august 1991 Introduction: Coup de Grâce? Ann E. Robertson

The collapse of the Soviet n August 4, 1991, Soviet president Mikhail Gor- Obachev left for the , to relax at his newly con- Union was the product of a structed in Foros. Russian president retired to his dacha, a two-story building outside . multifaceted struggle for power Both leaders planned to return to work by August 20 to between the center (Moscow) sign a controversial new Union treaty. At the same time, opponents of the treaty were meet- and the extensive periphery. ing in secret near Moscow, debating whether to pre-empt the ceremony. These men held high-ranking positions in The August putsch was the all-Union institutions, such as the military, police, and critical tipping point at which intelligence services, and their power bases would be drastically reduced under the new confederal union. With the advantage shifted from the August 20 deadline looming, they resolved to seize power, overthrow Gorbachev, and preserve the Soviet Gorbachev to Yeltsin. Union. They failed on all counts. After the attempted coup failed, the editors of Problems of Communism solicited contributions for a special issue focusing on the August events. Starting from the assump- tion that “the swift, bloodless collapse of this abortive ‘’ accelerated the very processes that the plotters hoped to block or reverse and effectively administered the coup de grâce to seven decades of Bol- shevik rule,”1 seven noted scholars were asked to analyze the August events and “reflect on the political, economic, social, and foreign policy ramifications of the disintegra- tion of the .”2 Their studies covered events through mid-October, when the November/December 1991 issue went to press. Twenty years later, the editors of Problems of Post- Communism revisited that special issue, asking the con- tributors to take a second look at their original papers. We were not able to reassemble the original lineup. Several Ann E. Robertson is managing editor of Problems of Post-Communism. authors declined, citing demanding responsibilities in

Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 58, nos. 4–5, July–August/September–October 2011, pp. 23–34. © 2011 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075–8216 / 2011 $9.50 + 0.00. DOI 10.2753/PPC1075-8216580402 Robertson Introduction: Coup de Grâce? 23 new jobs, several had retired, and one, William Odom, Background: The Soviet Union Begins to had passed away. Two authors, Anders Åslund and Mark Fray Beissinger, agreed to revisit their 1991 papers, which focused, respectively, on the accelerating post-coup eco- By 1991 the Soviet leadership faced growing battles on nomic crisis and options for establishing some form of several fronts. The economy continued to falter, violence successor political community.3 Amy Knight has provided was growing in many republics, and the Communist Party a new introduction to her paper, which is reprinted in full had adopted a hard-line stance against reform. But it was here. Two decades ago she warned that the August coup the issue of how republics should deal with one another “did not get rid of one of the greatest threats to democracy, and with Moscow that would prove fatal. Gorbachev’s the KGB, which over the years has moved from being an policies of (openness), democratization, and instrument of the ruling elite to being a key player in the pere­stroika (restructuring) set in motion a process of re- political arena.”4 Her prediction has been borne out by the thinking and reconfiguring the relationship between the rise of former KGB agent Vladimir Putin and the siloviki central party-state and the fifteen constituent republics of and the corresponding decline in democracy. the Soviet Union, as well as between the central party- We also invited to contribute a new state and citizens. Glasnost, for example, had resulted in paper. Although he was not part of the original special the publication of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’s issue, he has strong ties to the magazine. One of the secret protocols, revealing that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu- first Western profiles of the new Soviet leader was his ania had been illegally annexed by Moscow. Democratiza- article “Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin,” which tion brought new alternatives to the Communist Party and appeared in the May/June 1985 issue of Problems of new issues to the debate. “Outside ,” writes Michael Communism.5 Mandelbaum, “the opportunity for political participation Like its predecessor, Problems of Post-Communism revealed that popular political allegiance was not to so- features articles and supplemental materials that are cialism, or the Soviet Union, or to , intended to be readily accessible to researchers, policy- but rather to nationalism, which was deeply anti-Soviet makers, and students alike. The present issue includes a in character.”6 Glasnost exposed the party’s crimes and timeline of events in 1991 and reproduces the text of key human-rights violations, but Gorbachev also believed speeches and other documents to facilitate classroom it could be used to “politically educate” the population.7 discussion. The documents and translations come from shed light on the disastrous mismanage- “Seventeen Moments in Soviet History” (www.soviethis- ment of the Soviet economy. The republics had virtually tory.org), an online archive of primary source materials no control over spending in their territories because “more on Soviet history. The Field Note column contains more than 93 percent of the economy,” according to Russian information on this valuable project. state secretary Gennady Burbulis, “was controlled by the The authors in this issue were asked to consider one Soviet government.” Yeltsin’s team “soon came to believe question: “Did the collapse of the Soviet Union solve the that unless we were to content ourselves with being noth- problems that led to the August coup attempt?” To answer ing more than a ceremonial body, we had to change the that question, however, requires an understanding of the legal and economic base of the union itself.”8 situation that led to the August events and, ultimately, While the Baltic republics sought outright indepen- to the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991. dence from the Soviet Union, other republics issued de- The weeks between the putsch and dissolution are both crees announcing their intention to take more control over crucial and confusing. Multiple jurisdictions competed their local political and economic affairs. The “parade of for supremacy, while Gorbachev and Yeltsin jockeyed for sovereignties” gained momentum after the Russian Con- power. The authors here discuss the events that occurred gress of People’s Deputies under the leadership of Yeltsin during this brief interlude, including developments that declared the sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federated occurred after their papers were published. Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in June 1990. The fate of Problems of Communism from its begin- The leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union nings was always closely tied to that of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had few ideas about how to change the federal and its communist regime. The issue on the August putsch structure of the USSR and found themselves in a defensive was en route to subscribers and news agents when the So- mode, responding to the rapid proliferation of new issue viet Union ceased to exist, and Problems of Communism and new players. The documents drafted for a September abruptly ended publication six months later. 1989 plenum on nationality questions proposed a variety

24 Problems of Post-Communism July–August/September–October 2011 of new configurations for the USSR, including dividing Gorbachev’s First Draft. The first union treaty was pre- the RSFSR into autonomous economic regions9 or the sented in November 1990 and discussed by the fourth whole USSR into fifty or more American-style states.10 USSR Congress of People’s Deputies on December According to the plenum platform, a “completely new 17–27. It described the new union as a voluntary as- federation” was needed to address ethnic concerns, but sociation of equal, sovereign republics.17 Leaders of the it gave no specifics.11 Instead, however, the plenum pro- union republics loudly objected, arguing that they had not duced a reactive policy that emphasized the rights of the been consulted on the document’s content.18 Gorbachev Soviet state over the rights of ethnic groups or individuals. responded by calling for a popular referendum on the Gorbachev also rejected requests to upgrade the status of issue. A referendum would speed the process along, several Russian autonomous republics.12 Next the Party bypass republic Party structures, and break the deadlock began to split along republic lines, In December 1989 the caused by the ongoing between center and Lithuanian Communist Party declared itself independent periphery.19 of the CPSU, and in June 1990 a Russian Communist Party was formed within the CPSU.13 The creation of Morozka Draft. The second draft treaty, published on the RCP began a process of pulling Soviet leaders away March 9, 1991, had more input from the republics and from Russia and toward dual sovereignty. According to was approved by the Supreme Soviet’s Federation Coun- Galina Starovoitova, part of the team drafting a Russian cil on March 6. The republic-level Supreme Soviets sent constitution, “The president of the USSR, who does not delegates to the meetings. Known as the “Morozka Draft” have his own territorial domain inside the huge country, for the villa where discussions took place, the treaty would is, with the loss of power in Russia, in effect losing his create a “federative democratic state, formed as a result power. For this reason, he naturally seeks to obstruct the of a voluntary union of equal republics.”20 It envisioned growing sovereignization of the republics.”14 broadened local authority on economic and cultural Gorbachev and the CPSU initially tried to control the matters, but still entrusted the central government with restructuring process. In April 1990, the USSR Supreme considerable power over defense, state security, foreign Soviet adopted Gorbachev’s “On the Procedure for policy, and unspecified “foreign economic activities.”T he Dealing with Matters Connected with the Secession of a proposed union was still federal in structure, with federal Union Republic from the USSR.” The cumbersome law laws supreme, one currency, and a federal budget and required that two-thirds of a republic approve secession taxes, but the republics were designated as “full-fledged” in a referendum, a five-year transition period, and en- international players.21 The three Baltic republics plus Ar- dorsement by the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies. menia and Moldavia refused to participate in the Morozka Ultimately, only Armenia would attempt to follow the discussions. Georgia acted only as an observer, Azerbai- secession procedures.15 jan eventually withdrew, and the Ukrainian delegation Three weeks later, on April 26, 1990, the Supreme only dropped by briefly. Ukraine appeared less and less Soviet adopted the law “On the Delineation of Powers interested in a union and was raising issues, including Between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation,” in its declaration of sovereignty on July 16, 1990, that to redefine center-periphery relations. The newly estab- were likely to be deal-breakers, such as the right to its lished Federation Council, consisting of Gorbachev and own currency, military, and space program and the right the leaders of the fifteen republics, announced on June to annul union laws.22 12, 1990, that a completely new union treaty was needed On March 17, 1991, a referendum was held on the to clarify the changing authority structure of the country. question of continuing the Soviet Union as a “renewed Four separate union treaties were drafted in 1990–91, federation of sovereign republics,” but Armenia, Estonia, but already certain republics were looking for an exit.16 Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldavia (which changed Gorbachev primarily negotiated this matter with the its name to Moldova when it declared independence [Au- elected presidents of the republics, not the republic Party gust 1991]) refused to hold the referendum, and Kazakh- leaders, a move that would alarm die-hard communists stan Communist Party first secretaryN ursultan Nazarbaev in the months to come. As discontent grew within the (president of since February 1990) argued Party, Gorbachev’s two closest allies in the reform pro- that there was no need to waste money on a referendum cess, Foreign Minister and adviser in a pro-union republic like his.23 In the republics that did Alexander Yakovlev, began to warn that a reactionary, conduct the referendum, 76.4 percent of voters favored anti-Gorbachev coup was imminent. continuing some form of union. Many republics tacked

Robertson Introduction: Coup de Grâce? 25 on their own questions, including Russia’s question about that time. Ukraine did not, posing a vexing problem. Gor- having a directly elected president. Meanwhile, the lead- bachev political adviser Georgy Shakhnazarov described ers of Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia (which changed its Ukraine’s future political status as “far more important name to Belarus when it declared independence in August than the Baltic states . . . in the end we will use our force 1991), Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan met together in Kyiv to preserve the basic union of Russia, Kazakhstan, the on April 18 to formulate a joint position on the Morozka Ukraine, and Byelorussia.”30 Draft. One of their main conclusions was that the differ- Key Soviet leaders feared that the new treaty “provided entiation between union and autonomous republics must a blueprint for the gradual dissolution of the USSR,” not be maintained. Their united front prompted Gorbachev to mention the end of their own power, which was closely to address their demands directly.24 tied to the CPSU. The KGB already bore a deep grudge against Gorbachev for allowing communist regimes in Novo-Ogarevo. Draft treaty number three emerged from Eastern Europe to fall in 1989, thus destroying its net- the Novo-Ogarevo process (again named for a villa) work of contacts.31 Kryuchkov also accused Gorbachev and was signed on April 23. Also known as “Nine-Plus- of allowing Western forces to meddle in Soviet affairs in One,” these talks included Gorbachev (the “one”) and the return for Western aid. 32 Yeltsin later offered a similar leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, explanation of events: “Objectively, the new union treaty Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uz- would virtually strip each of the architects of the putsch bekistan—the republics that had participated in the March of their offices, and herein lies the secret of the conspiracy referendum. It did not include representatives of the Party and the main motivation behind the actions of the parties in each republic. Gorbachev saw this as a less formal, to it.”33 more personal round of negotiations.25 The Novo-Ogarevo In the years since August 1991, many of the coup lead- version would have the interested parties negotiate a new ers have confirmed that the new treaty spurred them to union treaty rather than amend any existing arrangements. action. According to , then speaker of Under this new Union of Soviet Sovereign (no longer So- the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, the treaty “in cialist) Republics, the Union republics acknowledged the fact, liquidated the Soviet state as a federation of Soviet republican declarations of sovereignty, while still ceding republics. Only the blind could not see this.”34 Plans to responsibility for defense, foreign policy, and regional block these developments had already been drawn up and trade to a central government.26 were implemented once Gorbachev had left Moscow. The draft tacitly acknowledged that the other six “for- mer” union republics (Armenia, Estonia,Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldavia) were free to enter or decline Moscow in August the new political union. “For those who choose the path On the morning of August 19, 1991, Soviet state televi- outside the union,” warned Gorbachev, “there should be sion suddenly switched to playing classical music, a pro- a divorce in the framework of the constitutional process. gramming change usually made prior to a major political Then everything must be sorted out—human questions, announcement. Soviet vice president questions of finance, economics, defense, all questions.”27 issued a statement that President Gorbachev had been Meanwhile, on May 25–26, these six established the removed for health reasons and that he, as vice president, “Kishinev Forum,” a coordinated mechanism to facili- was now acting president. In reality, Gorbachev was under tate, according to the charter, “re-establishing their state house arrest at his vacation home in Foros. Yanayev and independence.”28 seven other hard-line communists, under the authority of the newly constituted “State Committee for the State The August 20 Treaty. Draft treaty number four was is- of Emergency,” had seized power to prevent a major sued June 17, five days after Yeltsin was popularly elected reorganization of the Soviet Union. Military units began president of Russia and eight days before a CPSU plenum. rolling into Moscow, taking position at strategic sites such Among the revisions since Novo-Ogarevo was a directly as bridges, Moscow Echo radio, and main roads. elected USSR presidency, which would have given Gor- The plotters issued an “Appeal to the ” bachev the popular legitimacy Yeltsin now enjoyed.29 The that was full of warnings about the imminent demise of plenum scheduled a signing ceremony for September or the USSR, and court documents and testimony have since October. Only five republics—Russia, Kazakhstan, Uz- confirmed that the desire to preserve the union was a direct bekistan, Tajikistan, and Byelorussia—planned to sign at precipitant of the coup. The eight-man Emergency Com-

26 Problems of Post-Communism July–August/September–October 2011 mittee represented the traditional bastions of power in the to defend Russia from Soviet leaders. Soviet system, including Gennady Yanayev (USSR vice Whatever the explanation, Yeltsin slipped away and president), (prime minister), Vladimir immediately went to the Russian parliament building, Kryuchkov (head of the KGB), Dimitri Yazov (minister known as the “White House.” Climbing atop one of the of defense), (minister of interior), Alexander tanks surrounding the White House, Yeltsin denounced the Tizyakov (head of the Association of State Enterprises), coup as illegal, read his appeal, and called for a general Oleg Baklanov (head of the military-industrial complex strike. He also declared that military and police forces and deputy chair of the Defense Council), and Vasil Staro- on Russian territory now reported to him. Yeltsin’s team dubsev (chair of the Soviet farmers’ union). Although began circulating alternative news reports, faxing them Yanayev was the reluctant public face of the committee, out to Western media for broadcast back into the Soviet Kryuchkov was the real architect. Key leaders such as par- Union. Soon Muscovites began to heed Yeltsin’s call to liamentary speaker Anatoly Lukyanov and Gorbachev’s defend democracy. long-time chief of staff, Valery Boldin, supported the Tens of thousands of Russian citizens assembled committee but were not formal members. In the end, the outside the White House, constructing barricades out of coup collapsed due to its planners’ incompetence, popular trees, trolley cars, building materials, even old bathtubs, to resistance, and Yeltsin. hold off an expected attack by Soviet troops. But instead On Monday, Acting President Yanayev held a press of attacking on Monday, troops from the Tamanskaya conference that was a public relations disaster. His quiv- Division switched sides to defend the White House, ering hands, constant sniffling, and stilted delivery sug- turning their turrets away from the building. An airborne gested a lack of conviction, if not inebriation. It did little battalion also took position to defend the White House. to rally people to his cause or make them fear to oppose Outside Moscow, the reaction was mixed. Many local him. Reporters laughed at Yanayev’s lame answers about leaders hastened to support the Emergency Committee, the day’s events. while most Western leaders cautiously waited to see what The plan implemented on August 19 seemed haphaz- would unfold. ard and improvised and neglected to take several clearly On Tuesday, August 20, Russian citizens continued to needed actions. For example, the Emergency Committee gather at the White House. Veterans of the Afghanistan dispatched troops to key positions around Moscow, shut war came forward to organize the students, priests, and down all independent media outposts, banned all non- grandmothers who came to defend the building. Waving communist political organizations, and proclaimed a state Russia’s pre-communist flag, Yeltsin rallied the crowd, of emergency. Yet it failed to shut off telephones, e-mail, telling them to ignore decrees from the Emergency and fax machines, and the independent media merely Committee. Members of the Russian and Western media went underground. entered the White House and provided eyewitness reports. Inexplicably, the Emergency Committee did not arrest Some 250 RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputies alternately Yeltsin, who had become the popularly elected president holed up with Yeltsin or went into the crowds to persuade of the Russian Republic only two months earlier. The Soviet soldiers to join their cause. Pro-democracy figures KGB’s elite Alpha commando unit was dispatched to such as the now-former foreign minister Shevardnadze, Yeltsin’s dacha, but arrived too late to take him into custo- human rights activist Yelena Bonner, and cellist Mstislav dy.35 In hindsight, participants have attributed this critical Rostropovich, who flew in from Paris, arrived and ad- error to internal bickering among Alpha commanders or dressed the crowds gathered in the streets. the lack of a direct order from the Emergency Committee. Also on Tuesday, Kryuchkov ordered the KGB to While the plotters dithered, key leaders of Russia, includ- draw up plans to seize the Russian parliament. The first ing Prime Minister , speaker of the Russian planning meeting was held at the KGB headquarters Congress of People’s Deputies Ruslan Khasbulatov, Len- that morning. That afternoon, two dozen senior military ingrad mayor Anatoly Sobchak, Moscow deputy mayor officers, including General Pavel Grachev (Airborne Yuri Luzhkov, and General Konstantin Kobets, chair of Forces), General Viktor Karpukhin (KGB Alpha Unit), the Russian Congress’s military affairs committee, flocked and General Valentin Varennikov (Army Ground Forces), to the dacha, where they drafted their own appeal, “To met at the office of Deputy Defense Minister Vladislav the Citizens of Russia,” which declared events to be “a Achalov to plan an overnight assault on the White House. right-wing, reactionary, anti-constitutional coup d’état.”36 Paratroopers, KGB special forces, and police were read- The appeal also played the nationalist card, calling on ied to infiltrate the Russian stronghold, backed by more

Robertson Introduction: Coup de Grâce? 27 The Group of Eight The State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP). The Emergency Committee organized the attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, August 19–21, 1991. Seven of the committee’s eight members were arrested, charged with treason, and prosecuted in trials that began on April 14, 1993. (The eighth, Interior Minister Boris Pugo, committed suicide.) They spent months at the Matrosskaya Tishina detention facility in Moscow, but all had been released pending trial by January 1992. Another four men were charged with conspiring with the Emergency Committee. The Russian offered them political and economic amnesty on February 23, 1994, and three accepted. Their cases were formally closed on March 1, 1994. Valentin Varennikov said he would only accept amnesty if Gorbachev were immediately put on trial. He was cleared of all charges in August 1994.

Oleg Baklanov (1932–) (1923–) Deputy chair of the Defense Council Minister of defense Became director of Rosobshchemash, part of Russian Military adviser to General Staff Academy Space Agency Awarded Russia’s Order of Merit for “high achievements in useful, societal activities” by Putin in 2004. (1924–2007) Arrested and charged with treason for participating in Head of KGB the coup: Frequent Kremlin guest of Vladimir Putin Frequent interviews praising Putin Vyacheslav Generalov Commentator on intelligence issues KGB general Plekhanov’s deputy in presidential security force Valentin Pavlov (1937–2003) Prime minister Anatoly Lukyanov (1930–) Banking consultant Chair of USSR Congress of People’s Deputies Gorbachev friend since law school Member of Russian State Duma Boris Pugo (1937–1991) Minister of interior Yuri Plekhanov Committed suicide on third day of coup KGB general Head of presidential security Vasily Starodubsev (1931–) Chair of Soviet farmers’ union (1937–) Served two terms as governor of Tula Member of Politburo and CPSU Secretariat Leading member of Russian Communist Party Post-coup, headed Union of Communist Parties in former Soviet Union Alexander Tizyakov (1926–) Head, Association of State Enterprises Valentin Varennikov (1923–2009) Lost Duma election in 1999 Commander of Red Army Ground Forces Deputy minister of defense Gennady Yanayev (1937–2010) Refused amnesty; found not guilty in August 1994 USSR vice-president Member of Russian State Duma 1995–99 Taught history at Russian Tourism Academy Head of Duma Committee on Veterans Consultant for pension fund President of Association of Heroes of Russia

Sources: Rupert Cornwell, “Valentin Varennikov: Soviet General Who Helped Lead the Attempted Coup against Gorbachev,” Independent [UK] (May 12, 2009); Rupert Cornwell, “Vladimir Kryuchkov: Plotter Against Gorbachev,” Independent [UK] (November 26, 2007); “Ex-Putschists Defend 1991 Soviet Coup,” BBC News (April 28, 2011); “The Men Who Tried to Topple Mikhail Gorbachev,” Moscow Times (August 17, 2001): 13; John-Thor Dahlburg, “A Year Later, Surviving Coup Leaders Left in Limbo,” Los Angeles Times (August 16, 1992); Richard Boudreaux, “12 Soviet Coup Plotters to Stand Trial in April,” Los Angeles Times (January 27, 1993); Elizabeth Shogren, “Coup Leaders to Testify Gorbachev OKd Plot,” Los Angeles Times (April 14, 1993).

28 Problems of Post-Communism July–August/September–October 2011 August 1991 hardline coup organizers, left to right, Oleg Baklanov, Vyacheslav Generalov, Alexander Tizyakov, Dmitry Yazov, Gennady Yanayev, and, right to left, Valery Boldin, Valentin Varennikov, Oleg Shenin, Vasily Starodubtsev, and Valentin Pavlov attend a news confer- ence at the hardline Patriot newspaper's offices in Moscow, Wednesday, July 4, 2001. At center is Mikhail Zemskov, editor-in-chief of the Patriot weekly. The banner reads “PATRIOT, The Weekly of the National-Patriotic Forces of Russia. We are the true patriots!” Appearing together in public for the first time in ten years, organizers of the abortive coup defended their move as an attempt to hold the Soviet Union together and said they regretted only that they were reluctant to use force. (AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev) troops. By this time, however, segments of the military Krichevsky, were killed in the confusion, becoming the had decided to support Yeltsin, including General Evgeny coup’s martyrs. No further advance was made on the Shaposhnikov (head of the Air Force and deputy defense White House, as military and KGB troops refused to fire minister), who was prepared to order aerial bombing of on their fellow citizens. the Kremlin that night. Accounts vary, especially those of The Emergency Committee effectively surrendered at the military officers subsequently tried for their participa- 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, August 21. As troops began to tion,37 but some analysts credit Grachev and General Boris depart Moscow, two competing delegations raced to reach Gromov (first deputy interior minister) with making the Gorbachev in Foros. One group, consisting of Baklanov, critical decision to not attack the White House Tuesday Kryuchkov, Tizyakov, and Yazov, primarily wanted to night.38 Russian secretary of state Gennady Burbulis also plead their case to Gorbachev and avoid arrest. Yeltsin’s praises Grachev, recalling, “The intelligence he provided group, led by Russian vice president Alexander Rutskoi us on the conspirators’ plans and his ultimate refusal to and Prime Minister Silyaev, wanted to ensure Gorbachev’s carry out orders were among the determining factors in safety. They took Western media representatives and Rus- the coup’s ultimate failure and our survival.”39 sian security forces with them. Yeltsin’s team arrived first, Defying a curfew and drenching rain, people stayed and Gorbachev had the other group arrested immediately at the barricades through a very long and tense Tuesday upon arrival. Gorbachev and his family flew back to Mos- night, awaiting the imminent attack. When troops began cow, arriving in the early hours of Thursday. However, the to stir just after midnight, the crowds tried to halt them, people—at least in Moscow—had sided with Yeltsin, not shouting “Shame! Shame!” or trying to jump onto tanks Gorbachev, and power began to shift accordingly. Three civilians, Volodya Usov, Dima Komar, and Ilya To this day the plotters remain convinced that their ac-

Robertson Introduction: Coup de Grâce? 29 A crowd gathers around a personnel carrier as some people climb aboard the vehicle and try to block its advance near Red Square in downtown Moscow, August 19, 1991. Military vehicles were on the streets of Moscow following the announcement that Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev had been replaced by Gennady I. Yanayev in a coup attempt by hard-line Communists. (AP Photo/Boris Yurchenko) tions were justified if poorly executed.S even members of The defendants have been rehabilitated over time. Va- the Emergency Committee were arrested immediately, and rennikov, for example, was elected to the Russian State Interior Minister Pugo committed suicide. The seven—plus Duma in 1995. Kryuchkov was a special guest at Vladimir five co-conspirators—were sent to a Moscow detention fa- Putin’s presidential inauguration in 2000, was frequently cility, awaiting trials that finally began in April 1993. Many invited to Kremlin events, and became “something of an were conditionally released for health concerns before the elder statesman of the intelligence community.”42 In 2004, trial. The newly formed Russian State Duma offered politi- Putin honored Yazov with Russia’s Order of Merit for cal and economy amnesty to the plotters in February 1994. “high achievements in useful societal activities.” Surviving committee members called a press conference on July 4, 2001, to express their support for Putin. According to former prime minister Pavlov, “The current leadership After August is making efforts to restore control over the country. To- Upon his return, Gorbachev was slow to grasp the new day they are trying to do what we attempted to do in the mood in Moscow. He believed that a union treaty was Soviet Union in 1991.”40 At another press conference in still possible, quoted Lenin on socialism, and hesitated to April 2011, Yanayev indicated that he had not changed his resign from the CPSU.43 The public had fewer qualms, as mind. Sitting with Yazov, Baklanov, Pavlov, and Varen- people took to the streets, tearing down statues of Lenin, nikov, Yanayev declared, “All my comrades gathered here hammers and sickles off buildings, and even the statue of are true patriots, defenders of the state. I’m proud to have Feliks Dzerzhinsky outside KGB headquarters. Lenin’s joined them in their battle to defend the Soviet Union and Mausoleum was closed temporarily. its long-suffering people.”41 In an interview with Radio Liberty just after the coup

30 Problems of Post-Communism July–August/September–October 2011 failed, Yeltsin described how the mood in Moscow had publics. The new Inter-Republic Economic Committee, changed during those three days. selected by the State Council, would coordinate economic matters related to the transition, because the parties to the President Gorbachev has returned to a different Russia, agreement had resolved to maintain a common economic to a different country,” he said. “It seems to me . . . that he space for the time being. A provisional legislature, the has at last understood that without democracy, without the Council of Representatives, would consist of twenty development of democracy, without radical reforms— and not the sort of quiet reforms during which coups representatives from each republic. From a legal perspec- d’état of this sort can happen—that we can’t go further. tive all ten republics would be equally represented, but It seems to me too that he has understood the need in Russia’s sheer size and control over infrastructure would fact to end the ruling role of the Communist Party of the make it “first among equals.”49 Without defining any Soviet Union.44 specific powers or functions of any of these bodies, the Congress modified the agreement to include a bicameral At an August 23 session of the Russian parliament, legislature. The Council of Representatives was renamed deputies jeered at Gorbachev and demanded that he fire “Council of the Republics,” and a Council of the Union, his entire cabinet. Yeltsin compelled a stunned Gorbachev with seats awarded based on size.50 to read aloud the minutes of the August 19 meeting of the In mid-November, after continued discussions, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, which revealed that all but State Council announced that seven republics had agreed one member had supported the Emergency Committee. to form a political confederation, a “Union of Sovereign On August 25, Gorbachev resigned as Party general secre- States.” The republics would have much greater autonomy, tary, turned the CPSU’s reduced locations over to Russia’s while currency, defense, and foreign affairs would remain parliament, and banned Party activities in military, police, centrally controlled. Uzbekistan, Moldavia, Georgia, Ar- and government facilities in the dwindling USSR.45 menia, and, critically, Ukraine, remained holdouts.51 Lithuania was long gone, and Ukraine, Byelorussia, Throughout the autumn of 1991, Yeltsin gradually took Estonia, Latvia, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, the initiative away from Gorbachev, dissolving many and Uzbekistan all declared their independence in the USSR structures and reassigning economic, cultural, last week of August. Still, Gorbachev believed some and academic bodies to Russian control. He immediately common political and economic arrangement could be suspended the activities of the CPSU and the RCP and salvaged.46 banned them in November. Initially he had endorsed The USSR Supreme Soviet convened on August 26. Gorbachev’s plan for a Union of Sovereign States that For six days the legislature focused on the immediate af- would maintain a single economic space, maintain a uni- termath of the coup. It established a fifteen-member panel fied military under central control, and guarantee human to investigate the events of August 19–21 and search for rights across the country.52 But as he accumulated more ways to prevent similar efforts in the future. The Supreme of the USSR’s assets, Yeltsin modified his view in favor Soviet also suspended CPSU activities and canceled of a union that granted few prerogatives to the center— some of the extraordinary powers granted to Gorbachev namely, Gorbachev. Yeltsin may also have been biding in November 1990. his time. It was becoming increasingly plausible that The Fifth Extraordinary Session of the USSR Congress Ukraine would not agree to any form of union; Kyiv had of People’s Deputies convened on Monday September 2 not planned to sign the Novo-Ogarevo treaty on August to elect a new Supreme Soviet and consider laws relevant 20. Without Ukraine, a compromise was much less likely to the transition period.47 President to be reached.53 stunned the legislators by announcing that the night be- At a November 25 meeting, when Yeltsin persuaded the fore, Gorbachev and leaders of the republics had agreed representatives from Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Azerbai- to assume central power themselves because the USSR jan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan to press for was “on the brink of collapse.” Ten republics had agreed a “union of states” instead of a confederal “union state,” to Gorbachev’s proposed arrangement, while the Baltic Gorbachev stormed out of the room, in his own words states and Moldavia were not part of the discussion. Geor- “exasperated by this perfidious move.”54 While waiting gia attended but refused to sign the document.48 for him to return, Yeltsin and Stanislav Shushkevich of Three new institutions would govern until a new union Byelorussia agreed to meet at a hunting lodge near Minsk treaty was in force. The new State Council would consist to discuss the issue and to invite Leonid Kravchuk, the of Gorbachev and the leaders of the ten interested re- president of Ukraine.

Robertson Introduction: Coup de Grâce? 31 Most republic leaders had been stalling until Ukraine’s The magazine was launched in the spring of 1952 referendum on independence, scheduled for December by the newly created U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 1.55 Ukraine’s participation was vital for any future union; which operated as an independent foreign affairs agency Gorbachev even made a televised appeal to Ukrainians to within the Executive Branch, coming under the author- not abandon it.56 When the vote went for independence, ity of the State Department only in 1999. It was to be Yeltsin gave up on the Soviet Union. Meeting on De- modeled after Ostprobleme, an existing U.S. govern- cember 8, he, Kravchuk, and Shushkevich pronounced ment magazine established in 1949. Distributed in West the USSR dead and proposed a new grouping similar to Germany, Ostprobleme printed translations of English- the European Union. The remaining republics were still language articles on Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, discussing arrangements and were caught by surprise, but and world communism. Aside from a State Department quickly signed on to the Commonwealth of Independent sentiment that “something similar” should appear in States structure created in the Belovezhskaia accords.57 English, the new magazine had no concrete mission Gorbachev did not. statement. The arrangement was ad hoc and Yeltsin’s staff pulled The first editors considered the field of communist an all-nighter drafting the text in longhand, but it offered studies at the time and resolved to provide a more nuanced a workable mix of political independence and economic look at the communist world than the black-and-white cooperation.58 viewpoint that then dominated in the era. Prob- Gorbachev, however, was not even informed of the lems of Communism would encourage analysts to look meetings until after Yeltsin had consulted President beyond the dominant totalitarian model and to explore the George H.W. Bush. “What you have done behind my internal factors influencing events. Most important, as the back,” he railed at Yeltsin, “with the consent of the U.S. masthead always declared, “Views of contributors, as well President is a crying shame, a disgrace!”59 Nor was as geographic boundaries and names, [did] not necessarily Gorbachev invited to the first CIS meeting in Alma-Ata reflect the policies of the UnitedS tates Government.” To on December 21. Faced with the inevitable, Gorbachev further reinforce its editorial independence, the magazine resigned on December 25. Barely forty of the 173 Council refused to accept classified documents. of the Republics deputies reported to work on December After the dramatic geopolitical changes of 1989 to 26, when they formally voted to dissolve the USSR.60 The 1991, Slavic studies no longer seemed to merit its long- Soviet Union was no more. privileged status in universities and the U.S. government. The August 1991 coup may not have been directly re- When the war between the United States and Iraq began sponsible for the subsequent collapse of the USSR, but it in early 1991, emphasis shifted to Middle Eastern studies certainly facilitated the process. In their efforts to save the and the study of Arabic. Administration of government union, members of the Emergency Committee instead dis- programs focused on the post-communist states shifted graced their agencies, making it much easier for Yeltsin to from bureaus of cultural and educational affairs to the neutralize and dissolve them. Gorbachev’s absence during U.S. Agency for International Development. Russia, in the three days allowed other players, namely Yeltsin, to take the oft-repeated phrase, was now simply “Brazil with center stage. The Russian president’s leadership helped nuclear weapons.” observers—domestic and international—to regard him as The USIA itself underwent an extensive degree of soul- a more credible alternative to the USSR president. searching about its mission. Had it accomplished its goal The collapse of the Soviet Union was the product of of disseminating information about the United States? Nu- multifaceted struggle for power between the center (Mos- merous programs, including Voice of America broadcasts, cow) and the extensive periphery. The August putsch was came under scrutiny. In late 1989, the USIA director, the critical tipping point at which the advantage shifted Bruce Gelb, asked the agency’s advisory panel to review from Gorbachev to Yeltsin. all USIA-published magazines, including Problems of Communism. The panel concluded that surplus copies of House Beautiful, Road and Track, and other magazines Another Collapse of Communism that “reflect the American way of life” should be sent to The future of Problems of Communism looked uncertain Eastern Europe as part of USIA’s effort to “spread de- after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The demise mocracy around the world.” What role Problems would of the Soviet Union two years later seemed even more play in this mission was yet to be clarified. ominous, at least to the editorial staff.61 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the magazine’s

32 Problems of Post-Communism July–August/September–October 2011 days were numbered. During testimony before the Sen- and East European Research in 2003. NCEEER president ate Appropriations Committee on April 29, 1992, Henry Robert T. Huber succeeded Millar as editor. In early 2011 Catto, now director of the USIA, announced that he was Huber decided that he would step down as editor and closing down Problems of Communism. The USIA, he sponsor in 2013. Unfortunately, before a search began in said, was a product of cold war, and ending the magazine earnest, Huber suddenly passed away. NCEEER has stated would symbolize the ending of the cold war. The maga- that it will continue to host the journal in the interim. zine’s editorial staff were dumbfounded; Catto had not Problems of Post-Communism, now looking forward to its even bothered to consult them. Just as communism had seventh decade of publication, will continue to document collapsed in Eastern Europe in a matter of months, Prob- and analyze events in the best tradition of its founders. We lems of Communism closed down in a matter of weeks. have outlived the USSR, but the need for clear, unbiased After forty years of publication, Problems of Commu- analysis of the remaining communist and post-communist nism published its last issue in June 1992. As the editors states remains as vital as it was in 1952. wrote in the final issue, “The battle of ideas is won, not by the shaded fact or outright lie, but by the steady, rea- Notes soned presentation of the unembellished truth.” The edi- 1. “Moscow, August 1991: The Coup de Grâce,” Problems of Communism tors apologized to authors whose pending articles would 40, no. 6 (November/December 1991): 1. 2. Abstracts, Problems of Communism 40, no. 6 (November/December now not be published. The remaining inventory of back 1991), 1. issues was given away to subscribers, boxes were packed 3. Anders Åslund, “The Soviet Economy After the Coup,” Problems of up, and the staff scattered. Communism 40, no. 6 (November/December 1991): 44–52; Mark R. Beissinger, “The Deconstruction of the USSR and the Search for a Post-Soviet Community,” Soon afterward, M.E. Sharpe, a publisher in Armonk, Problems of Communism 40, no. 6 (November/December 1991): 27–35. New York, with long experience in social science publish- 4. Amy Knight, “The Coup That Never Was: Gorbachev and the Forces ing and specialties in Slavic and Asian studies, began to of Reaction,” Problems of Communism 40, no. 6 (November/December 1991): inquire about taking over publication of the magazine. 43. 5. Archie Brown, “Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin,” Problems of The firm’s reasoning was simple. AsS harpe vice president Communism 34, no. 3 (May/June 1985): 1–23. Patricia Kolb explained, “It would have been such a waste 6. Michael Mandelbaum, “Coup de Grâce: The End of the Soviet Union,” to let the magazine die. To cancel publication—in the Foreign Affairs 71, no. 1 (1992): 171. middle of a volume!—was to treat the magazine like last 7. Leon Aron, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” Foreign Policy (July/August 2011): 68. year’s propaganda, not the scholarly treasure it was.” 8. Gennady Burbulis, “Meltdown,” Foreign Policy (July/August 2011): Kolb approached James R. Millar, director of what was 72. then the Sino-Soviet Institute at the George Washington 9. John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 17, citing Pravda (August University, one of the few American university research 17, 1989). centers to combine both the Soviet bloc countries and 10. Dunlop, Rise of Russia, p. 18, n. 58; Robert Kaiser, The Geography of China under one roof. Kolb and Millar reached an agree- Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ment in which the institute would support the editorial 1994), p. 352. 11. Stephan Kux, “Soviet Federalism,” Problems of Communism 39, no. operation (with full editorial independence) while Sharpe 2 (March/April 1990): 1–20. would handle production and distribution. Because Prob- 12. Galina Starovoitova, “Nationality Policies in the Period of Perestroika: lems of Communism was in the public domain, Sharpe Some Comments from a Political Actor,” in From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics, ed. Gail Lapidus and Victor simply applied to the Library of Congress for an Inter- Zaslavsky (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 117; Ann Sheehy, national Standard Serial Number (ISSN) for a successor “Gorbachev Addresses Central Committee Plenum on Nationalities Question,” title, Problems of Post-Communism, that would begin RFE/RL Report on the USSR 39, no. 1 (September 29, 1989): 1–4. 13. Kestutis Girnius, “Lithuanian Communist Party Edges Toward Inde- publication in mid-volume, where Problems of Com- pendence,” RFE/RL Report on the USSR 40, no. 6 (October 6, 1989): 15–17; munism had left off. Francis X. Clines, “Lithuanians Resist Pressure from Moscow on New Party,” New York Times (November 18, 1989): A3; Saulius Girnius, “Lithuanian Com- In 2002 Harry Harding, dean of the George Washington munists Deny Gorbachev’s Request,” RFE/RL Report on the USSR (November University Elliott School of International Affairs, an- 3, 1989): 29–30; Esther B. Fein, “Gorbachev Voices ‘Alarm’ on Lithuanian nounced that the Elliott School would no longer provide Party Split,” New York Times (December 22, 1989): A12; Saulius Girnius, “Lithuania,” RFE/RL Report on the USSR (December 29, 1989): 23–26; Joan the financial support the institute had relied upon for Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei, Russia’s Communists at the Crossroads Problems of Post-Communism. Without these vital funds, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997). it became necessary to look for a new editorial home, and 14. Quoted in Dunlop, Rise of Russia, p. 24. 15. Ann Sheehy, “Supreme Soviet Adopts Law on Mechanics of Secession,” after a search that covered several interested institutions, RFE/RL Report on the USSR 2, no. 17 (April 27, 1990): 2–5; Commission on the magazine moved to the National Council for Eurasian Security and Cooperation in Europe, Presidential Elections and Independence

Robertson Introduction: Coup de Grâce? 33 Referendums in the Baltic States, the Soviet Union, and Successor States: A 38. Dunlop, “August Coup and Its Impact,” pp. 109–12. Compendium of Reports, 1991–1992 (Washington, DC, August 1992). 39. Burbulis, “Meltdown,” p. 76. 16. Details of various drafts are in John N. Hazard, “Managing National- 40. Andre Zolotov, Jr., “GKChP Couldn’t Finish What It Started,” Moscow ism: State, Law, and the National Question in the USSR,” in The Post-Soviet Times (August 17, 2001): 1. Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR, ed. Alexander J. Motyl (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 96–140; Jane Henderson, “Legal 41. “Ex-Putschists Defend 1991 Soviet Coup,” BBC News (July 5, Aspects of the Soviet Federal Structure,” in Soviet Federalism: Nationalism 2001). and Economic Decentralisation, ed. Alastair McAuley (New York: St. Martin’s 42. Rupert Cornwell, “Vladimir Kryuchkov: Plotter Against Gorbachev,” Press, 1991), pp. 33–55; Mikhail Gorbachev, On My Country and the World Independent [UK] (November 26, 2007). (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); idem, Memoirs (New York: 43. Dunlop, “August Coup and Its Impact,” p. 121. Doubleday, 1996); Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia (New York: Times Books, 1994); Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford 44. Quoted in Luke Allnutt, “Russia: The Fading Legacy of the Failed University Press, 1997), pp. 285–305. For an interesting, if biased, account, 1991 Soviet Coup,” RFE/RL (August 18, 2006), www.rferl.org/content/ see that of Gorbachev’s chief of staff and a plotter in the August 1991 putsch, article/1070664.html. see Valery Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World (New York: Basic Books, 45. Mandelbaum, “Coup de Grâce.” 1994), pp. 269–78. 46. Gorbachev, Memoirs, passim. 17. Gorbachev, On My Country and the World, p. 113. 47. Bill Keller, “Soviets Prepare to Design a New System,” New York Times 18. Ann Sheehy, “The Draft Union Treaty: A Preliminary Assessment,” (August 31, 1991), A11. Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 2, no. 51 (1990): 1–6. 48. As a result, Gorbachev referred to this plan as the “10 (11) + 1” arrange- 19. Ann Sheehy, “Referendum on Preservation of the Union,” Radio Liberty ment, with Georgia as the “11” (Memoirs, p. 648). On Moldova’s activities at Report on the USSR 3, no. 7 (February 15, 1991): 5–8. that time, see Vladimir Socor, “Moldavia Proclaims Independence, Commences 20. Serge Schmemann, “Moscow Publishes New Plan of Union,” New York Secession from USSR,” Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 3, no. 42 (October Times (March 9, 1991), A1. 18, 1991): 19–26; Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000). 21. Ann Sheehy, “Revised Draft of the Union Treaty,” Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 3, no. 12 (March 22, 1991): 1–4. 49. Serge Schmemann, “Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Republic Leaders Move to Take Power from Republics,” New York Times (September 3, 1991), A1. 22. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization, p. 417. 50. Serge Schmemann, “Soviet Congress Yields Rule to Republics to Avoid 23. Sheehy, “Referendum on Preservation of the Union,” p. 6. See also Political and Economic Collapse,” New York Times (September 6, 1991), A1. Ann Sheehy, “Fact Sheet on Questions in the Referendum of March 17 and Later Referendum,” Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 3, no. 12 (March 22, 51. Serge Schmemann, “Seven Republics Agree to Seek New Union,” New 1991): 4–8. York Times (November 15, 1991): A7. 24. At least this was Yeltsin’s explanation for Gorbachev’s convening of the 52. Dunlop, Rise of Russia, p. 266. Novo-Ogarevo meetings. See David Remnick, “Gorbachev Says Pact on Union 53. Archie Brown, Seven Years That Changed the World (New York: Oxford Is Close,” Washington Post (May 26, 1991): A39; see also Roman Solchanyk, University Press, 2007), p. 305. “The Draft Union Treaty and the ‘Big Five,’ ” RFE/RL Report on the USSR 3, 54. Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 656, and On My Country, passim. no. 18 (May 3, 1991): 16–18. 55. Leaders of Ukraine had declared independence in August, but the 25. Brown, Gorbachev Factor, p. 289. decision was held in abeyance until it could be put to a popular vote on De- 26. Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change cember 1. from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 104; 56. Brown, Gorbachev Factor, pp. 303–4. Solchanyk, “Draft Union Treaty and the ‘Big Five’ ”; idem, “The Gorbachev- Eltsin Pact and the New Union Treaty,” RFE/RL Report on the USSR 3, no. 57. Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Åslund, and Sherman Garnett, Getting 19 (May 10, 1991): 1–3. It Wrong (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999). 27. “Gorbachev Warns Secessionists It Won’t Be Easy,” New York Times (April 27, 1991), www.nytimes.com/1991/04/27/world/gorbachev-warns- 58. Egor Gaidar and Andrei Kozyrev wrote out the text and shoved it under secessionists-it-won-t-be-easy.html?scp=1&sq=gorbachev%20warns%20 the door of the one staff typist, only to have it thrown away by a maid the next secessionists&st=cse:/. morning. Kravchuk has made a point of noting that Yeltsin was not drunk at the time. See RFE/RL Newsline (December 10, 2001): End Note, www.rferl. 28. Vladimir Socor, “Political Forces of Six Republics Set Up Coordinat- org/content/article/1142576.html; Egor Gaidar, Days of Defeat and Victory ing Mechanism,” Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 3, no. 23 (June 7, 1991): (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), pp. 124–27. 18–20. 59. Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 659. Ten years later, Gorbachev was still 29. Brown, Gorbachev Factor, p. 289. blasting Yeltsin for his lack of decorum during the transfer of power. See 30. Quoted in David Remnick, “Ukraine Split on Independence as Republic his press conference of December 21, 2001, via Johnson’s Russia List 5614 Awaits Bush Visit,” Washington Post (August 1, 1991): A27. (December 24, 2001). 31. Amy Knight, “The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet 60. John-Thor Dahlburg, “Legislators Join in Scrapping Kremlin Power,” Union,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 1 (winter 2003): 75. Los Angeles Times (December 27, 1991), A1. 32. Ibid., p. 84. 61. This section is drawn from Ann E. Robertson, “Enduring Problems: 33. Serge Schmemann, “Gorbachev Back as Coup Fails, but Yeltsin Gains Fifty Years of Scholarship,” Problems of Post-Communism 50, no. 1 (January/ New Power,” New York Times (August 22, 1991): A13. February 2003): 3–7. 34. McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution, pp. 105–6. 35. John B. Dunlop, “The August Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 1 (winter 2003): 106–7. 36. Former Russian secretary of state Gennady Burbulis has described the atmosphere at Yeltsin’s dacha that morning. See Burbulis, “Meltdown.” 37. For a detailed examination of the military’s role, see William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), To order reprints, call 1-800-352-2210; passim; Brian D. Taylor, “The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the outside the United States, call 717-632-3535. USSR,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 1 (winter 2003): 17–66.

34 Problems of Post-Communism July–August/September–October 2011