to fight for a “Greater Serbia”. The aim of their side of the conflict was to take as much territory as possible from Bosnia and Herzegovina and to re-attach it to what remained of Yugoslavia. During the winter of 1992-1993, the nationalist wing of the Croatian HDZ pushed for the creation of a separate The lack of political will Croatian territory within Bosnia and Herzegovina. remains the main obstacle This led to an outbreak of violence between Croats and Muslims. The situation was desperate for the to reconciliation. Muslim-dominated Bosnian government: the army of Republika Srpska controlled about 70 per cent of the territory while the Croats claimed just 15 per cent. The first success towards peace was reached in March 1994, with the creation of a Muslim-Croat federation, called the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With support of the United States, a large-scale Muslim-Croat offensive in September 1995 radically changed the situation on the ground: the Serbs lost a large part of their territory and only managed to save about 50 per cent of what they had controlled in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Negotiations began in Dayton, Ohio on November 21st 1995 and an agreement was reached. Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain a country, divided into two entities: the Muslim-Croat dominated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51 per cent of the territory) and the Serbian-dominated Republika Srpska (49 per cent). The central government was delegated to tasks of national policy (such as printing money and customs), whereas a great deal of state autonomy was given to the two territories. Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats were recognised as the three equal constitutive peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Division not reconciliation

Twenty years since the breakout of war, it is difficult to accurately assess the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Jovan Divjak, the now retired general of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Army and observer of the political evolution in the country, has categorically stated that “the situation is chaotic”, using the very long period of time (a year and a half) it took to form the Council of Ministers (the government of the central state), as an example. According to Divjak, the situation is not better in the entities themselves: the Federation is going through a political crisis because of some disagreements between governing parties, whereas the President of Republika Srpska – Milorad Dodik – is threatening a referendum on the independence of his entity. Furthermore, the political problems are influencing the economy directly. Divjak has argued that 60 Opinion and Analysis Sevan Pearson, The Long Road towards Reconciliation

there is no common market in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Republika Srpska is under the economic influence of Russia and Serbia, whereas the Croatian parts of the Federation are linked to Croatia; while Turkey is present and very active in the Bosniak (Muslim) dominated regions. The high level of corruption, nepotism and dependence of the media towards political parties doesn’t help the situation. But what about the process of reconciliation in Reconciliation in Bosnia Bosnia and Herzegovina today? Nicolas Moll, a and Herzegovina seems historian and expert in the region, doesn’t consider the Dayton Peace Agreement to be a good basis for to be at an impasse. reconciliation. Moll argues that the treaty has divided the society along national lines: “Every community is living on their own, but at the same time tries to provide a political system with some common institutions,” Moll has said. A very important principle resides in the defence of the national interests of each community. There is no indication that the three ethnic groups are working together to build a common state. Moll concludes that “the system created by the Dayton Peace Agreement reproduces divisions and reinforces them, rather than provide links between the different nations”. One significant problem, perhaps, is the fact that the first aim of the Dayton Peace Agreement was to cease the hostilities. In this sense, Dayton was successful. But the constitutional arrangement provided by the Agreement was supposed to be provisional and to be worked out and developed. However, this has never happened. Another obstacle to reconciliation lies in the perpetuation of a psychological climate of war. Nationalist rhetoric continues to be promulgated throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Every actor who tries to work for reconciliation is quickly considered a traitor towards his or her nationality. This atmosphere is linked with the absence of any political will. A key sign was the failure of the Bosnian reconciliation commission (Komisija o istini i pomirenju – Commission on Truth and Reconciliation). The commission never got off the ground because no one could agree on the basic question of who the members would be. Moreover, Divjak, the retired general, believes that there is more hatred today than there was at the end of the war. This can be observed by the fact that about 80,000 Serbs work in the institutions of the central state in Sarajevo, but don’t live in the Bosnian capital any more (which is situated within the Federation). They have built a new part of the city, situated across the border in Republika Srpska. In Herzegovina, Croat and Bosniak pupils go to the same schools, but to separate classrooms. Parents don’t encourage contact between children of different nationalities. To try to overcome this, Divjak founded a non-profit organisation in 1994 called Education builds Bosnia and Herzegovina (Obrazovanje gradi Bosnu i Sevan Pearson, The Long Road towards Reconciliation Opinion and Analysis 61

Gravestones at the Potočari genocide memorial near Srebrenica are a bleak reminder of the need for reconciliation. Photo: Michael Büker (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Hercegovinu), which aims to organise camps for children of various nationalities. The parents, however, have been reluctant to support such projects.

Transitional justice

Nevertheless, this dark picture shouldn’t make us believe that there is no action for reconciliation. Various initiatives have been launched in the framework of transitional justice. This approach which has been used in post-conflict regions is defined by the United Nations Security Council as the “full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”. One important achievement within the transitional justice framework is the establishment of the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005. This Chamber was created under the direct involvement of international personnel. In order to better integrate this institution within Bosnian society, a Court Support Network was established in 2005 composed of five NGOs from different parts of the country. But there is another difficulty: the condemnation of criminals actually increases the animosity between different communities, making reconciliation even more difficult. Another example of a mechanism of transitional justice is the RECOM Initiative (Reconciliation Commission): a network of NGOs whose aim is to gain public 62 Opinion and Analysis Sevan Pearson, The Long Road towards Reconciliation

support for a regional Truth Commission, encompassing all seven ex-Yugoslav countries and inspired by the South African experience. However, the network itself is not able to establish such a commission, and can only be constituted by the different states. In 2005, three NGOs launched a consultation process, which was later joined by other organisations such as victims’ associations. The consultation process lasted until March 2011 and a draft law was formulated and sent to the different national parliaments. A petition campaign collected 600,000 signatures favouring the establishment of the regional Truth Commission. The idea of the NGOs was to start a bottom-up process primarily focused on having the victims involved in the process. Unlike the South African experience, the case of the RECOM initiative has an added challenge. The aim is not to establish a national reconciliation commission, but a multi-national one, made up of seven countries. Such a commission would be completely new in the history of transitional justice. In October 2011, a lobbying group was formed in order to reach politicians and increase the public’s awareness of RECOM throughout the seven countries. In December 2011 RECOM gained the support of Montenegro’s president, and won the support of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2012.2 Ivo Josipović, the Croatian president, has also recently backed the proposal. Serbia and Kosovo still remain sceptical of the initiative and there is currently no political support there for RECOM.

Political will, or a lack thereof

The lack of political will remains the main obstacle to reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the greater Balkans region. Most politicians are interested in maintaining a certain level of tension, retaining a climate of psychological war. Fear of the other mobilises the electorate who supports the nationalist parties the strongest. However, there are sometimes surprises. The official apology of Bakir Izetbegović, the leader of the Bosniak nationalist party SDA, for crimes committed by the Bosnian Army against innocent Serbian civilians serves as one key example. Interestingly, this declaration took place on Serbian TV in Belgrade and not in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similarly, the former Serbian president, Boris Tadić, came to Srebrenica to memorialise the 1995 killing of Muslim men by Serbian forces (although, the President of Republika Srpska didn’t attend). The same happened with Croatian

2 Since the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system has been supervised by a High Representative of the international community, who has powers to implement legal reforms. Sevan Pearson, The Long Road towards Reconciliation Opinion and Analysis 63 president, Ivo Josipović, who apologised for crimes committed by Croatian forces in the central Bosnian village of Ahmići. While there have been some initiatives on the regional level in apologies and reconciliation, this is less visible inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. What’s more, a withdrawal of reconciliation on the part of Republika Srpska seems to be taking place. In 2004, Republika Srpska recognised the Srebrenica massacre, whereas today, although still recognising the atrocity, it tries to minimise its importance. Moreover, as Nicolas Moll points out, we need to consider another central question: “Reconciliation between whom?” Certainly, between the three national communities who were at war. But the historian suggests another central aspect: the Bosnian War was a conflict between the idea of a unified democratic and multinational Bosnia and Herzegovina, and ultra-nationalists against such an idea. The complexity of the war also lies in the involvement of civilians, both as perpetrators of crimes, but above all as victims. It is easier to reconcile two countries, such as France and Germany after the Second World War, than in a case where the war was conducted against civilians. Today, the situation of reconciliation seems to be at an impasse. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the war only ended in 1995, and that time is necessary for true reconciliation. The RECOM Initiative is a very positive sign which favours exchange and dialogue, even if there is no certainty that it will succeed. As Pierre Hazan notes, the mechanisms of transitional justice are a slow historical processes. They can be instrumentalised, but they can also be appropriated by the concerned populations and become a sort of liberation from the past.3 Without important political change and the removal of all nationalist parties, the economic and political situation will not improve. A bad economic position is fertile ground for extremist politicians. In spite of the nearly gridlocked situation in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nicolas Moll mentions the “potential of a historical surprise”. In history, there has always been some contingency and positive changes can suddenly occur. Let us hope that in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he will be proved right.

Sevan Pearson is a scientific collaborator at Collegium Carolinum in Munich Germany, and a PhD candidate in contemporary history at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (Munich) and at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland).

3 HAZAN, Pierre. Juger la guerre, juger l’histoire. Du bon usage des commissions Vérité et de la justice internationale. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2007, 232. Solving the Unsolvable Zoran vučković

The forces that led Serbia into war and international isolation during the 1990s crept back to power in 2012. With their warlord coats finally shed, they have now taken to the challenge of catching up for lost time.

In 2012, the parties of the old Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), the coalition which ousted Slobodan Milošević in 2000 and ruled the Republic of Serbia for over a decade, were voted out of power in both the parliamentary and presidential elections. They were replaced by the once infamous Socialistic Party of Serbia (SPS) and the Serbian Progressive Party (SPP). The return of the SPS to lead the country again, preceded by years of distancing themselves from their murky past, has been welcomed by a large part of Serbian society. Not surprisingly, with over 12 years of unsuccessful economic transformation and unsolved conflict with Kosovo, the Serbs want change. With change, however, also comes concern: will there be any resemblance to the Milošević era?

Missing values

The governments of the DOS which ruled Serbia for 12 years failed to effectively transform the country’s dire economy, and corruption has remained an unsurpassable epidemic affecting the everyday life of almost every Serb. The numbers speak for themselves. In August 2012 the Serbian Statistical Office recorded a 28 per cent unemployment rate, the highest since 1998 when it was first monitored. Other data do not offer a much rosier picture. NGOs estimate that the number of unregistered workers ranges between 300,000 and one million, while around 60,000 employees are believed to be not getting paid on time. The practice of keeping employees on a period of work probation is common among employers in Serbia, who try to reduce the high employment costs demanded by the state. Zoran Vučković, Solving the Unsolvable Opinion and Analysis 65

Unsuccessful privatisation has allowed the public sector to remain the largest employer in the country. Unlike their peers in other European countries, most young Serbs dream of getting a job within the state administration. But finding one is not easy, and requires connections or money. Outside Belgrade, the price for landing a position in a school or hospital can cost around 5,000 euros, although it can be as high as Young Serbs dream 8,000 euros. These “kickbacks” are usually paid to of getting a job within the director or the person in charge of hiring. The other option is to put your bet on political support. the state administration. Political parties in Serbia like to take good care of their members and supporters. For proven loyalty, they offer well-paid positions in public institutions. The quality of Serbia’s public sphere is far from what we could call a truly modern state. The burden for the widespread corruption lies in the country’s recent history, dating back to the 1990s and Serbia’s military involvement in conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina meant to aid local Serbs. However, once the initial phase of the conflict was over and the military units left, they were replaced by paramilitary forces, all closely connected with criminal groups in their homeland. Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian leader at the time, in order to control criminals such as the notorious leader of the “Tigers”, Zeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan), allowed their activity both within Serbia and on the frontline. The authoritarian government’s policy, with Serbia’s isolation in the international arena, all led to a situation where the division between what is legal and illegal became blurred. For young people, this created an entirely new model and a fast track for getting rich. The criminal lifestyle of “live fast and die young” became widely accepted in a society experiencing the harsh consequences of an economic downturn. This is reflected in the refrain of one of the popular songs of the time: “I will give birth to your son, who will be the king of cocaine.” Not only did the criminals gain more power in society, but their work also became a characteristic feature of the state. But crime alone does not explain the pandemic of corruption facing the country. The system of economic reward set up by Milošević himself is also of key importance. As is common in authoritarian regimes, political leaders build blocks of loyal allies which enable them to stay in power. Those who have proved their loyalty to the leader receive economic compensation channelled through public institutions. Unsurprisingly, all the public offices were manned by Milošević’s supporters in Serbia. And this was all in the context of the ongoing privatisation process, which was at a very nascent stage. The possibilities for employment outside the public sector became few and far between. 66 Opinion and Analysis Zoran Vučković, Solving the Unsolvable

Pandora’s box The 12 years of maintaining power by the DOS governments did not result in rooting out the country’s main problems. Not only did the Milošević-era tycoons manage to hold on to their wealth, they actually got richer. As unlikely as it seems, the return of the old guard in 2012 has now given Serbia an Crime alone does not unexpected chance to change. At least that’s what explain the pandemic the new government has promised to do. This is how Aleksandar Vučić, deputy prime minister and of corruption in Serbia. president of the Serbian Progressive Party, using the political capital of not being in power for over 12 years, could start his fight against corruption. The real challenge is making headway in this fight, considering the widespread connections between DOS politicians and the oligarchs. Consider the case of Miroslav Mišković, the recently charged owner of Delta Holding. Mišković made his fortune back in the 1990s and is now considered the richest businessman in South Eastern Europe. It has always been an open secret that for 12 years he has been filling the coffers of Serbia’s ruling parties. As an owner of the daily newspaper Pres (a piece of information which was hidden from the public until 2012), Mišković was a true powerhouse capable of eliminating any political or economic opponent. And while his court case is today quite widely discussed, mainly due to broad media coverage, it still remains unclear what portion of Pres was owned by Dragan Đilas, another prominent politician of the Democratic Party. The government claims that these cases, aimed at fighting corruption, have opened a Pandora’s box and that the police are investigating 23 open cases. Rumour has it they will include key politicians from the 2000-2012 period, including Oliver Dulić (a long time member of the Democratic Party and the former president of the National Assembly of Serbia) and József Kasza (leader of Hungarian minority party and vice minister from 2000-2003).

Kosovo, a new course of action?

One of the assumptions regarding the new government is that it will take a conservative shift in its policy towards Kosovo. Since the normalisation of relations with Pristina was set by Brussels as a condition for Serbia’s negotiations for European Union membership, many expected a relapse in the EU integration process. However, the contrary has proven to be true. The new government has expressed a high level of rationalism in its actions over the Kosovo issue. Vice- president Vučić stated that the process of European integration must continue, stressing that the country has no other real alternative. Zoran Vučković, Solving the Unsolvable Opinion and Analysis 67

Photo: US Government / Defense Dept. (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Aleksandar Vučić, the new deputy prime minister of Serbia, has stressed that European integration must continue.

Such statements are a significant and somehow unexpected change in the rhetoric of Vučić and the SPP. Before 2012 the party’s officials mainly declared a desire to intensify relations with Russia. But, since taking power, Ivica Dačić, the new prime minister, has gone as far as shaking hands with his Kosovo counterpart Hashim Thaçi and Catherine Ashton at an official meeting in Brussels. Such actions were avoided by the previous government, mainly due to fear that the nationalists, primarily the SPS and SPP, would use this to accuse the government of betrayal. Somewhat unexpectedly, the SPP and SPS have started to emphasise the necessity of “any kind of solution to the Kosovo problem” since the elections. But how will this role reversal by the SPS and SPP (in the context of the country’s relations with the EU and a long-term solution for the Kosovo problem) affect the future of Serbia? There are a few scenarios which could play out here. The most probable one is based on the assumption that all of the current government’s promises will be put into action. In other words, an agreement with Pristina will be reached which will satisfy EU demands for the normalisation of the country’s relations in the region. The question as to which form of such an agreement will take, still remains open. Belgrade will probably push for a technical 68 Opinion and Analysis Zoran Vučković, Solving the Unsolvable

agreement which won’t contain clauses of formal recognition, even though it will lay down in substance the foundation for normal cooperation between the two countries. And yet, enthusiasm should be controlled here. A large Serbian minority is present in Kosovo, mainly in its northern part. In addition to the constant daily ethnic tensions, a high-risk environment for possible future escalation of tensions between the Albanian majority and Serb minority could be likely. This will not only affect relations between Belgrade and Pristina, but will also influence the internal situation in Serbia. On the other side of the border, in the southern part of central Serbia, Albanians make up the majority of the population in the region of Sandžak (for a report from this region see New Eastern Europe 2(III)/2012), where, in 2001, the Albanian rebellion began. The local Albanians restrained from demanding administrative divisions from Belgrade (mostly due to pressure from the United States and the EU), although tensions resumed again in early 2013 regarding a monument dedicated to the Albanian fighters who died in the 2001 rebellion and which Belgrade demands to be removed. However, the truth is also that as the situation in the province is closely monitored by the EU, and with international forces still present in Kosovo, the possibility of a conflict erupting is much smaller compared to the 1990s. This unstable environment is constantly being stabilised by the EU. Brussels’s primary tool is the integration process (and EU funds) conditioned by relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The influence of EU conditioning comes across even more powerfully during times of the global economic slowdown, the crisis in Greece, and uncertainty in the eurozone, as both countries are highly dependable on these EU funds. Thus, the cooperation of Serbian old time nationalists with Pristina shouldn’t be that much of a surprise. In fact, nationalist sentiments are gradually fading in the Balkans. This was confirmed by Vučić in 2012 when he stated that Serbia depends on EU assistance. In that manner the vice-prime minister has openly confirmed primacy of economic against national goals of the government. Therefore, in the best-case scenario, with no political obstacles in Belgrade-Pristina relations, an acceleration of Serbia’s integration with the EU is possible. This could result in the accession of Serbia to the EU in the next enlargement package after 2013 (when Croatia joins the EU) with other countries in the region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro). Zoran Vučković, Solving the Unsolvable Opinion and Analysis 69

Attractive package An alternative for Belgrade, and a much more pessimistic scenario, is to ignore the country’s economic difficulties and refuse any agreement with Pristina even if this means breaking off ties with the EU. In effect, the deterioration of Belgrade’s relations with Brussels is to be expected, and could lead Serbia towards the group of countries whose integration with the EU is blocked based on political reasons (such is the case with Macedonia, due to its conflict with Greece). Severing EU ties would make space for the possible escalation of a conflict with Kosovo (as the EU would lose its only real tool for forcing Belgrade’s cooperation). Bearing in mind the previously mentioned Serbian minority in North Kosovo and the present declaration of some Serbian politicians regarding the change of borders, a new regional crisis could breakout. This would have devastating effects for the Serbian economy. However, this is the least likely scenario. For Serbian voters, bread and butter issues seem to matter much more than politics or nationalism. The third and final scenario is based on the outside, unexpected and game-changing event; such as a conflict breaking out in one of the region’s countries, spilling over into Kosovo or Sandžak. Nevertheless, the newly elected Serbian government promises an extremely attractive package. A successful fight against corruption could eventually eliminate the main obstacle hindering Serbia’s dynamic economic growth. Normalised relations with Kosovo could become a catalyst for further EU integration, and also help its economic growth. Clearly, refraining from these reforms could make the country even more susceptible to all sorts of impulses. However, sentiments towards Moscow are still very strong and shouldn’t be ignored. In fact, not much time has passed since key SPP politicians, while still in opposition, supported close relations between Russia and Serbia. This is something that shouldn’t be forgotten in Brussels or Washington when the pressure is put on Belgrade to normalise ties with Pristina in the near future.

Zoran Vučković is a Serb national and a PhD candidate at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. His interest focuses on post-communist transformations in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. ADVERTISEMENT Yugo-nostalgia

dorota majkowSka-SZajer and tomaSZ SZajer

Evidence of Yugo-nostalgia can be found in all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia. These lovers of Yugoslavia gather both in cyberspace and the real world, to celebrate South Slavic unity and the fondness for a life in a country where the sun is always shining; a country which no longer exists.

We start with a journey back in time to May 4th 2009. We are in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, but in a place commemorating the existence of another state: the Museum of Yugoslav History. We have come here on foot but stop in the car park. Several dozen people are gathered; some are still languishing, they roll up Yugoslav flags and look back at the late-comers photographing themselves by a monument of the legendary leader of the South Slav nations, Josip Broz Tito. Others are already boarding buses with registration plates belonging to young Balkan states such as Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Each of these buses is plastered with images of Tito and should perhaps be called time machines: the admirers of the Yugoslav leader have just ended a journey to a country which can’t be found on any map of the world published since 2003.

House of flowers

Towering over the city of Belgrade, the complex of buildings housing the Museum of Yugoslav History was intended as a gift to Marshal Tito and opened on his 70th birthday: May 25th 1962. The three and a half thousand square metres were provided for the expanding set of presents given to the Yugoslav leader by the “grateful” citizens. In this collection of tokens of admiration, accumulated over a period of several decades, examples of folk craft are displayed side-by-side with achievements 72 Opinion and Analysis Dorota Majkowska-Szajer and Tomasz Szajer, Yugo-nostalgia

of native technological achievements: a model of a bridge, an armoured vehicle, a train, miniaturised equipment of a classroom, and a dental office. In one of the museum pavilions an extraordinary set of assorted things from all over the world can be seen gifted to Tito during diplomatic visits by representatives of other countries. But it isn’t this assortment of gifts that bring the inhabitants of the Tito’s tomb is not only former Yugoslav republics here. The biggest a curiosity for tourists but “attraction” of this place is Kuća cveća (The also a place of pilgrimage. House of Flowers), where Tito’s body rests under a granite slab. The Marshal’s tomb, constantly strewn with fresh flowers, is not only a curiosity for tourists but also a place of pilgrimage, and his funeral is an important element of the Yugo-mythology. On one of the mausoleum’s walls we can still see a map of the world marking the countries from which leaders came to pay their final respects to Tito. The fact that the heads of superpowers participated in the funeral is evoked as clear proof of the universal respect enjoyed by the Yugoslav leader. The museum’s memorial book is full of entries expressing the powerful emotions of people visiting the final resting place of the Yugoslav dictator, and helps to understand the motivations of people who still come to the Marshal’s grave 30 years after his death. “As long as my heart is beating, you will live in it,” declares a female inhabitant of Banja Luka on May 3rd 2009. This is not an isolated sentiment. Other entries read: “Comrade Tito, I am still your scout girl, my heart told me so through the rapid pulse of the happiness of old … Here this happiness is present also today. LONG LIVE MARSHAL TITO.” “Along your paths roses always blossom and on the pages of history one name shines in golden letters: TITO, friend of all nations.” “O, fate! Give us back the life from 1960-1980, not because we were young but because our life was peaceful, good and comfortable and we were respected the world over. You say this is impossible!? Then give a part of such life to our future generations which will come in 200 years and more.” “Dear Comrade, father, brother, son, our beloved president, our eternal leader. Your idea is alive today, it is alive now, the now which is eternal and never ends. We are your fighters, your pupils, in a journey which leads us, your sons, to brotherhood and unity … We thank you that the flower of youth will never wither in our hearts, which are beating and fighting on for our homeland, for some New Yugoslavia.” The date we read these expressions of unwavering love is not accidental – we are visiting the mausoleum on May 4th: the anniversary of Tito’s death. However, Dorota Majkowska-Szajer and Tomasz Szajer, Yugo-nostalgia Opinion and Analysis 73 this is not the only day commemorating Yugoslavia. In the Croatian village of Kumrovec, the native home of Josip Broz Tito, meetings bringing together disciples of the former Yugoslavia have been taking place for several years on every May 25th. It has an atmosphere of a family picnic, with the participants singing popular Yugoslav tunes. Day of Youth

Under the fluttering blue, white and red flag with a big red star you can see people of all ages (partisan groups of from the Second World War, as well as entire families). Regardless of when they were born, everybody is celebrating the Day of Youth – May 25th. The Day of Youth was an idea by the dictator himself. A crucial part of the celebrations was a relay race encompassing all of the Yugoslav republics. Every year about one million people from all regions of the federation participated, Yugo-nostalgia is a longing for passing birthday wishes for the head of state along with the baton. The race ended the small pleasures of daily life with a grand state ceremony at the National in the socialist Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Army Stadium in Belgrade, when a representative of Yugoslav young people presented the baton to the president. Although it is difficult to believe today, the ritual continued until 1987, seven years after the dictator’s death. This way of celebrating Tito’s birthday shouldn’t come as any surprise, however, as every citizen of Yugoslavia knew that young people were very dear to the president. Every Yugoslav student earned the title of “Tito’s boy/girl scout”. The sign of membership in this club was a red scarf and a navy- blue cap, and the catchphrase: “Mi smo Titovi, Tito je naš” (“We are Tito’s, Tito is ours”). Today, these emblems are fashionable gadgets and identification badges for those inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia who have never come to terms with the break-up of the country. In a poll in 2010, as many as 85 per cent of the citizens of Sarajevo said that they regarded Josip Broz Tito as a positive figure, while the remaining 15 per cent had no opinion. In Croatia, a battle is taking place between admirers and opponents of the Marshal, which concerns the naming one of the principal squares in Zagreb after him. Lovers of the former Yugoslavia are spontaneously organising relay races and “radne akcije” (voluntary campaigns) under the slogan “Uz Maršala Tita” (the beginning of the most popular scouting song “With Marshal Tito heading the march”), and photographing themselves in scouting costumes. In all the former Yugoslav republics we find proof of worship and remembrance: official names of streets and squares, less official names of restaurants and cafes, or portraits of Tito (often surrounded by religious icons and paintings) adorning the 74 Opinion and Analysis Dorota Majkowska-Szajer and Tomasz Szajer, Yugo-nostalgia

walls of shops, services and workshops (most commonly in Macedonia). In almost every city in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are societies named after Josip Broz, their members promoting anti-fascist ideas and protesting against sharp ethnic divides. Lovers of Yugoslavia gather both in cyberspace (issuing virtual Yugoslav passports) and in the real world. Advocates of unification are even collecting signatures under a petition appealing for the establishment of a new Yugoslav federation. An inseparable element of Yugo-nostalgia is the sense of betrayal and aggravation. Almost every conversation with lovers of the “good old Yuga”, as its inhabitants like to call it, sooner or later turns into a roll-call of all the people who contributed to the break-up of Yugoslavia. The sense of living in a besieged Balkan fortress is the subject of a separate article. But a fragment of a song by the popular Bosnian rapper HZA is worth quoting here. In his most popular piece called Dear Tito, taking the form of a letter to the late president of Yugoslavia, the young Bosnian vents his resentment caused by the collapse of Yugoslavia:

“America, the CIA, the Russians and the Vatican, We were a thorn in their side, so they blew your plan to fucking pieces, We were the fourth military power of Europe, It is easier to rule when you divide it into parts …”

Lost paradise

A sense of injustice is fertile soil in which the longing for old times is growing. But Yugo-nostalgia is not just a longing for the country ruled with an iron fist by Marshal Tito. Its most common expression is a longing for the small pleasures of daily life in the socialist Yugoslavia. The country existed for a good few decades and covered some part of the lives of three generations, with many inhabitants of the former republics having been born and raised in Yugoslavia. When the state was split into several independent parts, many citizens didn’t understand why they should say goodbye to their Yugoslav identity (as was witnessed, for example, by the peaceful mass demonstrations in the streets of Yugoslav cities in 1992, which questioned the necessity of the disintegration of the federation before the outbreak of the war). It is obvious that life in the former Yugoslavia was not reduced to worshipping the leader. The lost paradise of youth comes back as memories of many of the everyday trifles, which unite the inhabitants of the region into a community of memory. Back in 1989, Dubravka Ugrešić, Dejan Kršić and Ivan Molek started working on the Lexicon of Yu Mythology. The undertaking was suspended during the war, but in 1999 it acquired new momentum: the webpage www.leksikon-yu-mitologije.net Dorota Majkowska-Szajer and Tomasz Szajer, Yugo-nostalgia Opinion and Analysis 75

Photo: Tomasz Szajer

The “Tito” restaurant, located off a highway in Serbia, serves a healthy dose of Yugo-nostalgia. was created and internet users started flooding it with proposals of entries for this encyclopaedia of the collective memory of Yugoslavs. The paper version of Lexicon was put out in 2004 by two publishers: Postscriptum from Zagreb and Rende from Belgrade. As a bible of people suffering from nostalgia it is an extremely joyful work. Its ironic tone coupled with an alphabetic order of entries is a smart way of dodging accusations of an ideological, political or historical bias. Here are some examples: “A” for “Anti-Fascist Women’s Front” (Antifašistički Front Žena – a socialist organisation for the emancipation of women), “B” for “Šaban Bajramović” (the greatest performer of Gypsy songs), “C” for “Cocta” (the Yugoslav imitation of coca-cola), “Dž” for “Dragan Džajić” (one of the best Yugoslav footballers of all time, his popularity attested to by his worth in the collectors’ series of photographs Fudbaleri i timovi [Footballers and teams]: for one picture of Džajić you could get ten others!), “E” for “Eurokrem” (the first Yugoslav chocolate spread produced on an Italian licence by the Takovo factory from Upper Milanovec, and supported by bombastic state propaganda), “M” for “Mendo Mendović” (a teddy bear from a children’s TV programme recorded in Zagreb), “R” for “Radne akcije”, 76 Opinion and Analysis Dorota Majkowska-Szajer and Tomasz Szajer, Yugo-nostalgia

“T” for “Titovi govori” (or pearls of wisdom casually dropped by the leader, for example: “Today, we have what others don’t have. Many have what we don’t have. But it doesn’t matter.”), “Y” for “Yugo 45” (an achievement of the Yugoslav car industry, its propaganda aspect emphasised by a separate line sold in the United States). This is, of course, is just a handful of selected examples, which gives us some picture of the capacity of this box of souvenirs, as well as the diversity of its content.

Forgone childhood

The sample from the encyclopaedia above should also be supplemented with the “red passport”, which recurs in the reminiscences of former Yugoslavs – giving access to the West, which was closed to the citizens of the other socialist countries. Today, the former poor neighbours are members of the European Union and travel freely across the world, while the inhabitants of the countries established after the breakup of Yugoslavia were (and some still are) subjected to a visa regime. And, indeed, the exchange of Yugoslav passports for IDs of the new states was not trouble-free. The brutality of war For many people, the necessity to define their destroyed the belief in the national identity proved to be painful (especially harmonious co-existence in the case of mixed marriages) and involved a rejection of values held for many years (the writer of the South Slav nations. Miljenko Jergović, an atheist Croat who grew up in the multiethnic Sarajevo, had to accept being baptised as a Catholic in order to receive Croat citizenship – you can read Jergović’s “Merchants of Europe” in this issue of New Eastern Europe). The brutality of the war, which for many people destroyed the belief in the harmonious co-existence of the South Slav nations, is another reason for the nostalgic returns to the lost country where – as befits the country of foregone childhood – the sun is always shining. Blaško Gabrić is trying to recreate the space of his former homeland on a scrap of land adjoining the Serbian city of Subotica: the mini-Yugoslavia established by him is a Yugo-nostalgic map in miniature, drawn along the lines of the Yugoslav song Od Vardara do Triglava (where topographic symbols of all the former republics such as mountains, valleys, rivers and the sea can be found) – and another venue for the May meetings of Yugo-nostalgia sufferers. The half-century of socialist Yugoslavia cannot simply be erased. The permanent nature of the Yugoslav identity is attested by the fact that the Serbian census contains the category “ethnic Yugoslav”. In 2010 the Center for the Development of Civil Society in Zrenjanin estimated that close to 100,000 Serbian citizens regard themselves as Yugoslavs. But in the 2011 census, such a nationality was only Dorota Majkowska-Szajer and Tomasz Szajer, Yugo-nostalgia Opinion and Analysis 77 declared by 25,000 people. Perhaps the best-known representative of this minority is Srdjan Dragojević, one of the most popular contemporary Serbian (or perhaps we should say Yugoslav) film directors. Although Yugoslavia is definitely a closed chapter in history, it is difficult to avoid the impression that in many spheres of life, this country has never ceased to exist. Musicians, actors, singers and TV celebrities are popular in all of the former republic, regardless of their nationality, and many Serbian TV reality shows have an international character. The inhabitants of the countries established after the breakup of Yugoslavia, even those who don’t have any problems fitting into the structure of the South Slav nations, seem to feel they belong to a wider community. Most news websites divide the news into three sections: domestic, world and “regional”. The last part contains reports from all the countries that once belonged to the Yugoslav federation. Some publishers do not beat around the bush and simply call this section Ex-Yu.

Translated by Tomasz Bieroń

Dorota Majkowska-Szajer is a cultural anthropologist with the Ethnographic Museum in Kraków.

Tomasz Szajer is a cultural anthropologist and a television reporter with Polish TVN and TTV. ADVERTISEMENT A Pact with the Oligarchs

Paweł kowal

The fate of Ukraine lies in the hands of a group of the richest families, and any sensible policy towards Ukraine must take this into account. Vladimir Putin understands this fact, although the European Union has a problem accepting it.

The sources of the financial elite’s wealth in all states of the former Soviet Union can be found in the same period: the final phase of perestroika and the 1990s. Today’s “magnates’ estates” were founded on huge transfers of various kinds of goods. State property went into private pockets. People well-placed within the communist system had privileged access to these opportunities. However, connections with the regime An oligarch is not simply were not sufficient. To establish a fortune you also needed ruthlessness, propensity for risk-taking and, a rich man. An oligarch as always, talent. It helped even more if you could, craves power. speak multiple languages and move freely on the international scene. Children of the communist elites and Komsomol members were usually the winners. Many oligarchs and rich politicians were previously active in the Soviet Union’s communist youth organisation, including Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yulia Tymoshenko. After 1991, businessmen (and women) needed good relations with the new (only usually to some extent) regimes established in these freshly founded states. Political change created space for building wealth without ideological constraints. People were dependent on the regime for loans, contracts and commissions, while the authorities defined the position of large sectors of the economy dominated by the oligarchs such as metallurgy, energy and construction. Only the regime, especially in the initial developmental stage of the post-communist oligarchy system, had the possibility of guaranteeing security to this emergent group. 80 Opinion and Analysis Paweł Kowal, A Pact with the Oligarchs

Accumulating goods Only when the states, built on the rubble of the Soviet Union, consolidated their power, did the fate of the newly feathered oligarchs take slightly divergent paths in respect to the different countries. These differences were defined by a limited number of key factors. The first was wealth and the possibilities of the country they were active in. For various reasons you could gain less in The oligarchic nature Lithuania or Latvia than in a much larger country such as Kazakhstan. The economic structure determined the of the Ukrainian business environment in which particular oligarchies government is a fact. were operating – in the Soviet Union, various branches of industry were grouped in particular republics. The largest regional diversity in this respect was in Russia. Almost every form of activity provided scope for expansion, and the biggest opportunities were offered by the energy sector. In Ukraine, steelworks and transport of energy from Russia became a speciality, and later also the transfer of goods and raw materials to the West. Money earned was invested in other sectors of the economy such as the food industry and insurance. The dynamics of the post-communist transition, for example in Russia, in particular before the crisis in 1998, is almost unprecedented in the economic history of the world. If someone had sufficient capital, they were able to make money on virtually anything: tourist agencies and the import of second-hand cars flourished, and investing in new technologies could make people extremely rich. The Eastern barons became more and more serious. Their ambitions grew and their behaviour changed for the better: they were less “new”. The once popular jokes about the “new Russians” or “new Ukrainians” disappeared. The wealth was followed by a desire to have an extravagant lifestyle, to travel and spend more time in the West (luxury apartments in Spain, London, Karlovy Vary and Baden-Baden), to invest in studies at Western universities for their children, and to collect works of art. A relatively new hobby of the oligarchs is the purchasing of football clubs. Having a good image proved to be another desire. People from the East attach an enormous importance to reputation. Hence, investments in the media were not just about making a profit; they were treated as an element of a wider project. And although investing in the media might not be particularly profitable in economic terms, they often functioned better than professional public relations agencies. Incidentally, this sector was dominated by rich people from this area of the continent, and their financial potential far exceeded the sums that Western clients could afford to pay for these kinds of services. Rumours are rife about the number of companies promoting the image of the new prime minister of Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, in Brussels and Washington. And to a large extent, Boris Berezovsky owes his fortune to takeovers in the media market. Paweł Kowal, A Pact with the Oligarchs Opinion and Analysis 81

Sense of mission The shape of the future oligarchy was hugely influenced by politics and the social situation. At this junction the ways of the oligarchs from particular countries parted, as did the direction of development in their home states. The Baltic states chose the path towards liberal democracy. Under this system, the political ambitions of the oligarchs can be pursued mostly by supporting this or that political party, and then reaping the benefits should their party win. Joining the European Union, which brought with it the introduction of anti-monopoly and anti-corruption laws and regulations separating political parties from business, constrained the impact of the oligarchs even more, but they did not eliminate it altogether. For an oligarch is not simply a rich man or a rich man with shady origins of his fortune. An oligarch craves power; his ambitions are not limited to accumulating A negative view of the oligarchs is wealth. Even if at some stage his political a constant element in the analysis aspirations are driven by a desire for profit, of the situation in Ukraine. they are usually supplemented by a need to influence the regime or be a part of it, to draw satisfaction from it, to reinforce his conviction that he is motivated by a public mission transcending merely acquiring goods. It is difficult to say when the public involvement of a businessman is thus ennobled with the aspect of political responsibility for the people of his country, but such a moment certainly exists. Over time, the government starts to transfer some of its duties to the oligarchs, or rather tacitly accepts that it is relieved by them in its obligations. And they in turn display a propensity to take over these responsibilities, motivated by a sense of mission. And this in a way dignifies the circumstances in which their fortunes were established. But while the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin meant subordinating the oligarchs to the regime, Leonid Kuchma, in a state more poorly organised and internally divided, built a system of balance between the state and its structures on the one hand, and the oligarchs and their “princedoms”, on the other. The division based on particular industries in Ukraine is particularly important (Oligarch A controls the natural gas market; Oligarch B controls the airlines, etc). If the rules governing the spheres of influence are threatened, attempts at revising them become a source of tension and an opportunity for political change. Sometimes we can even see a demand to settle the matter indirectly at the polling booth, as particular parties are influenced by specific oligarchs in specific areas. Tensions between the oligarchs were one of the reasons for the success of the Orange Revolution in 2004, which resulted in a new political and economic deal for the oligarchs. 82 Opinion and Analysis Paweł Kowal, A Pact with the Oligarchs

Satiation, power, legitimacy Money gives the oligarchs self-confidence, although legitimacy of power is only produced by electoral mechanisms. A genuine oligarchy creates competition, at least between the oligarchs, and needs this competition to develop. The oligarchic system cannot exist without democracy, or at least without democratic procedures, which can become a playing field for it, a platform where particular groups compete against each other; some get stronger and some get weaker. Democratic procedures become one of the forms of the struggle for influence. This can be observed even in oligarchic systems with The question should not a clear domination of one party – then be “if”, but “how” the oligarchs the struggle is between factions under the forms of “internal democracy”, for example will function in Ukraine. through elections to the party’s governing bodies. When democracy gets weaker, the playing field shrinks, public opinion has a smaller impact on the decision-making process, and the media ceases to be spokesmen for the regime. The concentration of decisions in the hands of a democracy-destroying regime in Russia is an indication that you should leave for London or prepare your pyjamas before being taken to jail; while in the Ukraine it is the first signs of the coming revolution. For the generation of post-Soviet oligarchs, satiation with material goods came relatively quickly. They did not wait for a generational change to channel some part of their resources to “higher causes”; this stage of their development arrived rather early. Charities named after the oligarchs were established, large sports facilities were built. Rinat Akhmetov, owner of Shakhtar (a Ukrainian football club from the city of Donetsk), built a stadium for EURO 2012 in his native Donetsk. Another oligarchic area of interest is culture, especially museums and art. Kolomoyskyi and Gennady Timchenko are establishing a Jewish centre called the Holocaust Museum in Dnipropetrovsk. Victor Pinchuk established the PinchukArtCentre – a private museum promoting contemporary art which employs western experts. Vadim Rabinovich is the main sponsor of the rebuilding of the Lazarus Brodsky Synagogue in Kyiv and the gilding of the domes of the St. Volodymyr’s Cathedral in the Ukrainian capital. Henadiy Boholyubov, one of the richest Ukrainian oligarchs but also one of the least known in the West, has done a lot for the Jewish community in Ukraine and abroad – a few years ago he spent one million dollars on prayer books for people praying at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. Akhmetov, a Muslim, financed the construction of the Ahat Jami in Donetsk; and Dmytro Firtash is rebuilding Orthodox churches and monasteries all over the country. Another aspect of oligarch life is their socialising with the stars of show-business. Victor Pinchuk counts such celebrities as Elton John among his friends, and Paweł Kowal, A Pact with the Oligarchs Opinion and Analysis 83

celebrated his 50th birthday in the famous Alpine resort of Courchevel, with the whole town excitedly following the event. Travelling to the West showed the oligarchs how important it is to create ideas, to participate in the exchange of ideas, and to emphasise the importance of certain social and political solutions. They realised that in order to achieve that goal, it is not enough to have “their own” candidates on particular party lists to parliament. They must become interested in the soft forms of making an impact on reality. And this gave rise to another field of their activity: establishing think-tanks and organising conferences promoting specific ideas and solutions which are important for Ukraine (and of course for the sponsor himself). One example is the Yalta European Strategy Forum sponsored by Victor Pinchuk. A similar conference takes place in Batumi, although in Georgia it is financed by the government. The meetings in Crimea, which in fact are private events, host the most important American and European politicians (Javier Solana, Condoleezza Rice, Štefan Füle). Yalta is perhaps the only place where one can see at one time the whole gamut of Ukrainian politicians from Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Vitali Klitschko, to Viktor Yanukovych and Mykola Azarov. Pinchuk has such a strong position that they wouldn’t reject his invitation. Today’s Ukrainian oligarchs personally engage in politics, and from the point of view of the West they are normal politicians. They have often shown themselves to be capable negotiators, political players nimbly moving in the international power rooms. If they work as government officials or parliamentarians, they finance their 84 Opinion and Analysis Paweł Kowal, A Pact with the Oligarchs

activities from their own pockets. Having their own resource base, the salary paid by the government doesn’t play any role in their overall budget. Their benefit from having a government job is that it protects their private interests.

A Ukrainian speciality

Oligarchic rule as a type of government was not invented in Ukraine: an oligarchy ruled in ancient Greece and merchant families were an oligarchy deciding the fate of the Venetian Republic. In Eastern Europe, oligarchs are mostly a Ukrainian speciality. As president, Leonid Kuchma introduced a unique system combining the concentration of capital, political ambitions and opportunities into the hands of a small group, which today is practically closed and well established; you can list all its members by name. So the oligarchic nature of the Ukrainian government is a fact. While the growth of the importance of these magnates is proportional to the weakening of central government, we are witnessing the arrival of the second generation of oligarchs: inheritance and the institutionalisation of today’s feudal holdings reinforce the process of oligarchisation. In Russia the rich had something to say under Boris Yeltsin, but Vladimir Putin aimed the guns of his regime at them, especially those with political ambitions which conflicted with the president’s plan. The sad fate of Mikhail Khodorkovsky is a symbol of the victorious battle against the Russian oligarchs and the supremacy of the government’s power over their influence. The situation in the Ukraine is different. Here, we are dealing with a sort of balance of influence between the regime and the oligarchs, which also means a division of responsibilities. The oligarchs have taken so many functions of the government upon themselves that it would be difficult to fill the void left by them if such a void appeared. Could today’s Ukraine function without the oligarchs? The question is exactly the same as it was several centuries ago: will the “private” activity of the oligarchs or their individual political plans have an adverse effect on the good of the state? Dislike of the oligarchs is a constant element of analysis of the situation in Ukraine. All that is written about them is cast in a negative frame. Everyone from humble experts to influential politicians repeats the trivial claim that with the presence of oligarchs you cannot reform Ukraine. If the country is doing poorly, the blame is put on the oligarchs – this is the simple picture in which the rich are permanently cast as the villains. So is there an easy way of resolving the problem of the oligarchs, or do these authors intend to say Ukraine is doomed to the current type of oligarchic regime? Paweł Kowal, A Pact with the Oligarchs Opinion and Analysis 85

Realistically speaking, you cannot expect the oligarchs to give up their fortune voluntarily. And surely the aim cannot be to spark a revolution which would make it even easier to increase their wealth. Oligarchies based exclusively on political or military power are easy to liquidate in comparison with oligarchies based on capital – it is difficult to deprive them of their influence on the functioning of the country through a simple electoral change. A truly realistic programme would be for the pro-European political elites in Ukraine to strike a deal with the oligarchs. Some signs of such an arrangement are already visible. For various reasons, the oligarchs themselves want to hold the president in check and limit Russian influence on domestic politics. The Khodorkovsky case is discouraging enough for them to put a stop to the introduction of a system modelled on Russia in their own country. Such a broad pact should pay heed to three things. The first is self-restraint in expanding political influence through financial pressure. This means strengthening the parliamentary democracy in Ukraine with all its consequences and making an 86 Opinion and Analysis Paweł Kowal, A Pact with the Oligarchs

assumption that at some stage in the future, in the name of their own interests, the oligarchs would be ready to accept the rules of the game. Secondly, such an understanding should feature the adoption and consistent execution of an anti- corruption programme, possibly starting with an amnesty regarding the period when the magnates accumulated their wealth. This would ensure that seeking justice many years later would not be used as a method of exerting pressure. The case of Yulia Tymoshenko is the best illustration. And finally, pro-European orientation of the country would serve as a security warrant for the oligarchs. The question remains how many among the Ukrainian oligarchs would be ready to accept such a programme and how consistently would they implement it? Historical experience does not bode too well, proving that resignation from political ambitions or acting on behalf of the public good rather than private interests is very difficult. Ukrainian oligarchs also have problems with hearing the voice of the people. During the Orange Revolution we clearly saw a clash between the ambitions of the people and the inconsistency of the Ukrainian oligarchic elites. Will today’s oligarchs take a step further towards the responsibility for the state and promote the position of Ukraine in integrating with Europe?

Family instead of oligarchy

In the recent history of Ukraine, there has been no regime that has made an attempt at overpowering the oligarchs, removing them from co-deciding the situation in the country. But there were two major attempts at redrawing the map of spheres of influence in the oligarchic world. The first was connected to the elections in 2002 and consequently with the revolutionary events of 2004, and those behind them were oligarchs dissatisfied with the distribution of spheres of influence chartered by President Leonid Kuchma. But the results of this “shift” in the oligarchic hierarchies were limited: key players stayed in the game, although they had to make some room for the younger generation of influential figures in Ukrainian business. The second attempt at changing the balance of power, this time by the government rather than by revolution, can be seen unfolding live. It consists of creating a “family”, that is a group of even younger oligarchs owing their loyalty to the president of the country. The crucial factor here is not the potential benefits from the new distribution of influence, but the political experience of Yanukovych, who has concluded that some oligarchs easily switch loyalties. For it is clear that in some oligarchic circles, the support for the government of the Party of the Regions is weakening. So it is a mostly political undertaking aimed at preserving the electorate of the Party of the Regions for Viktor Yanukovych. Paweł Kowal, A Pact with the Oligarchs Opinion and Analysis 87

The president’s son Oleksandr is active in the construction business, and for the second year running found himself on the list of one of Ukraine’s richest. In 2011 he ranked 70th with his fortune estimated at 130 million dollars. His wealth today is believed to be 133 million, which gave him 61st place on the list published by the weekly Korespondent. As journalists from the Ukrainian edition of Forbes have reported, the All-Ukrainian Development Bank belonging to Oleksandr increased its turnover thirteen-fold, and in the next couple of years it may join the group of the largest financial institutions in the country. Another business activity of Oleksandr Yanukovych is coal-mining in Donbas. Besides the obvious political and economic aspect, the interest in coal has one more dimension, namely a strategic one. Coal could replace expensive Russian natural gas in the Ukrainian economy. In this sense the “family” could also provide a guarantee of expanding independence from Russia, should it want to use energy to exert pressure through other Ukrainian oligarchs. The country could be aided in this project by Chinese banks loaning money for investment in the coal industry. It is believed that President Yanukovych’s son will also try to take control over the Ukrainian oil sector and, in this way, influence relations with Belarus. As we can see, political pressure may lead to a remodelling of the balance of power between the oligarchs, but it is difficult to imagine its collapse. This is one more reason to treat it as a permanent piece of the political puzzle in Ukraine.

How to live with an oligarchy

Western rhetoric, where the oligarchs function as the principal target of criticism of the Ukrainian system, is based on a misunderstanding of the role of the oligarchs. For the question is not “if”, but “how” the oligarchs will function in this system. The fact that the oligarchs support the Ukrainian state in many functions is particularly important. So the argument concerns the future shape of Ukrainian society and the direction in which fortunes will develop, as well as the attitude of their owners to Ukrainian statehood and rules of the democratic game. But one thing is certain. Any effective constraining of the supremacy of the oligarchs could today (perhaps in the future the situation will change) occur not as a result of empowering the “people”, as the outcome of the Orange Revolution has shown, but through a more authoritarian regime, as the Russian experience proves. Do the unreflective critics of the oligarchy take this factor into consideration? Does the West know any mechanism which would rid Eastern political life of oligarchy other than revolution connected with “de-oligarchisation”? From this point of view the oligarchs emerge as a guarantee for maintaining democratic procedures in Ukraine, and in this sense they are to some extent allies 88 Opinion and Analysis Paweł Kowal, A Pact with the Oligarchs

of the West. They do not guarantee the quality of democracy, but they can ensure that some of its mechanisms function. The call to completely eliminate the problem of the presence of the oligarchs in the economic and public life in the East is utopian. A more rational project is to accept the status quo and unblock the Ukrainian system rather than try to remove the oligarchs. Before EURO 2012, when Carl Bildt and Radosław Sikorski visited Rinat Akhmetov, “the Lord of Donetsk”, to talk about the situation of Yulia Tymoshenko and the European aspirations of Ukraine, elites both in Brussels and Kyiv were full of indignation. Although the meeting didn’t have any major effect, the question remained whether such meetings should be looked at as one of the methods of seeking real partners for the political dance in Ukraine: not instead of talking to the government in Kyiv, but as an additional political activity. It is high time to start treating the word oligarch as a descriptive category rather than a term of abuse, to accept the presence of the new magnates in the East, and try to reach an understanding with them.

Translated by Tomasz Bieroń

Paweł Kowal is a Polish politician and member of the European Parliament. He is Chairman of the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee in the European Parliament. ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT

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The 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, although far from being free and fair, have kept the Party of Regions in power. But is their political alliance strong enough to maintain power against the will of the people?

“The fact that we can be deceived again and again fills me with optimism.” Stanisław Jerzy Lec

I wonder if there is any reader of New Eastern Europe who would readily and without the slightest doubt believe that the recent parliamentary elections in Ukraine were fair and transparent. If the answer is affirmative, check your pockets; perhaps you happen to have a membership card for Ukraine’s ruling Party of Regions; or, for non-Ukrainian citizens, a nice contract with the son of President Viktor Yanukovych. In Ukraine, if what is reported in the surveys is true, there are quite a few people who believe that the process of the expression of the people’s will in 2012 was absolutely perfect. Yet even these largely falsified elections still give rise to optimism over the next few years. I shall explain why.

Simple arithmetic

Let’s start with the cold hard facts. The ruling Party of Regions received 30 per cent of the votes. The Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) All-Ukrainian Union, led by the political prisoner Yulia Tymoshenko, received 25.54 per cent, while the other opposition force – UDAR, led by the world famous boxer, Vitali Klitschko – scored 13.96 per cent. The far-left communists received 13.18 per cent and the far-right Svoboda got 10.44 per cent, to round up the top five. If you compare the results of the traditional alliance between the Party of Regions and the communists with the total percentage scored by the remaining three opposition parties, simple arithmetic shows that the party of the current regime lost the political component 94 Opinion and Analysis Volodymyr Ariev, The Illusion of Elections

(through proportional representation) of the elections: 43 versus 50, even despite a mad stretch of votes in the Party of Regions’ fiefdom in Donetsk, the Luhansk Oblast and Crimea. Still, the fact that the opposition failed to win the overall elections for a number of obvious reasons is beyond any doubt. Firstly, only half of the seats in the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) of Ukraine were won by proportional representation – this was the political component. The second half of parliament was won in the majority (winner-takes-all) districts: a bearable election system also common in Europe. However, the rules of the game in Ukraine were far removed from Europe, and far from being civilised. But this will be discussed later. Thus, the majority share votes allowed the regime to prevent a victory for the opposition. How? I have seen this scheme up close while striving for victory in the majority district in the capital city of Kyiv. Its essence is simple, just like the entire policy of the ruling party in Ukraine. Kyiv, like most of Ukraine, doesn’t take to the Party of Regions. In other words, running for office there on behalf of the Party of Regions is like trying to feed bananas to a tiger – they won’t eat them, but they will lose their temper. The candidates in those regions were disguised as theoretically acceptable choices for the local political preferences: an independent, self-nominated candidate with serious resources or a strong service record, employing opposition rhetoric and pursuing a demonstrative policy of small deeds (such as paving roads, building playgrounds, repairing houses etc.) Although this “charity” is mostly financed through the municipal and regional budgets, the candidates regularly and solemnly inaugurate objects, one after another, usually in their own name. The champion, however, is not usually a “benefactor”. As a result, this tactic proved to be effective in many districts, and the geography of the self-nominated candidates’ victories greatly complicated the political picture of the pro-opposition Central and Western oblasts. After the elections, the majority of the “independent” deputies joined the Party of Regions or began voting in unison with it. Only the city of Kyiv, along with the oblasts of Ternopil, Lviv and Ivano- Frankivsk, have not afforded a single seat to the ruling power. In all other oblasts, the Party of Regions enabled their concealed candidates to sneak in. They managed “to get in”, but they didn’t win honestly. And this was the case in many districts, as well as in the elections from party lists. What happened on election day and the further vote counting was shown by the media around the world. There were spectacular shots, such as theBerkut special forces unit storming the electoral commissions; scenes of shaved-headed, criminal-looking militants with press cards from fictional newspapers elbowing election observers and real journalists out of the polls; whole packs of false ballots being found in the office Volodymyr Ariev, The Illusion of Elections Opinion and Analysis 95 of the chief commission official. And then, the court decision annulling the votes of almost 30,000 voters added to the drama. There were more than enough tricks, and the international observers had a healthy dose of astonishment in a country which until recently they held up as an example to its neighbours.

Experiment in democracy

Of course, the elections in five districts had to be renounced; the facts established there were so flagrant that observers from the principal international organisations alluded to a non-recognition of the elections if “victory” was awarded to the ruling party candidates. But as for the rest, the ruling regime managed to smuggle in the right people or get the right numbers: especially in places where no control of the process could possibly be introduced, as the authorities made sure that neither the opposition nor non-governmental organisations would be allowed any rights. The opposition and civil society organisations were easily deprived of any sources of financing or lacked equal possibilities for power. These offences were repeatedly emphasised in the OSCE mission report. However, this document contains a far too gentle and diplomatic assessment compared to the reality. An interesting experiment was carried out in the heart of the Party of Regions fiefdom: the city of Donetsk. Elections were held differently by two adjacent districts: District 41 and District 43. District 43 received close attention, with many observers and journalists present. District 41, on the other hand, had a standard set of participants and observers. The outcome was quite revealing. District 43 (the controlled district) was attended by half as many voters, and the Party of Regions received a significantly less percentage of votes when compared to District 41.

Election results at two adjacent polling stations: District 41 and District 43

Polling Number Communist Party of Ukraine – station of electors Party of Batkivshchyna UDAR Svoboda Regions Forward! /district who voted Ukraine

141622 1198 1001 121 22 16 6 10 (district 41)

141920 681 425 118 52 45 9 11 (district 43) 96 Opinion and Analysis Volodymyr Ariev, The Illusion of Elections

There were also districts in Donetsk which had more than 90 per cent voter turnout, and guess which party received almost 80 per cent of the votes? Of course, we can recall the favourite maxim of the criminal environment – innocent until proven guilty – but the comparisons are too eloquent to believe the assertions that the elections were fair and honest. As a result of all the successful (and failed) election schemes, along with the deputies repurchasing and attracting “independents” to the side of the regime, the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada is now composed as follow: The Party of Regions (208 seats), Batkivshchyna (99 seats), UDAR (42 seats), Svoboda (36 seats), the Communist Party (32 seats), and the non-affiliated (27 seats), including the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and the two deputy chairmen, who cannot be members of a voting fraction. Five seats remain vacant.

European course?

The allocation of forces is unsteady, but still in favour of the regime. The Party of Regions and the communists don’t have a very firm alliance, because the “Reds” were irritated over the Regions not giving them a chance to participate in any majoritarian districts, risking the Communist Party of Ukraine losing the status as a separate voting fraction. However, upon another infringement of the law and reciprocal concessions, the alliance between the communists and the Party of Regions came into existence. The communists got their status as a fraction and their seats in power, while the Regions received the majority of the 240 votes. Nevertheless, the Party of Regions doesn’t have a steady majority, and even with the maximum mobilisation of votes, which is not common, the parliamentary powers are distributed as 57 per cent to 43 per cent. This is almost the exact opposite when compared to the results of the proportional votes in the election. In other words, once again we have a situation in Ukraine of the people voting against the policy of the ruling party, but have to face the fact that the ruling party didn’t lose. Something similar occurred in 2002, two years before the Orange Revolution. Indeed, ten years ago, Ukrainians were also watching manipulations with criticism, but silently, eventually leading to the events which unfolded on the Maidan (during the Orange Revolution). In the context of foreign policy, Ukraine has again demonstrated that it will take time to convince the south-eastern part of the country to choose the European course; while it is impossible to force the centre and west to back into “the prison of the peoples”. This is why the problem of making no headway will only end after a high-power impulse, which ironically can only rise from within the country – from its people who have to make the choice for themselves. Volodymyr Ariev, The Illusion of Elections Opinion and Analysis 97

The only way to help the Ukrainian people is to tell the story of the European family and disseminate European-focused information throughout Ukraine, instead of creating the European Union information vacuum, which is slowly expanding.

Translated by Olena Shynkarenko

Volodymyr Ariev is a People’s Deputy of Ukraine, a member of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), and sits on the Ukrainian parliament’s committee for foreign affairs. Expectations and Reality Collide in Tiraspol

Piotr oleksy and kaMil Całus

In January 2013, Yevgeny Shevchuk, the president of Transnistria, completed his first year as head of this unrecognised state. But has the young politician managed to fulfil any of the domestic or international expectations during his first year in office?

Since coming to power in early 2012, both the people of Transnistria and the international community have had some well-defined expectations for the newly elected president, Yevgeny Shevchuk. However, domestic expectations inside Transnistria were completely different from those set abroad. While the people of Transnistria had primarily hoped for a decrease in the levels of corruption and a higher standard of living, the international community expected the new head of state to become much more open towards the West, and to show greater flexibility on the issue of the status of this unrecognised republic. The fact that it was Shevchuk who won the election a year ago, although quite unexpectedly to foreign observers, came as no surprise to the citizens of this quasi- state. The transfer of power was surprisingly peaceful, accompanied by no real resistance from the old guard or much social enthusiasm from among the people. Still, the political line-up in Transnistrian politics has changed considerably. The fact that the president has focused most of his efforts on the economy during his first year in office is evidence that establishing a strong position for himself as a domestic policy maker remains his greatest priority.

A dissident with a past

“It can be easily seen that Shevchuk was not entirely ready for his leadership role. He didn’t have his own political team and he only really started to build it after he Piotr Oleksy and Kamil Całus, Expectations and Reality Collide in Tiraspol Opinion and Analysis 99 was elected,” says Nikolay Babilunga, a Transnistrian historian. Shevchuk came to power presenting himself as a lone sheriff who promised to reintroduce law and order. But he is no novice to Transnistrian politics, and first challenged Igor Smirnov (the previous president of Transnistria, who held the post for 20 years) during the 2006 presidential election. Shevchuk was the leader of Obnovlenie – a new party on the Transnistrian political scene at the time –and took on the monopoly of power Shevchuk’s victory was due held by the directoriat (President Smirnov’s government whose members all came from to the fact that Transnistrians the Soviet Communist Party). were tired of the economic Obnovlenie was the political arm of the situation and social inequality. powerful “Sheriff” – one of the largest and most influential businesses in Transnistria. Winning a majority of seats in the Supreme Council of the Transnistrian Parliament was Obnovlenie’s first success, enabling Shevchuk to assume leadership of the party, but he soon fell victim to Smirnov and the corrupt system in Transnistria. After Shevchuk stepped down as a candidate in the 2006 presidential race (mostly due to Smirnov’s strong support from Moscow), Smirnov quickly made a deal with Obnovlenie, essentially removing Shevchuk’s political influence. From then on, this young politician has portrayed himself as a Transnistrian dissident and a victim of the political system. It was only after Igor Smirnov fell out of favour with his Russian patrons, however, that Shevchuk stepped in again to run for president in the 2011 presidential election. Officially, Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party supported Anatoliy Kaminski as their preferred candidate. Kaminski was the chairman of the Supreme Council of Transnistria and Shevchuk’s successor as the leader of Obnovlenie. However, this didn’t mean that Shevchuk’s coffers were empty. He was said to have received considerable financial assistance from Modest Kolerov, an influential political technologist, the former vice-chief of Putin’s administration, and currently the head of the Russian Regnum news agency. Shevchuk’s victory in the election was mainly due to the fact that the people of Transnistria were truly tired of the difficult economic situation and the deepening social inequality in the region. Many believed that Shevchuk could change something for the better, break down the old regime and improve the standard of living for ordinary people.

The Transnistrian Saakashvili?

Shevchuk’s lack of power base presented a real problem for the newly elected president. Almost immediately after the election, Vozrozhdenie (the party supporting 100 Opinion and Analysis Piotr Oleksy and Kamil Całus, Expectations and Reality Collide in Tiraspol

the policies of Shevchuk) was solicited into helping with the situation (it is worth noting that both Russian names – obnovlenie and vozrozhdenie – are quite similar in meaning and can both be translated as “rebirth”), and was expected to attract a large number of new people into Transnistrian politics. It was also supported by some members of the old camp of President Smirnov (while others joined Obnovlenie, and others left politics altogether). In this way, a bipartisan system was born in Transnistria, with clear divisions of power in Shevchuk has put a lot of effort which one party held legislative power, while the other held the executive power. into creating a strong image Shevchuk’s biggest priority was not political, of himself as the lone sheriff however, but was meeting the majority of restoring law and order. expectations set by the Transnistrian people who had brought him to power, with the primary goal of reducing corruption. In little over 20 years of its existence, Transnistria has seen a new class of people emerge within its society; those who are closely connected to the state apparatus. These officials enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle and preyed on small businesses. They controlled the customs and borders agencies and facilitated smuggling. Igor Smirnov, the former president, didn’t try to stop these practices in any way as he believed the stability of his government was dependent upon the existing system. Thus, Shevchuk’s new government simply had to declare war on its own administration and the country’s top officials. The first front in the new president’s war was with border control, aiming to repeat the success of former Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili, who also fought corruption. Shevchuk couldn’t afford, however, to fire all the border agency staff and hire new officers in their place. This would have been too drastic. Instead, he enacted new rules to enforce the border. Foreigners were given the right to file complaints against Transnistrian customs officers, and if evidence of forced bribery was discovered, the officer in question could be fired. At the same time, the salaries of customs officers were raised with the goal of making their jobs sufficiently attractive to not risk losing them to bribes. The initiative has been partially successful; crossing the Transnistrian border is less of a nuisance these days, although there is still extortion and bribery.

The lone sheriff

Shevchuk’s most difficult challenge, of course, is the fight against corruption at the highest levels of government. Shevchuk has had to act very carefully, facing strong resistance on the side of the officials. However, some serious measures are slowly being taken; starting with the government’s announced 25 per cent reduction Piotr Oleksy and Kamil Całus, Expectations and Reality Collide in Tiraspol Opinion and Analysis 101 in state employment, claiming that the inflated public sector is a financial burden on the state. Obnovlenie, which holds the majority of the seats in the Supreme Council, has not been particularly supportive of Shevchuk’s government. Shortly after the presidential election, Anatoliy Kaminski stood down as the chairman of Obnovlenie and was replaced by the lesser known Mikhail Burla, whose main challenge was to defend the party line on the one hand, while on the other try to avoidan all-out war with Shevchuk. The past year, however, has been wrought with conflict between the president and parliament. According to some experts, Obnovlenie’s focus is to deprive Shevchuk of his function. This conflict has not yet developed into a total war, and there are many areas in which the legislative and executive bodies have worked together, such as being able to reach a consensus on foreign policy matters. The second most important expectation of the electorate, which consists of healing the economy and improving the standards of living, seems to be even more difficult for Shevchuk to achieve. Since most financial transactions in Transnistria are made by companies registered in tax havens, the state doesn’t benefit much from the revenue of local businesses. Curbing such practices would be against the interests of the owners of those businesses, most of which are owned by Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs. Alisher Usmanov, for example, one of the richest Russians

Photo: Kamil Całus

The last presidential elections in Transnistria, just like previous ones, were accompanied by numerous festivities. 102 Opinion and Analysis Piotr Oleksy and Kamil Całus, Expectations and Reality Collide in Tiraspol

and a media magnate closely connected with the Kremlin, owns a large part of the shares of a metallurgical plant in Ribnita, fundamental to the local economy. Shevchuk has a difficult dilemma in this regard. Any action threatening the interests of a Russian businessman might cause the Kremlin to withdraw its shaky support for Shevchuk, and could prove decisive for the president’s future. To help his fight against corruption and his economic initiatives, Shevchuk has invested a lot effort into creating a strong image of himself. In this tiny quasi-state, personal visits by the president can play just as big of a role as media coverage does, and Shevchuk has made a point of visiting almost every village during his first few months in office. The image of a lone sheriff fighting crime has brought about a lot of jokes on the internet. There are caricatures showing Shevchuk’s face with John Wayne’s body, sometimes including satirical comments. But most Transnistrians support their president and see him as their best chance for restoring “law and normality”. The only flaw in the young president’s image is the fact that he is not married. His opponents have used this fact to disseminate gossip about his supposed homosexuality, something that would be discrediting in a conservative, Orthodox society. In reply, Shevchuk promised to get married by the end of 2012. This promise hasn’t been kept, although the president continuously emphasises his deep faith and devotion to the Orthodox Church.

Small steps abroad

A new leader behind the wheel in Transnistria was welcomed with great caution, and at the same time with some expectations, by both the European Union and Moldova, the country which still claims Transnistria as part of its territory. The prime minister of Moldova, Vlad Filat, was very complimentary, calling Shevchuk “a well-prepared, flexible person”. Indeed, Shevchuk quickly gained the reputation of a pragmatist who is willing to negotiate. One of the first decisions he made concerning mutual relations between Tiraspol and Chisinau was removing a restrictive customs tax on goods imported from Moldova. The tax dates back to 2006 as an act of revenge against the economic embargo by Moldova. Shevchuk’s move was meant to act as the start of a policy of “small steps” towards a constructive dialogue in solving the common economic and social problems of Moldova and Transnistria. The negotiation process, which had been frozen for a long time, is now taking place at a faster pace than ever before. Less than a month after the presidential inauguration, Shevchuk met the Moldovan prime minister in Odessa, where the two reached an agreement on resuming freight traffic in Transnistria. They also began Piotr Oleksy and Kamil Całus, Expectations and Reality Collide in Tiraspol Opinion and Analysis 103 talks on introducing uniform licence plates in both countries which would enable vehicles registered in Transnistria to cross into Moldova and EU countries. This new approach in foreign policy was also revealed by a cabinet reshuffle. Several days before the Odessa summit, Nina Shtanski, an attractive and dynamic young lawyer (aged 35), was nominated by the president as foreign minister of Transnistria. Shtanski quickly became the face of the new, liberal and non-confrontational politics of Tiraspol. The change in foreign policy can be explained by the president’s relative independence from the Kremlin, with Shevchuk showing signs that he would act in the best interest of his electorate rather than Russia. This claim had some solid basis and, in fact, many of Shevchuk’s decisions made in the first months of his term ran contrary to Russian interests. Many experts read this as the president’s attempt at loosening ties with Moscow. A significant sign was the Moldovan-Transnistrian agreement reached during the 5+2 Vienna summit in April 2012 (5+2 is the format of negotiations with Moldova and Transnistria on conflicting sides, with Russia and Ukraine holding the status of guarantor states. The EU, the United States, and the OSCE act as observers). According to this agreement, Moldova accepted the equal status of Transnistria in the negotiations process. In the past, Moldova had argued that it was unacceptable that an unrecognised state and a separatist region could be treated on equal terms. In return, Tiraspol agreed to grant equal status to all the other participants of the negotiations, which infuriated the Russian side. Up to that point, Russia and Ukraine, acting as guarantors of the negotiations process, enjoyed more rights than the EU or the US. Since the Vienna summit, however, Moscow has decided that it will no longer turn a blind eye to the policies of the new Transnistrian administration. In order to wield influence over the region, the Kremlin then created a new position of the Russian Special Representative for Transnistria and appointed Dmitry Rogozin, a deputy prime minister, to hold this function. Rogozin is no stranger to protecting Russian interests against western approaches. Between 2004 and 2006, Rogozin acted as Putin’s “Special Representative for the Kaliningrad District” and took care of Russian interests when the Baltic republics were joining NATO and the EU. A similar situation can now be seen in the case of Moldova and its aims at integration with the EU. Rogozin and other Russian officials have since made a strong presence in Tiraspol, having a visible influence on Transnistrian foreign policy. Bilateral meetings between Filat and Shevchuk have become less frequent. Planned visits have been cancelled and the talks regarding licence plates, which were launched last year, have come to a standstill. The most recent bilateral meeting took place in September 2012. Officially, the visit took place in a friendly atmosphere, although the Transnistrian 104 Opinion and Analysis Piotr Oleksy and Kamil Całus, Expectations and Reality Collide in Tiraspol

leader’s declarations left no doubt that the relations were deteriorating. Shevchuk’s willingness to compromise seems to have all but disappeared. In October 2012, Transnistria reintroduced the customs tax on goods brought over from Moldova – a symbolic event ending the improvement in bilateral relations.

The honeymoon is over

Nina Shtanski has quickly become the second most important person after the president. Most recently Shtanski was appointed deputy prime minister – highlighting the importance of foreign policy to the administration. In November 2012, under the watchful eye of Russian diplomats, Shtanski lead the development of a new document outlining Transnistria’s foreign policy goals for the coming years. According to the document, the biggest priority for the unrecognised republic is now economic and political integration with the Russian Customs Union. Relations with Moldova were pushed into the background, Transnistria’s foreign with guidelines ruling out any practical possibility of unification with Moldova unless Moldova policy reversal has brought decides to abandon the idea of integration with about disappointment the EU and also joins the Customs Union. Thus, it for Moldova and the EU. seems that Transnistrian foreign policy has gone from a short period of limited freedom back to full dependence on Russia. Additionally, Transnistrian foreign policy is becoming an instrument of the Kremlin to persuade Moldova to give up its efforts towards integration with the EU. By handing over foreign policy to Russia, Shevchuk has disappointed both Moldova and the EU who expected the new leadership to bring about a serious breakthrough in the negotiation process. However, in all honesty, such expectations were truly naive. Regardless of his ambitions and openness, it seems that the Transnistrian leader isn’t able to conduct any sort of long-term foreign policy without a green light from Moscow. If the Kremlin decides to use Transnistria as a political instrument to achieve its own goals, Tiraspol has little choice but to go along. Being economically fully dependent on Russia, the quasi-state would most probably not be able to survive even a month without Russian support. This kind of submissiveness does not endanger Shevchuk’s political interests, although it might run contrary to his ambitions. The new policy of joining the Customs Union, reflecting the interests of Russia, has met enormous public support in Transnistria. According to local statistics, the number of people supporting integration with the Customs Union nears 100 per cent. Even if this number is inflated, there is no doubt that the majority of Transnistrians support the idea Piotr Oleksy and Kamil Całus, Expectations and Reality Collide in Tiraspol Opinion and Analysis 105 of integration with the East; economic and political integration with Russia is an acceptable path for Transnistrians. In this quasi-state, the myth of the Great Russian civilisation, with Transnistria being an essential part, is still very much alive. Attempting any revolutionary changes in this area would be self-defeating for Shevchuk as he could lose his strongest asset: the support of the people. In reality, remaining loyal to Moscow in terms of foreign policy allows him to solve the necessary and urgent internal problems being faced by Transnistria today.

Translated by Agnieszka Rubka

Kamil Całus is a specialist on Moldova at the Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw and a PhD student at the Institute of Eastern Studies of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań.

Piotr Oleksy is a PhD student at the Institute of Eastern Studies of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. Power Politics and Identity in Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations

anar aBdullayev

Azerbaijani-Iranian relations have grown unfriendly over the past several years. The root causes of Iranian resentment towards Baku are found primarily in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Azerbaijan is a secular state which enjoys warm relations with Washington and growing strategic ties with Israel.

In 2012, a series of events took place which shaped the dynamics of Iran’s engagement with the South Caucasus, and particularly with Azerbaijan. Earlier, in May 2012, Iran arrested two Azerbaijani poets accused of spying. In the following weeks, ahead of the Eurovision Song Contest, tensions between Tehran and Baku were on the rise. There were reports of the Azerbaijani intelligence services preventing potential terrorist attacks during Eurovision, allegedly planned by groups linked to Iran. And more recently, a visa regime has been resumed between Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic. All in all, these are alarming signs of deteriorating relations between the two states. With a predominantly Shiite population and secular statehood, Azerbaijan stands out among the other two South Caucasian states of Armenia and Georgia. Thus, coupled with these factors, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy course of multi-vectorism has brought it to the centrepiece of Iran’s priorities in the South Caucasus.

Historic events

The modern history of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations dates back to the beginning of the 19th century. Numerous Russo-Persian wars ended with two crucial peace treaties – Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828). In the aftermath of these treaties, the territory, where Azerbaijani khanates were located, was divided between Persia and the Russian Empire. As a result, Northern Azerbaijan, i.e. present- Anar Abdullayev, Power Politics and Identity in Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations Opinion and Analysis 107

A building with the Azerbaijani Flag viewed from across the Aras River in the Azerbaijani - populated part of Iran.

Photo: Adam Jones, Ph.D./Global Photo Archive (CC) www.flickr.com day Azerbaijan, came under Russian political, economic and cultural influence. Meanwhile, Southern Azerbaijan, which is home to the majority of ethnic Azeris worldwide, has remained under Iranian authority, strongly religious and largely isolated from the socio-cultural processes of Northern Azerbaijan. Since then, social development in Southern and Northern Azerbaijan has taken different paths. The logical culmination of the historic events in Northern Azerbaijan was the establishment of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (ADR) in 1918. The ADR essentially set the pattern of statehood for the people of Azerbaijan – a secular and democratic republic. The ensuing Soviet rule in Azerbaijan ushered in a new era of secular education. For 70 years, Soviet state atheism sought to replace mainstream religions in Azerbaijan, mainly Islam. In 1991, Azerbaijan regained its independence and post-Soviet Azerbaijani society has remained mostly secular, although in terms of nominal religious affiliation, the majority still identify with the Shiite branch of Islam, also predominant in Iran. With the independence of Azerbaijan also came the bloody war with neighbouring Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) region. As a consequence of the war, 20 per cent of Azerbaijan’s territories were occupied by Armenia. The Islamic Republic of Iran was quick to propose its mediation efforts to the belligerent sides of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran’s initial reaction to the war over Nagorno-Karabakh was more balanced. However, Baku and Yerevan did not follow each other in choosing representatives for peace-making. Azerbaijan chose to side with Turkey 108 Opinion and Analysis Anar Abdullayev, Power Politics and Identity in Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations

as a guarantor of the former’s security in the region, while Armenia considered Iran as a reliable partner. By doing so, Baku undermined the efforts made by Iran to increase its influence in the region through peace-making. As a reaction to these developments, Iran decided to increasingly side with Armenia. Also fuelling the tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran were calls for the ethnic unification of certain nationalist political groups in Azerbaijan, as well as on the other side of Southern Azerbaijan is home to the the Iran-Azerbaijan border. Nationalist groups which forged these ideas had the majority of ethnic Azeris worldwide political support of Abulfaz Elchibey’s and is under Iranian authority. government (1992-1993) at the time. However, these calls for irredentism of Southern Azerbaijan ironically contradicted the principle of territorial integrity which official Baku adopted in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The next president of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev’s attitude towards Iran and particularly, Southern Azerbaijan, was based on pragmatic considerations. The Aliyev government essentially abandoned the nationalist rhetoric which prevailed during the Elchibey period. And yet, a more pragmatic approach did not end Iranian political support for Armenia, with the main reason being the foreign policy course that President Aliyev chose after coming to power. Having considered the potential for Western involvement in the resolution of the NK conflict and Western energy interests in the South Caucasus, the Azerbaijani government made a clear foreign policy choice in favour of the West rather than Iran. During Ilham Aliyev’s (son of Heydar Aliyev) presidency, Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have remained stable, despite the fact that relations would frequently deteriorate, as happened in 2012, with Azerbaijan purchasing weapons from Israel to the sum of 1.6 billion dollars. In February 2012 the Iranian Fars News Agency spread information about Israeli Mossad intelligence agents secretly working in Azerbaijan and contemplating attacks on Iran’s nuclear scientists. Around this time, Anar Bayramli, a correspondent for Iranian television in Azerbaijan was arrested in Baku, with another 22 people being arrested in connection with charges of spying in favour of Iran. These news reports have added to growing suspicions and fuelled more antagonism between Baku and Tehran. There have been numerous mutual accusations by Tehran and Baku in relation to threatening plots against each other.

Southern brothers, Shia Islam and multi-vectorism

When it comes to the issue of Southern Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev has essentially followed the pragmatic course set by Heydar Aliyev. Suffice to say that Ilham Anar Abdullayev, Power Politics and Identity in Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations Opinion and Analysis 109

Aliyev hardly ever highlights the issue of ethnic Azeris in Iran and has a strategic vision of Azerbaijan as a motherland for all the Azeris living outside the country. However, signs of diminishing political support toward ethnic Azeris in Iran have done little to prevent the worsening of relations between Iran and Azerbaijan at state level. In view of the pragmatic approach to the issue of Azeri minority in Iran, it cannot be considered to have had a strong effect on the overall Iranian policy towards Azerbaijan. Iranian perception of Azerbaijan is also affected by the fact that the latter is home to the second largest Shiite population outside Iran; and yet it is a secular state. Secular statehood by itself is not a strong reason to assume that Iran may adopt a hostile attitude towards Azerbaijan. After all, Iran supports the secular Assad The legal status of the Caspian regime in Syria. However, unlike other Sea remains a contentious neighbours of Iran with a significant Shiite issue in the relations between population, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, Azerbaijan is the country where Shiite Iran and Azerbaijan. Muslims constitute more than half of the population. A potential threat lies in the realm of Iran’s interference in internal affairs of Azerbaijan through Shiite radical groups loyal to Iran’s ayatollahs. In 2012, bilateral tensions ran high ahead of the Eurovision Song Contest when Iran expressed its utter concern over a potential gay parade due to be staged in Baku. The message was clear: the Eurovision-type of event in a country with a predominantly Shiite population bordering the Islamic Republic was totally unacceptable for Iran. The nexus between the majority Shiite population and the secular statehood of Azerbaijan has been a looming irritant in bilateral relations since Azerbaijan became an independent state. Finally, any foreign policy course adopted by Azerbaijan is the single most critical variable shaping Iran’s policy toward its northern neighbour. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has gone through several phases since restoring its independence: pro-Russian (1991 to mid-1992), pro-Turkey (1992 to mid-1993) and predominantly pro-Western (1993 to early 2000s). Multi-vectorism is the prevailing and current foreign policy orientation of Azerbaijan reinforcing the country to seek friendly relations with all its neighbours without committing a particular political military alliance. This policy choice was accentuated with the coming to power of Ilham Aliyev in 2003. Meanwhile, as a country bordering Iran, Azerbaijan is aware of the limitations and advantages of its foreign policy. It goes without saying that multi-vectorism is the main prerequisite of an independent foreign policy. However, with it also come certain risks. Pursuing friendly relations with countries that are in conflict with each 110 Opinion and Analysis Anar Abdullayev, Power Politics and Identity in Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations

other could put Azerbaijan in an uneasy situation. Azerbaijan’s increasing strategic partnership with Israel is an example of such a scenario. Israeli-Iranian antagonism is at an all-time high and the international sanctions on Iran are also raising tensions in the region. It may seem that Azerbaijan and Israel share common security concerns vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran. Others claim that Azerbaijan has chosen Israel as a partner in response to Iran’s being a regional ally of Armenia, which occupies 20 per cent of Azerbaijan’s territories. For its part, the Islamic Republic of Iran opts to support Armenia rather than Azerbaijan. Thus, Iran’s political support for Armenia openly contradicts its self-declared image of the “protector of Muslims”.

Caspian dilemma

Another contentious issue in bilateral relations between Iran and Azerbaijan is the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The Soviet-Persian Treaty from 1921 laid the foundation for the legal basis of the Caspian Sea. This treaty did not establish any territorial division and the Caspian Sea was defined as an object of joint usage by both seaside states, i.e., Persia and the Soviet Union. Neither the Soviet-Persian Treaty from 1921 nor the maritime trade treaty from 1940 succeeded in laying out either the principles of delimitation or a maritime border. The issue of whether the Caspian Sea is actually an “internal sea” or “lake” also causes ambiguity and hence makes the exploration of natural resources problematic. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – adopted the stance on viewing the Caspian Sea as a “sea” in accordance with Article 122 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In this case, the Caspian Sea would be delineated with demarcation lines, which would be equidistant between the states. Defining the Caspian as a sea also grants each littoral state the right of exploring the maritime resources in its national sector. The lack of a coherent legal basis for status of the Caspian Sea led to numerous disputes between Iran and Azerbaijan. In 1994 Tehran was displeased with the decision made by Baku not to consider Iran as a partner in a consortium for the development and exploration of gas and oil in the Caspian Sea. Iranian resentments were fuelled by the fact that against this background, Azerbaijan signed production sharing agreements with Western, primarily American and British, energy companies. In July 2001, the Iranian and Azerbaijani tensions in the Caspian Sea boiled to the point of an open military standoff, after attempts of Azerbaijani operating companies to develop oil fields in the sector which Iran had claims for. Two years later, in August 2003, joint naval exercises by Azerbaijani and American servicemen led to accusations by Iran of militarisation of the Caspian Sea. Anar Abdullayev, Power Politics and Identity in Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations Opinion and Analysis 111

Azerbaijan’s continuing and strengthening strategic partnership with Israel has also raised eyebrows in Tehran. An article posted on the Foreign Policy website in March 2012, added to Iran’s suspicions as it felt more isolated from the international community owing to its controversial nuclear programme. The Azerbaijani authorities have never denied the fact of an arms deal with Israel, arguing that Azerbaijan is still in a state of war with Armenia and arms purchased from Israel are Azerbaijan’s increasing to strengthen Azerbaijan’s defensive capabilities. strategic ties with Israel However, Iran was concerned with Azerbaijan’s has alarmed Iran. purchase of anti-ship missiles as a part of a 1.6- billion-dollar arms deal. In 2012 reports about the Israeli secret services attempting to use the territory of Azerbaijan as a staging ground against Iran escalated the already heightened tensions. Meanwhile, future progress on the legal status of the Caspian Sea will remain stagnant. The dynamics of the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations in the context of the legal status of the Caspian Sea goes far beyond the legal considerations and will mostly be shaped by the geopolitics of the region. The delimitation of the Caspian Sea may seem to be a merely legal issue, but against the background of Great Power Politics, it is the projection of the overall foreign policy course that the states pursue. The distribution of alliances demonstrates the primacy of Realpolitik in the foreign policy making of regional countries, particularly in the case of Iran and Azerbaijan. Thus, Azerbaijan’s increasing strategic ties with Israel and Iranian support for Armenia can be framed into the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. For these countries, the primary motivation of a certain foreign policy choice is inevitably based on national interests, but not on religion or ethnic unification. Azerbaijan is likely to capitalise on multi-vectorism in the realm of foreign policy. The country’s entry in the Non-Aligned Movement in May 2011 was a clear signal to Iran that Azerbaijan will never allow foreign troops on its territory and will continue the balanced engagement with all of the regional actors. The strategic partnership that Azerbaijan has pursued with Russia, Israel, the United States and Turkey can potentially counterbalance Iran’s ambitions in the region. However, growing international sanctions on Tehran and hostility between Iran and Israel will be an uneasy “feasibility test” for Azerbaijan’s balanced foreign policy in the future.

Anar Abdullayev is a Project Coordinator at the NATO International School of Azerbaijan (NISA) and a columnist for Central European University Weekly. The opinion expressed in this article is the author’s personal view and is not the official position of NISA. Life After Nazarbayev

A conversation with Dosym Satpaev, Kazakh political analyst and director of the Almaty-based Risk Assessment Group. Interviewer: Zbigniew Rokita.

ZBIGNIEW ROKITA: I get a feeling that successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, most people in Kazakhstan, including finished this off and cleaned out the both the supporters and the opponents house completely. of the current president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, are afraid of what will But the situation in Kazakhstan is very happen once Nazarbayev is out of different. Our model is more similar power. In a country which has been to what we see in Uzbekistan, which is ruled by the same person since 1991, ruled by Islam Karimov. The truth is that are these fears justified? Uzbekistan’s Karimov and Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev are the last two patriarchs DOSYM SATPAEV: The issue of in the region still deeply rooted in the presidential succession in Kazakhstan Soviet political and party structures. has been widely analysed in the last Nowhere else in the former republics ten years, and different scenarios have do you see this. However, these two been taken into consideration. First gentlemen are not gods. They have made of all, let me point out that there are some serious mistakes. For over 20 years already examples of changes in power in of being in power they did not allow it to Central Asia: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and be diffused in any way possible. Perhaps Turkmenistan. In Tajikistan, this was a the only exception is what we call the result of civil war, while in Kyrgyzstan presidential vertical. And that’s precisely it was because of two revolutions. Only why today’s Kazakhstan cannot be called Turkmenistan enjoyed a peaceful change a representative democracy. Neither of power. But this happened not because does it have strong political parties nor Turkmenistan is a special country, but a strong parliament, a free media, nor an because its former leader, Saparmurat independent judicial system. By pushing Niyazov, eliminated the country’s entire other political actors to the sides, both elite shortly before his death. Niyazov’s Karimov and Nazarbayev have created Life After Nazarbayev, A conversation with Dosym Satpaev Interview 113 states that are very heavily centred on Photo: Zbigniew Rokita their leaders. This also explains why it is these leaders, so strongly associated with the state, who are the main focus of the people’s discontent. There is simply no other political institution against which to direct dissatisfaction.

But what are some of the significant differences between these two countries? In Kazakhstan, for example, great influence is enjoyed by the financial and industrial establishment, something which is practically absent in Uzbekistan, where the regional elites are much more important. In this aspect, Kazakhstan is, in fact, closer to Russia. However, Dosym Satpaev is a director with the what should also be stressed is that in Almaty-based Risk Assessment Group. Kazakhstan, unlike in Russia, the oligarchs have never played a truly independent role. knows that it is easier to win the hearts In one way or another they have always of the non-Kazakhs than the Kazakhs, been controlled by Nazarbayev. who are bound by clan loyalty. Characteristically, Nazarbayev has also belittled the importance of the clans, the What will happen to this diversified zhuz (“hordes”). His vision is that every elite after Nazarbayev dies? Kazakh should be, first and foremost, The answer to this question is connected faithful to the president. Nazarbayev to another problem: the very many actors doesn’t want any of the zhuz to start who are, in a way, eligible to take over dominating, which is why he started power. The interested groups include to diversify the elite. To better explain the presidential family, the “old guard”, the process, just take a look at the list of consisting of Nazarbayev’s close circles Kazakhstan’s richest citizens. Other than from Soviet times, the business elite and Kazakhs you will find representatives of the regional elite. nationalities such as Koreans, Jews, and It starts to get even more complicated Uzbeks. With such a mix, Nazarbayev can at the regional level, which is play his games and switch his support characteristically dominated by two from one group to another, without powers: the presidential representatives letting anyone dominate. Nazarbayev also employed in public offices at the local 114 Interview Life After Nazarbayev, A conversation with Dosym Satpaev

level, called akims in Kazakh, and the opinion becomes more radical in its heads of clan families. The legacy and demands, a strong democratic opposition source of power of the akims is the result could play the role of a shock absorber. of political nomination; while in the case The advantage of a democratic movement of the clans – it is based on tradition. is its willingness to solve problems legally, Theakims are usually the outsiders who without extreme measures. Democrats want to get their job done, whereas the tend to support evolution, and even if heads of the clans consider themselves they opt for a revolution, it is usually to be the real bosses of their territories, velvet. The lack of any real opposition will deeply rooted in their localities. Akims be the reason why the non-democratic need to treat the clans seriously or they forces will play a role in post-Nazarbayev face being kicked out of the region. This Kazakhstan. is how some people also explain what happened during the riots in the oil So what can Nazbarayev do to ensure town of Zhanaozen in December 2011, peaceful change after his death? when after months of workers’ strikes, The behaviour of the elite in post- the army opened fire and killed over a Nazarbayev Kazakhstan will largely dozen people. While wanting to change depend on the way the president leaves power in the region, the state-owned oil power. The most likely scenario is that and gas company, KazMunaiGaz, together Nazarbayev will appoint his own successor, with the local clan leaders initiated anti- in the same manner as President Heydar government protests. They simply did Aliyev of Azerbaijan did some time not like the fact that those who governed ago. In Azerbaijan, it was clear who their lands were outsiders “stealing” would take over power a few years before their wealth. Aliyev’s death, and the elite seemed fine with it. It seems that the situation in The opposition are completely Kazakhstan today could be quite similar. unknown in Kazakh society and almost Everyone is waiting for Nazarbayev’s come across as niche organisations. Do decision on who his successor will be. the other parties in Kazakhstan offer This successor will, however, only be any alternative to the government? successful if Nazarbayev really supports The authorities have set up their own him and openly shows it to society. rules of the game and don’t allow the Nobody would then dare to question the opposition to play in any capacity. But president’s choice. At least as long as he the truth is that this technique is starting is alive. What happens afterwards, is, of to come back at them like a boomerang. course, anybody’s guess. However, the What is important to stress here is that lack of such a buffer period could lead this situation is not really favourable for to society not supporting Nazarbayev’s the elite. Considering that once public successor, especially if it is someone Life After Nazarbayev, A conversation with Dosym Satpaev Interview 115 they don’t well know. Political successors will make a deal, set up new rules of have never made it as household names the game, and divide the Kazakh pie. in Kazakhstan. Everybody understands that a war of all against all isn’t good for anyone. And what happens if Nazarbayev can’t get everything done in time? What role could terrorist organisations, His unexpected death may complicate which are on the rise in Kazakhstan, things. The diversified elite and the play in the near future? divided spheres of influence have created These are anti-system groups; meaning a situation in which all the stakeholders that their main goal is to destroy the have the same rights, including the system. There are also more and more members of the presidential family. Islamist groups which are growing in And equal rights means equal claims, popularity in Kazakhstan today. These which, in turn, could lead to serious groups are not homogenous either. conflict; in which case, there are three Kazakhs may be officially Sunni but factors that could play a role: patriotic, the level of religious knowledge is quite religious and clan-related. It is clear that low, especially among young people. This different groups of the elite will try to creates a fertile ground for manipulation divide society into Kazakhs, Russians, and allows extremists to develop new Muslims, etc. groups and find followers who may be frustrated with the social situation. If no successor is appointed, could Kazakh society is relatively young. it lead to violence? The average age is around 30. But the There are two scenarios of a peaceful democratic opposition has lost its evolution to consider. The first one requires opportunity to take advantage of the creating a presidential-parliamentary youth. It has not been allowed by the system. Parliament, whose advantage authorities to work with youth groups, would theoretically lie in the fact that and at the same time the authorities it is elected by the people, could create have not offered them much either. As a a counterbalance to the elite focused on result, a sort of vacuum has been created power struggles. Right now, parliament and it could easily be filled. People don’t is quite weak, although this is also a really have a clear concept of statehood result of its marginal position in the in Kazakhstan, a value that could be last 20 years. shared by all its citizens. In fact, neither A different scenario could be what the authorities nor the members of the I like to call the “scenario of a Soviet opposition know much about Kazakh politburo”. We can’t exclude the option society. that the representatives of the most influential groups, led by survival instinct, 116 Interview Life After Nazarbayev, A conversation with Dosym Satpaev

Do you think that Islamists have prisons as criminals, and their extremist a better understanding of Kazakh activities don’t cease once they are behind society? bars. They definitely have the experience of working with people at a grassroots Where do these Islamist groups level, which is why they know more about come from? the people, their weaknesses and their The process of the growing influence needs. The first terrorist attacks in 2011 of Islamist groups in Kazakhstan has came as a shock to the elite. They simply been taking place since the collapse of overlooked the changes that had been the Soviet Union. It consists of three taking place in Kazakh society in recent stages and is similar to what happened years. Pretending that the problem is no in other Central Asian countries. In the longer there they try to sweep it all under early 1990s, we saw an inflow of foreign the carpet. The elite claim that the attacks terror organisations, mostly from the were not carried out by the Islamist south. In Uzbekistan, they had already underground, but by criminals and also arrived by the late 1980s. The second stage embellish the reality, which they don’t, took place at the turn of the millennium. in fact, understand. Characteristically, After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the majority of them keep their families many young Kazakhs went abroad to abroad and treat Kazakhstan as a source study at foreign universities, mainly of profit. By doing so, they don’t show in Muslim countries – Turkey, Egypt, any signs of patriotic behaviour, nor do Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates. they see their own future here. If things This educational tourism was completely go wrong in Kazakhstan, it’s unlikely uncontrolled. Nobody knew exactly where they’ll come back to the rescue. the young people had gone and what If and when the crucial moment finally exactly they were studying. When they takes place, nobody will be there to defend started to come back, they were often the government, as the members of the infected with radical Islam. The third elite are career-oriented and out for stage of this process is taking place now themselves. They won’t lift a finger when and is characterised by an active Islamist the situation requires their involvement. underground. Domestic attacks have So, we will have a repeat of the situation already taken place, with the majority of that happened 20 years ago when the them having been prepared in an amateur Soviet Union collapsed. Whilst members way. However, their professionalism has of the elite are busy competing against also been visibly growing. Many Kazakhs each other, it gives way for Islamists to are also being trained in Taliban camps. emerge. People who are charged with As you can imagine once these people extremist activity are put in the same decide to return home, they won’t be Life After Nazarbayev, A conversation with Dosym Satpaev Interview 117 amateurs making homemade bombs What methods have the terrorists based on internet instructions, they will been using? come back as professionals. First of all they are fighting against the However, one important change of power structures. They try to appeal to note has taken place. Kazakhs are now social outsiders; those who don’t benefit fighting in their own country against their from the current system. They also like own authorities. Extremist groups were to talk about corruption. They appeal previously made up of fighters whose goal to people because Kazakh society lacks was to attack Russia or the Chinese in any system of values; in Soviet times the Xinjiang. They would treat Kazakhstan ideology was handed to them, but now as their hiding place but wouldn’t carry they are lost. The extremists often work out any military actions here. This has in mosques, attracting more and more now changed. Kazakhs. The Islamists hover around approaching people and attending Why did the attacks start in 2011? religious services. They start their small Quantity turned into quality. People talk, distribute flyers, start discussions who were responsible for the agitation and encourage deepened studies of Islam. decided to change strategy and turn Finally, when they get these young people towards more effective methods. This on their side, the Islamists start showing has become a serious problem as the their own interpretation of religion. majority of Kazakhs now live in fear. The truth is that young people who start In a way, this is the government’s fault, becoming dependent on a pseudo-religious since there is the problem of spreading group gradually distance themselves from information in Kazakhstan, which leads the system, from society, from their family to the proliferation of gossip, anxiety, and the workplace. They feel less and less speculation and doubt. connected with these groups and feel that they’ve got less to lose. Thus, these people become prepared to make greater sacrifices, and the Islamists succeed in recruiting their “soldiers”.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Dosym Satpaev is a political analyst and a director with the Almaty-based Risk Assessment Group.

Zbigniew Rokita is an editor with the Polish bi-monthly Nowa Europa Wschodnia. Remembering Sasha

A conversation with Marina Litvinenko, the widow of Alexander Litvinenko, an ex-KGB and FSB officer, who died as a result of radioactive polonium-210 poisoning. Interviewer: Hayden Berry

On November 1st 2000 Alexander Litvinenko arrived at Heathrow Airport in the UK with his wife Marina, and son, Anatoly, asking for political asylum. Six years later, Litvinenko was admitted to hospital and died 23 days later on November 23rd 2006. After her husband’s death, Marina Litvinenko pursued a campaign on behalf of her husband to find out the truth through the Litvinenko Justice Foundation. In October 2011, she won the right for a full public inquest into Litvinenko’s death to be conducted by a coroner in London. The inquest is due to start on May 1st 2013.

HAYDEN BERRY: How did you meet your look for their own contract. When they husband, Alexander Litvinenko? came back to Moscow, the people who MARINA LITVINENKO: I always had sent them tried to get their money say that Alexander, or Sasha as I call back. One thousand dollars was a huge him, was a birthday present, because amount of money in 1993 and they were I met him on my birthday. However, afraid to leave their flat. At that time I never expected him to become my Sasha was working for a unit which husband. It was 1993 and a very difficult was fighting against organised crime, time. Everybody was looking for work and I contacted him to ask him to help and some of my friends went to Sri these friends get out of trouble. It was a Lanka to work as dancers. However, really nice meeting. He didn’t look like when they arrived, the contract hadn’t an officer at all and was a really funny been organised properly and they had to guy, which surprised me. Remembering Sasha, A conversation with Marina Litvinenko Interview 119

What kind of man was Sasha? his relatives, often asked him to help Sasha wasn’t a typical person from them. At that time, it was extremely the security services: he didn’t drink, easy for people in the security services he didn’t smoke, and wasn’t macho. He to make money as everything had a also had a very romantic view of the price. If you were robbed, you could go world. He liked old Russian films about to the police station or militsiya (now the Second World War. His favourite the politsiya – editor’s note) to give a singer was Vladimir Vysotsky, and he statement; but it would cost you. However, owned a lot of CDs and books about people never took statements as if it were him. He also loved sports and spent his their duty, everything was like a business; teenager years in Kabardino-Balkaria (in but not for Sasha. I met all the people that the North Caucasus mountains – editor’s Sasha helped, and all of them ended up note), where he did the pentathlon: horse- becoming our friends. They were just so riding, fencing, swimming, running and grateful that he was doing a normal job. shooting. And when I saw how he could He was probably the hardest worker I actually ride a horse, shoot, run and have ever met. I have never been jealous of swim, I could see that sport was truly other women with respect to Sasha, but I Sasha’s passion. was jealous of his job. I couldn’t plan to go He was born into a military family somewhere at a particular time because it and was 17 years old when he joined the might all suddenly have changed. Sasha’s Soviet army. His grandfather had been a job was very, very important to him. military pilot during the Second World War. Sasha’s parents were divorced, and Was there a particular moment in he often stayed with his mother’s family, your husband’s career when he decided while his father, a military doctor, worked that he wanted to change Russia’s far away in Sakhalin (Russia’s largest corrupt system? island just off the east coast of Russia, and I think something happened around just north of Japan – editor’s note). The 1993 or 1994 because there was a lot of mentality of being very organised and change going on in Russia, particularly having a duty towards your country was in 1994 when the Chechen War started, very important to Sasha. He also knew with all the corruption associated with the history of his family stretching back it. In 1997 he was transferred to the FSB 200 years, and felt quite proud about this. Directorate of Analysis and Suppression His ancestors were Kazakh people sent of Criminal Groups, located in a small, by the tsar to Nalchik (the capital city of hidden place, not based in the Lubyanka the Kabardino-Balkar Republic). (the popular name for the headquarters Sasha wasn’t a completely uncompro- of the KGB – editor’s note). And when mising person, but he was on the side of Sasha realised that many of the things the law. His very close friends, and even they were asking him to do were illegal 120 Interview Remembering Sasha, A conversation with Marina Litvinenko

– to kidnap people, to scare people – the prosecutors that there would be he realised that something was wrong. at least seven more cases. It was like a The last straw was when he received the repetition of what happened to Mikhail order to kill Boris Berezovsky (a Russian Khodorkovsky all over again. However, it oligarch – editor’s note). When Sasha was at this time that he received a threat; first told Berezovsky about the order, not just for his own life, but also for us. Berezovsky didn’t believe him. But later, And when the next hearing came up at when Berezovsky started investigating the a military court, which was known to be order himself, Sasha realised he couldn’t extremely tough, Sasha had some inside work for the system any more. It didn’t information and said to me: “Marina, I’m happen suddenly, but was a strong build not going to this court, because they will up of these kinds of feelings. definitely put me in prison.” He then said that he needed to go to Nalchik to see Why did Sasha decide to leave Russia, his relatives, his father and grandfather, taking you with him? and he left. Two days later I received a In 1998 Sasha held a press conference message from one of my close friends (in which he and four other FSB officers saying that I had to buy a new phone, claimed they were ordered to kill Boris and Sasha called me and told me to go Berezovsky – editor’s note); afterwards to Spain, where he said he would contact I said to him: “What’s next?” And he me. It was not a decision to leave Russia, said: “Next, there are only two ways: they but just: “Go to Spain.” I didn’t tell anyone will either kill me, or they will put me in except my mother, and only told our prison.” However, there was never any sign son, Anatoly, who was six years old at of having to escape. Many of our friends the time, when we were at the airport, accused Sasha of not thinking about as Sasha was extremely nervous and what would happen to his family, saying: thought that the FSB would prevent us “Why did he need to do this? Why did he from leaving. It was only after we’d been need to protect Berezovsky?” And Sasha in Spain for ten days that Sasha said we would reply: “It’s not about Berezovsky. wouldn’t be going back home. And after It’s about the system, which I’m afraid a big discussion he said: “They’ll put me will take over the entire country.” Even in prison again and I won’t be released. I the following year, when he was put in won’t be able to help you and you won’t prison, on March 25th 1999, we didn’t have any support. We have to go.” think about having to leave. Then this first case was dropped in November You ended up travelling through 1999, but he was re-arrested and put in Turkey to London, where the British prison again. In December 1999 he was government gave you political asylum. released on bail, and there was another As a mother, how did you deal with case and then another case. I knew from being a political refugee? Remembering Sasha, A conversation with Marina Litvinenko Interview 121

We came to London on November MI6 helping them to combat Russian 1st 2000 and I started trying to build a organised crime in Europe. normal life. Sasha was extremely nervous because he knew Russia was trying to Did you ever realise that what extradite him. But it wasn’t until May your husband did for a living was 2001 that we received political asylum dangerous? in the UK. I tried to keep myself busy Sasha never said that what he did during this time. Anatoly started school, was dangerous, and to me it didn’t look which I wasn’t particularly happy about, particularly dangerous. But in the summer but I agreed to change our lives just to of 2006 he became very worried about a ensure Anatoly’s life would be as normal law which the Russian parliament created as possible. He was my indicator of what I to assassinate people they could name had to do and what I had to think about. as Russian enemies or terrorists, even if I started studying English, and to have they lived abroad. Sasha took this very this chance to do something completely seriously because he knew that these people would do anything. He likened new was actually very good therapy. it to the mentality of the Stalin era, and I didn’t really I miss anything, except how they killed Leon Trotsky. for my parents. I’m an only child and Anatoly is their only grandchild, and There are many conspiracy theories my mother felt betrayed when we left. related to your husband’s death, but She was devastated. what do you think really happened?

Why did your husband become First of all, I know that my husband was killed. And not just simply killed. involved in MI6 after you moved to He was poisoned and he was tortured, London? and died in front of me after 23 days in Firstly, Sasha worked for MI6 because hospital, in a way I wouldn’t wish on he was asked to do so. We weren’t able anyone. The first time I was shown how to go straight to the UK or the United radioactivity can be used to kill someone States because nobody was interested in in such a quick and easy way – without us. Sasha was an officer and politically any special equipment, you just put it in involved, but nobody paid any interest a glass and drink it – I decided that the in taking him, especially the British world had to know what really happened. government. Two years later after Sasha From my perspective, however, the people had published a couple of books (accusing who actually killed my husband have the Russian secret services of staging the already been punished. Andrey Lugovoy Russian apartment bombings amongst used his hands to poison my husband, other acts of terrorism – editor’s note), but we have to know who was behind his he became involved as a consultant for hands. Sasha wasn’t shot and he wasn’t 122 Interview Remembering Sasha, A conversation with Marina Litvinenko

poisoned with any ordinary substance. because I knew there would be a lot of But the people who were accessory to publicity. this crime, the people who provided the radioactive polonium, and those who Do you think anything new will come actually gave the order for him to be out at the inquest? poisoned have to be named. The investigation into Sasha’s death was started when tests showed Sasha Why has it taken such a long time had traces of heavy metals in his blood. for an inquest to be organised? When we were then moved to University I had the right to the inquest from the College Hospital, the investigation was time Sasha died. It was initially opened, but transferred from the local police to the then closed because of the investigation. Special Branch, and Sasha gave a very But even after the investigation had long interview lasting almost three days. finished at the beginning of February We became very close to the officers 2007, the case was sent to the Crown carrying out the interview. They were Prosecution Service (CPS). It was only almost crying when they left Sasha’s room in May 2007 when the prosecutor sent after the interview and said they couldn’t an extradition case to Russia and Andrey believe how Sasha had suffered. I still Lugovoy was named. But even after that, have a close relationship to the police and the investigation continued, and every have nothing bad to say about their job. time I was asked if I wanted to call for This crime was obviously very different an inquest, the police asked me not to to most normal murder cases because rush, as they needed to build the case the person who had been murdered was to be as strong as possible. They said it actually able to give evidence. In this case, was very scientific and that it wouldn’t be Sasha was a witness to his own murder. easy to explain without strong evidence. However, when the inquest was agreed, I After five years I realised that Lugovoy knew that not all the information would would never be extradited – it didn’t be disclosed because either someone happen when either Vladimir Putin or would be named, or there would be state Dmitry Medvedev were president – and protection, or for other various reasons. I didn’t want to wait another five years. So we will wait and see what amount of There was a campaign in Russia to find information comes out. I’m actually very out what had happened to my husband, pleased because they have organised a and all these conspiracy theories such as website, where all the information from he was carrying radioactive material or each session can be read, and they have that he committed suicide. I wanted to tried to make the inquest as open as stop this. It was a very difficult decision possible. Remembering Sasha, A conversation with Marina Litvinenko Interview 123

How will this inquest affect relations it, because it’s British law. But on the other between Russia and the UK? Can the hand, they need this relationship, and I British government afford to let the can see how the new British government truth come out? has tried to create new business with This is an extremely difficult question, Russia. But every time the case of my and I don’t really have a view yet. However, husband, and the Magnitsky case now, when the Crown Prosecution Service comes up, it doesn’t help the situation. organised the case, close friends said that But I believe that even if it becomes very Lugovoy would never become a suspect as unpleasant, we have to do something. it would make relations between Russian The relations between Russia and the and the UK very difficult. The CPS took UK won’t change until this case is solved. almost four months to decide whether Even if the outcome isn’t pleasant for to investigate the case. But eventually, Russia, relations are still frozen, and at the end of May 2007, they decided how can these two countries trust and that Lugovoy was a suspect and tried to cooperate with each other in areas such extradite him. I also met David Milliband as anti-terrorism and security? (the British foreign secretary at the time – editor’s note) twice, and he was very It takes an extraordinarily brave serious about the case, and tried to help man to take on the Russian, ex- us. I believed the case wouldn’t be dropped Soviet, system? What was it about in exchange for good relations between your husband’s personality that made the two countries. Any time there was a him want to do this? meeting between Milliband and Sergey It is only very romantic people who Lavrov (Russia’s foreign minister – editor’s really believe they can really change note), I was always asked the question: “Do something. And sometimes we miss you think there will be a discussion? Or these kinds of people; mostly because do you think they will forget about it?” But we are normal. Sasha was one of these each time, however, the Litvinenko case romantic people. I can’t say that it was was mentioned. When David Cameron easy for me, because I’m normal. I would became prime minister, there were more say: “Sasha, why do you have to do this? questions. I talked to William Hague (the Are you sure it will be safe for us?” And current foreign minister – editor’s note) he would say: “Marina, I am who I am. before his trip to Moscow in September And I do this because I know you will 2011, and he said they would never forget support me; because you love me.” For about the Litvinenko case. But of course him it was extremely important, and he it has become routine: we can meet, we had a very high threshold of what was can talk, but nothing will change. On one right and wrong. About two years ago, hand, the British government can’t drop our son, Anatoly, who is now 18 years 124 Interview Remembering Sasha, A conversation with Marina Litvinenko

old said to me: “I will never be like my Are you proud to be Russian? father, because my father is like a saint.” One of the first times I felt really proud And I said: “No, no, no. He’s not a saint, to be Russian was in 2011, when the white he’s just a man. He had bad habits and ribbon was first used to symbolise the liked to oversleep a bit too much.” In fact, opposition. However, I don’t feel I can Sasha was a real, ordinary man. support any organised opposition. I don’t want to go to join a committee or go on What do you hope to get out of the demonstrations. But I believe we now inquest personally? have people who have different minds; I’m not looking for revenge. As I’ve people who want to live in Russia, but already said, I believe Lugovoy has been who want to live in a democratic country punished. I called for the inquest because where their children have rights. And I I hate all the conspiracy theories; the believe that only when individuals can books which are published and the grow up in freedom, something will have programmes on Russian television, in changed in Russia. particular. But I want people to know what really happened. When Sasha was Finally, how do you remember your in hospital, before he died, he asked me husband? to organise an inquest. “You will do this, I remember him saying to me every because I need this,” he said. So I feel I day how much he loved me. And how we need to do it for him, because when he were so comfortable together, because we tried to save our lives by escaping from completely respected each other. It was Russia, he did it for us. Unfortunately, I an extraordinarily “right” relationship couldn’t save his life, but I can save the based on friendship, love and respect. I memory of him. miss him very much.

Marina Litvinenko is the widow of Alexander Litvinenko. The Litvinenko Justice Foundation was established to receive donations for the legal expenses associated with the inquest into the death of her husband.

Hayden Berry is an editor and web manager at New Eastern Europe. An Oasis in the Siberian Desert

marcin kalita

This is a city where there is hot and cold water in every house all year round; a city where the central heating is turned on in flats, factories and other buildings in September, and where it is not switched off until the end of May, later than in any other city in Russia; and a city which boasts the biggest monument to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in western Siberia. This city is called Seversk.

According to its city councillors, Seversk’s most important advantages, which are even emphasised in bold font on the city’s official website, include hot and cold water at all times, nine months of central heating, and the biggest monument to Lenin in western Siberia. This might sound funny to us, but for 141 million people who inhabit the Russian Federation, it is a convenience and luxury of those closed cities, towns and villages, the ones with the obligatory abbreviation ZATO (zakrytye administrativno-territorial’nye obrazovaniya or closed administrative-territorial formations – editor’s note) in front of their names, which are located throughout Russia. Western Siberia is a territory which could contain the area of Poland nine times over. It is a place rich in oil and natural gas deposits. It is a place where vast areas of forests – cedar, pine and larch – are harvested in large numbers. In one such forest, one of several ZATOs with the characteristic Soviet/Russian name, Seversk, is located. The number of Seversk’s citizens more or less equals the number of inhabitants of quite a large district of blocks of flats in a large Eastern European town (approximately 115,000). And indeed, Seversk looks like one such district: built in 1949, Seversk was built by the hands of 20,000 Gulag prisoners, and is typical of Soviet architecture. 126 Reports Marcin Kalita, An Oasis in the Siberian Desert

Secret place Western Siberia is also a place, where there is snow for over half the year, where the temperature in winter drops to 55 degrees Centigrade below zero, and where the walls of many blocks of flats are usually 60 centimetres thick. But why does the city council emphasise such trivial and obvious things as the continuous supply of hot water and an extended period of central heating? The answer is simple: for the majority of the inhabitants of Russian towns, these things are not so obvious. Looking at Seversk from this In western Siberia, it snows point of view, it is clear that this place is not the same as other Russian towns spread out over for over half the year and the vast area ranging from the Baltic Sea to the the temperature can reach shores of the Pacific Ocean. minus 55 degrees Celsius. So what’s the secret of this place? Again, the answer is simple: Seversk is part of a system of cities closed, not only to foreigners, but also to ordinary Russians. Every such ZATO town has its own secret, which it tries to protect from the outside world. Almost every town belonging to the ZATO sphere is somehow under the wings of the state, because it is the state for which these places have a multidimensional, strategic meaning. But what have the inhabitants of Seversk done to deserve such privileges? Compensation for the fact that they live in a place where one of the first nuclear power plants in the world is situated perhaps? A place which is surrounded by a three-layered barbed wire fence and protected by the Russian army. According to various sources, Seversk is a city in which parts of nuclear warheads and enriched uranium were (or still are produced), and where heat delivered to the surrounding towns is generated. The nuclear power plant in Seversk is part of the Siberian Chemical Combine, and its existence and the products it manufactures are a secret for the inhabitants of the city themselves, as well as for those who live “in the neighbourhood” (which in the Russian reality may be between 500 to 700 kilometres). Officially, information about the power plant, and in particular its nuclear reactors, has been withheld. At the same time, people talk about the authorities building a new power plant. The city has the status of a military objective and its territory on the maps can be seen as a blurred area, although strangely it is possible to look at Seversk on Google Earth. It is also possible to see satellite pictures of the city and even learn about the scheme of one of its reactors. Seversk is the biggest ZATO in Russia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the majority of such places changed their names from mysterious numerical designations into more ordinary names. Seversk was called Tomsk-7 (a satellite city of Tomsk) Marcin Kalita, An Oasis in the Siberian Desert Reports 127 until 1992, and although the name has changed, the design and the mentality of the inhabitants are still deeply embedded in socialism. From the very beginning of its existence, Seversk has had a separate system of tax relief and refinancing; it was an oasis among the vast Siberian area, and constituted a luxurious enclave with an appropriately higher level of life. People became accustomed to having what they desired, or they had what was only within the scope of the dreams of their “ordinary” neighbours – the inhabitants of the so-called “open cities”. In the period when sausage, condensed milk, and various items of clothing or shoes were not easily accessible for ordinary people, Seversk was abundant with these types of goods. Many people bought them under the table in order to resell them at Tomsk for three times the price.

To open or not to open?

Today, the situation has slightly changed and it is Seversk which goes shopping in nearby Tomsk. During the 1990s, the city lost the meaning and prestige it used to have. The situation has changed most of all for the inhabitants not professionally related to the businesses situated behind the barbed wire. Approximately 60,000 people work and study in Tomsk and have to count more on themselves; more so than the inhabitants of Seversk. Those who work in the “closed” city (and are related to the city’s industry) are still in a much better situation: they still get a salary or pension which According to some, Seversk is higher than most other people. However, the main question that started to appear in the minds is a city where nuclear of the inhabitants of Seversk after the fall of the warheads and enriched Soviet Union was whether to open the city or uranium are produced. not. A survey recently conducted revealed that 70 per cent of inhabitants actually don’t want to open Seversk, and the authorities (at least in the nearest future) have no intention of doing so. Margarita, a 28-year-old lecturer in one of Tomsk’s universities, both wants and doesn’t want the city to be opened. One of the reasons she wants it to be opened is because she cannot invite guests, and not only Russian friends, but also friends from abroad, where she frequently goes within the scope of university exchange programmes. However, Margarita also thinks the city shouldn’t be opened because, like the majority of Seversk’s inhabitants, she is afraid of the increase in crime, drug addiction and banditry, which is so characteristic of contemporary Russia; and characteristic of the peoples from the Caucasus who now live in Russia. The number of these peoples in Russia twice outnumbers the population of the ethnic groups 128 Reports Marcin Kalita, An Oasis in the Siberian Desert

in their own homelands. The “hachiks”, “chiurks” and “nieruses” (the most popular derogatory names used by Russians to refer to newcomers from the South) are most of all associated with shady businesses and the edges of the social margin. It is their “invasion” that the inhabitants of Seversk fear the most. Twenty-year-old Mikhail, a future computer scientist who talks about his city with a certain kind of satisfaction (in Russia, local patriotism is compared to national patriotism), has a similar opinion. According to him, the fact that there are no „hachiks” in Seversk, which makes the city safer and cleaner, is the main advantage of the territorial isolation. There are no slums inhabited by gypsies, people from the Caucasus or Central Asia. On the other hand, Grigoriy, a 21-year-old student of Tomsk Polytechnic University, who supported the idea of his home town of Seversk to be a closed city, changed his mind when he married a Russian woman and citizen of Latvia. Marriage is the only thing which allows for a common life in the closed zone, although in order for this to happen, a woman has to change her citizenship and become Russian, before waiting for a pass which allows A recent survey found her to enter the city independently. This that 70 per cent often takes several months to arrive. “They of Seversk’s inhabitants [the officials] don’t know themselves what documents are needed. Every time I come are against opening the city. they make up something new,” an irritated Grigoriy complains after each visit to the town hall. While the majority of citizens don’t want the town to be opened, young people, who are a minority in this confrontation, think that the representatives of the dominating group who categorically oppose the opening of the city are mainly the older generation brought up in the Soviet Union. The opening of Seversk’s gates would be a major blow for this generation. It simply wouldn’t be able to cope under the new conditions, and wouldn’t be able to live without the help of the state, without the social packages and support that these people are so used to. Seversk is not a prison, however, and you can enter the city whenever you want, if you have a pass, and there is no longer any permanent customs control when you leave the city. “If you’re not a close relative, you won’t get a pass,” complains Marina, who moved out to a different town a few years ago, leaving many of her friends and acquaintances behind in Seversk. One may enter Seversk unofficially through the fence, but then it is better to have a couple of thousand rubles in your pocket in case a soldier is patrolling the area. And although officers of a higher rank may not be tempted by this, someone who works in the police station can be bribed. “It gets on my nerves,” says Zenia, a student, “that anyone who wants to [for money], can be taken [across the fence] through the police station, whereas I, who don’t have any connections in the Marcin Kalita, An Oasis in the Siberian Desert Reports 129 police, can’t even invite my girlfriend to my home. Why should some old policeman decide who I can and can’t invite?” “We can use the ‘services’ of other people for a certain price, although if a terrorist wants to enter the city, he or she would be able to do so without any difficulties. I’ve even heard about the case of Seversk boasts the largest monument to Lenin a 10,000 rouble bribe (about in Western Siberia. Photo: Krzysztof Makarowski 250 euros). This transaction meant a pass for a month, which is not so expensive for a guarded state object,” says Natalia ironically, whose distant female cousin lives behind the barbed wire. Others, like businesswoman Tatyana Nikolaevna say: “Our authorities won’t allow the city to be opened, or will do everything to prevent this from happening, because budget cuts will start and there will be no subsidies from the state; the swindle of our administration will be revealed, and it will be clear who stole what and for how long one might be imprisoned.”

Neon people

In many photographs of the surrounding landscapes everybody notices one thing: “A sky like this can only be found here.” The sky is indeed extraordinary. It is made up of almost unnatural colours, with the proximity of the power plant having some influence. “Have you ever seen a sky so varied and so glaring?” asks Margarita. “We often say, half joking but half serious, that we live under a pink dome.” In Seversk it is often said that radioactive substances are regularly released into the atmosphere, although it is hard to say if this is true. However, the locals have their own solution: drink milk or vodka after each radioactive release. The Chemical Combine has had approximately 20 breakdowns since the beginning of its existence. The last one happened in 1993, and the power of the explosion was so large that it blew the windows out of some citizens’ homes. Forty-seven-year-old Georgiy Stepanovich talks about the dull sounds coming from somewhere in the distance, which can be heard once every three weeks. When he asked his colleague (a worker at the combine) about them, he was told that it was a water system, whose mechanism and functioning are secret, which he is not 130 Reports Marcin Kalita, An Oasis in the Siberian Desert

allowed to talk about. Another time the same worker started to draw the scheme of the reactor, but later crumpled up the piece of paper and burnt it. The residents take a confidentiality vow of not spreading any knowledge about the city and the industry connected with it. The vow is made in writing, not only by the workers of closed factories, but also by the inhabitants of the city. It takes place when they are given a pass to the city at the age of 14, and which they have for the rest of their lives. “What vodka, what milk, what glaring sky? Please don’t believe that. These are all phobias of the inhabitants. There is no radiation. Of course there is always some risk, but what’s more harmful than the nuclear reactors is heavy industry and the fumes we inhale every day in the streets,” says Alla Rustamovna, an ecologist and member of the Russian Academy of Science, with convincing self-confidence, and who almost vouches for the quality and function of the Seversk Combine. “Say what you like, but such spheres as the armaments, space and energy industries have always operated at the highest level here, and they have always been very well protected and guarded.” Today, almost half of the population of our planet sees the future in the nuclear industry. The inhabitants of places situated close to nuclear power plants such as the one in Seversk aren’t really worried about how harmful this industry is and what role it is supposed to have in the world. The most important thing is not to open the city and not to allow drastic changes, similar to the ones which took place in Russia after 1991; and what is manufactured there pales into insignificance. In a situation when people have to choose between a wealthy, peaceful life, on the one hand, and freedom, health and ecology on the other, it is understandable that the majority will pick the first option. If such concepts as warmth (which is equal to life and survival in Siberia) are put on a scale, there aren’t many people who would bother about the secondary issues, such as the protection of the environment, freedom or health. “People simply look where it is more convenient to look. This means that they incline towards things which don’t demand a huge effort; it is always easier to descend than to climb,” summarises one of the inhabitants of the oasis.

Marcin Kalita is a PhD candidate at the University of Wrocław, Poland, specialising in Slavic linguistics, as well as a traveller and amateur photographer. He spends half of his time in Poland and the other half in Russia. The City Built on Gold gani naSirov

Deep in the remote western hills of Azerbaijan lies Gadabay, a region that has been settled since the Bronze Age and hasn’t changed very much since. Neither a city nor a village, layers of gold ore lie deep underneath Gadabay.

When the German company Siemens started operating a copper mine in Gadabay, Azerbaijan, in the mid-1850s, it was a city located in the middle of nowhere. In 1879, Siemens constructed a 28 kilometre-long railway, the first of its kind in the Southern Caucasus; and in 1883 they built a hydroelectric power plant, the first in tsarist Russia. Siemens operated copper and gold mines for about 60 years, but when the company shut down their operation in 1917, Gadabay once again found itself in the middle of nowhere. For over 91 years, the mine in Gadabay remained dormant: throughout the period of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920), during the Soviet Union, and after the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan. But in 2008, gold-copper processing operations were reactivated and Siemens was replaced by another international joint venture which has been running the mine ever since. Gadabay, however, still remains in the middle of nowhere.

City or big village?

Gadabay is one of the most remote districts of Azerbaijan, situated between 1000 to 3500 metres above sea level. On the border with neighbouring Armenia, it lies 444 kilometres west of the capital Baku. There is only one road connecting Gadabay to other major socio-economic and political centres, the closest of which is Ganja, around 100 kilometres away. The district of Gadabay, and its capital of the same name, sits upon the top of hills and the ridges of mountains. It is believed (but not certain) that the region has been settled since the Bronze Age. It has easy access to a steady supply of spring water, despite the fact that the land is not fit for 132 Reports Gani Nasirov, The City Built on Gold

large scale cultivation. Over the centuries, the area has been well protected due to its elevation. The lack of development in agriculture has prevented the movement of the Gadabay settlements from the hills to the sloping and relatively flat areas, and it is amazing to see people still living in the ruined ancient settlements (two small castles still exist in every village in the Gadabay area), complete with tools and potteries. Preserving the living spaces on the same ground as the people have been living for centuries either demonstrates the indigenous peoples’ addiction to an intact, God-created nature, or their unwillingness to bother themselves with innovating and changing the living conditions or directing the flow of activities, natural or human-related, despite the unfriendly climate and landscape. The people here would rather let nature run its course. The climate of Gadabay is extremely harsh, and the well-known saying about weather forecasting being “predictably unpredictable” is prevalent in everyday life. To put it another way, it is very likely that all four seasons of weather can be observed in one day; from heavy hail and In Gadabay, one can still rain, to a very light summer drizzle under the beautifully shining sun and spring breeze; see people still living in ruined and later the hot sun which sears the skin. Bronze Age settlements. The climate has influenced the formation of city infrastructure patterns and shaped the way people move around and conduct their daily business. Interestingly, the impact of the climate is easily recognisable in the design and architecture of Gadabay and its houses. Gadabay City consists of eight villages including Soyudlu, Arikhdam and Slavyanka. There was a process that unified all these villages into a larger unit quantitatively, but lacked the ability to transform it into a higher unit qualitatively. Despite this unification, however, Gadabay is not actually a city at all, but rather an administrative unit still in the process of development between village and city. Gadabay is one of the rare places where once can see the harmony of ages. Small Bronze Age castles still host pottery, obsidian tools, ruins of rooms, pre- Christian cemeteries, Christian churches, monasteries (typically built on the very top of distant hills) and grave stones, along with the Christian and pre- Christian traditions of Caucasian Albanians. Castles from the Middle Ages are also exposed and intact, serving as a natural open air museum in Gadabay, and make it a place where people feel as if they were taken back to another time. Nonetheless, it is a place that is also ignored in the decision-making centres of Azerbaijan, which has, to a certain degree, led to the protection of all of the above-mentioned beauties. Gani Nasirov, The City Built on Gold Reports 133

German gold rush Although it is a remote region, Russian and German influences can be observed in the city, which are either indigenous to Gadabay or imported from other German influenced regions such as Shamkir. During tsarist Russia, Gadabay was a place for religious minority groups to be sent in exile. The most well-known of them were the Molokans (a sectarian Christian group who refused to obey the Orthodox Church – editor’s note), who were deported to Gadabay. Russian influences have remained on the edges of German influence the villages in which they settled, and they even built their own new villages, including Slavyanka, can be seen almost Novoivanovka and Novosaratovka, all of which are everywhere in Gadabay. easily identifiable by the organisation of the houses and yards, with trees and fields. The relationship between the Russians and the people of Gadabay has always been friendly, and there haven’t been any conflicts between ethnic Russians and Azerbaijanis. Although the Russian influence is limited to the villages where ethnic Russians settled, the traces of German legacies can be seen everywhere, in particular in Gryunfeld and to the south-east of Gadabay, where old red brick German houses and mine infrastructure still survive. What is admirable about the German miners who processed the copper and gold ore is that they ignored the impact of the climate and attempted to build real city infrastructure. Equally important is the fact that they built proper sewage systems supported by channels which directed heavy rain without damaging the infrastructure. The hydroelectric power plant supplied additional water and pressure. The Germans also used the area outside the mine as their mineral waste depository. The city centre of Gadabay, as well as the areas to the west and the south-east of the city centre, were built using these wasted ore elements, which still contain gold and copper minerals. One of the most interesting areas has private houses which utilised bricks containing these ore remnants to decorate the walls of their backyards. Some of the ore waste has also been used to decorate the city centre of Gadabay, including a one-metre high circular central island in the roundabout opposite the main bazaar. It is believed that gold is still concentrated underneath some of the villages of Gadabay City. However, the problem lies in how much gold there actually is and whether it is commercially profitable to exploit these minerals. The local people cannot harvest the gold minerals by simply looking for them in riverbeds or hills. The gold is concentrated as chemical compositions in the layers in the ground, and therefore requires chemical processing in order to extract and produce the gold. 134 Reports Gani Nasirov, The City Built on Gold

Modern gold production In the mid-1850s, the Germans initiated industrial mining activities in Gadabay (also the first mining activity in Azerbaijan) focusing on copper production. At the same time, they began extracting gold minerals, but hid their gold mining activities until the 1890s. The area where Siemens used to produce copper is exactly the same place where the current gold-copper production is now concentrated. However, they didn’t leave any resources for the people of Gadabay to sustain their future. During the Soviet period, the Russians didn’t pursue mining and life in Gadabay slowly reverted backwards, with most of the German-built infrastructure left to ruin. The mine is now run by an international team with manual labour being carried out by the people of Gadabay. The relationship between the people of Gadabay and those administering the gold-copper mine is neither focused on compatibility nor conflict. The international

Photo: Gani Nasirov

A house built by Germans in the 19th century still stands and is in use near the dam of the Gadabay mine. Gani Nasirov, The City Built on Gold Reports 135 business group is concentrated on the success of their commercially beneficial business, without any obstacles to their mining projects. Some of Gadabay’s citizens are suspicious, however, and don’t provide any kind of assistance to the mining activities. Some believe that the mine will lead to the destruction of their lands. Even after over 150 years, there has been no considerable change in the way the people of Gadabay perceive mining. It is true that there is a much greater social After 91 years of inactivity, impact of mining in Gadabay, now derived from the environmental impact, which infringes on the mine is now back the peaceful life of the people who are able to in operation and run see the heavy equipment in their backyard. by an international team. However, the local people never stand up to the miners unless their individual peace is violated by the mining activities. The general notion is that: „It is not my business to interfere in mining activity unless the miners touch my land”. Ultimately, it is still the people of Gadabay who bear, with tacit consent, the cost of the mine infrastructure. Despite its value in minerals, Gadabay is one of the most undervalued places in Azerbaijan. Gadabay has a rich history which spans centuries: religious evolution from pre-Christian Paganism legacies; Christian traces and weak Islamic consolidation; technological developments in the mining industry; immigration-migration of various ethnic groups, including Caucasian Albanians, Turks, Germans and Russians; and in the middle of all these developments, the people of Gadabay themselves. Gadabay is still a big village which requires the communal organisation of everyday life in response to the impact of the mining activity; something which is completely ignored by the local people. To put it simply, Gadabay City and the people of Gadabay are intact at the centre, and it is the world which revolves around them.

Gani Nasirov’s report top prizes in the 2012 “East to West” report competition on the New Eastern Europe website. History Goes to the Movies

łukasZ wojtusik

Until recently, Polish cinematography has been moderately successful at presenting historical narratives. While large productions were meant to stir patriotic feelings, the more ambitious directors stayed away from history. This has recently changed. Polish artists are no longer scared of stirring up a hornet’s nest and tackling socially difficult subjects.

It may sound commonplace, but the truth is that Polish cinematography takes everything it can from contemporary history. The filmmakers grapple with recent historical events on many different levels. Some try to go through the archives and present the problem of how, under communism, some Poles collaborated with the secret police (this was the lead topic of quite a few films, including Michał Rosa’s Rysa, Jan Kidawa Błoński’s Różyczka, and Jerzy Stuhr’s Korowód). Others, such as Janusz Majewski in the slightly sententious Mała Matura, or Borys Lankosz in the very interesting black comedy Rewers, try their best at depicting the early years of communism. What all these films have in common, and what comes across as a kind of trend, is their focus on human stories. Even the great Andrzej Wajda, probably the most internationally recognisable Polish film director, in his film Katyń (the title Katyń is the site of the mass murder of Polish officers carried out by the Soviet NKVD during the Second World War), showed the story of the crime from the perspective of the soldiers and their wives. Roman Polański, also an internationally recognised director, took a slightly different approach in 2002 with his story about a man trying to survive in a war- engulfed city. The man in question was Władysław Szpilman, the acclaimed 20th- century Polish pianist of Jewish origin, whose story the film The Pianist is based on. It may not have been the best work by the director of Rosemary’s Baby, but it is an important film, and worth watching. Characteristically the film was more Łukasz Wojtusik, History Goes to the Movies History 137 appreciated abroad, especially in the United States, where it received as many as three Oscars, than in Poland – where its reception was rather unemotional. This cold shoulder given to Polański in his homeland was, quite possibly, due to the very conventional presentation of the story. It was conventional to the point that most Polish viewers, who are quite familiar with tales about the Second World War, had difficulties in finding anything that would surprise them in this film. Much more ferment was brought about ten years later; again by a well-known and internationally recognised director – Agnieszka Holland. Her film, In Darkness, released in 2012, offered a slightly different type of story. The main character, Leopold Socha, is not a cultured man. He is a sewage worker who gets involved in saving Jews from the Lviv ghetto. Generally speaking, these two films, The Pianistand In Darkness share the same characteristic: they follow the Hollywood-style convention of cinematography. What differentiates them, however, is the way in which history is presented through the main characters. Szpilman is a well-known musician, while Leopold Socha is a crook trying to make money out of human misery. His transformation into an altruist who saves Jews is deprived of any symbolism. In Holland’s film, emotions, just like people, are hidden in the darkness. And yet something must have been missed in this film as the American Film Academy chose to award the Oscar to a different film in 2012. In her native Poland, however, Holland was showered with as many as nine awards in the prestigious Gdynia Film Festival.

Every rose has its thorn

Clearly, all of the above Polish films have been widely discussed and analysed, but the discussions that have been stirred by them have been somewhat limited to narrow circles of film critics. A change came with Wojciech Smarzowski’s Róża (Rose), a film whose viewing left many people silent, while compelling many others to write about their viewing experience on the internet. And Róża has thorns too. Released in 2011, Róża is another production by the director, of Wesele (The Wedding) and Dom Zły (The Dark House) which, in an uncompromising way, showed a world in which classical divisions between good and evil are inapplicable and blurred. Every character has dirty hands in this film; and the dirt of these hands can’t be washed off, unless with blood. This is probably why viewers of Róża often find themselves struggling with history: a history which is neither found in heroic behaviour nor in great courageous acts. Róża is a story about Tadeusz – a Second World War solider who participated in the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. Shortly after the war, Tadeusz decides to move to Mazury, a region in the north of Poland which had just been taken away from 138 History Łukasz Wojtusik, History Goes to the Movies

the Germans and given to the Russians. Tadeusz arrives at the house of Róża, the widow of a German solider. He informs Róża about her husband’s death and asks her to take him in. In exchange for lodging, Tadeusz offers help with household chores, an offer which Róża unwillingly accepts. Through asylum in Róża’s house, Tadeusz finds something he hasn’t been looking for. And yet because of the nature of love and human reactions, he loses almost all of it. But why has this so seemingly simple film had such an impact on Polish viewers? What was so special about it? And what distinguishes it from other films? Firstly, Smarzowski, has unveiled a few dark spots in Poland’s history, opening up discussions about the negative stories of the Mazury people, a nation deeply destroyed by nationalisation. Without a doubt, the heroine, Róża, is a perfect representation of her people as she, too, has experienced cruelty both from the Germans and the Russians. Secondly, the main characters in this film are, from the very beginning, nothing but psychological wrecks. They live in a place where the thaw doesn’t come after winter, nor better times after bad ones. Things have always been bad here and people’s lives have become stuck in the tragic grip of history. Thirdly, Róża is a film deprived of any form of pathos. It is cruel. It is probably the first time in the Polish cinematography where the sequence of the memories of the main hero, which go back to the Warsaw Uprising, bombard the viewers in such a straightforward and uncompromising way, and with so much cruelty. This cruelty is probably what most bothered both Róża was a film whose the film critics and internet-users alike. From their viewing left many comments, Róża comes across as a very powerful and tragically beautiful film. Nevertheless, it was people silent. also a piece of art that somehow wasn’t understood by the jury at the Gdynia Film Festival. Natalia Piórczyńska wrote on the web portal www.liberte.pl that: “The jury did not understand the message put forward in this film.” And it wasn’t only the jury. “I noticed a similar lack of enthusiasm among the viewers in some multiplexes,” she went on to say. Hence, it is not an exaggeration to say that Smarzowski has managed to make an uncomfortable and uneasy film. A film that is, indeed, not for everyone. The story has turned out to be very hermetic and, thus, quite unclear for many people.

With the communist reality in the background

Waldemar Krzystek, another contemporary Polish director, had a completely different idea on how to present Poland’s history in a film. Krzystek’s decision was to make a film based on real events. He brought to the screen the story of a reckless act, carried out by young Solidarity activists in 1981, who siphoned off 80 million Łukasz Wojtusik, History Goes to the Movies History 139 zlotys from the city of Wrocław’s banks. The film, simply titled 80 milionów (80 million), presents a little known, yet quite interesting historical event. But, just like the earlier mentioned films, it, too, is deprived of the grand pathos and big heroes. The director has clearly chosen to focus on the fast-flowing plot set up with the background of the Polish reality of the early 1980s. The film is also rather distressing. It portrays people permanently surveyed by the secret police; people forced to manage on food rations, struggling with restrictive allocations, as these were the everyday problems of typical Polish families fighting for a better tomorrow. Although much criticism can be voiced about this film, the truth is that it was selected as the Polish candidate for the 2013 Oscars. The chair of the Polish Oscar Committee, Juliusz Machulski, explained the Committee’s decision stating that the “film presents an element of Polish history in a universal, non-conventional, and optimistic way”. The chairman’s enthusiasm was, however, not translated into real success. The film lost in one of the first rounds of pre-selections and, in parallel, received much criticism from both critics and internet-users alike. It was clear to the bloggers and critics that Krzystek’s bravery was limited only to the breaking of the Polish conventional narrative about the difficult times of Martial Law. A well-done production in a comedy style, with a few chase scenes, and with the communist reality in the background, the film has attracted a mere 160,000 viewers; much lower than can be expected from a film which the Oscar Committee put so much faith into.

Black Thursday in the cinema hall

Similar accusations were made against another director, Antoni Krauze. The target was his film portraying the killing of 18 people during the pacification which took place in Gdynia in 1970 during the workers’ protests against increases in food prices. Czarny czwartek (Black Thursday) is a film made in a quasi-documentary style. Krauze treats the topic with full respect, which is perhaps why the picture was immediately labelled a “good film”. However, what it lacked was a shade of grey: it showed the establishment of the Communist Party as soaked with evil, while the workers are heroes fighting for human rights and life in dignity. Zdzisław Pietrasik in his review for the Polish weekly, Polityka, expressed the view of so many internet users when he wrote: “It’s too bad that we cannot make great films about great things.” Another interesting voice in this search for new forms of expression is Marcin Krzyształowicz and his 2012 film Obława (Manhunt). Obława is a film which strips away the myth of Polish guerilla soldiers who, during the Second World War, hid deep in the forests. The plot of this war-time thriller mostly takes place 140 History Łukasz Wojtusik, History Goes to the Movies

in the mountains. The job of the main protagonist, Corporal Wydra, is to execute the traitors collaborating with the Germans. One of Wydra’s orders is to kill his former schoolmate – Henryk. Setting out with Henryk on his last journey, Wydra, in fact, embarks on his own encounter with destiny. Krzyształowicz, who based the story on his own father’s wartime stories, has employed the tricks of classical fiction while attempting to create an interesting plot: a non-linear plot; broken retrospections, similar to Christopher Nolan’s Memento; a frequent change in the speed of the plot; and brutality (which is one of the main reasons Obława was compared to Quentin Tarantino’s Inglourious Basterds). The greatest controversy of this film is, however, the way in which the director has portrayed the guerrilla soldiers hiding in the woods. Characteristically these were not the beautiful boys, the heroes of the patriotic songs, but animal-like creatures, destroyed by life and vegetating in shabby, inhuman conditions. Obława has nothing that would stir patriotic feelings. The soldiers are barbarians and losers. The only thing that keeps them going is a need to carry out orders. The Polish critics, along with the bloggers, were almost unanimous in pointing out the excessive naturalism of this film. Krzyształowicz went, clearly, one step further than both Polański and Holland. The main hero of his story, the sword of justice of the Polish underground, is contaminated with sin. In her review for internet portal www.stopklatka.pl, Anna Bielak noted that both the director and the main character, Corporal Wydra, carried out murder. It was murder of stereotypes and habits, with Bielak believing that Krzyształowicz was probably the first Polish film director who has had “the courage to take the paint off the statue, take the statue down off its pedestal, and finally get it dirty with the truth”.

The aftermath

Without a doubt, the strongest hit of early 2013 was Władysław Pasikowski’s Pokłosie (Aftermath). Pokłosie is a film which has not only divided the critics but also, most importantly, initiated a discussion which hasn’t been seen in Poland for a long time. The film touches on issues brought up earlier by Jan Tomasz Gross (author of the controversial book Neighbours about the Jedwabne massacre – editor’s note), waking up the demon of intolerance and bringing to light the unfinished business in Polish-Jewish relations. This film has, clearly, left the cinema halls and quickly become the subject of many television debates. And the debate is not only about controversial history, but also producing “anti-Polish” films in Poland. The issue that Pasikowski touches on are the Jewish pogroms and Polish anti-Semitism. The main protagonist of the film, Józek Kalina, seeks the truth about Gurówka’s past, the village where he was Łukasz Wojtusik, History Goes to the Movies History 141

A scene from the Polish film Pokłosie (Aftermath). Courtesy of Apple Film Productions.

raised. He discovers, for example, that old Jewish tombstones (matzevas) were used to pave a local road. Inevitably, the story leads to Józek’s discovery of the cruel truth about his father – one of the initiators of the pogrom. Józek’s father, just like the majority of the residents of the village, took advantage of the system changes (following the war) and repossessed the better plots of land, and of course those previously owned by the now murdered Jews. However, Pasikowski also shows that anti-Semitism didn’t finish with the end of the Second World War. The problem is still very present today. Jewry is a topic which is very difficult to discuss in the Polish public sphere, not only in cinematography. Pokłosie has whipped up a serious storm. Right-wing ideologues quickly joined the discussion ridiculing and discrediting its message, stressing that in what they called The film Pokłosie has a normal country, nobody would ever allow the promotion of a crooked picture of reality whipped up a serious storm. in which “barbarian Poles are capable of murdering, without the blink of an eye, anybody who would want to take away the ravished Jewish estates from them,” (Piotr Gontarczyk on niezależna.pl). No mercy was spared for the director himself, or the lead actor, Maciej Stuhr. In some online portals they were even called the “anti-Poles”, and became victims of heartless attacks online. 142 History Łukasz Wojtusik, History Goes to the Movies

Stuhr even stepped out of his film role and began discussing the topic of anti- Semitism in Poland, admitting that it is a still very valid problem. “Should we continue to think that Poles were only doing wonderful things, then we will be shocked. Should we stop sweeping our problems under the carpet, then we won’t be shocked,” he summed up in the popular Tomasz Lis na żywo TV show. Pokłosie has become an important part of Pasikowski’s work, coming back to the world of cinema after 11 years of the. With this production, the director not only became an actor himself, but also a commentator on historical reality. He departed from the role of being a storyteller and, together with Stuhr, initiated a difficult discussion on the values which Poles want to represent: a discussion on things that are socially difficult and quite often embarrassing. The impact of their work is reflected in the fact that this actor-director duet found itself among the finalists of the 2013 Anna Laszuk Radio TOK FM Award, given for work that has had a significant influence on social awareness and the Polish reality.

Changing perspective

Seemingly, there is no shortage of historical topics worth exploring. Another topic, recently tackled by means of a film production, is the Polish defence of the Westerplatte peninsula during the Second World War. Paweł Chochlew’s recent debut, Tajemnica Westerplatte (The Secret of Westerplatte), was shown in cinemas at the beginning of 2013, and has so far had mixed reactions. However, Tomasz Raczek, a well-known Polish critic, warned film goers on his Facebook page about the poor quality of this film. Comparing it to a recently recorded attempt of an 81- year-old lady to refresh a fresco of Jesus, Raczek called Chochlew’s work a crude. After his controversial Pokłosie, Pasikowski is now making a film titled Jack Strong, reconstructing the life of Ryszard Kukliński, a Polish Colonel who while employed by the Polish Army was actively involved in The change in how Polish informing the CIA and passing important data about the Warsaw Pact on to the American people talk about Poland’s government. The controversy around this most history is one of the greatest famous Polish spy not only divides the Polish qualitative changes political scene, but historians alike. of the last few years. While Pasikowski may have fallen into the trap of sensational cinematography, Andrzej Wajda can be found in the snare of heroic biography. Wajda’s film about Lech Wałęsa, the legendary leader of Polish Solidarity, is anticipated to make it to the cinemas later this year. Will this be just another biased glorification of a past hero? Łukasz Wojtusik, History Goes to the Movies History 143

Could it even be possible to make a single mark on the biography of one of the most recognisable Poles in the world? The most controversial of upcoming films, however, may turn out to be the one announced by Antoni Krauze, the director of Czarny Czwartek. Krauze wants to make a film about the 2010 plane crash near Smoleńsk in which 96 passengers were killed including the President of Poland at the time – Lech Kaczyński. As public opinion polls show their Polish society remains deeply divided in search for the answers to why the crash happened (with nearly 30 per cent believing it was a Russian attack). In an interview for the portal wpolityce.pl, Krauze clearly presents his own perspective of looking at this case: “We don’t know the culprits of this attack, but we know enough to talk about a plot and an attack.” Regardless of the ideological and political intentions, the discussions about new productions of Polish cinematography will centre around the topic of truth. In this debate, participation will not only be limited to professional critics and essayists; it will be joined by bloggers and internet users who seem to care more and more about contemporary history, even if it formally remains just cinematographic fiction. More than anything else, this crossing of the old divides and the change in the way we talk, in the cinema, about Poland’s troubled history is one of the greatest qualitative changes to Polish society that has taken place over the last few years.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Łukasz Wojtusik is a Polish journalist and radio reporter. He is the head of the Kraków office of the radio station TOK FM. A Cause to Live For?

A conversation with Arzu Geybullayeva and Emin Milli, Azerbaijani journalists and writers. Interviewer: Łukasz Grajewski.

Arzu Geybullayeva is an Azerbaijani 2007 when I started to work at a think- activist and writer. Her blog “Flying tank in Istanbul, and started travelling Carpets and Broken Pipelines” has become throughout Azerbaijan due to the research one of the most widely read English- projects I was coordinating. It was only language blogs covering the Azerbaijani when I started to spend a lot of time in regime. Azerbaijan that I realised how important Emin Milli is a dissident writer from the lives of the people of Azerbaijan Azerbaijan. In 2009 he was imprisoned for are for me. My first piece of research his critical writing and spent 17 months was about women’s rights. It was really in detention. He was arrested again in the first time I had the opportunity to January 2013 for participating in protests travel throughout the country and talk in Baku. with people in the towns and villages. I started to see a not very optimistic ŁUKASZ GRAJEWSKI: Both of you write picture of the country, which I decided critically about the Azerbaijani regime to start writing about. either online or in print, something EMIN MILLI: When I was a teenager, that can be considered a dangerous in 1992 and 1993, the democrats were profession. Why did you decide to get in power. It was a difficult time for involved in activist writing to describe Azerbaijan, right after the collapse of the situation in Azerbaijan, not only the Soviet Union. We went to war with to Azerbaijanis but to the rest of the Armenia, which occupied part of our world? territories. The democratic opposition ARZU GEYBULLAYEVA: I left came to power but they couldn’t control Azerbaijan to study abroad, which really the situation in the country. During disengaged me from Azerbaijani issues, those times I was mesmerised by Heydar and even my friends. I was living in my Aliyev, an ex-KGB general who appeared own bubble. Change for me came in in Azerbaijani politics in 1993. He was A Cause to Live For? A conversation with Arzu Geybullayeva and Emin Milli People, Ideas, Inspiration 145 invited by the democratic president, and maybe he will make real reforms.” Abulfaz Elchibey, who was proving I was very naive. My position changed to be unable to govern the country. in 2005. The crucial moment was the There were armed riots and sabotage murder of Monitor magazine’s executive everywhere. Many people were carrying editor, Elmar Huseynov. Monitor was an guns. Aliyev with his KGB experience independent magazine which exposed from Soviet times looked like the right the corruption of the Aliyev regime. solution for people who wanted some I took Huseynov’s articles for granted. stability. I was too young to vote, but I The moment he was killed was a shock for pushed my parents to vote for him. A me. I cried for two days. After the sadness, lot of people had big expectations of there was anger. I thought that I should Aliyev. Personally, I liked his speeches. join the old opposition, but many of my He was a great speaker. I just loved the friends advised against it. I felt the need way he talked to the people. to create something new, to create a non- Over the next 10 years I learned that political independent platform for a new politics is not only about talking. Aliyev generation of Azerbaijanis. And I knew brought stability, but at a high price. We that I needed to use both offline and online began to lose more and more freedoms. tools to get people to talk to each other and In the 1990s tens of thousands of people come up with new initiatives that could protested in the streets. People used their change our country. I began to organise constitutional right to a peaceful protest public lectures and discussions in Baku, actively. The media were quite free. When as well as other regions. Our discussion Aliyev came to power, the atmosphere group on Yahoo rose to 3,000 members changed. He centralised power and almost very quickly and I was able to reach about managed to eliminate all opposition to 10,000 people on Facebook. him. Aliyev made some reforms not only to strengthen the country, but Where did you find people to firstly to strengthen his position as an organise all of those activities? authoritarian leader in the country. In EMIN MILLI: I mainly invited them 2003 I was really having mixed feelings online after public lectures. I found many about him when his son, Ilham Aliyev, of my friends, such as Khadija Ismayil, at was elected president for the first time. those public lectures. Khadija is one of Maybe “appointment” is a better word the best independent journalists in the than “election” here. country and her life is now at risk. I didn’t support the younger Aliyev, but accepted that the son of Heydar So, in a sense you became a political had become president. I thought that leader...? I cannot change it and nobody can. I EMIN MILLI: I don’t want to become thought: “He is a businessman, he is young a politician. I see myself as a writer. I 146 People, Ideas, Inspiration A Cause to Live For? A conversation with Arzu Geybullayeva and Emin Milli

Photo: Courtesy of Emin Milli

believe that it is not only politicians who too long for economic reforms after the can influence society. There are plenty of fall of the Soviet Union. And this ended things that writers and journalists can do. up being a crucial turning point. The I want to make people more reflective. To leadership of Aliyev wouldn’t have been make people think about who we need so successful if he hadn’t signed the oil to have in parliament or who should be contracts (Azerbaijan signed oil contracts president. I don’t define this as the job with 21 foreign oil companies in 1994 – of a politician. It is the job of a citizen. editor’s note). It was a very specific strategy. That is my ambition – to write about it He professionalised his skills when he was and about life, and to inspire people to be in the KGB and he knew how to create a thoughtful and responsible citizens. network of trusted people. EMIN MILLI: Aliyev was in a good Going back to Heydar Aliyev, it looks position to receive a high level of as though everything starts from him legitimacy from the people who were in Azerbaijan. tired of losing the war, having refugees ARZU GEYBULLAYEVA: I have and a destroyed economy. He could blame similar feelings to Emin. Aliyev was like a both the democratic government before king at that time. He was a very charismatic him and Mikhail Gorbachev for all the figure who was strong enough to stop problems that people faced every day; the conflict with Armenia. The reason and he asked them to give him some the democrats couldn’t stay in power time to build up the country and bring in the early 1990s was that they waited democracy. A Cause to Live For? A conversation with Arzu Geybullayeva and Emin Milli People, Ideas, Inspiration 147

Did Heydar Aliyev ever speak about Without comparing the two bad regimes democracy? with each other, I think it is just the way EMIN MILLI: In 1994 he was asked by in which Heydar Aliyev was more of a a journalist from Azerbaijan International politician and more of a strategist, in Magazine: “When will democracy come terms of political policies than his son to Azerbaijan?” It was a very honest is. Ilham Aliyev is known for spending question and the answer was also very money in casinos with Turkish pop- honest: “Democracy is not an apple, you stars. And thus there is a very striking can’t go and buy it at the market.” So the difference in reputation and charisma. next question was: “How long it will take Because when Heydar Aliyev came to for Azerbaijan to become democratic?” power, he had this very strong personality, And he said: “It will take 10 to 20 years.” whereas when his son came to power, he Later in November 2008, I was giving was not very politically attractive. a speech in the British parliament, and quoted Heydar Aliyev on his vision Is the government too strong or of democracy in Azerbaijan. Some are the people too weak to generate representatives of the oligarchs at this change? forum said that it is not so easy to build EMIN MILLI: When we talk about democracy in Azerbaijan and that it change in any country, there are several might take 100 to 200 years. Democracy factors to be considered. The will of the in Britain was built over hundreds of people is just one factor and it is often years, they argued. influenced by other factors. There are also ARZU GEYBULLA: I feel that perhaps different views about which factor driving when Aliyev said that democracy would democratic change is more important. Is come to Azerbaijan in 20 years, he wasn’t the division in the elite or the government expecting that his cronies around him more important? Some academics think would start getting greedy. It’s like a virus. that without the division of the ruling I think that’s what happened when the elite, any sort of democratic change is money started flowing into the country. He simply impossible. had very powerful people around him and If we look at Georgia in 2003, during the so when he passed away and his son was Rose Revolution and we look at Azerbaijan brought into power, those various people in 2003 where the Rose Revolution didn’t stayed with his son because he didn’t have happen, we can compare these cases and the same powers his father had had. see how different factors played out. In A lot of people you talk to – journalists Azerbaijan, there were more people in the in Azerbaijan, for example – would say streets protesting the result of falsified that during Aliyev’s times it was fine; elections in 2003 than in Georgia. But at least we could write, at least we were why did the revolution happen in Georgia not liable, whereas now it is much worse. and not in Azerbaijan? Azerbaijan has 148 People, Ideas, Inspiration A Cause to Live For? A conversation with Arzu Geybullayeva and Emin Milli

oil and gas. Oil and gas means that case about girls wearing head-scarves there are international actors who are in schools. The Minister of Education interested in keeping the political status came out and said: this is not part of the quo. In Azerbaijan, the ruling elite was uniform and it is not going to happen. So not divided, it was actually united. you have the government which is very The ruling elite in Georgia was divided much against religion and tries to portray and that opened up the possibility for the itself as a very secular country. will of the people to be articulated and to This makes it very different from other be supported, structurally and financially, religious neighbours – it makes us different by very strong actors. This was not the case from Iran and from Turkey, which is in Azerbaijan. There are often strategic becoming more and more conservative. decisions made in the capitals of the world The government in Azerbaijan is saying which can decide the outcome of certain that it doesn’t want to be seen as a Muslim local struggles. I am not a supporter country. Yet, most people are Muslims, of any sort of conspiracy theory. I like and have been Muslim despite the Soviet checking the facts. And facts say that the Union. You have people who still practise support of the international community, Islam, you have several hundreds of the interest of big oil corporations, such as radicals who are fighting for their own British Petroleum, can greatly influence conservative, individual rights. You are the position of the British government battling with all these religious factors, in Azerbaijan. as well as the bashing of these religious movements and destroying of mosques. How does Islam act as an important I don’t think the government actually factor for Azerbaijan and the has a religious policy, and that’s really region? what the issue is. The only policy they ARZU GEYBULLAYEVA: The religion have is for Azerbaijan not to be associated question is always very difficult to explain. with Islam. In Azerbaijan, you almost have two different groups: people who are religious, Do you think that with your studies who follow Islam and pray five times a day. abroad, your perfect English and your You also have the group of people who still friends all over the world, you can still come from the background of not having have contact with the Azeri nation religious freedom during the Soviet Union, and speak about the problems of who – I wouldn’t say “forgot” – but do Azerbaijan? not necessarily follow their religion. You ARZU GEYBULLAYEVA: I think can also observe a radical wing within this touches me specifically because live the Islamic movement, people claiming abroad and I don’t live in Azerbaijan. I that a female middle school student must have a feeling that most of the criticism cover their head. Recently, there was a that I get about what I do comes from A Cause to Live For? A conversation with Arzu Geybullayeva and Emin Milli People, Ideas, Inspiration 149

Photo: Courtesy of Arzu Geybullayeva

that kind of thinking. I believe that I worked for Google. He was living outside received a unique opportunity to study of Egypt but his influence was huge. His abroad and then used that experience to Facebook posts at the culmination of the my advantage, and to the advantage of revolution had 60,000 shares. I have a my country. I feel that if I had studied in different background than Arzu. I lived Azerbaijan, I wouldn’t be so outspoken. in Azerbaijan, I studied for two years in Abroad, I was taught how to think Germany and one year in London. So I analytically, how to question things. have only spent three years abroad. I have EMIN MILLI: But there are many people spent 30 years of my life in Azerbaijan. I who have studied abroad, and the absolute have contact with everyone in Azerbaijan. majority of them are not outspoken at all. I I have communicated with people from think it doesn’t have that much to do with various regions: very poor people but us studying or not studying abroad. I think also the very rich. I have met people in there are people much braver than us, doing the government, I have met people in the great things who have never studied abroad. opposition. I travel all over the country to Rasul Jafarov, for example, campaigns for organise and participate in countless events. democracy. He didn’t study abroad, his I was also in jail, where you can really English is not perfect and yet I think he learn a lot from very different people. I is doing much more than me personally. talked to many people in jail, with people Another interesting comparison is the from various social statuses, who asked Egyptian blogger who lived in Dubai and me to become their criminal leader. 150 People, Ideas, Inspiration A Cause to Live For? A conversation with Arzu Geybullayeva and Emin Milli

They recognised that people like us are see myself as something of an “educator” becoming representatives and wanted me – I don’t know if that is the right word. to lead their criminal community. They I think that my experience as a person could see that I understood them, and who shares knowledge has always been that I could help them and they respected very inspiring to myself. Having people me. Of course I politely rejected and said coming up to me after lectures or training that I had no plans to live the rest of my and share their positive experience is life in the criminal world. But that just something that I value a lot. I feel like I shows you how much I am in touch with can continue doing this on different levels society, and not just with people like and with different people. As a woman, Arzu, who are rarely in Baku, but even for example, I can still do a lot when I with people who haven’t seen anything travel to the regions or the villages in besides their small region. Azerbaijan and talk to younger women. ARZU GEYBULLAYEVA: The only I would definitely continue journalism, thing I could do is to stay in touch with as well as to continue shedding light on the people on the ground. Every time the situation and giving a voice to those I write something, I always contact who cannot speak. people I know in Azerbaijan. I can’t EMIN MILLI: I see my future very just write something based on what I clearly. I am trying to establish myself read on the internet, because it is not as a writer. I have developed a literature my style and I don’t consider it right. club and I hope that we will be able to I feel that I also have to give a voice to re-launch the publication of the only the people. If I have this opportunity, independent literary journal Alatoran. they might as well have it through me, I also hope to create an independent through the articles that I write. That’s network of writers and to develop a PEN my only explanation to the fact that I Club (a worldwide association of writers live abroad and don’t come to Azerbaijan – editor’s note). Azerbaijan is, I think, the very often. I still feel that it was my only country where PEN International personal choice to use my education cancelled the recognition of the PEN abroad as a card to do something for Club, because the older writers with my country. the Soviet mindset didn’t allow young independent writers to join PEN Club You both have this desire to do events. I hope that our new network of something for your country. How do independent writers will one day turn you see your future and the future of into an official PEN Club. I will continue Azerbaijan? as a citizen and writer, to raise issues ARZU GEYBULLAYEVA: I don’t which I feel concerned about. have a very clear picture of how I see I recently submitted my open letter myself in the near future but I definitely to President Aliyev in the Independent, A Cause to Live For? A conversation with Arzu Geybullayeva and Emin Milli People, Ideas, Inspiration 151

Gazeta Wyborcza, Der Tagesspiegel, and writing I can influence or inspire Le Monde and also in the Azerbaijani politicians, journalists, businessmen as language Radio Free Europe website. well as many other citizens to do what We don’t just need good politicians they have to do as citizens: to awaken to change our society. We need even and fulfil their basic civic duties. If I more good journalists, creative writers, can do that within my lifetime, I will be courageous businessmen and responsible very happy. I think it is a good cause to citizens. I hope that with my thoughts support and to live for.

Arzu Geybullayeva is freelance journalist and social media trainer. She is the author of the popular blog Flying Carpets and Broken Pipelines (http://flyingcarpetsandbrokenpipelines.blogspot.com).

Emin Milli is a writer and dissident from Azerbaijan. Milli was imprisoned in 2009 for two and a half years for his critical views of the government. He was conditionally released in November 2010, after serving 17 months of his sentence, in part due to strong international pressure on the government of Azerbaijan. He was arrested again in January 2013 for 15 days after participating in a protest in Baku.

Łukasz Grajewski is a Project Coordinator at the Common Europe Foundation and an editor with Eastbook.eu – a blog about the Eastern Partnership.

Special thanks to Ola Cichowlas for her additional editorial work on the interview. The Hidden Fruit of the Underground

evgeny kaProv

In Belarus, the most vivid, original and interesting music is based solely below the surface of society. It is not supported by government institutions and is often completely ignored. Yet, dig a little deeper and a thriving underground music scene can be found, with bands that are more often recognised outside of Belarus than inside.

Navigating the music industry is like walking through an orchard. The visible fruit isn't necessarily delicious, yet they are easy to pick. Just stretch out your hand! Pick and eat; and if you don't like it – spit it out and pick another one. Yet, there is so much fruit hidden beneath the leaves or hanging high out of reach! To taste them, you have to make an effort to find them. Music in Belarus, however, is more like a potato plant. The top of the potato plant, the leaves, are the “stage” singers who routinely appear in the state-run mass media. In fact, it seems like the word “stage” was developed during the times of the Soviet Union. This was the way to refer to the artists of any genre who managed to struggle through the Soviet censorship barrier and make their way to the stage. In Belarus, many regard the “stage” as a carpet, inherited from your grandmother. It's a pity to throw it away, but yet it's shameful to show it to guests. Biologists contend that eating potato leaves can cause poisoning and even death. The edible part of a potato plant, however, is hidden and one should look for it. The vivid, original, and most interesting music in Belarus is 100 per cent underground, below the surface, and isn't supported by government institutions. It is hard to imagine the representatives of the “stage” as being “mainstream” (something corresponding to the European concept of “mainstream” simply doesn't exist in our country!), as they are busy “consuming” public resources, and spark very little interest amongst the public. Evgeny Kaprov, The Hidden Fruit of the Underground People, Ideas, Inspiration 153

Black lists In Belarus during the late 1980s and early 1990s, rock bands such as Krama, Mroja and Ulis emerged. These groups sang about critical social issues, not in Russian, but in Belarusian. Mroja’s frontman, Lavon Volski, said in a recent interview with www. kulturaenter.pl: “I consider 1984 the real starting point, when Mroja participated in ‘The Week of Visual Arts’. We went on stage and played a rock show in the Belarusian language. Everyone understood that rock music emerged in Belarusian. Of course, we did all this very awkwardly and were rather an amateur band, but with interesting lyrics for the time and up-to-date music. A period of stagnation then came. Belarus became independent. It seemed as though there was nothing to struggle Disgraced Belarusian bands against. Yet Mroja were a team of fighters. We kept on rehearsing and considered our are always looking for a way future. When Alyaksandr Lukashenka took out, giving sold-out concerts over as president, the problem solved itself. in Vilnius, Prague and Berlin. Favourable conditions arose, in the form of a lot of new problems which emerged in society. Thus the band N.R.M. (Niezaležnaja Respublika Mroja) was formed, and we have achieved success with this project, which has never before been achieved in Belarus.” Since then, the quantity and quality of protest rock bands has been on the increase, and their relationship with the state can be described as bad, or non-existent, because the government prefers not to pay any attention to this process. From time to time a “black list” appears with the names of bands and artists whose concerts are prohibited. The humour of the situation is that the officials practically deny the existence of such black lists, although their actions can hardly be missed. On March 2nd 2012, another mythical black list appeared on the internet, which included Belarusian bands such as Palats, N.R.M., Lyapis Trubetskoy, Neuro Dubel, Krambambula, Naka and many others. Concerts of these blacklisted bands fell through due to various reasons beyond the control of the musicians and organisers. In some cases, the reason for cancelling a concert was said to be an allegedly leaking pipe, an electrical problem, etc. During a press conference on January 15th 2013, Lukashenka answered the question about these prohibited musicians: “I would like to see those whom we prevent from singing, dancing or anything else. Believe me, I have not given such instructions to anyone. And I presume, if someone criticised the country, and someone else pays for it, let him hear the songs.” The disgraced rock bands are always looking for ways out. Many of them regularly give sold-out concerts in Vilnius, Prague and Berlin. Eugene Hütz, the frontman of Gogol Bordello, called Krambambula the “Eastern European Mano Negra (a 154 People, Ideas, Inspiration Evgeny Kaprov, The Hidden Fruit of the Underground

band from France influential in Europe and Latin America during the early 1990s – editor’s note).” And for Belarusian fans, going abroad is the only opportunity to experience a live performance of the group. On the day of Krambambula’s concert in Vilnius, the check points at the Belarus-Lithuania border could barely manage the flow of fans trying to get to the concert by car. On the other hand, actor and musician Leonid Pashkovskiy believes that in the future, the prohibited bands would face the fate of the former soldiers from Erich Maria Remarque’s novel The Road Back: “I am becoming more and more convinced that being a part of the protest scene is not an inspiration. For some it has become a mode of existence; when your art only exists and is perceived due to the prohibition (or largely due to it). Without prohibition some musicians would have nothing to say.” Political connotation

The very essence of distinguishing the Belarusian underground scene is that the musicians who take a strong stand against the government mostly use the Belarusian language as the language of their performances. And in my opinion, by virtue of a wrong stereotype: the Belarusian language means opposition. Young groups adhering to neutrality consciously avoid using the national language in their work, and are even afraid of it. Yet there are always exceptions. The Mogilev post punk band Akute (formed from the remains of the prohibited punk rock group Gluki) caused a real furore within two years of their existence. They have taken part in a scandalous film, Above the Sky, opened up for the famous British group Placebo, and recorded two albums which were positively acclaimed by “underground” critics (there are no other critics in Belarus!). The members of Akute have done more to popularise the Belarusian language than many projects under the auspices of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. In an interview with the Belarusian portal ultra-music.com the members of Akute said, “Our music and the themes of our songs don’t suggest any evident political implications whatsoever; except for perhaps the Belarusian language, which itself has a very interesting political connotation, starting approximately from the 1920s. Should we wish to be a political band, we would be one. But it is not because we are intentionally doing or not doing something. It is just happening. For us it is indeed very easy to compose a political chant, a hymn or something like that. A dozen bands like N.R.M. could be started, each one better than the other. But this would just be ‘artificial’ rubbish.” As a result of the official bilingualism as well as the forcible Russification in Belarus, a language dialect “trasianka” has emerged in Belarus (primarily composed Evgeny Kaprov, The Hidden Fruit of the Underground People, Ideas, Inspiration 155 of Russian vocabulary and Belarusian phonetics and grammar). Some bands were careful to utilise this unique phenomenon. In the early 2000s a project named Sasha i Sirozha was created by Sergey Mikhalok, the leader of the iconic Belarusian band Lyapis Trubetskoy, and artist Alexey Khatskevich. With brisk ska arrangements, the musicians performed brutal songs about the lives of two country boys. Lyrics from their texts have turned into aphorisms. The group ceased to exist due to a ban, but their place was taken by another Minsk band Razbitaye Sertsa Patsana (RSP). Almost all of the members of RSP work in the Free Theatre, which is known amongst the theatre stages of the world, and is also prohibited in Belarus. RSP is one of the few indie-rock bands in Belarus which regularly attracts a full house, mostly thanks to its ability to create a special atmosphere during their performances. However, even in spite of the sold-out concerts, most musicians still can’t fully concentrate on their creative work or abandon their primary employment. In an interview with ultra-music.com, Vladimir Shablinskiy, the head of the concert agency, The The major problem of underground Line of Sound, recently commented music is that there are no managers on the current situation: “Today, the or promoters in Belarus. stuff broadcast on the air is of the same format as was played during my days at Radio BA between 1993 to 1996. Of course the singers have changed, but the inarticulate musical substance of the same genre still remains. The taste of a general radio listener without access to the internet is influenced by radio stations. Both young and middle-aged people think that the stuff broadcast by their local FM radio is up-to-date, while in fact it is total rubbish. And here lies the problem that concert organisers have to face [in Belarus]: the desire to bring a band to Belarus which is contemporary, but which only 500-600 people in the country know about.” This is the basic reason for the fact that the Belarusian capital remains the main and only cultural centre of the state. Although the major target audience of young bands has almost completely migrated to the internet, another problem of underground music is that there are no professional managers, promoters and music video directors in Belarus. A rare example of professional management is the project of Alexander Bogdanov, who established the promo group BOpromo. Initially, Bogdanov paid attention to the most non-standard underground bands as well as groups who perform in the style of Lars von Trier’s Dogville. Due to his efforts, the cabaret band Serebryanaya Svadba have become one of the flagships of Belarusian music abroad, with regular performances in Germany and France. And the Russian version of Rolling Stone magazine has also begun writing about the electronic project Kassiopeya, the boogie band RockerJoker, 156 People, Ideas, Inspiration Evgeny Kaprov, The Hidden Fruit of the Underground

the psychedelic folk group НАГYАЛЬ (Nagual) and the post punk band Petlya Pristrastiya, calling these bands “a Belarusian breakthrough”. The Minsk indie-rock band, The Toobes, is known as the best live group in the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Its members actively participate in Polish, Swedish and other European festivals, and share the stage with the likes of Franz Ferdinand, Beady Eye and Deep Purple. Paradoxically enough, the history of the Belarusian music has seen a lot of instances when artists which attract 200 people to concerts in their homeland, get to become the headliners of European festivals. This is even more relevant to such extreme genres as death metal, deathcore, post-hardcore, and the traditionally strong genre in Belarus – folk-music. Among metal bands, Gods Tower, RaSta and Vicious Crusade have been well received in Europe. One can distinguish them as young, yet very promising hardcore groups. They have already signed contracts with various Western labels, including Rogue Records America, but are still treated as dark horses in Belarus. This list also includes Dead Silence Hides My Cries, Main-de-Gloire and BFI.

National pride?

At the last Koktebel Jazz Festival in Ukraine, I was approached by a young man who asked for a few hryvnias to buy some bread. His face was covered with a thick and untrimmed beard, but he was dressed neatly and tidily and had a big backpack on his shoulders. His appearance cleared my suspicions that he was a beggar, and together we strolled to the closest shop to get some bread. On the way he told me that he came from Kyiv and that he had hitch-hiked throughout the whole territory of the former Soviet Union. He then asked where I was from, when I said Belarus, he started humming Tuman yarom – a Belarusian folk song. The version he hummed was that of the folk fusion band Jambibum. According to him, this version of the song is one of the hymns of committed hitch-hikers in the former Soviet Union, and virtually all of them know it. A few years ago, despite being one of the most interesting folk groups, Jambibum started to stagnate. After successfully participating in the Polish Union of Rock, the Flader Pop Festival and the German Rock 4 Peace festival, the band ceased giving concerts in Minsk, and almost all of the members of the band emigrated to other states in the CIS. Only the flautist, nicknamed Grusha, stayed in Belarus. Grusha is a contemporary example of a shepherd playing his pipe. Having no musical education and being illiterate in musical grammar, he has written flute parts which even Ian Anderson of Jethro Tull would be envious. Grusha now makes his living by busking in the tunnels and underpasses. According to rumours, the money he Evgeny Kaprov, The Hidden Fruit of the Underground People, Ideas, Inspiration 157 earns is sufficient to pay not only for his rent and food; he also sends a share of it to his parents living in his provincial hometown. An example of the relationship between Belarusian officials and Belarusian folk-musicians, which one would think to be a source of national pride, is the band Troitsa. For almost 20 years this ethno-trio has toured half of the world and merited the title of one of the best folk groups on the planet. The musicians create songs that traverse cultures, using unique instruments from different countries. The instrument collection of Minsk remains the its leader, Ivan Ivanovich Kirchuk, numbers around 250 of various unique pieces. Officials in Belarus, however, main and only cultural ignore Troitsa and call them an underground band. centre in Belarus. However, notwithstanding all the unfavourable conditions, factors and conventionalities, the musical life of the Belarus hasn't disappeared. The process continues. New artists and bands appear; and they record something without any real hope of becoming famous or popular. Why? Just because there are always people who find it an interesting thing to do. Thus, in my opinion, the hidden fruit and the underground “potato” of Belarusian music is well worth digging up.

Translated by Olena Shynkarenko

Evgeny Kaprov is a journalist with the Belarusian music portal ultra-music.com. Books and Reviews

Listening to Bosnia’s Ghosts where there is no solid boundary between the rational and the irrational. After having spent exactly nine months and three days – the author enjoys the symbolism of numbers – depressed in bed after his wife left him, the main character of Seven Terrors Seven Terrors. is reborn and decides to join the world once By: Selvedin Avdić. more. However, when the daughter of his old Publisher: Istros Books, friend Aleksa appears in his flat one morning London, 2012. with news that her father has disappeared, he realises that his life is again about to change. The Bosnian author Selvedin Avdić could The two search for clues in Aleksa’s war diary, not have started his book Seven Terrors in a unearthed in a library in Sweden, and come better way than with the following words: upon unexpected events: meetings with “Whoever ends up reading this text will not ghosts, a town under siege, demonic brothers be my choice.” Indeed, once one has finished who ride on the wings of war and many more reading the book, it is quite difficult to determine terrifying discoveries. to who exactly this book was meant for: does As the investigation into Aleksa’s disappearance Seven Terrors deal with the Bosnian War or the continues, the reader is progressively drawn unravelling of a surreal world? further and further into a surreal world where Its nomination for the Jutarnji List (the most rationality is nowhere to be seen, evil doesn’t famous Croatian daily newspaper) prize for spare anyone, and love is no longer a sound best prose fiction in 2009 and the fact that value. Amidst such chaos, the hero endeavours it missed the top prize by only one vote are to cling to his sanity and does his best to solve enough to demonstrate the widely shared and the riddle of Aleksa’s disappearance whilst recognised success of this book in the Balkan struggling to bemoan his wife’s departure. neighbourhood. But what could possibly account Although the post-war context pervades for this success? The answer most probably lies throughout the book, the key for its thorough in the author’s ability to mingle different literary understanding is not only available to Bosnian genres and contradictory themes. Through his readers but to all kinds of reader, thanks to writing, Avdić certainly believes that one can find the text’s great hybrid style: Seven Terrors a way to merge the post-war situation in Bosnia can either be seen in the genre of fantasy, and Herzegovina with tales of unspeakable or considered a socio-historical work of art. horror and mystery. His Seven Terrors provides Similar to modern masters of fantasy such us with a distinctive and multicultural story as Mikhail Bulgakov, Selvedin Avdić manages Seven Terrors, Selvedin Avdić Books and Reviews 159 to provide his readers with an insight into the Even for a person who is not closely familiar mysteries of the Bosnian mythical underworld, to the intricacies and history of the Bosnian War, which are embodied in Avdić’s character of the it is quite interesting to notice how ten years mine ghost, Perkman, with whom the narrator, later (the story takes place in 2005), Bosnia and and the reader, get to know quite well. All Herzegovina still appears as the Balkan country kinds of enigmatic and troubling figures fill which most struggles with its past. And this the pages until they leave their mark in the is where Selvedin Avdić deserves a bow a la reader’s mind, who soon begins to wonder if française: “Chapeau!” Although the author didn’t these characters are actually just a product of outright state that he wanted to write a war book, the narrator’s own lost spirits. the presence of the Bosnian War is all the more There is no correct answer to these doubts. acute as its mere mentioning happens to have a One of the book’s main features is that it is greater impact than if the author had dealt with full of questions which are devoid of answers. it directly. Almost everything about the war is Once one faces the beings coming out of this implicit, and to that extent, everyone knows but unsettling nightmare, reminiscent of a book by no one talks about it. There is no peculiar bloody Franz Kafka or a David Lynch film, one has to or shocking detail, but themes such as fear, time, struggle in order to find an explanation for it. In dehumanisation, and silence are enough to elicit brief, this book could be seen as a bomb which the impact of the unspoken. Sometimes, at the is not afraid of pointing out questions, and bold least expected moment, the narrator brings enough to take them away from the reader, and up a memory from life during the war, where eventually, the hero himself. Nevertheless, the people, habits, customs and words disappeared, supernatural dimension of the book is relevant and where normality turned into the absurd. A enough to urge the reader to consider the clear example can be found in the middle of the existence of worlds which are more exalted than book, where the reader finds the sentence: “The our own and the beings that inhabit these worlds. war had ended long ago, there was a country Of course, this mythic horror familiar from now; miserable and unsteady, but still it existed.” legends would not have the same acuteness if it Seven Terrors implies defining the book as a was not for the post-war Bosnia background. The literary success due to the apparent spontaneity recovering city of Sarajevo serves as the stage of merging genres. The link between the to the story as Avdić lifts the veil covering the themes of enigma, fantasy and love perfectly truths on concentration camps, locales where fits the local ground of Bosnia and Herzegovina. prisoners were murdered and old jealousies Through Seven Terrors, Selvedin Avdić in fact which during the war turned into valid reasons dedicates a space of freedom where he tries to to commit murder. Catherine Baker (the author reach and express the complexity of the Bosnian of Sounds of the Borderland: Popular Music, War soul, even if it has to imply searching through and Nationalism in Croatia since 1991) very rightly its most ancient and unsettling ghosts. states that in Seven Terrors, “the supernatural and the political merge into a compelling secret Lana Ravel history of a city living with the effects of war”. 160 Books and Reviews Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, Branislav Radeljic

Complicated Diplomacy in the gaps in the literature and examine the relationship between the European Community and Yugoslavia before the collapse. Europe and the Collapse Radeljic maintains that the “Yugoslav crisis of Yugoslavia: The Role was a European problem from the beginning,” of Non-State Actors and but despite this, the region only interested European Diplomacy Europeans when the “conflict became easy to By: Branislav Radeljic. deal with”. In his words, the problems between Publisher: I.B. Tauris, the European Community and Yugoslavia October 2012. were due to “complete ignorance” and lacked a “serious strategy”. Once the conflict became If you walk down any street in the former international, there was no going back: the Yugoslavia, you can see remnants of the wars world was a stage and it was not just Europe from the 1990s as well as contemporary Euro- that was involved. While the spotlight started skepticism, both of which are surprisingly to shine on the former Yugoslavia early on, prevalent. Perhaps it is the word “euro” crossed Radeljic states that “the more Europe discovered out in an alleyway in Zadar, or graffiti illustrating about the Yugoslavs, the more confused their support for 1990s-era war criminals in Belgrade. relationship became.” Despite the fact that they have been over for In the chapter entitled From Unofficial to quite some time, what has really changed Official Relations he remarks that before the since the end of the Yugoslav Wars and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the European Milošević era? How does looking back at that Community and Yugoslavia were “two separate time help us move forward? works of progress” and that the latter “strongly In his new book, Europe and the Collapse of believed in endless balancing” between Yugoslavia, Branislav Radeljic, from the University the “East and the West”. Despite economic of East London, takes us back to that time, mismanagement, the objective of keeping and reminds us that this collapse didn’t just Yugoslavia afloat was a common goal not originate from within Yugoslavia. In fact, the just for Yugoslavia, but also for the European European Community along with the internal Community. and European media, the Catholic Church, and Recognition policy (recognising the the well-connected diaspora communities independence of Croatia and Slovenia) proved to also played a prevalent role in this process. be dangerous as it lacked a general agreement for He argues that in order for us to understand Yugoslavia. In effect, the Arbitration Commission the present situation, it is best to reflect on for the former Yugoslavia (1992-1995) and the the causes of the Yugoslavian implosion and accompanying EC policy of recognition lacked the outside forces involved. teeth. Recognition, Radeljic points out, was Radeljic dedicates a chapter to each of his not the real problem. The real problem was identified culprits involved in the collapse that there was no enforcement to “protect the of Yugoslavia. The aim of the book is to fill borders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina”. Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, Branislav Radeljic Books and Reviews 161

He also suggests that this policy was reflected identifying “enemies”, namely the Croats, by a division between the East and West. The Albanians and Muslims. But Serbia was not Yugoslav conflict was perceived as a threat to the only country undergoing feelings of European stability due to the risk of dividing victimisation. Croatia also felt marginalised. Europe into two camps: an integration-focused He also notes that the European Community West and a disintegration-focused East. failed to distinguish between the conflicts in This division, along with paranoia and Croatia and Slovenia and acknowledges an increased xenophobia, became increasingly orientalist bias in the Western media, citing evident in the local media, which in both the German media as an example. He notes Serbia and Croatia sought heroes. Slobodan that in the German media, Croats and Slovenes Milošević and Franjo Tudjman became father were portrayed as “Western” and the Serbs as figures to their respective countries. These new “defenders of communism”. emergent nationalisms were really “patriotisms” The local media perceived the “tardy in disguise. Yesterday’s Yugoslav pride evolved European response” as being largely responsible into fervent pride and growing vehement for the further conflict between the Croats support of a new-ism. Thus, Croatian-ism and and the Serbs. In other words, the media Serbian-ism were accompanied by growing didn’t aid or prevent further conflict, but their fear and disdain of one’s neighbours. complacency may have justified and perhaps The West comprised of Croatia and Slovenia. even encouraged it. Diplomacy was a futile Historically, they were more affluent with cause. The Slovenian and Croatian media felt greater resources and wealth, while Serbia and it was unjust that the entire former Yugoslavia Bosnia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia region was punished instead of just Serbia, who were comparatively poorer. This explains why were portrayed by them as the perpetrator. Serbia, the biggest country in the federation The Western media catered in a way more to with respect to population, wanted to preserve Croatia and Slovenia. Radeljic, however, points the union and hold on to Croatia and Slovenia out that Croatia and Slovenia were not entirely as much as it could. The media reflected the blameless; they each had responsibilities in popular attitudes at the time. The Slovenian the conflict with strong external support from media aimed for a more European identity diaspora communities abroad, most notably and Austrian officials even publicly acted in Canada, the United States, Austria, Germany on Slovenia’s behalf. The general argument and Western Europe. made was that geographically and culturally, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia is a Slovenia was never a part of the Balkans and stimulating account of the “collapse”, and the belonged more to Middle Europe or Central book is packed full of information presented and Eastern Europe. in a straight-forward and well-organised The local media helped fan the flames of manner. Like Radeljic’s book, however, the war and encouraged feelings of victimisation. relationship between Europe and the former Radeljic points out that a new post-Tito Serbian Yugoslavia is complex; and while one might identity was created through crafting and gain a clearer understanding, the reader may 162 Books and Reviews Ciemno, prawie noc, Joanna Bator

also want to brush up on European history Wałbrzych. Alicja wants to solve the riddle of the in order to best benefit from the book. In his mysteriously missing children; there is the story conclusion, Radeljic stresses that he aimed not of Albert, a gardener who has known Alicja since only to encourage a “deeper understanding” of she was a child, even though it is just now that European decision-making regarding the former he is able to share with her some of the painful Yugoslav Federation, but also as an example experiences from his own childhood; there is of how much impact non-state actors such the story of the magical Silesian Książ Castle, as “diaspora groups, the media and churches” located near Wałbrzych. The castle has been can have on influencing decision-making in explored by tireless treasure hunters for many Brussels. years; and there is the story of the beautiful Daisy, Radeljic concludes that understanding Princess von Pless, the last lady of the castle, and reflecting upon the role of all the actors who was buried, as the legend says, together responsible in the collapse of Yugoslavia (not with her priceless pearl necklace. There is also just internal) will help understand the various the story of a fast, shoddy love, found after a factors that are still currently at play in the long search, and the story of human stupidity region. Despite the marked progress and a and thoughtless succumbing to manipulation; “deeper mutual understanding” between the a search for faith and authority, and their rapid current EU and the Western Balkans; Radeljic rejection. Unloved and poorly treated children. rightly notes that there is still much work to be War and intolerance. A story of those who want done towards further EU integration. to change something but can’t. Ciemno, prawie noc (Dark, Almost Night) by the Maia Lazar contemporary Polish writer, Joanna Bator, is full of such stories. Individual stories of human life which, together, build a story about a place. The main heroine, Alicja, is a journalist who returns Lessons Not Learnt to her hometown, Wałbrzych, notorious for missing children. Alicja lives in a house outside the castle complex that dominates this middle- sized Silesian city; a house in which she spent Ciemno, prawie noc her own childhood. Alicja takes on a difficult (Dark, Almost Night). investigation into the stories of these missing By: Joanna children. She does it not necessarily wanting Bator. Publisher: to solve the riddle, to write an article or do an Wydawnictwo WAB, interview. Just like her father, who never stopped Warsaw, 2012. buying old maps or giving up on his expeditions into the tunnels under the castle, Alicja is not Listen. Don’t interrupt as there are many someone who discovers, but someone who stories to be told: the story of Alicja, who explores. And while exploring she finds things returns to her hometown in western Poland – that she’s never been looking for. Ciemno, prawie noc, Joanna Bator Books and Reviews 163

Wałbrzych is full of such explorers. The effect, but one that works only for those who biggest and the most dangerous of them read books just to cry. Alicja also finds some is Łabędź, who uses the legend of a local traits, memories, objects that once belonged prophet, Jan Kołek, and artfully manipulates to her older, already deceased, sister. All these the bemused crowd, by announcing that traits contribute to the recapturing of a story: he himself is a prophet. He seeks financial a story of seeking early lost childhood, the benefits, and even more desirable – the love story of painful adulthood and the saddest of the masses. of choices. And it is probably here that the The author herself is an explorer too. She author is at her best in finding her own style. unveils her own stories in small parts, although The most captivating are the descriptions of the they all complement each other, like pieces of relations between the young girls, the portrait a puzzle which fit precisely when put in the of Ewa, Alicja’s sister, who built a magical world right place. However, there are a few too many for her, full of charms and spells expressed in of these stories; at least for me. And I am not a strange language, mysterious characters, saying that a reader might get lost here. Not ghosts, legends about a beautiful princess, at all. Joanna Bator is a mature writer, very Daisy, all to protect her younger sister, for as competent in her skills. She controls all the long as possible, and prevent her from finding subplots masterfully and doesn’t allow any out that the world around is full of violence, element of this complex puzzle to get lost. injustice and fear. But there are too many stories and that’s why Yet, this book is about fear. And this is what the picture gets a little too dim. I like the most about it. I like it not because I I admit that, while reading the book, I too get enjoy feeling scared myself. Actually, it isn’t the involved in a guessing game with myself, asking, fear itself that I like so much, but rather the fact “What hasn’t happened yet?”, only finding the that this motif of fear gets flipped around. In missing element after a few pages. One more other words: what should be fearsome is not, story. The picture gets dimmer. But my naivety while fear is an ordinary, everyday, thing. Alicja makes me believe that the feeling of satiety is is alone. She lives alone, and is probably already meant to serve something. It was foreseen by used to the inconveniences that comes with the author although I can’t fully understand this type of lifestyle. It was her choice after all. why. If it was otherwise, and all these stories She doesn’t get scared with the screeching of were put together haphazardly, then my reader’s the door, nor the inside of an old, dark house. hunger wouldn’t be adequately satisfied. Nor does she get scared when she receives Alicja manages to solve the riddle of strange emails. She also isn’t scared when she the missing children and those who were needs to go into a basement which brings responsible for their misery get punished. about so many of her past memories. She However, in my view, this subplot is actually doesn’t even get scared when there are signs the weakest in the whole book. Its ending is that somebody is following her and when the least original and rather calculated to bring it’s clear that this person hovers around her about a visual effect – a strong emotional garden at night, leaving behind scary traces. 164 Books and Reviews Ciemno, prawie noc, Joanna Bator

Alicja is not scared of any of this. Her actions nominated for prestigious literary awards are, in fact, very rational. and highly esteemed in many important There is also nothing scary in the childhood competitions. They seem to have marked the stories, meaning the world which Alicja’s sister track that Bator has taken in her writing and has created for her. There is nothing fearful in which focuses on a few main objects. The first the late night walks, conversations about those is a man who is being shaped, or limited, by the who have died, or images of the ghosts who burden of the baggage of previous generations; live, in parallel, with those who are still alive the baggage he carries around and tries to free and can, therefore, influence their actions, himself from; a man who is written into what lead them in life, just like in romantic ballads. his predecessors have prepared for him. The There is also nothing scary in the stories of the second object is contemporary Poland, which dirty and poorly dressed women who take like a patient at a doctor’s office has just been care of stray cats. They may indeed wonder given a worrisome diagnosis. around and show up unexpectedly as nobody In this book, Bator reveals the picture of really knows what it is they really want. These Polish internet discussions through short characters, from the very beginning, have “inserts” weaved into the narrative; discussions some sort of magic, an element of a world about intolerance, which are built entirely on that is not available to everybody, something conventional knowledge. In fact, it would even of a higher value. They are ragged and poor, be misleading to call them discussions as their but also saints. Finally, there is nothing scary participants already have their own views in the language that Ewa uses to put a spell and stick to them. Not only are these places on the world. This language was not meant a display of our own stupidity, mindlessness to get anybody scared. It was meant to free and the fact that we draw final conclusions everybody from fear. based on false preconceptions, they also show What comes across as scary is, in fact, the that we are not capable of talking to each reality. It is the self-proclaimed prophet Łabędź, other. And this is frightening. This is what we who wants to rule people’s hearts and who should fear the most; as much as those who achieves it so easily. The crowd is also quite can hurt a child. fearsome. And it isn’t the eccentrics or freaks Hurt children. Yes, this is a book about hurt who are scary, but those who pretend to children. All the characters have been, in one be normal and ordinary. What is frightening way or another, hurt in childhood or are being are the things Alicja finds while searching hurt, if they are still children. And as there are internet forums, investigating what happened many characters, there are also many ways of in Wałbrzych and analysing the clues that lead inflicting pain. I wonder why. A picture of a hurt her towards discovering the truth about the child is always painful. It has to be painful for missing children. every normal human being. And even though Joanna Bator is a writer, essayist, lecturer we already talk about it a great deal, with the and a traveller. Her previous novels, Piaskowa media who often show us such stories, digging Góra (2009) and Chmurdalia (2010) were both into these difficult problems, we need to listen Ciemno, prawie noc, Joanna Bator Books and Reviews 165 to them. Without any interruption. Obviously, it helping everybody, regardless of what side they is very difficult to build normal, mature relations were on. During the Second World War, Adolf with another person when someone, as a child, Hitler had great plans for the area of Wałbrzych has only experienced pain and fear. Clearly, it and its surroundings, as well the range of the is impossible to escape from such memories. Central Sudetes known as the Owl Mountains. But why doesn’t Bator create a character that He started building a huge construction called would be a different type of protagonist? A the Riese (the Giant) complex. It included person who is good and honest despite their overground and underground halls, rooms, traumatic childhood? Or somebody who shelters, all probably planned for secret military becomes a crook and a deviant despite coming production, although the real story behind Riese from a normal family? Why is this motif such still remains unknown. The heaviest labour an obsession? was carried out by prisoners from the nearby Maybe because it is still dark. So dark that concentration camp of Gross-Rosen, who, it is almost night. This is why Poland, as seen apparently, received care packages from the by the author, is still in the Dark Ages. It is a princess. She was removed from Książ Castle, backward mass which, like sheep, follows cheap which, due to its favourable geographic location, demagoguery of a miserable actor; because was destined to become Hitler’s private lodging. we are still being blinded by medieval bigotry When the princess died in a Wałbrzych villa in and thoughtlessly fall victim to quasi-religious 1943, the casket in which she was buried was crooks. Even the experience of the Second later destroyed by the Red Army. Her body World War and its repressions have not taught was moved to different places. It wasn’t safe us tolerance, and we still hate the Jews, the anywhere; treasure hunters were apparently Gypsies, Ukrainians, Germans and Muslims. still attracted to the legend of her six-metre This is why our judgements and views about long pearl necklace, a beautiful present which people of different nationalities and religious was placed next to her in the casket. denominations still entail the old muckraking, Pearls are not popular in Poland. An old based on the not-so-funny stereotypes and a wives’ tale, no one knows why, says that brides dark, dark history, which should be finished by should not wear them on their wedding day. now, although nobody wants to interrupt it. Apparently they bring bad luck and sorrow. Daisy, Princess Maria Teresa Oliwia Hochberg Pearls are tears. Those who seek them, find von Pless, was famous for her beauty and sorrow. charitable work. She was born in 1873 and died in 1943. For 31 years she was the wife of Hans Zośka Papużanka Heinrich XV Hochberg, Prince of Pless. During Translated by Iwona Reichardt the First World War she worked in sanitary trains 166 Books and Reviews Rok 1989 i lata następne, Tadeusz Mazowiecki

Behind Poland’s Success relevant to the situation: from his predecessors he inherited an empty coffer, empty shops, Rok 1989 i lata massive inflation, a huge debt, and a socialist- następne (1989 and style, ineffective economy. Many Poles regret the Following Years). the fact that Mazowiecki and his government By: Tadeusz only ruled for 16 months, understanding that Mazowiecki. Publisher: with respect to such a short period of time Wydawnictwo and the number of difficult tasks it had to face, Prószyński i S-ka, Mazowiecki’s government deserves the highest Warsaw 2012. recognition. The memoir fully reflects the dramaturgy of politics in such difficult times. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, now 86 years old, is From the very beginning Mazowiecki knew one of the best known and most respected how to choose the right people. It was Mazowiecki politicians in Poland. Despite his advanced who convinced the economist Leszek Balcerowicz age, Mazowiecki is still very politically active: to become finance minister, despite the fact he advises the current president of Poland, that Balcerowicz was planning to move to the Bronisław Komorowski, participates in many United Kingdom to start an academic scholarship conferences and meetings, both in Poland and wasn’t interested in getting involved in and abroad, and has recently published his politics. Balcerowicz even rejected the request, memoir titled Rok 1989 i lata następne (1989 arguing that he wasn’t the right person for and the Following Years). the job. But Mazowiecki’s persistence paid off. In 1989, Poland regained its independence Today, it is hard to imagine what the Polish after many years of communist rule and quickly economy would look like had the courageous began building a new democratic political economic reforms initiated by Balcerowicz not system. The Solidarity (Solidarność) movement, taken place in the early 1990s. To his government, led by Lech Wałęsa, facilitated the first free Mazowiecki appointed such people as long- elections and the first non-communist prime time activist and oppositionist Jacek Kuroń, minister: Tadeusz Mazowiecki. During his first philosopher, academic lecturer and editor with the address to the Polish parliament after the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny, Krzysztof creation of the government 1989, Mazowiecki Kozłowski, and acclaimed lawyer and specialist lost consciousness. But after a short break and in international law, Krzysztof Skubiszewski. some fresh air, he returned to the assembly Mazowiecki’s book is not only a collection and jokingly said that the state of his own of conversations with the prime minister, his health reflects the state of the Polish economy. speeches, documents issued, and letters written Mazowiecki had been preparing his address for to important people. It is a kind of journal, and the entire night, and despite having smoked one that was never intentionally been written by two packets of cigarettes and drunk several Mazowiecki, but whose excerpts, chronologically cups of coffee, he was quite tired and had the presented, make a cohesive picture, providing right to faint. But the joke he made was quite witness to historical events. Rok 1989 i lata następne, Tadeusz Mazowiecki Books and Reviews 167

It also shines light on the fact that while stubborn man he is. When two such people the destruction of the Berlin Wall did indeed enter the political scene at the same time, one symbolise the demise of Communism in can only expect trouble. This was the case with Europe, many people don’t remember that Mazowiecki and Wałęsa. Mazowiecki became the destruction of the order of Yalta had been prime minister upon Wałęsa’s request, although initiated much earlier, namely with the creation from the very beginning, he ensured that his of the Solidarity movement in Poland. It is government would be immune to the influences estimated that at its peak, this movement, which inflicted by Solidarity’s activists. Wałęsa kept was aimed at defending workers’ rights, included his word for six months and didn’t disturb ten million Poles (compared to the two million the government, until his personal ambition members of the Communist party registered pushed him to run for the presidency. At the in 1989). Solidarity, the workers’ union, which same time, he became braver and braver in became a massive, democratic movement his criticism of Mazowiecki’s government. This showed that they had to be taken seriously, criticism was often populist in tone, and very even by the most hard-core communists. unjust (it was based on the assumption that One of the most important tasks of the new the reforms could have been organised in a government was faced with was, as Mazowiecki quicker, smarter and more efficient way). describes in his memoire, to eliminate the To find time for the reforms and “unveil” structures of the former secret police, conduct the works of the government, Prime Minister background checks on people employed in Mazowiecki decided to run against Wałęsa in different agencies dealing with home affairs, the 1990 presidential elections. His failure in and transform the militia into a police force. these elections, however, shows that he didn’t Needless to say, none of these reforms were adequately recognise the power of the symbol very popular, especially among those who Wałęsa had become. Upon Wałęsa’s victory, couldn’t pass a test and could no longer serve Mazowiecki resigned. in the army, the police or special forces (for Among the most important issues for example, because it became clear that they Mazowiecki at the time, which the book also had done harm to Solidarity members or were illustrates, was the withdrawal of Russian troops fighting against the Church). Neither were from Polish territory. The Soviet Army had these reforms popular among the part of the been stationed in Poland and other Eastern former opposition which was (and whose Bloc countries for many years, and it is no members are still today) upset that the process secret that the leader of Romania at the time, of de-communisation took place too late, and Nicolae Ceauşescu, sent letters to Moscow and wasn’t complete and courageous enough. All other leaders of the Warsaw Pact demanding this, in 2001, allowed the former-communists Poland’s punishment due to the fact that it had to temporarily return to power. dangerously “left the socialist path”. Thankfully, Anybody who has ever had an occasion to and primarily because of the work of the then meet the Solidarity’s legendary leader, Lech leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Wałęsa knows what an ambitious, proud and Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, the wind of change 168 Books and Reviews Rok 1989 i lata następne, Tadeusz Mazowiecki

was already blowing in Moscow, and the Soviet Mazowiecki, half seriously, half-jokingly, generals were focused on other things than postulated an introduction into public life the military intervention in Poland. Mazowiecki’s goal following rules: “Careerists should live in zoos. was only reached by subsequent governments. Those who take bribes should not be talked The last contingent of Soviet Army soldiers left to. People should write summaries of the book the territory of the Polish Republic in 1993. they read last year and send them to the tax For many people, both in Poland and abroad, office. Candidates to parliament should go Tadeusz Mazowiecki is a symbol of honesty and through an obligatory psycho-reconnaissance integrity. His life choices have always been led exam; hatred is a disease. Sub-national and by Christian values. In 1958 he set up a Catholic local government offices should have honesty monthly magazine called Więź, remaining its and kindness detectors installed.” editor-in-chief until 1981, and was a close I have a few younger female friends, mostly friend of Pope John II. Unsurprisingly, one of in their early or mid-30s, who on frequent the most moving excerpts of the book are to occasions have told me that they are in love be found in the chapters describing his service with Tadeusz Mazowiecki… platonically, of as a special United Nations emissary to Bosnia course. Is it possible not to love him, I ask? and Herzegovina between 1992 to 1995. In a moving letter to the Secretary General of the Grzegorz Nurek United Nations, in which he announced his Translated by Iwona Reichardt resignation in a protest of the international community’s lack of response to the atrocities committed during the Bosnian War, Mazowiecki wrote: “When I was given this mandate for the At the Crossroads of Democracy first time in 1992, I took it, stating clearly that my goal would not only be to write reports Від “хаосу” до but also help people. Setting up a safety zone “стабільності”. was, from the beginning, one of the main Хроніка recommendations of my reports. The decision авторитарної of the London Conference, which accepted the консолідації (From fall of Srebrenica and wrote off, in advance, the “Chaos” to “Stability”. fate of Žepa, are for me unacceptable. They A chronicle of an have not created the conditions for defending authoritarian system). all the zones … In Poland, we fought against a By: Mykola Riabchuk. totalitarian regime, we looked with great hope Publisher: K. I. S., Kyiv, 2012. to the future Europe. How could we believe in the Europe of tomorrow created by the children Certain states emerged in the early 21st of those who are today being left behind?” century, which political scientists haven’t been On another occasion in a manifesto written able to classify using common 20th-century together with his granddaughter, Tadeusz tools, such as modelling political systems From “Chaos” to “Stability”, Mykola Riabchuk Books and Reviews 169 on a rather clear distinction between what Yanukovych, the main “protagonist” of the is a democracy versus authoritarianism or book, took office as Ukraine’s president. In the totalitarianism. These “neither, nor” states are, essay titled Pragmatism, Donetsk style, Riabchuk therefore, found somewhere in-between the argues that in chaotic and dysfunctional well-defined ideal types, combining features democracies, such as Ukraine experienced of at least two of these political systems. In under the presidency of Leonid Kuchma and academic discourse, the term used to describe Viktor Yushchenko, stability can be renewed this type of state is a “hybrid regime”. This in two ways. It can either take the form of a name is primarily given to the states that find transformation which leads towards a functional themselves at the crossroads of democracy (legal) democracy, or it can consolidate chaos and authoritarianism. However, as the process and dysfunctionality. Riabchuk believes that of balancing is rather long, it may also happen the latter took place in Ukraine, especially that a state remains in a never-ending evolution in the early years of Yanukovych’s rule when between two different types of political systems. the state authorities revealed a characteristic Mykola Riabchuk, a contemporary Ukrainian indifference towards national interests. intellectual, essayist and prolific writer, argues In the essay titled On the Advantages of that the political system in today’s Ukraine is Naiveté, Riabchuk openly disagrees with such a hybrid. Alexander Motyl, the American political In his recent book, From “Chaos” to “Stability”. scientist who predicted that Yanukovych’s A Chronicle of an Authoritarian System, Riabchuk regime would collapse in 2012. Motyl’s thinking, presents a unique chronicle of his country’s as we learn from Riabchuk’s book, was based political history from 2010 to 2012; the period on a somewhat naive belief that Ukraine’s which he calls “authoritarian consolidation”. parliamentary elections of 2012 and presidential The book consists of analytical essays, elections of 2015 will, at least to a certain degree, published in parallel, in an English edition titled be honest and just. Riabchuk has no illusions Gleichschaltung. Authoritarian Consolidation in here. Looking at the speed and directions of Ukraine, 2010-2012. The English edition, also the reforms that have been implemented in published in Kyiv, includes the same collection his country, he believes that, under what is of essays with the exception of a few texts commonly called the Donetsk regime, Ukraine which are included in the supplement. has moved much closer to the Russian model The book is also unique in the naming of of a “steered democracy”. its chapter titles: in the case of the first three This is why in a subsequent essay titled The chapters they are simply the years that are Game According to the Rules, Riabchuk shows the discussed, while chapter four, Addendum, is slowing down of the political transformation a supplement and includes essays from the towards democracy which characterises period between 2009 to 2012. Yanukovych’s presidency. Importantly, he The first chapter, 2010, is a collection of seven states that the still existing division of power, essays presenting events between April and was, in fact, the sole obstacle to why a complete December 2010. This is the year when Viktor consolidation of the authoritarian regime has 170 Books and Reviews From “Chaos” to “Stability”, Mykola Riabchuk

not yet happened in Ukraine. A paradox that though it is clear that democratic standards Riabchuk brings to light is that Yanukovych, who are breached? He finds the answer in another while in opposition aggressively defended the article written by Motyl and published in the political reform against Yushchenko’s attempts American journal World Affairs. Motyl believes to stop it, completely changed his tune when that Europe is interested in integrating Ukraine he took power. And while for five years this with its structures because Brussels wants to “bad” reform was actually good for Yanukovych, include Ukraine in its orbit, and by doing so upon coming to power he replaced the “bad” prevent it from moving more towards “Eurasia”, constitution with an even worse one. Worse, meaning the sphere of Russian influence. The but more comfortable for him. already authoritarian and oligarchic Ukraine In subsequent essays Riabchuk analyses would then become even more authoritarian important events which took place on Ukraine’s and oligarchic, strengthening its ties with the political scene. Since its independence in 1991, authoritarian and oligarchic Russia. Ukraine has been in a “grey sphere” between In the third chapter, 2012, Riabchuk a defective, non-liberal, non-consolidated summarises what happened in Ukraine democracy, and a defective, non-liberal, non- during 2012 and analyses these events in consolidated authoritarianism. Riabchuk believes the framework of Yanukovych’s presidency. that this process is slowly nearing its end. The He believes that Yanukovych’s presidency hybrid system, which included both elements can be described in three ways: a period of of a democracy and authoritarianism, was authoritarian consolidation, “imitation” reforms, replaced by Yanukovych’s authoritarianism. and permanent scandals. The next chapter, 2011, consists of 12 essays. Summing up, at a time when Ukraine’s In Selective Law, Riabchuk argues that the political discourse is centred around polemics chair of the Security Services (SBU) in Ukraine on the evolution of the country’s political system combines a state function with private business: and choosing a pro-European or pro-Russian the vice prime minister builds public roads with stance in its further development, the reading state money and has no reservations against of Riabchuk’s book is a valuable experience. extending them a few kilometres towards his The essays it includes are, without a doubt, own private estate. In Virtual Euro Integration, great pieces of analytical work and reveal Riabchuk examines the reality of Ukraine’s the masterful style of the author’s essayist foreign policy, and in particular why Ukrainian skills. Importantly, the conclusions presented oligarchs want to keep the process of European in the book are a result of Riabchuk’s own integration virtual. In A False Alternative, Riabchuk reflections and observations, but are also a ponders why Europe cares so much about part of the wider, international debate, on Ukraine. To prove his point he even quotes the current political system in Ukraine, which Polish experts who say that Poland shouldn’t is led by such prominent thinkers as Thomas care more about Ukraine than it does about Karothers, Robert Putnam, Dimtry Furman, itself. For Riabchuk, the main question is: why Lucan Way, Andrew Wilson, Keith Darden is Europe so supportive towards Ukraine even and Paul D’Anieri. This feature of the book The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan Books and Reviews 171 puts it on the wider spectrum of international Kaplan does not try to convince the reader discourse on political systems in Eastern Europe, that he can foresee the future. He simply takes and allows us to hazard a guess that it will the facts and points out what potentially probably be regarded as one of the key texts may occur. Sure, one may not agree with his on Yanukovych’s regime. conclusions. But it would probably be quite unwise not to notice some of the processes Maryana Prokop and the cause-and-effect links that he artfully Translated by Iwona Reichardt describes. Going against the current of many pessimistic opinions that the European Union is doomed for failure, Kaplan claims that the community will not only continue to survive, but also remain “one of the world’s greatest post- The Revenge of Kaplan industrial hubs”. However, he also points that the “power shift within it” will move eastward The Revenge of to Berlin. Geography: What the Kaplan also claims that as a result of the Arab Map Tells Us About Spring, Europe will have to move southward; Coming Conflicts and just as in the 1990s it moved eastward after the Battle Against Fate. the collapse of the USSR. “Tunisia and Egypt are By: Robert D. Kaplan. not about to join the EU, but they are about to Publisher: Random become the shadow zones of deepening EU House, New York, involvement,” he writes, adding that Europe’s USA, 2012. real southern border is not the Mediterranean Sea. It is the impassable Sahara, dividing the In the first part of his most recent book, old continent from “Black Africa”. Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan, an Kaplan seems to praise the once quite American journalist and senior fellow at the popular concept of Mitteleuropa “as a beacon of Center for a New American Security, resurrects, multi-ethnic tolerance and historic liberalism”. in almost a hand-book way, the old school But the “critical factor” of European unity “will geopolitical thinkers: Halford Mackinder and his be the degree to which European, particularly Heartland Theory and Nicholas Spykman and German, quasi-pacifism holds up in the future”, the Rimland Concept. These were the founding he writes. Kaplan heralds the re-emergence fathers of the “geography-first” approach. Their of Mitteleuropa, in which Poland will serve as selectively chosen hypotheses are then followed Europe’s loudspeaker to the East, spreading by Kaplan’s own take on the geopolitical analysis European values. Such a Mitteleuropa would be of today’s state of the world, which, in a way, of great importance, since, according to Kaplan, could be seen as a summary of his work as “the legacy of depredations against Russia by an analyst and former correspondent for The Lithuanians, Poles, Swedes, Frenchmen and Atlantic Monthly. Germans, leads to the need of a cordon sanitaire 172 Books and Reviews The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan

of compliant regimes in the space between realised.” Kaplan quotes Zbigniew Brzeziński who historic Russia and Central Europe.” wrote that Poland, “coveted by Russia, would Russians, obviously, will be willing to regain as become the geopolitical pivot determining much influence as they can since the collapse the fate of Central and Eastern Europe and, of the Soviet Union. “To be sure,” writes Kaplan, therefore, the European Union itself”. “The “the Russians will not deploy land forces to struggle between Russia and Europe,” he writes, reoccupy Eastern Europe … but through a “goes on as it has since the Napoleonic Wars, combination of political and economic pressure, with the fate of countries like Poland and partly owing to Europe’s need for natural gas, Romania hanging in the balance.” Russian could exert undue influence on their As Kaplan sees it, due to energy supplies, former satellites in 40 years to come.” This “Europe, especially Eastern Europe and the influence will most undoubtedly derive from Balkans, will still be dependent on Russia to Europe’s need for natural gas from Russia and a significant degree.” Russia’s expansion is Russia’s investment activities. Thus arguing that expressed as a Moscow’s must do: Russia, “we may wake up from Europe’s epic economic lacking natural boundaries, situated on a flat and currency crisis to a world with greater plain, easy to traverse, simply tries to obtain as Russian influence within the continent.” much of a buffer zone around it as possible. Kaplan seems to support the consolidation of And Russia’s harsh climate pushes the country Central Europe, but he also has his doubts. He southward, towards the Caucasus and “warm looks to the ideas of Mackinder, who thought water outlets” for its fleet. that “there is no Central Europe or Mitteleuropa, Searching for a new Russian justification only maritime Europe and a continental one, for expansion, Kaplan again quotes Brzeziński with a crush zone in between.” Having said who wrote in The Grand Chessboard (1998) that that, two general visions of Europe emerge: “Russians began to resurrect the nineteenth- in the first, “a debellicised Germany partly century doctrine of Eurasianism as an alternative succumbs to Russian influence, leading to to Soviet communism, in order to lure back the somewhat Finlandised Eastern Europe.” But non-Russian peoples of the former Soviet Union.” there’s another scenario in which “Central Kaplan agrees that Eurasianism fits nicely with Europe would fully reappear and flower,” as “a Russia’s historical and geographical personality. tier of states between Germany and Russia … “Sprawling from Europe to the Far East and yet Mackinder hoped for, leaving Europe in peace, anchored in neither, Russia, in the way of no even as its aversion to military deployments other country, epitomises Eurasia.” But, as he is geopolitically inconvenient to the United emphasises, “this does not mean that Georgians, States.” Armenians, or Uzbeks … will begin to think of In the latter scenario, Kaplan sees that “Russia themselves as Eurasians.” The same applies to would accommodate itself to countries as far Ukrainians, Moldovans, Georgians and others east as Ukraine and Georgia joining Europe who are pining to be Europeans. … thus the idea of Europe, as a geographical Kaplan quotes liberal Russian political expression of historic liberalism, would finally be scientist Dmitri Trenin who notices that even The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan Books and Reviews 173 if Russia spreads from the Pacific to the Baltic Mackinder’s “Heartland”, is, according to Kaplan, Sea, the vast majority of its population lives in its “truly becoming an independent power … European part anyway. Potentially, Russia could It is rich in all the world’s natural resources.” be transformed into a European-styled liberal Kazakhstan would not be able to militarily democracy, and the Russian Far East would defend itself against Russia, but it can always turn serve as an outlet to the rapidly developing to China. Along with other “non-threatening” Pacific Basin, being Russia’s “Twenty-first-century Asian countries such as Japan and South capital”. Kaplan claims that Russia was closest Korea, China is already present in Central Asia, to westernisation in 1917, while it “would have which is also weakening Russian influence. evolved throughout the course of the twentieth Kaplan does, however, see a chance for Russia century into a poorer and slightly more corrupt to increase its attractiveness in the region. and unstable version of France and Germany, He proposes the Chinese way. China helped anchored nevertheless in Europe”, with its Central Asia, Belarus and Moldova financially, westward oriented “heavily German tsardom, and has established itself in these countries French-speaking nobles and bourgeoisie as a wealthy and reliable ally. “For Russia, a parliament in the European capital of St. corresponding strategy would be to politically Petersburg”. The Bolshevik revolution, writes attach itself to Europe and economically attach Kaplan, marked an end to this orientation, since, itself to East Asia.” as Samuel Huntington would say, Russia chose Kaplan is fortune teller of countries. But its own way rather than mimicking Europe. This he reads maps. And a map can say almost way was, however, a catastrophe. everything about geopolitical prospects and Today, according to Kaplan, Russia is “an possibilities. However, there is no “Laplace’s energy caliphate”; and an Asian one. An demon” (Pierre-Simon Laplace’s 19th scientific independent Ukraine keeps Russia out of theory of causal determinism – editor’s note), Europe, although a Russian Ukraine would add which can calculate every potential move in the 46 million people to its own, Western-oriented, universe. Kaplan reminds us that sometimes a demography. single man, such as Adolf Hitler, can influence But even if Russia re-creates some kind of global history. For that reason, it is impossible version of its former empire, it will be just a to draw a complete picture of the future world. shadow of it, Kaplan notes. He reminds us of But Kaplan at least sketches the frames. the demographic catastrophe of Russia and its devastation. He sees the symptoms of potential Ziemowit Szczerek regional separatism and urban terrorism in Russia, and adds that the birth rate among Russia’s Muslims is higher than ethnic Russians. Russia will have to face Islamic radicalism more often than it used to ever before. And Islam is growing stronger in the region. Islamic (though not fundamentalist) Kazakhstan, 174 Books and Reviews Moldova: Arena of International Influences, M. Kosienkowski and W. Schreiber

International (In)significance? Andrey Dyevyatkov, a Russian researcher with Tyumen State University in Russia, claims that, from the Kremlin’s perspective, Moldova has Moldova: Arena of outgrown its status as Russia’s “near abroad”. The International Influences, primary goal of the Russian government is to eds. M. Kosienkowski prevent the further integration of Moldova with and W. Schreiber, 2012. the West, especially NATO. The primary method Publisher: Lexington used to achieve this goal is the positioning of Books, Lanham MD, Russian forces in Transnistria. An interesting USA. 2012. paradox is the pragmatic nature of Russian- Moldovan relations despite the role of ideology. Moldova: Arena of International Influences is After a series of symbolic gestures in Moldova’s the result of a multi-national team of authors “historical” rhetoric that were deemed offensive led by the Polish-American editorial duo of to Russia (and Soviet history), for example, Marcin Kosienkowski and William Schreiber. Moscow reacted with an embargo on Moldovan The book focuses on the relations between agricultural products. Moldova and the “outside world”. Each of Beyond Russian-Moldovan relations, the the 19 chapters constructs the story of how chapter focusing on Romanian-Moldovan certain actors of international relations interact relations requires closer scrutiny. Its author, with this relatively young and small country. Octavian Milevschi, stresses that although They include: 17 states, the European Union Moldova has a special place in the Romanian and the unrecognised breakaway territory of heart, it has not been a strategic goal of Transnistria. In the preparation of this book, Romania’s foreign policy over the last two the editors requested that the authors of decades. Romania has been much more focused individual chapters, who represent different on Euro-Atlantic integration. Hence, Moldova has nationalities, discuss their native country’s had no choice but to remain in the background. relations with Moldova. Hence, Russian- The great value of both the “Romanian” and Moldovan relations are analysed by a Russian, “Russian” chapters is their presentation of while Italian-Moldovan relations are presented the many nuances which allow for a better by an Italian. The chapters are not arranged understanding of the uneasy relations these based on the level of influence or any other two countries have with Moldova. factor, but are put in alphabetical order by Transnistria, the breakaway Moldovan territory, country. To provide a summary of all the is also a unique geopolitical aspect in when chapters here would make little sense, although discussing Moldova. The role of this quasi-state in it is worth considering the most important ones the shaping of international relations is generally and connecting the most visible phenomena quite limited. Nonetheless, the attitude of the and tendencies that have emerged when Transnistrian government towards Moldova has, examining the global picture of international in the context of international influences, quite influence on Moldova. an important significance. Andrey Safonov, Moldova: Arena of International Influences, M. Kosienkowski and W. Schreiber Books and Reviews 175 a Transnistrian political scientist, labels his or less at the same time. After years of holding country’s policy towards Moldova a policy of a pro-Russian position, it declared that the denial, containment and separation. Safonov country’s goal would now be integration with stresses that for Tiraspol, reintegration with the West. The ruling Communist Party, less Moldova is unacceptable. The main objective persistent in this area, was replaced in 2009 by of the Transnistrian authorities is international a coalition called the Alliance for the European recognition of their own sovereignty or – at Integration, and Moldova has become one of the very least – to maintain the status quo. the shining stars of the EU’s Eastern Partnership The author describes Moldovan-Transnistrian programme ever since. relations as a vacuum of prospects. Interestingly Bulgaria, Turkey and Hungary present other enough, Safonov concludes with the paradox interesting elements of Moldova’s role in that it is easier for Tiraspol to enforce its own Europe. For these countries, ethnic relations policies when the government in Chișinău is are the drivers of their policy towards Moldova. more pro-Western and pro-Romanian. In the case of Bulgaria, the problem relates Another element in this story is Moldovan to a rather large Bulgarian diaspora living in relations with the United States. This issue is southern Moldova, while Turkey sees itself as particularly interesting because the US is the only a defender of the Turkish-speaking Gagauz western country that has recognised Moldova people. Hungary has consistently supported from the beginning of its independence. Moldovan statehood and regulating the inter- James Baker, the US Secretary of State at the ethnic relations in this country, which it used time, visited Chișinău in 1992. In addition, the as a strong argument in the dispute with pragmatic nature of US-Moldovan relations Romania regarding the Hungarian minority has been maintained regardless of who is in in Transylvania. power in Moldova. The best example of this was Schreiber and Kosienkowski’s Moldova: Arena Moldova’s engagement in the Iraq War in 2003 of International Influencesallows us to recognise – at the time the Moldovan Communist Party how insignificant Moldova really is from the was in power. From the American perspective, perspective of western actors. Dedicating whole Moldova is, of course, quite critical for balancing chapters to some countries, such as Great Britain, relations with Russia. Moldova is also a key US France and Italy, and their relations with Moldova, interest regarding security policy, including the seems like a stretch. And that makes it worth very important policy of non-proliferation of pondering the structure and content of the nuclear weapons. The unregulated status of book itself. The reader can’t help but wonder if Transnistria and the lack of full control over this it wouldn’t have been a better idea to arrange territory in this case remains a threat. the chapters based on a more thought-out For the EU, Moldova has increased in order (not just alphabetical); perhaps based importance since it became clear that Romania on a state’s power to influence Moldova, for would become a member of the community. example, or the rationale to carry out a certain The Moldovan Communist Party also made a type of foreign policy? This would seemingly large shift in its geopolitical orientation, more be an interesting solution but would probably 176 Books and Reviews Moldova: Arena of International Influences, M. Kosienkowski and W. Schreiber

open a further discussion about the reasoning knowledge of Moldova, it shines light on the behind choosing such an order, or why one problems of its foreign policy; while for an expert given actor is in one category but not another. It specialising in this area, it is an eye-opening would seem, the approach taken by the editors publication. It precisely depicts the position is a simpler one, and one that allows for better Moldova has in the system of international transparency and clarity in navigating the content. relations and how differently this position is Another question that comes up is whether seen from Paris, Warsaw and Moscow. However, 19 actors (each with a separate chapter) are the most interesting aspect of this book is not needed to determine the international influences the story of Moldova, but also the fact that it over Moldova? It is quite clear that countries is a great source of knowledge about today’s such as Italy, the Czech Republic and Slovakia international relations, and the motives behind do not play a big role here. Other countries, the foreign policies of the various states and such as France and Belarus, only implement power systems in Europe. their policies in one area (culture or economy). Piotr Oleksy A safer way out would have been to combine Translated by Iwona Reichardt the analyses of these less important countries into one chapter. However, what is quite clear is that the editors of the book were driven by their belief that the presentation of topics The Last of the Great Surrealists would give a fuller, more complete picture of the place Moldova enjoys in today’s world. And it is hard to disagree with them in this respect. One flaw of the book could be the lack of a chapter focused on the Moldovan perspective. Even though the title itself suggests that Moldova has a limited place in international relations and its position in the world is largely based on the result of the power of other bigger players, the chapters note Moldova’s Jan Švankmajer: Dimensions of Dialogue turns in its geopolitical orientation has had – Between Film and Fine Art. October 26th a significant influence on both the EU and 2012 to February 3rd 2013. House at the Russia’s policies. A chapter dedicated to the Stone Bell, Prague City Gallery, Prague Czech Moldovan-centric perspective would have Republic. helped the reader who might be slightly less knowledgeable in this area. When an artistic movement reaches its There is no doubt that Kosienkowski and 100-year mark it is usually as a gilded fossil, Schreiber’s book is extremely valuable and its practitioners having long been dead and contributes greatly to the limited literature on buried. What is far worse is that these former Moldova. For the reader with only a general innovators and renegades become as blindly Dimensions of Dialogue – Between Film and Fine Art Books and Reviews 177 accepted as they were formerly shunned, placed As impressive as the diverse range of mediums in the safe and distant category of genius, a Švankmajer has worked in and continues to status which creates a sharp and artificial divide explore further, what is even more striking between what they did in their work and what in the show is the diversity of his sources of an artist of similar sensibilities might hope to influence. Both his films and artwork display do today. Surrealism remains an exception in practically all the hallmarks of classic Surrealism this respect, as was made evident recently by – a fascination with dreams, eroticism, madness, the Prague retrospective of contemporary artist violence and with the unleashing of unconscious and filmmaker Jan Švankmajer. and the absurd. And so it is no surprise that The exhibition Jan Švankmajer: Dimensions of you can find traces of all those influences you Dialogue – Between Film and Fine Art at Prague would expect in an artist of his sensibility. City Gallery’s House at the Stone Bell (Dum U Yet Švankmajer seems to bypass the imitative Kamenneho zvonu), brought together the work stage that would seem unavoidable for an of the Czech Surrealist from different periods of artist coming so late in an artistic movement’s his long career, showing how active he remains life. When he touches on one of the standard in his late seventies and how unconfined he is Surrealist practices, such as in his Dream Objects by any previous artistic or commercial success or automatic drawings, the work doesn’t seem he has had. In fact, it is hard to find any sense in even remotely like imitations of what the which Švankmajer lets himself be confined. The Surrealists themselves were doing, as most exhibition had more than its fair share of the “surreal” art of the past almost 80 years has film, animation and puppetry that Švankmajer led us to expect. is best known for internationally, in work such In his Dream Objects, one object of which as his dark 1988 adaption of Alice in Wonderland contains a pair of framed bread rolls with (Alice, Něco z Alenky) as well as his no less offbeat chicken legs coming out of them, Švankmajer version of Faust (Lessons of Faust, Lekce Faust) makes you feel as if he is working directly set in modern-day Prague. The latter film is from his dreams as opposed to straining to represented by a puppet stage set that fills be dreamlike. This comes partly from the half a room, complete with a life-size Faust, frankness and humour of the dream the work Mephistopheles and various devils, while the derives from, narrated in all its bizarre culinary smaller displays for Alice contain much harder detail in an accompanying note, and with the to identify creatures which have an even more crowning final touch which he mentions, he profound echo with the rest of the artwork in woke up from the dream starving. the exhibition. Many of his features and short His automatic drawings and references to films are screened throughout the museum Primitive Art likewise feel fresh, almost as if he between the sculptures, paintings, puppets has never seen the previous century’s worth and art pieces that range from constructed of similar work, or purposefully ignored it. For machines and hybrid animals, to found objects Švankmajer, each of these artistic directions, and the Czech artist’s stab at primitive and familiar or not, are simply one of many means outsider art. of expressing himself. 178 Books and Reviews Dimensions of Dialogue – Between Film and Fine Art

Another ground that Švankmajer’s work “Like the alchemists of old, in my creative mines is geographically much closer to home, work I keep distilling the water of my childhood although one which draws on a tradition experiences, obsessions, idiosyncrasies and of the fantastic that predates Surrealism anxieties for there to emerge the ‘heavy water’ by centuries. The exhibition shows how of learning necessary for the transmutation consistently he has turned to the Prague of of life.” Rudolf II, with its alchemists, mysticism and Yet if this reference to arcane knowledge attraction towards the grotesque and exotic, makes you suspect that Švankmajer takes as reflected in the eccentric emperor’s mania himself a bit too seriously, all that is required for collecting curiosities. In fact, the exhibition is to look at the video below the quote, which documents Švankmajer’s contemporary is a self-portrait on which some claymation attempt to create an equivalent of Rudolf’s leads to a climax of a sticking-out tongue; the Kunstkammer, or Cabinet of Curiosities, by mix of serious and irreverent being signature bringing together an assemblage of objects Švankmajer. It is this mix of the deep, historical seemingly without logic or limits. In a certain and the laughingly irreverent (as well as a sense, it is a characterisation that could be sheer enjoyment of shapes, colours, textures applied to this exhibition as well. of materials) which might sum him up best, There is an entire room of work devoted if anything could sum up such a diverse and to Giuseppe Arcimboldo, the 16th century prolific artist. court painter famous for making portraits out Švankmajer proves just as comfortable in of fruit and vegetables. It contains paintings more exotic geographies, with two graphic series and sculptures in which Švankmajer takes from 1973, Fellaceus Oedipus and Amazonian Arcimboldo’s technique as a point of departure, Coy Longtail, exhibiting fantastical monsters in forming heads out of everything from pine reference to the beliefs and practices of cultures cones, starfish and shells. to body parts and ranging from the Aboriginal Australians to wild animals. The works show a decades- the tribal peoples of the Amazon. Fantastical long obsession, starting in the mid-1970s monsters are given skeletal form in his Bestarium, and continuing towards the morbid End of in which he constructs grotesque and hilarious Arcimboldo (2002) made of rotting, worm- animals and combinations of creatures out of infested fruit and vegetables, and with a animal bones, parts and assorted objects. The further epitaph in his painting Arcimboldo series is ceaselessly inventive and demands with Fish Eyes (2011) formed from dead fish. detailed, individual inspection. In Duel I two Švankmajer’s debt to and fascination with animal skulls attached to large roots are poised Prague is also evident elsewhere, from the to battle one another, one of them with a settings and subjects of films, to his use of sculpted human hand holding a fork ready illustrations from 19th-century Czech books, to stab, while a closer look at its opponent and his comparison of his creative process to reveals a second skull and small animal head its legendary alchemists in a quote on the wall coming out of its lower body. Other creations above one of his animated films: in these glass boxes include snakes with skulls, Dimensions of Dialogue – Between Film and Fine Art Books and Reviews 179 bird heads on animal horns, roots with a rooms in the exhibition contain work that in turtle shell and some virtually unidentifiable itself doesn’t outshine his best, but displays reconstructed skeletons from a number of an artistic courage and integrity that is almost different skeletons. Entering the nearby room unparalleled. There is a tactile room filled with devoted to his puppets, however, which show objects related to his filmConspirators of Pleasure some of the same grotesque elements as these and related to a multitude of textures and monstrosities, such as the life-size skeleton notions of touching, including the multi-armed puppet gracing one wall, the effect is entirely robotic TV Masturbation Machine, whose finest different. There are shapeless figures and detail might be the small side table equipped a Tortured Puppet with nails and pins in a with tissues and hand cream. Then there are mutilated ceramic body, but there are also the simple collages with shells, works which African puppets and puppets that verge on it is hard to imagine similarly-established abstraction, such as Woman with Three Breasts, contemporary artists undertaking. which is a large wooden frame with various You are left with the question of whether bottles and levers. Švankmajer writes that he Švankmajer is the last of the great Surrealists returns to making puppets as a kind of anchor or if he is an inspiring reminder that Surrealism in his relation to the world, his words again is more than a movement tied to a historical showing his local roots: “Usually, I resort to time and place, but is still relevant and evolving, them in times of uncertainty, because in this and whether this Czech artist has creatively way I am creating my own Golems to protect and irreverently carried its torch into the 21st me from the pogroms of reality.” century. It would be easy for Švankmajer to settle on the Švankmajeresque and churn out work that Michael Stein would sell, but he clearly doesn’t bother with such a strategy. Some of the most impressive New Eastern Europe is a collaborative project between three Polish institutions

The City of Gdańsk the Marshall of the Pomeranian Voivodship, the www.gdansk.pl President of the City of Gdańsk and the Chairman A city with over a thousand years of history, of the NSZZ Solidarność Trade Union. Gdańsk has been a melting pot of cultures and The main purpose of the European Solidarity ethnic groups. The air of tolerance and wealth Centre is to preserve the heritage and memory built on trade has enabled culture, science, and of Solidarność in order to hand it down to future the Arts to flourish in the city for centuries. generations, while stressing its relevance and Today, Gdańsk remains a key meeting place universal value. and major tourist attraction in Poland. While the city boasts historic sites of The Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College enchanting beauty, it also has a major historic of Eastern Europe and social importance. In addition to its 1000-year history, the city is the place where the Second www.kew.org.pl World War broke out as well as the birthplace The College of Eastern Europe is a non-profit, of Solidarność, the Solidarity movement, which non-governmental foundation founded on led to the fall of Communism in Central and February 9th 2001 by Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, Eastern Europe. a former head of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe and a democratic activist. The European Solidarity Centre The foundation deals with cooperation between the nations of Central and Eastern www.ecs.gda.pl Europe. The aims if its charters are to carry out The European Solidarity Centre is a educational, cultural and publishing activities, multifunctional institution combining scientific, and to develop programmes which enhance the cultural and educational activities with a modern transformation in the countries of Eastern Europe. museum and archive, which document freedom The organisation has its headquarters in movements in the modern history of Poland Wrocław, Poland, a city in western Poland, and Europe. perfectly situated in the centre of Europe and The Centre was established in Gdańsk on with a deep understanding of both Western November 8th 2007, by the Minister of Culture, and Eastern Europe. No 2(VII)/2013 Price 19 PLN (w tym 5% VAT) 10 EUR 12 USD 7 GBP ISSN: 2083-7372 quarterly April-June www.neweasterneurope.eu

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Azerbaijan ISSN 2083-7372 A Cause to Live For www.neweasterneurope.eu 2(VII)13/ Emin Milli Arzu Geybullayeva Nominated for the 2012 European Press Prize