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The Man Who Solved His Own Murder Moshe Holender that Putin is ready to be a partner with the give examples where the US has conceded to a nuanced approach to the problem: “[Putin’s] West… as long as they respect Russian inter- Russian interests, and say that far from “NATO a bully…. And you enable bad behavior when ests as well. expansionism,” some former Soviet Republics you’re nuanced with a guy like that.” The current consensus in the United States are so desperate to shield themselves from Is Vladimir Putin and the Russia he is is decidedly against Professor Cohen. News Moscow’s bullying tactics that they have recreating in his image a menace to world outlets regularly attack Putin’s and Russia’s begged for more NATO involvement. peace? Or is he simply a bold leader in a actions. Critics rebut Cohen point by point, Meanwhile, candidates for the 2016 US world of weak-willed, self-delusional profes- saying that Ukraine’s economy and military presidential election talk about who is going sional politicians who would do well to learn is such a mess that it wouldn’t stand a chance to be the strongest and most resolute presi- from the way Mr. Putin tries to protect and Deputy Prime Minister Nemtsov (left) in discussion with Minister of Internal Affairs Anatoly Kulikov at at joining the European Union or NATO in dent, best able to “stand up to Putin.” Jeb Bush promote the interests of his nation? a cabinet session in 1997. Nemtsov, a prominent any case, so what is Russia afraid of? They (now out of the race) has explicitly renounced Time will tell. Putin critic, was mysteriously gunned down in 2015. The Man Who Solved His Own Murder Moshe Holender The Iron Curtain has long since come down on the world theater, yet Russia’s Presi- dent (and former KGB officer) Vladimir Putin continues to live in its shadow. Many people who questioned Putin’s human rights violations have been eliminated, their murderers never brought to justice. However, when Putin ordered the assas- sination of Alexander Litvinenko using an expensive and rare poison available only to Russian authorities, he went too far. Litvinenko, a former Russian spy, identified his murderers from his deathbed and even the means by which he was poisoned. He also revealed that none other than Vladimir Putin himself had ordered the assassination. t was a cold day as two Russian agents in The Millennium Hotel is a very unlikely the heart of London laid plans for their spot for a political assassination. It is located Isecret mission: the murder of one of Russia’s near London’s Grosvenor Square and next President Vladimir Putin’s greatest enemies. door to the US Embassy, where the CIA 160 | ZMAN • April 2016 ZMAN • Adar II 5776 | 161 allegedly maintains its central station for most outspoken opponents. He became a a secret FSB laboratory so that it could be journalist and writer, and from 2003 on he During World War II, the Supreme also became a British agent, getting paid for CommanderEngland on the of 4thAllied floor. Forces, US General his services by England’s MI6 intelligence transported in a tiny flask. Dwight D. Eisenhower, made his military service. From KGB to Berezovsky headquarters at 20 Grosvenor Square in Recently, Litvinenko had begun giving Alexander Litvinenko began his career, order to be near the American Embassy. Her Majesty’s agents, as well as Spain’s like virtually every other brilliant mind in During that period the entire square was intelligence service, shocking information Russia at that time, under the supervision popularly known as Eisenhower Platz. In regarding the intricate connection between of the infamous KGB. After communism a mark of appreciation to the US for assist- fell, he went to work for the FSB. In the ing in overcoming the Nazi monster, an Russian politicians, reaching all the way early 1990s, he rose in rank, becoming an imposing statue of US President Franklin the Russian Mafia in Spain and high-ranking - London’s Grosvenor Square. Roosevelt was erected in the square, along gence service that controlled all matters of with the legendary commander, and later US tumultuousup to the president’s 1990s, when office. Putin, The then contacts an aide internalimportant security. officer This in includedthe internal the Russianintelli president, Dwight D. Eisenhower. towith Mayor the ofRussian St. Petersburg Mafia began Anatoly during Sobchak, the In 2011, another statue was erected worked hand-in-hand with underworld network even under communist control. in the same place of former US President thugs. Litvinenko was preparing to testify Mafia, which had developed into a powerful Ronald Reagan, as a tribute to his role in about the subject one week later before a years under Gorbachev, when the winds of bringing down the Soviet Union. The statue Spanish prosecutor. The Kremlin was under reformIt became permitted especially the underworldpowerful in tothe rear final its also bears an inscribed greeting from the pressure to take care of Litvinenko, and fast. ugly head in the open. last leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail The two agents from Moscow were Among Litvinenko’s tasks was to protect Gorbachev, which reads: “With President carrying a deadly and costly poison that wealthy Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky, Reagan, we traveled the world from confron- was hardly known in the Western world: and the two became close friends. Boris tation to cooperation.” polonium-210, a highly radioactive element Abramovich Berezovsky belonged to a group Those words provide some absurd comic that is hard to detect. When swallowed, of Russian oligarchs, some of whom were relief to the very serious event that took even a small amount is fatal. The poison Jewish (Berezovsky considered himself place in Grosvenor Square less than 10 years had been produced in a nuclear reactor in Jewish, although he is not recognized as such ago. This is especially true in light of the the Ural Mountains, and was processed in by halachah) and who became fantastically steps taken by the present Russian president wealthy in the years immediately after the downfall of the Soviet Union. turn back the clock and return to the days A central tenet of communist ideology is when(and former Soviet KGBleaders officer) maintained Vladimir absolutePutin to that nothing should be private. All businesses control over their subjects and used the KGB and business activities should be controlled to make their enemies disappear. by the state, which then distributes the On November 1, 2006, two Russian agents wealth equally among all the citizens (a sat down in a restaurant just 500 yards from false dream that never materialized). When - of murder. They probably did not take the cially switched over to a democratic political the statue. There they finalized their plans communism collapsed and Russia offi cooperation between Russia and the West was the transfer of business ventures to time to contemplatethat Gorbachev the praisedsignificance so highly. of the privatesystem, hands.one of the most significant events The agents were Andrei The corrupt administration of Russia’s Lugovoi and Dmitry Kovtun. The - man they were out to get rid sin oversaw the process of privatization. The of was Alexander Litvinenko, a governmentfirst democratically sold numerous elected leader industries Boris Yeltthat had been previously under its control. The agency (the successor to the KGB normal course of action, which a legitimate former officer in Russia’s FSB spy government would have followed, would be Moscow in 2000, and while in exile to put these businesses up for auction. This The US Embassy in London with the inof Londonthe Soviet he becameera). Litvinenko one of Putin’s fled Russian President Vladimir Putin was once a KGB officer. would create competition and guarantee the statues of Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan. 162 | ZMAN • April 2016 ZMAN • Adar II 5776 | 163.
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