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1 RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE CIS, 1991-1996: DEBATES ABOUT THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE MOLDOVA-TRANSDNIESTRIA, GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA AND TAJIKISTAN CONFLICTS Nicole Janine Jackson Ph.D. Dissertation London School of Economics UMI Number: U150835 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U150835 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 T h £-s £ S F -T\SH Ufi-o OF POLITICAL AIMD t*. 7^0Lt i l sC*r. 2 Abstract The most serious foreign policy challenge that the Russian Federation faced from 1991 to 1996 was whether and how to respond to outbreaks of conflict within its neighbouring states. Unlike under the Soviet Union, there were open, diverse and complex debates about whether Russia should react to these conflicts, and if so, by what means. These foreign policy debates among the political elite and the ensuing policies form the subject of this thesis. The thesis asks what the dominant ideas expressed in these debates about foreign policy were, and whether they were reflected in Russia's policies towards specific military conflicts in the CIS States. To answer these questions, the thesis first derives insights about the role of ideas and debates within international relations literature which are helpful for the subsequent analysis of Russian foreign policy debates. It then identifies the dominant foreign policy ideas and foreign policy orientations, traces the major stages in the debates and the policies, and compares Russia's political debates, policies and actions towards the Moldova- Transdniestria, Georgia-Abkhazia and Tajikistan conflicts. Using interviews and both primary and secondary sources, the general finding of the thesis is that broad foreign policy ideas and orientations provided the backdrop against which debates occurred and policies were formulated or pursued. Ideas and debates were crucial factors in developing and defining an official pragmatic nationalist foreign policy orientation that crystallised in the later period. On the whole, there was congruence between the dominant ideas within the debates and the foreign policies enacted towards specific conflicts. Specific foreign policies towards the conflicts developed in response to the general debate (clash of ideas), which in turn responded to the domestic conditions and particular events in the near abroad. Military actions tended to start independently as local initiatives, and then fall in line with government policy. 3 Acknowledgements My greatest debt belongs to not one but two distinguished scholars, teachers and supervisors: Professor Margot Light and Professor Dominic ILieven. was exceptionally fortunate to benefit from their tremendous knowledge and great passion for the study of Russia and Eurasia. Both were always exceedingly generous with their time, experience and friendship. I thank Professor Lieven for his unstinting support since my MSc, for sharing his sweeping historical insights and profound understandings of empire, and for his great charm and character, which made my years studying in London a truly wonderful learning experience. I thank Professor Light for being a role model to me - for her high standards of excellence, her dedication and kindness, and especially for her own superior work which strongly inspired and helped to shape mine. I am grateful to the Canadian Department of National Defence for a renewable Security and Defence Forum PhD Scholarship; Celanese Canada for an Internationalist Fellowship; the Canadian Embassy in London for a Centennial Scholarship Fund Award; and to the LSE for the Alfred Zauberman Award and Robert McKenzie Canadian Scholarship. My research trips to Moscow were funded by a University of London Central Research Grant; Russian lessons and an internship at the Russian parliament were possible thanks to a Canadian DND Language Scholarship. The thesis would not have been possible without the assistance given by Russian politicians and decision-makers - too numerous to list here. I thank the faculty of MISPS in Moscow, as well as Dr. Roy Allison (RIIA), Dr. Christopher Donnelly (NATO), and Dr. Tatiana Parkhalina (INION) for their insights and guidance as well as the introductions that made many interviews possible and profitable. Dr. Mark Smith (CSRC) was exceedingly generous with his time, knowledge and friendship. His work motivated my own and he has provided me with multiple research documents, news sources, and come to my rescue several times in my search for obscure facts. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Jonathan Aves (FCO) who encouraged me to do a 4 PhD, fuelled my passion for the study of Eurasia, and gave me good advice and constant support. My love for the study of international relations and Russia/CIS politics began at the University of Toronto and continued thereafter thanks to four outstanding professors - Janice Stein, Franklyn Griffiths, Donald Schwartz and Peter Solomon. Dr Peter Gerlich (U of Vienna) introduced me to European politics and later Dr. Philip Boobbyer (University of Kent at Canterbury) encouraged me to do a PhD. Research trips to Moscow were always a true joy thanks to the warm hospitality of my dear friends Kostia, Nastia, Sasha and Marina Soukhodolets; and to my friend, Katia Zhuravskaya, who always welcomed me to her home city. I also thank Razmik Panossian for introducing me to Armenia, and Olga Fedina for being my patient Russian tutor and friend. Others were there for me. My wonderful London House friends shared with me lively conversations and evenings at Jimmy’s - Anna Snaith, Dalia Bankhausite, Roli Asthana and Shondeep Baneiji, Katia Antonoff, Albert Caruana and Jackie Harris. Trinity friends Sarah Bright and Kirstin Gunther kept in touch. Agi and Andy Okany, Kathy, Tom and Linda Lakatos, and all my many relatives in Southern Ontario provided kindness and love. For making this journey the happiest time of my life, I thank Gary Kett, Stephen Foumey, David Lewis, Lisa Clarke, Claire Smart, Murielle Bendeck, my biggest fan, my Grandma, Velma Sholdice; and most of all my best friend - Michael Lakatos - a true Renaissance man who has brought philosophy, music and sports to my life. Finally, I can never thank my parents enough. Robert and Doreen opened up the world to me and made all my dreams possible. They fuelled my love of learning, passion for politics, enthusiasm for adventure, and then survived the trauma of having to visit their daughter in London and Moscow - and not sipping Chardonnay in the Loire Valley as planned. They have dedicated dozens of books to me, and now finally receive a dedication with all my love in return. 5 Table of Contents A b s t r a c t ....................................................................................................................................... 2 A cknowledgements ................................................................. 3 List of T a b l e s ...............................................................................................................................7 C hapter O n e: Introduction ................................................................................................... 8 1. R ussia ’s Political D ebates A bout Foreign Po lic y................................................ 8 2. C o n tex t: T he S earch for a N ew R ussian Foreign P olicy in a P eriod of Un c e r t a in t y ......................................................................................................................9 3. A pproach /M ethodolo gy and S o u r c e s.................................................................... 11 4. Parameters of the T hesis .......................................................................................... 13 5. T hesis O u tlin e...................................................................................................................19 C hapter Tw o : Ideas and Po litical D ebates in T h eo retic al A ppro aches to Foreign P olicy D e velo pm en t............................................................................................... 23 1. T he R ole of Political D ebates and Ideas in the T heoretical A pproaches to Foreign Po l ic y .........................................................................................................23 2. Ideas /P olitical D ebates and G rand T h e o r ie s.......................................................24 3. Ideas /P olitical D ebates and M iddle -FIa ng e T h e o r ie s........................................26 4 .T he R ole of Ideas and D ebates in International R elations T heoretical Lit e r a t u r e .......................................................................................................................41 5. C onclusions and th e A pproach Used in this T h e s is ...........................................43 C hapter T h r e e: Fo reig n Po licy Ideas and T heir M anifestation in K ey Foreign Policy O rientations ...............................................................................................................
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