POLITICALLY BIASED ELECTION OBSERVATION – a Threat to the Integrity of International Institutions

Politically biased electionPolitically observation POLITICALLY BIASED ELECTION OBSERVATION – a threat to the integrity of international institutions – a threat to the integrity the to – a threat of international institutions POLITICALLY BIASED ELECTION OBSERVATION – a threat to the integrity of international institutions 2 Imprint Edition: European Platform for Democratic Elections www.epde.org Responsible for the content: Europaischer Austausch gGmbH Erkelenzdamm 59 10999 Berlin, Germany Represented through: Stefanie Schiffer EPDE is financially supported by the European Union and the Federal Foreign Office of Germany. The here expressed opinion does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the donors. 3 Content Introduction 4 Detection and Prevention of politically Biased election observation (“fake observation”) in the OSCE region 7 Foreign Observation of the Illegitimate Presidential Election in Crimea in March 2018 13 Politically biased foreign electoral observation at the Russian 2018 presidential election 33 Politically Biased International Election Observation at the 2018 Regional Elections in Russia 63 The Globalisation of Pro-Kremlin Networks of Politically Biased Election Observation: The Cases of Cambodia and Zimbabwe 75 Foreign Observation of the Illegitimate “General Elections” in the Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic in November 2018 101 4 Introduction In recent years, we have witnessed the increasing phenomenon of “biased observation”—a form of more politically-motivated election observation whose chief objective is to mislead the public regarding the regularity of some political process or the legitimacy of an election result. Striking examples were the “referendum” on Crimea in March 2014, the “elections” in Eastern Ukraine in November 2014, the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan since 2013, and the Presidential elections in the Russian Federation in March 2018. By participating on an individual basis in election observation activities that do not respect the basic, internationally agreed-upon principles and methodology of election monitoring, parliamentarians can damage—intentionally or unwit- tingly—the reputation of the institutions they represent. The integrity of the parliamentary body can come under suspicion not only in the host country, but also in the region, within the EU, and abroad. In cases when such individual and unauthorised “observations” nevertheless do take place, those parliamentarians who “observed” the elections on their own initiative must ensure that their personal opinion is not confused with or intentionally presented by the media as the official position of the institution. EPDE has been following the phenomenon of politically biased election observation since 2014, when Anar Mammadli, Director of the Azerbaijani EPDE member organisation “Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre”, was sentenced to 5,5 years of prison time after critically reporting on the fraudulent Azerbaijani Presidential elections in 2013. At the same time, these elections were whitewashed by international “election observers”—among them members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 5 Since that time, election experts and civil society networks have done a lot to increase transparency in the field of international election observation. In 2017, the Council of Europe initiated an internal investigation on political corruption in member countries where election observation missions have played a key role. International institutions, election observers, and election experts still face a series of challenges in protecting well-established mechanisms of election observation against misuse and political corruption. There are still open questions: § How have election observation missions in the past served as an entry to international corruption networks? What are the personal and international links between politically motivated election observation and lobby activities for authoritarian states in the OSCE region? § How can international organisations improve their institutional framework in order to safeguard themselves from politically biased election observation? § How can international and local election observers together take action against intentional delegitimation of electoral processes? By publicizing the findings of its research on politically biased election observation, EPDE contributes to the protection of elections against biased outcomes. This brochure includes two reports by Anton Shekhovtsov on biased observation of the March 2018 Presidential elections in the Russian Federation and the annexed Crimea. Additionally, we are pleased to be able to publish here the recommendations that EPDE experts gathered in March 2017 during a Round Table on biased election observation in the European Parliament. 6 7 Detection and Prevention of politically Biased election observation (“fake observation”) in the OSCE region EPDE Board Berlin, Germany, 7 March, 2017 Background In the last years we observe that an increasing number of countries in the OSCE region assess election observation no longer as an instrument to improve electoral processes but as a threat to the intentional and systematic manipulation of elections in their countries. At the same time these regimes increasingly misuse the instrument of international election observation to give legitimacy to fraudulent elections through the assignment of biased election reports. These developments destroy the trust in elections and shatter the legitimacy of all institutions involved in these processes. In 2015 EPDE has started to systematically study the quality of international election observation missions. In-depth research of international election observation missions into the following elections has been done during the: § Parliamentary elections Azerbaijan, 1.11.2015 § Constitutional Referendum Armenia, 6.12.2015 § Parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation, 18.9.2016 § Constitutional Referendum in Azerbaijan, 26.9.2016 8 All reports are accessible on www.epde.org EDPE hereby refers to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observation1 along with the OSCE and Council of Europe standards of free and fair elections. With respect to that, EPDE promotes the article 6 of the aforementioned Decla- ration as a fundamental norm for international election observation missions: “International election observation is conducted for the benefit of the people of the country holding the elections and for the benefit of the international community. It is process oriented, not concerned with any particular electoral result, and is concerned with results only to the degree that they are reported honestly and accurately in a transparent and timely manner. No one should be allowed to be a member of an international election observer mission unless that person is free from any political, economic or other conflicts of interest that would interfere with conducting observations accurately and impartially and/ or drawing conclusions about the character of the election process accurately and impartially…” Findings EPDE observes a growing tendency among authoritarian regimes in the OSCE region to orchestrate benevolent election observation in order to give legitimacy to fraudulent elections. For this purpose, some regimes use EOM of national and international GONGOs and invite members of European parliaments or international parliamentary bodies as PA OSCE, PACE, EP and others to voice out biased election assessments. EPDE observes a series of cases where European parliamentarians individ- ually make public assessments of elections abroad, giving an impression to represent the position of their parliament also while their activity is not en- dorsed by their parliament or their faction, and when they are not member of any official EOM. By that, they discredit not only the parliament and the faction they represent but election observation as such. Currently, there are European parliaments which did not sufficiently elaborate effective internal control mechanisms (i.e. Codes of Conduct) to discourage their members from participating in biased international election observation missions. Generally, the countermeasures to prevent parliamentarians from giving public individual assessments differing from the findings and conclusions of the election observation mission they are members of are neither suf- ficient, not efficient. 1 https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1923_declaration_102705_0.pdf Detection and Prevention of politically Biased election observation (“fake observation”) in the OSCE region 9 Also, an increasing number of GONGOs (governmental organized NGOs) publish assessments on election processes which are not based on any meth- odological election observation, while often being purely politically motivated. EPDE observes a tendency that election administrations in some countries of the OSCE region deliberately deny accreditation to independent international EOM2 adhering to international standards as the ODIHR methodology or the DoP. Unlike OSCE/ODIHR, which has a well-established methodology as a profes- sional international election observation institution, IEOM from CIS, PACE, OSCE PA and the European Parliament do not operate on the basis of a transparent and clearly definedelection observation methodology for the assess- ment of the election process. So far, there are no established mechanisms

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