Notes and References Introduction 1. In this book, ‘peacekeeping’ refers to those operations designated by the Russian government and/or the CIS bodies as peacekeeping actions. The term is placed in inverted commas, because these operations have differed substantially from international practice. 2. Johan Joergan-Holst (1990) ‘Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations’, Survival, vol. 32, no. 3, (May/June), pp. 264–5. 3. See, for example, Scott Parrish (1996) ‘Chaos in Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, Transitions (17 May), in which it is argued that Russian foreign policy does not ‘reflect a broader design, careful plan- ning or cool deliberation’. 1 Peacekeeping and Coercive Diplomacy: Russian Suasion 1. Marrack Goulding (1993) ‘The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping’, International Affairs, no. 3, pp. 432–65. 2. Paul F. Diehl (1994) International Peacekeeping (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 7–8. 3. Jordan Joergan-Holst (1993) Survival, p. 274. 4. See Introduction by William Durch in William Durch (ed.), (1994) The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center); and Alan James (1990), Peacekeeping in International Politics (London: Macmillan), pp. 368–70. 5. John Mackinlay (1990), ‘Powerful Peacekeepers’, Survival (May/June), p. 242. 6. John Mackinlay (1989) The Peacekeepers (London: Unwin Hyman), p. 222. 7. See overview in The Blue Helmets (New York: UN Department of Public Information: 1996), pp. 389–401. 8. Adam Roberts (1993) Survival, p. 12. 9. Sir Brian Urquhart (1991–92), The UN: From Peacekeeping to a Collective Security System?, Adelphi Paper 266, IISS, (Winter) (Oxford University Press). 10. See, for example, W. J. Durch and Barry Blechman (1992) Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order (Washington, DC: Henry Stimson Center), pp. 17–21; and discussion in Adam Roberts (1993) ‘Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights’, International Affairs, no. 3, pp. 429–49; Christopher Greenwood (1993) ‘Is there a Right to Humanitarian Intervention?’, The World Today (February), pp. 34–40.; T. G. Weiss and K. M. Campbell (1991) ‘Military Humanitarianism’, Survival (September/October), pp. 451–65; and Comfort Ero and Suzanne Long (1995) ‘Humanitarian 189 190 Notes and References to Chapter 1 Intervention: A New Role for the UN?’, International Peacekeeping (Summer), pp. 140–56. 11. Cited in Edward Newman (1995) ‘Realpolitik and the CNN Factor of Humanitarian Intervention’, in Dimitris Bourantanis and Jarrod Weiner (eds), The UN in the New World Order: The World Organization at Fifty (Macmillan: London), pp. 191–211. In Agenda for Peace, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali went even further: ‘the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed … its theory was never matched by reality’. 12. Security Council Resolution 688 of April 1991, which led to Operation Provide Comfort regarding the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq, was justified in terms of threats this situation posed to peace and secur- ity. See also Adam Roberts (1996) Humanitarian Action in War, Adelphi Paper 305, IISS (Oxford University Press). 13. For a discussion of these new tasks, see Mats Berdal (1993) Whither UN Peacekeeping?, Adelphi Paper 281, IISS (Oxford University Press). 14. On the former Yugoslavia, see James Gow (1997) Triumph of the Lack of Will, International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London: Hurst and Company). 15. Boutros Boutros-Ghali ·(1993) ‘Appendix A: An Agenda for Peace’, in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds), United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations (Oxford University Press), p. 475. See also ‘UN Peacekeeping in a New Era’, The World Today (April 1993), pp. 66–8. 16. Sir Brian Urquhart (1990) Survival, p. 201. For a good example of national doctrines that follow this approach, see Nordic Stand By Forces (1993) (NORDSAMFN), and Nordic Tactical Manual , vols 1 and 2 (1992), (NORDSAMFN). 17. See John Mackinlay (1994) ‘Improving Multifunctional Forces’, Survival, vol. 36, no. 3, (Autumn), pp. 149–73. 18. See also T. G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra (1993) A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations (Providence, RI: T. J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University). 19. James Gow and Christopher Dandeker, ‘Peace Support Operations: The Problem of Legitimation’, The World Today (August/September 1995), p. 173. See also Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? (National Defense University, MacNair Paper 15: November 1993). 20. Ibid., p. 37. 21. Adam Roberts (1994), The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, (Institutt for Forsravstuddier, 2), p. 17. 22. Ibid., p. 24. 23. Mats Berdal (1993), Whither UN Peacekeeping?, p. 32. For other works on UN reform see, for example, John M. Lee, Robert van Pagenhardt and Timothy W. Stanley (1992) To Unite our Strength, Enhancing the UN Peace and Security System (Washington, DC: International Economic Studies Institute); and ‘Words to Deeds: Strengthening the UN’s Enforcement Capabilities’, (Final Report, International Task Force on the Enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions, New York: (December 1997). Notes and References to Chapter 1 191 24. Charles Dobbie (1994) ‘A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping’, Survival, vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn), pp. 121–48. See also Wider Peacekeeping: Army Field Manual Vol. 5, Operations Other than War, part 2, (London: HMSO) 1995. 25. It is interesting that so-called ‘middle-ground’ theorists have also retreated from more ambitious approaches to peacekeeping. See John Mackinlay’s (1996) A Guide to Peace Support Operations (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University). 26. Cited in Shashi Tharoor (1995–6) ‘Should Peacekeeping go “Back to Basics”?’, Survival, vol. 37, no. 4 (Winter), pp. 52–64. See also Daniel Donald and B. C. Hayes (eds) (1995) Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (London: Macmillan Press). 27. Ibid., p. 162. In June and July 1994, the Security Council passed three resolutions to this effect: (i) permitting French intervention in Rwanda, which led to Operation Turquoise; (ii) expanding the UN observer mission in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict; and (iii) allowing US inter- vention in Haiti to ensure the return of Aristide before 15 October 1994. 28. T. G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra (1995) ‘Prospects for Containing Conflict in the Former Second World’, Security Studies (September), pp. 262–83. See also T. G. Weiss (1995) ‘Military–Civilian Humanitarianism – The Age of Innocence is Over’, International Peacekeeping (Summer), pp. 157–74. 29. Weiss and Chopra (1995), p. 276. On peacekeeping task-sharing, see also Thomas G. Weiss (ed.) ‘Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs’, (Special issue, Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3, 1997); and Georgios Kostakos and Dimitris Bourantanis (1998) ‘Innovation in Peacekeeping: The Case of Albania’, Security Dialogue, vol. 29, no. 1 (March), pp. 49–58. 30. See Muthiah Alagappa (1997) ‘Regional Institutions, the UN and International Security: A Framework for Analysis’, Third World Quarterly, (vol. 18, no. 3), pp. 421–41. 31. For an overview of the literature on coercive intervention, see R. J. Vincent (1974) Non-Intervention and International Order (NJ: Princeton, Princeton University Press); and Hedley Bull (ed.) (1984) Intervention in World Politics (Oxford University Press). See also Neil MacFarlane (1985) Intervention and Regional Security, Adelphi Paper no. 196, p. 1. MacFarlane’s work is particularly interesting in underlin- ing the reactive nature of intervention. The interplay between Hans Morganthau’s ‘push’ perspective and Thucydides’ ‘pull’ interpretation is relevant to the Russian case. In all, however, this literature is in- appropriate for examining Russian ‘peacekeeping’, as it focuses only on the coercive tool without delving into the wider purposes of the intervenor’s policy. 32. See also the analysis of the ‘discrete use of force’ in Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (eds) (1978) Force Without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington DC: Brookings 192 Notes and References to Chapter 1 Institution). Blechman and Kaplan argue that military force can repre- sent a ‘discrete’ instrument of policy in time of peace. The ‘discrete use of force’ is defined as: ‘when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence the specific behaviour of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence’. See also work on Soviet use of force in Stephen Kaplan (ed.) (1981) Diplomacy of Power (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution). 33. See the discussion in Alexander L. George and Gordon A. Craig (1990) Force and Statecraft, Diplomatic Problems of our Time, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 197–211; and Alexander L. George (1991) Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace). 34. George discusses such cases as the American bombing of Hanoi in 1965, the US arming of the Contras in the early 1980s, and US policy during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. 35. Ibid., p. 198. 36. George, (1991) (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace), p. 7. 37. George and Craig (1990) (Oxford University Press), p. 201. George and Craig determine a number of ‘contextual’ as well as ‘policy’ variables that will affect the implementation and course of a policy of ‘coercive diplomacy’. 38. Ibid., p. 211. 39. E. N. Luttwak (1974) The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: Md Johns Hopkins University Press). 40. Ibid., p. 6. 41. Ibid., p. 54. 42. Ibid., p. 35. 43. Ibid., p. 57. 44. E. N. Luttwak (1987) Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press), p. 193. 45. See George (1991), p. 4. George does recognize explicitly the limits of this ideal-type view of the state. 46. Scott Parrish has argued that it is impossible to refer to rational strate- gic decision-making in Russia. The foreign policy-making process is characterized by ad hoc decision-making and ‘freelancing’ by different agencies.