Notes Introduction 1. Clement Dodd (1993) edited a volume on Turkish Cypriot affairs, cover- ing political, social, and economic areas. More recent research has been concerned with particular issues such as the dynamics of political econ- omy (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005; Sonan, 2007); the question of Turkish Cypriot identity building and social conflicts within Northern Cyprus (Kızılyürek and Gautier-Kızılyürek, 2004; Hatay, 2005, 2008; Ramm, 2006; Navaro-Yashin, 2006); as well as the analysis of the connection of Turkish Cypriot sovereignty with Turkey’s involvement from different perspec- tives (Navaro-Yashin, 2003; Bahcheli, 2004a). The case of Transdniestria, on the other hand, has been marked by a paucity of research. Whereas economic developments have been followed in detail by Moldova’s Center for Strategic Studies and Reforms (CISR), internal political dynamics have been explored in only a very few specialized articles (Büscher, 1996; Tröbst, 2003; Hanne, 2004; Korobov and Byanov, 2006; Protsyk, 2009). 2 Setting up a State 1. The metaphor is borrowed from Richmond (2002a) mentioned in Chapter 1. 2. Although it is widely believed that Denktas¸ was the founder and leader of the TMT, Denktas¸ himself described his role within the organization as a political advisor (Cavit, 1999, p. 512). For an alternative view of the TMT’s activities and Turkey’s role in the formation of this group see Ionnides (1991). 3. It should be noted, however, that although these armed clashes are often referred to as ‘inter-communal’ fighting, on closer examination this term is a misnomer. The two armed groups were highly nationalist in ideology. There were many instances in which the two groups used violence against their own communities, due to the cooperation between left-leaning Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Cavit, 1999; Stavrinides, 1999; Patrick, 1976). 4. The agreements included three parts: Treaty of Establishment, Treaty of Guarantee, and Treaty of Alliance. The constitution and the new Cypriot republic were safeguarded by the Treaty of Guarantee between Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey, according to which, if security, territorial integrity, or independence were undermined, the guarantor states could intervene to restore order. The Treaty of Alliance provided for coopera- tion between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus on matters of common defense. 180 Notes 181 In addition to the national Cypriot forces, Greece and Turkey were to keep their military forces on the island (Patrick, 1976, p. 30). The Treaty of Establishment gave Great Britain rights to keep its sovereign bases on the territory of Cyprus. 5. Among the most significant changes to the constitution were elimination of the president’s and vice president’s veto powers, collective holding of elections, establishment of unified municipalities, and adjustment of the ratio of representatives of the two communities in the civil service and security forces to match the ratio in the population as a whole. Furthermore, according to the plan, the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, which excluded enosis and provided for the intervention of the guarantor states, were to be abolished (Patrick, 1976, pp. 35–6). 6. Aimed at restoring peace on the island, the resolution also had some political repercussions. Referring to the government of Cyprus, the reso- lution implied the Greek Cypriot faction, because at that time no Turkish Cypriot representative remained in the administration of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot side was thus recognized as the legitimate government of this state (Patrick, 1976, pp. 52–4). At the practical level this led to UN acceptance of arms supply to the Greek Cypriot side, since it was considered to be the Cyprus government and had a legitimate right to defend the state. The Turkish initiatives were labeled as ‘smuggling’ (Crawshaw, 1978, p. 370). 7. Denktas¸’s critics believed that this move was a pretext for him to assert his authority and to add more presidential powers to the constitution, because in the elections of the early 1980s the left managed to gain politi- cal weight (Interview, 2005a). 8. According to Denktas¸, he already had a majority in the parliament, but he preferred unanimity. To receive a unanimous vote, Denktas¸ pointed out that, ‘It would not be possible to recognize a voice in the new con- stitution to those parties who came out against the establishment of the Republic. … Permission cannot be given to the establishment of parties who say “I do not want the Republic”’ (quoted in Dodd, 1993, p. 135). 9. On the details of historical developments in the region see Dima (2001) and King (2000). 10. The majority consisted of 48.5 per cent ethnic Ukrainians. The rest of the population represented 8.5 per cent Russians, 8.5 per cent Jews, and 2 per cent Germans (King, 1998, p. 60). 11. The decrease in Moldovan population in the MSSR has been due to the fact that many of the intellectuals chose to leave for Romania (Crowther, 1991, pp. 185–6). Yet, according to some accounts, the decrease is a result of the purges and overt deportation in the 1940s, and the planned migration, in accordance with the Soviet labor policy, in the 1950s (Dima, 2001, p. 46). 12. The club was named for a prominent Romanian/Moldovan priest and poet. 13. This event was of great significance for the Moldovan nationalist camp. As suggested by Dima, ‘When the Cyrillic script was changed to Latin, 182 Notes all of a sudden everybody discovered that the Moldavians were in fact pure and simple Romanians. … After all, it wasn’t an alphabet question, but one of national identity; an identity which propelled the Moldavian Romanians on a new historical stage’ (Dima, 2001, p. 143). 14. Mircea Druc was dismissed a year later, in 1991, and moved to Romania, where he attempted to continue his political career. In 1992 he ran for the presidential post, campaigning for the union of Moldova with Romania, and received around three per cent of the vote (Kaufman, 1996, p. 125). 15. This explains the inconsistent use of Moldovan/Moldavian in this work. 16. Calls for enosis with Romania evoked memories of World War II, when the region was occupied by Romanian forces from 1941 to 1944. In addi- tion, the adaptation of Romanian symbols was viewed as Romanization of the region. 17. On the details of the Gagauz region see Chinn and Roper (1998). 18. Igor Smirnov was one of the organizers and the head of the OSTK. Having worked as assistant director of a factory in Ukraine, in November 1987 Smirnov moved to Transdniestria and was appointed to lead the machine- building factory Elektromash in Tiraspol. Promoted by the OSTK, Smirnov won a seat in the City Soviet of Tiraspol and was elected as its chair, a key post in Transdniestria at that point. He also managed to be elected to the Supreme Soviet of the MSSR. The engineer-turned- politician became the leader of the PMSSR in September 1990. 19. It is also reported that the long-term aims of Cossacks and the Transdniestrian leadership were divergent. If the Transdniestrians were fighting for independence, the Cossacks were believed to have aimed at reestablishment of the tsarist Russian Empire (Kolstø et al., 1993, p. 13). 20. The issue of weapons distribution to the Transdniestrian armed forces, however, is also a subject of dispute. According to the Moldovan ver- sion of events, Transdniestrians could have acquired weapons in two ways. First, they could have had open access to ammunition stores, which belonged to the 14th Army. Second, the 14th Army command failed to implement measures to prevent the seizure of weapons by Transdniestrian armed forces and civilians (ECHR, 2004). There is no denial on the Transdniestrian side that weapons were acquired from the 14th Army. Gaining access to ammunition, however, was more problem- atic than suggested by the Moldovan side (Bergman, 2004; Grosul et al., 2001). 21. I use the term ‘Transdniestrians’ in reference to inhabitants of the region, the political implications of this term are further discussed in Chapter 3. 22. Ozhiganov points out that although Lebed appeared to have taken a pro-Transdniestrian stance, his main concern was not defending PMR as such, but to make certain that the 14th Army and its ammunition depots remained under Russian control and to prevent the Transdniestrian side from gaining possession of additional military supplies which could lead to further escalation of the armed conflict (1997, p. 183). In addition, it Notes 183 was also important for Lebed to address the interests of the 14th Army’s officer corps. The harsh statements to the Moldovan government as well as demonstrational military operations could be viewed, in this regard, as a warning to the Moldovan forces that the army’s contingent and installations on the left bank are not to be attacked (Ozhiganov, 1997, p. 182). 23. In 1995 the Moldovan government changed some of the reforms under- taken when the Popular Front was in power in the early 1990s. The government replaced the Romanian anthem Desteapta-te, Romane! with the new national anthem Limba Noastra (Our language), a poem by a Moldovan/Romanian writer. The hymn avoids reference to whether the language is Romanian or Moldovan. According to the Moldovan Constitution, as amended in 1994, ‘the state language of the Republic of Moldova is the Moldovan language and functions on the basis of the Latin Script’, omitting any connection to Romania (Panici, 2003, p. 44). 3 Symbolic Statebuilding 1. The description is based on the press coverage by Olvia Press (2 September 2005). 2. For a detailed analysis of this issue see Papadakis (2003). 3. Greek Cypriots are referred to as Rumlarr, a term which is usually used for the Greek Orthodox community of the Ottoman Empire, as well as Greeks living in Turkey nowadays.