Notes and References

Introduction

1. In this book, ‘peacekeeping’ refers to those operations designated by the Russian government and/or the CIS bodies as peacekeeping actions. The term is placed in inverted commas, because these operations have differed substantially from international practice. 2. Johan Joergan-Holst (1990) ‘Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations’, Survival, vol. 32, no. 3, (May/June), pp. 264–5. 3. See, for example, Scott Parrish (1996) ‘Chaos in Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, Transitions (17 May), in which it is argued that Russian foreign policy does not ‘reflect a broader design, careful plan- ning or cool deliberation’.

1 Peacekeeping and Coercive Diplomacy: Russian Suasion

1. Marrack Goulding (1993) ‘The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping’, International Affairs, no. 3, pp. 432–65. 2. Paul F. Diehl (1994) International Peacekeeping (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 7–8. 3. Jordan Joergan-Holst (1993) Survival, p. 274. 4. See Introduction by William Durch in William Durch (ed.), (1994) The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center); and Alan James (1990), Peacekeeping in International Politics (London: Macmillan), pp. 368–70. 5. John Mackinlay (1990), ‘Powerful Peacekeepers’, Survival (May/June), p. 242. 6. John Mackinlay (1989) The Peacekeepers (London: Unwin Hyman), p. 222. 7. See overview in The Blue Helmets (New York: UN Department of Public Information: 1996), pp. 389–401. 8. Adam Roberts (1993) Survival, p. 12. 9. Sir Brian Urquhart (1991–92), The UN: From Peacekeeping to a Collective Security System?, Adelphi Paper 266, IISS, (Winter) (Oxford University Press). 10. See, for example, W. J. Durch and Barry Blechman (1992) Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order (Washington, DC: Henry Stimson Center), pp. 17–21; and discussion in Adam Roberts (1993) ‘Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights’, International Affairs, no. 3, pp. 429–49; Christopher Greenwood (1993) ‘Is there a Right to Humanitarian Intervention?’, The World Today (February), pp. 34–40.; T. G. Weiss and K. M. Campbell (1991) ‘Military Humanitarianism’, Survival (September/October), pp. 451–65; and Comfort Ero and Suzanne Long (1995) ‘Humanitarian

189 190 Notes and References to Chapter 1

Intervention: A New Role for the UN?’, International Peacekeeping (Summer), pp. 140–56. 11. Cited in Edward Newman (1995) ‘Realpolitik and the CNN Factor of Humanitarian Intervention’, in Dimitris Bourantanis and Jarrod Weiner (eds), The UN in the New World Order: The World Organization at Fifty (Macmillan: London), pp. 191–211. In Agenda for Peace, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali went even further: ‘the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed … its theory was never matched by reality’. 12. Security Council Resolution 688 of April 1991, which led to Operation Provide Comfort regarding the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq, was justified in terms of threats this situation posed to peace and secur- ity. See also Adam Roberts (1996) Humanitarian Action in War, Adelphi Paper 305, IISS (Oxford University Press). 13. For a discussion of these new tasks, see Mats Berdal (1993) Whither UN Peacekeeping?, Adelphi Paper 281, IISS (Oxford University Press). 14. On the former Yugoslavia, see James Gow (1997) Triumph of the Lack of Will, International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London: Hurst and Company). 15. Boutros Boutros-Ghali ·(1993) ‘Appendix A: An Agenda for Peace’, in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds), United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations (Oxford University Press), p. 475. See also ‘UN Peacekeeping in a New Era’, The World Today (April 1993), pp. 66–8. 16. Sir Brian Urquhart (1990) Survival, p. 201. For a good example of national doctrines that follow this approach, see Nordic Stand By Forces (1993) (NORDSAMFN), and Nordic Tactical Manual , vols 1 and 2 (1992), (NORDSAMFN). 17. See John Mackinlay (1994) ‘Improving Multifunctional Forces’, Survival, vol. 36, no. 3, (Autumn), pp. 149–73. 18. See also T. G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra (1993) A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations (Providence, RI: T. J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University). 19. James Gow and Christopher Dandeker, ‘Peace Support Operations: The Problem of Legitimation’, The World Today (August/September 1995), p. 173. See also Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? (National Defense University, MacNair Paper 15: November 1993). 20. Ibid., p. 37. 21. Adam Roberts (1994), The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, (Institutt for Forsravstuddier, 2), p. 17. 22. Ibid., p. 24. 23. Mats Berdal (1993), Whither UN Peacekeeping?, p. 32. For other works on UN reform see, for example, John M. Lee, Robert van Pagenhardt and Timothy W. Stanley (1992) To Unite our Strength, Enhancing the UN Peace and Security System (Washington, DC: International Economic Studies Institute); and ‘Words to Deeds: Strengthening the UN’s Enforcement Capabilities’, (Final Report, International Task Force on the Enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions, New York: (December 1997). Notes and References to Chapter 1 191

24. Charles Dobbie (1994) ‘A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping’, Survival, vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn), pp. 121–48. See also Wider Peacekeeping: Army Field Manual Vol. 5, Operations Other than War, part 2, (London: HMSO) 1995. 25. It is interesting that so-called ‘middle-ground’ theorists have also retreated from more ambitious approaches to peacekeeping. See John Mackinlay’s (1996) A Guide to Peace Support Operations (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University). 26. Cited in Shashi Tharoor (1995–6) ‘Should Peacekeeping go “Back to Basics”?’, Survival, vol. 37, no. 4 (Winter), pp. 52–64. See also Daniel Donald and B. C. Hayes (eds) (1995) Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (London: Macmillan Press). 27. Ibid., p. 162. In June and July 1994, the Security Council passed three resolutions to this effect: (i) permitting French intervention in Rwanda, which led to Operation Turquoise; (ii) expanding the UN observer mission in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict; and (iii) allowing US inter- vention in Haiti to ensure the return of Aristide before 15 October 1994. 28. T. G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra (1995) ‘Prospects for Containing Conflict in the Former Second World’, Security Studies (September), pp. 262–83. See also T. G. Weiss (1995) ‘Military–Civilian Humanitarianism – The Age of Innocence is Over’, International Peacekeeping (Summer), pp. 157–74. 29. Weiss and Chopra (1995), p. 276. On peacekeeping task-sharing, see also Thomas G. Weiss (ed.) ‘Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs’, (Special issue, Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3, 1997); and Georgios Kostakos and Dimitris Bourantanis (1998) ‘Innovation in Peacekeeping: The Case of Albania’, Security Dialogue, vol. 29, no. 1 (March), pp. 49–58. 30. See Muthiah Alagappa (1997) ‘Regional Institutions, the UN and International Security: A Framework for Analysis’, Third World Quarterly, (vol. 18, no. 3), pp. 421–41. 31. For an overview of the literature on coercive intervention, see R. J. Vincent (1974) Non-Intervention and International Order (NJ: Princeton, Princeton University Press); and Hedley Bull (ed.) (1984) Intervention in World Politics (Oxford University Press). See also Neil MacFarlane (1985) Intervention and Regional Security, Adelphi Paper no. 196, p. 1. MacFarlane’s work is particularly interesting in underlin- ing the reactive nature of intervention. The interplay between Hans Morganthau’s ‘push’ perspective and Thucydides’ ‘pull’ interpretation is relevant to the Russian case. In all, however, this literature is in- appropriate for examining Russian ‘peacekeeping’, as it focuses only on the coercive tool without delving into the wider purposes of the intervenor’s policy. 32. See also the analysis of the ‘discrete use of force’ in Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (eds) (1978) Force Without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington DC: Brookings 192 Notes and References to Chapter 1

Institution). Blechman and Kaplan argue that military force can repre- sent a ‘discrete’ instrument of policy in time of peace. The ‘discrete use of force’ is defined as: ‘when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence the specific behaviour of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence’. See also work on Soviet use of force in Stephen Kaplan (ed.) (1981) Diplomacy of Power (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution). 33. See the discussion in Alexander L. George and Gordon A. Craig (1990) Force and Statecraft, Diplomatic Problems of our Time, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 197–211; and Alexander L. George (1991) Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace). 34. George discusses such cases as the American bombing of Hanoi in 1965, the US arming of the Contras in the early 1980s, and US policy during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. 35. Ibid., p. 198. 36. George, (1991) (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace), p. 7. 37. George and Craig (1990) (Oxford University Press), p. 201. George and Craig determine a number of ‘contextual’ as well as ‘policy’ variables that will affect the implementation and course of a policy of ‘coercive diplomacy’. 38. Ibid., p. 211. 39. E. N. Luttwak (1974) The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: Md Johns Hopkins University Press). 40. Ibid., p. 6. 41. Ibid., p. 54. 42. Ibid., p. 35. 43. Ibid., p. 57. 44. E. N. Luttwak (1987) Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press), p. 193. 45. See George (1991), p. 4. George does recognize explicitly the limits of this ideal-type view of the state. 46. Scott Parrish has argued that it is impossible to refer to rational strate- gic decision-making in Russia. The foreign policy-making process is characterized by ad hoc decision-making and ‘freelancing’ by different agencies. See ‘Chaos in Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, Transition, vol. 2, no. 10 (17 May 1996), pp. 30–3, 64. 47. See the interesting discussion in Jeremy Azrael, Benjamin S. Lambeth, Emil A. Pain and Arkady A. Popov (1996) ‘Russian and American Intervention Policy in Comparative Perspective’, in Azrael and Payin (eds), US and Russian Policy-Making with Regard to the Use of Force, (Washington DC: RAND, Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies), pp. 201–17. 48. The CIS staff does not speak with authority with regard to Russian policy towards the CIS region. Its views on CIS ‘peacekeeping’ must be noted, however, particularly as these echo important views held in the Russian MoD. Notes and References to Chapter 2 193 2 The Evolution of Foreign Policy towards the ‘Near Abroad’

1. See discussion in Alex Pravda (1994) ‘The Politics of Foreign Policy’, in Stephen White et al. Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (London: Macmillan) p. 209. 2. A Ministry for Cooperation with the CIS was created in January 1994. This ministry is not considered here, as it has focused on economic issues. Similarly, the role of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in the econ- omic area will not be discussed. See Neil Malcolm (1996) ‘Foreign Policy Making’, in Neil Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, (RIIA/Oxford University Press) pp. 126–8. 3. Neil Malcolm argues that Russian foreign policy has been presidential from 1992 – this situation was reinforced in the 1993 constitution and Yeltsin’s decrees bringing the Border Service, Foreign Intelligence Services and Federal Security Services under his jurisdiction in early 1994; Malcolm et al. (1996), p. 109. 4. Yeltsin’s criticism of the MFA in October 1992 is a case in point. 5. See Neil Malcolm (1995) ‘Russian Foreign Policy Decision Making’, in Peter Shearman (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, (Bolder Col.: Westview Press), pp. 23–51. 6. Ibid., p. 29. 7. In December 1992, an Interdepartmental Foreign Policy commission was created within the Security Council. In December 1995, Yeltsin also created a Foreign Policy Council, under the president, with deliber- ative functions, to prepare recommendations on foreign policy. This Council appears not to have overshadowed the MFA. As will be dis- cussed, further decrees in 1996 increased the ‘coordinating’ role of the MFA in policy-making. 8. The initial membership of the Council included as permanent voting members: the President; Vice President; Chairman of the Council of Ministers; the Secretary of the Council; and the First Deputy Chair of the Supreme Soviet. And as non-voting members: the Minister of Defence; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Security; Minister of Justice; Minister of the Interior; Chair of the Foreign Intelligence Services; and the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. After the October 1993 ‘events’, the number of permanent members was increased to include the Prime Minister; the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice, the Interior; the Chairs of the Foreign Intelligence Service and Counter-Intelligence Service; and the State Committee for Nationalities and Civil Defence. The C-in-C of the Border Service joined the Council in mid-1994. Moreover, the Chairmen of the two Chambers, Ivan Rybkin and Vladimir Shumeiko, were invited to join the Council in early 1995. Rybkin became Secretary after Lebed resigned in October 1996. He was noted for his loyalty and ‘team-playing’. Kokoshin’s appointment as Secretary saw a reduction in its staff size. 9. See Ellen Jones and James H. Brusstar (1993) ‘Moscow’s Emerging Security Decision-Making System’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies (September), pp. 345–74. 194 Notes and References to Chapter 2

10. According to Neil Malcolm, until May 1993, under Yury Skokov, the Council was quite influential, but lost influence under Shaposhnikov’s leadership up to September 1993. Oleg Lobov’s chairmanship restored its position of influence in the policy process; Malcolm et al. (1996), p. 111. 11. ‘Russia’ TV, Moscow, 7 September 1992. 12. See the discussion in Bruce Parrot and Karen Dawisha (1994) Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 204–5. 13. In June 1992, Yeltsin decreed the creation of an 80-member staff, including 20 military officers, for the Security Council, establishing a first deputy secretary, Directorate for Strategic Security, and one for Planning and Coordination, and a Centre for Information and Analysis. The Council has been constrained over resources. Its staff in February 1993 numbered ten, and its first full meeting occurred in April 1993 to approve the MFA Concept. By mid-1994, the staff had increased to about a hundred. 14. Yeltsin expanded the role and prerogatives of the Security Council in early July, presumably at Lebed’s behest. See Decree No. 1024, 10 July 1996 reported in SU/2669, B/1–4. 15. Accounts by members of the Security Council have given an exagger- ated picture of its importance. See Lobov (1995) International Affairs (Moscow, October), pp. 11–16; and interview with Valery Manilov (1994) Moskovskiye Novosti (5–12 June), p. 6. For a damning account of the Security Council see, Leonid Mlechin (1996) New Times (November), pp. 4–5. 16. See Alex Pravda (1996) in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russia Foreign Policy, pp. 168–229; and Vadim Solovyov (1993) International Affairs (Moscow, March), pp. 33–44. 17. See the discussion on Duma prerogatives in Jan Adams (1994) ‘Who Will Make Russia’s Foreign Policy in 1994?’, RFE/RL Research Report (RR) (11 February), pp. 36–40. The Duma has exercised its right to ratify international treaties by delaying the ratification of START 2. 18. Alex Pravda (1996), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 218. 19. See the discussion in Roy Allison (1996), in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, pp. 230–89. 20. See Aleksandr Golts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 October 1992, p. 1. 21. ‘Russia and the CIS: Does the West’s position Need Adjustment?’, FIS report, Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 September 1994, p. 3. 22. See Izvestiya, 26 November 1993, p. 2. 23. Cited in Stephen Blank (1995) The OSCE’s Code of Conduct and Civil–Military Relations in Russia, Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC) RMA Sandhurst (November), p. 6. 24. For alternative discussions of this debate, see Alex Pravda (1994) Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics; Alex Pravda et al. (1996); Aleksei Arbatov (1993) ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives’, International Security, (Autumn); and A. Pushkov (1993–4) ‘Russia and America, the Honeymoon’s Over’, Foreign Policy (Winter). Notes and References to Chapter 2 195

25. For the influence of a prominent Gosudarstvennik, Aleksei Podberyozkin, on Zyuganov’s leadership, see Victoria Clark, Observer, 19 May 1996, p. 21. 26. As leader of the Communist Party, Zyuganov’s position has reflected a mixture of these two views. 27. Yegor Gaidar advocated a perspective presumably closest to what one might expect to be a ‘liberal-internationalist’ view. Gaidar, however, played a minimal role in the foreign policy debate. 28. Interview with Kozyrev after his first official tour of the newly independent states, ‘Russia’, TV programme, Moscow, 12 April 1992, SU/1355, B/3–4. 29. It must be noted that there are also divisions within the ‘centrist’ group- ing over policy towards the CIS, the pace and focus of integration, as well as the costs of military engagements in the ‘near abroad’. These divisions have increased since the Chechen war. 30. See the analysis of Gennady Zyuganov (1995) Rossiya I Sovremennyy Mir (Moscow Publishers) by Mark Smith (1996) The Geopolitics of Gennadi Zyuganov, Conflict Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst (March). See also the ‘radical nationalist’ perspective offered by the independent Defence Research Institute in Segodnya, 20 October 1995, p. 3. 31. ‘Russia’ TV programme, Moscow, 3 June 1992, SU/1402, A1/1–4. 32. Kozyrev interview, ‘Russia’ TV programme, Moscow, 12 April 1992, SU/1355, B/3–4. 33. Interview with Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 22 February 1992, pp. 1, 3. 34. Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 30 June 1992, p. 3. 35. See summary of draft ‘Basic Principles of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 February 1992, p. 4. 36. ‘Russia’, TV programme, Moscow, 12 April 1992, SU/1355, B/3–4. 37. MFA statement on Mayak Radio, Moscow, 30 January 1992, SU/1293, B/3–4. 38. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 April 1992, p. 2. 39. Interview with Shelov-Kovedyaev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 July 1992, pp. 1, 5. 40. Many Russian commentators underlined the dangers of Russia becom- ing the guarantor of stability in Central Asia. See, for example, Vitaly Portnikov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 May 1992, p. 1. 41. See, for example, Aleksandr Zhdnev, Izvestiya, 1 June 1992, pp. 1, 4. 42. Cited in Suzanne Crow, (1992) ‘Russia Prepares to Take a Hard Line on the “Near Abroad”’ RFE/RL Research Report (14 August), pp. 22–4. 43. See Konstantin Eggert, Izvestiya, 11 April 1992, p. 5. 44. Sergei Stankevich, Izvestiya, 7 July 1992, p. 3. See also Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 March 1992, p. 4; and Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 23 June 1992, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet (CDPSP) (26–92), pp. 1–3. 45. See, for example, Yury Glukhov, Pravda, 24 February 1992, in CDPSP (8–92), pp. 8–10. 46. See International Affairs (April–May, 1992), p. 82. 47. ‘Russia’, TV programme, Moscow, 22 June 1992, SU/1416, C/5. 48. See Suzanne Crow (1992), p. 21. 196 Notes and References to Chapter 2

49. Colonel S. Pechorov and Lieutenant-Colonel Y. Tegin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 April 1992, p. 3. 50. Interview in Armiya, 29 June 1992, JPRS-UMA-92-005-L, pp. 16–21. 51. ‘Fundamentals of Russian Military Doctrine’, Voennaya Mysl’ 19 May 1992, JPRS UMT-92-008-4, pp. 1–5. 52. Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 30 June 1992. 53. ‘Russia’, TV programme, Moscow, 4 July 1992, SU/1425, A1/1–5. 54. Reported in Nezavisimaya Gazeta 23 June 1992, CDPSP (25–1992), pp. 1–5. 55. ‘Russia’ TV programme, Moscow, 10 July 1992, SU/1431, C1/3. 56. Vladimir Lukin (1992), Foreign Policy (Fall), pp. 58–71. 57. Boris Utekhin, ‘Russia in Which We Get Lost’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 21 October 1992, p. 1. 58. See also the interview with Kozyrev on Ostankino, 14 November 1993, SU/1851, B/1–2. 59. See the article by Vladimir Lukin, (1994) ‘Russia and Its Interests’, in Rethinking Russia’s National Interests (CSIS), pp. 100–10. 60. See statements by Sergei Karaganov, a founder of the CFDP, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 Novmber 1992. The CFDP’s report of August 1992, entitled ‘Strategy for Russia’ called for ‘variable speed post- imperial integration’ within the CIS. At the same time, it maintained a somewhat pessimistic view on the need to maintain security in the region. See the discussion in Margot Light (1996) Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 64. 61. Sergei Karaganov, Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 February 1993, pp. 2, 3. 62. ‘Centrist’ analyses have usually offered guarded views on Ukraine, underlining the challenge it presents to Russia, but calling for an overall regularization of relations. 63. Sergei Karaganov (1992) Russia: The New Foreign and Security Agenda – A View from Moscow, (London Defence Studies No. 12, University of London), p. 17. 64. Andrannik Migranyan, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 4 August 1992, p. 7. 65. See a full summary and analysis of the Report in John Lough (1993) ‘Defining Russia’s Relations with Neighbouring States’, RFE/RL RR, 14 May, pp. 55–60; and Defining Russia’s Role in the Near Abroad, Soviet Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, April 1993. 66. Shelov-Kovedyaev resigned in early September 1992, to be replaced by Anatoly Adamishin in mid-October. Earlier in the summer, he had threatened to resign if Russian government policy made increasing use of force in the ‘near abroad’ and if the MoD continued to dominate foreign-policy making. His resignation might also have been forced by conservative pressure in parliament and the Security Council. See inter- view in Izvestiya, 26 July 1992, p. 6. 67. See report by Aleksandr Golts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 October 1992, p. 1. 68. See the summary of the Draft Concept, Rossiskiye Vesti, 3 December 1992, for the influence of Yeltsin’s statements, reported in CDPSP (48–92), pp. 14–17. 69. Yeltsin’s speech to the Civic Union, reported on ‘Russia’, TV programme, Moscow, 28 February 1993, SU/1626, B/1–3. Notes and References to Chapter 2 197

70. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 17 March 1993, SU/1641, B/1. 71. The first draft of the Concept was presented to the Supreme Soviet in February 1992, but was rejected for being too vague. A new draft was produced in November and published in late 1992. The final version was given to the parliament in February 1993. See the discussion in Margot Light (1996) in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 61. For a summary of the December draft, see International Affairs (January 1993), pp. 14–16. 72. See Vladimir Chernov’s summary of the Concept, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 April 1993, pp. 1, 3. 73. See the discussion in chs. 5–7 of this book. 74. Aleksandr Pelts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 May 1993, p. 1. 75. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 6 May 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-086, pp. 7–8. 76. See, for example, the presidential decree on ‘The Strategic Course of Russia towards the Member States of the CIS’, on 14 September 1995, Diplomatichesky Vestnik, October 1995, pp. 3–6; also Yeltsin’s more cautious memorandum on National Security, prepared by Yury Baturin in mid-1996, Diplomatichesky Vestnik, July 1996, pp. 24–35. The Memo focused substantially on internal problems and threats to Russia. See the strong discussion in Mark Webber (1997) CIS Integration Trends: Russia and the Former Soviet South (London: Former Soviet South Project, Royal Institute of International Affairs). 77. Address to Federal Assembly, 24 February 1994, Ostankino Ch. 1 TV programme, Moscow, SU/1931, S1/1. 78. Hill and Jewett (1994), p. 34. 79. See the discussion in Martha Brill Olcott (1995) ‘Sovereignty and the Near Abroad’, Orbis (Summer), pp. 353–67. 80. See Yeltsin’s comments in Itar-Tass, Moscow, 19 January 1996, SU/2514, A/1–2. 81. See the text of the agreement in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 4 April 1996. 82. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 March 1995, p. 2. 83. See Andrei Kozyrev on Ostankino, Moscow, 14 November 1993, SU/1851, B/1–2. 84. Yevgeny Bey, Izvestiya, 17 February 1994, p. 1. 85. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 March 1994, p. 1. 86. See Mark R. Bessinger (1995) ‘The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire’, Post-Soviet Affairs (April–June), pp. 149–84. 87. See report in Itar-Tass, Moscow, 18 January 1994, SU/1900, B/4; and Vladimir Gavrilenko, Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 January 1994, p. 1. It is notable that centrist-nationalists warned against the ‘Zhirinovsky factor’ in Kozyrev’s increasingly nationalist rhetoric. See Vladimir Lukin’s criticism in Izvestiya, 20 April 1995, pp. 1, 3. See also cautionary statements in the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy second ‘Strategy for Russia’ in May 1994, discussed in M. Light (1996) in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 73. 88. See the report in Vyacheslav Elagin, Segodnya, 2 March 1994, p. 3. 89. See also Kozyrev’s comments on the defence of the diaspora by the use of force (a so-called gunboat diplomacy) in International Affairs (Moscow, June 1995), pp. 107–24. 198 Notes and References to Chapter 2

90. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 19 March 1994, SU/1944, G/1. 91. George Kondratev, Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 February 1994. 92. Aleksandr Golts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 October 1993, p. 3. 93. Major Mark T. Davis (1993) ‘Russia’s Peacemaking Operations: An Issue of National Security?’ SHAPE: Central and Eastern European Defence Studies (September 3) p. 1. 94. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 September 1993, p. 1. 95. Andrei Kozyrev to the MFA conference on 19 January 1994, Itar-Tass, Moscow, SU/1901, S2/1–2. 96. Andrei Kozyrev, Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 September 1993, p. 3. 97. The government called for the creation of a voluntary fund at the UN, arguing that Russian operations represented a contribution to global UN peacekeeping. 98. Kozyrev to the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, 16 June 1994, SU/2025, B/4–5. 99. The government has pursued a parallel campaign in the CSCE (later OSCE) since mid-1992, lobbying hard at the Rome Council meeting in December 1993. In 1994, the Russian representative, Vitaly Shevstov, proposed that future OSCE peacekeeping be based on ‘third parties’ – that is, Russia in the former Soviet Union. See the discussion in Roy Allison (1994), Peacekeeping in Soviet Successor States (Chaillot Paper, November), pp. 47–9. 100. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 31 January 1994, SU/1911, B/10–11. 101. Interview in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 November 1993, pp. 1, 3. 102. See Kozyrev’s speech to the UN, 26 September 1995, in Diplomatichesky Vestnik (October 1995), pp. 49–51. 103. Andrei Kozyrev, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 30 October 1993, pp. 1, 7. 104. See Mikhail Karpov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 April 1994, p. 1. 105. Andrei Kozyrev to UN on 26 September 1995, Itar-Tass, Moscow, SU/2400, B/12; and International Affairs (Moscow, March 1995), pp. 7–15. 106. See the text of this speech in Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 October 1995, p. 1. 107. Andrei Kozyrev, Segodnya, 6 June 1993, p. 3. 108. Andrei Kozyrev (1994) ‘Russia and NATO: A Partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe’ NATO Review (August) 1994, pp. 3–6. See also Kozyrev’s speech to NATO Council, 31 May 1995, Diplomatichesky Vestnik (July 1995), pp. 22–3. 109. See, for example, Sergei Rogov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 31 December 1994, pp. 1, 4, 5; and in SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika,Ideologiya (March 1995), pp. 3–14; Vladimir Lukin, Izvestiya, 12 May 1995, p. 2; and Interview in SSHA (October 1995), pp. 77–9; and Aleksei Arbatov (1994) ‘The Prospect of the Eastern Widening of NATO: A Russian Point of View’, Paper presented to a conference in Prague, 24 October, JPRS UMA-94-055, pp. 8–14. 110. See reports in Izvestiya, 26 November 1993; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 November 1993; and Segodnya, 27 November 1993. 111. See the adviser to Kozyrev, Galina Sidorovna, Segodnya, 27 November 1993, cited in Aleksandr Konovalov (1995) ‘International Institutions and European Security: The Russian Debate’, in Marco Carnovale Notes and References to Chapter 2 199

(ed.), in European Security and International Institutions after the Cold War, p. 132. 112. Apparently, the MFA called for there to be no nuclear weapons or groups of forces deployed in the ‘enlarged’ areas; Aleksei Pushkov, Moskovskiye Novosti (19–26 March 1995), p. 7. 113. For a General Staff view, see the interview with General Dmitry Kharchenko, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 July 1995, p. 3. 114. ‘Kozyrev Not In the Know’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 November 1995, p. 1. 115. Grachev represented the government increasingly in negotiations with NATO. See the report of Grachev visit to Brussels in Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 June 1996. 116. Cited in Aleksandr Konovalov (1995), p. 132. 117. Ekaterina Akapova, Kommersant Daily, 16 March, p. 1, CDPSP (11–95), pp. 7–8. 118. In an interview with the author, Aleksandr Belkin, (an analyst at the CFDP) argued that the NATO issue was devised as a weapon to oust Kozyrev from the MFA. 119. In March 1996, Yeltsin once again decreed that the MFA should play the role of coordinator of foreign policy and exercise supervision of all its aspects; Leonid Velekhov, Segodnya, 14 March 1996, p. 3. See also the report in Diplomatichesky Vestnik, no. 4, (April 1996), pp. 3–4. This was more significant given Primakov’s stature. With Yeltsin’s illness, Aleksei Pushkov saw an increasing role for the MFA through Primakov’s author- ity; Moskovskiye Novosti (8–15 September 1996), p. 5. 120. See the report in Diplomatichesky Vestnik (February 1996), pp. 3–6. For Primakov’s views on the ‘far abroad’, see, for example, Primakov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 October 1996, pp. 1, 5. 121. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 2 April 1996, SU/2578, A/1. See Dmitry Gornostayev for an account of Primakov’s first year; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 January 1997, pp. 1, 2. 122. This consensus was confirmed in the Memo on National Security, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 June 1996, pp. 7–8; see also the Yeltsin decree on ‘Strategic Course of Russia Towards the Member States of the CIS’, of September 1995. For one, Aleksei Arbatov continued to attack the MFA for a lack of strategy towards the CIS: International Affairs (Moscow, November 1994), pp. 11–30. 123. See the report in Inside Central Asia, 8–14 July 1996, p. 3. 124. ‘Russian Federation National Security Concept’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 December 1997, reported in SU/3114, S2/1–14. 125. See, for example, the interview with Vladimir Lukin in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, October 1997. 126. See ‘Upholding National Interests’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 13 May 1998. 127. See, for example, the protocol struck by Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov with Azerbaijan on this issue, on 29 March 1998, SU/3188, F/2. 128. TV6, Moscow, 26 October 1997, SU/3061, B/4. 129. See Armen Khanbabyan, ‘Russia is no longer a Big Brother’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 May 1998. 200 Notes and References to Chapter 3

130. Primakov immediately toured the former Soviet republics after being appointed foreign minister. He has also reshuffled the upper ranks of the MFA, giving Adamishin a more prominent place. See reports on new appointments in Diplomatichesky Vestnik (March and June 1996). In inter- views by the author, Aleksandr Belkin, from the CFDP, and Pavel Kandel, Head of Group at the Russian Institute of Europe, argued that Primakov was a ‘heavyweight’ with better access to Yeltsin than Rodionov. 131. See overview of Primakov’s first year by D. Gornostayev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 January 1997, pp. 1, 2. 132. Reported on Prism, Jamestown Monitor (Internet), 4 November 1996. 133. Vladimir Lukin (1992) Foreign Policy (Autumn), p. 67. 134. Dmitry Trenin, New Times (30/93), pp. 1–4.

3 Russian Military Approaches to the ‘Near Abroad’

1. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 1 July 1992, SU/1421, i. 2. Grachev Press Conference, Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 July 1992. 3. It must be noted that the CIS High Command and its residual bodies have never formally directed Russian military policy. However, in dis- cussing bureaucratic in-fighting in Moscow, these agencies must be con- sidered because of their importance in 1992. Also, the plans and policy options put forward by the CIS Coordinating Staff since 1993, although without decision-making authority, reflect the views of some senior Russian officers. 4. Cited in John W. R. Lepingwell, ‘Restructuring the Russian Military’, RL/RFE, RR (18 June 1993), p. 17. 5. See, for example, an overview by General Mikhail Kolesnikov, Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 May 1996, pp. 1, 3; and M. J. Orr (1996), The Current State of the Russian Armed Forces, CSRC RMA Sandhurst, D60. 6. Roy Allison (1993) Military Forces of the Soviet Successor States, p. 28. 7. Cited in C. J. Dick (1994) The Russian Army: Present Plight and Future Prospects, CSRC (22 November) p. 2. 8. Roy Allison (1993) Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States, p. 28. 9. C. J. Dick, (1992) Crisis in the Former Soviet Military, CSRC (April), pp. 2–3. 10. Lieutenant-General. A. Dokuchaev, cited in Stephen Foye (1993), ‘Rebuilding the Russian Armed Forces: Rhetoric and Realities’, RL/RFE, RR (23 July), pp. 52–5. 11. RFE/RE Newsline (vol. 2, no. 51, 16 March 1998). 12. Cited in T. R. W. Waters (1993), The New Russian Army: One Year On, CSRC, (August) p. 2. 13. Ekho Moskvy Radio, 11 December 1996, SU/2794, S1/1. 14. T. R. W. Walters (1993) The New Russian Army: One Year On. 15. Ibid. 16. Yeltsin’s decree on the abolition of military service by the year 2000, on the face of it, appeared as a bid for public support. See Segodnya, 17 May 1996, p. 2. Notes and References to Chapter 3 201

17. See C. J. Dick (1994) The Russian Army: Present Plight and Future Prospects. 18. See the account by a General Staff officer, Russia Public TV, 17 January 1998, SU/3129, S1/3. 19. On morale problems, see Igor Rodionov, Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, SU/2807, S1/1–4. 20. See the discussion in articles by Stephen Foye, ‘The Defence Minister and the New Military ‘Opposition’, RFE/RL RR (14 May 1993), pp. 68–73; and ‘Civilian and Military Leaders in Russia’s ‘New’ Political Arena’, RFE/RL RR (15 April 1994), pp. 1–6. See also Roy Allison (1996) in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy on this situation, which is compounded by intra-service conflict within the armed forces. 21. Colonel A. Nikonov and Lieutenant-Colonel S. Prokopenko, Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 November 1994, p. 2. 22. Reported in SU/2764, S1/2. 23. RFE/RE Newsline (vol. 2, no. 51, 16 March 1998). 24. Roy Allison (1994) Jane’s Intelligence Review (December), p. 544. 25. See Kondratyev, Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 June 1994, pp. 1, 2. 26. For example, Russian ‘peacekeeping’ forces have sufficient supplies for 3–5 days. Many military commentators have argued that these troops should have enough for 30 days. See Major-General G. Yelchishchev (1993) TYL Vooryzhennyzh Syl’ Voenno-Ekonomichesky Zhurnal, no. 9, JPRS UMA-94-009, pp. 20–3. Moreover, M. J. Or has noted the short- age of junior officers in Russian ‘peacekeeping’ forces, in The Russian Army and Peacekeeping, CSRC (June 1994). 27. See the decree in Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 May 1996, p. 1. In this decree, Yeltsin acceded to a long-standing MoD demand to finance Russian operations from a separate budget. 28. See Izvestiya, 23 March 1994, p. 2. 29. Viktor Litovkin, Izvestiya, 23 June 1994. 30. Pavel K. Baev (1996) The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles (Oslo: Prio), p. 132. 31. Interview in Chesti Imeyu (May–June 1994), JPRS UMA-94-041, pp. 33–6. As will be seen, these figures are uncertain. According to the Centre for Political and International Studies (Moscow), the 201st Division numbers 6000 with fewer than 10 000 in the entire collective operation; Unpublished report ‘Operations Involving the Use of Armed Forces in the CIS’, May 1995. 32. See the discussion in Roy Allison (1994) ‘Russian Peacekeeping- Capabilities and Doctrine,’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (December), pp. 544–7. 33. According to Pavel Baev (1996) The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, p. 132, Russian operations were run out of Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev’s office, which relied primarily on the Airborne Troops Command Deputy Commander for Peacekeeping. 34. Yury Golotyuk, Segodnya, 15 June 1995, p. 2. 35. Interview in Chesti Imeyu (May–June 1994), see note 31 above. 202 Notes and References to Chapter 3

36. For this reason, Grachev had proposed that the UN pay for transport- ation, while Russia would be responsible for other costs. 37. See, for example, Lieutenant-Colonel V. Krutishchev, Voenny Vestnik (July 1993), pp. 16–17, JPRS UMA-93-043, pp. 1–2. 38. See the interview in Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 January 1995, p. 2. 39. See the report of the meeting of the CIS Coordinating Staff in Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 April 1995, p. 1. 40. See a discussion of these difficulties by Pavel Baev (1996) The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, pp. 128–35. 41. Ibid., p. 132. 42. In an interview by the author in January 1997, Dmitry Trenin made this point very strongly, noting, for example, the supply difficulties facing the MoD. 43. Interview with Rodionov in Moscow News (11–18 August 1996), p. 7, reported in CDPSP (32–96), pp. 7–8. Rodionov gave the example of the demobilization to 500 000 after the civil war as a possible model. Rodionov pledged to overhaul the armed forces completely, focusing on the Ground Forces. See also his speech to the High Command of the Air Defence Forces, Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 July 1996, p. 1; and Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 4 October 1996, p. 1. 44. See the discussion in Stephen Blank (1996) ‘Yeltsin Fosters a Military Threat to Democracy,’ Transition (vol. 2, no. 16). 45. According to Oleg Falichev, the Border Troops numbered about 264 000 and the Internal Troops 210 000, depleting the manpower and financial resources available to the MoD: Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 September 1996, p. 1. Both these services have been involved in active combat, reinforcing their ‘voice’ in decision-making. In an interview by the author in January 1997, Aleksandr Belkin of the CFDP argued that the Border Troops and MVD had better lobbying powers than did the MoD. According to Belkin, unlike Grachev, Rodionov ‘did not drink out of Yeltsin’s bath’. 46. Baturin assumed control of these two ‘military’ areas through the Defence Council. See Vadim Solovyev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6 November 1996, p. 1; and Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 12 November 1996, p. 1. 47. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Aleksandr Belkin of the CFDP argued that Yeltsin had been afraid that the armed forces might challenge him early in 1992 – and this delayed the creation of the Russian forces. 48. William Odom and Robert Dujarric (1995) Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus (Indiana: Hudson Institute), p. 11. 49. See, for example, General M. A. Gareev (1992) ‘On Military Doctrine and Military Reform in Russia’, Journal of Soviet Military Studies (December), pp. 539–51. 50. See the discussion in Stephen Foye, ‘Armed Forces Confront the Legacy of the Soviet Past’, RFE/RE RR (21 February 1992), pp. 9–13. 51. Shaposhnikov speech to All-Army Officers’ Assembly, reported on ‘Russia’, Ch. 1 TV programme, Moscow, 17 January 1992, SU/1280, C5/1–5. Notes and References to Chapter 3 203

52. S. V. Stepashin (1992) ‘On the Future Defence Policy of Russia’, RUSI Journal (April), p. 36. 53. See the discussion in Douglas L. Clarke (1992) ‘The Battle for the Black Sea Fleet’, RFE/RE RR (21 January 1992), pp. 54–7. 54. See Richard Woff (1992) ‘High Command of the CIS – Putting the Pieces back Together Again’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (April), pp. 174–7. 55. See Odom and Dujarric (1995) Commonwealth or Empire?, p. 25. 56. Interview with Andrei Kokoshin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 March 1992. 57. General M. A. Gareev, Krasnaya Zvezda, 26 February 1992, p. 3. 58. See the discussion in Odom and Dujarric (1995) Commonwealth or Empire?, p. 17–25. 59. See also Lieutenant-General G. Bogdanov and Colonel N. Golusha, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 February 1992; Colonel V. Erokhin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 29 January 1992; and, for a civilian view, Vladimir Abarinov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 February 1992. 60. Yeltsin to 6th CPD, 8 April 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-068, p. 27. 61. The new leadership sidelined those reformist military figures in the MoD, with the rise of Afghanets officers (Pavel Grachev, Georgy Kondratyev and Boris Gromov). This group saw ‘peacekeeping as a military–political means to protect Russian interests actively in the “near abroad”. See Roy Allison (1996). in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 233. 62. The draft was published in Voennaya Mysl’ (19 May 1992), JPRS, UMT-92-008-4, pp. 1–5. This source is the basis for all citations in the following discussion. 63. See discussion in C. J. Dick (1992) ‘Initial Thoughts on Russia’s Draft Military Doctrine’, Journal of Soviet Military Studies (December), pp. 552–66. 64. See, for example, the analysis by Colonel C. Pechorov, Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 March 1992, p. 3. 65. See the discussion of the Soviet view of geopolitics in Milan Hauner (1992) What is Asia to Us? Russia’s Asian Heartland, Yesterday and Today (London: Routledge), pp. 165–91. 66. See the report of Rodionov’s speech in Mary C. FitzGerald (1993) ‘Chief of Russia’s General Staff Academy Speaks out on Moscow’s New Military Doctrine’, Orbis (Spring) pp. 281–8. 67. Senior-Lieutenant A. B. Longinov (1993) ‘Ethnos and Territory in Geostrategy’, Voennaya Mysl’ (May), pp. 20–5, JPRS-UMT-93-008-L, pp. 11–4. 68. Colonel O. A. Bulkov (1993) Voennaya Mysl’ (July), JPRS, UMT- 93-010-L, 17 September 1993, pp. 7–11. 69. Grachev cited by Vadim Solovyov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7 May 1993. 70. See the discussion in FitzGerald (1993) Orbis (Spring) p. 285. 71. Term used by Valentin Larionov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 August 1992. 72. Grachev’s reform plans included the reduction of the services to three in number, and the reorganization of the armed forces on a corps/brigade structure. 73. For an account of some of the lessons drawn from Afghanistan, see Stephen Blank (1992) ‘Airmobile Troops and Soviet AirLand War: 204 Notes and References to Chapter 3

From Afghanistan to the Future’, Journal of Soviet Military Studies (March), pp. 28–52. 74. On the Mobile Forces, see C. J. Dick (1993) ‘Russia’s Draft Military Doctrine, 10 Months On’, SSRC (April), and Richard Woff (1993) ‘Russian Mobile Forces, 1994–95’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (March, pp. 118–19. 75. In 1995, the MoD had deployed the following: in the Far Eastern Military District (MD) – 83rd Air Assault Brigade (Ussuriysk); Transbaikal MD – 11th Air Assault Brigade (Ulan-Ude); Siberian MD – 100th Air Assault Brigade (Abakan, former 300th Parachute Regiment); NCMD – 21st Air Assault Brigade (Stavropol) and 7th Airborne Division (Novorossiysk); and Leningrad MD – 76th Airborne Division (Pskov). See ADVAB 1026 CSRC, (January 1996). 76. Interview with Grachev, Rossiyskiye Vesti, 6 March 1993. 77. Presidential decree, Itar-Tass, 10 January 1993, SU/1585, C2/4. 78. Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 March 1993, p. 1. 79. For a discussion of Russian military reform, see Roy Allison (1993) Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States, pp. 18–36; as well as Allison (1997), pp. 188–90. 80. Grachev cited in John W. R. Lepingwell, ‘Restructuring the Russian Military,’ RFE/RL RR (18 June 1993), p. 22. 81. Aleksandr Goltz, Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 January 1996, p. 1. 82. For a major exposition of the Shaposhnikov’s plans, see his report, To Security Through Co-operation, 19 May 1993, reproduced by JPRS UMA-94-005-L, pp. 1–40. 83. Concept reproduced in full in Raevsky and Vorobev (1994) Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations (Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research), pp. 140–53. 84. See discussion in Mark Smith (1993), Pax Russica: Russia’s Monroe Doctrine (London: RUSI). pp. 16–7. 85. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 27 May 1993, SU/1702, C2/1–2. 86. A HQ was set up for the Coordinating Staff on 24 October 1993. The HQ consisted of about 250 officers from the nine signatories of the CST (Armenia, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), with observers from other CIS member states. Nine deputies supported the Chief of Staff of the HQ. In this staff, Russia had a quota of 100, while the other states are allowed 15. Moreover, Russia provided 50 per cent of costs, with the others providing 6.5 per cent. In all, this structure does not represent a military bloc, but more of a think-tank for specific areas of CIS military co-operation as well as ambitious plans for a collective security system. See the discussion in Boris Zhelezov (1996) ‘Development of Military Cooperation between Russia and the CIS Countries’, in FSU 15 Nations: Policy and Security (October), pp. 3–9. 87. For a discussion of Russian treaties with the Central Asian states see Maxim Shashenkov (1992) Security Issues of the Ex-Soviet Central Asian Republics (October). Notes and References to Chapter 3 205

88. Cited in Parrott and Dawisha (1995) Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). p. 254. 89. Richard Woff (1994) ‘The Armed Forces of Turkmenistan’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (March), pp. 132–5. 90. Interview with Grachev, Rossiyskiye Vesti, 6 March 1993. 91. Lieutenant James M. Greene (1993) ‘Russia’s “Peacekeeping” Doctrine: The CIS, Russia and the General Staff’ (SHAPE: Central and Eastern European Defence Studies, 11 January), pp. 1–13. 92. See the discussion on MoD’s role in negotiations with Baltic states in John Lough, ‘The Place of the “Near Abroad” in Russian Foreign Policy’, RFE/RE RR (12 March 1993), pp. 21–9. 93. For the Russian debate, see Daniil Proektor, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 December 1992; and, more importantly, Shaposhnikov on Russian Radio programme, Moscow, 21 November 1993, SU/1853, S1/1–4; and Andrei Kokoshin interview in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3 June 1993. 94. For example, General M. A. Gareev (1992) ‘On Military Doctrine and Military Reform in Russia’, Journal of Soviet Military Studies (December), pp. 539–51. 95. See the discussion in Christopher Donnelly (1989) Red Banner (London: Jane’s Information Group) p. 106. 96. See Grachev’s initial presentation of the doctrine in Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 November 1993. 97. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 November 1993. 98. At a Security Council meeting in March 1993, Yeltsin had called for rapid progress in the adoption of the doctrine, under MoD pressure. At that point, according to Grachev, the political level of the doctrine had already been formulated. See Vera Kuznetsova and Vadim Solovyev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 March 1993. 99. C. J. Dick (1994) ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (January). The October 1992 Law on Defence gave precedence to the General Staff in the formulation of the military –technical level of doctrine. Roy Allison reported that Yeltsin called on the MoD to participate in elaborating its political level – abrogating a major area of civilian political control. See Allison (1996) in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 255. 100. ‘Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, as reported in FBIS, SOV-93-222-S, Special Report, 19 November 1993, is the basis for the following discussion and citations. For interest, see also S. Rogov’s (1994) discussion in SSha: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya (nos 4 and 5). 101. Grachev press conference, Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 November 1993. 102. Aleksandr Lyasko, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 29 September 1995. Yury Baturin raised the issue of revising Russian doctrine through the Defence Council in November 1996 in response to new geopolitical developments. 103. Grachev raised the possibility of doctrinal revisions in late 1995. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 November 1995. 104. Viktor Litovkin, Izvestiya, 5 April 1995, p. 3. 206 Notes and References to Chapter 3

105. Press conference after speech, Itar-Tass, Moscow, 15 November 1995, SU/2463, S1/1. 106. See Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 28 November 1996, in CDPSP (50–96), pp. 1–5. 107. See Nezavismoye Voennoye Obozreniye (9–15 August 1997), p. 4. 108. Interfax, 28 March 1996, SU/2573, A/1. 109. See Ivashov interview, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6 June 1994, pp. 1, 3. 110. See also Colonel-General Viktor Samsonov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 November 1994, p. 3; and Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 December 1995, p. 3; Interview of Lieutenant-General Leonid Ivashov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 September 1993, pp. 1, 3. 111. For a cross-over between CIS staff and Russian General Staff views, see Colonel N. Khomchenko and Major I. Biziuk, Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 October 1995, p. 3. 112. The CIS Collective Security Concept endorsed the staged creation of a system, starting with the creation of national armed forces: see Diplomatichesky Vestnik (March 1995), pp. 34–7. For this reason, Ivashov, now Head of the MoD Department for International Cooperation, has noted that CIS security integration is proceeding at very slow pace: Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (no. 2, 1997), pp. 1, 3. 113. See the report of Grachev’s meeting with the UN Secretary in Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 April 1994, pp. 1, 3. 114. Grachev, Russian Radio programme, 15 April 1994, as reported in SU/1975, S1/3, 19 April 1994. 115. Grachev speech in Brussels reported in Rossiyskiye Vesti, 30 November 1995. 116. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 26 March 1996, SU/2571, B/9. 117. General M. A. Gareev (1992), Journal of Soviet Military Studies (December). 118. See Prudnikov interview, Krasnaya Zvezda, February 1995, p. 2; and interview after a tour of CIS, Izvestiya, 10 March 1995, p. 2. 119. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 17 February 1995, SU/2232, A/2. 120. See reports on ‘Russia’, TV programme; Moscow, and Interfax, Moscow, 2 November 1995, SU/2452, A/1–2. See Sergei Prokopenko on the results of Moscow Defence Ministers’ summit, Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 November 1995, p. 1. Air defence systems have to be created in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and maintained in Kazakstan, Armenia and Uzbekistan. 121. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 19 January 1996, SU/2514, A/1–2. 122. See the interview with Belarus Commander of Air Defence Forces, Lieutenant-General. V. Koslenko, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 May 1995, p. 2. 123. Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 15 June 1994. 124. Georgian TV programme, Tbilisi, 13 May 1995, SU/2305, S1/2–3. It is unclear where this centre is and whether it is now still functioning. 125. Ostankino, Radio Mayak, Moscow, 27 March 1996, SU/2573, A/1. 126. Interfax, Moscow, 21 July 1995, SU/2364, B/4. 127. Interfax, Moscow, 3 April 1996, SU/2580, S1/3. 128. Interfax, Moscow, 25–26 January 1996, SU/2520, S1/1. Notes and References to Chapter 3 207

129. Anatoly Ladin and Vladimir Maryukha, Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 February 1995, p. 1. 130. Colonel-General Semenov, Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 April 1993. Moreover, Russia has lacked the strategic airlift to deploy such forces rapidly from second strategic echelon military districts. 131. On Russia–Belarus relations, see, for example, Aleksandr Pelts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 December 1995, p. 1; and Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 May 1996, p. 1, on the meeting of two MoD Collegia and decision to create not a unified but a ‘single’ air defence system. 132. Ekho Moskvy, Moscow, 4 April 1994, SU/1965, S1/3. 133. See the discussion in Roy Allison (1996) ‘The Security Priorities of the Central Asian States’, Amu Darya: The Iranian Journal of Central Asian Studies (Autumn), pp. 261–74. 134. Interfax, Moscow, 25–26 January 1996, SU/2520, S1/1. 135. Interview with Kazak Defence Minister, Alibek Kozymov, in Kazakstanskaya Pravda, 10 February 1995, reported in SU/2228, S1/1–2. 136. Ostankino Mayak Radio programme, Moscow, 13 June 1994, SU/2022, S1/2–3. 137. See the discussion in Richard Woff (1995) Jane’s Intelligence Review (July), p. 294. See also A. Pelts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 March 1995, p. 1. There were rumours about an additional Russian base after Chernomyrdin’s visit in September 1995; see Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 September 1995, p. 3. 138. See the report SU/2233, S2/2, 21 February 1995. 139. See reports in Itar-Tass, Moscow, 24 March 1995, SU/2263, S1/1; and Itar-Tass, Moscow, 30 March 1995, SU/2270, S1/5. 140. Itar-Tass, Moscow, 26 June 1995, SU/2341, S1/2. 141. See Roy Allison (1994) (Chaillot Paper: November), p. 94. 142. It is notable that Nikolaev was a Ground Forces commander and General Staff officer as 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff from December 1992 to July 1993. See the discussion in Richard Woff (1995) ‘The Border Troops of the Russian Federation’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (February), pp. 70–3. 143. Decree of 30 December 1993 ‘On the Creation of a Federal Border Service and RF Border Troop High Command’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 December 1993, p. 1. 144. Interview in Rossiyskiye Vesti, 11 June 1994. 145. Interview in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 20 January 1994. 146. Interview in Izvestiya, 13 January 1994, p. 5. 147. Susan L. Clark (1995) ‘The Russian Military in the Former Soviet Union: Actions and Motivations’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (Vol 6, no 12, December), p. 542. See 17 March 1995. 148. See Nikolaev on the Azeri rejection of the draft CIS Joint Border Protection Concept at the Almaty summit in February 1995, RIA, Moscow, 10 February 1995, SU/2225, A/3. 149. Reported in CDPSP (July 1994), p. 25. See Vitaly Strugovets, Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 August 1994, p. 2. 150. Richard Woff (1995) Jane’s Intelligence Review (February), pp. 72–3. 151. See Itar-Tass, Moscow, 10 February 1995, SU/2225, A/3. 208 Notes and References to Chapter 4

152. In the severely constrained conditions now facing the MoD, the gov- ernment decided to cut back its training of CIS officers in Russian centres, as these states owe the MoD $6.5 million. Reportedly, the MoD will reduce the numbers of such officers from 1850 to 130; see Moskovskiye Novosti report (11–18 February 1996), p. 9. 153. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Aleksandr Belkin argued that the issue was now of the survival of the armed forces. In this vein, the MoD has announced a reduction of its troops in the Transcaucasus. Aleksandr Nikitin, in an interview with the author, argued that the MoD is following the ‘Chinese’ in ‘a thousand small steps’ in moving towards CIS collective security, rejecting the alter- native model of the ‘great leap forward’. 154. For Rodionov’s speech that was subsequently disavowed by Yeltsin, see Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 December 1996, p. 1. Indeed, reports emerged in March 1997 that the GFTC has been subordinated to the NCMD and cut by 70 per cent in the process; see Iprinda, 10 March 1997, SU/2865, S1/1. 155. In this programme, the branches of the armed forces will be re- organized, particularly the Strategic Missile Troops and the Air Force and Ground Forces. The military districts will be cut and reorganized into new operational-strategic commands. By 1997, 500 000 troops had been reduced. 156. See, for example, Igor Sergeyev (1998) ‘We Are Not Adversaries, We Are Partners’, NATO Review (Spring). 157. See, for example, the 24 March 1998 military cooperation agreement with the USA. 158. Itar-Tass, 15 April 1998, SU/3203, S1/3.

4 Consensus and Differences on ‘Peacekeeping’

1. Kozyrev to United Nations General Assembly, Itar-Tass, 22 September 1992, SU/1496. 2. Kozyrev, Segodnya, 6 June 1993, p. 3. 3. See critical comments by Yeltsin on the UN operation in Bosnia, on ‘Russia’, TV programme, Moscow, 20 April 1994, SU/1978, B/1. 4. Kozyrev on ‘Russia’, TV programme, Moscow, 12 April 1992, SU/1355, B/3–4. 5. Kondratyev, Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 February 1994, p. 2. 6. Ibid. 7. Interview, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 November 1993, pp. 1, 3. 8. Kozyrev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 September 1993, p. 1. 9. See Vladimir Abarinov, Segodnya, 6 April 1994, p. 1. 10. Kozyrev, Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 September 1993, p. 3. 11. Kozyrev, Itar-Tass, 22 September 1992, SU/1496. 12. Kozyrev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 September 1993. 13. See Grachev’s comments after the first MFA and MoD Collegia meeting on the elaboration of Russian ‘peacekeeping’ principles: ‘All Notes and References to Chapter 4 209

the operations of Russian contingents, including collective peacekeep- ing forces, must be strictly in keeping with the interests of Russia’s national security’, Itar-Tass, Moscow, 6 May 1993, SU/1688, A1/1. 14. Itar-Tass, 19 January 1994, SU/1904, S2/1–2. 15. Given their deep involvement in restoring ‘law and other’ in Chechnya, one might include the views of the Interior Ministry. Colonel-General Anatoly Kulikov’s report to the conference on ‘Non-Traditional Operations with the Use of Armed Force’, held at the Centre for Political and International Studies (Moscow) in May 1995, provides some insight. Kulikov admitted that the use of force could not resolve a complex conflict. However, he still called for force to ‘normalize’ a situ- ation in the shortest time possible, presumably through its preponder- ant use. See ‘Russian Policy in the Sphere of National Security: Internal Threats to Stability and Order,’ May 1995. However, it is beyond the scope of this book to discuss MVD operations in Chechnya. These have occurred within Russia and cannot pretend to be ‘peacekeeping’ operations. 16. Kozyrev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 September 1993. 17. Itar-Tass, 22 September 1992, SU/1496. 18. See ‘On Military Presence in Neighbouring Countries’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 January 1994. 19. See numerous Kozyrev comments on the ‘two extremes’ in Russian policy choices towards the ‘near abroad’. For example, Itar-Tass, 19 January 1994, SU/1901, S2/1–2. 20. Kozyrev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 November 1993. 21. See Kozyrev interview on ‘Russia’, TV programme, Moscow, 4 July 1992, SU/1425, A1/1–5; also Shelov-Kovedyaev’s distinction between a ‘strong policy’ and a ‘policy of strength’ in an interview in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 July 1992, pp. 1, 5. 22. Kozyrev on ‘Russia’, TV programme, Moscow, 4 July 1992, SU/1425, A1/1–5. 23. Interfax, 20 April 1995, SU/2284, B/4–5. 24. Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 30 June 1992, p. 3. 25. Kozyrev on the draft MFA Concept in Rossiyskiye Vesti, 3 December 1992. 26. See the report by Valery Yakov, Izvestiya, 26 August 1994, p. 1. 27. See, for example, the article on the Development of the Law on Mobile Forces, Moskovsky Komsomolets’, 12 February 1994, SU/1925, S1/1. 28. See, for example, Senior-Lieutenant A. B. Longinov (1993) ‘Ethnos and Territory in Geopolitics’, Voennaya Mysl’ (May), JPRS UMT-93-008-L, pp. 11–14. 29. Only General Vladimir Dudnik made a military case for ‘peacekeeping’ on the lines of traditional UN practice, maintaining that Russia does not have the experience, trained forces, mandate or legal mechanisms for these operations. Dudnik rejected the use of force in ‘peacekeeping’. See Moskovskiye Novosti (14 March 1993) p. A9, and New Times (no. 14, 1993), pp. 14–5. 30. See the discussion in Allison (1996) in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 271. This group included Pavel Grachev, Boris 210 Notes and References to Chapter 4

Gromov, Georgy Kondratyev, Aleksandr Lebed and Vitaly Sorokin. Allison makes the point that the consensus in this group on the limited use of force was shattered with the Chechen invasion, after which Gromov and Kondratyev resigned. 31. See pertinent discussion in Pavel Baev (1996) The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, pp. 19–25. 32. For a civilian view, see Dmitry Trenin, Novoye Vremya (June 1993) UMA-93-024, pp. 22–6. Trenin also argued that Russian peacekeeping success depended on the existence of a clear policy, interests and priori- ties, with clear goals, public support and international coordination. 33. See Major Mark T. Davis (1993), ‘Russia’s “Peacemaking Operations”: An Issue of National Security?’ (SHAPE, CCEEDS), pp. 6–8. 34. Programme for the Training of Units of Peace-Creating Units (1992) (Moscow: Russian Federation Ministry of Defence); and Temporary Instructions: Training of Military Contingents for the Formation of Groups of Military Observers and Collective Forces for the Maintenance of Peace of the CIS Member-States (1993) (Moscow: Russian Federation Ministry of Defence). 35. See discussion in Roy Allison (1994) Jane’s Intelligence Review, Major Mark T. Davis (1993); and Pavel K. Baev (1996) The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, pp. 101–58. 36. Cited by Roy Allison (1996) ‘The Military Background and Context to Russian Peacekeeping’, in L. Jonson and C. Archer (eds), Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia, p. 45. Allison reports that this training programme was elaborated by the Chief Directorate for Combat Training of the Ground Forces. 37. See the revealing discussion in A. Raevsky and I. N. Vorobyev (1994) Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations (UNDIR, Research Paper No. 28), p. 29. 38. Dubynin, Izvestiya, 1 September 1992. 39. See Aleksandr Golts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 November 1993, p. 2. 40. Colonel V. Chuban, Armeisky Sbornik (August 1994), pp. 6–8, JPRS UMA-94-045, pp. 3–5. 41. Russia’s Radio programme, Moscow, 25 August 1993, SU/1782 C4/2. 42. Interview with Lebed in Argumenty i Fakty (June 1994) reported in SU/2017, D/3. 44. It must be noted that Gareev comments that force should be used in ‘indirect operations’ to be successful in such conflicts; International Affairs (Moscow, June 1994), pp. 75–83. 45. Lieutenant-General G. Zhilin, Voenny Vestnik (September 1993) JPRS- UMA-94-005, pp. 32–4. 46. Major-General Ivan Vorobyev, Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 February 1994, p. 2. See also ‘Peacemaking Operations’, Voennaya Mysl’, no. 5, 1994, pp. 40–7. 47. See discussion in I. N. Vorobyev and A. Raevsky (1994) Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations, pp. 34–74. 48. Lieutenant James M. Greene also distinguished between an official CIS ‘peacekeeping’ doctrine and an unofficial CIS collective security doc- trine, see Russia’s ‘Peacekeeping’ Doctrines: The CIS, Russia and the Notes and References to Chapter 4 211

General Staff, SHAPE, CCEEDS 11 January 1993). It is difficult and perhaps misleading, however, to talk about doctrines in these cases, as these views have not been fully developed and do not represent official state policy. 49. See, for example, the argument made by Colonel V. I. Kuzmin for the creation of a supranational logistical support system for CIS ‘peace- keeping,’ in ‘Logistical Support of Peacekeeping Forces’, Voennaya Mysl’, no. 5, 1995, pp. 60–5. 50. Itar-Tass, 19 February 1992, SU/1310, C2/1. 51. See the full report in Itar-Tass, 23 March 1992, SU/1339, C2/2–3 and comments in Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 April 1992, p. 3. 52. This agreement was signed by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Ukraine signed with the proviso that its parliament should decide each operation on a case-by-case basis. Azerbaijan also signed with the qualification that the agreement be ratified by its parliament. 53. For a report on protocol, see Itar-Tass and Interfax, Moscow, 16 July 1992, SU/1436, B/1–2. See also the ‘Provisions for Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS’, prepared for the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, 29 October 1994, which established clear political control over the mandate of any operation, and set restricted tasks for operations with the limited use of force, following traditional UN principles. This proposal was formalized in the ‘Proposal for Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS’ and the agree- ment on the ‘Concept for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the CIS’ adopted by at the CIS summit, January 1996 (by Russia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). These follow tradi- tional UN peacekeeping approaches, and define the CIS as a regional organization. See reports in Diplomatichesky Vestnik (February 1996), pp. 38–42 and 46–52. See also excellent discussion in Lena Jonson (1996) ‘In Search of a Doctrine: Russian Interventionism in Conflicts in its Near Abroad’, Low Intensity Conflicts and Law Enforcement, vol. 5, no. 3 (Winter), pp. 440–65. 54. By mid-August, the presidents of Russia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldova had signed. The presi- dent of Turkmenistan refused to sign the protocol. 55. Interview with Vasily Volkov in Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 14 August 1992, JPRS UMA-92-036, pp. 2–3. See also later CIS agreements in January 1996 on ‘Conflict Prevention and Settlement on the Territory of Members of the CIS’ and the ‘Status of CIS Peacekeeping Forces’, and documents on preparation and training. 56. The CIS HC also sought command-and-control of collective ‘peace- keeping’ operations, which was confirmed at the Bishkek CIS summit in September 1992. In practice, the MoD has run this operation, as the 201st constitutes the main core of the ‘CIS’ forces. As a result, tensions arose between the appointed CIS commander and the commanders of the 201st Division. 57. Shaposhnikov (1993) To Security Through Co-operation (19 May) JPRS UMA-94-005-L, pp. 1–40. 212 Notes and References to Chapter 4

58. See ‘Resolution on the Terms, Presence, Composition and Tasks of Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Republic of Tajikistan, September 24, 1993,’ establishing the Joint Command, mandate, decision-making structure and financing of the operation (Russia 50 per cent; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 10 per cent each; and Uzbekistan and Kazakstan 15 per cent each). It is notable that the commander of the forces is allowed to take decisions independently of the CIS executive political organs in case of emergency. 59. Interview with Pyankov in Rossiya (26 January–1 February 1994), JPRS UMA-94-009, pp. 19–20. 60. See reports of exercises on Mayak radio, Moscow, 21 November 1993, SU/1854, G/1; Editorial report, 22–23 March 1994, SU/1955, G/4; and Itar-Tass, 28 March 1995, SU/2266, S1/2. 61. See, for example, Leonid Ivashov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6 June 1994 pp. 1, 3; and Colonel-General Viktor Samsonov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 November 1994, p. 3. 62. See Vadim Khasvisky, Segodnya, 30 July 1994. 63. See interviews in Izvestiya, 13 January 1994, p. 5; and Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 20 January 1994. 64. The tension between Grachev and Nikolaev flared in the open in September 1994, after the Border Service organized strategic-command staff exercises (Vostok-94) in the Russian Far East, which included border troops, FSK troops, local militia forces, customs officers and senior staff officers of the Far East and Transbaikal Military Districts. See the discussion in Richard Woff (1995) Jane’s Intelligence Review (February), pp. 70–3. 65. Aleksandr Tymko, Rossiyskiye Vesti, 11 June 1994, SU/2024, S1/1–2. 66. See the revealing report by Yury Golotyuk, Segodnya, 26 January 1995, p. 3. 67. Interview in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6 April 1994, p. 6. 68. The Duma only interfered once in directing Russian ‘peacekeeping’, when it delayed the deployment of troops in Abkhazia in mid-1994. The Duma finally passed a bill on 23 June 1995 entitled ‘On the Participation of Military and Civilian Personnel of the Russian Federation in Restoring International Peace and Security’. In general, however, neither the President nor the MoD have allowed the Duma to interfere in Russian ‘peacekeeping’ deployments. 69. In the MoD, a small Directorate for Supervising Peacekeeping Forces was created under General Arinakhin. Grachev’s deputy for crisis situ- ations and ‘peacekeeping’ operations, General Kondratyev, however, relied mainly on the Airborne Troops Command, in which a special position of Deputy Commander of Airborne Troops for Peacekeeping was created in late 1992. General Staskov was appointed to this position in October 1993, maintaining direct command and control lines to all operations except Tajikistan, which fell formally under CIS auspices. See the discussion in Pavel Baev (1996) The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, pp. 69 and 132. Notes and References to Chapter 5 213 5 Russian Strategy towards Moldova

1. Kate Litvak has argued that Russian policy towards Moldova has been determined by domestic political competition within Russia – so-called ‘non-international’ sources. This argument may explain initial Russian policy, and it does underline the contradiction that the Russian govern- ment acted coercively against Moldova to prevent its reunification with Romania at a time when this was unlikely. However, Litvak fails to grasp that the Russian government wished to exclude Romania from conflict resolution in the Dnestr conflict. Her argument is decreasingly persuasive in explaining Russian policy since 1992, by failing to ascribe any strategic aims to Russian policy. See ‘The Role of Political Competition and Bargaining in Russian Foreign Policy’ (1996) Communist and Post-Communist Studies, no. 2, pp. 213–29. 2. This book will refer to the separatist region by its Russian initials PMR (self-declared Pridnestrovskaya Moldovaksya Respublika). The capital of Moldova will be referred to as Chishinau and not Kishinev. 3. On the sources and evolution of this conflict, see Charles King (1995) Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition (London: RIIA); and Vladimir Socor, ‘Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova’, RFE/RL RR (17 January 1992). 4. Daria Fane (1993), ‘Moldova: Breaking Loose from Moscow’, in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds), Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (Cambridge University Press), pp. 138–9. The Dnestr region was traditionally closer to Russia and the Soviet Union, as it was ceded to Russia from the Ottoman empire in 1792. 5. Ibid., pp. 132–3. 6. Paul Kolstoe (1995) Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (London: Hurst & Co.), p. 147. See also Oazu Nantai, Moskovskiye Novosti, 19 July 1992, p. 7. 7. According to the 1989 Soviet Census, Russians represented 25.5 per cent of the Dnestr population and Ukrainians 28.3 per cent, while ethnic Moldovans made up 40.1 per cent. In the late 1980s, Moscow had provided support for the Dnestr claims of discrimination from the Moldovan capital, even sending troops to protect the separatist Dnestr ‘congress’ in September 1990. It must be noted that the Moldovan central authorities under Mircea Snegur quite rapidly moved away from extremist Popular Front demands. 8. The PMR has been led by Igor Smirnov, an ethnic Russian who settled in the Dnestr region in the late 1980s, Alex Karaman (Vice President) a pro-Russian Romanian; and Vadim Shevstov (Minister of Security), a former OMON commander from Riga, under an arrest warrant in Latvia. See discussion in Stephen Bowers (1994), ‘The Dnestr Republic: Further Insight’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (December), pp. 562–4. 9. See the discussion in Charles King, Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition (1995). 214 Notes and References to Chapter 5

10. See ‘Interim Report on the Conflict in the Left Bank Dnestr Areas’, 16 September 1992, CSCE Committee 281, prepared by Adam Rotfeld. 11. See discussion in Charles King (1995) Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition, pp. 14–5. 12. S. J. Kaufman argues that the conflict, which has encompassed econ- omic and political aspects, has been broadly ethnic. According to this view, mass-led mobilization in Moldova in the late 1980s and elite mobilization in the Dnestr region in the early 1990s, combined with Russian support, led to full-scale war by the spring of 1992. See ‘Spiralling to Ethnic War’ (1996) International Security (Autumn), pp. 108–38. It is undeniable that ethnic issues sparked off this conflict, yet it seems that political and economic contradictions underlie the fun- damental conflict between the region and the central government. 13. Cited in Vera Kuznetsova, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 July 1992, p. 1. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Eugene Vizir, Political Attaché at the Moldovan Embassy to Russia, argued that conflict opposed two political elites at the highest levels. 14. See discussion in Charles King (1995) Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition, pp. 21–3. 15. Jane’s Sentinel: Russia and the CIS (Jane’s Information Group) (1996), pp. 7.10.1 to 7.14.1. In early 1997, the Moldovan Minister of Defence, Pavel Crianga, stated that Moldova had six brigades (of which three were infantry); Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, no. 1, 1997, p. 3. 16. These figures were provided to the author by the OSCE Mission in the Moldovan capital in late May 1998. 17. See Stephen Bowers (1992) ‘The Crisis in Moldova’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (November), pp. 483–6. 18. See the account in Mark Smith (1993) Pax Russica: Russia’s Monroe Doctrine (London: RUSI), pp. 56–60. 19. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Dmitry Trenin stressed the fact that many depots were guarded by ‘local’ officers, who were very willing to assist the Guard. 20. See Jane’s Sentinel (1996), p. 7.14.1. 21. Trevor Walters (1996) ‘Moldova: Continuing Recipe for Instability’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (September), pp. 398–401. 22. See the account by Stephen Bowers (1992) Jane’s Intelligence Review. 23. See Eduard Kondratev, Izvestiya, 5 March 1992, pp. 1, 2. 24. Interview with Union of Cossacks Ataman A. Martykov by Gennady Melkov in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 10 June 1992. 25. See discussion by Michael J. Orr (1992) ‘14th Army and the Crisis in Moldova’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (June), pp. 247–50. 26. According to the OSCE, in late 1992, the 14th Army consisted of 6081 men (1712 officers and 4369 non-commissioned officers); 60 per cent of the officer corps and 80–90 per cent of the soldiers were permanent res- idents of the Dnestr region. This situation has impeded any full with- drawal of the Army. See Adam Rotfeld, ‘Final Report on the Conflict in the Left Bank Dnestr Areas,’ Prague, 31 January 1993. 27. See report on Duma hearings for details on 14th Army equipment, V. Ermolin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 May 1995, p. 3. According to the OSCE, Notes and References to Chapter 5 215

there are ‘enough weapons in the TransDniestr region to equip a 150 000 to 200 000 strong army’, cited in J. Chin, (1996), p. 113. 28. According to Eduard Vizir, of the Moldovan Embassy to Russia, in late 1996, the former 14A represented 5000 men, with an additional 500 personnel as ‘peacekeeping’ forces. 29. Kozyrev’s speech to Congress of Peoples’ Deputies, 20 April 1992, reported in SU/1361, C1/3. 30. The Foreign Ministers of Ukraine, Moldova, Russia and Romania met initially in Helsinki on 23 March 1992; see Diplomatichesky Vestnik (8/92), pp. 9–11. 31. See Diplomatichesky Vestnik (9–10/92), pp. 8–9; and Aleksandr Taro, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 April 1992, pp. 1, 2. 32. See Diplomatichesky Vestnik (13–14/92), pp. 32–3. 33. See Igor Rotar, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 April 1992, p. 3; and Konstantin Eggert, Izvestiya, 11 April 1992, p. 5. 34. Eduard Kondratev on Rutskoi’s visit, Izvestiya, 6 April 1992, p. 1. 35. Rutskoi’s speech on ‘Russia’ TV programme, 6 April 1992, SU/1350, C1/3–4. 36. Sergei Stankevich, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 23 June 1992. 37. Reported in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 11 April 1992, SU/1356, C1/9–10. 38. Draft Military Doctrine, Voennaya Mysl’, 19 May 1992, in JPRS, UMT- 92-009-4, pp. 1–5. 39. Russian military commentators reported that Romania had dispatched train-loads of equipment and weapons, as well as pontoons and techn- ical advisers. See, for example, Major Anatoly Stasovsky, Krasnaya Zvezda, 26 May 1992, p. 1. 40. Interview in Izvestiya, 21 May 1992. 41. See, for example, Aleksandr Taro, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 May 1992, p. 1. 42. Charles King states that high-level officers in the MoD gave orders for the 14A to intervene in the conflict; see Foreign Policy (Winter 1994–5), p. 111. In an interview by the author in January 1997, Pavel Kandel, of the Institute of Europe, argued that ‘it was impossible to think other- wise’ than that Lebed acted in accordance with MoD orders. 43. Cited in Roy Allison (1996) Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 288. 44. Vladimir Socor (1992), ‘Russia’s 14th Army and the Insurgency in Eastern Moldova’, RFE/RL, RR, (vol. 1, no. 36), pp. 41–8. For other accounts of 14A intervention, see Don Ionescu (1992) ‘Rumanian Concern over Conflict in Moldova,’ RFE/RL RR, (1 May), pp. 46–51; and Stephen Bowers (1992) ‘The Crisis in Moldova’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (November), pp. 483–6. 45. See Aleksandr Taro, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 May 1992, p. 1, in which it is reported that the 14A provided the Dnestr forces with ten tanks and twelve armoured fighting vehicles. See also Aleksandr Taro and Pavel Felgengauer, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 May 1992, pp. 1, 2. On the role of the Russian Cossacks, see, for example, Eduard Kondratev, Izvestiya, 5 March 1992, pp. 1, 2. 46. Itar-Tass, 19 May 1992, SU/1386, B/5–6. 216 Notes and References to Chapter 5

47. Interview on ‘Russia’ TV programme, Moscow, 31 May 1992. 48. Mayak Radio, Moscow, 20 June 1992, SU/1413, C3/4. 49. Interview in Izvestiya, 29 June 1992. 50. See the discussion by Andrannik Migranyan, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 January 1994. 51. Kozyrev on ‘Russia’ TV programme, 12 April 1992, SU/1355, B/3–4. 52. Russia’s Radio programme, 10 June 1992, SU/1406, B/10. 53. Kozyrev on ‘Russia’ TV programme, 4 July 1992, SU/1425, A1/1–5. 54. Yeltsin’s comments reported in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 June 1992. 55. ‘Russia’ TV programme, Moscow, 10 July 1992, SU/1431, C1/3. 56. See Diplomatichesky Vestnik (15–16/92), pp. 34–6. 57. The ‘peacekeeping’ forces were deployed in a Security Zone, 225 km by 12 km, divided into three sectors, jointly monitored by the Moldovan– Dnestr–Russian Control Commission. This zone has thirteen observer posts, and five checkpoints. The Trilateral Joint Control Commission is composed of eighteen members (6–6–6) – thus ensuring a pro-Russian predominance with the combined Russian and Dnestr members. 58. Rutskoi warmly welcomed the trilateral negotiation mechanism, which excluded Ukraine and Romania but included the Dnestr authorities. See Izvestiya, 23 July 1992, p. 2. 59. Lieutenant-General G. Zhilin (1993) Voenny Vestnik (September), pp. 17–19, in JPRS, UMA-94-005, pp. 32–4. 60. Interfax, 8 February 1992, SU/1610, B/6. 61. Itar-Tass, 5 February 1993, SU/1608, B/8–9. 62. Itar-Tass, 1 September 1993, SU/1785, B/6. 63. Viktor Litovkin, Izvestiya, 29 May 1992, p. 1. 64. Interview with Grachev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 June 1992. 65. Anatol Tsaranu, 30 June 1993, reported in SU/1730, B/11. 66. Interfax, 17 November 1992, SU/1544, B/9. The CSCE Mission to Moldova arrived there in late April 1993, after a request from the Moldovan government and a CSCE decision in February 1993. The mandate of this mission was to facilitate the peaceful resolution of the conflict as well as to encourage negotiations on the withdrawal of the 14A. The mission was designed also to liaise with the ‘peacekeeping’ forces. The mission has played a minimal role in overseeing the oper- ation, but still an important one through participating in negotiations between Moldovan and Dnestr authorities. 67. 1200 men were recruited – 80 per cent to the 14A and 20 per cent to the Republican Guard. 68. RIA, Moscow, 30 December 1992, SU/1577, B/16. 69. Itar-Tass, 18 September 1992, SU/1491, B/5. 70. Itar-Tass, 20 October 1992, SU/1503,B/9. 71. Interview in Izvestiya, 3 February 1994, p. 3. 72. Lebed, cited in Vladimir Socor (1993), ‘Russia’s Army in Moldova: There to Stay?’ RFE/RL RR (no. 29) pp. 44. 73. Cited in CSCE, Final Report, January 1993, p. 8. 74. Interfax, 14 September 1992, SU/1489, B/7. 75. Reported on ‘Russia’ TV programme, 30 December 1992, SU/1577, B/16. Notes and References to Chapter 5 217

76. This broke off the apparent movement towards economic normalization between Moldova and Russia which had started in early 1993; see ‘Talks between Two Presidents’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 February 1993, p. 1. 77. Itar-Tass, 3 August 1993, SU/1759, B/6. 78. Reported later in Lebed interview in Izvestiya, 3 February 1994, p. 3. 79. Itar-Tass, 19 January 1994, SU/1904, D/6–7. 80. Itar-Tass, 16 July 1994, SU/2054, D/3. 81. Elena Shotokhina (1994) Moskovskiye Novosti, no. 9, p. 10. 82. Moldova subsequently delinked these two negotiations. 83. See Vasily Terletsky, ‘Moldova Moving Away from Russia’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 March 1997, p. 3. 84. Cited in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 September 1994. 85. Itar-Tass, 5 December 1995, SU/2481, S1/3. 86. This normalization process has continued. See, for example, ‘Meeting between V. Chernomyrdin and S. Sangheli’, Diplomatichesky Vestnik (May 1996) during which agreements were reached for 1996–7 and on the creation of an intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation. 87. Reported on ‘Russia’ TV programme, 2 March 1994, SU/1940, D/2. 88. Itar-Tass, 28 April 1994, SU/1985, D/1. 89. Romanian Radio programme, 3 February 1994, SU/1917, B/8–9. 90. This agreement expanded the rights of the CSCE mission to monitor the buffer zone and make contact with the Joint Control Commission and ‘peacekeeping’ forces, as well as the local population. These new ‘freedoms’ provide insight into the restraints imposed on the OSCE Mission from early 1993. See, for example, ‘Principles of Cooperation Between the OSCE and the Joint Control Commission in the Security Zone’, 17 January 1996. 91. See Diplomatichesky Vestnik (21–22/94), pp. 47–51. 92. See the discussion by Sergei Kniazkov, Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 February 1995, p. 3; and Vladimir Ermolin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 May 1995, p. 3. 93. Interview in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 September 1994, p. 1, reported in CDPSP (36–94), pp. 21–2. 94. Dmitry Trenin broke the consensus on this issue, arguing that conflict resolution is more important than the retention of a military base: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 November 1994, p. 3. 95. Interfax, 26 June 1995, SU/2341, S1/1. 96. Itar-Tass, 25 June 1995, SU/2341, S1/1. Lebed had contested the reform of the 14A. The appointment of Yevnevich ensured that MoD orders have been implemented, and has given Moscow more flexibility com- pared to Lebed’s forceful stance. 97. Interfax, 27 June 1995, SU/2342, S1/1. 98. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 June 1995, p. 3; Aleksandr Pelts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 June 1995, p. 1; and the interview with Yvevnevich, Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 September 1995, pp. 1, 2. 99. Besapress, Chishinau, 20 June 1995, SU/2338, S1/1. 100. Itar-Tass, 10 November 1995, SU/2459, S1/2. In mid-1996, Lieutenant- General Yevnevich stated that the 14A had been cut from 52 to 26 com- bined units – a full division and some ‘peacekeeping’ units, and the 14A 218 Notes and References to Chapter 5

management had been cut by three-quarters (by 1526). Moreover, significant amounts of equipment had already been transferred to Russia and 9000 units of ammunition destroyed. See interview in Trud, 19 June 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-121, pp. 23–5. 101. Interfax, 6 June 1996, SU/2633, D/5–6. However, Yevnevich revealed that 80 per cent of the Op.Gp were ‘locals’, who had been given Russian citizenship as volunteers. See interview in Trud, 19 June 1996, SU/2646, D/8–10. 102. The Moldovan government has sought to involve Ukraine in the Dnestr resolution process since 1994. See, for example, Natalya Prikhodka, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 August 1994, p. 3. Increased Ukrainian partici- pation has not been unwelcomed by Russia. Moldova, Ukraine and Russia issued a joint declaration at the January 1996 CIS summit, as joint guarantors of Moldovan territorial integrity: Diplomatichesky Vestnik, February 1996, p. 37. 103. Itar-Tass, 26 May 1995, SU/2315, D/4. 104. See Natalya Prikhodka, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 December 1995, p. 3. The CSCE has consistently called for a rapid withdrawal of the 14A since a CSCE Council resolution on 15 December 1992; see CSCE, Final Report, January 1993, p. 5. 105. Infotag, Chishinau, 27 December 1995, SU/2497, S1/1. 106. See, for example, the visit by William Cohen to Moldova in January 1998. 107. In this, the parties agreed to resolve the conflict in accordance with CSCE principles. As noted by Yury Selivanov, the Moldovan govern- ment abandoned its previous appellation of the Dnestr authorities as ‘criminal separatists’, Segodnya, 5 May 1994, p. 1. 108. For example, in late 1994, the two parties discussed draft documents for economic normalization, with formal agreements in early 1995 on the lifting of customs barriers and allowing the free movement of goods and people, with the phased introduction of the Moldovan leu currency. See reports of meetings in Itar-Tass, 11 January 1995, SU/2199, D/2; and Interfax, 16 February 1995, SU/2231, D/4; and on the leu, see Interfax, 5 July 1995, SU/2349, D/3. 109. The Moldovan authorities have proposed the example of the status given to the Gagauz region in Moldova as a model. This status provides for extensive autonomy within a unitary state. See its parliament’s resolution ‘On the Special Legal Status of Gagauz-Eri’, Infotag, 23 December 1994, SU/2191, D/2. Moreover, the Moldovan constitu- tion allows for ‘special conditions and forms of autonomy’ to the Dnestr ‘localities’. 110. See the discussion in Don Ionescu (1996) ‘Playing the Dnestr Card in and After the Russian Elections’, OMRI Transition (23 August), pp. 26–8. During the presidential elections in Moldova in late 1996, the issue was shelved. President Snegur indeed withdrew support for the Memorandum early in the campaign. 111. President Luscinski called for a reconsideration of the Memorandum, proposing a special status that would give the region control over foreign economic and broader economic matters. Luscinski entered Notes and References to Chapter 6 219

direct talks with Smirinov in early 1997. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Eduard Vizir was optimistic about the prospects for resolution, particularly through ‘normal and gradual economic normalization’. 112. Yury Karlov, ‘Success for Russian Diplomacy’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 April 1997, p. 1. 113. For a discussion of the internal political pressures on the Dnestr authorities, see Gottfried Hanne (1997) ‘Playing Two Different Tunes, as usual, in Moldova’, Transitions (September), pp. 68–71. 114. The Duma resolution did raise the possibility, however, of renewed Russian government pressure on Moldova, and fit in with the govern- ment campaign to retain a military base. 115. Interfax, 16 March 1998, SU/3178, B/2. 116. However, the PMR may be used by Russia again in the future if relations break down with Moldova. 117. See comments by Valery Pasat from the Moldovan consulate in Moscow in Segodnya, 10 August 1994, p. 1. 118. Moldova seemed to accept this new mandate on condition that these troops were Russian (and not local) and were placed under the command of the MoD in Moscow and not the Op.Gp. – a radical departure from previous positions, as these troops had not been trained as ‘peacekeepers’; Besapress, 17 June 1996, SU/2643, D/4. 119. Infotag, 28 February 1997, SU/2859, D/1–3. 120. By early 1998, Russia had apparently withdrawn all the equipment and toxic materials of the former 14th Army’s chemical battalion. Russian military commanders, however, expected that it would take another three years to withdraw the rest. 121. The problem posed by these arms stocks will plague conflict resolution for a long time. The PMR has deployed an additional cordon of forces surrounding the Russian guards to ensure that no armaments are with- drawn from the storage dump at Kolbasna.

6 Russian Strategy towards the Abkhaz Conflict

1. In an interview with the author in January 1997 at the Institute of Europe, Pavel Kandel underlined Russia’s ‘sphere of influence vision’ of its inter- ests in Georgia, with regard to problems in the North Caucasus, Turkish military developments and Caspian Sea energy resources. 2. For a brief overview of the political, economic and military situation in Georgia, see Report of CSCE Rapporteur Mission to Georgia (CSCE Communication No. 186, Prague, 29 May 1992). It is important to note that the Abkhaz conflict coincided with the South Ossetian conflict and the civil war that broke out in western Georgia in 1993. These conflicts, combined with the break-up of the Soviet economic system, led to econ- omic collapse in Georgia, as well as a severe humanitarian crisis with a total of 280 000 internally displaced persons. These crises placed tremendous pressure on the already overtaxed and disintegrating Georgian state. 220 Notes and References to Chapter 6

3. See Stephen Jones (1993) ‘Georgia: A Failed Democratic Transition’, in Nations and Politics in Soviet Successor States, pp. 291–4. 4. For background, see Suzanne Goldenberg (1995) Pride of Small Nations, pp. 81–115; and Elizabeth Fuller (1992) ‘Abkhazia on the Brink of Civil War?’, RFE/RL RR, 4 September, pp. 1–4. It is not unusual in the North Caucasus for the titular nationality to represent a minority in its own republic. John Colarusso (1995) ‘Abkhazia’, Central Asian Survey (vol. 14, no. 1), p. 76. See also ‘The United Nations and Georgia’ (Reference paper, April 1995). 5. Stephen Jones (1993) in Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, p. 294. 6. See Jonathan Aves’ (1996) discussion of different regions making up the ‘little empire’ of Georgia, in Georgia: From Chaos to Stability? (London: Former Soviet South Project, RIIA). 7. Stephen Jones (1993) in Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, p. 302. 8. The Military Balance, 1992–1993 estimated about 3000. William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric (1995) Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, p. 85–6 estimated between 7000– 12 000. 9. Jane’s Sentinel: Russia and the CIS (1996), pp. 4–10 to 4–13. 10. See the account in ‘Your Disarmament Results – Not One Army but 17’, Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 11 June 1993, p. 5, in JPRS UMA-93-031, pp. 1–4. 11. Odom and Dujarric (1995) Commonwealth or Empire? 12. Richard Woff (1993) ‘The Armed Forces of Georgia’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (July), pp. 307–10. 13. The Military Balance, 1993–1994, p. 80. 14. ‘Blessed are the Peacemakers’, Novoye Vremya, June 1993, pp. 8–12, in JPRS UMA-93-024, pp. 22–6. 15. ‘Your Disarmament Results – Not One Army but 17’, Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 11 June 1993, see note 10. 16. According to Dmitry Trofimov, an agreement between Grachev and Kitovani in October 1991 sealed Gamsakhurdia’s fate, with the Russian MoD transferring military equipment in exchange for a Georgian acceptance of an enduring Russian military presence. 17. Roy Allison (1993) Military Forces in Soviet Successor States, p. 66. See also The Military Balance, 1993–1994, pp. 81, 106. The Russian GFTC was estimated at about 20 000 in total, with about 5500 in Armenia. 18. Russian forces in Abkhazia were commanded by V. Sorokin in the crucial period of Russian intervention between November 1992 to March 1993. Roy Allison included Sorokin in the ‘peacekeeping clique’ in Moscow, with Grachev, Kondratyev, Gromov and Lebed; see Allison (1996) in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 271. 19. The Russian envoy to Georgia, Vladimir Zemsky, affirmed that these factors were not linked to the GFTC command; see interview, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 December 1992, p. 1. However, Dmitry Trofimov noted the long-standing and close relationship between Deputy Defence Minister Notes and References to Chapter 6 221

Kondratyev and Viktor Kakalia, Abkhaz Defence Minister from August to November 1992 (thereafter military adviser to Ardzinba)–as the basis for support to the Abkhaz forces by Russian forces deployed in Abkhazia; in Hans-Georg Erhart, Anna Kreikeyer and A. V. Zagorsky (eds) (1996), Crisis Management in the CIS, p. 81. 20. Pavel Felgengauer argued in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7 November 1993, p. 3, that ‘either Russia controls the Caucasus or the Caucasus will control Russia’. 21. See the discussion of a ‘Yugoslav’ scenario by Arkady Ostalsky, Izvestiya, 18 January 1992, p. 1; and A. Vasiliyev, New Times (20/92), pp. 4–6. 22. ‘Russia’ TV programme, 11 March 1992, SU/1328, B/2–3. 23 See, for example, statements by the then Deputy Prime Minister Georgy Khizha on these points, Itar-Tass, SU/1476, C1/5. 24. See report on Mayak Radio programme, Moscow, 24 August 1992, SU/1469, C3/1. 25. ‘Russia’ Radio programme, Moscow, 19 August 1992, SU/1465, C2/2. 26. Itar-Tass, 20 August 1992, SU/1466, C2/3. 27. Itar-Tass, 9 September 1992, SU/1483, C3/3. 28. MFA Deputy Boris Pastukhov later admitted to the CSCE Rapporteur that ‘unfortunately, Russia did not pay attention to this conflict in time. Russian foreign policy could not foresee the development of the political situation in Georgia’; see ‘Report of Personal Rapporteur’ (1993), (CSCE Communication), pp. 3–4. 29. Televised meeting, Ostankino, Ch. 1 TV, programme Moscow, 24 August 1992, SU/1469, C3/3. 30. Units in Russia’s southern regions also closed the airspace and water- ways, according to Pastukhov. 31. Rutskoi met with the heads of the regions and republics of the North Caucasus in late August. Gayaz Alimov, Izvestiya, 25 August 1992, p. 1. 32. See Agreement in Diplomatichesky Vestnik (17–18, 1992), pp. 13–16. 33. According to David Darchiashvili, the T-55 tanks and SU-15 planes were of low quality. See unpublished paper, ‘Russian–Georgian Military Relations’, August 1996, p. 2. 34. See Nodar Broladze et al., Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 August 1992, pp. 1, 3. 35. Itar-Tass, 31 August 1992, SU/1475, C1/3. The government’s reaction to the conflict also came under ‘centrist’ and ‘radical’ criticism within Russia, from the Civic Union, Sergei Baburin and Viktor Aksyuchits, for the delay in Russian policy. See discussion in Catherine Dale (1996) ‘The Case of Abkhazia (Georgia)’, in Peacekeeping and Russia’s Role in Eurasia, pp. 124–5. 36. Interfax, 18 May 1992, SU/1394, C2/2. 37. Pavel Felgengauer, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 June 1992. 38. See Nodar Broladze, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 April 1992, p. 2. 39. Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 30 June 1992, p. 3. 40. Abkhaz forces, with support from North Caucasian fighters, even threatened to capture Sukhumi and 80 per cent of Abkhazia. Moreover, some 30 000 refugees fled into Russia. 222 Notes and References to Chapter 6

41. On these ‘first principles’, see the statement by Russian parliament, Itar-Tass, 25 September 1992, SU/1497, C2/1; the statement by Deputy Premier Sergei Shakhrai, Ostankino, Ch. 1 TV programme, Moscow, 20 June 1993, SU/1721, B/4–5; the statement by Yeltsin, Itar-Tass, 7 December 1992, SU/1558, B/6; account of MoD position in talks with Georgia, Interfax, 19 March 1993, SU/1643, B/5; and Kozyrev statement on ‘Russia’ TV programme, Moscow, 9 June 1993, SU/1713, B/12–13. 42. Decree of 5 August 1993, Federatsiya (14 August 1993). 43. Ostankino Ch. 1 TV programme, 4 July 1993, SU/1734, A1/1–3. See also Kozyrev’s statement on Russia’s need for peace, in Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 June 1993, p. 3. 44. See the report on Ostankino, Ch. 1 TV programme, Moscow, 13 July 1993, SU/1741, B/1. 45. In the spring of 1993, under intense internal pressure, because of Russian coercive intervention, Shevardnadze did call for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Abkhazia, but not from Georgia as a whole. 46. See analysis in S. F. Jones (1995) ‘Adventurers or Commanders? Civil–Military Relations in Georgia Since Independence’, in Civil– Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, pp. 35–52. 47. TCMD Statement, Itar-Tass, 19 November 1992, SU/154, B/6. 48. See Shevardnadze’s statement to the UN on Russian intervention, Interfax, 16 October, SU/1515. C1/1 49. Interview with Shevardnadze, Izvestiya, 19 December 1992, in SU/1572, B/10–11, 24 December 1992. 50. Shevardnadze on Mayak Radio programme, Moscow, 11 January 1993, SU/1585, B/3–4. 51. A small UN Observer Mission was deployed in Georgia in November 1992 to help ‘promote negotiations between the conflicting parties in Georgia which are aimed at reaching a peaceful political settlement’. Eduard Brunner was the Secretary General’s Special Envoy. In February 1994, the UN Mission numbered 88, increasing to 134 in 1995. In parallel, the CSCE also sent a small mission to Georgia in early 1993, under Istran Gyarmati. This mission has played a secondary role to the active UN presence. The CSCE decided to send a small mission in November 1992, on the basis of the ‘Report of the Personal Rapporteur’, (CSCE, October 1992). 52. For an overview of the UN role in Georgia, see ‘The UN and the Situation in Georgia’ (Reference Paper, April 1995). 53. Interfax, May 31, 1993, SU/1704, B/11. 54. Marrack Goulding letter to Ardzinba on 2 July 1993. Cited in Jewett and Hill (1994) Back in the USSR, p. 53. 55. See Shevardnadze, Kontact News Agency, 27 August 1993, SU/1781, B/8. 56. Grachev, cited in Mark Smith (1993) Pax Russica, p. 54. 57. Interfax, 13 January 1993, SU/1587, B/14. 58. See, for example, interview with Georgian military adviser, Lieutenant- General L. Sherashenidze in Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 May 1992. Moreover, military negotiations continued during this period on the status of Russian forces with progress even in September 1993. See the account of Pyotr Karapetyan, Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 September 1993, p. 1. Notes and References to Chapter 6 223

59. Shevardnadze stated that these units constituted their ‘own military state in the conflict zone’, Itar-Tass, 5 October 1992, SU/1505, C1/1. The Russian Envoy argued that these forces performed a ‘peace mission’. See Pyotr Karapetyan, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 December 1992, p. 1. 60. Itar-Tass, 26 October 1992, SU/1523, B/8. 61. See report on Interfax, 11 December 1992, SU/1563, B/1. 62. MFA statement, Itar-Tass, 25 February 1993, SU/1625, B/8. 63. See account in Jewett and Hill (1994) Back in the USSR, pp. 51–4. See MoD Declarations on these events in Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 and 23 March 1993. 64. See an account of the attack by Pyotr Karapetyan, Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 September 1993. 65. Elena Glebova has argued that the Abkhaz received Russian support in the form of thirteen train wagons of military equipment; in Moskovskiye Novosti, 13 October 1993, p. 13. Erhart, Kreikmeyer and Zagorsky (1996) argued that Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev ordered Russian forces to support the Abkhaz offensive in September 1993, in Crisis Management in the CIS, p. 247. If these reports are true, they may present evidence of a lack of coordination in the MoD command, as it seems that Grachev had no desire to bring Georgia to the edge of total collapse. 66. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Dmitry Trenin argued that the MoD lost control at this point of its forces on the ground, which supported the Abkhaz. 67. See the report of Shevardnadze meeting with Grachev in Tbilisi on 1 September 1993, in Guga Lolishvili, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 September 1993. 68. Vice Premier Sergei Shakhrai accused the Abkhaz of exploiting the cease-fire, and pledged to apply pressure on the Abkhaz leadership. See Vasily Kononenko, Izvestiya, 22 September 1993, p. 2. Chernomyrdin imposed immediate financial and economic sanctions against Abkhazia, and the border was closed. See Besik Urigashvili, Izvestiya, 22 September 1993, pp. 1, 2. 69. See the discussion in Irakli Tseretli (1996) ‘Seeking Stability under Shevardnadze’, Transition, (6 July), pp. 42–5. 70. Igor Giorgadze, the Security Minister, fled to Moscow after the ‘terror- ist’ acts in Tbilisi in August 1995. Following this, the Georgian Security Services were purged. Moreover, in early 1995, Tengiz Kitovani was arrested for attempting to attack Abkhazia. Kitovani went on trial in December 1995 and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment; see Mikhail Vignansky, Segodnya, 10 October 1996, p. 7. Ioseliani has been accused of illegal arms sales. 71. In October 1996, the parliament voted to set up a state commission to review relations with Russia, in response to the Abkhaz planned parlia- mentary elections in November. Outside the parliament, Georgian political parties (including Georgian–Abkhaz groupings) are more forcefully anti-Russian. 72. Certain Russian military commanders reinforced the Georgian percep- tion of the bargain. Yakushev pledged to ensure the rapid return of 224 Notes and References to Chapter 6

IDPs to Abkhazia, before being forced to back down under pressure from Grachev in 1995. 73. Georgian Radio programme, 10 November 1993, SU/1844, F/2–4. 74. Itar-Tass, 26 October 1993, SU/1832, F/8. 75. Russia’s Radio programme, Moscow, 5/6 November 1993, SU/1841, F/2. 76. See report on Russia’s Radio programme, Moscow, 6 November 1993, SU/1841, F/2. 77. Itar-Tass, 2 October 1993, SU/1810, F/2. 78. See Diplomatichesky Vestnik (5–6/1994), pp. 32–41; and Aleksandr Pelts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 February 1994. 79. Itar-Tass, 3 February 1994, SU/1914, S1/1. 80. An initial agreement was reached in March between Grachev and Nadibaidze, before being finalized by Chernomyrdin in a visit in September 1995; see Vitaly Denisov and Aleksandr Pelts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 March 1995, p. 1. 81. Still, in February 1995, Georgia signed the Collective Security Concept, and the agreement on the Main Directions of Collective Security and the Agreement of the creation of a Joint Air Defence System. See the discussion in David Darchiashvili (1996) Russian–Georgian Military Relations (August), p. 6. 82. Lieutenant-General Boris Dyukov of the GFTC stated that these ‘strategic’ forces were the ‘plenipotentiary representative of Great Russia’; Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 April 1994, p. 2. 83. In mid-1996, Grachev announced the decision to create coalition forces with Georgia and Armenia, and the GFTC; Vitaly Denisov and Pyotr Karapetyan, Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 May 1996. 84. Itar-Tass, 9 March 1995, SU/2250, F/2–3. 85. See Segodnya, 14 February 1996. 86. In a report to the Security Council on 25 January 1994, Boutros-Ghali presented two options. First, the UN would deploy 2500 troops across Abkhaz territory to restore order and ensure the safety of returning IDPs. The second option would consist of a multinational deployment, including Russian troops, which UNOMIG would monitor. As subse- quent reports made clear, the Secretary General favoured the second option. See discussion in ‘The UN and the Situation in Georgia’ (Reference Paper, April 1995). 87. See report on Georgian Radio programme, Tbilisi, 6 May 1994, SU/192, B/10–11. In a report on 3 March 1994 to the Security Council, the Secretary General argued that the UN was ‘already over-extended’, and that it would be ‘ill-planned to take on an additional commitment’; cited in P. Taylor and K. Smith (1996) Peacekeeping and Russia’s Role in Eurasia, p. 204. 88. See the interview with Shevardnadze, Georgian Radio programme, Tbilisi, 28 March 1994, SU/1960, F/2–4. After September 1993, the mission was reduced to five members. 89. The agreement ‘On the Cease-Fire and Demarcation of Security Zones’, provided for CIS forces with UN oversight; see Diplomatichesky Vestnik (11–12, 1994), p. 47. Notes and References to Chapter 6 225

90. The Russian government was forced to make initial use of these forces because of the veto by the Federation Council of the ‘peacekeeping’ deployment plan. 91. These forces are deployed at forty-five checkpoints on both sides of the Inguri river, including at special heavy weapon withdrawal zones and with special patrol duties in the Kodor Valley. See the discussion in ‘Operations Involving the Use of the Armed Forces in the CIS’, (1995) unpublished paper, Centre for Political and International Studies (Moscow, May). 92. Georgian Radio programme, Tbilisi, 13 June 1994, SU/2022, F/4–5. Boutros-Ghali stated that the CIS–UN ‘peacekeeping’ cooperation in Abkhazia was a ‘further step in the new direction of cooperation in peacekeeping activities between UN and regional organizations and alliances’; cited in P. Taylor and K. Smith (1996) Peacekeeping and Russia’s Role in Eurasia, p. 201. In a report to the Security Council in 14 October 1994, Boutros-Ghali considered this cooperation to be ‘satisfactory’. 93. Se the report on Georgian Radio programme, Tbilisi, 15 July 1994, SU/2051, F/3. UNOMIG was created in late August 1993, during the Sochi cease-fire, with 88 military observers and 55 civilian observers. In December, 1993, the Security Council had recommended the gradual deployment of 50 more observers. However, active combat continued on the ground throughout this period. The expanded mandate of UNOMIG included oversight of the CIS operation, verification of troops and weapons withdrawal, monitoring the Kodori Gorge, where Georgian forces remained, and contributing to the safe return of refugees. The Mission was deployed in three sectors (Gali, Zugdidi and Sukhumi). See MacFarlane, Minear and Shenfield (1996). A Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping, pp. 52–3. 94. The two operations are technically independent, providing formally for interaction at various levels on the ground. See UN Security Council resolutions in ‘The UN and the Situation in Georgia’ (Reference Paper, April 1995). However, as noted by Neil S. MacFarlane, Larry Minear and Stephen Shenfield (1996) A Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping, UNOMIG has had limited access to the sectors within the Security Zone, p. 58. 95. See the discussion in Neil S. MacFarlane (1997) ‘On the Front Lines in the Near Abroad: The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia’s Civil Wars’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 509–25. 96. Georgian TV programme, Tbilisi, 4 July 1994, SU/2041, F/3. 97. Itar-Tass, 7 July 1994, SU/2024, F/4. 98. Russia’s Radio programme, Moscow, 15 April 1994, SU/1975, S1/3. 99. See Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 20 July 1994, p. 1. 100. See Memo from talks, December, in Diplomatichesky Vestnik (1–2/1994), p. 38. Also, Itar-Tass, 1 December 1993, SU/1862, F/2. 101. Diplomatischesky Vestnik (9–10, 1994), pp. 53–7. See the account of talks in January in Geneva, in Diplomatichesky Vestnik (3–4, 1994), pp. 43–4. 226 Notes and References to Chapter 6

102. In Moscow in April 1994, the two parties had agreed on a ‘Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons’. In this, the parties pledged to cooperate with Russia and the UNHCR to guarantee the safe return of refugees. Little actual progress was made on the ground on this issue, however. In late September, the Abkhaz authorities accepted only 100 applications for return. 400 000 refugees fled Abkhazia during the war, according to the UNHCR, with 250 000 displaced persons within Georgia – the majority of whom are Georgian. See R. Redmond (1994) ‘Conflict in the Caucasus’, After the Soviet Union (no. IV, 1994), pp. 22–5. The presence of these refugees has placed great strain on the Georgian central gov- ernment; see UNHCR, Information Bulletin, (July 1994), pp. 4–7. After an initial attempt to force the pace of IDP return in 1994, the UNHCR has since been forced to retreat to its original humanitarian mandate. A further agreement in February 1995 secured a timetable only for the voluntary return of refugees. See the discussion in MacFarlane, Minear and Shenfield (1996); A Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping. 103. See the report in Interfax, 12 July 1995, SU/2355, F/2. 104. According to the ‘peacekeeping’ forces, 85 per cent had returned to the Security Zone by late 1996; Iberia, Tbilisi, 1 November 1996, SU/2761, F/6. 105. See Georgian TV programme, Tbilisi, 26 November 1995, SU/2473, F/4–7. For an example of Ardzinba’s position, see Interfax, 28 November 1995, SU/2474, F/2. 106. See comments by Zhvaniya in Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 September 1996, p. 3. Parties not represented in parliament have been the most outs- poken against the Russian operation, and Russia’s overall military presence. In August 1996, fourteen opposition parties formed a commission calling for the total withdrawal of Russian troops. 107. Interfax, 4 April 1995, SU/2271, F/3. Shevardnadze called ‘peace- keeping’ ‘senseless’ in its present state, Segodnya, 23 February 1996, p. 9. 108. David Darchiashvili (1996) Russian Peacekeepers in Georgia (May–June), p. 7. 109. See Grachev reported on Interfax, 26 September 1995, SU/2420, B/8–9. 110. Georgian radio programme, 15 April 1997, SU/2895, F/1–2. 111. Georgian radio programme, 4 April 1997, SU/2888, F/2–3. 112. In October 1996, the Georgian parliament adopted a law calling into question Georgian cooperation with Russia in this area. 113. In January 1997, Georgian security forces began checks at the Russian airports around Tbilisi, and even placed a temporary ban on Russian military transport planes. Throughout the spring, random checks and detentions have been made among the Russian border troops. 114. Interfax, 6 May 1997, SU/2913, F/2–3. 115. Kontakt News, 23 October 1997, SU/3059, F/2. 116. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 April 1997, pp. 1–2. 117. See Nodar Broladze, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 March 1997. Two regi- ments will be withdrawn, including the 345th Airborne Regiment in Notes and References to Chapter 7 227

Gudauta. The GFTC has been subordinated to the NCMD, and these forces are to be reduced by 70 per cent. 118. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 January 1997, p. 3. 119. See comments of the General Staff’s ‘peacekeeping’ commander, Lieutenant-General Arinakhin, Itar-Tass, 4 April 1997, SU/2886, F/3. See also Nikolai Staskov, in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 April 1997, p. 3. 120. Since 1995, Georgian GDP has increased by 8 per cent and industrial output by 10 per cent. The lari has also started to hold firmly against the US dollar. See discussion in Elizabeth Fuller (1997), ‘Georgia Stabilizes’, Transition, (7 February), pp. 2–3. 121. RFE/RL Newsline (vol. 2, No. 42, 3 March 1998).

7 Russian Strategy towards Tajikistan

1. M. J. Orr (1996) The Russian Army and the War in Tajikistan (February), pp. 6–7. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Aleksandr Belkin from the CFDP argued that the ‘Afghan platoon’ in the MoD sought initially to deliver a devastating first strike. After this failed to produce stability, the MoD sought to avoid further engage- ment in the conflict. 2. On the background, see K. Martin (1993), ‘Tajikistan: Civil War Without End?’, RFE/RL RR (20 August), pp. 18–29; and R. Dannreuther (1993) Creating New States in Central Asia. For Russian accounts, see A. Malashenko and A. Niafu, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3 March 1993, p. 3; Vitaly Naumkin, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 July 1993, pp. 1, 3; and also Sharam Akbarzadeh (1996) ‘Why did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?’, Europe–Asia Studies (no. 7), pp. 1105–29. 3. See the discussion in Iver Neumann and Sergei Solodovnik (1996) ‘The Case of Tajikistan’, in Peacekeeping and Russia’s Role in Eurasia, p. 85. 4. See the discussion in Marlan Makhramov (1994) ‘Islam and Political Development of Tajikistan after 1985’, in Hafeez Malik, Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, pp. 195–209. The Garmis are traditionally more Islamic than other regions. 5. See Marlan Makhramov and M. Atkin (1994) ‘The Politics of Polarization in Tajikistan’, in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, pp. 211–31. 6. The autonomy of this region has been related to its flourishing drug busi- ness and traffic; see Yevgeny Krutikov, New Times, August 1996, pp. 43–5. 7. On Turajonzoda’s background, see Martha Brill Olcott (1995) ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, in Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, p. 30. 8. The Islamic opposition changed its name in 1995 to the United Opposition Movement in Tajikistan (UTO), in an attempt to broaden its appeal to the population of Badakhshan and other regions. 9. ‘Opposition’ refers to the Islamic and democratic forces, while ‘gov- ernment’ forces refers to first pro-Nabyev and then pro-Rakhmonov conservative forces. 228 Notes and References to Chapter 7

10. According to the report of the CIS Conference on refugees in May 1996, by late 1995, nearly all the 600 000 internally displaced refugees and 43 000 of the refugees in Afghanistan had returned to their homes. Moreover, a reported 50 000 Tajiks of Uzbek origin fled to Uzbekistan, at least 3000 of Kyrgyz origin went to Kyrgyzstan, and 20 000 of Turkmen origin fled to Turkmenistan. Reported in R. Colville (1994) After the Soviet Union (New York: UNHCR, no. IV), p. 26. Substantial numbers of Garmis fled to the Pamir highlands. 11. Yevgeny Krutikov estimated that 500 000 have been lost in combat, New Times, August 1996. 12. Muriel Atkin (1994) ‘The Politics of Polarization in Tajikistan’, in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, pp. 211–31. 13. M. Makhramov (1994) ‘Islamic and Political Developments in Tajikistan since 1985’, in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects; and Allen Hetmanek (1993), Central Asia Survey (12–3), pp. 65–78. 14. Ivan Sevastianov, International Affairs, August 1996, p. 177. At the same time, Sevastianov argued that Russia should not become a ‘crusader’ against such extremism as this would hold back Russian development. See also Dmitry Volkov on the potential threat to world stability, New Times, January 1994, pp. 24–6. 15. Point made by Shirin Akiner (1993) Central Asia: A New Arc of Crisis? (London: RUSI). 16. Vitaly Naumkin (1995) ‘Russia and the States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus’, in Damage Limitation or Crisis?, p. 213. 17. See Jane’s Sentinel: Russia and the CIS (1996), p. 9–10–1. 18. See, for example, accounts by Boris Vinogradov, Izvestiya, 19 February and 23 June 1993. 19. Semyan Bogdasanov, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniya, 22 April 1995, p. 1–2. See also detailed accounts by Yevgeny Krutikov, New Times, August 1996. 20. These units have maintained neutrality within the conflict, allowing the armed opposition to remain within the region. Russian forces have attempted to avoid antagonizing these units. 21. The 201st MRD consisted of the 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) in Kulyab, the 191th MRR in Kurgan-Tyube, the 92 MRR, 410th Tank Regiment and 998th Artillery Regiment in Dushanbe. Air support has been provided by Russian Air Force units on short tours from bases in Russia. See Orr (1996), p. 4. There were numerous inci- dents of intervention in the conflict by units of the 201st MRD in mid- 1992 in the south, which may be explained by the local make-up of conscripts. 22. Interview in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 January–1 February 1994. 23. Estimate provided by the Centre for Political and International Studies (Moscow) in ‘Operations Involving the Use of the Armed Forces’, May 1995. 24. Russian Border Troops have had five detachments on the border with command posts in the Pyanzh, Moskovsky (Kurgan-Tyube), Kalai- Khumb, Khorog and Mugrab (Badakhshan) districts. The HQ is in Notes and References to Chapter 7 229

Dushanbe, from where reserve forces and air regiments have operated (air assault forces). 25. Interfax, 15 February 1995, SU/2230, G/1–2. 26. See Editorial Report, SU/2141, G/2–3, 1 November 1994. 27. The officer cadre has been under particular stress. According to M. Orr (1996) only 58 replacements were found in 1994 for 74 departing officers: The Russian Army and the War in Tajikistan, p. 5. See a per- sonal account of terrible conditions of service on the border in I. Ryabov, New Times, August 1994, pp. 9–11. 28. It must be noted that the border defence system is weak, with Russian troops lacking in fortification infrastructure and mobile capabilities. Moreover, the training of locals in the border troops has been ineffec- tive. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Zardiev Kurdonovich, Political Secretary at the Tajik Embassy to Russia, noted that supply problems to Russian forces had induced these troops to become involved in the drugs and arms trade: ‘They also have to live’. 29. Cited in Ahmed Rashid (1994) The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Zed Brooks), p. 39. 30. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 October 1992, pp. 1, 4–5. 31. Andrannik Migranyan, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 January 1994. 32. See the discussion of Shelov-Kovedyaev’s ‘Russia in the New Abroad: Strategy and Tactics for Safeguarding National Interests’ in John Lough (1993) Defining Russia’s Role in the ‘Near Abroad’, SSRC, (April). 33. Novoye Vremya, 14 August 1992 in FBIS, 11 September 1992, p. 31. 34. Vladimir Lukin (1992), Foreign Policy, p. 71. 35. Colonel S. Pechorov and Lieutenant-Colonel Y. Tegin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 April 1992, p. 3. 36. Anatoly Ladin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 26 September 1992, p. 2. 37. See Yury V. Gankovsky (1994) ‘Russia’s Relations with the Central Asian States since the Dissolution of the Soviet Union’, in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, p. 118. 38. Interview with Shelov-Kovedyaev in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 July 1992. 39. See Kazak Radio programme, Almaty, 3 September 1992, SU/1478, C1/1. 40. Interfax, 6 October 1992, SU/1505, i. 41. See the statement by the Deputy C-in-C of Russian Ground Forces, Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev, Interfax, 2 October 1992, SU/1502, B/1–2. According to Dmitry Trenin, in an interview with the author in January 1997, the MoD wanted to withdraw the 201st MRD because of resource and supply difficulties. 42. KazTag, Almaty, 6 November 1992, SU/1533, B8–9. 43. KazTag, Almaty, 4 November 1992, SU/1531, B/8. The ‘Almaty Committee’ also called on the 201st MRD to protect the civilian popu- lation and important facilities, as the basis for a possible CIS operation; Igor Rotar, Nezavismaya Gazeta, 6 November 1992, p. 1. 44. Itar-Tass, 8 December 1992, SU/1560, B/5. 45. Cited in O. Panfilov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 April 1993, p. 3. 46. Reports by the Russian Migration Service stated that, of the 388 000- strong Russian diaspora in Tajikistan, some 300 000 had left by mid- 1993. See I. Rotar Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 April 1993, p. 3. 230 Notes and References to Chapter 7

47. Interfax, 8 October 1992, SU/1507, B/2. 48. See, for example, comments by Border Troops Commander, Lieutenant-General G. A. Chechulin, on Ostankino, Ch. 1 TV pro- gramme, Moscow, 3 August 1993, SU/1760, C1/1–2. 49. Cited in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7 May 1993, CDPSP (18–93), p. 29. 50. Colonel D. A. Afinogenov (1993) ‘Military Questions of Russia’s Security’, Voennaya Mysl’ (February) JPRS UMT-93-005-1, pp. 6–9. 51. Colonel-General A. A. Danilevich and Colonel Y. Tikhomirov (1993) Voennaya Mysl’ (February) JPRS UMT-93-005-L, pp. 9–14. 52. See Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 January 1993; and Maksim Yushin, Izvestiya, 14 April 1993. 53. Itar-Tass, 2 December 1992, SU/1554, B/2–3. 54. Security Minister Viktor Barannikov, SU/1629, C2/2–3, 1 March 1993; and Itar-Tass, 27 April 1993, SU/1675, B/5. The border systems were also mined; V. Litovkin, Izvestiya, 8 September 1993, p. 1. 55. Oleg Falichev, Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 February 1993, p. 3. 56. Cited in Vera Kuznetsova, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 May 1993, in CDPSP (21–93), p. 16. 57. MFA statement, 30 May 1993 reported in Izvestiya, 23 June 1993, CDPSP (25–29), pp. 19–20. 58. Tajik Prime Minister Abdullajanov in Moscow in late February report- edly secured 40 billion roubles in loans, a six-month 80 billion-rouble technical credit and 2.5M tons of oil products; Itar-Tass, 27 February 1993, SU/1626, B/10–11. 59. Ostankino TV programme, Moscow, 30 May 1993, SU/1703, B/5–9. 60. Dmitry Trenin, Novoye Vremya (8–12 June 1993) JPRS UMA-93-024, pp. 22–6. 61. In the Security Council meeting that was convened after the July attack, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, then Secretary, presented three options for Russian policy: a complete Russian withdrawal; pre-emptive Russian strikes into Afghanistan; or an increased Russian and CIS military pres- ence. The latter option was adopted. 62. ‘Resolution on the Terms, Presence, Composition and Tasks of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Republic of Tajikistan, 15 April 1994. These forces were to contribute to the normalization of the situ- ation on the border and create the conditions for political dialogue. A six-month mandate was set up. The joint command of the CPKF was clearly detailed, with a Commander, Chief of Staff and Administrative Staff. The Commander was given leeway to use force in case of need on the ground. The mandate set up in September 1993 did not specifically refer to Tajikistan. 63. See the account of CIS Defence Ministers’ summit in Ashgebat, by Aleksandr Pelts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 December 1993. 64. Mayak Radio programme, Moscow, 21 November 1993, SU/1854, G/1. 65. Editorial Report, 22–23 March 1994, SU/1955, G/4. 66. See the discussion in A. Raevsky and I. Vorobyev (1994) Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations, pp. 44–61. 67. See Lena Jonson (1997) The Tajik Civil War: A Challenge to Russian Policy Discussion paper (London: RIIA, Discussion Paper). Notes and References to Chapter 7 231

68. See the discussion in Michael Orr (1996) The Russian Army and the War in Tajikistan, p. 6. 69. Presidential Decree, 27 July, Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 July 1993. 70. See the discussion in UN Peace-keeping Information Notes, December 1994, p. 236, UNMOT at that time had offices in Dushanbe, Tavildara, Kurgan-Tyube, Pyandzha, and later in Garm and Vanj. By May 1996, it consisted of sixty-nine personnel. These were reduced in early 1997 after a rash of kidnappings. 71. An OSCE Mission to Tajikistan was created in February 1994, but fact- finding missions had been sent there before. In general, the UN has been more active in this process. Liviu Bota was Head of Mission until March 1995, when Darko Silovic was appointed. 72. See CIS documents adopted in 1996 and discussion in Lena Jonson (1996) ‘In Search of a Doctrine: Russian Interventionism in Conflicts in its “Near Abroad”’, Low Intensity Operations and Law Enforcement (Winter), pp. 440–65. 73. Itar-Tass, 26 July 1993, SU/1753, C3/1. 74. Kozyrev was first appointed to chair this commission, later followed by Anatoly Adamishin. 75. Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 4 August 1993. 76. Ostankino TV progamme, Moscow, 11 February 1995, SU/2228, A/3–7. 77. Itar-Tass, 4 April 1995, SU/2272, G/2–3. 78. Arkady Dubnov (1996) ‘Tadjikistan’ in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Pain (eds), US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force (Washington DC: RAND), pp. 31–56. 79. Rakhmonov and Nuri met in May 1995 in Kabul, which paved the way for the fourth round in Almaty under UN auspices, with observers from Iran, Afghanistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia and Uzbekistan. This round resulted in an agreement on POW exchanges and an appeal for the voluntary and safe return of refugees. In August 1995, after Rakhmonov and Nuri met again in Tehran, a protocol was reached providing for continuous talks between the two sides. See the account of talks in Moscow in April, Diplomatichesky Vestnik (No. 9–10/94), p. 58; and consultations in Tehran, Diplomatichesky Vestnik (19–20/94), pp. 35–6. 80. See accounts of further rounds in Moscow, Diplomatichesky Vestnik (May 1995), pp. 38–9; and Ashgebat, in Itar-Tass, 30 November 1995, SU/2476, G/1–2. 81. Diplomatichesky Vestnik (March 1996), p. 38. 82. Lowell Bezanis (1996), ‘An Enlarged Golden Crescent’, Transition, (20 September) see also Keeley Lange on the involvement of Russian border troops in this traffic: ‘When Druglords are Warlords’, Transition, (20 September 1996). See also Yevgeny Krutikov on the importance of drugs in Badakhshan, New Times (August 1996). See also Grigory Sanin, Segodnya, 14 August 1996, p. 7. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Zardiev Kurdonovich, Political Secretary at the Tajik Embassy to Russia, underlined the splitting of Tajikistan into ‘mini states’ based around local militias and criminal groupings. 232 Notes and References to Chapter 7

83. Peace talks were set back in July 1994, after the Tajik Supreme Soviet announced plans for a referendum on a new constitution. Only Rakhmonov and Abdullojanov were allowed to run in the presidential elections. 84. Leonid Velekhov, Segodnya, 20 April 1995, p. 5. 85. See Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 April 1995, p. 1. 86. Itar-Tass, 26 April 1995, SU/2289, B/10. General Chechulin affirmed that the border troops ‘act in Tajikistan under the inter-state treaty of May 1993 on the joint protection of the Tajik-Afghan border’. 87. Itar-Tass, 28 March 1995, SU/2266, S1/2. 88. Interfax, 23 November 1995, SU/2470, G/2–3. 89. Reportedly, 85 per cent of the population participated in the February 1995 parliamentary elections. Rakhmonov, from Kulyab, won the presi- dential election in November 1994 over Abdullo Abdullajanov, from Leninabad, reinforcing Kulyabi control of Dushanbe; see Yury Golotyuk, Segodnya, 9 November 1994, p. 5. 90. Interfax, 1 February 1996, SU/2526, G/3–4. Rakhmonov admitted that Tajikistan was unlikely to become a Western-style democracy in a hundred years; Dmitry Zhdannikov, Segodnya, 28 February 1995, p. 1. 91. See the discussion in Bruce Pannier (1996), ‘Weathering Another Storm of Violence’, Transition (8 March), pp. 36–8. 92. See Said Amir, Segodnya, 9 February 1996, p. 7. 93. These demonstrations also contested Rakhmonov’s Kulyabi-dominated government. Rakhmonov was forced to replace the Kulyabis in the northern administration; see Said Amir, Segodnya, 24 May 1996, p. 8. See also Sanobar Shermatova, Moskovskiye Novosti, 4–11 February 1996, and Mikhail Lantsman, Segodnya, 16 May 1996. 94. See the account by Yevgeny Krutikov, New Times, August 1996, on developments in the fighting; see also Vitaly Strugovets, Krasnaya Zvezda 14 June 1996, p. 3. 95. These advances stimulated refugees flows into central Tajikistan. At the same time, demonstrations continued in areas west of Dushanbe: Interfax, 11 August 1996, SU/2689, G/1. 96. Russian border troops reached an agreement to create an exclusion zone with Afghan forces across the border in the northern regions con- trolled by General R. Dostam. However, this zone was only 140 km long. Another protocol was signed between Russian border troops and the Command of the Afghan 6th Army Corps. 97. Interfax, 12 April 1995, SU/2271, G/3. 98. See Lieutenant-General Nikolai Demidyuk, Itar-Tass, 27 July 1995, SU/2368, S1/1. The MoD announced that another 70 advisers were to be sent: Interfax, 26 November 1996, SU/2782, S1/2. 99. Itar-Tass, 31 March 1994, SU/1963, G/2. Nikolaev had noted the possibil- ity of constructing another border on the Orenburg–Chelyabinsk–Omsk line; Vladimir Ermelianenko, Moskovskiye Novosti, 13–20 October 1996, p. 8. Nikolaev also raised the possibility of reducing Russian border troops in Tajikistan. 100. See the account by Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 20 April 1995, p. 2. 101. Interfax, 12 April 1995, SU/2271, G/3. Notes and References to Chapter 7 233

102. The tension between the MoD and the RFBS reflected the struggle occurring in Moscow for scarce resources, as well as Grachev’s attempts at that point to assume policy-making control of this independent service. 103. Itar-Tass, 30 April 1995, SU/2292, G/6. At a Security Council meeting on 13 July 1994, Grachev argued that ‘a state cannot have two armies’ calling for MoD control of the Border Troops. See the discussion in Amy Knight (1996) Spies without Cloaks, The KGB’s Successors, p. 146. 104. RIA news agency, 14 April 1995, SU/2279, B/17–18. 105. Interfax, 13 April 1995, SU/2279, B/17; and Anatoly Ladin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 April 1995, p. 2. 106. Interfax, 1 February 1996, SU/2525, G/4. 107. Vitaly Strugovets, Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 January 1996, p. 2. 108. Interfax, 29 January 1996, SU/2523, B/10. 109. See accounts of Primakov’s activities in Sanobar Shermatova, Moskovskiye Novosti (Nos. 22 and 29, 1996). See also Leonid Velekhov, Segodnya, 12 July and 30 July 1996. Since 1995, President Karimov argued that the Russian government and Yeltsin formulated policy towards Tajikistan on the basis of false data and disinformation. Primakov’s appointment, with his background in Middle Eastern pol- itics, seems to have changed this situation. 110. In February 1997, Rakhmonov and Nuri reached further agreements on joint actions against illegal armed groups in Tajikistan, and on the com- position of the National Reconciliation Council (26 seats each). In early March, the two sides also agreed on the gradual integration of opposi- tion units within the Tajik armed forces. 111. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Aleksandr Belkin noted that this debate remained at the elite level, there being very little popular controversy over Russian policy. Still, a poll conducted by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Studies in January 1997 found that 50 per cent of respondents favoured a Russian withdrawal from Tajikistan (total polled 1600); see Inside Central Asia, 27 January–2 February 1997, p. 2. 112. Interview in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 July 1993. 113. Cited in Aleksandr Golts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 November 1993, SU/1860, S1/1–2; and Igor Rotar, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 November 1993, pp. 1, 3. 114. Moskovskiye Novosti, 6–13 October 1996, p. 9. Gromov compared the Tajik opposition in Afghanistan with the Afghan opposition in Pakistan in the 1980s. 115. Novoye Vremya, July 1993, JPRS-UMA-93-031, pp. 42–5. 116. Moskovskiye Novosti, 8 August, p. 10. 117. Aleksei Arbatov, in Damage Limitaton or Crisis?, pp. 55–76. S. Kovalev argued that Russian support to Rakhmonov undermined Russia’s author- ity as a democratic state; cited in Moskovskiye Novosti, 14 February 1993, p. 12A. 118. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 January 1994, pp. 4, 5, 8. 119. Segodnya, 16 August 1996, p. 9. Arkady Dubnov has also argued against relying on Rakhmonov: New Times, February 1996, p. 44. 234 Notes and References to Chapter 8

120. Cited in Hill and Jewett, (1994) Back to the USSR, p. 44. 121. Inside Central Asia (22–28 July 1996), p. 2. 122. Anatoly Ladin, et al., Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 April 1995, p. 1. 123. Interfax, 25 May 1995, SU/2316, G/4. 124. Yury Golotyuk, Segodnya, 31 October 1996, p. 1. 125. See border troop complaints to the Tajik government because of short- ages in call-ups in mid-1995; Interfax, 4 July 1995, SU/2348, G/1. 126. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Zardiev Kurdonovich stated that ‘Russia willy-nilly will support the Tajik government’, under- lining the central weakness in Russian strategy. 127. For the texts of two agreements, see Tajik Radio 1st programme, 24 December 1996, SU/2885, G/1–2. Following these, a cease-fire has held within Tajikistan and POW exchange started. Further talks were held in Tehran to determine the composition of the reconciliation body. For details of opposition, government and ‘National Revival’ bloc views, see Igor Rotar, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 January 1997, p. 3. 128. See Bruce Pannier (1997) ‘Defining the Third Force’, Transition (21 March), pp. 42–5. 129. Radio Afghanistan programme, Kabul, 1 September 1996, SU/2707, G/1.

8 Conclusions

1. Vadim Solovei described the situation: ‘This will be an empire of a new type, a “velvet empire”, based on the financial, economic and military dependence of the former Soviet republic on Russia, and, because of this, ensuring Russian political hegemony in the post Soviet ‘space’. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 February 1995, pp. 1, 2. 2. A term used by Andrei Kortunov (1995) The New Russia: Troubled Transformation, p. 73. 3. Andrei Bogaturov argued in 1993 that Russia had to adopt policies dif- ferentiated according to region in order to extend Russian influence in a subtle manner. Economic and moral measures were to be used against the Baltic states, while a limited use of force was called for in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia; International Affairs (Moscow, 2/93), pp. 32–44. 4. Itar-Tass, 5 February 1993, SU/1608, B/8–9. 5. Itar-Tass, 4 March 1994, SU/1940, D/2. 6. Itar-Tass, 31 March 1993, SU/1653, B/8. 7. Georgian TV programme, 3 February 1994, SU/1914, S1/3–7. 8. Georgian Radio programme, 7 February 1994, SU/1918, F2–6. 9. Interfax, 13 April 1993, SU/1668, B/17. 10. Ostankino Ch.1 TV programme, 25 May 1993, SU/1699, B/1. 11. Kozyrev (1994) Foreign Affairs (May/June), p. 63. 12. Paul Kennedy (1988) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 539. 13. Colonel-General Kondratyev, Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 February 1994. 14. The geopolitical view has been questioned by Aleksei Arbatov, who has argued that such thinking is not appropriate for the end of the twentieth Notes and References to Chapter 8 235

century, when economic power is crucial; see New Times, November 1995, pp. 46–9. A. V. Torkhunov, from MGIMO, has also criticized ‘rivalry politics’, as divergent from the creation of a competitive and open economy; International Affairs (Moscow, 2/96), pp. 1–26. 15. ‘Upholding National Interests’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 13 May 1998. 16. Hedley Bull (1984) Intervention in World Politics, p. 1. 17. Charles Dobbie (1993) ‘A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping’, Survival, pp. 142–3. 18. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995), ‘Democratization and War’, Foreign Affairs (vol. 74, no. 3), pp. 88–9. 19. See interview in New Times, August 1996, pp. 23–5. 20. In an interview with the author in January 1997, Pavel Kandel, from the Institute of Europe, underlined that, in contrast to the US operation in Haiti, ‘Russia is there [in these conflict zones] but cannot control the situation’. 21. Fostering separatism as it did in 1992–3 was also a dangerous strategy for the new Russian state, which is based on asymmetrical federalism. It is notable that, during the Chechen war, the Russian government shifted away from supporting such developments. 22. Of course, these separatist enclaves remain as potential instruments of Russian suasion against the Moldovan and Georgian central govern- ments if these waver in their acceptance of the Russian ‘compulsion of necessity’. 23. MacFarlane (1985) makes a similar point, arguing that intervention usually occurs in response to ‘catalytic events in the target state, to sudden changes in the fortunes of local allies and in the type and level of involvement of other external actors’; Intervention and Regional Security (Adelphi Paper No. 196), p. 24. 24. Pavel K. Baev (1996) made this point cogently: ‘The Chechen war indeed came as a natural product of Russia’s self-assertive political course which had converted conflict management into a tool for applying pressure. Quite characteristically, the whole intervention which soon escalated into a full-scale war was presented as merely yet another ‘peace operation’ aimed at disarming ‘illegal formations’ and restoring constitutional order … What is less obvious about this connection is that the Chechen war was not so much a consequence of the military pattern of peacekeeping, as a result of the inability to maintain this pattern’; The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, p. 148. 25. Ibid., p. 143. However, there are several indications that the MoD expected that the intervention might not be immediately successful and might require additional troops. As was pointed out to the author by M. J. Orr, Russian military districts received mobilization orders in mid-December 1994. This does not take away from the MoD’s hope that the initial intervention might effectively reach its limited objectives of recapturing the Chechen lowlands and Grozny, while forcing the armed opposition to withdraw to the mountainous areas. See also New Times report from the NCMD, June 1996, p. 38. 26. Ibid., p. 144. 236 Notes and References to Chapter 8

27. Interfax, 10 July 1997, SU/2971, S1/1. 28. Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan (eds) (1978) Force Without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution), pp. 517–8. Select Bibliography

This select bibliography offers further references to the reader in addition to the notes in the text. It is divided into six parts: foreign policy; security policy; peacekeeping and intervention; the Moldovan–Dnestr conflict; the Georgia–Abkhazia conflict; and the Tajik conflict. Despite some overlap, I hope this categorization will make the bibliography more accessible. Each of these categories is also divided into subsections: (i) secondary sources; and (ii) primary sources. In this bibliography, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Research Reports will be referred to as RFE/RL RR. The Joint Publications Research Service Report, Soviet Union, Military Affairs (after 1991, Central Eurasia, Military Affairs) will be noted as JPRS-UMA. The documents contained within the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Soviet Union will be noted as FBIS-SOV. Articles from Current Digest of the Soviet Press (from 1992 – Post-Soviet Press) will be referred to as CDPSP. Papers published by the Conflict Studies Research Centre (before 1992, the Soviet Studies Research Centre) at Sandhurst will be noted as CSRC. Not included in this short bibliography are references from the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB SU), which are noted in the endnotes to each chapter. Moreover, this book drew on several research trips to Russia, and to Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia where numerous interviews were conducted. The details of some of the interviews are noted in the endnotes.

Foreign Policy

Primary Sources Diplomatichesky Vestnik (1992) ‘Russian Foreign Policy Strategy towards the Near Abroad, 6 October 1992’ (21–22/92), pp. 38–61. Diplomatichesky Vestnik (1994) ‘Speech of A. Kozyrev to 47th Session of UN GA, 22 September 1994’, (19–20/94), pp. 18–20. Diplomatichesky Vestnik (1996) ‘Presidential Decree of Council of Foreign Policy Under President, 26 December 1995’ (no. 2 (February), pp. 6–8. International Affairs (1993) ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept’ (Moscow, 1/93), pp. 14–16. International Affairs (1995) ‘Fate of Russian-Speaking Population of CIS and the Baltic Countries, 18 April, 1995’ (Moscow, 6/95), pp. 107–124. Abarinov, Vladimir, (1994) ‘Russia Does Not Require Permission for Peacekeeping in the CIS’, Segodnya (6 April), p. 1. Arbatov, A. (1996) ‘Russia’s New Role in World Politics’, New Times (March), pp. 46–9. Adamishin, Anatoly (1994) ‘CIS Integration’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, (12 November), pp. 1, 3. Chernov, Vladislav (1993) ‘Russia’s National Interests and Threats to Its Security’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (29 April), pp. 1, 3.

237 238 Select Bibliography

Dzhanashya, Vakhtang (1993) ‘Kozyrev: We Have the Means to Defend our National State Interests’, Segodnya (23 November), p. 1. Elagin, Vyacheslav (1994) ‘Russian Military Presence – Legal Status’, Segodnya (2 March), p. 3. Felgengauer, Pavel (1995) ‘MoD Conquered the MFA’, Segodnya, (31 May) p. 3. Gavrilenko, Vladimir (1994) ‘Near Abroad Was, Is and Will Be a Zone of Vital Russian Interests’, Krasnaya Zvezda (20 January), p. 1. Golts, Aleksandr (1992) ‘There is One Ideology for our Foreign Policy – Russian Interests’, Krasnaya Zvezda (28 October), p. 1. Golts, Aleksandr (1994) ‘New Monroe Doctrine or Defence of Legitimate Interests’, Krasnaya Zvezda (1 October), p. 2. Golts, Aleksandr (1996) ‘Russian Diplomacy’, Krasnaya Zvezda (16 January), p. 3. Karaganov, Sergei (1993) ‘After the USSR – A Quest for Strategy’, Krasnaya Zvezda (17 February), pp. 2, 3. Karaganov, Sergei (1995) ‘Let Us Remember Neo-Gaulism’, Moskovskiye Novosti, no. 47 (9–16 July), p. 5. Karaganov, S. (1996) ‘Problems to be Faced by Primakov’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (18 January), p. 2. Karpov, Mikhail (1992) ‘Great and Unique Russia – Great and Unique Foreign Policy’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (28 October), pp. 1, 2. Kozyrev, Andrei (1992a) ‘Russia: A Chance for Survival’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2 (Spring), pp. 1–17. Kozyrev, Andrei (1992b) ‘The War Party Is On the Offensive’, Izvestiya (30 June), p. 3. Kozyrev, Andrei (1993a) ‘Partnership in Establishing Peace’, Segodnya (6 June), p. 3. Kozyrev, Andrei (1993b) ‘World After the Cold War: Democracy or Chaos?’, Segodnya (7 October), p. 3. Kozyrev, Andrei (1994a) ‘The State Military Doctrine and International Security’, Krasnaya Zvezda, (14 January), pp. 3, 4. Kozyrev, Andrei (1994b) ‘The Lagging Partnership’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 3 (May/June), pp. 59–71. Kozyrev, Andrei (1994c) ‘A Strategy for Partnership’, International Affairs (Moscow, 8/94), pp. 3–13. Kozyrev, Andrei (1995a) ‘Non Festive Reflections on UN Jubilee’, International Affairs (Moscow, 3/95), pp. 7–15. Kozyrev, Andrei (1995b) ‘Speech to Russian Ambassadors to CIS, Moscow, 6–7 July, 1995’, Diplomatichesky Vestnik, no. 8 (August), pp. 22–6. Kozyrev, Andrei (1995c) ‘Speech to the 50th Session, UN General Assembly’, Diplomatichesky Vestnik no. 10 (October), pp. 49–51. Leonov, Yury (1993) ‘Good Concept but Doubtfully Practical’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (20 February), p. 4. Portnikov, Vitaly (1994) ‘Burbulis Doctrine or Kozyrev Doctrine?’, Nezavisimiya Gazeta (5 October), p. 3. Povoskov, Lt Col. N. (1992) ‘Russian Foreign Policy Requires Firmness and Flexibility’, Krasnaya Zvezda (26 June), p. 1. Select Bibliography 239

Pozdniakov, Elgiz (1992) ‘The Geopolitical Collapse and Russia’, International Affairs (Moscow, 9/92), pp. 3–12. Primakov, Yevgeny (1996a) ‘Press Conference of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 12 January 1996’, Diplomatichesky Vestnik, no. 2 (February), pp. 3–6. Primakov, Yevgeny (1996b) ‘Speech to UN General Assembly’, Krasnaya Zvezda, (26 September). Primakov, Yevgeny (1996c) ‘On the Horizon – A Multipolar World’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (22 October), pp. 1, 5. Shermatova, Sanobar and Arkady Mikadze (1995) ‘Minister of Defence in Role of Minister for Foreign Affairs’, Moskovskiye Novosti, no. 21 (26 March–2 April), p. 10. Stankevich, Sergei (1992a) ‘A Power in Search for Itself’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (28 March) , p. 4. Stankevich, Sergei (1992b) ‘Russia Has Already Made an Anti-Imperial Choice’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (6 November), p. 2. Velekhov, Leonid (1994) ‘Kozyrev Demands Support for Russian Peacekeeping Efforts’, Segodnya, (2 December), p. 1. Volsky, Vladimir (1993) ‘Russian Policy Between Scilla and Charybdis’, New Times (33/93), p. 26. Yeltsin, B. N. (1995) ‘Speech to the General Assembly’, Krasnaya Zvezda (24 October), p. 1. Yeltsin, B. N. (1998) ‘Upholding National Interests’, Rossiskaya Gazeta (13 May). Zagorsky, Andrei (1993) ‘The Commonwealth: One Year On’, International Affairs (Moscow, 2/93), pp. 45–93. Zagorsky, Andrei (1994) ‘Russia, the CIS and the West’, International Affairs, (Moscow, 12/94), pp. 65–72.

Secondary Sources Arbatov, Aleksei G. (1993) ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives’, International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, (Fall), pp. 5–42. Aron, Leon and Kenneth M. Jensen (eds) (1994) The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press). Blackwill, Robert D. and Sergei Karaganov (eds) (1994) Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World, CSIA Studies in International Security No. 5 (London: Brassey’s). Blank, Stephen (1995) ‘Russia’s Real Drive to the South’, Orbis, Journal of World Affairs, vol. 39, no. 3, (Summer), pp. 369–86. Bremmer, Ian and Ray Taras (eds) (1993) Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (Cambridge University Press). Brusstar, James H. (1994) ‘Russian Vital Interests and Western Security’, Orbis, Journal of World Affairs, vol. 38, no. 4 (Fall), pp. 607–19. Crow, Suzanne (1992) ‘Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 1, no. 50 (18 December), pp. 45–50. Crow, Suzanne (1993a) ‘Processes and Policies’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 2, no. 20 (14 May), pp. 47–52. 240 Select Bibliography

Crow, Suzanne (1993b) ‘Russia Asserts its Strategic Agenda’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 2, no. 50 (17 December) pp. 1–8. Crow, Suzanne (1993c) The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia under Yeltsin (Munich: RFE/RL Institute). Crow, Suzanne (1994) ‘Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 3, no. 11 (March), pp. 33–8. Hauner, Milan (1992) What is Asia to Us? Russia’s Heartland Yesterday and Today (London: Routledge). Jackson, William D. (1994) ‘Imperial Temptations: Ethnics Abroad’, Orbis, Journal of World Affairs, vol. 38, no. 1 (Winter), pp. 1–17. Karaganov, S. A. (1992) Russia: The New Foreign Policy and Security Agenda, A View From Moscow, London Defence Studies No. 12 (London: Brassey’s). Kipp, Jacob (1994) Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky and the LDP: Statism, Nationalism and Imperialism, CSRC, RMA Sandhurst and Foreign Military Studies Offices, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, (June). Lough, John (1993a) The Place of Russia’s ‘Near Abroad’, SSRC, RMA Sandhurst, RMA, F-32 (January). Lough, John (1993b) Defining Russia’s Role in the ‘Near Abroad’, SSRC, RMA, Sandhurst, F-33 (April). Lough, John (1993c) Russia’s Influence in the ‘Near Abroad’: Problems and Prospects, SSRC, RMA Sandhurst, F-34 (August). Lukin, Vladimir (1992) ‘Our Security Predicament’, Foreign Policy, no. 88 (Fall), pp. 58–71. Lynch, Allen (1994) ‘After Empire: Russia and its Western Neighbors’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 3, no. 12 (25 March), pp. 11–4. Malcolm, Neil (1994) ‘New Russian Foreign Policy’, The World Today, vol. 50, no. 2 (February), pp. 29–32. Malcolm, Neil, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light (1996) Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (RIIA/Oxford University Press). Nevers, Renée de (1994) Russia’s Strategic Renovation: Russian Security Strategies and Foreign Policy in the Post-Imperial Era Adelphi Paper No. 289 International Institute for Strategic Studies, (July). Parrish, Scott (1996) ‘Chaos in Foreign Policy Decision Making’, Transition, vol. 2, no. 10 (17 May), pp. 30–32, 64. Parrott, Bruce and Karen Dawisha (1994) Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (Cambridge University Press). Pushkov, Aleksei (1993/4) ‘Letter from Eurasia: Russia and America, The Honeymoon’s Over’, Foreign Policy, no. 93 (Winter), pp. 76–90. Sestanovich, Stephen (ed.) (1994) Rethinking Russia’s National Interests (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies). Shearman, Peter (1995) Russian Foreign Policy since 1990 (Boulder CO: Westview Press). Smith, Mark (1993) Pax Russica: Russia’s Monroe Doctrine, Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall Paper Series. Wallander, Celeste A. (ed.) (1996) The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Boulder CO: Westview Press). Select Bibliography 241 Security Policy

Primary Sources Krasnaya Zvezda, (1994) ‘Prospects for CIS Development and the Position of the West’, (28 September), p. 3, Summary of the FIS Report ‘Russia and the CIS: Is an Adjustment of the West’s Position Necessary?’ Diplomatichesky Vestnik (1995) ‘Declaration of the Members States of the Collective Security Treaty, 10 February 1995’, no. 3 (March), pp. 33–4. Belkov, Col. O. A. (1993) ‘Ethno-political Factors of Military Security in the CIS’, Voennaya Mysl’, no. 7, JPRS-UMT-93-010-L, pp. 7–11. Falichev, Oleg (1994) ‘Russian Interests in the Near Abroad: Where to Establish the Border Now?’, Krasnaya Zvezda (2 March), p. 1. Falichev, Oleg and Aleksandr Ivanov (1996) ‘Russia Will Remain a Great Power If It Preserves Its Military Might’, Krasnaya Zvezda (25 July), p. 1. Felgengauer, Pavel (1995) ‘No Professional Army in Sight for Russia’, Segodnya (4 May), p. 2. Felgengauer, Pavel (1996) ‘Increasing Tension in Defence Council’, Segodnya (12 November), p. 1. Gareev, M. G. (1992) ‘Does Russia Have its Own Interests?,’ Krasnaya Zvezda (26 February), p. 3. Getmarenko, D. (1993) ‘Russian Military Doctrine: New Understanding of National Security,’ Krasnaya Zvezda (4 November), pp. 1, 3. Golotyuk, Yury (1994) ‘Defence Ministries Attempt to Put Out Hot Spots’, Segodnya (19 July), p. 1. Grachev, Pavel (1993) ‘Russian Blue Helmets’, Krasnaya Zvezda (7 May). Grachev, Pavel (1995) ‘Our Military Doctrine May Be Revised’, Krasnaya Zvezda (1 November), p. 3. Ivashov, Leonid (1994) ‘From Disintegration to Unity: Commonwealth Collective Security’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (6 July), pp. 1, 3. Kobets, Konstantin (1992) ‘Russian Military Priorities’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (5 February), p. 2. Kolesnikov, M. P. (1996) ‘Military Reform and the Development of the Armed Forces’, Krasnaya Zvezda (25 May), pp. 1, 3. Kuzyar, Vladimir (1996) ‘First Meeting of Defence Council’, Krasnaya Zvezda (5 October), p. 1. Litovkin, Viktor (1993) ‘Shaposhnikov Unsatisfied with Talks on Collective Security’, Izvestiya (29 May), p. 5. Lyasko, Aleksandr (1995) ‘A Brand New Doctrine that Looks Like an Old One’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, (29 September), p. 2. Manilov, Lieutenant-General Valery (1994) ‘The Partnership Strategy and International Security’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (26 July). Nikolaev, Colonel-General. A. (1994a) Interview, Izvestiya (13 January), p. 5. Nikolaev, Colonel-General. A. (1994b) Interview, Rossiya, no. 20 (25–31 May), p. 2. Pechrov, Col. S. (1992) ‘Geostrategic Threats to Russia: Real or Imaginary?’, Krasnaya Zvezda (20 March), p. 3. 242 Select Bibliography

Plotnikov, Nikolai (1994) ‘New Defence Bloc in Eurasian Region’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (19 July), p. 1. Rodionov, Igor (1996) ‘We Must Do Everything Possible in Order for Army to Exit Crisis Rapidly’, Krasnaya Zvezda (2 October), pp. 1, 3. Samsonov, Colonel-General V. (1994) ‘On the CIS Collective Security System’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (26 November), p. 3. Samsonov, Colonel-General V. (1995) ‘Defence Union: This Is Not a Military Bloc’, Krasnaya Zvezda, (6 October), p. 3. Samsonov, Colonel-General V. (1995) ‘It Is Necessary to Have a Collective Security System’, Krasnaya Zvezda (5 December), p. 3. Shaposhnikov, Yevgeny (1993) ‘To Security Through Cooperation’, (19 May), JPRS UMA-94-005-L, pp. 1–40. Strugovets, Vitaly (1994) ‘Southern CIS Borders: How They Are Guarded’, Krasnaya Zvezda (4 August), p. 2. Trenin, Dmitry (1994) ‘Collective Security and Collective Defence’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (4 November), p. 3. Volkov, Major-General V. (1994) ‘Commonwealth Collective Security’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, (20 August), p. 3.

Secondary Sources Allison, Roy (1993) Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States Adelphi Paper No. 280, International Institute for Strategic Studies, (October). Baev, P. K. (1994) ‘Russian Military Thinking and the Near Abroad’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 6, no. 12 (December), pp. 531–3. Baev, P. K. (1996) The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles (Oslo: PRIO). Blandy, C. W. (1995) The Chechen Conflict: Escalation and Expansion, CSRC, RMA Sandhurst (June). Carnovale, Marco (ed.) (1995) European Security and International Institutions After the Cold War (London/New York: Macmillan St Martin’s Press). Clark, Susan L. (1994) ‘The Russian Military in the Former Soviet Union: Actions and Motivations’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 6, no. 12 (December), pp. 538–43. Danapoulos, C. P. and Daniel Zirker (eds) (1996) Civil–Military Relations in Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder CO: Westview Press). Dellow, R. W. (1995) Instabilities in Post-Communist Europe: The Drugs Trade, CSRC, RMA Sandhurst (January). Dick, Charles (1992) Crisis in the Former Soviet Military, SSRC, RMA Sandhurst, D-56 (April). Dick, Charles (1993) ‘Russia’s Draft Military Doctrine; 10 Months On’, CSRC, RMA Sandhurst, Occasional Brief No. 17 (April). Dick, Charles (1994a) ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report 1 (January). Dick, Charles (1994b) ‘The Russian Army: Present Plight and Future Prospects’, CSRC, RMA Sandhurst, Occasional Brief No. 31 (22 November). Donnelly, Christopher (1989) Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (London: Jane’s Information Group). FitzGerald, Mary C. (1992) ‘Russia’s New Military Doctrine’, RUSI Journal (October), pp. 40–8. Select Bibliography 243

FitzGerald, Mary C. (1993) ‘Chief of Russia’s General Staff Academy Speaks Out on Moscow’s New Military Doctrine’, Orbis, vol. 37, no. 2 (Spring), pp. 281–8. Foye, Stephen (1993a) ‘End of CIS Command Heralds new Russian Defense Policy’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 2, no. 27 (2 July), pp. 45–9. Foye, Stephen (1993b) ‘Rebuilding the Russian Military: Rhetoric and Realities’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 2, no. 30 (23 July), pp. 49–57. Foye, Stephen (1993c) ‘Updating Russian Civil–Military Relations’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 2, no. 46, (19 November), pp. 44–50. Galeotti, Mark (1995) The Kremlin’s Agenda: The New Russia and its Armed Forces (Jane’s Information Group). Gareev, M. A. (1992) ‘On Military Doctrine and Military Reform in Russia’, Journal of Soviet Military Studies, vol. 5, no. 4 (December), pp. 539–51. Grachev, Pavel S. (1992) ‘The Defence Policy of the Russian Federation’, RUSI Journal (October), pp. 5–7. Hill, Fiona and Pamela Jewett (1994) Back in the USSR: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for US Policy Towards Russia, Harvard University, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project (January). Jones, Ellen and J. H. Brusstar (1993) ‘Moscow’s Emerging Security Decision- Making System: The Role of the Security Council’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (September), pp. 345–74. Lepingwell, John W. R. (1993) ‘Restructuring the Russian Military’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 2, no. 25 (18 June), pp. 17–24. Odom, W. E. and Robert Dujarric (1995) Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hudson Institute). Orr, M. J. (1996) The Current State of the Russian Armed Forces, CSRC, D-60: RMA Sandhurst (November). Sherr, James (1994) The Return of Russia’s Intelligence Empire, RMA Sandhurst, CSRC, F-44 (July). Sherr, James (1996a) Ukraine, Russia and Europe, CSRC, RMA Sandhurst (October). Sherr, James (1996b) ‘A New Storm Over the Black Sea Fleet’, Occasional Brief, CSRC, RMA Sandhurst (13 November). Woff, Richard (1992) ‘High Command of the CIS: Putting the Pieces Back Together Again’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 4, no. 4 (April), pp. 174–7. Woff, Richard (1993) ‘Russian Mobile Forces, 1993–1995’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 5, no. 3, (March), pp. 118–19. Woff, Richard (1995) ‘The Border Troops of the Russian Federation’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 7, no. 2 (February), pp. 70–3.

Peacekeeping and the Use of Force

Primary Sources ‘CIS Resolution on Terms of the Presence, Composition and Tasks of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Republic of Tajikistan’ and Supplements (24 September 1993). 244 Select Bibliography

‘Operations Involving the Use of the Armed Forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States’, Unpublished paper, Centre for Political and International Studies, Moscow (May 1995). ‘Programme for the Training of Units of Peacecreating Forces’ (1992) (Moscow: Russian Federation MoD). ‘Temporary Instructions for the Training of Military Contingents for the Formation of Groups of Military Observers and Collective Forces for the Maintenance of Peace of the CIS Member States’ (1993) (Moscow: Russian Federation MoD). ‘Use of Armed Forces in International Relations: Russia’s Approaches’, Unpublished paper, Centre for Political and International Studies, Moscow (May 1995). Burbyga, Nikolai (1994) ‘Russian Peacekeeping Forces in Action’, Izvestiya (23 March), p. 2. Dudnik, Vladimir (1993) ‘Army Should Avoid Localized UN Operations’, Moskovkiye Novosti (14 March), JPRS-UMA-93-013, p. 30. Ermolin, Vladimir (1994) ‘Russian Peacekeeping Forces Require Legal Foundations’, Krasnaya Zvezda, (25 March), p. 1. Felgengauer, Pavel (1992) ‘Russian Peacekeeping in a Trap’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (11 August). Gareev, Gen. M. (1992) ‘Local Wars and Troop Training’, Krasnaya Zvezda (20 November). Golts, Aleksandr (1993) ‘Peacekeeping Mirage and Real Civil War’, Krasnaya Zvezda (23 October). Golts, Aleksandr (1994) ‘The Generals are Ready for Peacekeeping in the Transcaucasus’, Krasnaya Zvezda (9 July), p. 1. Kobrinskaya, Irina (1994) ‘Peacekeeping – Concept and Reality’, Krasnaya Zvezda (7 December), p. 3. Kondratyev, Colonel-General G. (1994a) ‘Russia’s Blue Helmets’, Krasnaya Zvezda (16 February), p. 2. Kondratyev, Colonel-General G. (1994b) ‘Russia’s Peacekeeping Role’, Krasnaya Zvezda (21 June), pp. 1–2. Kozyrev, Andrei (1993a) ‘Peacekeeping Costs a Good Deal’, Krasnaya Zvezda (1 September), p. 3. Kozyrev, Andrei (1993b) ‘Russia Practically Alone Shoulders the Burden of Peacekeeping on its Periphery’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (22 September), p. 1. Kozyrev, Andrei (1993c) ‘Democracy and Peacekeeping: Two Sides of the Same Coin’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (13 October), p. 1. Kozyrev, Andrei (1994) ‘Russia’s Peacemaking: There’s No Easy Solution’, New Times (January), pp. 16–18. Pain, Emil (1993) ‘Can Russia be a Peacekeeper?’, Izvestiya (29 September), p. 4. Pelts, Aleksandr (1994) ‘Who is Paying for Peace Missions?’, Krasnaya Zvezda (18 March), p. 1. Petrovsky, Vladimir (1994) ‘Humanization of Conflicts’, Segodnya (2 September), p. 3. Pogorely, Mikhail (1994) ‘Russian Peacekeeping Activity: Far From the Imperial Ambitions of a Great Power’, Krasnaya Zvezda (5 April), pp. 1, 3. Select Bibliography 245

Pustogarev, Vladimir (1994) ‘Hot Spots in the CIS and International Law’, International Affairs (Moscow, 8/94), pp. 52–60. Olynik, Col. Aleksandr (1995) ‘Blue Helmets: Honour of the Nation Above All Else’, Krasnaya Zvezda (19 December), p. 2. Ryabov, Igor (1994) ‘Hired to be Humiliated’, New Times (August), pp. 9–11. Samsonov, Viktor (1995) ‘Peacekeeping Experience: UN and CIS’, Moskovskiye Novosti, no. 71, (15–22 October), p. 10. Vinogradov, Boris (1994) ‘Defence Ministers Decide Who Will Pay for CIS Peacekeeping’, Izvestiya (20 July), p. 2. Vorobyev, Major-General Ivan (1994) ‘Gaps in Theory and What We Lack in Order to Carry Out Peacemaking Operations’, Krasnaya Zvezda (22 February). Yakushev, Lieutenant-General Vasily (1996) ‘Military–Diplomatic Duty’, Krasnaya Zvezda (11 June), p. 2. Yasnosokirsky, Yury (1995) ‘Organization, Conduct and Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations’, Unpublished paper for Seminar at the Centre for Political and International Studies, Moscow (May). Yelchischev, Major-General G. (1993) ‘Support for Collective Peacekeeping Forces, TYL’, Vooruzhennykh Sil Voenno-Ekonomichesky Zhurnal, no. 9, JPRS-UMA-94-009, pp. 20–3. Zhdanov, Major I. (1992) ‘Blue Helmets for the CIS?’, Krasnaya Zvezda (17 April), p. 3. Zhilin, Lieutenant-General G. (1993) ‘Troops of Peacekeeping Forces Must Operate Decisively, Firmly and Without Delay’, Voenny Vestnik, no. 9 (September), JPRS-UMA-94-005, pp. 32–4. Zhinkina, I. (1994) ‘Peacekeeping Actions: Some Theoretical and Practical Issues’, SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya (10/94), pp. 10–23.

Secondary Sources Nordic Stand-By Forces (1993) (NORDSAMFN). Nordic UN Tactical Manual (1992) vol 1 and 2 (NORDSAMFN). Wider Peacekeeping: Army Field Manual Vol. 5, Operations Other than War, pt 2 (London: HMSO). Allison, Roy (1994a) Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States, Chaillot Papers No. 18 (November) (Paris: WEU, ISS). Allison, Roy (1994b) ‘Russian Peacekeeping; Capabilities and Doctrine’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 6, no. 12 (December), pp. 544–7. Azreal, Jeremy R. and Emil A. Pain (eds) (1996) US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force (Washington DC: RAND, Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies). Baev, Pavel K. (1994) ‘Russia’s Experiments and Experience in Conflict Management and Peacemaking’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn), pp. 245–60. Berdal, Mats R. (1993) Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper No. 281, International Institute for Strategic Studies (October). Blank, Stephen (1995a) ‘Russia’s Draft Laws on Peacemaking and Defence, Part One’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 7, no. 4 (April), pp. 156–7. 246 Select Bibliography

Blank, Stephen (1995b) ‘Russia Draft Laws on Peacemaking and Defence, Part Two’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 7, no. 5 (May), pp. 201–4. Bull, Hedley (ed.) (1984) Intervention in World Politics (Oxford University Press). Craig, G. A. and A. L. George (1990) Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (2nd edn) (New York: Oxford University Press). Crow, Suzanne (1992a) ‘Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR’, RFE/RF RR, vol. 1, no. 37 (18 September), pp. 31–6. Crow, Suzanne (1992b) ‘Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy or Imperialism?’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 1, no. 37 (18 September), pp. 37–40. Crow, Suzanne (1993) ‘Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 2, no. 15 (9 April), pp. 28–32. Davis, Major Mark T. (1993) Russia’s ‘Peace-making Operations’: An Issue of National Security? SHAPE, Center for Central and Eastern European Defence Studies. Dobbie, Charles (1993) ‘A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping’, Survival, vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn), pp. 121–48. Erhart, Hans-Georg, Anna Kreikmeyer and A. V. Zagorski (eds) (1995) Crisis Management in the CIS: Whither Russia? (Baden-Baden: Namos Verlagsgesellschaft). Forsberg, Tuomas (ed.) (1995) Contested Territory: Border Disputes at the Edges of the Former Soviet Empire (Aldershot: Edward Elgar). Freedman, Lawrence (ed.) (1994) Military Intervention in European Conflicts (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). George, A. L. (1991) Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington DC: US Institute for Peace Press). Goulding, Marrack (1993) ‘The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping’, International Affairs, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 432–64. Gow, James and Christopher Dandeker (1995) ‘Peace Support Operations: The Problem of Legitimation’, The World Today (August/September), pp. 171–4. Greene, Lt. James M. (1993) Russia’s ‘Peacekeeping’ Doctrines: The CIS, Russia and the General Staff, SHAPE, Central and Eastern European Defence Studies (January). Jonson, Lena and Clive Archer (eds) (1996) Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press). Kaplan, Stephen S. (ed.) (1981) Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution). Kaplan, Stephen S. and B. M. Blechman (eds) (1978) Force Without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution). Kostakos, Georgia and Dimitris Bourantonis (1998) ‘Innovation in Peacekeeping: The Case of Albania’, Security Dialogue, vol. 29, no. 1 (March), pp. 49–58. Luttwak, Edward N. (1987) Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Lynch, Dov (1997) Introduction to Documents, RIIA, ‘Keeping the Peace in the CIS’, Unpublished paper, (June). Mackinlay, John (1990) ‘Powerful Peacekeepers’, Survival (May/June). Select Bibliography 247

Mackinlay, John (ed.) (1996) A Guide to Peace Suport Operations (Rhode Island: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University). MacFarlane, Neil S. and Albrecht Schnabel (1995) ‘Russia’s Approach to Peacekeeping’, International Journal (Spring), pp. 292–324. Orr, Michael J. (1994) The Russian Army and Peacekeeping, CSRC, RMA Sandhurst, A-97 (June). Raevsky, A. and I. N. Vorobyev (1994) Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations, Research Paper no. 28, UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva. Roberts, Adam (1993) ‘The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn), pp. 93–120. Roberts, Adam (1994) The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping (Institutt for Forsravstuddier, 2/1994). Roberts, Adam (1996) Humanitarian Action in War, Adelphi Paper No. 305, IISS. Shashenkov, Maxim (1993) ‘Russian Peacekeeping in the Near Abroad’, Survival, vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn), pp. 46–69. Weiss, T. G. (ed.) (1997) ‘Special Issue: Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task- sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3. Weiss, T. G. and Jarat Chopra (1995) ‘Prospects for Containing Conflict in the Former 2nd World’, Security Studies, vol. 4, no. 3 (September), pp. 552–83.

The Moldovan–Dnestr Conflict

Primary Sources ‘Agreement Between Russian Federation and Republic of Moldova on Status and Conditions of Russian Formations Temporarily Stationed on the Territory of the Republic of Moldova, 21 October, 1994’, (1994) Diplomatichesky Vestnik, no. 21–22, pp. 47–51. ‘Agreement on Peaceful Conflict Resolution in the Dnestr Region in Moldova, 21 July, 1992’, (1992) Diplomatichesky Vestnik, no. 15–16, pp. 34–6. ‘Joint Communique of the Presidents of Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine, 25 June, 1992’, (1992) Diplomatichesky Vestnik, no. 13–14, pp. 32–3. ‘Principles of Cooperation Between the OSCE Mission and the Joint Control Commission in the Security Zone’, (17 January 1996). Chugaev, Sergei (1992) ‘Russian Parliament Sanctioned the Use of the 14th Army as Peacekeeping Force,’ Izvestiya (9 July), pp. 1, 2. Eggert, Konstantin (1992) ‘Two Approaches to the Dnestr Conflict’, Izvestiya (11 April), p. 5. Felgengauer, Pavel (1994) ‘Russia Doesn’t Need the Dnestr Frontier’, Segodnya (16 April), p. 3. Felgengauer, Pavel, A. Taro and V. Morsov (1992) ‘Conflict in the Dnestr Region’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, (27 May), pp. 1, 2. 248 Select Bibliography

Gamova, Svetlana (1993) ‘Future Moldova: With or Without the Dnestr Region’, Izvestiya (19 October), p. 2. Gamova, Svetlana (1994) ‘Russia to Withdraw Peacekeeping Forces from the Dnestr Region’, Izvestiya (1 December), p. 2. Gamova, Svetlana (1996) ‘Russian Card in Moldovan Elections’, Segodnya (15 November), p. 1. Golotyuk, Yury (1995) ‘Grachev Invites Lebed to Remove Shoulder Boards’, Segodnya (7 May). Karapetyan, Pyotr (1995) ‘Process of 14th Army Reform Ongoing’, Krasnaya Zvezda (22 June), p. 3. Kondratev, Eduard (1992) ‘Cossacks Aggravate Crisis in Dnestr Region’, Izvestiya (5 March), p. 1, 2. Krutikov, Yevgeny (1996) ‘Bleak Prospects for Self-Proclaimed Republic’, New Times (July), pp. 50–1. Lebed, Aleksandr (1992) ‘Interview’, Krasnaya Zvezda (4 March), p. 2. Litovkin, Viktor (1992) ‘A New Commander and New Tactics of Neutrality’, Izvestiya (29 June). Litovkin, Viktor (1993) ‘After Lebed’s Discharge, the Whole Army Will Be Different’, Izvestiya (16 June), p. 1. Melkov, Gennady (1992) ‘Mercenaries? Aggressors? Volunteers? Cossacks in the Dnestr Conflict from the Point of View of International Law’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (10 June), JPRS-UMA-92-024, pp. 25–7. Narishkin, Andrei (1992) ‘MoD Values Peaceful Resolution Process in the Dnestr Region’, Krasnaya Zvezda (6 August), p. 1. Pelts, Aleksandr (1995) ‘Reformed 14th Army Could Be Basis for the Creation of a Russian Military Base in Moldova’, Krasnaya Zvezda (29 June), p. 1. Prikhodka, Natalya (1995) ‘14th Army Will Become Peacekeeping Force’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2 December), p. 3. Prikhodka, Natalya (1997a) ‘Success of Russian Diplomacy’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, (12 April) p. 1. Prikhodka, Natalya (1997b) ‘The Long Awaited Document’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (7 May), p. 3. Rotfeld, Adam, N. (1992a) ‘Interim Report on the Conflict in the Left Bank Dnestr Areas’, CSCE Communication No. 281, Prague (16 September). Rotfeld, Adam N. (1992b) ‘Addendum One to the Interim Report’, CSCE Communication No. 281/ADD 1, Prague (5 November). Rotfeld, Adam N. (1992c) ‘Addendum Two to the Interim Report’, CSCE Communication No. 281/ADD 2, Stockholm (3 December). Rotfeld, Adam N. (1993) ‘Final Report on the Conflict in the Left Bank Dnestr Areas of the Republic of Moldova’, CSCE Communication No. 38, Prague (31 January). Selivanov, Yury (1994) ‘Russian Peacekeepers are Leaving Moldova’, Segodnya (1 December), p. 4. Sitya, Ekaterina (1994) ‘Transdnestrian Republic Declared Zone of Special Interests’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (15 November), p. 3. Terletsky, Vasily (1997) ‘Moldova is Moving Away from Russia’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (18 March). Vladona, Tatyana (1996) ‘Tiraspol and Chisinau Experts Agree. Ready to Sign Memo on Normalization of Conflict’, Segodnya (19 June), p. 8. Select Bibliography 249 Secondary Sources Bowers, Stephen (1992) ‘The Crisis in Moldova’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 4, no. 6 (November), pp. 483–86. Bowers, Stephen (1993) ‘The Partition of Moldova’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 5, no. 10 (October), pp. 435–7. Bowers, Stephen (1994) ‘The Dnestr Republic – Further Insights’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 6, no. 12, (December), pp. 562–64. Grubincea, Mihai (1996) ‘Rejecting a New Role for the Former 14th Army’, Transition, vol. 2, no. 6, (22 March), pp. 38–40. Hanne, Gottfield (1997) ‘Playing Two Different Tunes, as Usual, in Moldova’, Transitions (December), pp. 68–71. Ionescu, Don (1996) ‘Playing the Dnestr Card In and After the Russian Election’, Transition, vol. 2, no. 17 (23 August), pp. 26–8. Kaufman, Stuart J. (1996) ‘Spiralling to Ethnic Conflict: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War’, International Security, vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall), pp. 108–38. King, Charles (1993) ‘Moldova and the Bessarabian Question’, The World Today, vol. 49, no. 7 (July), pp. 135–8. King, Charles (1995) Post-Soviet Moldova, A Borderland in Transition (RIIA, Post-Soviet Business Forum). Lamont, Neil (1993) ‘Territorial Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: The Moldovan Case, 1991–March 1993’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 6, no. 4 (December), pp. 576–612. Litvak, Kate (1996) ‘The Role of Political Competition and Bargaining in Russian Foreign Policy: The Case of Russian Policy Towards Moldova’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 213–29. Orr, M. J. (1992) ‘The 14th Army and the Crisis in Moldova’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 4, no. 6, (June), pp. 247–50. Petersen, Philip (1994) ‘Moldova – Improving the Prospects of Peace’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 6, no. 9, (September), pp. 396–400. Socor, Vladimir (1992) ‘Russia’s 14th Army and the Insurgency in Eastern Moldova’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 1, no. 36 (11 September), pp. 41–8. Socor, Vladimir (1993a) ‘Russia’s Army in Moldova: There to Stay?’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 2, no. 29 (18 June), pp. 42–9. Socor, Vladimir (1993b) ‘Isolated Moldova being Pulled into Russia’s Orbit’, RFE/RL RR, vol. 2, no. 50, (13 December), pp. 9–15. Sunley, Jonathan (1994) ‘The Moldovan Syndrome’, World Policy Journal, vol. XI, no. 2 (Summer), pp. 88–91. Walters, Trevor (1997) ‘Problems, Progress and Prospects in a Post-Soviet Borderland: The Republic of Moldova’, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (Spring), pp. 71–9.

Georgia–Abkhazia Conflict

Primary Sources ‘Report of the CSCE Rapporteur Mission to Georgia’, CSCE Communication no. 186, Prague, 29 May 1992. ‘Supreme Soviet Resolution on Events in Abkhazia, 22 September, 1992’, Diplomatichesky Vestnik (19–20, 1992), p. 26. 250 Select Bibliography

‘Supreme Soviet Resolution on Situation in the North Caucasus in Relation to Events in Abkhazia, 25 September, 1992,’ Diplomatichesky Vestnik, (19–20, 1992), pp. 18–20. ‘The UN and the Situation in Georgia’, (1995) Reference Paper, UN Department of Public Information (April). Ardzinba, Vladislav (1993) ‘We Count On Russian Help’, Izvestiya (11 March), p. 5. Barakhova, Alla (1996) ‘Tense Relations in the Russian–Georgian and Abkhaz Triangle’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (11 January), p. 3. Darchiashvili, David (1996a) ‘Russian Peacekeepers in Georgia – How the Russians Perceive their Role in the Region’, Unpublished paper (May/June). Darchiashvili, David (1996b) ‘Russian–Georgian Military Relations’, Unpublished paper (August). Denisov, Vitaly (1995) ‘Our Bases in Georgia: To Be or Not To Be’, Krasnaya Zvezda (24 November), p. 3. Felgengauer, Pavel (1993a) ‘MoD Strengthens Southern Flank’, Segodnya (10 March), p. 3. Felgengauer, Pavel (1993b) ‘Are We Entering a Caucasian War?’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (7 November), p. 3. Felgengauer, Pavel (1994) ‘Russia Strengthens Its Influence in the Transcaucasus’, Segodnya (15 June). Felgengauer, Pavel (1995) ‘The Russian Army in the Transcaucasus’, Segodnya (25 March), p. 1. Glebova, Ekaterina (1993) ‘Russian Style Peacekeeping’, Moskovskiye Novosti no. 42 (17 October), p. 13. Gyarmati, Istran (1992) ‘Report of the Personal Representative of the Chairman in Office of the CSCE to Georgia’, Fact-Finding Mission, 13–22 October. Iskandaryan, Aleksandr (1996) ‘Russia Does Not Want an Abkhaz Version of Chechenia’, New Times (March), p. 32. Malkina, Tatyana (1996) ‘Yeltsin on Principles of Caucasian Policy’, Segodnya (4 June), p. 1. Shevardnadze, Eduard (1993) ‘Disintegration of Georgia – Dangerous for Russia’, Izvestiya (11 March), p. 5. Shevardnadze, Eduard (1996) ‘Interview’, Segodnya (6 March), p. 5. Urigashvili, Besik (1993) ‘Georgia Demands Rapid Withdrawal of Russian Troops from Abkhazia’, Izvestiya (7 April), p. 1. Velekhov, Leonid (1996a) ‘Shevardnadze: Peacekeeping in Abkhazia in Present State Senseless’, Segodnya (23 February), p. 9. Velekhov, Leonid (1996b) ‘Georgia Demands Rapid Expansion of Peacekeeping Mandate’, Segodnya, (23 July), p. 2. Vignansky, Mikhail (1996) ‘Tbilisi and Sukhumi Flex Muscles on Eve of CIS Summit’, Segodnya, (9 August), p. 7. Zhvanya, Zurab (1996a) ‘Interview’, New Times (March), pp. 33–5. Zhvanya, Zurab (1996b) ‘Interview’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta 19 November, p. 3. Select Bibliography 251 Secondary Sources Aves, Jonathan (1993) Post-Soviet Transcaucasia (London: Post-Soviet Business Forum, RIIA). Baev, Pavel (1997) Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus (London: Former Soviet South, RIIA). Chervonnaya Svetlana (1994) Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia and the Russian Shadow (Glastonbury, UK: Gothic Images Publications). Coppieters, Bruno (ed.) (1996) Contested Borders in the Caucasus (Brussels: Vubpress). Goldenberg, Suzanne (1994) Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post- Soviet Disorder (New Jersey: Zed Books). Gusseinova, M. (1995) ‘Russian Interests in the Abkhaz Conflict and the Position of the USA’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 8, no. 3 (September), pp. 470–5. Hewitt, B. G. (1993) ‘Abkhazia: A Problem of Identity and Ownership’, Central Asian Survey (12/3) pp. 267–323. Lakoba, Stanislav (1995) ‘Abkhazia is Abkhazia’, Central Asian Survey (14/1), pp. 97–105. Lynch, Dov (1998) The Conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian Peacekeeping Policy, Discussion Paper, RIIA (February). MacFarlane, Neil S., Larry Minear and Stephen Shenfield (1996) A Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping Rhode Island, Paper 21, T. J. Watson Institute. Naumkin, Vitaly (ed.) (1994) Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict (Conn: Greenwood Press.) Tsereteli, Irakli (1996) ‘Seeking Stability under Shevardnadze’, Transition, vol. 2, no. 15 (26 July), pp. 42–5. Woff, Richard (1993) ‘The Armed Forces of Georgia’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 5, no. 7 (July), pp. 307–10. Woff, Richard (1994) ‘The Armed Forces of Georgia – An Update’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 6, no. 12 (December), pp. 555–61. Woff, Richard (1995) ‘Russia Strengthens Ties with Georgia and Armenia’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 7, no. 7 (July), p. 294. Wright, J. F. R., Suzanne Goldenberg and Richard Schofield (1996) Transcaucasian Boundaries (London: UCL Press).

Tajik Conflict

Primary Sources ‘CIS Measures for Stability on the Tajik–Afghan Border’, Diplomatichesky Vestnik, no. 2 (February), pp. 43–4. ‘Joint Declaration of Presidents of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan on Events in Tajikistan, 4 September, 1992’, Diplomatichesky Vestnik (no. 17–18), pp. 16–7. Abarinov, Vladimir (1996) ‘Moscow Afraid of Domino Effect in Central Asia’, Segodnya (30 July), p. 2. 252 Select Bibliography

Ali Hikmet, Alp (1993) ‘Report of the Personal Representative of the Chairman in Office to the Republic of Tajikistan’, CSCE Communication No. 126, Prague (25 April). Azamova, Asal and Oleg Panfilov (1993) ‘Afghan Boomerang’, Mokovskiye Novosti no. 7, (14 February), p. 12A. Bogdasonov, Semyan (1996) ‘Does Fundamentalism Threaten Us?’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (18 October), p. 3. Buskhov, Valentin and D. Mikulsky (1996) ‘Tajikistan on the Edge of Collapse’, Segodnya (16 August), p. 9. Dubnov, Arkady (1995) ‘Does Russia Have a Tajik Policy?’, New Times (June), pp. 39–42. Dubnov, Arkady (1996) ‘Relying on the Wrong Man’, New Times (February), p. 44. Felgengauer, Pavel (1993) ‘A Border Too Far’, Segodnya (13 August), p. 1. Golotyuk, Yury (1996) ‘CIS Ministers Discuss Threat from Afghanistan’, Segodnya (31 October), p. 1. Grigoriev, Sergei (1993) ‘Russian Army in Tajik War’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (16 September), pp. 1, 3. Karimov, Buri (1994) ‘Tajik Crisis Will Not Be Resolved by Peacekeeping Influence’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (12 October) p. 3. Kasenov, Umirsirik (1994) ‘Russian Policy towards Central Asia’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (16 March), pp. 1, 3. Kozyrev, Andrei (1993) ‘What Russia Wants in Tajikistan’, Izvestiya(4 August). Kulistikov, Vladimir (1992) ‘Afghanistan Has Caught Up with Russia but this Time in Tajikistan’, New Times (37/92), p. 3. Kuznetsova, Vera (1993) ‘Moscow Does Not Plan to Answer Alone for Central Asia’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, (31 July), p. 2. Ladin, Anatoly (1992) ‘Is Tajikistan a New Afghanistan?’, Krasnaya Zvezda (26 September), p. 2. Lanstman, Mikhail (1996) ‘Situation in Tajikistan Again in Flames’, Segodnya (16 May), p. 7. Malashenko, A. and Aziz Niafu (1993) ‘On Tajikistan – Without Bias’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (3 March), p. 3. Mlechin, Leonid (1995) ‘Russia Must Understand What Awaits it in Tajikistan’, Izvestiya (22 April), p. 1. Modestov, Sergei (1993) ‘And What Does the General Staff Think of It?’, Novoye Vremiya, no. 32 (July), pp. 12–13. Panfilov, Oleg (1994) ‘Military-Political Map of Tajikistan’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2 September), p. 3. Panfilov, Oleg (1995) ‘MoD Ignores Border Troop Request for Help?’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, (14 April), p. 1. Rotar, Igor (1993a) ‘Is Russia Getting Drawn into Another Unnecessary War?’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, (27 May), p. 1. Rotar, Igor (1993b) ‘Russian Policy Towards Tajikistan Either Shortsighted or Unrealistic’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, (20 July), p. 1. Rotar, Igor (1994) ‘Russian Peacekeeping in Tajikistan: Myth or Reality?’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 March, p. 3. Scipanov, Mikhail (1996) ‘Primakov and Grachev in Dushanbe’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, (30 January), SU/2524, G/1–2. Select Bibliography 253

Sevostianov, Igor (1996) ‘Islamic Fundamentalism and Extremism Are Not the Same’, International Affairs, Moscow (September), pp. 171–182. Shermatova, Sanobar (1995) ‘Central Asia without Russia?’, Moskovskiye Novosti, no. 26 (16–23 April), p. 10. Strugovets, Vitaly (1994) ‘Russia Paying with Soldiers’ Blood in Tajikistan’, Krasnaya Zvezda (26 August), p. 1. Vasilyev, Aleksei (1996) ‘Is Central Asia a New Middle East?’, New Times (20/96), pp. 4–6. Velekhov, Leonid (1996) ‘Primakov’s New Initiative’, Segodnya, 12 July 1996, p. 5. Zhdannikov, Dmitry (1995) ‘Western Democracy – A Hundred Years Away’, Segodnya, 28 February, p. 1.

Secondary Sources Akbarzadeh, Shahram (1996) ‘Why Did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?’, Europe–Asia Studies, vol. 48, no. 7, pp. 1105–29. Akiner, Shirin (1993) Central Asia: A New Arc of Crisis? (London: RUSI Defence Studies). Banuazizi, Ali and Myron Weiner (eds) (1994) The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands (London: IB Taurus). Barylski, Robert (1994) ‘The Russian Federation and Eurasia’s Islamic Crescent’, Europe–Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 389–419. Bezanis, Lowell (1996) ‘An Enlarged Golden Crescent’, Transition, vol. 2, no. 19 (20 September). pp. 6–11. Dannreuther, Roland (1993/ 4) ‘Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf’, Survival, vol. 35, no. 4 (Winter), pp. 93–107. Dannreuther, Roland (1994) Creating New States in Central Asia Adelphi Paper No. 288; International Institute for Strategic Studies, (March). Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (ed.) (1994) From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game (University of Exeter Press). Ferdinand, Peter (ed.) (1994) The New Central Asia and its Neighbours (London: Pinter/RIIA). Hetmanek, Aleksander (1993) ‘Islamic Revolution and Jihad Come to the Former Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Tajikistan’, Central Asian Survey (12/3), pp. 365–78. Jonson, Lena (1997) The Tajik War: A Challenge to Russian Policy, Discussion Paper 74, RIIA (November). Lange, Keely (1996) ‘When Drug Lords are Warlords’, Transition, vol. 2, no. 19 (20 September), pp. 15–8. Malik, Hafeez (1994) Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (London: Macmillan). Naby, Eden (1993) ‘Ethnicity and Islam in Central Asia’, Central Asian Survey (12/2), pp. 151–67. Orr, M. J. (1993) ‘The Civil War in Tajikistan’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (April). Pannier, Bruce (1996) ‘Drug Traffic on the Rise in Central Asia’, Transition vol. 2, no. 19 (20 September), pp. 12–4. Pannier, Bruce (1997) ‘Defining the Third Force’, Transition (21 March), pp. 42–5. 254 Select Bibliography

Rashid, Ahmed (1994) The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Zed Books). Ro’i, Yaacov (ed.) (1995) Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (London: Frank Cass). Rubinstein, Alvin Z. (1994) ‘The Asian Interior: The Geopolitical Pull on Russia’, Orbis, Journal of World Affairs vol. 38, no 4 (Fall), pp. 56–83. Shashenkov, Maxim (1992) Security Issues in the Ex-Soviet Central Asian Republics, London Defence Studies No. 14, University of London (October). Wyllie, James (1993) ‘Tajikistan: A Strategic Threat to Regional Harmony’, Jane’s Intelligence Review vol. 5, no. 3, (March), p. 133. Zviagelskaya, Irina S. (1995) The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia (London: RIIA, Former Soviet South Project). Index

Note: Organizations (e.g. Defence Council) are Russian unless otherwise stated.

Abdullajanov, Abdullo 169 Babenkov, Dolya 146 Abkhaz conflict see Georgia-Abkhazia Balkans, Russian influence in 110 conflict Baltic Sea, naval presence in 73 Adamishin, Anatoly 124 Baltic states, Russian troops withdrawal Adygei, Republic of 133 from 55 Afghanistan 9, 13, 74, 150, 151, 153 Barannikov, Viktor 117 Agapov, Lieutenant-General Boris 103 Barsukov, Mikhail 40, 59 Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali) 22 Batumi, Russian base at 140 Supplement to 23 Baturin, Yuri 40, 64, 68, 87, 181 Airborne Regiment, 345th 134, 137 Belarus air defence system, joint 7, 70, 82–3 agreement on deepening CIS 59 Air Forces 66, 88 CIS focus on 91 Akhalkalaki, Russian base at 140 economic union with 54 Albright, Madeleine 120 in forward-basing agreements 83 Alimov, R. 176 in joint air defence system 82 Allison, Roy 66 military policy towards 7 All-Tajik Consultative Forum 164 as crucial to Russia 51 Almaty Committee 157 Bendery (Moldova) 111, 112, 117 Almaty summit (1991) 70 Berezovsky, Boris 60, 147 Ambartsumov, Yevgeny 48 Bergman, Colonel Mikhail 113, 120 Arbatov, Aleksei 169 Black Sea Ardzinba, Vladislav 128, 133, 145, 146 Economic Cooperation Zone 144 armed suasion see suasion Fleet 55, 59, 132, 174 Armenia military bases 84 CIS focus on 91 naval presence in 73 economic ties with Azerbaijan 59 Blechman, Barry 184, 189 economic union with 54 Bobryshev, Lieutenant-General Valentin in forward-basing agreements 83 167 increasing importance of 175 Bombara (Georgia) airfield, lease to in joint air defence system 82 Russia 139 military policy towards 7 Border Concept 103 as strategic ally to Russia 51 Border Service (RFBS) 32, 68, 69, 78, arms control agreements 81 84–5, 87, 146 Army tensions between MoD and 166–7, 14th 112 168 40th 100 views of ‘peacekeeping’ 102–4 Arzhba, Vladimir 130 Border Troops Asia, Central see Central Asia CIS 84–5 Averchev, Vladimir 41 Russian 140, 154, 162, 163, 167 Azerbaijan 55 Bosnia, NATO activities in 57 air defence in 7 Bourantanis, Dimitris 190, 191 determination to create national armed Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 22, 141, 190 forces 47, 70 Brunner, Eduard 136, 141 and multilateralization of CIS borders Bull, Hedley 179 8 Burbulis, Gennady 46

255 256 Index bureaucracy, Russian, divisions in 5–6, military integration of 63 9–11, 12, 30, 31, 37 Military Security Concept 75 Bushkov, Valentin 169 ‘peacekeeping’ forces 81–2 ‘Russia first’ policy in 7, 13 Campbell, K. M. 190 Russian ‘peacekeeping’ in (summary of Caspian Sea argument) 2–3 resources, ‘ownership’ of 5 Russia’s over-extension in 177 transport of oil from 59–60 Staff for Coordinating Military Caucasian Special Border District 85 Cooperation 7 Caucasus, perceptions of insecurity in summit (1997) 89 132 UN regional arrangement status for Central Asia 162–3 as area of threat 73–4 as vital to Russian interests 7 MFA strategy for 157 see also CIS High Command military dependence on Russia of 83 CIS High Command (HC) 62, 69, 70, military policy towards 7 75–6, 77 multilateral agreements on troop abolition of 72 deployments in 8 replaced by Coordinating Committee ‘peacekeeping’ in 161–2 160 Russian defence of interests in 155 views of ‘peacekeeping’ 101–2 Russian perspectives on, post-Soviet Civic Union 43 156 civil–military relations 50, 63 centrist nationalists 40 ‘coercive diplomacy’ 19–36 Chechnya George and Craig on 24–5 fighters from, in Abkhazia 131 Cold War war in 10, 13, 33, 42, 59, 67, 100, 104, end of 21 127, 142, 183, 184–7 peacekeeping norms in 4 Chernyshev, Albert 165 Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPKF) China 156 102, 161, 163, 167 Chopra, Jarat 23–4, 190 Collective Security Council Chubais, Anatoly 10, 87 (Shaposhnikov proposal) 76 CIS Collective Security Treaty (CIS) (1992) adventurist schemes in 2 47, 102, 139, 159 and bilateral military cooperation Communist Party 43, 45, 152 75–7 Congress of Mountain Peoples (CMP) Collective Security Council 89 131 collective security system and ‘peace- Russian Procurator proceedings keeping’ 102 against 133 Coordinating Committee 32, 160 cordon sanitaire, isolation of Russia by Coordinating Staff 80 50 cost of ‘peacekeeping’ by 81 Cossacks, Russian, in Abkhazia 131 Council of Heads of State 70, 144 Council of Europe 81 defence alliance in 7 Council on Foreign and Defence Policy defence budget 70 (CFDP) 43, 50 defence of external borders of 7, 12 Craig, Gordon A. 24 deterring intervention in, by outside CSCE 48 powers 28 division of labour between UN and Dagestan, tension in 59 23 Dandeker, Christopher 190 external borders, defence of 7, 84–6 ‘Decisions on Additional Measures for integration 44, 58 Resolving the Conflict in Abkhazia’ international mandate for 162–3 147 Joint Armed Forces 70, 76 ‘Declaration on the Settlement of the lack of progress on 60 Transdnestrian Conflict’ 123 Index 257 de Cuellar, J. Perez 21 force defence alliance in CIS 7 limited to self-defence in traditional Defence Council 10–11 peacekeeping 20 Democratic Forces of Tajikistan 164 short of war, use of 24–6, 187 Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) use of, within framework of CIS 50 152, 164 see also suasion ‘demokraty’ wing in foreign policy debate Foreign Ministry see Ministry of 43 Foreign Affairs ‘demokraty-derzhavniki’ wing in foreign foreign policy 173–8 policy debate 43 centrist–nationalist grouping in 42–5, Denyakin, Colonel-General Pyotr 64 49, 50–1, 53, 55, 61, 94, 115, 173 desertion, military 64 in CIS region 173 diaspora, Russian see Moldova; debate on 42–5 Tajikistan interacting factors in 37–45 Diehl, Paul F. 189 liberal internationalist grouping in division of labour 54–8 42–5, 49, 132 between MoD and MFA 9, 32, 55–6, politicization of 37–9 63, 104, 134, 135, 163, 181 radical nationalist grouping in 42–5, between UN and CIS 23 115 Dnestr region conflict see towards ‘near abroad’, evolution of Moldova–Dnestr conflict 37–61, 173 ‘Dnestr Republic’ 120 Foreign Policy Concept 40, 41, 46, 52 Dnestr Republican Guard 112 forward-positioning, Russian 2, 8, 83–4 Dnestr Soviet Socialist Republic 111 Dobbie, Charles 23, 179, 191 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad 128–9, 130 Dokuchaev, Anatoly 64 Gareev, General Makhmud 71, 80, 82, domestic factors affecting Russian 99 strategy 6–9 Garm 166 draft evasion 64 gas pipelines 147 Dubynin, Lieutenant-General V. 98, Gazprom 147 134 George, Alexander L. 24–5, 27 Dudnik, Major-General Vladimir 168 Georgia Duma Abkhaz parliament of 145 Committee on Defence and assimilation of Abkhazia by 128 International Affairs 40 as bulwark in North Caucasus and Defence Committee 65 Transcaucasus 127, 135 International Affairs Committee 41 and CIS 91, 127, 131 Durch, W. J. 189 continuing consolidation of 149 Dushanbe 159, 165, 166 in joint air defence system 82, 140 Youth Movement 152 limits to independence of 174 military bases in 84, 127, 131 economic relations, Russian–Ukrainian nationalism 128, 148, 184 59 populations 128 economic ‘shock therapy’ in Russia 47 protection of external borders of 140 economic union of Russia, Tajikistan, relations with Russia 128 Kazakstan, Uzbekistan 54 return to Abkhazia of IDPs from 132 Ero, Comfort 190 Tbilisi University 128 ‘evolutionists’ on use of force by UN trade with Turkey 149 troops 23 transportation links in 134 Union referendum in 128–9 ‘far abroad’ 61 Georgia–Abkhazia conflict 4, 11–12, 13, Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) 41, 61 52, 68 agreement with Russia on 183 Filatov, Sergei 39 armed forces involved in 130–1 258 Index

Georgia–Abkhazia conflict (cont.) Hanoi, American bombing of 27 bilateral relations with 51 Helsinki Act 46 casualties of ‘peacekeeping’ forces High Command of Joint Armed Forces 146 54 coercive intervention in 27, 77, 179 ‘hostage’ effect in traditional conflict with South Ossetia 11 peacekeeping 20 criticism of Russian operations in 138 humanitarian missions 101, 163 differences from Moldova 127 human rights violations as threats to economic blockade in 145 peace 21 Eschera attacks in 137 evolution of Russian strategy towards Ichkeria, Chechen Republic of 144 131–47 IISS 130 in forward-basing agreements 83 Immediate Reaction Forces 74 Georgian sabotage groups in 147 impartiality in traditional peacekeeping military policy towards 7 20 MoD heavy-handed approach to 9 independent states as belt of insecurity 1 and multilateralization of CIS borders Interdepartmental Coordination 8 Commission 56 operational pattern in 105 Interior Troops 68 refugees in 133, 142 internally displaced persons (IDPs) 132 regional reconciliation in 132–4 international affairs, effect on Russian reliant on Russia for military strategy 34 equipment 89 International Monetary Fund (IMF) reluctance of MoD in 104 149 and Russian interests 127 Ioseliani, Jaba 129, 130 Russian strategy towards 127–49 Iskandarov, Akbarsho 152, 156 Security Zone in 145, 147 Islamic radicalism 153, 156, 158, 163 separatist movements in 28 Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) 152 Sochi agreement 135, 136 Ivanov, Igor 42 sources of conflict 128–30 Ivashov, Lieutenant-General Leonid 80 special commission on 39 strategy of armed suasion in 4, 27 Joergan-Holst, Johan 1, 189 Sukhumi attacks in 137 Joint Control Commission (JCC) 122 ‘Zviadist’ offensive in 137–9 Joint Staff for Coordinating Military see also Abkhaz conflict; Congress of Cooperation 76 Mountain Peoples Golotyuk, Yury 103 Kaplan, Stephen 184 Gorbachev, Mikhail 178 Karaganov, Sergei 43, 50 Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan) 151, Karimov, Islam 158, 164 154 Kazakstan 55 ‘gosudarstvenniki’ grouping in foreign agreement on deepening CIS 59 policy debate 42 air defence system of 82 Goulding, Marrack 19, 136, 189 bilateral agreement with Russia 76 Gow, James 22 CIS focus on 91 Grachev, Pavel 8, 9, 48, 58, 62, 63, 72, contribution to ‘peacekeeping’ in 74, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83–4, 99, 104, 116, Tajikistan 161 121, 137, 166 as crucial to Russia 51 dismissal of 10, 42, 59, 78 economic union with 54 Greenwood, Christopher 189 in forward-basing agreements 83 Gromov, Boris 66, 98 joint agreements on use of military Group of Forces in the Transcaucasus facilities 8, 83 (GFTC) 131, 139, 149 military policy towards 7 guerilla warfare, classic, on Tajik–Afghan Khasbulatov, Ruslan 47, 48 border 103 Kiev summit (1992) 70 Index 259

Kitovani, Tengiz 129, 133, 135 Medvedev, Nicolai 121 Kitsak, Colonel S. 113 Memorandum of Understanding Kittani, Ismat 162 (US–Moldova) 121 Kobets, Colonel-General Konstantin Memorandum of Understanding 71, 122 (Russia–Moldova) 109, 123 Kokoshin, Andrei 10, 11, 40, 71, 87 Memorandum of Understanding on the Kondratyev, General Georgy 67, 92, Principles for Normalizing Relations 133, 177 123–4 Kornukov, A. 66 Menagharishvili, Irakli 144 Korotchenya, Ivan 81 ‘middle ground’ theorists on use of force Korzhakov, General Aleksandr 40, 59 by UN troops 22 Kovalev, Nikolai 147 Migranyan, Andrannik 39, 155, 169 Kozyrev, Andrei, 42, 45, 46, 53, 56, 92, Mikhailov, Yevgeny 167 116, 134–6, 164, 176 Mikulsky, Dmitry 169 on ‘belt of good neighbourliness’ military around Russia 61 civilian relations with 9–11 and centrist–nationalist perspective combat readiness, decline in 65–6 55, 58 cooperation, assertive forms of 78–86 resignation of 48 cooperation, bilateral, and CIS 75–7 sidelining of 37 districts 88 Kravchuk, Leonid 70 doctrine 41, 78–81, 103 Kuchma, Leonid 82 equipment and infrastructure, loss of Kulikov, Anatoly 11 64 Kunadze, Georgy 168 manpower system 64 Kyrgyzstan officer corps 65 agreement on deepening CIS 59 policy 7–8 bilateral agreement with Russia 76 problems of 62, 64–8 contribution to ‘peacekeeping’ in reform 35, 74, 87 Tajikistan 161 strategic reserves 74 thinking, evolution of 68–86 Ladin, Anatoly 156 Military Council (Georgia) 129 Lali Badakhshan (Tajik regional Ministry of Defence (MoD) 3, 52, 76, movement) 152 80–1 Latifi, Otokhon 164 attitude to former Soviet Union 62 Latvia 83 creation of 48, 71–2 Law on Defence (1992) 65 dominant role until 1996 6–9, 77 Law on Military Service (1993) 64 dual-track approach to military Lebed, Aleksandr 40, 48, 99, 119, 121 cooperation 86 Leninabad (Tajikistan) 151, 153 financial constraints on 67–8 Leningrad military district 75 policy towards CIS region 6 Liberal Democratic Party 43 policy towards ‘near abroad’ 32, 41 Lithuania, Soviet crackdown in 111 proposal for pan-European security Lobov, Oleg 78 81 Long, Suzanne 190 taking charge of ‘peacekeeping’ 9–10 Longinov, A. B. 73 tensions between RFBS and 166, 168, Lordkipanidze 147 181 Luscinski, Petru (Moldova) 14, 112, views on peacekeeping 96–100 118, 120, 123, 174 see also division of labour Lukin, Vladimir 43, 49, 61, 155 Ministry for Emergency Situations 68 Luttwak, Edward 24, 25–6, 27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 2, 52 Mackinlay, John 22, 189 accusing UN of double standards 57 Mansfield, Edward 181 approach to former Soviet Union 37 Martykov, Ataman A. 113 attitude to former Soviet Union 62 260 Index

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Moldova–Dnestr conflict 11, 48, 71 (cont.) agreement on Russian withdrawal from and Central Asian states 157 110 challenged by Supreme Soviet 40 air defence in 7 commitment to Moldovan integrity armed forces involved in 112–14 118 cease-fire negotiations in 114 evolution of approaches of 45–58 coercive intervention in 179 initial approach to conflicts in former and determination to create national Soviet Union 46 armed force 47, 70 integration of ‘peacekeeping’ activities evolution of Russian strategy in into strategy of 56 114–24 joint declaration with Georgia (1992) increasing engagement in 37 46 Memorandum of Understanding on policy towards the ‘near abroad’ 6, (1997) 2 32 MFA progress in resolution of 10, proposal for pan-European security 14 81 MoD heavy-handed approach to 9 redefinition of diaspora 55 and multilateralization of CIS borders renewed weight in security policy- 8 making after Primakov 10, 14–15 operational pattern in 105 sidelining of, in ‘peacekeeping’, before OSCE mission in 109 Primakov 9–10 resistance to demands for Russian views on ‘peacekeeping’ 94–6 Operational Group 33 see also division of labour Romanian involvement in 34, 125 Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations Russian military base in 14, 109–10, 52 182 Minsk Group 60 Russian ‘peacekeeping’ contingents in Minsk Summit (1992) 70 53, 77 Missile Space Defence Forces 88 Russian pressure on Dnestr leadership Mitrofonov, Aleksei 169 in 122 Mkhedrioni (‘Horsemen’) 129, 130, Russian strategy towards 109–26 135 separatist movements in 28 Mobile Forces 72, 74–5, 83, 96, 102 sources of 111–12 Modestov, Sergei 168 strategy of armed suasion in 4, 27 Moldova withdrawal timetable for 121 CIS taxes, lifting of 121 Moldovan Popular Front 111 customs union with Ukraine 123 Molotov–Ribbentrop pact 111 declaration of independence 111 monitoring cease-fire regime 101 isolation from Russia and CIS 174 Moscow military district 75 language law in 111 Motor Rifle Division (MRD) limits to independence of 174 27th 66, 97–8 and membership of CIS 119 45th 66 military base in 84, 109 201st 100, 154, 156, 159, 161, 162, nationalist backlash in 183–4 166, 169 prospects for Russian strategy towards 124–6 Nabiev, Rakhman 151, 152 rescheduling of debts of 125 Nagorno-Karabagh, war in 46, 60, 71, reunification with Romania 111 132 Russian economic blockade of 117 National Guard (Georgia) 129, 130 Russian military presence in 126 NATO 72, 123 Russian normalization of economic activities in Bosnia 57 relations with 120 normalization of relations with 61 Russian policy towards 109 prospect of enlargement of 41, 57–8, see also Dnestr; Moldova-Dnestr 78, 80, 81, 84, 121 Index 261

Naumkin, Vitaly 153 ‘peacekeeping’ 189 Naval Forces 66, 88 and armed suasion 3–6 Nazarbaev, President N. (Kazakstan) Border Service views on 102–4 164 casualties in 67 ‘near abroad’ CIS forces for 81–2 conflicts in 28 CIS High Command views on 101–2 factors in policies towards 6–7, 37–8 as collective CIS endeavour 81 and future of Russia 44 comparison with UN operations 24, MFA policy towards 125 26 MoD ambitions in 78 compliance with UN Charter 95 ‘peacekeeping’ operations in 61 as component of collective security 101 Russian involvement in 158 as compromise between subjugation Russian military approaches to and neglect 95 62–90 and conflict mediation 77–8 as threat to Russia 7 consensus and differences on 91–105 uncertainty in Russian interaction with consensus on role of 91–3 31 Defence Ministry views on 96–100 Nemtsov, Boris 10, 87 definitions of 9 neo-Clausewitzian views on use of force differences in the nature of 93–104 97 as diplomatic instrument 97 Newman, Edward 190 dominated by Russian forces 3 Nikolaev, Colonel-General Andrei 87, emergence of 45 103, 140, 147, 166, 167 to establish hegemonic control 4 Nikonov, Colonel A. 66 as focus of MFA promotion of CIS North Caucasus 127 56 North Caucasus Military District forces for 66 (NCMD) 75 as form of combat activity 99 North Western Group of Forces 75 and international practice 101 nuclear weapons, centralized control over legislation 3 70 MFA views on 94–6 Nuri, Said Abdullo 164 in military doctrine 79 ministerial agreement on 32 Odessa agreements (1998) 126 MoD initiative in 77 Odom, William 69 as obstacle to CIS cooperation 89 oil pipeline role in military relations with new Baku-Supsa 143–4 states 62 Novorossiysk-Supsa 147 and Russian armed suasion 26–30 Operational Group see Russian Russian claim of special responsibility Operational Group for 8–9 operational mandates 3 Russian terms for 97 Operation Desert Storm as paradigm peacekeeping, international 72 contemporary 21–4 Orr, Michael J. 150 evolution of 19–24 OSCE 13, 81, 109 norms of 4 support for CIS ‘peacekeeping’ 160 traditional 19–21, 101 support for Moldovan government Perry, William 80, 121 122–3, 124, 125 persuasion see suasion Piriz-Ballon, Ramiro 162–3 paramilitary forces 87 PMR 126 Paris Charter of New Europe 46 declaration of independence 111 Parrish, Scott 189 as ‘industrial showcase’ of Moldova Partnership for Peace 123 111–12 Pastukhov, Boris 133 and Moldovan government, conflict Patrikeyev, Commander 166 between 111–12 262 Index policy-making inconsistency 30 as guarantor of stability in former Popov, Lieutenant-General V. 67 Soviet Union 51 Popular Unity Front (Tajikistan) 152 internal revitalization and external Poti (Georgia), lease to Russia 139 hegemony of 177, 187 Odessa to, ferry 144 in joint air defence system 82 power struggles see bureaucratic over-reliance on military tools by divisions 187 Pravda, Alex 40 shifts in civil–military relations 182 Presidential Security Services 68 ‘Russia first’ integrationist policy in CIS Prikhodka, Sergei 60 region 7, 13, 45, 77, 81, 91, 162 Primakov, Yevgeny 2, 42, 87, 147, 161, Russian 14th Army (14A) 48, 125 183 cease-fire ultimatum to Moldova 116 and coherence of Russian policy 6, involvement in Dnestr conflict 33, 35–6 112–16, 118–19 direct leadership of Russian policy withdrawal of 118 104 Russian Central Bank effect of appointment of 6, 10, 37, 54, credits to PMR 119 58–61, 63, 146, 167 demonetization of rouble 54, 160 and enlargement of NATO 57–8 freeze on Dnestr assets 120 role in Tajikistan 41, 164 Russian Federation (RF) Prudnikov, Colonel-General Viktor 82, force in response to threats to 79 83 over-reliance on use of force in 10 Pyankov, Lieutenant-General Boris transition period of 5 154, 157 see Border Service Russian National Security Concept 59 Rakhmonov President Emomali Russian Operational Group (Op.Gp) (Tajikistan) 152–4, 157, 163, 168, 33, 122, 124, 126 176 Russian sphere of influence 28 military support for 9, 14, 27, 151 Rutskoi, Aleksandr 47, 115, 117, 132–3 collapse of public support for 161 Rybkin, Ivan 61, 147 Rapid Deployment Forces 74 Rastokhez (Tajik nationalist movement) Safarov, Sangak 153–4 152 Safronov, Anatoly 133 refugees 56, 153 Samsonov, Colonel-General Viktor 76, regional security sub-systems 80 80 Rescue Corps 135 Sapegin, Colonel-General Sergei 82, resource constraints in peacekeeping 3, 140 33, 35, 126 Schelling, T. 4 RFBS see Border Service Security Council 7, 11, 42, 52, 78–9, 87, Riurikov, Dmitry 164 194 Roberts, Adam 23, 189 Security Council (UN) 21 Rodionov, Colonel-General Igor 10, 68, security policy-making, shifts in 86–90 69, 73–4, 80, 86, 146 security systems, regional 86 Rokhlin, Lev 65 Semenov, Colonel-General Vladimir Romanian involvement in Moldova 13 83, 159 rules of engagement 3 Sergeyev, Igor 10, 86, 147, 149 Rumyantsev, Oleg 47 Serov, Valery 147 Russia Shapavalov, Lieutenant-General A. 66 attitude to Abkhaz conflict 145 Shaposhnikov, Marshal Yevgeny 69–70, creation of armed forces for 71 76, 102, 115 economic and military difficulties of Shelov-Kovedyaev, Fyodor 39, 46, 50–3, 177, 180–1 155, 156 foreign and security policy of 173–8 Shevardnadze, President Eduard Great Power status of 56, 176 (Georgia) 14, 134, 135–45, 148, 175 Index 263

Shevtsov, Lieutenant-General L. 87 joint use of military facilities in 83 Shokhin, Aleksandr 54, 169 Ministry of Defence 153 Shoygu, Sergei 133 population of 151 Shumeiko, Vladimir 142 Russian support for 157 Sigua, Tengiz 129 Supreme Soviet 157 Skokov, Yury 39, 52 UN view on elections in 165 Smirnov, Igor 111, 112, 121 Tajik civil war 11 Snegur, President Mircea (Moldova) and Afghan civil war 13 14, 48, 112, 117–19, 126, 174 armed forces involved in 153–5 Snyder, Jack 181 armed suasion in 150 Socor, Vladimir 116 attack on Russian Border Post No 12 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr 155 160 Somalia, civil war in 21–2, 23 CIS framework for security in 53 Sosalev, Colonel Sultan 130 CIS involvement in 67, 102 South Ossetian conflict 53, 71, 77 counter-insurgency campaign on Soviet 14A, former see Russian 14A borders of 10 Soviet Union see USSR MFA progress in resolution of 10, Space Missile Forces 88 14 Stankevich, Sergei 39, 47, 115, 116 military policy towards 7 Staravoiteva, Galina 39 MoD heavy-handed approach to 9 State Duma 40 neutrality of Russian forces in 26 State Military Inspectorate 11, 87 operational pattern in 105 Strategic Missile Troops 88 ‘peacekeeping’ in 3, 26, 77, 101, ‘Strategy for Russia’ (CFDP) 52 159 suasion, strategy of armed ‘peacekeeping’ dilemmas in 168–72 bargains implicit in 29, 36 peace process in 2 bureaucratic infighting in 31 Peace Treaty (1997) 161, 171 coercive strategy of 12, 29, 30, 179 political context of 152 definitions of 4 Russian deployment in 53, 78, 97, factors in 5, 30–6 157–8, 179 forms of behaviour in 28 Russian mediation in 163–8 fragility of 180 Russian strategy towards 150–72 and independence of Moldova, Russian training and equipping of Georgia and Tajikistan 178–84 Tajik forces in 154, 159 naval (Luttwak) 24, 25–6, 27 sources of conflict in 151–3 and ‘near abroad’ 91 stability in 12 objectives of 28–9 strategy of armed suasion in 4, 27, and ‘peacekeeping’ 306 29 prospects for future of 184–8 Tajik–Russian ‘Protocol of Intentions’ Russian armed, and ‘peacekeeping’ 156 26–30 UN Observer Mission (UNMOT) for supportive strategy of 12, 29 cease-fire 163 targets of 28 violations of cease-fire 165 Supreme Soviet 40 see also Rakhmonov Committee on International Affairs Taran, Anatol 126 40 Tavildare 166 Committee on Security and Defence Tbilisi, Russian base at 140 40 Ter-Petrosyan, President Levon (Armenia) 84 Tajik–Afghan border 36, 63 Tharoor, Shashi 191 Tajikistan threats, potential, in draft Military characteristics of 151 Doctrine 72 dependence on Russia 176 Tiraspol (Moldova) 111 economic union with 54 Totskoye 66 264 Index traditionalists on use of force by UN missions 57 troops 22 Operation Provide Comfort 190 Transcaucasus peacekeeping, post-Cold War 92 as area of threat 74 Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Georgian–Abkhaz conflict in 11–12, 66 127 Security Council 180 integration into CIS security subcontracting of peacekeeping to arrangements 175 regional organizations by 23 interest of Turkey and Iran in 132 support for CIS ‘peacekeeping’ 160 military policy towards 7 in Tajikistan 163 multilateral agreements on troop Unified Task Force in Somalia 22, deployments in 8 23 Russian Group of Forces in 35 United States (US) 72, 123 Russian policy towards 133 interest in Moldova 120 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation support for CIS 163 (TFC) (Georgia–Russia) 139–40, United Tajik Opposition (UTO) 175 (Tajikistan) 163 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and UNOMIG 141 Mutual Aid (Tajik–Russian) 159 Urals military district 75 Trenin, Dmitry 6, 131 Urquhart, Sir Brian 21, 189, 190 Tsaranu, Anatol 118 USSR, former Turkey, military cooperation between collapse of 1, 156 Abkhazia and 144 disintegration of 188 Turkmenistan 55 geostrategic interests in 46 bilateral agreement with Russia 76–7 and influence of neighbouring states and multilateralization of CIS borders 34 8 international community role in 57 Tymko, Lieutenant-General Aleksandr as ‘sphere of vital interest’ 85, 103 Uzbekistan bilateral agreement with Russia 76 Ukraine contribution to ‘peacekeeping’ in as crucial to Russia 51 Tajikistan 161 customs union with Moldova 123 economic union with 54 determination to create national armed and multilateralization of CIS borders forces 47, 70 8 UNHCR 141, 163 population of 151 United Council of Work Collectives (Moldova) 111 Vasev, Vladlen 121 United Nations (UN) 13 Vincent, R. J. 191 Abkhazia Observer Mission 140–1 Volga military district 75 Charter 46, 92 Volkov, Colonel Vasiliy 101 devolution of peacekeeping to regional Volsky, Arkady 43 organizations by 180 volunteers, foreign, in Dnestr conflict division of labour between CIS and 113 23 Vorobyev, Major-General Ivan 100 in former Yugoslavia 23 and Georgia 136 Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) grounds for use of force by troops of 80 22 Weiner, Jarrod 190 increase in tasks of 21 Weiss, T. G. 23, 190 involvement in internal conflicts 21 Western Group of Forces 75 involvement in peacekeeping 21 Western European Union (WEU) 81 legislative bodies establishing withdrawal timetables 3 peacekeeping operation 19–20 World Bank 149 Index 265

Yakovlev, Lieutenant-General 113 Yevnevich, Major-General Valery 113, Yeltsin, Boris, President 10, 48, 51–2, 53, 122 58, 79, 88, 109, 124, 177–8, 194, 201 Yugoslavia, former 13, 23 access to 41, 68–9, 77 Yumashev, Valentin 147 ‘betrayal’ of 44 on Bosnia 57 Zavarzin, Lieutenant-General Viktor on Georgia 133–4, 137, 145 167 on Moldova 117, 118, 121 Zemsky, Vladimir 89 and Shaposhnikov 70 Zhilin, Lieutenant-General G. 99 speech to MFA Collegium (1998) 59 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 43 on Tajikistan 163, 167 Zhvaniya, Zurab 138, 145 weakening of position of 42 Zyuganov Gennady 43