eee Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military eee Zoltan Barany PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD Copyright © 2007 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 3 Market Place, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1SY All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Barany, Zoltan D. Democratic breakdown and the decline of the Russian military / Zoltan Barany. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-691-12896-2 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-691-12896-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Russia (Federation). Russkaia Armiia—Reorganization. 2. Russia (Federation). Russkaia Armiia—Political activity. 3. Civil-military relations—Russia (Federation). 4. Russia (Federation)—Politics and government—1991– I. Title. UA772.B275 2007 322′.50947—dc22 2006033996 British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available A University Co-operative Society Subvention Grant awarded by the University of Texas as Austin aided the marketing of this book, and is gratefully acknowledged by Princeton University Press. This book has been composed in Sabon with Insignia display Printed on acid-free paper. ∞ press.princeton.edu Printed in the United States of America 13579108642 eee To my beloved little daughter, Catherine eee CONTENTS Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 CHAPTER 1 The Tragedy and Symbolism of the Kursk 19 CHAPTER 2 Assessing Decay: The Soviet/Russian Military, 1985–2006 44 CHAPTER 3 Explaining the Military’s Political Presence 78 CHAPTER 4 The Elusive Defense Reform 111 CHAPTER 5 Civil-Military Relations and Superpresidentialism 143 Conclusion 169 Notes 193 Index 239 eee ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ne of the first undergraduate term papers I wrote in the Soviet and East European Studies program at Carleton University in Othe mid 1980s analyzed Admiral Sergei Gorshkov’s drive to es- tablish a global Soviet navy. Although since then I have occasionally wan- dered far in my research and writing from Soviet-Russian military issues, they have never left my peripheral vision. Since the late 1990s—starting with a symposium on Russian politics I organized and the subsequent book my colleague Robert Moser and I edited—Russian civil-military re- lations returned to my professional life as one of my primary preoccupa- tions. This book is the culmination of my work in this field. I am happy to recognize colleagues who took the time to read parts of the manuscript in its various incarnations and provided me with construc- tive criticism: Mark Beissinger, Michael Dennis, Roger Haydon, Dale Herspring, Patricia Maclachlan, Jennifer Mathers, Thomas Nichols, Scott Parrish, Anna Seleny, and Brian Taylor. I want to record my special ap- preciation to Dale, Tom, and Brian for their own first-rate scholarship on the core issues of this book and their careful and straightforward com- ments that improved my study. I presented the theoretical argument to the Comparative Politics/Democratization Workshop in my department, and its members—Henry Dietz, Wendy Hunter, Rau´ l Madrid, Rob Moser, and Ami Pedahzur—rewarded me with sage advice. The talented group of graduate students in my spring 2006 “Soldiers and Politics” seminar read the entire manuscript and gave me excellent feedback. I am grateful to the many friends and colleagues—in addition to those mentioned above—who facilitated introductions, wrote letters on my be- half, answered queries, sent materials, talked with me about the project, x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS or invited me to talk about it: Pavel Baev, A. David Baker III, Archie Brown, Valerie Bunce, Daniel Chirot, Joseph Derdzinski, Vladimir Gel’- man, Aleksandr Golts, Lionel Ponsard, and David Yost. There are many others, mostly in Russia, whose positions would make it most imprudent to thank them publicly. They know who they are and how much I value their assistance. Two visiting fellowships—at the Centre for International Relations at the University of Oxford in 2003 and at the East-West Center in Honolulu in 2006—provided pleasant and stimulating work environ- ments for the beginning and the completion of the project. I tried out different parts of the argument at the U.S. Air Force Academy, the Univer- sity of Texas, Texas A&M University, the University of Wisconsin, the NATO Defense College in Rome, the East-West Center, and St. Antony’s College at Oxford, and the questions and comments from these audiences had proved to be very helpful. The project received a good deal of financial support from various sources in my ever-generous home institution, including a Faculty Re- search Assignment that freed me from teaching responsibilities for the fall 2004 semester. The Frank C. Erwin, Jr., Centennial Professorship I have been privileged to hold paid for some of the travel and research expenses. I was honored to receive yet another award from the International Re- search and Exchange Board for a research trip to Moscow in 2005. I declined the grant, with IREX’s full understanding and support, because by this time doing fieldwork on “sensitive subjects” in Russia had become dangerous both for researchers—who, like me, refuse to mislead the Rus- sian authorities about what they are interested in studying—and, even more so, for those willing to talk to them. Portions of my earlier work on Russian military politics and related subjects found their way into the book in a much revised form. I thank the editors and publishers of these publications for permitting me to cite myself. “Controlling the [Russian] Military: A Partial Success,” Journal of De- mocracy 10:2 (April 1999): 54–67. “Politics and the Russian Armed Forces,” in Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser, eds., Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 174–214. The Future of NATO Expansion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi “The Tragedy of the Kursk: Crisis Management in Putin’s Russia,” Gov- ernment and Opposition 39:3 (summer 2004): 476–503. “The Politics of Russia’s Elusive Defense Reform,” Political Science Quarterly 121:4 (winter 2006–7): 597–627. I want to thank Chuck Myers at Princeton University Press for his inter- est in and enthusiasm for this study and attentive involvement in the publi- cation process. The book is better because of his efforts and those of oth- ers at the press with whom it was a pleasure to work: Jack Rummel and Deborah Tegarden. Finally, a word of thanks to my “girls”: My wife, Patricia Maclachlan, a fellow social scientist, urged me to write this book because she knew that I would enjoy researching and writing it and I did, for the most part. We broke with our long-standing tradition of not discussing each other’s work as I asked her to read some of the manuscript. Patti brought to this task her uncompromising standards and made some terrific suggestions. Our little daughter, Catherine, is far less interested in my scholarly pur- suits than in maximizing the time we spend together. I am old enough to have my priorities in order and have tried to make sure that my work does not encroach on our family life. I am confident that I more or less succeeded but just in case she is not entirely satisfied, I dedicate this book to Catherine as paternal settlement. I doubt that she will ever read it but I know she will be delighted to see her name on the dedication page. Zoltan Barany September 2006 Austin, Texas eee Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military eee INTRODUCTION he fifteen years since the founding of the new, post-Communist Russian Army have been marked by the unprecedented deteriora- T tion of the once-proud Soviet military. Unprecedented, that is, be- cause there is no similar case in world history of a dominant armed force so rapidly and so thoroughly deteriorating without being defeated in bat- tle. As a perceptive 2001 article noted, “Russia’s fall from military super- power Number Two to a country whose army can be neutralized by bands of irregulars fighting with little more than the weapons on their backs” was one of the most spectacular elements of the Soviet Union’s collapse.1 The army’s decline had actually begun during the late-Brezhnev era in the early 1980s and then had gathered momentum in the late 1980s under President Mikhail Gorbachev. The rule of Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, however, was synonymous with a virtual free-fall of the military’s effectiveness and overall standards. A plethora of articles and books published in Russia and abroad have depicted the shocking conditions in the armed forces brought about by the years of neglect, financial constraints, and competing priorities for state attention. In the 1990s officers left the service in droves to escape poor pay, lack of adequate housing, insufficient training, and plummeting social prestige. Soldiers were often compelled to feed themselves by forag- ing in forests and fields, their commanders rented them out as laborers, and the physical abuse they were subjected to by fellow conscripts and commanders alike frequently drove them to desertion or suicide. In the meantime, a seemingly endless string of major accidents and defeat at the hands of a ragtag guerrilla force added to the army’s public humiliation. 2 INTRODUCTION In some respects—particularly regarding the armed forces’ material conditions—matters have improved since the ascension of Vladimir Putin to the presidency in 2000. Most important, defense expenditures have been steadily and significantly boosted under his tenure for two reasons. First, the president apparently recognized the magnitude of the army’s problems, particularly after the tragedy of the Kursk nuclear submarine in August 2000.