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THE CASES of RUSSIA and TURKEY a Master's Thesis By STATE’S RESPONSE TO TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING: THE CASES OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY A Master’s Thesis by TATIANA ZHIDKOVA Department of International Relations İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University Ankara July 2011 STATE’S RESPONSE TO TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING: THE CASES OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences of İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University by TATIANA ZHIDKOVA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS in THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY ANKARA July 2011 I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. Assoc. Prof. Ersel AYDINLI Supervisor I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. Assistant Prof. Özgür ÖZDAMAR Examining Committee Member I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. Assistant Prof. Zeki SARIGİL Examining Committee Member Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences Prof. Dr. Erdal EREL Director ABSTRACT STATE’S RESPONSE TO TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING: THE CASES OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY Zhidkova, Tatiana M.A., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı July 2011 In the aftermath of globalization, it has become increasingly easier for non-state actors to develop in transnational networks, thus jeopardizing domestic security and political stability of states. Studying the influence of transnationalism on non-state actors could help these states develop new strategies of dealing with criminal networks. The present thesis is trying to answer the following research question: “What is the states’ response to transnationalism in terms of their dealing with human trafficking networks?” It examines the way the state is adapting itself to transnational security challenges posed by violent non-state actors (VNSAs). To this end, comparative case studies method is used by means of comparing Russia and Turkey’s responses to human trafficking. The basic conclusion of the author is that Russia and Turkey’s responses to human trafficking have been very different due to the impact of two main factors. First, it is the degree of the international pressure that determined the state’s willingness to take human trafficking challenge seriously. Second, the degree of the state’s success in its anti-trafficking policy is also influenced by the political regime of this state. Thus, international pressure and political regime both have an impact on the state’s response to the transnational security threat of human trafficking. Keywords: Transnationalism, Violent Non-State Actors, Human Trafficking, Illegal Migration iii ÖZET ULUSLARARASI İNSAN KAÇAKÇILIĞINA DEVLETİN TEPKİSİ: RUSYA VE TÜRKİYE ÖRNEKLERİ Zhidkova, Tatiana Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı Temmuz 2011 Küreselleşme sonrasında devlet dışı aktörlerin ulusaşırı ağlar geliştirmesi, böylece devletlerin iç güvenliklerini ve siyasi istikrarlarını tehlikeye sokmaları kolaylaştı. Ulusötesiciliğin devlet dışı aktörler üzerindeki etkisinin çalışılması devletlerin suç örgütleriyle başetmede yeni stratejiler geliştirmelerine yardımcı olabilir. Bu tez, “Devletlerin insan kaçakçılığı ağları açısından ulusötesiciliğe tepkisi nedir?” sorusunu sormakta; ve devletlerin şiddet yanlısı devlet dışı aktörlerce yaratılan ulusötesi güvenlik tehditlerine nasıl adapte olduklarını incelemektedir. Bu amaçla, karşılaştırmalı örnek olay incelemesi yöntemi kullanılarak Rusya ve Türkiye'nin insan kaçakçılığına verdikleri tepkiler karşılaştırılmıştır. Yazarın ulaştığı temel sonuca göre, Rusya ve Türkiye'nin insan kaçakçılığına verdikleri tepkiler iki ana faktör nedeniyle oldukça farklıdır. İlk faktöre göre, uluslararası baskının yoğunluğu devletin uluslararası insan kaçakçılığı tehdidini ciddiye alış derecesini belirler. İkincisine göre, devletin kaçakçılık karşıtı politikasının başarı derecesi bu devletin siyasi rejiminden etkilenmektedir. Bu şekilde, uluslararası baskı ve siyasi rejim faktörlerinin ikisinin de devletin ulusötesi güvenlik tehditlerinden insan kaçakçılığına verdiği tepkiye etkisi bulunmaktadır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusötesicilik, Şiddet Yanlısı Devlet Dışı Aktörler, İnsan Kaçakçılığı, Yasadışı Göç iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Ersel Aydınlı for his invaluable help and advice in directing this study. His theoretical knowledge and experience in security studies definitely increased the quality of this work. I am also grateful to Dr. Özgür Özdamar and Dr. Zeki Sarıgil who generously accepted to participate in my thesis committee and provided me with many helpful comments and feedback that, I believe, will help me in my future research. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Nil Şatana and Dr. Serdar Güner of Bilkent University Department of International Relations for their intellectual advice on the methodology and case selection for this thesis. My fellow graduate students Tuna Gürsu, M. Yaşın Yavuz, H. Selçuk Türkmen and H. Barkın Öztürk deserve special thanks for their suggestions and advice in the initial stages of this research. Another special thanks go to my roommate Fatma Nur Ünal who always encouraged me and helped me in thinking positively even in the most difficult times. Finally, I would like to thank my sisters, Ola and Katya, and my parents, Vasiliy Zhidkov and Tatiana Maksimova, who always supported me with their endless love and understanding and taught me to never give up on my dreams. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................iii ÖZET..........................................................................................................................iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..........................................................................................v TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................vi CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION..............................................................................1 CHAPTER 2: TRANSNATIONALISM AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS.....................................................................................................................10 2.1 Globalization and the Erosion of State Sovereignty.................................11 2.1.1 The Role of Non-State Actors....................................................14 2.1.2 The Concept of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs).................16 2.2 The Study of Transnationalism..............................................................20 2.2.1 The Impact of Transnationalism on the International Security..23 2.3 Transnational Networks of Violence........................................................25 2.3.1 Network Analysis in the International Relations.......................25 2.3.2 Networks of Violence as a New Threat to Global Security.......29 2.4 State’s Response to Transnational Security Challenges..........................31 2.5 Conclusion............................................................................................32 CHAPTER 3: HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONALISM..........................................................................................34 3.1 Defining Human Trafficking..................................................................35 3.1.1 Trafficking or Smuggling?........................................................39 3.2 Historical Overview of the Human Trafficking Problem.........................42 3.2.1 Human Trafficking in the International Law.............................44 3.3 State’s Response to Human Trafficking...................................................48 3.4 Types of Human Trafficking...................................................................50 3.4.1 Trafficking for Labor Exploitation.............................................50 3.4.2 Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation...........................................51 3.4.3 Trafficking for the Removal of Organs......................................53 3.4.4 Child Trafficking......................................................................54 3.5 The Scope of the Problem......................................................................56 3.5.1 Reasons for Human Trafficking.................................................58 3.5.2 Human Trafficking Routes........................................................61 3.6 Human Trafficking As a Transnational Threat.........................................63 3.6.1 Human Trafficking and Globalization.......................................63 3.6.2 Human Trafficking and the Involvement of Organized Crime..65 3.6.3 Transnational Criminal Networks and Human Trafficking.......67 3.7 Conclusion............................................................................................69 vi CHAPTER 4: RUSSIA’S RESPONSE TO TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING.......................................................................................................70 4.1 Human Trafficking in Russia: The Scope of the Problem........................71 4.1.1 Trafficking for Labor Exploitation.............................................73
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