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978-3-659-33076-6 Ebook.Pdf !" # $ % ! & & ' # $ % ! # $ ! !( # ) * + " ! , - $ ! . / 0 " $ $ , ! "! " ! " # $ !% ! & $ ' ' ($ ' # % %) %* % ' $ ' + " % & ' !# $, ( $ - . ! "- ( % . % % % % $ $ $ - - - - // $$$ 0 1"1"#23." 4& )*5/ +) * !6 !& 7!8%779:9& % ) - 2 ; ! * & < "-= %/ & > -%= %# ? . %:@@A /- B:@9C4& )*5/ +) "3 " & :@9C Contents Foreword v Acknowledgments vii A Note on Transliteration ix Tables and Figures x Chapters 1. Introduction 1 2. Roots of the Conflict 9 Historical Factors 9 Political Factors 15 Socio-Cultural Factors 21 Economic Factors 24 Leadership Factors 29 Summary 34 3. The Chronicle of the Chechen Wars 35 The First Chechen War: 1994-1996 36 Yeltsin’s Policy 36 Negotiations 38 Russian Withdrawal 41 Pursuit of Independence: 1997-1999 43 i Elections of Chechen President 43 Yeltsin-Maskhadov Peace Accord 43 Deterioration of the Situation 44 The Second Chechen War: 1999-2003 45 Putin’s Policy 46 The OSCE Summit 52 Ultimatum to Grozny 53 Zachistki 55 Theater Siege in Moscow 58 The Future Status of Chechnya 60 Summary 63 4. Responses to the Chechen Wars 65 Responses in Russia to the First Chechen War 65 Military 65 Public Opinion 66 Media 68 Political Parties 69 Yeltsin’s Solution 70 Responses in Russia to the Second Chechen War 72 Military 72 Public Opinion 74 Media 76 Political Parties 77 Foreign Policy Makers 79 Putin’s Solution 80 U.S. Response to the First Chechen War 81 Clinton Administration Response 81 Congressional Response 82 ii U.S. Response to the Second Chechen War 83 Clinton Administration Response 83 Congressional Response 86 Bush Administration Response 87 Congressional Response 89 Summary 90 5. Conclusion 91 Bibliography 99 Chronology 115 iii iv Foreword On December 4, 2014, as dawn broke, a fierce gun battle between militants and government security forces paralyzed the center of the Chechen capital, Grozny: ten police officers and nine militants were killed and another twenty- eight police officers injured. The New York Times reported that the most brazen attack linked to militant activity in the region in months occurred hours before President Vladimir Putin, unflappable as usual, delivered his State of the Nation Address to the joint session of the Duma in Moscow. Ramzan Kadyrov, the Kremlin ally who governs Chechnya, played down the violence. He told the Interfax news agency reporters at the Kremlin that he had managed to fly home, organize a special operation to kill the terrorists, gather the staff needed to restore the damaged Publishing House and a nearby school, and make it back in time to listen to the speech. President Putin made a passing reference to the attack, suggesting once again that the West was behind the insurgency in the restive Caucasus region because it wanted to break up Russia, as it had Yugoslavia. The third major assault last year came on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of the first Chechen war on December 11. The attack served as a reminder that despite numerous declarations to the contrary, most recent in 2009, the war in Chechnya never really ended. In fact, it has been a prelude to Russian assertiveness in the “Near Abroad.” Conflicts spilled over across its borders, first into Georgia in August 2008, then Crimea last year in February-March, followed by incursions into eastern Ukraine in April, and v more, no doubt, is to come. In the words of Michael Stürmer, a right-wing German historian and Putin’s biographer, “the West had no idea what was at stake in Chechnya.” A new era of limited confrontation has begun: “the bear had left his den, and things would have to change.” The twenty-year-long drama in the Caucasus has had domestic and international implications. Andrew Foxall, the director of the Russia Studies Center at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based international affairs think tank, recently observed in his World Affairs Journal online feature artile that “Putin came to power on the back of a “small, victorious war” in Chechnya, and he has reasserted his domestic popularity by a similar endeavor in Ukraine. But the lesson from Chechnya is clear: such wars are never small. .” The two wars in Chechnya have eroded Russian democracy and strengthened those within the military and security forces who call for a return to the old ways. The Russian military for years has been a source of pride to Russia; it has bolstered Russia’s claim as a world power. In the period of social and political upheaval, the military and security can be the forces that support democratic reform, or they can undermine the hopes for reform with a return to repression and authoritarian rule. The restoration of the lost Soviet empire might be the ultimate objective of today’s Russian elite. The developments in the future deserve the world’s attention. Victoria A. Malko Fresno, California vi Acknowledgments Many thoughtful people made this publication possible. The work started in a seminar on International Relations during fall 1999 under the late Professor Lyman Heine, to whom I wish to express my sincere gratitude. As a historian, I felt at a disadvantage because the conflict in Chechnya unfolded on a day-to- day basis without allowing sufficient distance in time necessary to write a good history. Another disadvantage was the absence of first-hand observations and field notes from the area of conflict, which makes the researcher an outsider who analyzes the war at a safe distance from a university “ivory tower.” Thanks to Professor Heine for his critical eye and for his suggestions that helped the revision of the manuscript. His colleague at the Department of Political Science, Professor Emeritus Alfred Evans, read the draft from cover to cover and provided much needed insight into the intricate world of Russian politics. My deep appreciation goes to Professor Michelle DenBeste, a respected scholar of Russian history, under whose guidance my thesis gained its focus and shape. As Chair and Graduate Advisor at the Department of History, she encouraged and supported my research work. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor William Skuban, a specialist on nationalism, for his comments on the final draft. I also owe much to Professor Emeritus of History Sidney H. Chang for his advice on research methodology. He called my attention to sources I had overlooked. He not only encouraged me to write this book, but whatever value it has is due in large part to his selfless willingness to read and critique it. Thanks to their comments, the book has become more readable and useful. vii Above all, my thanks to Professor Malik Simba, the past Chair, as well as faculty at the Department of History, and especially Dean Emeritus of the School of Social Sciences Peter Klassen, who took notice of my modest endeavors and provided their wholehearted moral and financial support. The Division of Graduate Studies at California State University, Fresno supported my research and writing with the Graduate Student Research Merit Award and a travel grant to present my preliminary findings at the Western Social Sciences Association Conference in Las Vegas, Nevada, in April 2003. Dean of the School of Social Sciences, Luz Gonzalez, provided ideal working conditions. Two honors, the Dean’s Medalist and the University’s Outstanding Thesis Award, were a great encouragement to the completion of the thesis the following year. The less obvious yet very important help came from Janice Byrd of the Henry Madden Library, who never balked at my piles of interlibrary loan requests. I am especially grateful to Molly Molloy, reference librarian of the Hoover Library, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford, California, for professional guidance given on key citation sources. For his untiring assistance as thesis consultant, I wish to express my appreciation to Charles Radke. His expertise and attention to detail were helpful in preparing the manuscript for publication. Others deserving credit include Ian Fowler, who as editor for Lambert Academic Publishing at Saarbrücken, Germany, believed in this book and was extremely helpful to work with. Needless to say, all shortcomings are my own responsibility. Finally, this work would not have been completed without the support, endless patience, and inspiration of my family. I am grateful to them all. V. M. viii A Note on Transliteration With the exception of certain terms and individuals’ names, for which the most commonly used spelling has been adopted (for example, Chechnya, Grozny, Yeltsin), I have followed the Library of Congress system for transliteration from the Cyrillic alphabet. Transliteration from Chechen is without diacritics. ix Tables and Figures Tables 1. Chechen and Ingush Population in the Russian Federation 14 2. Oil Extraction and Refinery in the Chechen Republic 25 Figures 1. Chechnya 11 2. Russia’s Ethnic Republics 17 x Chapter 1 Introduction Within five years
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