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Thesis Full Manuscript Revised 2011V2 Regime Transition and Foreign Policy: The Case of Russia’s Approach to Central Asia (1991-2008) Glen Hazelton A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand June 2011 Abstract In 1991, Russian embarked on an ambitious regime transition to transform the country from communism to democracy. This would be a massive transformation, demanding economic, political, institutional, and social change. It was also expected that the transition would result in significant foreign policy adaptation, as Russia’s identity, direction and fundamental basis for policy-making was transformed. However, it was an unknown quantity how transition in the domestic environment would interact with foreign policy and what the nature of these changes would be. This thesis examines the relationship between regime transition and Russia’s foreign policy. It begins with an examination of literature on regime transition and the types of changes that potentially impact policy-making in a democratising state. It then moves to examining the policy environment and its impact on the contours of policy in each of the Yeltsin and Putin periods, drawing links between domestic changes and their expression in foreign policy. How these changes were expressed specifically is demonstrated through a case study of Russia’s approach to Central Asia through the Yeltsin and Putin periods. The thesis finds clearly that a domestic transitional politics was a determining factor in the nature, substance and style of Russia’s foreign relations. Under Yeltsin, sustained economic decline, contested visions of what Russia’s future should be and where its interests lay, as well as huge institutional flux, competition, an unstructured expansion of interests, conflict, and the inability to function effectively led to an environment of policy politicisation, inconsistency, and turmoil. Tracing relations with Central Asia through this period demonstrates the challenges of transitional foreign policy. Although an apparent ‘consensus’ on a focus on ‘near abroad’ partners emerged in the wake of rising nationalism and political conflict in 1993, it was never consistently implemented. Continued uncertainty, division, and unrestrained political competition, meant Moscow never substantiated opportunities to maintain or increase its influence in the region. iii This situation changed drastically under Vladimir Putin. Economic recovery, greater agreement on identity and national interests, transformation of the institutional environment and the installation of a more managed, delegative form of democracy stabilised the policy-making context. The political system became more personalised and tightly controlled, while political liberalism and pluralism declined. A smaller range of actors influenced foreign policy and their involvement was more predictable and constructive, though less autonomous. Policy shifted from the previously reactive nature where it catered more to immediate political interests, to demonstrating greater coherence, consistency and long-term, strategic focus. The subsequent change in Russia’s policy towards Central Asia was signficant. Putin saw Russia’s relations with Central Asia as part of an integrated approach to the world. He refocused relations to target economic and security considerations; areas of primary Russian interest and in which he knew Russia had something to offer. The greater coordination of a range of foreign policy actors and the growth of resources at the state’s disposal allowed for more comprehensive strategies. Importantly, it also laid the basis for a more significant future Russian presence, even in spite of the challenges presented by the more vigorous external activity in the region following September 11. Ultimately, Putin’s domestic changes meant that regime transition came to matter less in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and allowed Russia to pursue a more successful foreign policy in Central Asia. iv Table of contents Abstract iii Introduction 1 Chapter one: Regime transition, democratisation and foreign policy 9 Chapter two: Russia’s historical relationship with Central Asia 73 Chapter three: Russian foreign policy making in the transitional environment – 1991-1999 113 Chapter four: Yeltsin’s foreign policy from a global and regional perspective 157 Chapter five: Yeltsin’s Central Asia policy: Dimensions of Russian engagement 201 Chapter six: Russian foreign policy making in the transitional environment – 1999-2008 241 Chapter seven: Putin’s foreign policy from a global and regional perspective 287 Chapter eight: Taming the transition: Putin’s brand of ‘Realpolitik’ in Central Asia 331 Conclusion: The impact of regime transition on Russian foreign policy-making towards Central Asia and beyond 381 Bibliography 403 v List of Tables Table 1: Russian Gross Domestic Product, 1990-1999 114 Table 2: Russia’s trade with Central Asia, 1994-1999 214 Table 3: Russian Gross Domestic Product, 1999-2008 243 Table 4: Russian Foreign Direct Investment in Central Asia, 1998-2008 359 Table 5: Russia’s trade with Central Asia, 1998-2008 360 vi Introduction With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s came some of the most profound political changes of the twentieth century. For those states involved in the transition from communism, there were no roadmaps or prescriptions. While they could draw on the prior experiences of other states transiting from authoritarianism, no one really knew how applicable these experiences would be to regimes transiting from perhaps the most comprehensive forms of authoritarianism in the modern age. While there was much hope and expectation, postcommunist states— and the rest of the world too—were effectively stepping into the unknown. If there was one state whose transition was watched with more anticipation than any other, it was that of newly independent Russia. So long at odds with the West, there was hope that change would open new opportunities for more cooperative and constructive relations with Russia. Of particular focus then, was the impact of transition on foreign policy change. What would the abandonment of communism mean for the way Russia interacted with the world and what would be the impact on global security environment more generally? How would transition affect its relationships with the Former Soviet Union (FSU)—countries previously ‘imperial vassals’ but now theoretically ‘equal partners’? And while many had optimistic hopes for what Russia’s potential democratisation might ultimately mean for its interaction with the rest of the world, what might happen in the meantime during the transition itself—given this could potentially be a long, involved process—was much less clear. Exactly how the process of transition might affect the foreign policy outputs of the state while Russia was transforming was something that was much less understood. As it happens, Russia’s transition has been far more tumultuous than many expected and the meandering of its foreign policy often hard to predict, with many unexpected twists and turns. This thesis aims to make sense of Russia’s postcommunist, post-Soviet foreign policy in relation to the domestic transformations that have been occurring. The specific research question investigates what changes took place during the evolving 1 transitional processes, and then how and why they were expressed in foreign policy. It seeks to identify the broad range of impacts—both positive and negative—of regime transition on foreign policy, and then considers how these dynamics impacted Russia’s relations with the outside world. Understanding how regime transition has impacted Russia’s foreign policy is important, not only because of the size of the country and its regional and global influence, but also because of the potential to better explain and even predict the course of Russia’s future foreign policy. Throughout the Yeltsin and Putin periods, traditional approaches to understanding foreign policy have often failed to explain Russia’s foreign policy choices and actions, leaving the outside world baffled by exactly where Moscow was headed. While analysts often refer to a nebulous set of influences broadly termed ‘domestic politics’ in explaining the many twists and turns in Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy, less attention is paid to understanding precisely which aspects of the domestic environment have been influential and why. Instead, many instead revert to the old adage that Russia was inherently incomprehensible, perpetuating the belief that “Russia is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma” so famously coined by Winston Churchill, and, by inference, the supporting the existence of some type of Russian ‘exceptionalism’. It is the position of this research, however, that Moscow’s contemporary foreign policy choices and actions are not some kind of mystery unfathomable to those outside of Russia. Ultimately, Russian foreign policy has been the product of its transitional domestic environment, and the domestic upheaval and change has actually been one of the strongest, if not the pre- eminent influence on foreign policy. Closely examining the domestic context and impacts of regime transition on political functioning, the economic and social context in which policy has been formed and actions undertaken, and the way in which external factors (or more precisely perceptions and interpretations of these events and dynamics) entered the transitional foreign policy arena, makes understanding
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