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02 Intro.Indd AUGUST 1991 Introduction: Coup de Grâce? Ann E. Robertson The collapse of the Soviet N August 4, 1991, Soviet president Mikhail Gor- Obachev left for the Crimea, to relax at his newly con- Union was the product of a structed dacha in Foros. Russian president Boris Yeltsin retired to his dacha, a two-story building outside Moscow. multifaceted struggle for power Both leaders planned to return to work by August 20 to between the center (Moscow) sign a controversial new Union treaty. At the same time, opponents of the treaty were meet- and the extensive periphery. ing in secret near Moscow, debating whether to pre-empt the ceremony. These men held high-ranking positions in The August putsch was the all-Union institutions, such as the military, police, and critical tipping point at which intelligence services, and their power bases would be drastically reduced under the new confederal union. With the advantage shifted from the August 20 deadline looming, they resolved to seize power, overthrow Gorbachev, and preserve the Soviet Gorbachev to Yeltsin. Union. They failed on all counts. After the attempted coup failed, the editors of Problems of Communism solicited contributions for a special issue focusing on the August events. Starting from the assump- tion that “the swift, bloodless collapse of this abortive ‘state of emergency’ accelerated the very processes that the plotters hoped to block or reverse and effectively administered the coup de grâce to seven decades of Bol- shevik rule,”1 seven noted scholars were asked to analyze the August events and “reflect on the political, economic, social, and foreign policy ramifications of the disintegra- tion of the Soviet Union.”2 Their studies covered events through mid-October, when the November/December 1991 issue went to press. Twenty years later, the editors of Problems of Post- Communism revisited that special issue, asking the con- tributors to take a second look at their original papers. We were not able to reassemble the original lineup. Several ANN E. ROBERTSON is managing editor of Problems of Post-Communism. authors declined, citing demanding responsibilities in Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 58, nos. 4–5, July–August/September–October 2011, pp. 23–34. © 2011 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075–8216 / 2011 $9.50 + 0.00. DOI 10.2753/PPC1075-8216580402 Robertson Introduction: Coup de Grâce? 23 new jobs, several had retired, and one, William Odom, Background: The Soviet Union Begins to had passed away. Two authors, Anders Åslund and Mark Fray Beissinger, agreed to revisit their 1991 papers, which focused, respectively, on the accelerating post-coup eco- By 1991 the Soviet leadership faced growing battles on nomic crisis and options for establishing some form of several fronts. The economy continued to falter, violence successor political community.3 Amy Knight has provided was growing in many republics, and the Communist Party a new introduction to her paper, which is reprinted in full had adopted a hard-line stance against reform. But it was here. Two decades ago she warned that the August coup the issue of how republics should deal with one another “did not get rid of one of the greatest threats to democracy, and with Moscow that would prove fatal. Gorbachev’s the KGB, which over the years has moved from being an policies of glasnost (openness), democratization, and instrument of the ruling elite to being a key player in the pere stroika (restructuring) set in motion a process of re- political arena.”4 Her prediction has been borne out by the thinking and reconfiguring the relationship between the rise of former KGB agent Vladimir Putin and the siloviki central party-state and the fifteen constituent republics of and the corresponding decline in democracy. the Soviet Union, as well as between the central party- We also invited Archie Brown to contribute a new state and citizens. Glasnost, for example, had resulted in paper. Although he was not part of the original special the publication of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’s issue, he has strong ties to the magazine. One of the secret protocols, revealing that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu- first Western profiles of the new Soviet leader was his ania had been illegally annexed by Moscow. Democratiza- article “Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin,” which tion brought new alternatives to the Communist Party and appeared in the May/June 1985 issue of Problems of new issues to the debate. “Outside Russia,” writes Michael Communism.5 Mandelbaum, “the opportunity for political participation Like its predecessor, Problems of Post-Communism revealed that popular political allegiance was not to so- features articles and supplemental materials that are cialism, or the Soviet Union, or to Mikhail Gorbachev, intended to be readily accessible to researchers, policy- but rather to nationalism, which was deeply anti-Soviet makers, and students alike. The present issue includes a in character.”6 Glasnost exposed the party’s crimes and timeline of events in 1991 and reproduces the text of key human-rights violations, but Gorbachev also believed speeches and other documents to facilitate classroom it could be used to “politically educate” the population.7 discussion. The documents and translations come from Perestroika shed light on the disastrous mismanage- “Seventeen Moments in Soviet History” (www.soviethis- ment of the Soviet economy. The republics had virtually tory.org), an online archive of primary source materials no control over spending in their territories because “more on Soviet history. The Field Note column contains more than 93 percent of the economy,” according to Russian information on this valuable project. state secretary Gennady Burbulis, “was controlled by the The authors in this issue were asked to consider one Soviet government.” Yeltsin’s team “soon came to believe question: “Did the collapse of the Soviet Union solve the that unless we were to content ourselves with being noth- problems that led to the August coup attempt?” To answer ing more than a ceremonial body, we had to change the that question, however, requires an understanding of the legal and economic base of the union itself.”8 situation that led to the August events and, ultimately, While the Baltic republics sought outright indepen- to the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991. dence from the Soviet Union, other republics issued de- The weeks between the putsch and dissolution are both crees announcing their intention to take more control over crucial and confusing. Multiple jurisdictions competed their local political and economic affairs. The “parade of for supremacy, while Gorbachev and Yeltsin jockeyed for sovereignties” gained momentum after the Russian Con- power. The authors here discuss the events that occurred gress of People’s Deputies under the leadership of Yeltsin during this brief interlude, including developments that declared the sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federated occurred after their papers were published. Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in June 1990. The fate of Problems of Communism from its begin- The leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union nings was always closely tied to that of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had few ideas about how to change the federal and its communist regime. The issue on the August putsch structure of the USSR and found themselves in a defensive was en route to subscribers and news agents when the So- mode, responding to the rapid proliferation of new issue viet Union ceased to exist, and Problems of Communism and new players. The documents drafted for a September abruptly ended publication six months later. 1989 plenum on nationality questions proposed a variety 24 Problems of Post-Communism July–August/September–October 2011 of new configurations for the USSR, including dividing Gorbachev’s First Draft. The first union treaty was pre- the RSFSR into autonomous economic regions9 or the sented in November 1990 and discussed by the fourth whole USSR into fifty or more American-style states.10 USSR Congress of People’s Deputies on December According to the plenum platform, a “completely new 17–27. It described the new union as a voluntary as- federation” was needed to address ethnic concerns, but sociation of equal, sovereign republics.17 Leaders of the it gave no specifics.11 Instead, however, the plenum pro- union republics loudly objected, arguing that they had not duced a reactive policy that emphasized the rights of the been consulted on the document’s content.18 Gorbachev Soviet state over the rights of ethnic groups or individuals. responded by calling for a popular referendum on the Gorbachev also rejected requests to upgrade the status of issue. A referendum would speed the process along, several Russian autonomous republics.12 Next the Party bypass republic Party structures, and break the deadlock began to split along republic lines, In December 1989 the caused by the ongoing war of laws between center and Lithuanian Communist Party declared itself independent periphery.19 of the CPSU, and in June 1990 a Russian Communist Party was formed within the CPSU.13 The creation of Morozka Draft. The second draft treaty, published on the RCP began a process of pulling Soviet leaders away March 9, 1991, had more input from the republics and from Russia and toward dual sovereignty. According to was approved by the Supreme Soviet’s Federation Coun- Galina Starovoitova, part of the team drafting a Russian cil on March 6. The republic-level Supreme Soviets sent constitution, “The president of the USSR, who does not delegates to the meetings. Known as the “Morozka Draft” have his own territorial domain inside the huge country, for the villa where discussions took place, the treaty would is, with the loss of power in Russia, in effect losing his create a “federative democratic state, formed as a result power.
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