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ANNUAL REPORT 1999 Russia IHF Focus HONORARY CHAIRMAN ADVISORY BOARD (CHAIR) PRESIDENT Yuri Orlov Karl von Schwarzenberg Ludmilla Alexeyeva EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE VICE PRESIDENT Aaron Rhodes Sonja Biserko Ulrich Fischer DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR Holly Cartner TREASURER Brigitte Dufour Bjørn Engesland Stein-Ivar Aarsæther Krassimir Kanev Andrzej Rzeplinski Wickenburgg. 14/7, A-1080 Vienna, Austria; Tel +43-1-408 88 22; Fax 408 88 22-50 e-mail: [email protected] – internet: http://www.ihf-hr.org Bank account: Bank Austria Creditanstalt, 0221-00283/00, BLZ 12 000 ANNUAL REPORT 1999 Russia IHF Focus: Elections and referenda; freedom of expression and the media; freedom of association and peaceful assembly; judicial system and independence of the judiciary; conditions in prisons and detention facilities; religious tolerance; freedom of movement; protection of minorities and tolerance; death penalty; rights of the child; human rights defenders. The August decision of the Russian government to devaluate the ruble and to default its foreign debt escalated the collapse of the already miserable economy. As a result of the financial crisis, millions of citizens lost their bank savings. The failure to pay pensions, salaries and social allowances – in some cases for as long as over a year - placed much of the population at the verge of subsistence, the situation getting even more dramatic in the winter of 1998-1999 due to fuel and food shortages in many rural areas. In pace with economic decline, basic human rights were increasingly violated and the rule of law grew extremely weak in the Russian Federation. Regional authorities often operated in total disregard of federal laws, with little protests from Moscow. Corruption penetrated all sectors of society. The judicial system was dependent on local authorities, and often showed little interest in administrating the law. The media faced increasing financial problems and restrictions. There were virtually no genuinely independent media outlets left in most Russian regions. In 1998 critical journalists were harassed by local authorities, and many were murdered. The trials against Alexander Nikitin and Grigori Pasko revealed the vulnerability of free expression in Russia, the strength of the influence of the Federal Security Bureau (FSB, formerly KGB), and the weakness of the judicial system. The murder of the deputy Galina Starovoitova, one of the most prominent defenders of the rule of law, tolerance and human rights and a member of the Moscow Helsinki Group, who had condemned the rise of fascism in Russia, illustrates the climate of violence in the country. The IHF has consultative status with the United Nations and the Council of Europe. MEMBER AND COOPERATING* COMMITTEES IN: Albania – Austria – Azerbaijan - Belarus – Bosnia-Herzegovina – Bulgaria – Canada – Croatia – Czech Republic – Denmark – Finland – France – Georgia* Germany – Greece – Hungary – Italy – Kazakhstan – Kosovo – Kyrgyzstan – Latvia – Lithuania – Macedonia – Moldova – Montenegro – The Netherlands Norway – Poland – Romania – Russia – Serbia – Slovakia – Slovenia – Sweden – Switzerland – Ukraine* – United Kingdom – United States – Uzbekistan* COOPERATING ORGANIZA TIONS: The European Roma Rights Center – Human Rights Without Frontiers – Mental Disability Advocacy Center Elections and Referenda 1 In the past few years the electoral rights of Russian citizens have been violated in numerous cases. The methods used by authorities included tampering of election laws as well as slander campaigns and fabricated criminal charges against rivals who ended up behind bars, sometimes for years. In 1998 at least four such cases occurred: - On 29 March businessman Andrei Klementyev was elected mayor of Nizhny Novgorod, the third largest city of the Russian Federation. Local authorities confirmed his victory in televised statements and noted - just like independent observers - that the elections were held without any substantial irregularities. The local electoral commission declared the elections valid. However, on the demand of the central electoral commission, the local commission on 1 April declared the results invalid. The following day Klementyev was arrested in the court building where he wanted to attend hearings of a longstanding criminal case in which he was accused of embezzlement of government funds. New elections were held in September, but Klementyev could not run as he was already convicted. - On 14 June, six months earlier than stipulated by the constitution, presidential elections were held in Bashkortostan. This was done in order to allow incumbent president Murtaza Rakhimov to run before his 65th birthday, the age limit to run for president. Rakhimov’s main rivals were groundlessly denied registration as candidates and were refused access to the local government-controlled press. Independent media were attacked (see below). - In October at the eve of the elections for mayor in the city of Vladivostok (Primorsky region), the electoral commission decided to take the city’s incumbent mayor, Victor Cherpkov, off the list of candidates, citing violation of law during his election campaign. This act was preceded by a long animosity between Cherpkov and the local governor, Evgeny Nazdratenko. The majority of the electorate protested the act by voting against all the candidates remaining on the list. As no one was elected mayor, by law, the incumbent mayor should have stayed in office until the second elections, which were scheduled for January 1999. But in December 1998 President Yeltsin dismissed Chepkov, without legal authority to do so. Mr. Konyakhin, mayor of the town of Leninsk-Kuznetsky in Kuzbas, was dismissed and arrested after Izvestia newspaper had published articles alleging that he had used municipal funds to acquire personal property. These allegations could not be substantiated in a year-long investigation, during which time Konyakhin was held in custody. Finally, Konyakhin was released under the sole condition of paying a fine for minor violations of business management regulations. Freedom of Expression and Media2 Freedom of expression suffered serious setbacks. In mid-September the new Prime Minister Evgeni Primakov banned government officials from talking to reporters without prior permission. Draft regulations submitted by the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) regarding the Internet and e-mail would allow the security services to monitor all such communications without obtaining prior permission.3 The FSB played a central role in restricting free expression generally, and in the prosecution and trials of Alexandr Nikitin and Grigori Pasko in particular. Both proceedings were dangerously reminiscent of the Soviet system - Alexandr Nikitin, former submarine captain and nuclear engineer, was charged with espionage and disclosure of state secrets after co-writing a report on the Russian Northern fleet’s treatment of nuclear waste. The right to report on environmental issues, however, is protected by both the Russian constitution (article 41) and international law. The charges were based on secret decrees of the Ministry of Defense. Throughout the investigation, which lasted more than three years, the FSB’s methods amounted to harassment and intimidation. In October 1998 Nikitin stood trial before the St. Petersburg City Court. On 30 October the judge remanded the case for further investigation. On 4 February 1999 the Supreme Court avoided issuing a final decision, which was in violation of the defendant’s right to be judged without delay and the presumption of his innocence. It upheld the decision of the lower court, declaring the indictment vague and depriving the defendant of any possibility of defense – and remanded the case for further investigation.4 Nikitin will appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. - A similar case was that of Grigori Pasko, a naval captain and correspondent for the newspaper of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Boyevaya Vakhta. Pasko also worked for the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) and the Japanese national daily Asahi Shimbun. Pasko was imprisoned in November 1997 in Vladivostok and faced trial on charges of treason. The charges were based on his publications on the problem of nuclear waste disposal, which has created a major environmental danger. The authorities admitted that none of the facts he had published revealed state secrets or endangered national security. Moreover, all of Pasko's contacts with the Japanese media were sanctioned or coordinated with the leadership of the Pacific Fleet, and all material published in the Fleet's newspaper had passed the military censor. Nevertheless, the authorities argued that the net effect of his publications resulted in revealing a pattern whose exposure constituted a challenge to Russian state security.5 The trial continues in 1999. A return to the Soviet practice of misuse of psychiatric institutions was reported in Kalmykia: In early March the Kalmyk authorities placed Lidia Dordzhieva, head of the humanitarian organization "Heart to Heart," in a psychiatric hospital after she had led a hunger strike of disabled people and mothers of large families to protest government allowance arrears. After about one week she was released, as doctors diagnosed her as healthy. She was later granted asylum abroad.6 Freedom of the Media The mass media grew increasingly dependent on local authorities, serving their needs rather than distributing objective information. Only very few regions still had independent newspapers, radio or television companies. Most of them
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