REVIEWS 275 tion’s wealth for themselves: rather, as is the Magyar, Bálint: case in Hungary, it could be a country whose corrupt, kleptocratic leaders also go out of POST-COMMUNIST MAFIA STATE. their way to actively control illicit societal THE CASE OF HUNGARY. activities and organized crime. These leaders do not simply steal from the state: they rot Budapest: Central European University it and create a society of thieves dependent Press. 2016. 311 pages. upon the elites who sanction their crimes (pp. 81–82). It is a vicious cycle that makes DOI: 10.5817/PC2018-3-275 everyone complicit in the state’s corruption. Magyar’s latest text successfully tests his An unequivocal condemnation of the Fi­ expanded theory of the mafia state, con­ desz­controlled Hungary, Bálint Magyar’s cretizing it and demonstrating how Hun­ Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of gary’s authoritarian government can mas­ Hungary could not be timelier. This book querade as a ‘good’ state whilst eroding civil explores the deceitful mechanisms by which society and democratic institutions – even the hybrid regime installed by Prime Min­ without exerting any physical mass violence ister Viktor Orbán and his fellow Fidesz of­ (see Levitsky, Lucan 2010). It argues that ficials has systematically stripped Hungari­ Hungary is a corrupt, parasitic state (p. 13). ans of civil liberties (p. 255) with impunity, The book begins with the premise that upon ironically owing to its control over the rule its accession to the European Union in 2004, of law. While this text specifically investi­ Hungary was the model of liberal democrat­ gates democratic backsliding in Hungary, its ic consolidation for other former Commu­ framework will surely prove crucial for un­ nist states. It enjoyed free and fair elections, derstanding any former Communist states a revitalizing amount of foreign direct in­ undergoing autocratic rule (e.g. Poland). vestment, and a pro­democratic population Magyar had formulated his own con­ – 84% of which voted in favor of Hungary ception of the ‘post­communist mafia state’ joining the EU (Nohlen, Stöver 2010: 902). in the early 2000s. His formulation enrich­ Ten years later, however, Hungary is proud es recent studies of kleptocracy and mafia to call itself an ‘illiberal democracy’, as Prime states, marked by texts such as Karen Daw­ Minister Viktor Orbán has so eagerly an­ isha’s Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? nounced. (2014) and Luke Harding’s Mafia State: How This book would be an enticing read on One Reporter Became an Enemy of the Bru- this irony alone. How could Hungary, the tal New Russia (2011), particularly because bright star of post­Communist states look­ he expands the scope of the traditional mafia ing to the West, defy the commitment it state. Magyar stresses that more mafia states made to the European Union while acting exist than just Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and as a full­fledged member of this very insti­ that a mafia state can infiltrate all aspects of tution? But actually, the text tackles an even society, from the public to the private. Most deeper problem: the Western community significantly, he reveals that a mafia state can does not even realize how bad the situation be more than just a country run by corrupt, truly is in Hungary, allowing Orbán’s regime kleptocratic leaders who take advantage of to drive the country further into a down­ their privileged positions to seize the na­ ward, anti­democratic spiral. Magyar reveals 276 POLITOLOGICKÝ ČASOPIS / CZECH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 3/2018 how Hungary cunningly distracts its crit­ political family makes for the most danger­ ics by calling itself an ‘illiberal democracy’, ous kind of mafia because they have the tools when in reality critics should be questioning to legalize their otherwise illegal, anti­dem­ whether or not Hungary even is a democ­ ocratic actions: they can pass legislation, racy at this point (p. 59). If the EU contin­ threaten exorbitant taxes and fines, control ues to evaluate Hungary in the context of the judiciary, ‘tip off’ the police (or, con­ traditional democracy, then it will miss the versely, discard investigations), and terrorize truth that Hungary is a mafia state – a dif­ individuals via secret police. ferent political beast altogether – and cannot Having established the cast of characters, be righted through traditional enforcement Magyar’s book goes on to explain the func­ mechanisms. tionings, guiding principles, and specific In just over 300 pages, Magyar manages features of the mafia state. These sections of to break through the multitudinous layers of Post-Communist Mafia State are horrifying, rhetoric, excuses, and unfulfilled promises as the author describes how the mafia state that obscure the truth of what is really hap­ has infiltrated nearly all aspects of society. pening in Hungary. Post-Communist Mafia This means the Fidesz regime has taken not State first traces the fall of the democratic just the public sphere, but the private sphere Hungarian state. Anti­democratic currents, as well. Small businesses, multinational bu­ of course, stem from the Communist era, sinesses, churches, schools, media outlets, but it was not until the populist conserva­ NGOs, bureaucrats, and state institutions tive party Fidesz gained a supermajority in such as the judiciary, the parliament, etc. – parliament in the 2010 elections, and took all have been coerced into complicity within advantage of their numbers to rewrite the the mafia state’s vision. This complicity could Hungarian Constitution, that Hungary’s de­ directly involve the elites, e.g. an intellectual mocracy was destroyed. From this point on, praises the Hungarian leadership in order to the Hungarian government’s top priority keep his position at a university, or it could has been the expansion of power and the simply seep into everyday life, e.g. a police­ accumulation of wealth for its elites, rather man seeking a bribe from a business that has than the interests of the nation or its pop­ violated tax laws. Through tactics of censor­ ulation. Hungary, in this manner, became ship, extortion, and blackmail, the mafia state a post­communist mafia state. is able to ‘legalize’ and normalize criminality. The book then delineates the features Such a capture of an entire society re­ and mechanisms of the post­communist quires an ideological campaign to convince mafia state, beginning with the roles of ev­ the population that their state is ‘good’ and ery member of society. Orbán is the ‘godfa­ ‘just’ (p. 235). Orbán and his media moguls ther’; the ‘family’ is comprised of his closest constantly use aggressive rhetoric, creating allies, be they politicians, media magnates, the illusion that ‘enemies’ to the Hungarian or oligarchs; and all other members of soci­ state are everywhere and fostering ultrana­ ety share a mixture of titles, all of which are tionalist desires that place Hungary above subordinated to the family and the godfather international law in the minds of its citi­ (p. 94). All of the mafia’s actions and rules are zens. Anti­Semitism, racism, homophobia, aimed at one goal: raking in as much profit xenophobia – all of these nasty ‘isms’ are for themselves as they can while pretending employed not because the Fidesz regime be­ it is all for the good of the nation­state. This lieves them, but because they help to unify REVIEWS 277 a target population of Hungarians commit­ readers can examine for themselves, should ted to their nation (synonymous with the they wish to be doubly sure about Mag­ ruling mafia elites). yar’s analysis. Reading Magyar’s thoroughly researched Another notable achievement is that the book, it becomes clear that the author is not book reminds readers to keep a global per­ just an analyst of Hungarian politics. He is spective and to consider international con­ an experienced opposition politician him­ nections with the case of Russia, the epitome self. He had long served as a Member of Par­ of anti­democratic policies and manipula­ liament for the Alliance of Free Democrats tive ideology. Unfortunately, the quick, un­ (SZDSZ) between 1990 and 2010, and as explained mentions of Putinism might the Minister of Education and Science be­ diminish the author’s message of Hunga­ tween 2002 and 2006. This accounts for the ry’s unique criminality. Without elaborating book’s greatest strength: it is imbued with upon the Russian example, readers might fail credibility, passion, and technical detail on to comprehend a pivotal point: Russia nev­ the local, national, and supranational levels. er enjoyed a liberal democracy (apart from To do this, Magyar had to break Western tra­ the few short months in 1917 of the Ker­ ditional political understandings, which he ensky Provisional Government), whereas achieved via his creative reading of the mafia Hungary astoundingly managed to turn its state concept. Thus, Post-Communist Mafia back on a well­founded democracy. Thus, it State is a fresh, comprehensive study that is important to recognize that Hungary of­ touches upon all sectors of Hungarian soci­ fers a similar yet crucially different under­ ety, convincing readers that Orbán’s Hunga­ standing of authoritarianism. The Russian ry is an abomination that cannot be tolerated context – devoid of true democracy – reveals any longer. insights on human psychology, but the Hun­ Of course, the fact that Magyar has such garian case – owing to the fact that it was an involved, personal history with the Hun­ once an established liberal democracy – is garian government might give pause to some capable of revealing lesser­known insights as readers. Perhaps they would be comforted to the failures of democracy and the Europe­ to consider the fact that Magyar recently an Union’s structure. co­edited with Júlia Vásárhelyi a volume en­ Despite all of Post-Communist Mafia titled Twenty-Five Sides of a Post-Communist State’s crucial insights, the source(s) of Mafia State (2017) that expands upon Mag­ Hungary’s anti­democratic spiral is not al­ yar’s reviewed text from 2016.