Problems of disarmament 1933-1934: German and British reactions

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Authors Carter, Jon William, 1940-

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/317871 PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT 1933 - 1934: GERMAN AND BRITISH REACTIONS

by Jon Carter

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1 9 6 5 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfill­ ment of requirements'for an advanced degree at The Uni­ versity of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Libraryo Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknow­ ledgment of source is made„ Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the in­ terests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

APPROVAL BY THESIS. DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

4 : C4. __ j MG 6 J." A T m w B S O N Date Visiting Professor of History ACKBCELEBCMEEES

The author wishes to especially thank Br 0 J0" A 0

Thompson 5, Visiting.. Professor of. History $ for not only i reading the manuscript but giving thoughtful criticism throughout its ..conceptiono In addition, recognition must be given to the many constructive suggestions kindly render­ ed by Dr* Guido Gapponi, -Associate Professor of Italian0 However., the author ®s deepest gratitude is- extended- to

Dto James Donohoe, Associate Professor of History0 In the classroom, Br 0 Donohoe presented- the story of Western Civilization in such a way that the author was allowed for the first time to appreciate history as a living, critical and humanistic disciplineo Because of Br 0 Donohoe*s lectures and continual encouragement, the author desired to live more responsibly and fullyo And finally, above all else, the author must express his unlimited gratitude as the son and natural student of the man most responsible for the overall completion of this---thesis— my father, Allan Garter, MoB 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

lo BACKGROUNDo o = » » c o 'o » « c o = = 0 = = 1 XI o BEGINNING OF DIS,ARMAMENT CONFERENCE 1932, , 22 III, 14 OCTOBER 1933 , 30 IV, THE REACTION: 15 OCTOBER - 30 DECEMBER

1933 o 0,000000000000000 93 V, BRITISH MEMORANDUM OF'29 JANUARY 1934 , , , 126 VI. THE END . , , 169 VII. CONCLUSION...... 196 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 202 ABSTRACT

Although Part V and its Preamble- - 51 In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes the mili­ tary, naval and air clauses which follow15— were still recog­ nized by the Treaty of Versailles signatories in 1932 as law--at least on paper--it was Germany6 s interpretation of this provision since 1921 that caused the French end­ less anxietyo Therefore, on 2 February 1932, at the behest of pacifist England the urgent need of an internationsl arms agreement was recognized at Geneva„ Whether it was the Harriot Plan of November 1932, or the MacDonald Plan of March 1933, or finally the British Memorandum of Febru­ ary 1934, the French refused to disarm while Germany con­ tinued to illegally rearm. Great Britain6s pacifism did not strengthen the security of France, while the latter8s political and economic disintegration by 1933 were no match for Hitler8s singleness of purpose„ In the last analysis, the failure of the Disarmament Conference in June 1934 was largely due to Great Britain and France8s inability to in­ terpret successfully the Preamble to Part V of the Versailles

Treaty and the Five Power Declaration of 1 1 December 1932-- in the face of illegal German rearmament and Hitler..,,.

v CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

An examination of the major problems of disarmament between the- years 1932 and 1934, must first recognize the primary causes of discord which continually plagued Germany,

Great Britain and France after the first World War 0 The Treaty of Versailles was the primary source of German dissatisfactiono When the Council of Four was draw­ ing up the disarmament terms. President Woodrow Wilson was sympathetically conscious of the fact that Germany was the vanquished power= Germany8s likely resentment over any dictated terms of disarmament had to be taken into account ' 1 if peace was to be maintained0 Therefore, a preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles was agreed upon: "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limita­ tion of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes to 2 observe the military, naval and air clauses which followo"

lo "On 26 April 1919 President Wilson suggested to his colleagues .that the disarmament terms would be ’more acceptable to the enemy if they were presented as preparing the way for a general limitation of armaments for all na­ tions 0 6 H Wo J= Jordan, Great Britain» France, and the German Problem (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), 1340 2, This clause was reinforced by another: "The Allied and Associated Powers = » 0 recognize that the

1 Vanquished Germany never Let the victorious Allies forget 3 the contractual obligation, of this particular preamble0 Wo Me Jordan, recognized the preamble for what it really was 5 "This „ c « unhappy afterthought, this verbal homage to Wilsonian aims advanced the cause of general disarmament by hardly an iota, at the cost of incorporating within the Treaty yet another imprecision, the fruitful source of dis-

4 • pute in coming years *n The question of how long the unilateral disarmament of Germany was to last received no answer in the Versailles Treaty* This critical problem, "glossed over in 1919, be­ came the critical issue of the World Disarmament Conference acceptance of Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments, and * * * the eventual adoption of a scheme of general reduction* It goes without saying that the realization of this program will depend on the satisfactory carrying out by Germany of her own en­ gagement * United States Document Number 51, Treaty of Peace with Germany (Washington: Government Printing Office 10 July 191977 191* 3* "One writer insists, 6A legal argument may be constructed to prove they, the Allies, left themselves free but there can be no doubt that on any natural reading of the Covenant the Germans and all nations had the right to expect they would disarm* 8 This seems to me [Kennedy^ to be the correct interpretat ion of what was intended by the signatories*H John F= Kennedy, Why gn.gland Slept (New York: Funk, Inc*, 1940), 12* 4* Jordan, 134-135* 5* Ibid*. 149* The Treaty of Versailles was further handicapped by a lack of balance between, "the obligations imposed on Ger­ many and the guarantees instituted to ensure their observ- 6 ance . 0 » on If the Treaty was to be enforced at all, provisions for the registration of violations and punishment exercised accordingly were an absolute necessity. But be­ cause of the differing national interests the Allied Powers were unable to overcome this "Treaty handicap," Therefore, unintentionally, Germany was gently provided with a fertile soil in which her grievances could grew unmolested, German discontent stemming from the Treaty of Versailles grew with­ out this instrument of enforcement. The national differences which appeared between the two major victorious Powers in Europe— England and France-- at the end of the war may be expressed geographically I "The North Sea is wider than the Rhine, and the German fleet is 7 at the bottom of the sea," With an intense national feel­ ing, the French never forgot their status as the "deserved" victors: The war caused among the French intense loath­ ing for the enemy, whose merciless cruelty they had felt heavily upon them , , , and whose com­ bative spirit they feared for the future. They had no doubt that, if in a moment of weakness

6 , Ibid,, 84, 7, Ibid,, 50, they had wavered9 they would have received no mercy from the German victor. That night­ mare of apprehension was , , , never fully, shaken off in the post-War years. In peace the French continued to feel that they were confronted with a powerful and relentless machine which was being wound up slowly for., another spring. Therein lay the origin of the insistent French demand that the elabora­ tion of safeguards against Germany should proceed any experiment in reconciliation,& The French, then, until 1926, maintained that a policy of coercion supported by military might was the right and prudent course in dealing with a defeated enemy--especially a defeated Germany so much stronger in population and in­ dustrial resources, Hius, in the years that followed, the French did everything within their power to initiate and further any diplomatic maneuver that guaranteed the im= potency of another possible #German spring,” Conceiving

of a Hpeace11 only in terms of military guarantees, — "With one passionate spasm the French people cried, 8Never 9 again 1 981 The English on the other hand were much more in­ terested in the complete revival of British trade, for the economic reconstruction of Europe was a matter of economic health to their nation. Excessive armaments and war did

8 , Ibid.. 49, 9, Winston S, Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 5-6, 10 not coincide with this economic security» Neither did a sense of bitter vengeance0 In post-War years, therefore, Great Britain, reinforced by her characteristic "fair- mindenness,continually sought to redress the grievances of a bitter Germany through reason and sympathetic under­ standing c The English Government felt that a true and lasting “peace11 could be attained only in this manner0 In short, contrary to the French point of view, Great Britain believed that no system of security or a" substantial peace could be realized as long as nations remained highly armed.

Thus, England advocated progressive disarmament0 In this light, Anglo-French understanding (more often than not, misunderstanding) in their future intercourse, o c o could indeed proceed, given the con­ trast of outlook between the two countries, on no other basis than that of trading French as­ sent to the British policy of accommadation against British assent to the French policy of coercion. Thereby Allied policy acquired the character of an unstable compound of which the

10. “To be bothered as little as possible and to be allowed to go his peaceful way was all that the average Englishman asked. The Englishman's natural instincts were strongly against armaments- -he had to be taught the need for them. Internally, armaments were a menace to his economic security . . . an unproductive drain on a budget he was trying his hardest to balance . . . externally, armaments were a menace to his conception of a peaceful World order based on a League of Nations.w Kennedy, 4. 6 constituent elements alternately exercised the predominating inf luence0 The history of this British and French exchange of counter­ acting national policies came to a head between the years

1933 and 19340 Nevertheless, at the end of World War I, one solid security for peace remained, or so it appeared, as a result of the Treaty of Versailles: the total disarma­ ment of vanquished Germany0 When the terms of peace were presented, the German delegation made no protesto However, on 20 April 1920, the German Government requested Allied consent to the permanent retention of an army of 200,000 men. In the Boulogne Note of 22 June 1920, the Allies preemptorily rejected the re­ quest c This initial overture was the offspring of Germany1s early post-War attitude--an attitude which was to grow stronger as time went on:

The Allies9 trust had been placed in arbi­ trary safeguards against the recrudescence of German power 6 o = <> This then was no peace of justice and of right, such as would win the assent of the German people; it was not, in the language of the pulpit, the vehicle of a healing spirito It was a peace by preponderant military power„ 1 2

lie "The pre-Locarno years from 1920-1925, were marked by the adoption of Great Britain and France of ap­ parent ly antithetical policies; the object of the one, was economic reconstruction, of the other political stabiliza­ tion, " Jordan, pp, 74 and 225, 12, Ibid,, 41-42, 7 In this unhappy mood„ the German military staffs soon began.to inject a “healing spirit" of their own into this festering malignancy. It consisted of a dedicated 13 struggle. General von Seeckt was.the 9doktor6 who ap- 14 plied the.principal remedy. “As early as 1921, Seeckt was busy planning in secret and on paper, a full size 15 German array . . . The chief of the German army also had a hand in the re-creation of German air power. In fact, as early as 1923, this persistent German militarist care­ fully prepared in secrecy the union of the future German 16 air force with the. army. In this way, the Reichswehr was

13. “o . . the struggle to preserve weapons from destruction was waged persistently.by the German staffs throughout the years of control . . . . The work of evasion became thoroughly organized . . . . Under a civilian camou­ flage an organisation was set up to safeguard reserves of weapons and equipment .... State arsenals built for war were not closed down in accordance with the Treaty. A general scheme had thus been put into action by which all the new factories, and many of the old, founded with American and British loans for reconstruction, were designed from the outset for a speedy conversion to war, and volumes could be written on the thoroughness and detail with which this was planned. 88 Churchill, 49. 14. “The Inter-Allied Control . . . tried in the boldest ways to discover how General Staff officers were being trained, but we succeeded in giving nothing away, neither the system nor what was taught. Seeckt never gave in, . . . . Without Seeckt there would today [194CQ be no General Staff in the German sense, . . . .“ [Written by General .von Rabenau, von Seeckt8 s biographer

While this early German “rearming15 was illegally progressing unnoticed by the victors, they nevertheless began initiating the execution of military terms as pro­ vided for in Part V of the Treaty of Versailles» There was little trouble at first. For by the spring of 1922 the stipulated disarmament of Germany was almost executed in full— or so thought the Allies. Suddenly, however, these two years |j.921-1922| of Allied forward momentum were open­ ly challenged by obstruction on the part of the Vanquished. The Ruhr occupation soon followed. Many statesmen equated this French disciplinary measure to the backward moving of a clock. However, to appreciate historically Germany8s ob­ stinacy and initial lack of cooperation during these un­ fortunate “backward" years, one must examine briefly her internal and fluctuating political state proceeding and following the "wound in the west55; the Ruhr occupation.

17. "The German Government contested the Allied claim to proceed to a general inspection . . . . Through­ out 1923 the German Government obstructed visits of inspect­ ion to the army corps and only permitted visits to factories by British and Italian officers . . . on 11 November 1923 the German Government replied that the resumption of con­ trol would aggravate the internal situation; they requested the Conference of Ambassadors 8to put off its demands under the pressure of circumstances. 8 The request met with a re­ fusal and the German Government reluctantly agreed to visits of inspection which took place in January 1924.15 Jordan, 134-13S. When the Allies presented Germany the bill for reparations and a demand for immediate cash payments in May 1921, the current government, the Fehrenbach cabinet, resigned and, for another year and a half, the so-called i9Weimar coali­ tion^ of the Center, Democratic, and Majority Socialist parties returned to office* This coalition ruled largely by the sufferance of the Right, which was to a great extent supported by industry, the bureaucracy and the Reichswehr* The assasination of Walter Rathenau, the Foreign Minister of the Mirth Cabinet, in June 1922 was a dreadful symptom 18 of the demoralization of the fanatic nationalists* In November 1922, a government of the Right under Wilhelm Cuno took over * This government called for passive resistance to Allied intervention and control* But within eight months the French succeeded in establishing control over the oc­ cupied Ruhr area, while the fantastic super-inflation brought Germany to the brink of complete chaos* The danger of the loss of the Rhineland, as well as the BoIshevization of the rest of Germany was very real* Although the ultra­ radicals of the right, like Hitler, would have transformed the passive into an active resistance. General von Seeckt now felt that his Reichswehr was, at this stage of the game,

18* Gordon A* Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds*), The Diplomats 1919-1939(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, T953), 157» 10 too weak to benefit from such violence» Therefore, realis­ tically taking into account his carefully laid plans for an all-mighty, future military establishment, von Seeckt quick­ ly ordered the Reichswehr to stamp out the supposed centers of Left socialist and communist agitation, in addition to squashing Hitler’s Munich Putsh of 9 November 1923» The stage was thereby set for a new approach to the major poll- 19 tical problems of Germanye It was within this chaotic atmosphere that the liberal leader of the German People’s Party, Gustav Strese- mann, now tried to persuade the German industrialists to assist in the stabilization of the mark and attempt to reach an understanding with the foreign Bowers'= It was indeed this remarkable mid-wife, Gustav Stresemann, who 20 aided the successful birth of the ^Spirit of Locarno e 68 Certainly with the communists becoming increasingly active and the pressures exerted by the ultra-radicals, in addi­ tion to the prowess of von Seeckt8s military clique, a

19» 6iThe great decisions of foreign policy, as far as they were at all in German hands, were inherent in the outcome of the internal political struggle®M lbido, 158® 20® “His political moderation and, circumspection, as well as the strong fortitude of heart, that he had shown were the greatest single factor in achieving for Germany this new position in the world® She could feel a new sense of relative independence and at the same time of self- chosen participation in European affairs®11 Ibid®, 171® 11 strong hand was needed at the helm of the Foreign Office in order to hold the course through the various political , , storms of popular resentment and dissension at home* In the history of the Weimar republic Gustav Stresemann was the only statesman, who, through his great.ability as a parliamentary tactician and orator, as well as through his diplomatic talents, could make the office fully his own* Under him, the German Foreign Office settled down to the execution of foreign policy in greater calm than in the first five years after Versailleso21 Recognizing Allied complaints and apprehensions over the continued and increasing activities of nationalist and militarist associations frequently now springing up throughout Germany, Stresemann set out to form a government that could end the Buhr occupation and work out a compromise 22 with France, under British mediation and guarantees6 However, during the year of the Locarno Conference,

21. Ibid.. 150„

22 0 ’’Stresemann was as determined as the most ex­ treme nationalist to get rid of the whole treaty lock, stock, and barrell; reparations, German disarmaments, the occupation of the Bhineland,,and the frontier with Poland. But he intended to do this by persistent pressure of events not by threats, still less by war. Where other Germans insisted that revision of the treaty was necessary for the revival of German power, Stresemann believed that the re­ vival of German power would inevitably lead to revision of the treaty „ „ . after his death the publication of his papers revealed clearly his intention to destroy the ex­ isting treaty-sett lament = A= J q P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961), 51= 12 1925, Germany was still actively doing what she could to evade her responsibility of carrying out the military dis­ armament provisions of Part V e A military report of the

Allied Control Commission was made available on 17 February0 On 4 June the Allied note on the results of the inspection was presented to Germany0 “It contained a formidable in­ dictment o o o in regard to which Germany had so far failed 23 to give satisfactiono" It must be accredited to the genius of Gustav Stresemann that, even amid these acknow­ ledged and persistent illegal evasions on the part of his fatherland, he was able to win, to a great extent, the trust of Germany8s former enemies and implement them into a docu­ ment of firm confidence: the Locarno Treaty» Stresemann knew that France and England were not the only factors that he had to face* Within his own country the Foreign Minister realistically opposed the violent programs of the bitter ultraradicals, such as

Hitler8s infant National Workers Party0 Stresemann did not employ the policy of appeasement within the malignant ranks at homeo He knew better» Stresemann realized the futility of such an approach: “Appeasement is that final search, in the least advantageous circumstances9 for a basis of understanding with those, 8Radicals of the

23o Jordan, 137» 13 24 Right, whom no man can satisfy, nor ever will,8 ,l In the end, however, Stresemann6s political position was undemined by the international economic stresses, and it was the ve­ hement assaults of Hitler8s Nazis and Hugenfoerg6s capitalist magnates that finally led to his overthrow in 1929o The Pact of Locarno was concerned only with the guarantee of national frontiers in Western Europe, as pre­ viously set down by the Treaty of Versailles, and the de~ 25 militarization of the Rhineland. The Treaties as a whole afforded Europe a measure of stability which she had failed to achieve during the preceding period 1920-1925 = From the Allied point of view, Locarno ^constituted an ingenious compromise between the determination of Great Britain not to extend her commitments beyond western Europe, and the preoccupation of France with the maintenance of the terri- 26 torial settlement in eastern Europe » c = 0M France par­ ticularly valued the negotiations as the full realization

24o Ibid., 229. 25. Kennedy, 87. 26. 6lThus at the. out set of the negotiations France was assured of British support on the point to which she attached special importance, while Germany was enabled both to participate in the preparatory work and to enjoy complete liberty of negotiation in the concluding conference . . . . Locarno constituted the realization at last of . . . an ar­ rangement which should override the division of the European Powers into hostile groups and bring them together in re­ lationships of mutual trust and confidence.e$ Jordan, pp. 228 and 97. 14 of her essential need to co-ordinate French and British views regarding those questions of interest deemed to con­ cern France alone--in advance of any further negotiations 27 with Germanyo Great Britain on the other hand, in perfect

consistency with her “fair-minded11 mentality, felt the Locarno negotiations had cleansed her soul of any guilt it might have acquired earlier in 1919 as an “imposing vic­ tor." While the preliminary stages of the Locarno talks were in progress, Germany, in July, accepted the linking up of a Western Pact with her possible entry into the League of Nations--but stating the prior need for agreement upon general disarmament. In August the French, with the full agree­ ment of Great Britain, replied officially to Germany. Germany must enter the League without reservations as the first and indispensable step. The German Government accepted this stipulation. This meant that the conditions of the Treaties were to continue in force unless or until modified by mutual agreement, and that no special pledge for a reduction of Allied armaments had been obtained . . . . On this basis the Conference at Locarno was formally opened on 4 October.

27. Ibid., 96. 28. Churchill, 28-29= 15 In this light g Germany still accepted the legal obligation of her disarmament as stipulated in Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, She had not so far employed the legal implica­ tions as expressed in the ^contractual” preamble of Part V, And yet Germany8s official admittance into the League of Nations on S September 1926 only brought into clearer focus the essential discord that was in the future continually to 29 set apart England1s and France6s foreign policy. Before the Treaties at Locarno were initialed on

15 October9 Briand, the French Premier insisted on the necessity of na real discussion with the Germans so as to arrive at a mutual agreement and not another treaty imposed 30 by the Allies upon Germany,” Thus, the Treaty of Locarno was finally signed in London on 1 December 1925, In the words of Britain8s Foreign Secretary, "Locarno was not the end, but the beginning £pf mutual trust] ,” The mutual faith and confidence of Briand, Austen Chamberlain, and Stresemann remained the dominant political factor in European affairs for the next three years. The Locarno Conference achieved: first, the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between the

29, "The French wanted the League to develop into a system of security directed against Germany; the British regarded it as a system of conciliation which would in­ clude Germany ,,,= In practice, the British interpreta­ tion carried the day, 11 A, J, P, Taylor, 39, 30, Jordan, 96-97, 31, Ibid., 56, 16 five powers Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy ; secondly, arbitration treaties between Germany and France,. Germany and Belgium, Germany and Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakiae Thirdly, special agreements between France and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia, by which France undertook to afford the assistance if a breakdown of the Western Pact were followed by an unprovoked resort to arms „ . „ „ As between France and Germany, Great Britain became solemnly pledged to come to the aid of which ever of the other two states was the object of unprovoked ag­ gression o » <, e Although this far-reaching military commitment seemed dangerous in theory— pledging us in fact to take part on one side or the other in any Franco-German war that might arise--there was little like­ lihood of such a disaster ever coming to pass as long as o o o France remained armed and Germany disamed--and this was the best means of preventing it * 0 a the question whether there was any obligation on the part of France or Britain to disarm, or to disarm to any par­ ticular level [Preamble to Part V] was not affected » « = ? The histories may be searched, in vain for a parrallel to such an undertaking„32 Germany’s entry into the League of Nations within a year of the official signing of the Treaty of Locarno was a direct consequence of the Locarno Conferencee Briand and Chamberlain had from the outset of the negotiations insisted on German membership in the League as an "absolutely essen- 33 tial condition.of the conclusion of any pact*" This pre­ condition necessitated the bringing of German statesmen into contact with the representatives of the former Allied

32* Churchill, 29-30 33* Jordan, 98* 17 Governments, thus enabling a more positive, direct under­ standing between the victors and the vanquished0 In fact a feeling of understanding among the British and French 34 existed towards Germany following the Treaty of Locarno0 Because of this "unparalleled undertaking,H Gustav Strese- mann was able to procure the complete evacuation of the Rhineland by the French A m y and Allied contingents in 1929-- 35 a much earlier date than had been prescribed at Versailles» But even amidst these outstanding agreements made possible at Locarno, the issue of European peace as de­ fined by the Treaty of Versailles was continually hereafter underminedo At the end of 1926 the Allied Military Com­ mission reported that no progress had been made towards the settlement of five points of special difficulty per­ taining to German armaments:

& 0 the organization of the police

b 0 the High Command Co prohibition of training with certain weapons do artillery arming of the fortress of Konigsberg So military associations^ On 24 November 1926 Stresemann impressed on the British

34o Churchill, 31= 35o Ibid,. 62, 36, Jordan, 38, 18

-Ambassador that, 81 Germany8s whole policy of understanding would be at stake if the question of Military Control was 37 not put out of the way » 88 Now amid the good will and hopes following Locarno a significant decision was taken by the French and British

Governments0 It was decided to withdraw the Military Gam- 38 mission of Control from Germany after January 1927„ Thus, after this date there existed no permanent organiza­ tion to watch over the disarmament of Germany, while even the institution of any special investigation under Article 39 213 of the Treaty of Versailles was virtually ruled out 40 after the first months of 1928»

37o Ibid, 38o "The inter-Allied Commission was to be with­ drawn, and in substitution there should be an agreed scheme of investigation by the League of Nations ready to put into operation when any of the parties desired= It was thought that some such arrangement might form a complement to the Locarno Treaty, This hope was not fulfilled. Marshal Foch reported that effective disarmament of Germany , » , a nation of sixty-five millions could not be permanent, and that cer­ tain precautions were necessary. Nevertheless, even though at the time it was already known that the Germans were straining the interpretation of the Treaty of Versailles in many covert and minor ways, let alone making paper plans to become a military nation once again, in January 1927, the Control Commission was withdrawn from Germany," Churchill, 47, 39, This was a clause to empower the League of Nations to set up, if necessary, a commission to inquire into the observance by Germany of her disarmament obliga­ tions, 40, The future detrimental effect of this impru­ dent Allied decision is plainly and painfully revealed, in 19 By 1929 there prevailed the uneasy feeling that

Locarno had failed to fulfill its promises0 Locarno was now no longer realized as ^years of hope,1* rather the spirit of Locarno was looked upon as the My@ars of illusiono" And 41 this view was held especially by France and Germany» It

is true that Locarno had eased France8 s fears of Germany— but Locarno did not remove them. In addition, the Treaty of Locarno was more of a British solution to the problem of security--more of a pact of understanding than, from the 42 French view point, an effective Treaty of Guarantee. So

WeMoJordan*s own words; MIt was not the lack of permanent inspection which permitted the rearmament of Germany«, The failure to provide such inspection was itself the result of that division of purpose on the part of the victorious Powers which, already present in 1919, was accentuated by the passage of time and sapped their will to keep Germany disarmed." Jordan, 148. 41. "In Germany disillusionment was intense and widespread. The signature of the Locarno' Treaties had yielded forth with a galaxy of minor concessions--the re­ linquishment by France of the demand for a permanent Com­ mission of Inspection in the Rhineland, the evacuation of the Cologne zone, modifications in the regime of the Rhine­ land occupation so extensive as to transform its character, and a pledge to reduce the army of occupation. Yet the German Government had deemed it politic to convey to its citizens a false impression of disappointment. But in later professions of discontent there was no pretense. The fulfillment of the promised reduct ion in the Allied army of occupation was unwarrantably delayed; by the time it was completed— towards the close of 1927— Germany had begun to count on complete evacuation . . . ." Ibid., 56. 42. Ibid. 20 the search for security continued= One of the most significant manifestations of the Treaty of Locarno was its effect of future Anglo-French relationso From 1926 until World Mar II, French foreign policy was continually subordinated to British direction<, The fact is that Locarnoin essence, meant that France had knuckled under to Qreat Britain o- o o by yielding to the British demand to evacu­ ate the Ruhr and by bringing in the British as guarantors of the Franco-German frontier, France . completely abandoned any hope, of an independent policy or any return to ito Furthermore, Im­ mediately afterwards the British „ @ „ began to exert full pressure on the French to agree to disarmament conferences= The British agreed that, since the French now had the security pact which they had been clamoring for since Versailles, the time had now come to investigate the chances of reducing armaments, in particular, French armamentsc All of this, in the setting of the 19208s appeared to be Anglo-French cooperation or collaboration, but it really boiled down to French subservience to the wishes of England® The fact is that, after the end of the Ruhr experi­ ment and after signing of the Locarno pact, the French never again would act alone; they had, indeed, lost a large part of their nerve, had caved in before English pressure and thereafter followed closely behind a British lion whose roar was frequently not very loud® Thus Berthelot8s program of close Anglo-French cooperation,was to ' make French policy 'a prisoner of the British® It was, indeed, a first and important step on the road to M u n i c h ® 43

43® Graig and Gilbert (eds ®), 82® By the first year of the second decade of peace, 1930., the Locarno spirit had disappeared, and with it, un fortunately, none of the problems of German and general disarmament„ CHAPTER II

BEGINNINGS OF DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 1932

Before examining in some detail the actual begin­ nings of the Disarmament Conference, a study of the outlook of British politicians on the European and disarmament ques­ tion must be made. It will be followed by an examination of the French position on the disarmament question after Locarno= Germany's own political fluctuations and her devastating economic crisis during 1930 and 1931, too, shall be like­ wise examinedo Only in this manner can the Disarmament Conference of 1932 possibly be viewed or understood in perspectiveo Anthony Eden, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary, had this to say about the European scene in an address to the House of Commons on 29 June 1931: The seeds of war psychology still exist in Europeo 1 even doubt whether during the last two years what is usually called the spirit of Locarno has grown in strength in Europe0 On the contrary, the probability is that it has weakened 0. „ * 0 One of the unhappy features is that in many countries of Europe, and France is not one of them, the youngest generation is being trained up into military formations, taught and encouraged in military methods of thought and military drill with consequences, which can hardly be happy for the future peace of Europe „ = o o^-

lo Anthony Eden, Facing: the Dictators (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riversi^™toesl7raT9B2Ts™^'° 22 23 Eden, later the Substitute British Delegate at the Disarma­ ment Conference, stated further in his published memoirs: The Locarno spirit had begun to fade by March 1931 and no substitute had been found to take its place « e o <, I strongly favoured an arms agreement, in the national as well as international interestc The alternative was nervous tension in the world « = 0 = 2 Sden at this time also noted the significant, yet undefined mood of a restless Germany: I had long been skeptical about how the Germany of the Weimar Republic might evolve o' o o more than two years later {“after the military occupation of the Rhineland] 1 travelled in Germany as a visitor and 1 thought I noticed a changing mood, a rest­ lessness which economic distress alone could not explain0 This, 1 feared, might have its consequences for us all„3 In addition to this unexplained German mood of rest­ lessness, the British Government which resulted from the general election of 1931 was in appearance one of the 4 strongest, "and in fact one of the weakest," In British recordso Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, was "eager to resume the initiative which he had taken in 1924 and to • 5- complete the work of appeasement." Stanley Baldwin,

2o Ibid.. 15-16. 3. Ibid. 4. Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 6 6. < 5. A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 19151), 64-651 "™ ' ~ 24 however9 was the real power in Britain during this period:

$lMr 0 Baldwin preferred the substance to the form of power, 6 and reigned placidly in the background0 11 Thus, in poli­ tical brotherhood, these two statesmen governed the country= The Foreign Office was now filled by Sir John Simon, one of the leaders of the Liberal contingent» The significance of this change of office can be clearly seen when one real­ ized the policy of the earlier Foreign Secretary during the Locarno years„ ”Austen Chamberlain believed that the way to keep peace in Europe was to be on the best possible terms with France and to move with her towards an under- 8 . standing with our former enemy. 11 When this former Foreign Secretary first heard of Simon’s likely selection for the office, his immediate reaction was; ’’Had I known it was a 9 possibility 1 would have tried to go back myself. 61 He certainly should have tried. Chamberlain’s reaction is clearly understood in acknowledging the following: Sir John Simon, a Liberal who almost re­ signed at the outbreak of war in 1914, actually

6 = Churchill, 65. 7. Eden deemed this particular change in the For­ eign Ministry as a failure of strength. "In the make-up of the National Government, the Foreign Office had to fall to the Liberal Party. Compromises of this kind are the weakness of coalitions." Eden, 25.

8,. Ibid., 11. 9. Ibid., 25= 25 resigned in protest against conscription eighteen months later„ Simon, like Mac­ Donald, regarded French anxieties as imagin­ ary o 0 o far from being willing to increase British commitments, the National Government were eager to reduce still further those that existedo The French found to their dismay that they were being pressed to disarm without receiving any compensation,, ^ 0 Since Great Britain felt that arms in themselves were the principal causes of war, she now called for a direct ap­ proach to the problem of disarmament„ The Government pro­ posed to inquire how armaments might be reduced and to con­ clude agreements forthwith. In this same connection, the English felt that any increase in arms was a blow to the League of Nations because "without disarmament the League 11 can have no reality." Thus, from the very beginning, the League8s success and disarmament were seen to be synonymous. For a country to ream, simply indicated either aggressive tendencies or a failure to believe in the League--both in­ excusable failings to the British mind. Thus, the best guarantee of peace lay within the League of Nations as the symbol of man8s determination to prevent the recurrence of 12 war. As far as French post-War military policy was to be

10. A. J= P. Taylor, 6 6. 11. John F. Kennedy, Why England Slept (New York: Funk, Inc., 1940), 8-9. 12. "Trust in the League was therefore widely preached and loudly acclaimed, but rather by way of moral 26 taken into account, to the British understanding, Erench hegemony could not be durable0 Germany would not in the end be satisfied with anything less than military parity with France; better then to let parity come about by agreement through the reduction of.French armaments within the framework of a general convention then wait till Germany should re­ a m o o o o It is then comprehensible that Frenchmen approached the Disarmament Gonfer- England it called forth 8une esperance de caractere religiuexo6 ^ The British Government, or more specifically from

1929 to 1935, the nMacBonald-Baldwin regime81 practiced what it morally, if not prudently, preached when it came to Brit­ ish disarmament„ The British army, on the whole, was the strongest in the world at the armistic© 0 By the end of

1920 it was weaker than the Belgian force6 In fact, until 1934, each year the British army8s strength was further re­ duced» The British air force experienced a similar cur­ tailment c In November 1918 Great Britain topped the list for air strength, with 14,000 serviceable machines» Four years later the R 0 A, F. in Europe comprised 180 planes, while France held in Europe 900 planes. The British navy, exhortation than as the advocacy of a clearly conceived policy, for few were curious to inquire what the League meant in terms of machinery and of obligations," W, H, Jordan, Great Britain. France and the German Problem (London:™ Oxford University Press, 1943), 206-2076 13. Ibid., 163. 27 too, was cut do w m By the Washington Agreement of 6 Febru­ ary 1922, Great Britain consented to the scrapping of 40 per cent of her existing strength in capital ships„ In addition, with the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty of 22 April 1930 the entire strength of the British navy 14 was subjected to limitation by international agreement. It is with no great wonder that by June 1931, England6s Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, could have then claimed, 15 6,We have gone pretty nearly the limit of example." In critically considering British politics and disarmament in the very early 30s, "It would be wrong in judging the policy of the British Government not to re­ member the passionate desire for peace which animated the uninformed, misinformed majority of the British people 16 e 0 o o'* As Churchill states in his personal narrative of the Second World War, HI do not suppose there has ever 17 been such a pacifist -minded Government „n However, as he immediately points out in Burkean fashion, "the passionate desire for peace . . . seemed to threaten with political

14o Ibid.. 155. 15= Ibid. 16. Churchill, 112. 17. Ibid.. 115. 28 extinction any party or politician who dared to take any other line. This* of course, is no excuse for political 18 leaders who fall short of their duty.Si Thus the National Government of Great Britain in 1931 soon began to function within three distinct political factions: the extremists of the right, led by Churchill, who favored a strong armament policy; the moderate or Government group; and the Opposition, which, while it did not favor complete unilateral disarmament, was led by an 19 out and out pacifist, George Landsbury. In discussing France’s attitude towards disarmament soon after Locarno, it will not be necessary for our pur­ poses to realize them within her c m m political struggles at home. Her political life, hectic as it was, did not ever really split into distinct opposing factions over disama- 20 ment as in England. The French, although their political affairs still remained in constant flux, clung tenaciously to the French Army as the center and prop of the life of France and of all her allies. "This attitude earned them

18. "We cannot doubt the sincerity of. the leaders of the Socialist and Liberal Parties. They were completely wrong and mistaken and they bear their share of the burden before history." Ibid. 19. Kennedy, 38-39. 20= "On no issue were the French people so united as on the priority of security over disarmament." Jordan, 155. 29 rebukes both in Britain and in the United Stateso The opinions of the press and public were in no way founded 21 upon reality; , = » o81 Although the British public opin­ ion under the so-called National Government showed an in­ creasing inclination to disregard Germany8s post-Mar condition, the French, in vain, had pointed out in a memorandum of 21 July 1931, that "the general assurances given at Versailles that a universal limitation of arma­ ments should follow the one-sided, disarmament of Germany did not constitute a Treaty obligation,, It certainly was not an obligation enforceable apart from time and circum- 22 stance*" The French, then, felt that it was the fear of war that caused nations to a m in self-defense. By removing this fear of attack, armaments will automatica1ly wither away, "Accordingly they called for an indirect approach to the problem of disarmament, Let us, they urged, build up the apparatus of security defensive armaments ; then 23 nations will be able to disarm." In only this under­ standing was France ever willing to disarm— and even then only within a guaranteed system of "collective security."

21. Churchill, 71, 22. Ibid.. 73. 23. Jordan, 154. 30 Of this there was no quest ion , "Disarmament as a method of appeasement fas it was for England8s MacDonald jfwas 24 wholly contrary to the spirit of French policy=H It was likewise with no great wonder that the words of Briand in November 1921 would continue to represent and further clarify the French policy towards disarmament in 1931;

If anybody asks us to go further3 I should have to answer clearly and definitely that it would be impossible for us to do it without exposing ourselves to a most serious danger. You might possibly come and tell us; •We are going to » o o put all means at your disposal in order to secure your safety! 6 Immediately, if we heard these words, of course we would strike upon another plan s 0 <, = If France is to remain alone; 0 = 0 you must not deny her what she wants in order to ensure her security,25 In England such French fears as the substitution of a real German for an alleged French hegemony were counted as un­ founded or were even dismissed. That is, for all, with the exception of one lone voice. In the House of Commons in 1931, Winston Churchill solemnly declared; The sudden weakening of that factor of stability, the unquested supriority of French military power, might open floodgates of mea­ sureless consequences in Europe at the present, time, might break the dyke and •Let the boundless dee Down upon far off cities while they dance - Or dream8 26.

24. Ibid.» 169. 25. Ibid., 155. 26. Ibid.. 162. 31 Thus ? the real cleavage between France and Great Britain over disarmament on the eve of the Disarmament Con­ ference was centered on the question whether European peace should continue to rest on the sanction of preponderant 27 force* When Hitler was released from Landsberg am Lech prison at the end of 1924, he said that it would take him five years to reorganize his movement* In 1928, he had but twelve seats in the Reichstag* By 1930, this had become 107* It soon became apparent to the Reichswehr, "the real poli­ tical power in Germany," that "as a military caste and or­ ganisation in opposition to the Nazi revolutionary move- 28 ment, they could no longer maintain control of Germany," Thus, the A m y chiefs in 1931 felt they must, * * * for their own sake and for that of the country join forces with those to whom in domestic matters they were opposed with all the rigidity and severeness of the German mind , , , * The Army Chiefs had gradually realised that the strength of the Nazi Party in the nation was such that Hitler was the only possible successor to Hindenburg as head of the German nation* Hitler on his side knew that to carry out his programme of German resurrection an alliance with the gov- erning elite of the Reichswehr was indispensable.

27, Ibid,. 169, 28, Churchill, 59, ' 29, Ibid,, 59-60, Gordon A, Craig suggests that there was no question about the Reichswehr8s attitude if the Nazis had attempted to seize power in 1931, However, there was doubt over the Reichswehr8s support of the 32 As Churchill further states: It is not necessary in this account to fol­ low year by year this complex and formidable development political with all its passions and villainies, and all its ups and downs. The pale simlight of Locarno shone for awhile upon the scene,'3® It was to a great extent American loans which made the rays of this Locarno sun seem warm upon a gray scene. But the depression of 1929-1930 put an end to all this. The United

Bruening government in the event of the latter 18striking out at the Mazis, 98 The entire question centered around the S,A» The Bruening government hesitated to strike at this para­ military body for two reasons. First, to dissolve the S,A, would have required the dissolution of similar groups, like the Reichsbanner, the uniformed but unarmed organization of the Social Democrats, This would undoubtedly have cost Bruening the much needed support of the Social Democrats, Secondly, the S,A® "was gradually winning support within the Reichswehr itself,tr Thus, the support of the Reichswehr would have been at stake if Bruening eliminated the S«A, In addition, Bruening at this time was hoping to persuade the allied Powers to allow Germany the right of supplementing the existing Reichswehr with a militia of some 200,000 men, recruited in accordance with the principal of universal ser­ vice, This "Bruening victory" would have taken much wind out of the sails of the 3,A,, thus satisfying the dissenting Reichswehr officers. But all came to naught. Therefore, "in their desire to end a political situation which threatened to degenerate into complete anarchy, the military chiefs rashly took upon themselves tasks of political negotiation and party manipulation for which they were not qualified. At the start they justified this activity by claiming that it was necessary to prevent the victory of the extremist parties; but when their experiments proved unsuccessful, they looked with increasing approval to one of those parties and, in the end concurred in its accession to power," Gordon A, Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp, 428, 434, 441, and 438, 30, Ibid,, 52, . ' : • ■ - 33 States banks, faced with increasing commitments at home, re

fused to increase their improvident loans to Germany0 This led to the sudden ruin of many enterprises on which the peaceful revival of Germany was based. Unemployment in 31 Germany rose to 2,300,000 in the winter of 1930. However, amidst all this economic horror in Germany the reparation question was somewhat mitigated by Germany*s procurement of the "Young Plan" which "not only put a final limit to the period of reparation payments, but freed both the Reichsbank and the German railways from Allied control, and abolished the Reparations Commission in favour of the 32 Bank for International Settlements." Nevertheless, this "far-reaching and benevolent" Young Plan was not fully ap­ preciated by the majority of Germans-~for the ever-present and over shadowing fear that dominated the German masses during this period was out and out unemployment = The middle classes had already been ruined and driven into violent courses by the flight from the mark . . . . Hitler and his National- ' Socialist Movement joined forces with the busi­ ness and commercial interests which were repre­ sented and led by the truculent commercial magnate, Hugenberg.33

Thus, it was the international economic scene, accompanied

31. Ibid., 55. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid.. 55-56. 34 by the vehement assaults of Hitler0s Nazis and Hugenberg8s capitalist magnates that led to the political overthrow of the dying Str@s@mann0 On 28 March 1930, Brnening, the leader of the Catholic Centre Party, became Chancelloro He pursued continuously the scheme of factory preparation for war which had been devised by Herr Rathenauc In addition. Chancellor Bruening made the last recognizable effort to rally what remained of the old Germany against the re- 34 surgent, violent and debased nationalist agitation0 • The new. Chancellor-immediately went about t© rally the'11©Id Germany81 around a constitutional monarchy on English lines o' Hot only was the re-election of President Hindenburg a necessary prerequisite, but if he could just persuade the old Field-Mamhal to act as a regent for the possible succession of one of the gone of the Crown Prince, all would be feasible0 But Hindenburg refused<, The monarch- ial conception could not be reconciled with picking and. choosing among royal princes0 Thus, all that Bruening could do im the end was, by accomplishing Hindenburg8s. re-election, stave off-Hitler0s filling the voido In March 1932, the Disarmament Conference having already- convened- for one month, Hindenburg was returned

340 Ibid. , 35 over the Communist Thaelman and "That man (who) can lick stamps with my head on them,” Adolf Hitler. But the sig­ nificant thing about this March election was that the Austrian did surprisingly well upon a "roaring campaign 35 against the humiliations of Germany under Versailles." One must at least admire the frustrated architect for being consistent for he never basically altered his March 1932 campaign "line16 in the future. And in the end, it was this 36 "sales pitch” that endeared Germany to Hitler. One other event must be briefly mentioned before examining in detail the "last hope" for world peace. "The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 seemed only to be a localized affair; it is only after having watched . . . the other events leading up to the present 37 war, that we can see this was the beginning of the end. 11 We see even more than this. As W. M. Jordan already

35. Ibid., 57. 36. "The subsequent inflation period of 1929 and the economic collapse of 1931 combined to make the German nation fertile ground for new ideas, therefore, Hitler found it easy to convince the people that their way back to the top in Europe was through national regimentation, based upon a policy of re-armament. Eearmament answered all Germany9 s problems; through it the evils of Versailles would be wiped out, through it unemployment would end, through it Germany would be able to attain her destiny. And so Germany re-armed." Kennedy, 3-4. 37. Ibid., 33. 36 pointed out: "For European peace to continue to rest on

the sanction of preponderant force 0 = „ = Great Britain sought to substitute a community of relatively disarmed states, the peace of which should be assured by the mutual 38 confidence of each in the intentions of all." This Eng­

lish ,1 dis armed - sub s t itut ion " was the League of Nations 0 When Japan withdrew from this "community of relatively dis­ armed states" on 27 March 1933, "the moral authority of the League was shown to be devoid of any physical support at a 39 time when its activity and strength were most needed0" Furthermore, It was to show that the basis on which Eng­ land and the other powers had built their se­ curity was worthless, c o » » Britain8s failure to take the lead in stopping Japan when America extended the promise of co-operation has been re­ garded as one of the greatest blunders of post­ war British d i p l o m a c y 0 40 The long-awaited Disarmament Conference assembled at Geneva on 2 February 19320 It was regarded as the last 41 hope for world peace= in numbers, 59 countries sent dele­ gations,, Since its conception on 12 December 1925, the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference had

38o Jordan, 169=

39o Churchill, 8 8, 40o Kennedy, 33» 41<> Ibido, 19o 37 toiled to make ready a schedule on which the Conference

could work. At its final session, 6 November-9 December 1930, it completed its task, which was to draw up a draft convention embodying appropriate methods for the limitation of armamentse However, Mthe weakness of its plan lay in the failure to propose specific limitations on the forces of any nation except Germany, whose Government soon gave notice, 42 that they would accept no such discrimination0 Indeed, in this light, the Conference was born under a "dismal . 43 : star, 11 As A* J; P 0 Taylor rightly points out: The time of this meeting was peculiarly in­ appropriate* The victorious Powers had been committed to some such act ever since 1919, when the peace treaty had imposed disarmament on Germany as the first step towards "a general

42= . Sden, 27* 43* 8fBy the time the Disarmament Conference met in February 1932, the foundations for its work had long since been eaten away* In the face of the deterioration of the German situation, it would have been difficult to persuade France to reduce her military superiority except in return for rigid guarantees of collective support to compensate for the sacrifice * * * * However, when the National gov­ ernment took over, the greater reluctance of Great Britain to make such commitments became quickly apparent * * * , The French demand for security, the German claim to equality added up to a dilemma for which the Conference had no solu­ tion * * » The German Nazis and their Nationalist allies were not really concerned with disarmament * By 1932 they were well on their way to power * * * * The disintegration of the German political system in the solvent of the economic depression was the final precipitant of the collapse of the disarmament dream*" Gordon A* Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds*), The Diplomats (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University 3res%Tr933TT^ 340-341* - 38 limitation of the armaments of all nationsoM This was far from a promise that the victors won Id disarm down to the German level, but it was a promise that they would do something0 The promise was steadily evaded throughout the nineteen-twenties« This evasion played into German hands. The Germans increasingly insisted that the victors should either fulfil their promises or release Germany from h e r s . 44 In his opening speech at the Disarmament Conference, Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary echoed the very words of Lloyd George some ten years ealieri ’• Security for all fundamentally depends on armament reduction.” This terse phrase epitomized the British doctrine throughout the 45 history of the conference. It is not at all surprising then, to find that within a few months of the opening cere­ monies, the French and English, let alone the Germans, were exchanging acrimonious notes. The French Government told Simon as early as 12 March that, "German armament already 46 exceeded the limits imposed by the Versailles Treaty." Britain could not deny it. For that matter, neither could the Bruening Government. The substantial results of lruening8s pursued scheme of ”factory preparation for war" were now becoming known to the always-suspicious French. In April, Chancellor Bruening went to Geneva with

44. A. Jo P. Taylor, 64. 45. Jordan, 155. 46. Eden, 28. 39 a far-reaching plan of Treaty revision under his arm, con­ taining provisions for Mequality for armamentse,? Bruening came to the Gonference fully determined to attain for Ger­ many the equality through which a balanced order might be worked out in Europe. Unexpectedly, he found a favorable reception0 A s Churchill relates: Tardieu, the French Premier, was telephoned to come immediately from Paris to Geneva. But unfortunately for Bruening, Tardieu had other news. Schleicher had been busy in Berlin, and had just warned the French Ambassador not to negotiate with Bruening because his fall was imminent. It may well be also that Tardieu was concerned with the military position of France on the formula of ^equality of armaments." At any rate Tardieu did not come to Geneva, and on 1 May Bruening returned to Berlin. To arrive empty-handed at such a moment was fatal to him.4? It is true that the intrigue of the ambitious and cunning General von Schleicher was the direct cause of Bruening8s ^failure at Geneva.M But of far more significance. In terms of the actual proceedings at the Disarmament Gonference, lies John F. Kennedy°s explanation as to the likely chances of Bruening8s plan of Treaty revision having ever been ac­ cepted at all. The great obstacle, according to Kennedy, was the inability of the delegates to agree on fundamentals, such as what constituted an offensive weapon. The whole question centered on which end of the revolver was facing whether it was an offensive or a defensive weapon. "Because

47. Churchill, 64. 40 of the inability of the different countries to come to an agreements Chancellor Bruening was unable to satisfy the vigorous demands for equality of the home front in Ger- 48 many,M neverthelesss Schleicher now persuaded the senile .President von Hindenburg to dismiss Bruening as Chancellor, On the morning of 30 May, having learned of his sealed fate, Bruening resigned to avoid actual dismissal, Bruening8s forced resignation was of great significance to the fail­ ure of the Disarmament Conference and the world peace in general: So ended the last Government in post-Mar Germany which might have led the German people into the enjoyment of a stable and civilized constitution, and opened peaceful channels of intercourse with their neighbors. The offers which the Allies had made to Bruening would, but for Schleicher8s intrigue and Tardieu8s delay, certainly have saved him. These offers had presently to be discussed with a different system and a different man,^9 Bruening was succeeded by von Papen, who paved the way for 50 Hitler in 1933, By June, Eden, who had been attending the Conference but not yet as an official delegate, summed up its apparent peril: 8,While one half of Europe has been dominated by

48, Kennedy, 32-33, 49, Churchi11, 65, 50, Kennedy, 38, 41 apprehension and the other by impatience, there has been a tendency to pay too much attention to the mechanics of peace 51 and too little to its fundamentals o 0 » Summer was now upon the Conference, and all was going from bad to worse* It was a further misfortune for the Disarmament Conference that reparations reached a final settlement in the summer of 1932* For, while it would have been admirable if they had been disposed of before, this was the worst moment to do it * The German Government now trans­ ferred from Bruening to Papen, was weaker and more unpopular than ever, hence still more anxious for popularity in for­ eign affairs* Reparations no longer provided a grievance; and the one-sided disarmament of Germany had to take their place* Any real negotiations were impossible; the German 52 government needed a sensational success* Thus, the new Chancellor von Papen, now demanded equality of armaments 53 ‘ , for Germany* His words were clear: "The condition of affairs in which we are definitely forbidden the use of arms, which other states are allowed to possess as indis- • 54 pensable weapons of defence, cannot continue*"

51* Eden, 28= 52= Jordan, 67* 53* Ibid*. 62* 54* Eden, 28* 42 Accordinglyg on 22 July 1932 s unless c?general principle of equality of rights’9 was recognized, Germany 55 announced that she would not continue in the Conference,, By autumn, Germany Was refusing to take further part in the Conference, unless her claim---which originated from the implied "contractual obligation” of the raisfortunate preamble of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles was met„ As W s M e .Jordan says, "By 1932 a position legally correct 56 had become politically untenable=M The British Government was now perplexed for this German claim was, „ «, „ supported by British journals of all shades of opinion, from The Times, which called for 8the timely redress of inequality9 to The Mew Statesman, which proclaimed the need Tor unqualified recognition of the principle of equality of statuse”57 The more cautious

55, "The almost interminable haggling of the first six months of the Conference set the tone for its labors„ By July, all that had been accomplished was the drafting of a general resolution as a proposed basis for further ne­ gotiation, When the resolution was presented, the German delegate, Herr Hadolny, made it clear that he could not accept a formula which made no provision for equality of armaments , , , „ Although the resolution was carried, the fate of the Conference was clear. Thereafter, from the first German withdrawal through her final departure on 14 October 1933, its work went on in a vacuum of unreality. The triumph of the National Socialists should have been proof enough of the failure of its efforts,” Craig and Gilbert (eds,), 341, 56, Jordan, 149, 57, Winston Churchill interpreted The lew Statesman’s quoted phrase as follows: "This meant that the seventy attitude of the Brit ish Goverraaent provoked widespread impatience, a « 0 =58 The British Embassy in Berlin felt that Germany*s"appro­ priate" withdrawal from the Conference was a substantial admission of her continued present program of rearming--as Germany did not want to take the chance of submitting her­

self to any outside scrutiny on the League of Nations8 part= Thus, MHis Majesty8s Government had now to create a policy which took account of these unpleasant realities, but did 60 not surrender to them.H The whole atmosphere of antici­ pated disarmament by internation agreement had practically 61 evaporated. million Germans ought to be allowed to ream and prepare for war without the victors in the late fearful struggle being entitled to make any objection. Equality of status between victors and vanquished; equality between a France of thirty-nine millions and a Germany of nearly double that numberChurchill, 73. 58. Jordan, 149. 59. Eden, 29. 60. Ibid. ( 61. $sBy 1932, all the basic assumptions of the campaign which was supposedly to culminate in the progres­ sive reduction of armaments had disappeared. It was now time for rigid resistance to the demands of an importunate German nationalism--and time also for equaliy? fi m support of France and the European order. ‘The threat to the sta­ bility of Europe itself was too great to be ignored. In such a pattern, there was little place for the chimera of disarmament by international agreement. 81 Craig and Gilbert (eds.), 343. 44 On 15 September His Majesty's Government responded with a memorandum dealing specifically with Germany's claim to equality of rights: His Majesty's Government can give no countenance or encouragement to the disre­ gard of Treaty obligations0 Although His Majesty's Government do not understand the German memorandum to have stated a contrary view, they desire to associate themselves with the opinion that it could not be maintained as the legally correct "construction of the Treaty of Versailles that Germany is legally entitled to the abrogation of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles by any disarmament treaty to be concluded, or by the failure to conclude any convention at all.62 On 23 September, the Conference resumed without Germanyo ^To coax them back became the prime political 63 objective of the victorious Allies." Therefore, on 28 October, "under pressure of public opinion the British Government announced its readiness to meet the German 64 claim." The Foreign Office's 28 October memorandum respecting Germany's claim to equality of rights contained the following: In dealing with the claim to equality of rights in the matter of armaments raised by

62. Statement of Views of His Majesty's Government in the UnitedKingdom on Questions arising out of Notes ex­ changed "between the German Government (29 August) and the French Government (11 September) regarding; the Work of the Disarmament Conference. 15 September 1932. British Foreign Policy, second series, iv. No. 92. 63. Churchill, 74. 64. Jordan, 150= the German Government in their Hote of 29 August 1932, it is necessary to recall that the limitations contained in Part V of the Treaty of Versailles were imposed as a means of securing the peace of Europe » » « the hesitation which may have shown itself in certain quarters in granting the German claim proceeds „ 6 <> from a deep anxiety as to the use which might be made of the new situation and of the dangers which would re­ sult to the tranquility of Europe if an ex­ press assurance as to the peaceful intentions of Germany was not forthcoming „ »' e , The acknowledgment by others of Germany8s moral right entails upon Germany the acceptance of this corresponding obligation: » e e the meeting of Germany6s claim will not involve any attempt by violent means to disturb the existing territorial regime in Europeo On the assumption that such an assurance is given, His Majesty8s Government in the United Kingdom consider that the German claim to equality of rights should be fully met in the following manner: - = o ® (iii) The principle must be accepted that all States should content themselves with the same kind of arms, but any changes in Ger­ many 8 s fighting strength must be carried out in such a way as not to conflict with the principle of no rearmament=63 Before one proceeds any further, the critical reader must attempt in an objective manner to try and understand the outstanding implications of this British Memorandum« The memorandum explicitly states that if Germany will promise not to cause havoc in the present established European theater, England will recognize her equality of 46 rights in the matter of armaments» But this equality of rights can only be granted and executed in so far as Ger­ many will be free to disarm. At this time, the British Government fully suspecting, if not possessing in many cases, substantiated proof of German rearmament by 1932, continued to deceive themselves. Why did they increase French mistrust, in addition to promoting further German rearmament by offering section (iii) and implying in good faith that the illegal events in Germany had not already negated the essential significance and merit of this sec­ tion? By July, the British Embassy had informed the Govern­ ment that GermanyBs withdrawal was very possibly a substan- 64 tial admission of her present illegal rearmament program. In this light, the 28 October 1932 British memorandum can only be objectively seen as a questionable example, o o o of British fatuity and fecklessness, , , , a.refusal to face unpleasant facts, which, though o , o free from wickedness or evil de­ sign, played a definite part in the unleashing upon the world of horrors and miseries which, even so far as they have unfolded, are already beyond comparison in h u m a n experience,65

Thus, in November, the Allies8 %ew" prime political objective was geared full-speed ahead: "Hander severe and constant British pressure, the French proposed what was

64, Eden, 29, 65, Churchill, 89, 66 called * The Herr lot Plan. * 11 This French effort of 14 November provided that the national armies of Europe, re­ duced to a militia level, should be deprived of bombing aircraft and of powerful mobile land material, especially heavy artillery and tanks such as were necessary for de­ livering attacks on permanent fortifications* But a restricted amount of powerful mobile material was to be re­ tained by specialized contingents of long-term soldiers, who were to be maintained by each state and held at the disposal of the League for common action against an ag­ gressor* Moreover, material in excess was not to be de­ stroyed, but stored in each state under international supervision* If engaged in a war of legitimate self- defense, a state was to regain full use of its League contingent of troops and of the stocks of material within its territory* This military organization was to be crowned by the constitution of "an organically international 67 air force* 19 Once more Winston Ohurchill states the case with clarity: The essence of this Harriot Plan was the reconstruction of all European defence forces as short-service armies with limited numbers, admitting equality of status but not necessarily accepting equality of strength* In fact and in principle, the admission of equality of status made it impossible ultimately not to accept equality of strength* 6 8

6 6* Ibid*, 74* 67* Jordan, 167*

6 8* Churchill, 74* 48 "Doubtless, once 6equality of status® had been conceded, the transition to 6equality of strength8 at least on land, was inevitable^ It was soon effected by the MacDonald Plan 69 of 16 March 19330 Nevertheless, "the British attitude to the French proposals presented at the Disarmament Con­ ference- -the Harriot Plan of November 1932--revealed that time had not lessened the rift between the views of the 70 French and the British Governmentso" Therefore, in 71 December, "French inhibitions were overcome,n Ramsay MacDonald and Simon came to Geneva to make their effort in persuading Germany to take part in the Conference againa The French Prime Minister, M, Herriot e , accepted to grant Germany equality of rights "in a system which would provide security for all nations Von leurath, the German Foreign Minister, , , „ at length, yielded enough to allow the British Prime Minister to announce on 11 December that Germany would rejoin the Conference,/!

69, Jordan, 150-151, 70, Ibid,. 203, 71, Ibid,, 149-150, 72, Eden, 30, The following is the actual draft: "The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy have declared that one of the principles that should guide the Conference on Disarmament should be the grant to Ger­ many, and to the other powers disarmed by the treaty, of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations, and that this principle should find itself embodied in the convention containing the conclusion of the Disarmament Conference , , , , 2. On the basis of this declaration, Germany has signified its willingness to resume its place at the Disarmament Conference," Declaration 11 December 1932, British Foreign Policy, second series, iv. Enciosurel No, 220, 49 As Churchill points out: ’’Under certain safeguards of il­ lusory character the French were reduced to accepting this 73 meaningless formula,,” On 14 December, the General Com­ mission of the Disarmament Conference adjourned until 31 January 1933-~the day after Adolf Hitler took office as Chancellor of Germany„ Thus, at the end of 1932, the French having immorally 74 acquiesced against their better judgment by adding their signature to this corrupt, English-inspired Declaration of

1 1 Bee ember--which was immediately "hailed as a notable 75 victory for peace"--now too, side by side with their Anglican brothers, had to accept full responsibility for what was soon to follow; the success of the relentlessly aggressive designs of Hitler,,

73o Churchill, 740 However, A 0 Jo P„ Taylor fur­ ther explains its "canceHating" nature: "This promise was meaninglesso If the French got security, there would be no equality of status; if they did not get security, there was to be no equality* The promise did not impress the German electors o16 74o Jordan, 35„ In June 1919, Clemenceau was re­ ported to have said: "Me Frenchmen understand Germany and the Germans better than you. The more concessions we grant them, the more they will ask for." Ibid. 75. Churchill, 74. CHAPTER III

14 OCTOBER 1933

At the end of 1932, Anthony Eden could say, 811 still had hopes that good might come from the Geneva dis- 1 cussions, o o o 0 n But it was now 1933» On 23 January the Disarmament Conference once again proceeded with a German representative present. Its work began with a gener­ al discussion of the Harriot Plan, The General Commission for the Conference resumed its calling on 31 January, However, on 30 January Adolf Hitler took office as Chancellor of Germany, It was not a "seizure of power" despite National Socialist boasting. In January 1933 Papen and Hindenburg were imploring him to become Chancellor, and he graciously consented. Hitler's appointment was in a strictly constitutional way and for solidly democratic 2 reasons he could provide a majority in the Reichstag, To a large extent, because of von Papen8s association with

1, Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1962), 30, 2, A, Jo P, Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamish HaraTitTon^’ 196TJ", "ppT"~68 and 71,

50 51 the political general, Schleicher, in 1932, and their mutual, but harmful Splaying one off against the other,11 the reins of Germany were now placed in Adolf Hitler’s hands--whom they both thought would be a "tame figurehead»11 This expectation turned out to be wrong 1 More important was Hitler’s acces­ sion to power in light of the disarmament question» Im­ mediately after 30 January the Krupp concern received orders for the production of anti-aircraft guns, mortars, tanks and tank parts, submarine parts, and prior to October 1934, of 3 six submarineso In addition to this "rearming" result of Hitler’s appointment, on 20 February Goring invited leading German bankers and industrialists to his home, in order to obtain financial support for the critical election of 5 March: "Hitler and Goring in unmistakable terms, promised this would be the last election and Hitler assured his lis­ teners that the question of restoration of the Wehrmacht 4 will not be decided in Geneva, but in Germany," During the month of January, Sir Alexander Gadogan,

3, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg; Military Tribunals. October 1946-April 1949 (Washington, D,Co: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), Volume IX, 464„ 4„ Xbido, 462o This particular quotation discloses that Hitler, even at the beginning of his Chancellorship, was already bent on rearming Germany regardless of the pro­ ceedings at Geneva, In addition, this material refutes A 0 J0 P0 Taylor’s highly questionable thesis that Hitler had no real premeditated plan to ream Germany, 52 the chief adviser to the United Kingdom delegation at Geneva stated the awful disheartening, precarious condition of the floundering Disarmament Conference, and the lack of a "British captain0 h We are drifting to disaster0 To navigate difficult seas you must have both a chart and a Captaino 1 had hoped to get the latter, but you know the difficulties that have arisen thereo I thought at least we were going to get a chart, but even that seems doubtful „ c » „ This blessed Conference will fail unless it is taken properly in hando We are the people who ought to do thato The French won't; if the Italians did, the French wouldn't follow; the Germans would wreck everything; the Ameri­ cans talk very big when there is nothing doing, o o » we are the only people who could make it a success « » » . If the Conference is not driven along hard, it will fail c » = „ The Conference cannot survive many more pauses or adjournments <> o <> <>5 Eden, now officially second-in-Gommand in Geneva to Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, sadly explained Great Brit­ ain' s principal difficulty at the Conference: The Foreign Secretary by temperament was not suited to drive the Con­ ference o Despite Simon's remarkable intellectual gifts, his brilliant and analytical mind--or perhaps because of them— he hated to take decisions. As a consequence, he was tempted to dodge them, for which there was always an in- 6 genious reason, while the difficulties in Europe grew.

5„ Eden, 31-32. 53 Although the Herrlot Plan of four months earlier was presently being discussed at Geneva5 the atmosphere now took on an "’ultimatum-climateoAs Eden pointed out: After another week of discussions, reasoning and pleading. Sir Alexander Cadogan and I came to the conclusion that unless we could inject some new life into the Conference, it was doom­ ed <, Britain was not without blame . . « .7 Eden further emphasized the terrible significance of this tense situation from Great Britain's immediate point of view in a letter to Stanley Baldwin on 22 February: As to disarmament as a whole, I am beginning to believe that the only way in which we could utilize progress1over the whole field would be for us to produce a convention complete in all its details and lay it on the table and ask that the Conference accept it » « = for even if the Conference then failed we should least have made the greatest effort in our power to achieve suc­ cess, and I am not so sure that it would then failo8 'x. ' . ■ . Thus, by February 1933 Great Britain realized that any success whatsoever achieved through the Disarmament Con­ ference rested solely on her efforts and initiative = With this in mind, she now decided to draft a convention— -the first of two. Eden did all he could in promoting this British draft. On 11 March the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary arrived in Geneva. Eden told them that the posi­ tion had not changed and that he saw no hope unless Great

7. Ibid.. 34. 8. Ibid., 35. 54 Britain could put on the table a convention complete with figures0 Adjournment in his view spelt failure, and a limited convention was no better, for it meant the re­ armament of Germanyo The only solution was a convention 9 with serious disarmament which might bind Germany 0 Therefore, fanned by the breeze of popularity over the Serriot Plan of November 1932, His Majesty’s Government now produced on 16 March 1933, HThe MacDonald Plan, named after its prime source of inspiration0 "MacDonald’s pur­ pose, it is clear, was to demonstrate the futility of seek­ ing a solution of the problemc£ security based on the pit- 10 ting of collective force against an aggressor," The Herriot Plan, providing for the formation of national militia throughout Continental Europe was incorporated in the new English draft. However, the British Government now added precise figures for troops of each country. For Germany as for France, 200,000 was proposed. As regards military material calibre of 105 mm,, the limit prescribed for Germany by the Versailles Treaty, and tanks to a maximum weight of 16 tons, all material in excess of these limits was to be destroyed within three years, with the exception of guns up to 155 mm,, which might be retained but not

9, Ibid,, 38, 10, ¥, Me Jordan, Great Britain. France, and the German Problem (London: Oxford University Press, 1943}, 205, 55 replacedo The restrictions on German naval armaments were to remain unchallenged until 1935= Military aircraft were to remain prohibited to Germany for the duration of the convention, while each of the other Great Powers was to reduce its air force to 500 planes0 Bombing from the air 11 was to be.outlawed. In essence, the first British Draft was unique, “This was almost a revolutionary departure, for it implied hot only that we would draft a convention, but that we would write into it figures for our country and for every nation represented at the Conference, Secur- 12 ity could then be discussed in terms of reality,11 After its presentation, however, the French Government dropped their insistence on internationalization as opposed to abolition, and the last stages of the negotiations were concerned not with the question whether the French would abandon “offensive weapons,“ but at what stage they would 13 do so. After debate, the Conference accepted the British draft as a basis for its future work. It then adjourned for one month, which unfortunately was too long. As Eden rightly pointed out, “I thought that the Convention would 14 be accepted, but only if the advantage now gained were pressed,“

11, Ibid,. 151 12, Eden, 35, 13, Jordan, 169, 14, Eden, 40, 56 Churchill had his grave doubts as to tthe existence of any advantage in the MacDonald Plan, On 23 March, he had the opportunity of saying to Parliament: 1 doubt the wisdom of pressing this plan upon the French at this time 0 o <> = When we read about Germany, when we watch with surprise and distress the tumultuous insurgence of fero­ city and war spirit , *- , «, the persecution of large numbers of individuals solely on the ground of race™-when we see all that occurring in one of the most gifted,.learned, scien­ tific and formidable nations in the world, one cannot help feeling glad that the fierce pas­ sions that are raging in Germany have not yet found any other outlet but upon themselves * o o o The French must be greatly concerned at what is taking place in Germany, » „ „ „ I dare say that during this anxious month there are a good many people who have said to them­ selves, as I have been saying for years: 8 Thank God for the French Army0815 The "lone voice" at this time had just one observation to make about the sessions at Geneva: "Then there is the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, a solemn and prolonged farce, which has undoubtedly lowered the prestige of the League of Nations and irritated many of the countries 16 affected," Churchill in addit ion used this occasion to point out that "the removal of the grievances of the van­ quished should precede the disarmament of the victors c" As to this last maxim, Eden, in his published memoirs retorted:

15, Winston S, Churchill,"The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 75%' 16, Churchill, While England Slept1932-1938 (New York: G, Pd Putnam’s Sohs, 1938), 55, 57 "The weakness of this argument, as we were soon to find out 5 was that the vanquished nourished their grievances and had decided to rearm, whether the victors liked it or 17 .. not*" But this remark of the British second-in-command at Geneva was a revealing confession as to the inconsist­ ency of Great Britain's current efforts* For if the van­ quished had already, before 16 March 1933, decided to re­ arm, whether the victors liked it or not, why did the British and Eden formulate and encourage a draft whose sole aim was to 'remove the grievances of the vanquished' at the suicidal expense of the victors' safety— the French Amy? Obviously, His Majesty's Government took Germany at its word--a grievous fault* The British Government felt that without appease­ ment of grievances there was no chance of security* The French held that without security against Germany, there was no possibility of peace* On 16 March, when the Mac­ Donald Plan was revealed, the French made known their deep suspicions as to Geman intentions: M* Daladier wished to observe that he could not entirely agree that Germany was at present disarmed. For several years she had been mak­ ing every effort towards rearmament and the French Government had a very complete dossier providing violations of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, particularly during the last few months* These violations related

17. Eden, 41* 58 mainly to war material, and he gave one ex­ ample: according to the German budget, the repairs alone to a machine gun cost as much as the manufacture of three new machine guns in France =3-8 Germany1s reaction to the MacDonald Plan was posi­ tive- -but on a temporary basis = Without considerable im­ provement the draft was not acceptable to Germany, but on the whole it was to be welcomed and represented a useful basis for discussion: n6 „ = our stand must be so posi­ tive that if the plan should fail the fault would lie on the French side and we would not lose the association with 19 the British0M Therefore, Germany^s tactics for the time being had to consist in upholding their own interests with­ out prematurely revealing their stand regarding the actual situation during the first stage* In this light, it is hard to understand how the Disarmament Conference could have ever really been a success--either from a French or German point of view* The Conference resumed at the end of April and be­ gan to discuss the MacDonald Plan* The question of the date at which Germany should be allowed to attain practical

18= Conversation between MacDonald, Simon, Eden, Daladier and M= Paul - Boneour, 16 March 1933= British Foreign Policy, second series, iv= Ho= 310= 19 = Hadolny to Foreign Minister von Heurath, 20 March 1933= German Foreign Policy, series C, i= No* 103= 59 equality emerged as the critical issue of the negotiations,. The French Government refused to contemplate the destruc­ tion of their heavy war material until after a delay of four years» during which the reduction of the Reichswehr and of the French army to a militia level would be affected9 and the efficacy of the proposed system of supervision over 20 armaments fully tested. However, it was soon apparent that the MacDonald Plan with its allotment of a 200 9000 man army for both France and Germany did not satisfy the latter, Germany refused to include her military police in the fig­ ures allotted to her. The amendments to Great Britain's draft desired by the Nazis would have prolonged the period of training and swollen the total of Germany's trained troops, The Conference would not agree and Eden was asked to make this plain to the German delegate, Nadolny9 who re- 2 1 acted by banging the table and being generally truculent, On 30 April, Brigadier Temperley, the senior military ad­ viser for Great Britain reported to the British Foreign Secretary a conversation he had had with General von Schonheiny, the military adviser for Germany, earlier that same day. Temper ley pointed out that the German amendments had created a very difficult situation, and it was clear that if they were maintained a deadlock in the Conference

20, Jordan, 151, 21, Eden, 42, 60 would ensue, entailing very serious political consequenceso When he further stated that Britain was not particularly concerned in the police question one way or the other but only sought to bring France and Germany together, the German general replied that the police question was sus­ ceptible to no compromise and that England’s efforts to find a compromise were unlikely to succeed» 5,0 0 » the 22 results of the conversation were almost entirely negative=” On 1 May, Eden could only write to Baldwin: 1551 only wish we had more to show in the way of results. The Germans are exasperating and progress is very slow . . . . This job is like trying to force a bill through an international House of Commons with no whips and no government majority 23 e o o o Six days earlier in a speech to the Royal Society of St. George, Churchill explained the critical difficulty in Great Britain’s present but troublesome foreign policy: Our difficulties come from the mood of un­ warrantable self abasement into which we have been cast by a powerful section of our intellectuals. They come from the acceptance of defeatist doc­ trines by a large proportion of our politicians. But what have they to offer but a vague internation­ alism, a squalid materialism, and the promise of impossible Utopias?

22. Conversation between Brigadier Temperley and General von Schonheiny of the German Delegation, 30 April 1933. British Foreign Policy, second series, v. Mo. 108. 23. Eden, 43. Nothing can save England if she will not save herself = = = = If, while on all sides foreign nations are every day asserting a more aggressive and militant nationalism by arms and trade, we remain paralyzed by our theoretical doctrines „ „ , then indeed our ruin will be swift and final,24 On 3 May, Eden painfully summed up the unhappy stag­ nate condition of the negotiations over the MacDonald Plan, Great Britain had hoped that the presentation of a Draft Convention, would result in a different atmosphere for dis­ cussions at the Conference and might encourage mutual con­ cessions, But Eden confessed that he could not detect any fundamental change, And the rigid attitude of the German delegation was of no little help in maintaining this in­ ertia, In fact, Eden feared.that Nadolny had precise instructions to resist standardization to the last, "If this should be his attitude, it is useless to expect the French to make a sufficient concession in the matter of 25 material. In these circumstances Convention would fail,"

24, "Historians have noticed, all down the centur­ ies, one peculiarity of the English people which has cost them dear. We have always thrown away after a victory the greater part of the advantages we gained in the struggle. The worst difficulties from which we suffer , , , come from within, They come from a peculiar type of brainy people always found in our country, who, if they add some­ thing to its culture, take much from it," Churchill, While

25, Eden to Simon, 3 May 1933, British Foreign , second series, v. No, 110, 62 The Conference was further undermined on 9 Hay when Eden discovered that the German delegate, Nadolny, now de­ manded ^complete equality in material by the end of first Convention5' if Germany were to transform the Reichswehr ac­ cording to the stipulations in the MacDonald Plan, Eden6 s following reaction illustrates the uncompromising obstinacy of the Germans at this stage of the negotiations, I said this was a new demand, Germany had previously accepted principle of $stages,6 1 thought she had even demanded full equality in first Convention, German delegate said that if it was a new demand so also was demand for standardization of armies, 1 must say at once that I regarded his sug­ gestions as so unacceptable that 1 would not communicate them to anyone else as I feared that they might render all further conversations use­ less ,26 All that existed by 11 Hay was the possibility of employing the MacDonald Plan as a basis of discussion, "but even this is largely destroyed by Herr Nadolny1s insistence on * counter 27 concessions’ in the realm of material,M The same day Eden telegraphed to the Foreign Secretary: I have now definite impression what Germany really wants, rearmament, i,e, she demands to have weapons allowed to others , , , , I made

26, Idem to Simon, 9 May 1933, Ibid,. second series, v. No, 123, 27, Minute by Sir Robert Vansittart, 11 May 1933= Ibid,, second series, v. No, 137, 63 it perfectly plain to German delegate that there could be no German rearmament„ I said His Majesty8s Government were resolutely op­ posed to it » o 0 <,28 Although Great Britain both at home and at Geneva sounded "firm" Germany simply ignored these exhortations of "deter- 29 minatlon0M In a speech of 11 May in Berlin, the German Foreign Minister, von Heurath indicated that, whatever might be the result of the Disarmament Conference, Germany intended to ream in mili­ tary and naval aircraft, heavy artillery and man­ power = Baron von Neurath said: 9Such weapons and armaments as the others hold to be necessary for their security can no longer be dispensed with for Germany8s security,830 At a Conference of German Ministers on 12 May in Berlin, von Neurath reported to Hitler that Germany was facing at the Conference a solid front which was unwilling to make any concessions = Furthermore, Germany was running the risk of being outvoted in Geneva, Hitler then made it clear that the disarmament question would not ever be

28, Eden to Simon, 11 May 1933, Ibid,, second series, v. No, 133, 29, "In a debate in the House of Lords on 11 May, Lord Hailsham expressed his view that if Germany left the Disarmament Conference she would remain bound by the pro­ visions of the Treaty of Versailles, Any attempt on her part to r e a m in contravention of that Treaty would be a breach of the Treaty and would bring into operation the sanctions which the Treaty provided," House of Lords8 Debate, 11 May 1933, Ibid,, second series, v. Footnote no, 3, No, 141, 30, von Neurath8s speech, 11 May 1933, Ibid,, second series, v. Footnote no, 1, No, 141, 64 solved at the conference tables for there was no historical instance where a victor accorded arms to the vanquished through negotiationso It was quite obvious to him that the sole purpose of the Disarmament Conference was none other than to either break up the Eeichswehr or saddle Germany with the blame for the failure of the Gonference0 And the demand for eliminating the Eeichswehr was prompted solely 31 by the desire to weaken Germany0 That same day the London Foreign Office acknowledged Germany’s unreasonableness and Simon instructed the British delegation at Geneva accordingly; Germany is clearly manoeuvring for position. It is vital that she should not be enabled to manoeuvre herself off the defence 0 0 » = It is essential that you should therefore refuse to formulate or discuss any detailed figures, until Germany has accepted the principle that equality must be reached by stages, and until principles are settled accordingly. Germany’s attitude makes this vital.32 The British policy towards Germany continued to be hopeful appeasement. However, from the vantage point of time, Brigadier A. C. Temperley’s following appraisal of Germany and the disarmament question was more farsighted. Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office was in complete

3.1 . Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, 12 May 1933. German Foreign Policy, series C, i. No. 226. 32. Simon to Patteson, 12 May 1933. British For­ eign Policy, second series, v. No. 141. 65 agreement with it and suggested that it should be circulated to the Cabinet, This was done in vain on 16 May: Germany and Disarmament The time has come when Germany0s attitude to disarmament and the attitude of the United King­ dom towards Germany ought to be reviewed. In the past there has been much sympathy with Ger­ many and public opinion was in favour of granting her equality of status by degrees and in porpor­ tion to evidence of good behaviour; even France had realised that the end of the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaty was in sight, Ger­ many had laboured for thirteen years under these restrictions , , , , Germany had not been idle during these years and with great ingenuity had carried out a steady erosion of the disarmament clauses, in some cases with permission but more frequently without, 38,000 of her police have just been declared by the Effectives Committee to be definitely on a military basis: they are well armed with machine guns and armoured cars, organised in military for­ mations, and with military staffs, Another 44,000 have been lucky to escape a similar decision. Very extensive preparations have also been made to pre­ pare Germany0s industry for industrial mobilisation. It is also calculated that there are in the combined Nazi and Stahlhelm forces over a million young men of military age who have received some military training, . Within a few weeks of his arrival. Hitler has carried out a revolution and made himself complete master of Germany, The country has given itself up to a delirium of reawakened nationalism and of the most blatant and dangerous militarism, , , „ On the military side, Storm detachments of the Nazis and Stahlhelm have been converted into auxiliary police. As the Nazi detachments were recruited from the most desperate and violent ele­ ments of the unemployed, they do not seem particu­ larly suitable for police work, the more so since arms have been placed in their hands. Their num­ bers are probably in the vicinity of 75,000, They are to undergo military training similar to that given to the militarized police. The incorporation of these troops in the police is, of course, a fla­ grant violation of the Peace Treaty „ „ , „ 66 On the material side it is understood that the Air Ministry have identified at least 125 fighting machines in existence or being made, exclusive of some 60 believed to be at Lipetsk in Russia, Information has been received from secret sources that an order has been given by the Reichswehr Ministerium to the Dornier works for 36 twin-engined night bombers, , , , At Geneva the German attitude has stiffened considerably. The German delegate has reiterated his refusal to accept the cardinal points of the British Draft Convention and has, in particular, declined to give up the Reichswehr and accept the uniformisation of European armies on a militia basis. The increasing insolence of the Germans has brought discussion on effectives to a complete standstill. When material is dis­ cussed, there are strong indications that the demands for samples of military aeroplanes, tanks and heavy guns will be very large. What then is to be our attitudef Are we to go forward as if nothing has happened? Can we afford . to ignore what is going on behind the scenes in Germany? The brief sketch of the post-war posi­ tion, and particularly the intensification of military preparations under the Hitler regime, coupled with the strident appeals to force of the Nazi leaders, not only mean a secret German rearmament, but create an entirely new situation. Admittedly it would be a good thing to get Ger­ many bound by a Convention, as a breakdown would mean that she would commence to rearm at once. On the other hand, there is little use in a Con­ vention limiting effectives and material, if the preparations above indicated are to proceed un­ checked, while the warlike spirit is being openly roused to a fever heat against the Poles as the first objective, with France as the ultimate enemy. Ho moment could be worse chosen than the present one to advocate drastic reductions in the armaments of France, the Little Entente and Poland, Moreover, the destruction of all heavy material and bombing machines belonging to the French and her Allies and to our own armed forces seems madness in the face of this direct German menace. We should do well to remember the old Ironsides motto of 8Trust in God and keep your powder dry,8 If it is dangerous to go forward with disarmament, what then is to be done? There appears to be one 67 bold solution,, France, the United States and ourselves should address a stem warning to Germany that there can be no disarmament 9 no equality of status and no relaxation of the Treaty of Versailles unless a complete re­ version of present military preparations and > tendencies takes place in Germany= Admittedly this will provoke a crisis and the danger of war will be brought appreciably nearer„ We should have to say that we shall insist upon the en­ forcement of the Treaty of Versailles, „ „ „ „ Germany knows that she cannot fight at pre­ sent and we must call her bluff0 She is power­ less before the French army and our fleet0 Hitler, for all his bombast, must give way. If such a step seems too forceful, the only alterna­ tive is to carry out some minimum measure of dis­ armament and to allow things to drift for another five years, by which time, unless there is a change of heart in Germany, war seems inevitable» German rearmament will by then be an accomplished fact and the material of the ex-Allies, which would take years of work and scores of millions of pounds to replace, may have been destroyed. This is an alternative which is unlikely to lead us anywhere„ Strong combined action, however, as suggested above, should prove decisive, even though the threat of military pressure might have to be maintained for years, calling for fresh monetary sacrifices, until Germany is brought to her senses. But even this heavy responsibility should be accepted rather than that we should allow all the sacrifices of the last war to be in vain and the world to go down in economic ruin. There is a mad dog abroad once more and we must resolutely combine either to ensure its destruction or at least its confinement until the disease has run its course. A. C. Temperley Brigadier^ The French now began to hope. If Great Britain was fully aware of Germany's militarism and her flagrant

.33.0 Memorandum on Germany and Disarmament, 10 May 1933. Ibid., second series, y. Ho. 161. 68 violations of the Treaty of Versailles9 possibly she would be more sympathetic to a French policy of "no appeasement without security first," Apparently the French Government had seen Temperley’s memorandum for on 19 May the British Ambassador in Paris informed Simon of the following: How, for the first time in twelve years per­ haps , France finds that she is no longer isolated, for her feelings and fears are shared by Great Britain , « , „ If she felt confident that this Power would join her in setting a definite and final limit to German ambitions, she would then feel justified in reducing her defences accord­ ingly ,34

The French were convinced that, "whatever Germany may put her signature to at Geneva, nothing but effective control 35 will prevent her from continuing to rearm," Germany now realized the full significance of her interactable demands; If, confronted with the English draft, we keep insisting on all three of our demands, i,e,, disarmament, preservation of the Reichswehr, and equal rights, with respect to material, the Con­ ference will undoubtedly end in failure, and the blame for it will be put on u s , 36 On 17 May Chancellor Hitler delivered a very significant speech to the Reichstag, He pointed out that all the causes of the present crisis lay in the faults of the Treaty of

34, Tyrell to Simon, 19 May 1933, Ibid,, second series, v, Ho, 161, 35, Tyrell to Simon, 18 May 1933, Ibid,, second series, v. No, 157, 36, Memorandum by Nadolny, Head of German Delega­ tion at Geneva, 16 May 1933, German Foreign Policy, series C, i. No, 241, -S' Versailles— the foremost fault being the partition of the world into victors and vanquished as the deliberate and per­ manent basis of all future systems0 This very principle was groundless because the vanquished had been given the right to demand a revision of the Versailles settlement by the very Treaty itself» Hitler further pointed out that if anyone was to insinuate that Germany had not disarmed, or for that matter had rearmed, he must reject any such accusation as unfair and absolutely untrue. The Chancellor then referred to the Declaration of 11 December 1932, The equality of rights conceded to Germany then had not yet been realized, "although Germany by her disarmament has completely justified her claim to the disarmament of the other Powers" in accordance with their obligations under the Preamble to Part V of the Treaty, However, the Chancellor did not men­ tion the "system of security" stipulation in the 11 December Declaration, Nevertheless, Germany was ready without fur­ ther ado to disband her entire military apparatus if the adjacent States did likewise. But if these States refused to carry out the disarmament obligatory on them in accord­ ance with the Versailles Treaty, then Germany must at least insist on "Gleichberechtigung," Furthermore, if in news­ paper articles and in speeches the attempt was made to threaten Germany with sanctions, such regrettable pressure could only lead to the "moral and actual invalidation" of 70 the Treatyo The German people would in no circumstances be forced to put their signature to anything which would involve a perpetuation of Gemany8 s “disqualificationoa If this were to be attempted at Geneva by means of a major­ ity vote "against the clear meaning of the treaties," Ger­ many would quit the League of Nations rather than remain as a permanently stigmatized people= In concluding. Hitler begged the world to understand "Germany8s unshakable will" 37 in realizing her equality of rightSo Unfortunately, it took the world another six long years before acquiring such vital understandingo . The very day before Hitler delivered this speech, Great Britain8s Military Attache, Colonel-Te G0 Heywood issued a statement that all but said if Germany wanted to ream the allies could not apply military sanctions--for she would soon be too powerful: If Germany insists on r e a m i n g , whatever the fate of the Disarmament Conference, as declared in Baron von Neurath8 s speech last week [ll May], and if the whole League procedure is gone through before any military steps are started, it probably would give Germany time to effect such a measure of rearmament as to enable her, 0 0 » to offer armed resistance = = 0; from such an amed con­ flict to war is but one step;38

, . , .37o Sir Horace Rumbold to Simon, 17 May 1933o British Foreign Bolicv. second series, v 0 Enclosure, No. 153. .... ' . ' 38. Tyrell to Simon, 15 May 1933. Ibid.« second series, v. Enclosure no. 1, No. 154. 71 On 19 Hay Secretary of State von Bulow issued instructions to all German Ambassadors requesting them at - the earliest opportunity9 while the impact of the Chancel­ lor0 s speech was still felt, to state that because of Hitler0 s statements on the disarmaments question there was now a real possibility of reaching speedy decisions in Geneva if the other side would show the same accommodating spirit in view of the impending World Economic Conference 39 to be held shortly in London, On the very same day, Foreign Secretary Simon, in a telegram to the British Ambas­ sador in Rome, gave his evaluation of Hitler8s 17 May policy statement on German disarmament: "We recognized the modera­ tion of Herr Hitler8s tone, but the real test would come at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. If Germany remained obdurate and unaccommodating there, the favorable impression 40 produced by the Chancellor8 s speech would amount to nothing 0 M Why was Simon willing to postpone the "real test" of Ger­ many 8 s moderation to future meetings of the "prolonged farce?" Could he not see that by her documented, present illegal rearmament program that the "real test" had long been occurring in Germany8 s own backyard since 1923?

, 39.0- Secretary of State von Bulow8s message, 19 May 1933o German Foreign Policy„ series C, i. Footnote no, 3, Ho, 25lo 40o Simon to Graham, 19 Hay 1933„ British Foreign Policy, second series, v, Noe 160, 72 There is no greater mistake than to suppose that Hitler did not give foreign statesmen plenty of warningo On the contrary he gave them only too mucho Western statesmen saw the problem all too clearly* Germany had now a strong govern­ ment ; and this government would again make Ger­ many a great military power * But what were the Allied statesmen to do? They posed the question to themselves, and to each other9 again and again* One obvious course was to intervene and to prevent German rearmament by force* This was suggested by the British military representative Brigadier A* G* Temperley at the Disarmament Conference; it was constantly suggested by the French* The sug­ gestion was repeatedly considered and always turned down* It was unworkable from every aspect * * * * The alternative on the other side was to do noth­ ing: to abandon the Disarmament Conference and let events take their course* Both British and French dismissed this as ^inconceivable"; "un­ thinkable"; "a counsel of despair*" What way out remained If one is to assume that Brigadier A* C* Temperley's 10 May Memorandum on Germany and Disarmament. which advocated the prevention of Germany's further, already acknowledged illegal rearmament by applying military force as stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles, was "unworkable from every aspect," then there was little else the Allies could do but 'fabandon the conference and let events take their course*H In the end, this is what Great Britain and France through their moral default allowed to happen, much to Hitler's surprised delight* On 29 May, the London Foreign Office released a memorandum recognizing the fact that the discussion which

41* A* J, P* Taylor, 73= ' 73 had gone on the last few days on the first reading of the British Draft Convention had brought to light the extreme improbability of any agreed measure of disarmament being concluded at the Disarmament Conferenceo In fact the pros­ pects of a Disarmament Convention emerging, based on recent events at Geneva and elsewhere were now extremely pessimis­ tic 0 The only result to be concluded was the clear implica­ tion that (discussions proceeding on Germany0 s demand for 0 samples0 would not lead to. Disarmament Convention but would only succeed in calling down "on our devoted heads the blame 42 for the failure to conclude a Convent ion o,i In June, Eden declared: The first reading of our Draft Convention was concluded at Geneva in an unsatisfactory scramble= Despite anything that I had been able to do, too many major points had been left unsolved» This was in part because a World Economic Conference which was summoned to meet in London was now dis­ tracting attention „ „ „ o It proved a total loss 0^-3 Eden had the additional insight to realize that if any pro­ gress were to be made at Geneva, Great Britain must realis­ tically face the French "bugaboo": supervision within a system of guarantees0 Nothing was going right. I urged that the Government should reconsider their attitude to­ wards questions where their view was at variance with that of most other members of the Conference,

42-0 ..Memorandum by Ao W# A« Deeper, 29 May 19330 British Foreign Policy, second series, v 0 No, 1790 43 o Eden, 45 0 74 for example „ „ o in regard to supervision. The Government decided that until acute dif­ ferences .between France and Germany were re­ moved ? the Draft Convention could not be modified. This was a mistake, for the action I had proposed would have increased our author­ ity, and the modifications had to be made later anyway, with less effect.44 Thus, Arthur Henderson, the President of the Dis­ armament Conference, was now charged with preparing a draft for the second reading of the MacDonald Plan— »"but the Con- 45 ference was slipping again, through no fault of his.M Von Neurath talked with Henderson on 19 June. This conver­ sation revealed the Germans” justified impatience as to the "no decision" negotiations. He told Henderson that Germany was interested in knowing at last where she stood and there­ fore wanted either the earliest possible conclusion of a convention or else have the fact established that nothing was to be achieved at the Disarmament Conference. To von Neurath”s question as to how the President pictured the continuation of the Conference, Henderson replied that he realized even now that it would be impossible to reach a decision before the beginning of the summer recess, which 46 he would set for the end of July.

44. Ibid.. 48-49. . 45. Ibid.. 45. ,46.. von Neurath to Foreign Ministry, 19 June 1933. German Foreign Policy, series G, i. No. 322. 75 Amid all of this unproductivity at Geneva, His Majesty6 s Government continued -indirectly hut very effect­ ively to undermine their entire post-Mar concept of "no security without peace first." On the very same day that von Neurath conversed with Henderson9 Group Captain J0 Ho Herring, the British Air Attache in Berlin, telegramed the following: My conversation with Rittmeister Ao Do Bolie threw official light on a wide field of sub­ jects o o d o Bolie said that except for two at­ tempts at building two-seater aircraft some time ago, Arado6s had never built anything other than high-powered military types of single seaters, I said that 1 was sorry that I should not see any at close quarters as the Arado 64°s that had apparently been placed on the aerodrome at Waraeraunde a year ago for my inspection seemed to be quite interesting0 Bolie replied that those two jjArado 646 s] had certainly not been placed there for me to see and their presence on the aerodrome during my visit had not only created the greatest stir but much unpleasantness for those responsible for indlscretion„ He went on to say that it was useless to try to keep the fact Germany was arming in the air a secret: a rearmament programme such as that now in progress should become known. Bolle said that as to the present building pro­ gramme it was realized that a risk was being run, . o o but that the building of military proto­ types had in fact not been thought particularly dangerous . . . or of sufficient importance to justify a protest £a protest lodged with the League by the signatories of the Paris Air Agree­ ment of 19263 and this view proved correct.47

47= Telegram by Herring, 19 June 1933= British Foreign Policy, second series, v. Enclosure no. 1, No. 223. Thus 9 not only were the Germans illegally reaming in the air by 1933, they further realized that there was little or no risk of Allied complaints and substantial threats to halt their additional reaming„ In fact, the British Government, in so many words, heartily agreed: "The fact is that Ger­ many is building military aircraft in anticipation of the revision of the air clauses of the Versailles Treaty» This is no new development and has for some time been known to 48 the competent Departments of His Majesty's Government . 6 o „" When the Geman Secretary of State von Bulow was questioned by the British Charge d'Affaires about the Air Attache's "new information," the Secretary only replied: If the statements of the Air Attache were incorrect, I fear, however, that this would be the last visit of the Air Attache to the Air Ministryo For no official of the Air Ministry could have made such statements* There was no Geman firm producing any military planes, let alone only military planes of one type * * * * Did his Government wish to assume the function of supervising Germany? I said that these representations were un­ justified and uncalled for * * « * We had stated in Geneva and elsewhere that we were in favor of complete abolition of military planesi, I did not understand how the English could insinuate that this attitude was not seriously meant and that, contrary to our repeated statements, we were not proceeding with the construction of a military force*™ Although this "new" proof of Geman reamament apparently struck little terror into the hearts of the

48* Rumbold to Simon, 27 June 1933* Ibid*, second series, v* No* 223* 49* Secretary of State to Embassy in London, 29 July 1933* Geman Foreign Policy* series C, i* No* 380 = 77

English9 the French nows more than ever before were in­ sistent on a trial period and supervision as absolute pre­ conditions for any further agreement on their part in the Disarmament Convention. Great Britain's reaction to this new French demand is best illustrated in Eden's remark at this time; "In view of the information now reaching London about Germany's military preparations, French distrust of 50 the Nazi Government seemed to me justified." By 26 June the second reading of the MacDonald Plan had come to naught. As was now customary, the British Government could see as the only obstacle to progress "dif­

ference between France and Germany, 61 rather than their own refusal to give France the necessary military guarantees that she had begged for in light of continuing German illegal rearmament. His Majesty's Government felt that until it was known,whether the differences between France and Germany could be remedied by the acceptance of the British Draft as a whole, there was no object in continuing the discussions of in­ dividual articles at Geneva.51 Therefore, it was suggested to adjourn the General Com­ mission of the Conference. The French agreed. M. Boncour . . . accepted the idea that Bureau and General Commission should adjourn till October

50. Eden, 50. . 51.=, Simon to Tyre 11, 26 June 1933= British Foreign Policy, second series, v. No. 221= 78 and that there should be exchanges of view between the Governments in the meantime. But he said that something must be done to arrest the German rearmament that was pro­ ceeding constantly.52 This particular French prodding, however, was in vain. Never­ theless, on 29 June von Neurath telegramed the German Foreign Ministry that following a statement by Henderson that no progress had been made on the text of the British Draft Convention for the second reading, the General Commission would adjourn until 16 October. The German representative at the Conference, supported by the Hungarian representative 53 were the only ones who opposed the adjournment „ The Ger­ mans declared that progress might now only be attained from discussion in the Bureau, particularly on non-political quest ions--thus their opposition to adjournment„ But any serious anticipation of substantial progress of the Con­ ference was, by 29 June, an illusion. Only Churchill had the unique genius of realistically appraising and forecast­ ing the disillusioning situation— as it was: By the autumn of 1933, it was plain that neither by precept nor still less by example would the British effort for disarmament suc­ ceed oo.o The- Labour and Liberal Parties both continued in the name of peace to urge

52o Tyreli to Simon, 26 June 1933. Ibid, second series, Vo_ No. 220. ... ,.,,,53,..,,...von Neurath to Foreign Ministry, 29 June 1933 = German Foreign Policy, series C, i. No. 322. 79 British disarmament„ and anyone who differed was called "warmonger" and "scaremonger„,f It appeared that their feeling was endorsed by the people9 who, of course, did not understand what was unfolding,54 Throughout the summer months of 1933 the Conference was inactive-“■but not the essential cause of its harmful malig­ nancy: Great Britain5 s unwillingness, even in the face of documented and proven illegal German rearmament, to grant France the necessary military guarantees in order that both countries could grant Germany real "equality of rights in a system of security, 11 On 14 July, the London Foreign Office released a memorandum on German Rearmament, entitled: Summary of Information Supplied by Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry Regarding Infractions by German Government of 55 .Versailles Here was a documented inventory.of all public and secret information pertaining to illegal German rearmament on land as well as in the air since 1919, Even with this substantial evidence before them, the British continued to equivocate = The French, since the beginning of the Disarmament Conference, felt that they could have easily offered dis­ armament to German Liberals like Stresemann or even for that matter, Bruening, But Hitler was 11 something else"

54, Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 111, 55, Memorandum by Vansittart, 14 July 1933, British , second series, v. Annex I, No, 253, 80 altogether: "the dice seem, to have been loaded against them from the start, for the policy of reconciliation „ <> „ had been met in Germany at every turn by ever~increasing 56 manifestations of militarism,” Thus, at the end of July 1933 the worrisome French held to the position that Nazi Germany during the trial period should not be allowed to possess samples of those weapons denied to her by the Ver­ sailles Treatyo However, if Germany observed the conditions in the trial period, she would be allowed the same weapons as France in the second period» Some guarantee of the execution of the Convention must be given0 France would not be content with anything less than a promise to apply sanctions to any power found to be violating the Convention. On 12 September Simon received the following telegram from the British Ambassador to France; How far the French Government will be found to have retreated from the position which they had taken up at the end of July will largely depend on the degree to which "His Majesty!s Government are able to commit themselves to their support. If they were able to offer the French to join in putting before Germany a firm offer of re­ duction of equipment at the end of a trial period in return for acceptance of general permanent and automatic supervision, and to show themselves ready to face in partnership the consequences of German refusal, I believe that the French Govern­ ment might still be ready to waive insistence on a previous investigation into existing German armaments. But unless able to point to such

56. Campbell to Simon, 12 September 1933. Ibid., second series, v. No. 386. 81 British partnership, no French Government would now I fear, be able to resist » = „ expert opin­ ion, in demanding thgt by some means or other Germany's bluff might be called before proceed­ ing any further with disarmament»57 Great Britain would have nothing to do with any real inves­ tigation into the state of German rearmaments, much less referring any such question to the League for disciplinary actiono On 12 September Lord Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, instructed the British Embassy in Paris that in regards to referring to the League the question of German rearmament, the Embassy should say nothing which might lead the French to erroneously believe that His Majesty's Government would be ready to join them in taking such action. There were still further aspects to be considered before Great Britain could take a decision 58 on such an important and difficult question. And yet the English were well aware of France's irrefutable argument insisting upon a preliminary investigation of Germany's rearming: What possible value can be attached to a German signature to a disarmament convention, when German obligations under the treaty are thus flagrantly violated? There is increasingly insistent demand that before anything else can be offered her, Germany must be required to sub­ mit to a preliminary investigation to show the present state of her a r m a m e n t s , 59

57, Ibid, " 58, Vansittart to Campbell, 12 September 1933, Ibid,. second series, v. No, 387, 59, Campbell to Simon, 12 September 1933, Ibid,, second series, v. No, 386, 82 Aside from these "differences" between the French and the English9 Germany began strengthening her demands 60 in Septembero Germany now wanted no trial period and insisted upon equality from the start. The final upshot of these new German demands occurred disastrously within the Allied camp on 22 September:

During the summer of 1933 the British „ 0 = pressed the French to grant Germany a theo­ retical "equality" of armaments0 After all, there was plenty of time before this equality became real. These promptings were nearly successfulo The French almost took the plunge on 22 September . . . On 2 September the British Foreign Secretary had a definitive conversation with the French Ambassador in Lon­ don. The Ambassador asked Simon what would happen if, be­ fore the second period was reached, there was an infraction of the treaty by any Power and he pointedly added that his Government was anxious to know what sort of penalty would follow such infraction. The Foreign Secretary replied that His Majesty's Government did not contemplate, and could not undertake, any new commitment in the nature of taking part in penal action. However, if during the first period there

60. "On the 15th, von Neurath declared that Ger­ many could make no further concessions and that, if the armed powers continued to evade their obligation to disarm, Germany "would have the right and duty to provide for the equality and security of her own people according to her own judgment and without hesitation of false scruple.'" Eden, 51. 61. A. J. P. Taylor, 75. 83 had been flagrant and deliberate breach and evasion, the British Government understood that this might be regarded as discharging other parties from what would otherwise be their obligations in the second period. To Great Britain0s way of thinking, this was the effective way of supporting 62 due observance of the Convention, Simon's answer merely implied that if Germany was caught deliberately rearming during the first trial period, the other Powers could ig­ nore their second period obligations and likewise, imme­ diately commence with rearmament. However, this would lead to a disastrous arms race among all nations in order to catch up with the guilty Power, But what about German illegal rearmament in Sep­ tember 1933? Only France was prepared to view this with any degree of hard truth and reality. On 22 September British and French ministers met in Paris: M, Daladier asked what guarantees would there be of the observance of the Convention, The French Government had before them a dossier giving details of German rearmament from which it appeared nothing practically was left of the Treaty of Versailles and there had even been infringement of the Treaty of Locarno, as there were Nazi garrisons and arms in the Rhineland, Further, there was excessive activity in the factories throughout the Reich, France did not wish to give the appearance of always com­ plaining, but she believed that it was in the interest of Europe as a whole and, indeed, of the world that the Convention should be respected.

62,.. Simon to Tyrell, 21 September 1933, British Foreign Policy, second series, v. No, 403, 84 It was necessary to consider what would be the consequences for any State of a viola­ tion o o o o In his opinion, he believed that the work which they had all done would be use­ less unless some guarantee was included in the Convention— else it would be only another scrap of paper 0 = o » For M„ Daladier a convention without such a provision would be uselessa63 But the British were hesitant on this question* They did not want to face it directly, Baldwin9 unacknowledged head of the British Government, had come from Aix to attend this Paris meeting* He supported Simon by re-emphasizing that there could be no new British commitment* He added: "If it could be proved that Germany was rearming, then a new situation would immediately arise9 which Europe and His Majesty0s Government would have to face and consider very 64 seriously, but that situation had not yet arisen* 61 There was little else that France could do now but state their final position as to general disarmament: * * * if the Convention were drawn up to pro­ vide for two periods and if it were loyally ob­ served, then the French Government would be preapred to see inserted in the agreement suit­ able provisions to operate only after the first period, and, if it had been loyally observed, to grant prototypes of the limited class which all would continue to possess and which the Treaty of Versailles did not at present allow • to Germany, * , = M= Daladier emphasized that this position of the French Government was definite and 5 5 final. They would do no less: they would do no more.

63* Anglo-French meeting, 22 September 1933, Ibid, second series, v. No, 406, 64; A, J, P, Taylor .. . . 65*. Anglo-French meeting, 22 September 1933, British Foreign Policy, second series, v. No, 406, 85 Because "the French were being asked to give up a superior- ( ity which they imagined to be real; and were being offered only the prospection that something undefined might be done if the Germans misbehaved," their insistence on Germany re­ maining disarmed during a "trial period" of four years was not conducive to a sure and quick solution at Geneva, On 23 September, in a conversation with Simon, von Neurath "expressed that it would be very difficult for him to accept the position that Germany was to enjoy during the first per­ iod no greater latitude in armaments when other nations dur- 66 ing that period were not going to disarm at all," The following day, the German Foreign Minister forecast what was soon to come: "We must in any case for the present expect the solid opposition of the French and the English to our procuring any additional weapons of defense and the 6 negotiations here presumably will collapse over this point," On 29 September Simon informed the Foreign Office that the central point of difficulty between France and

Germany was that the latter demanded ^samples0 during the trial period while the former absolutely refused to yield on this point. If negotiations were to break down at this stage, undoubtedly it would be over this very matter. The

' 6 6, Simon to Foreign Office, 23 September 1933, Ibid,, second series, v. No, 411, .,67~e- - von-Seurath to Foreign Ministry, 24 September 1933. German Foreign Bolicv. series C, i. No. 447. i ■ 86

Foreign Secretary stated further that Germany8 s attitude towards this question was most unreasonable. Not only be­ cause they were refusing a Convention which would give them what they were asking for in 1938, rather than in 1934, but because it was practically impossible to know how resolutely Germany would maintain their position in regard to this ques­

tion of 1sampleso8 The German Foreign Minister was refusing

to even consider the matter0 Simon concluded with the fol­ lowing prophesy: “These exchanges of views have brought matters to a head and the real crisis of Disarmament Con- 68 ference cannot be long delayed “ Two days earlier, in a dispatch from His Majesty8s Consul-General in Munich, Britain received the first fore­ cast of 14 October: “It is being said that, if Germany is not able to force a satisfactory settlement at the Disarm­ ament Conference, she may abandon not only the Conference 69 but the League of Nations as well,“ On 4 October Great Britain still refused,to grant the French any guarantee in the matter of sanctions. In a Minute by Eden, Britain8s position was clearly stated: “M, Corbin jj:he French tobassadosQ stated that what the

.SSL lai&esan...to- Vansittart, 29 September 1933, British Foreign Policy, second series, v. No, 419, 69; Newton to Simon, 27 September 1933, Ibid,. second series, v. No, 415, 87 French Government were anxious about was what action would be takeno I said that this would seem to imply a new com­ mitment on the continent of Europe, such as clearly we 70 could not undertake." On 5 October the German Secretary of State, von Bulow, in a conversation with the British Ambassador in Berlin stated that if there were any indications of a wish to impose unfair conditions on Germany by a united front 71 she would leave Geneva. Von Bulow8s statement was only a reflection of his conversation with Hitler the day before. Hitler had said that a breakdown of the Conference as a result of Germany8s rejection of supervision or her rearmament demands must be absolutely avoided. In order to prevent such a development, it was now necessary that Germany immediately revert to the "original question" to demand by ultimatum the disarmament of others and to declare that she, would leave the Confer­ ence, as well as withdraw from the League of Nations in the event that the other Powers rejected disarmament, if they deprived Germany of equality of rights, or if a draft un- 72 acceptable to her was brought up for debate. However,

70. Minute by Eden, 4 October 1933= Ibid., second series, v. No. 426.

71. Phipps to Simon, 5 October 1933. Ibid., second series, v. No. 427. 72. Memorandum by Secretary of State von Bulow, 4 October 1933. German Foreign Policy, series C, i. No. 479. 88 on 6 October Prince Bismarck, the German Charge d 6Affaires told Simon that absolute equality would have to be applied to Germany during the two-year trial period0 The concept of stages was now altogether ignored. Prince Bismarck said that the basis of Ger­ many 8s point of view was the demand for equality. This demand was acknowledged by the joint Declara­ tion on 11 December last, Germany cannot accept a period of probation; if there is a first stage of two years, equality would have to be applied to her in those first two years, 1 answered that , , , Herr von Neurath pre­ viously had constantly mentioned the subject of 8 samples0 , , , , Where was the reference to 6samples0 in the communication now made to me? , , , it was clear that there was a vast dif­ ference between the conception of limited speci­ mens and the claim which was now being put forward for the first period. This claim ignored alto­ gether the plan of stages , ,, , Secondly, 1 r said that it was wrong to quote the Declaration of 11 December as though it simply proclaimed equality; on the contrary the formula was one which referred to the principle of equality in a regime of security. What was there in present German statement which dealt with that?'3 The practical realization of "German equality within a regime of French security89 was now for all purposes, plainly 74 impractical, if not almost impossible.

Z3»— wSimon to Phipps, 6 October 1933, British Foreign Policy, second series, v. No, 434, 74, "The later history of the Disarmament Confer­ ence turns round the series of abortive efforts to find some practical application of this 11 December 1932 formula- Germany should be granted 8 equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations8— equally- acceptable to France and Germany, This objective could be attained only along a double line of advance; on the one hand with political understandings to satisfy the French desire for security; on the other hand with an armaments pro gramme to meet the German demand for equality, 88 Jordan, 150 89

On 6 October Adolf Hitler Issued a final directive to the German delegation at Geneva: In case the English Government submits a new draft convention which contains the essential French thesis Ctrial peridd with supervision before actual disarmament] it is to be branded as a new attempt of the heavily armed states to avoid disarmament and to shove off the blame, for a possible break-up of the Confer­ ence on Germanyo Negotiation concerning such a draft is to be rejected,, Return to the Mac­ Donald Plan is to be demanded9 and (in case this does not happen) return to the original task of the Conference--the disarmament of the heavily armed states and the restoration of equal national security for all states as laid down in Article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant and the Five Power Declaration of 11 December 19320 It is to be intimated in this connection that failure to consider this demand is apt to result in German withdrawal from the Conference and therewith, also to her leaving the League of Nations, The Chancellor reserves for himself the decision concerning the carrying out of this intimation,75 Therefore, it was not surprising when the German Charge

d°Affaires in London called on Simon on 6 October and announced that: "NadoIny would address the Conference and tell them that Germany could not accept any trial period at all and must insist on full equality from the start," Signor Suvich, the Italian delegate, called this Ma re- 76 markable step backward," Two, days later Nadolny auda-

. i . • . ■ ■ - . ■ . ciously told the British Ambassador in Geneva that:

75, Unsigned Memorandum, 6 October 1933= German Foreign Policy, series C, i. No. 484. 76. Eden, 51-52. 90 ,fThe German Government could not agree to two periods. He contended that , , , this suggestion of first period seemed to throw doubt on Germany6s good faith. No country could . 7 7 be expected to endure such reflexion, 18 Needless to say, the German delegate did not discuss his country6s proven illegal rearmament since 19238 On 10 October Simon sent the following telegram to the British Ambassador in Berlin, It concerned his recent conversation with Hoesch, the German Ambassador to London; Germany6s latest communication was in sub­ stance , a claim fosf immediate and substantial rearmament , , , , It now appears that the demand was not for 6samples6 at all, but for immediate and substantial quantities, in some cases unrestricted as to amount , , , , I felt that the claims put forward from Berlin are of so grave a nature that they are clearly calculated not to promote agreement at Geneva but, on the contrary, to make it almost im­ possible , , , , I said to Hoesch that, , , , it was neces­ sary to face facts, and it was a fact that the sense of security, without which world-wide dis­ armament could not be obtained, was shaken by de­ velopments in Germany during the past months and for this reason the British Government urged Ger­ many not to take up an attitude which would only confirm existing a n x i e t i e s ,78 How ironic it was that of all people to be truly concerned with "facts, 68 we find it to be the "British Oaptain"--Sir John Simon. Unfortunately for the Disarmament Conference it was much too late to face reality.

77. Patteson to Simon, 8 October 1933, British Foreign Policy, second series, y. No, 438., 78. Simon to Phipps, 10 October 1933, Ibid., second series, v. No. 443. 91 On 11 October von Neurath fired off a telegram to Nadolny for his personal use only. _ The Foreign Minister pointed out that a trial period with unilateral supervision and a ban on the weapons of defense allowed to the other. Powers would constitute for Germany a violation of the supreme principle of equality. Furthermore, if as the statements of Simon to Ambassador Hoesch lead Germany to assume, the English proposals for amending the MacDonald Flan are irreconcilable with German equality, such as was defined on 11 December, Germany would withdraw from the Dis­ armament Conference. However, as von Heurath made clear, the official statement regarding the break-off would be made 79 by the Reich Chancellor in Berlin and not in Geneva. That very same day the British Fbreign Secretary telegramed home from Geneva: I saw M. Boneour this morning when in the course of long discussion we agreed upon two points as to which we were in accord that no concessions were possible:

(1) that there must be preliminary period,

(2) that during that period there should be no rearmament of G e r m a n y . 80 The Czechoslovakian representative, M. Benes, in a conversa­ tion with Eden on 10 October, now believed that Germany's

79. voh Heurath to Nadolny,.11 October 1933. German Foreign Policy, series C, i. Bo. 489. . 80. Patteson to Wellesley, Under Secretary of State, 11 October 1933= British Foreign Policy, second series, v. No. 445. 92 present demanding attitude was due only to the fact that she was already so well armed. M. Benes felt that the reas­ on for this change was that whereas in the summer Germany had nothing but prototypes, now she was so far rearmed that permission to have only prototypes would involve the destruc- tion of numbers of weapons which the convention would not allow her. In M. Benes® opinion, Germany would not sign a 81 convention that included no rearmament for Germany. Thus we see by October 1933, because of Great Britain6s reluct­ ance to look at the facts in the past--especially through the blind orbs of Baldwin--the very real present fact of illegal German rearmament beginning to effectively destroy any British efforts for international disarmament. On 12 October Nadolny sent the following telegram to the German Foreign Ministry: Sir John Simon told me that . . . the Cabinet had decided that disarmament with respect to material of the heavily armed states should not take place until a second period of the convention . . . . The realization of equality of rights with respect to material was not to be carried out till the second period . . . . To this I replied, . . „ that such a solution was entirely unacceptable to us . . ... Unless I am instructed otherwise, I shall „ . . con- ‘ " " uality of rights must be

81. Conversation between Eden and M. Benes, 11 October 1933. Ibid., second series, v. Enclosure. No. 446. 82. Nadolny to Foreign Ministry, 12 October 1933. Foreign Policy, series C, i. No. 493. 93 For all practical purposes, Germany's withdrawal was now

imminent 0 At 11:26 A 0 M 0 on 12 October Nadolny was ordered immediately home by Hitlero However, Nadolny that same afternoon telegraphed indirectly to Hitler the following: There are indications that not everyone on the other side is disposed to hold fast to the blunt position taken at first by Simon „ „ o » I therefore request that I be given at least a certain leeway for my departure,83

Nevertheless at 5:58 P0 M, Nadolny received the curt reply from von Neurath; MI request you to proceed with your de­ parture as ordered,fi At seven o'clock the same evening, Simon wired London that Nadolny had told him that he had been summoned back home and that he probably would not re­ turn at all. Before Nadolny departed, Simon made it clear to him that His Majesty6 s Government held "no prospect of modification" in their advocation of the granting of equal- 84 ity of rights within a system of two periods. In an article in the Daily Mail of 13 October, Lloyd George did his country and the cause of a realistic conception of general disarmament a great dis-service, He stated to the effect: His Majesty's Government should not be swayed by opinions concerning the internal form of

83, Nadolny to Foreign Ministry, 12 October 1933, Ibid,. series G, 1, No, 495, 84, Patteson to Wellesley, 13 October 1933, Brit­ ish Foreign Policy, second series, v. No, 447, 94

government in Germany «, „ 0 , Germany had been completely disarmed under the Treaty of Versailles and it was France and her satellites who were breaking the Treaty by delaying their own disarmament 0. Germany was in no position to attack any other country though there might be some clandestine manu­ facturing of small arms, and the Powers should be aware of military action to enforce the Treaty, which would only lead to Communism in Germany085 The former Prime Minister0s argument evolves directly from the troublesome preamble of Part V of the Treaty of Ver­ sailles 0 The “clandestine manufacture of small arms," il­ legal as it was, now had little or no bearing to this

Englishman's mind in discussing problems of disarmament0 This is just one more example of English "realistic evasion,," That very same day, 13 October, the President pf the Disarmament Conference told the British Foreign Secretary that if Germany withdrew, he would be in favor of continu­ ing negotiations of a convention without Germany in order to present her with a complete offer. Simon, for once, realistically and prophetically replied, "This seems to me to be a very difficult project which is likely to become 86 both dangerous and useless

85. Phipps to Wellesley, 14 October 1933. Ibid.. second series, v 0 Footnote no. 1, No. 451. 86. Patteson to Wellesley, 13 October 1933. Ibid., second series, v. No. 447. 95

That evening 9 the English Government became aware of a conference which took place at Hitler's headquarters in Berlin, military and civil leaders being present in

order to hear Nadolny8 s account of affairs and to discuss the German position. The British Ambassador in Berlin mis­ takenly wired home: "My informant's impression was that 87 nothing dramatic had been decided. 11 Likewise, the Brit­ ish Ambassador in Rome pointed out that the Italians also considered it very unlikely that Germany would leave the Disarmament Conference at this particular time. Hitler's conference on 13 October at 6:20 P.M. resulted in the Ger­ man Government deciding to not only withdraw from the Dis- ' ■ ' ■ ■ ' > ' . ; . ' armament Conference but from the League of Nations as well I The Chancellor pointed out the following: The English Government has expressed the view that the equality of rights granted us last December 11 December 1932 cannot be up­ held under the changed political conditions. When the Disarmament Conference reconvenes we will be handed a draft to sign . . . . Ger­ many cannot put her signature under such a con­ vention . . i . It is absolutely impossible to sign a convention which leaves the entry into force of our practical equality of rights to the decision of a later conference. Especially in­ tolerable are the provisions regarding super­ vision, which technically can be carried out only with respect to us. . . . since the condition that we recognized as a nation with equality of rights is not ful­ filled .. . and the other nations have firmly committed themselves in order to be able to blame

87, Phipps to Wellesley, 13 October 1933. Ibid.„ second series, v. No, 449. 96 us for the failure of the Disarmament Con­ ference and the League of Nations0 In this situation, our position can be strengthened if, * -» „ we dissolve the Reich­ stag, call for new elections, and ask the German people to identify themselves through a national plebiscite with the peace policy of the Reich Governmento By these measures we will make it impossible for the world to accuse Germany of an aggressive p o l i c y , , 8 8 In Berlin, on 14 October, 12;00 A»Mo, s,The Chancel­ lor o = 0 proposed that the decisions taken yesterday be 89 carried out today*?' At 3;00 P 0 M 0 that same afternoon in Geneva, the President of the Disarmament Conference received the following communication from the German Foreign Minis­ ter: It is now clear the Disarmament Conference will not fulfill what is its sole objective— ■ namely, general disarmament0 It is also clear that the failure of the Conference is due solely to the unwillingness on the part of the highly armed states to disarm. This renders impossible ( the satisfaction of Germany8s recognized claim to equality of rights, and the condition on which the German Government agreed at the be­ ginning of this year again to take part in the work of Conference thus no longer exists. The German Government is accordingly compelled to - leave the "‘Disarmament Conference .90 At 7:00 P.M. the German people were addressed by their Chancellor on the wireless. Thus, with Hitleras,

8 8. Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, 13 October 1933. German Foreign Policy, series G, i. No. 499= 89. ‘.Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, 14 October 19339 Ibid. 90. Phipps to Wellesley, 14 October 1933. British Policy, second series, v. Footnote no. 4, No. 454. 97

*’Proclamation of the German Government to the German N a t i o n , " which reiterated the major issues and conclusions of the Conference of Ministers the day before, in addition to addressing the following question to the German people; "Does the German nation approve the policy which its Government here submits to it, and is it prepared to de­ clare and solemnly acknowledge this policy as the expression 91 of its own view and its own will?" Adolf Hitler took Germany out of the Disarmament Conference on 14 October 1933o

■ 91. Proclamation of the German Government to the German Nation, 14 October 1933. German Foreign Po1icy. series C, ii. No. 1. CHAPTER IV

THE REACTION; 15 OCTOBER - 30 DECEMBER 1933

On the morning of 14 October, Sir John Simon de­ livered a speech at Geneva, which while leaving Germany every possible opportunity to revise her attitude, stated plainly that His Majesty's Government considered no agree­ ment could be reached on the basis of a convention which 1 provided for immediate disarmament, This inflexible statement of commonly known British foreign policy was utilized by Germany as the "final straw" of her patience 2 and peaceful good will. However, as the documents ;have already shown. Hitler's decision to withdraw from the Dis­ armament Conference and the League of Nations was for all practical purposes decided on 13 October at the Conferences of Ministers in Berlin— 18 hours before the British Foreign

Secretary delivered his "questionable" speech0

lo Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The RiversTde^Press% l9o2y% 5Z'„ 2, "I understand from Secretary of State von Bulow that decision to leave Geneva was taken when your speech there this morning made it clear that there would be no change in the British positiono" Phipps to Wellesley, 14 October 1933o British Foreign Policy, second series, Vo NOo 454o 98 99 Eden summed up the situation on the eve of 14 October within these words: "The hopes for progress with our Convention or for disarmament at Geneva were dead, the dangers for Europe were very much alive. The Conference was becoming a sham so that it was perhaps just as well 3 now . 61 On the following day, 15 October, the British For­ eign Office received the following telegram from the Foreign Secretary: "A very serious and difficult question of policy now arises as to the future course of Disarmament Confer­ ence. I am profoundly concerned as to what will happen 4 next? ..== What is to be done?" It is interesting to note that the perplexity of Simon left little doubt as to which country must initiate the next constructive step to possibly overcome the Geneva riddle. By not condemning Germany’s withdrawal and her responsibility therein, Simon, by default, now accepted for his country an overwhelming, moral responsibility to explore every effort towards some sort of disarmament convention with Germany--even at a price 5 . if "necessary.n

3. Eden, 53= 4. Patteson to Wellesley, 15 October 1933. British Foreign Policy, second series, v. No. 458. 5. "The withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference left the British Government with several dis­ agreeable alternatives. In law at least, they could use 100 On the other hand, Germany too, asked herself the same question--but unlike confused England, was all too sure of the answer: What is to come now? The answer to this question, however, is not a matter for Germany but for the other Powers„ It is now their turn to speak * . „ , Our withdrawal need not consti­ tute an obstacle to the Disarmament Conference’s activities, since we are disarmed » Ger­ many will, of course, examine at any time serious proposals for disarmament and continue to be pre­ pared to come to an understanding about its future armaments system on the basis of equality of rights,^ Thus, because England for so long had ignored, much less openly denounced, the glaring evidence which reinforced the fact that Germany was anything but disarmed according to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany, thanks to Great Brit­ ain, now voiced the same declaration of her disarmed con­ dition— and got away with it„ The British Foreign Office could only continue putting forward "serious proposals for disarmament,M while Hitler simply examined them half­ heartedly, altering his demands as often as he pleased, Germany was now truly in command.

force against German rearmament; or they could give up any idea of a disarmament convention and let events take their course; or, finally, they could make further efforts for a disarmament convention and try to persuade Germany to re-_ turn to the Conference at a price. This last, combined with - some rearmament at home, was the policy chosen," Eden, 54- 55,

6 , Speech by von Eeurath, 16 October 1933, German Foreign Policy, series G, ii. Footnote no, 4, No, 8 . 101 On 24 October the Reich Chancellor welcomed the English Ambassador to a pleasant ’’ga m e of cards” in Berlin. When Sir Eric Phipps read a telegram from the British For­ eign Secretary to his courteous host, which stated that the English Government regretted Germany’s withdrawal and could not recognize as valid the reasons given but hoped, however, that the doors had not thereby been shut and that Germany would very soon again be ready to cooperate, the Chancellor simply replied that apparently Great Britain had still not 7 grasped how matters stood. This, no doubt, is the under­ statement of the entire Disarmament Conference years. Nevertheless, Hitler pointed out the only two remaining possibilities left for any additional progress concerning international, general disarmament: ’’either the disarmament of the others or the rearmament of Germany.” The dictator even went so far as to oropose how this latter possibility , 8 might be accomplished while his guest took note.

7. Memorandum by von Neurath, 24 October 1933= Ibid., series C, ii= No. 23.

8 . ”1 urged the Chancellor to tell me exactly what he meant by ’Gleichberechtigung’ for Germany, and how he envisaged resumption of negotiations for disarmament. He replied that . . . Germany was quite ready for highly armed states to retain their present armaments which should merely be limited to their present numbers by a regular conven­ tion .... He would only ask for Germany to be allowed a short term, one year service period, army of 300,000 men with no offensive weapons such as tanks, heavy artil­ lery or bombing aeroplanes but complete liberty to have as many defensive weapons as might be necessary for this 102

The French Government8 s reaction to 14 October was one of “alliance consciousness, 11 M, Paul-Boncour, the French Foreign Minister, concurred that it was now absolute ly essential that there should be a strong and reliant “Anglo-French accord as to the future of the Disarmament 9 Conference, 88 The French realistically faced Germany' s withdrawal in light of her national mentality; her illegal rearmament program; and her predicted response to the pos­ sible application of Anglo-French military sanctions. In a remarkable conversation with Colonel Heywood, one of Britain8s military advisers at Geneva, Generals Weygand and Gamelin of the French General Staff plainly re­ vealed their interpretations of 14 October, The former did not consider Germany’s withdrawal in any way abnormal, Ger many had clearly taken up again her methodical progression towards power and expansion in Europe which had been in­ terrupted by the Great Mar, Hitler was simply accelerating number. He incidently urged that poison gas and bombing behind battle zones at a distance of 30 km, should be en­ tirely prohibited. The Chancellor stressed once more that Germany would in no circumstances sign any sort of agree­ ment that did not concede her equality of rights," Phipps to Simon, 24 October 1933, British Foreign Policy, second series, v. No, 485,

9, Minute by Eden, 21 October 1933. Ibid., second series, v. No. 479. 103 10 the pace of this 8 Grossdeutschland8 cancer. As far as illegal German rearmament was concerned, General Game1in said that, "Germany was definitely rearming, and at a much 11 faster rate than one might think it possible," Colonel Heywood then pointed out the general feeling in England that Germany should not be allowed to ream, but that no- - body seemed to be able to suggest an effective means of stopping her. General Weygand replied that he had given the subject a great deal of thought and could only suggest the following: He for one had presumed that Germany had learnt her lesson in the Great War, but it now seemed as if she had forgotten it. However, the presence of French troops on the Rhine would have the effect that a few sharp strokes of the birch have on a mischievous schoolboy. The occupation of the Rhineland must bring the Germans to their senses; there would be no more talk of the revision of the Treaty of Versailles, for Germany would realize that the the Treaty of Versailles could be revised in quite a different

10. Colonel Heywood to Tyrell, 25 October 1933, Ibid,, second series, v. Enclosure. No. 508. 11, Gamelin further stated: "As regards personnel, recent information, which was confirmed from several inde­ pendent sources, was that . . . with the various Nazi or­ ganizations and societies, like the Stahlhelm, Germany had now a million men undergoing military training of some sort . , . , The French General Staff estimated that at the moment the Germans could rapidly dispose of a force of twenty-one divisions, fully provided with field artillery and small arms, obtained by the process of triplicating the existing Reichswehr." Ibid. 104 way from that which she wished0 But, General Weygand added, such an operation would involve the mobilization of the French army as there was the risk, which must be faced, 12 that it might mean war. Colonel Heywood now asked General Weygand whether he considered France prepared to mobilize for this purpose. He replied: "Yes, but on one condition and that is that we were not alone in this; we must have British naval support 13 in on it too." For the French General felt assured that Germany would not., at present, attack France as long as she felt that France and Great Britain were standing together. But he added, "we must be strong and Germany must realize 14 our strength." On 25 October, Reichswehr Minister von Blomberg issued a directive to the chiefs of the High Command of the Army and Navy and to the Reich Air Minister "in the 15 event of sanctions." However, two days earlier, von

12. Ibid. 13. "General Weygand did not feel at all certain that this support would be forthcoming from England .... 0 It is a pity that so many of your countrymen are afraid that if they make a promise it is certain that they will be called upon to fulfil it, whereas very often the mere giving of a promise prevents the occasion arising which necessitates its fulfilment.8" Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. "The directive concluded that 8 in the first place an occupation of German territory had to be expected.8 With respect to sanctions 8representing a violation of 105 Neurath had told the United States Ambassador that Hitler would not fight even if the French occupied the Ruhr, but 16 would merely call a conference. Here again is an example of Hitler "reshuffling the pack” to keep his adversaries in constant confusion. On 26 October, Ambassador Phipps in Berlin sent the following letter to Simon: Germany, until the elections 12 November are over, will be in a state of fever .... From our point of view I do not think that we need be in any particular hurry to resume ne­ gotiations broken off by Germany. She is, for all her talk, rather nervous as to French in? tentions. An interval to cool down and in which to recover from her present dancing- dervish state will do no harm.17 To a great extent, this realization of 16an interval to cool down” was to be the dominant objective saturating all fur­ ther negotiations during November and December 1933= On 22 November the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference unanimously

German territorial sovereignty* the directive declared that the Reich Government was determined ’to offer armed resist­ ance locally regardless of prospects of military success.1 Finally, the directive enumerated the organizational meas­ ures to be taken by the Amy, Navy and Air Force to carry out? such armed resistance and its military objectives on land, sea, and in the air.” Editor’s note, 25 October 1933. German Foreign Policy, series C, ii. No. 26. 16. Phipps to Simon, 25 October 1933. British Foreign Policy, second series, v. No. 492. 17. Phipps to Simon, 26 October 1933. Ibid., second series, v. No. 495. 106 decided that the work of the Conference should be suspended for a period3 in order to permit of parallel and supple­ mentary efforts being carried on between different States, mainly through the diplomatic channel« In relation to Hitler’s new demands of 24 October for the actualization of German MGleichberechtigung,11 the German Secretary of State, von Bulow, issued the following telegram to all German embassies in Great Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union; The Reich Chancellor’s statements on dis­ armament in his conversation with the English Ambassador Phipps here, - . ? significant as they are for the further development of the disarmament problem, they nevertheless must not be evaluated as a German proposal worked out in every detail „ It would be de­ sirable if the press would now publish nothing, if possible, no particulars about the matter,18 Did the above telegram mean that Hitler’s new "disarmament plan" was now not to be taken seriously--not even by the German Government? Once again, reshuffle at will and de­ ceptively change the rules of this sham card game , , , , On 1 November, von Blomberg sent a "strictly con­ fidential" telegram to von Neurath officially declaring that the German Government had now taken the necessary steps to facilitate all immediate and future violations of 19 the "dictate of Versailles,"

18, von Bulow to German Embassies, 26 October 1933, German Foreign Policy, series C , ii. No, 29, 19, "The withdrawal of the Reich from the Disarma­ ment Conference and the League of Nations makes it necessary 107 In his memoirs5 Eden wrote the following: Nevertheless9 by November 1933 we knew that Hitler was starting to build military aircraft in quantity and that para-military organiza­ tions were being equipped and trained » = , » The Chiefs of Staff had no doubt that German rearmament would continue whether a disarmament convention were signed or not = 20 On 3 November Tyrell, at his post in Paris, sent . his British chief the three possible foreign policy alterna­ tives that France was contemplating in the event of a dis- 21 armament convention breakdown= The British Ambassador to take especially into account the difficult foreign policy situation in connection with all measures which have to do with strengthening the national defence = = = = In carry­ ing out this assignment, the responsibility for which has been entrusted to me by the Reich Government by virtue of the decision adopted on 17 October 1933, I must make all measures that violate the provisions- of the dictate of Versailles subject in principle to my prior consent = It will become necessary in each case to consider whether measures which are in themselves desirable and correct are to be deemed of such practical momentary value that they justify running the risks thereby incurred in foreign policy. If the reply to this question shoul'd be affirmative it will be necessary to consider carefully in what form camouflage and secrecy can be most effectively applied = = . =" Blomberg to von Neurath, 1 November 1933= Ibid=, series C, ii= No= 39= 20= Eden, 55= 21= "If the plan for a comprehensive convention . = = were to break down,, = = = only three courses would remain open to France (i) separate military action, (ii) to fall back on her own resources and maintain at any cost whatever margin of superiority she considered necessary to ensure her security, (iii) to make a separate agreement with Germany, (i) can be excluded . = = = France will embark single- handed on no kind of military adventure, though she might (perhaps even gladly) join in a re-occupation if shared by 108 concluded his remarks with the following weighty note; All I plead is that every effort be made to continue cooperation with France for fear of her being,driven to resort to action which is bound to lead to a race in armaments* in the event of her having to face Germany by her­ self.22 "It was evident that Germany wad bentupon rearming . . . and that the only thing France could now do was to remain strong in her alliances* . . . and hope that a germ of reason must exist in a latent state somehwere in Germany and might some 23 day get a chance of developing." In these early days of November* Great Britain fully realized that the only progress to be achieved would be an agreement for the maintenance of the status quo sub- 24 ject to no further rearmament by Germany. In other words, England must condone the present illegal German rearmament level--and then ask Hitler to go no further! In this way,

Great Britain, (ii) would lead to an immediate race in armaments between Germany and France which, by process of contagion, would inevitably become general. It is the last counsel of despair, (iii) . . . There is, indeed, already the nimbus of a movement in this direction ori­ ginating with persons . = . who have already lost faith in the support of Great Britain." Tyrell to Simon, 3 November 1933. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 3. 22. Ibid. 23. Heywood to Tyrell, 25 October 1933. Ibid., second series, vi. Enclosure. No. 508. 24. Tyrell to Simon, 3 November 1933. Ibid., second series, vi. No. 3. 109 if Germany ignored such a "fair" offer and continued to illegally rearm, the world would finally be convinced of her insincerityo The great question that now arises is; were not England and France already convinced of Germany’s insincerity? Was this not enough? Why was it necessary for the world to be convinced of Germany’s immoral behavior? Was this a necessary precondition to some sort of inevitable concerted punitive action? The French Government now began to truly fear England’s foreign policy. Was England to do continually nothing about illegal German rearmament? Might England, in light of these proven German infractions, be thinking of granting further concessions to Germany, other than those of 14 October, and even possibly from the French, in order to realize her return to the Disarmament Conference and the League? On 6 November Tyrell informed Simon that he had good reason to believe that the French Government would shortly press again for the observations of His Majesty’s Government on the French dossier relating to German infract­ ions of the Treaty of Versailles, Tyrell further reported ^ that the French "cannot understand our reluctance to respond,"

25, "What the French really wish of course is to establish a common charge sheet of German infractions to be kept; in readiness for prompt use at the proper moment , , , , The French think that failure to do this can only 110 Two days later,Tyrell relayed home the considered opinion of the French Ambassador at Berlin, Mo Poncet, "who has always been ready to go further than his Government on the road of conciliation»11 Poncet felt that the German Government had no intention of returning to the Conference under any circumstances» In his opinion, the Germans hoped that the Powers would continue to negotiate among them­ selves because Germany believed that the result would be either failure or produce a convention which in substance would not differ from what had been rejected on 14 October, The French Ambassador further claimed that Hitler would then declare that an entirely new situation had been created which justified Germany in considering herself no longer 26 bound by Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, One wonders if Hitler had ever really considered Germany bound by the Treaty1 On 9 November Tyrell again telegramed to London further definitive statements which he believed to now be the dominant French position pertaining to Germany and dis­ armament : In no circumstances can French Government be a party to holding out further concessions

lead Germany to suppose that we are afraid to call her to task and consequently encourage her to persevere in vio­ lating her engagements,11 Tyrell to Simon, 6 November 1933, Ibid,, second series, vi. No, 5, 26, Tyrell to Simon, 8 November 1933, Ibid,, second series, vi. No. 14, Ill to Germany «<,<,, Indeed they believe that no concessions, however extensive would in­ duce her to return to Geneva as she has cut definitely adrift from the League and is set upon destroying it „ . „ „ The French do not despair of prospect of framing a comprehensive convention. Its comprehensiveness would be in direct ratio to the safeguards which it con­ tained, e.g. guarantee of execution. Such a convention would not be offered to Germany, as she would naturally refuse it, but would remain open to her accession in the unlikely event of her undergoing a complete change of mind . . . .27 The next day, M, Paul-Boncour, in a conversation with Eden, referred to the need of exchanging British and French information revealing recent German violations of Part V, Eden than minuted to the Foreign Office in White­ hall that M. Paul-Boncour presumed that he had observed that the German press was repeatedly stating that the Ger­ man Government had carefully carried out fully the Treaty of Versailles, whereas the former Allied Powers had not. "This was not true, and the French Government were not satisfied that such a statement should be allowed to pass 28 unchallenged.18 On 11 November, in reference to a proposed state visit of Hitler to London by Prime Minister MacDonald, von Neurath made it fully clear that such a visit was absolutely absurd, and that Germany would "stick to her guns" of

27. Tyrell to Simon, 9 November 1933, Ibid., second series, vi. No. 27. 28. Minute by Eden, 10 November 1933. Ibid., second series,vi. No. 32. 112 29 14 October0 Hitler, on the day of 12 November, intensi­ fied his determined position as 8Scard shark66 with the fol­ lowing words to Benito Mussolini, his Italian counterpart: Germany has disarmed. The German people having fulfilled their obligations, have a moral right to demand and expect of the rest of the world the fulfillment of the analogous obligation . . . . In whatever way things de­ velop in the future, however, one thing alone will be our immutable decision and determina­ tion: not to do anything or subscribe to any­ thing that is incompatible with the honor of the nation and its claim to equality of r i g h t s . 30 This quotation is of the highest significance. The first sentence is an outright lie. As secondary sources have already shown, since 1921 von Seeckt along with his generals, did everything in their power to prevent the Allied Control Commission from discovering the military rearmament of post­ war Germany. On this premise alone, the rest of Hitler’s utterance is completely incomprehensible. Knowing the

29. "The idea mentioned to you on 10 November by MacDonald of a visit by the Reich Chancellor to England is naturally quite absurd .... 1 request you, however, to point out to MacDonald that the English Foreign Minister t,Simon3 has stated that the equality of rights conceded to Germany in December of last year cannot be granted to the present regime in Germany. I request you furthermore to point out to MacDonald that . . . for the present we have nothing to add to these statements and MacDonald is mis­ taken if he believes . . . that we will come forward with new proposals after the elections [of 12 November] ." von Neurath to Hoesch, 11 November 1933. German Foreign Policy, series C, ii. No. 59, 30. Hitler to Mussolini, 12 November 1933. Ibid., series C, ii. No. 40. 113 ,facts as disclosed in the presented documents, was Hitler seriously advocating Germany’s "moral right" on the basis of "honor*?" On 12 November, the referendum pertaining to Ger­ many’s withdrawal from the Conference and the League, along with the new Reichstag elections were held— the candidates being only of the Nazi Party. "The halt, the lame and blind were taken by willing hands to the polling booths-- 31 the Nazis accepted very few excuses." The overall sig­ nificance of this sham election is best described in a telegram by Phipps to Simon, nine days after the election; Herr Hitler’s position is unassailable. He has definitely enhanced his prestige by the election . . . . Hitler is becoming the people’s Chancellor and, . . . the masses are now con­ vinced that Hitler is now converted to a policy of peace and reconciliation . . . the crowd will be patient, believing that no one could have

31. ". . .. the referendum and the new Reichstag elections which took place on the 12th instant, resulted in 90 per cent vote for the foreign policy of the Govern­ ment. There were a little over 45 million voters on the register. Assuming that half a million were genuinely prevented by extreme age or illness, the number of ids- sentients was roughly 5 million or one out of every ten Germans . . . . 'It can only be said with certainty that a very large majority of Germans have signified their ap­ proval of the policy of the Administration in deciding to leave the Disarmament Conference and the League .... In conclusion, it must be observed that no account of the ’electoral’ campaign would be complete without some men­ tion of the lies served up daily to the worthy German voter from start to finish in the press." Phipps to Simon, .15 November.1933. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 39. 114 succeeded where he failed. They realise, however, that he will insist on Germany being given a fair deal, and that the time for humiliation is at an end.32 Two days before the German "elections," the French Minister of Communications, M. Mandel, delivered a speech 33 in the Chamber whose effect was schocking. Once again, figures pertaining to illegal German rearmament were brought to the open. Not only were these estimates verified by the French General Staff, but this group of military experts viewed them, if anything, as rather understated. According to their expert opinion, based on substantial and proven sources, "by June 1935, or the beginning of 1936 at the latest, German rearmament . . . would reach a stage as to 34 permit Germany to wage war on a large scale if necessary.16 The French General Staff even thought it possible that if Germany worked at high pressure they might be ready to wage war by the end of 1934.

32. Phipps to Simon, 21 November, 1933, Ibid.. second series, vi. No, 60= 33. "The most disquieting features of Germany's preparations are: (a) the enormous increase in imports of raw materials required for war- manufactures since the Hitler regime. (b) the definite information that the German air­ craft factories were being organized so as to be able to produce 6,000 aircraft a month , . . which neither England nor France were capable of doing = (c) the construction of aircraft engines was being undertaken by ordinary motor car . factories. (d) 145,000 S.S. and S.A. men served permanently, whilst the majority of the balance was receiving rapidly im­ proving, weekend training." Tyrell to Simon, 17 November 1933. Ibid.. second series, vi. Enclosure no. 1, No, 48. 34. Ibid. 115 On 18 November, Simon and Eden had a heart to heart talk with M. Paul-Boncour at Geneva. The result was further animosity between the French and English points of view. In M. Paul-Boncour9s opinion there still remained the great and fundamental obstacle that Germany really wanted immediate rearmament. It would just be utterly impossible for him to justify before the French Parliament any new attempt to offer further concessions to Germany, •’much less give up a single gun until France knew the real state of Germany’s . 35 armaments.•• Furthermore, if it had not been for the Dis­ armament Conference France would long ago have taken action, either under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles or Article 4 of the Pact of Locarno. The English representa­ tives then stated their country’s official position; Eden pointed out that . . . it was obviously useless to draft a convention embodying sug­ gestions already refused by Germany. Sir John Simon then said that His Majesty’s Government would = . . continue to participate' in working for a convention at Geneva, but that did not mean that they would limit themselves to the suggestions made in October .... A formal repetition of what had been already refused by Germany would be regarded in Great Britain as a dictated treaty . . . and that British public opinion would not stand for this. Some way must be found which would obviate sticking strictly to the formulae evolved this autumn.36

35. Conversation between Simon, Eden and M. Paul- Boncour, 19 November 1933. Ibid., second series, vi. Enclos­ ure. No. 53. 36. Ibid. 116 Here again we see the French hopelessly facing unpleasant facts squarely and realistically, although in vain, whilst their Anglican brethren muck about in the quicksand of appeasement„ That same day, 19 November, Germany expressed her delight over Anglo-French discord. The German Ambassador in London telegramed the following recommended policy to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin: Misfortune dogs the present Geneva dis­ armament negotiations. There is no doubt that English and French positions no longer harmonize .... In order that the develop­ ment of the situation may not be interfered with, 1 should like to recommend that, first of all, the German Government refrain as much as possible from attacks on England . . . at the present moment, it seems to me at any rate that the main thing is to be on guard that nothing happens that might help to restore the united front of our opponents which has been shaken.37 . Thus, while Germany immediately recognized the harm­ ful confusion reigning within the French and British ranks, and adjusted accordingly, Simon, Eden and M. Paul-Boncour met again for further talks on 20 November. Simon began by saying that if the object of the Conference was to produce a convention which Germany could sign, was not the right policy to make it easier for her to sign by encouraging

37. Hoesch to the Foreign Ministry, 19 November 1933. German Foreign Policy, series G, ii. No. 76. 117 Germany to participate in building up the convention? Time was not on Great Britain and France6s side but was running against them. M. Paul-Boncour then pointed out that during the whole course of discussions the rhythm of German rearma­ ment had accelerated. The more Germany rearmed, the less interest she would have in returning to the Conference, since the equality she desired would be achieved in fact. In addition, it would be wrong to run after Germany pos­ sibly giving the impression that the whole fate of the Con­ ference depended upon her. Such an impression had been given once before and the result had been unfortunate. If this happened again, said M. Paul-Boncour, the result would 38 be disastrous. On 23 November, Winston Churchill, before the House of Commons, read his verdict as to the value of the entire disarmament question: I will not predict that no agreement will be reached at Geneva. Indeed, it would be disastrous if no agreement were reached there. But I do not believe that what is going to be done at Geneva is going to mean any great or decisive change in the condition of European and world p e a c e . 39 On 25 November the British Foreign Office informed its Ambassador in Berlin that the major drawback to Hitler's

38, Conversation between Great Britain and France at Secretary General's House, 22 November 1933. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. Enclosure.No. 65. 39. Winston S. Churchill, While England Slept 1932-1938 (New York; G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1938), 30. 118 24 October proposal was that it seemed to involve substan­ tial German rearmament instead of disarmament„ A further obstacle was pointed out--by far the graver: One of our difficulties in dealing more definitely with the German piroposal is the doubt whether it should be regarded as a firm offer 0 « - or whether it is merely de­ signed to bring us and others along the road with the intention of then declaring that no agreement is possible unless we go yet furthero . . .40 Only Hitler knew „ „ „ , However, on 5 December Eden urged Simon not to delay any longer in making His Majesty8s Government8s posi­ tion known as it had been over six weeks since Hitler8s 24 October interview with Phipps, Eden feared, and rightly so, that unless Great Britain voiced her opinion, Nazi demands would increaseo Unfortunately, the Foreign Secre­ tary thought otherwise: But the Foreign Secretary preferred to move tentatively. The Government believed that a convention which controlled the extent and speed of German rearmament would be better than nothing at all. This reasoning had force,41 but delay could only make matters

40, Vansittart to Phipps, 25 November 1933. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 77. 41. This reasoning had absolutely no moral force whatsoever! It merely represents England8s willingness to condone illegal German rearmament at the possible ex­ pense of "controlling" the extent and speed of this un­ lawful and evil activity. England was slowly but surely "compromising" herself right into the horror she least of all wanted: World War II, 119 worseo Hitler now had control of a lever and we were past the point when any dis­ armament could be asked of France or any other allyo 4*2 Eden was now admitting that Hitler dealt all the cards and , that Great Britain and France’s "hands" were almost com­ pletely dependent on his manipulation of the pack. The cardinal point Eden failed to mention was that Hitler’s "control of a lever" was only possible because Great Brit­ ain, through "compromise" and moral default, had placed it earlier in Hitler’s hands. Nevertheless, during December, Great Britain had begun to think seriously of another ne­ gotiation .with Germany. "Rumours of this made French Ministers uneasy . . . the French feared that any discus­ sions with the German Government would result in more con- 43 cessions. In this they were probably right . . . ."

On 5 December, Ambassador Phipps was received by Hitler for three-quarters of an hour. When the discussion reached the subject of French security, Hitler dealt a sur­ prising "hand" to his astonished guest— it was almost a "royal flush": "if France wanted more security than she had at present, . . „ including her almost impregnable system of fortifications all along her eastem frontier,

42. Eden, 56= 43. Ibid., 60. 120 why not conclude a Franco-British defensive alliance, to — _ 44 which he J^HitlerJ would have no objection whatsoever?" Needless to say, Phipps could only mumble something to the effect that His Majesty’s Government could not accept any further European commitment other than that already stipu­ lated in the Treaty of Locarno, In other words, although Great Britain wanted her cake, she was beyond the stage of eating it too. Hitler never forgot this invaluable piece of information, On 1 December the S,A, became a statutory a m of the German Government, Four days later, Secretary of State von Bulow issued the following memorandum: "The incorpora­ tion of the S,A, in the state had undoubtedly complicated the situation in a certain sense, Paris was visibly worried , , , , After all, the 8,A, was militarized, disciplined, uniformed, and also provided with all pieces of equipment . 4 5 " And yet on 9 December Hitler claimed otherwise to the British Ambassador: "Betraying a lamentable lack of humour, Hitler compared the S,A, and S,S, to the Salvation Army, and shouted out that they were in no sense military.

44, Phipps to Simon, 5 December 1933, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No, 99, 45, Memorandum by Secretary of State, 5 December 1933, German Foreign Policy, series C, ii= No, 100, 46 o o = here I regret to say I laughed openly," This was a costly laugh as Great Britain was to realize in the very near future, Hitler finally received Great Britain6s long awaited opinion pertaining to his 24 October proposals on 8 December His Majesty's Government directed Phipps to inform von Neurath that the proposed increase from 200,000 to so large a figure as 300,000 was considered excessive while the pro- 47 posals regarding aircraft and guns also looked very for­ midable, Furthermore, His Majesty0s Government wanted from Hitler a clear assurance that the S,A, and S,S, would be absorbed in the new army and would not continue to exist as 48 supplementary organisations = Hitler would not yield on his proposed 300,000 man army. On 9 December Phipps informed his Government accord­ ingly, but there was an additional proposal by the Chancel­ lor: "The Chancellor , , „ declared that Germany would only

46, Phipps to Simon, 9 December 1933, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No, 120, 47, On 9 December the Foreign Office communicated the following to Phipps: "You state 8 the same percentage of those Powers8 aeroplanes would be required by Germany,6 According to the published figures in the League of Nations8 Armaments Year Book, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia to­ gether possess 2,913 aircraft. This would give Germany 728 military aircraft as compared with approximately 850 British of which a very considerable portion are permanently station ed overseas,M Letter from Sargent to Phipps, 9 December 1933, Ibid,, second series, vi. No, 124, 48, Phipps to von Neurath, 8 December 1933, Ger­ man Foreign Policy, series C, '11, No, 111, 122 require defensive weapons for her short-term army of 30090009 leaving France and highly armed States to retain 49 their present armaments including offensive weapons»11 Hitler, two days later, amplified the generosity of this ’’new” offer--on the basis of an outright lie: Germany, who on her side is completely de­ fenseless, has more reason to Complain of the offensive weapons of the surrounding States than the latter have for representing the de­ fensive weapons demanded by Germany on her side as a d a n g e r , 50 Germany was not, nor anywhere near defenseless--and the French General Staff knew it. So did Great Britain, That same day, the French Ambassador, M, Poncet, talked to von Neurath about the realization of Germany’s newest demand for defensive weapons. The German Foreign Minister quickly set the matter straight: ”1 flatly re­ jected another attempt by Poncet to obtain our consent to having the armament which we demand conceded to us by stages, stating that the pace at which we were able to arm 51 and wanted to was our own affair,” Now, suddenly, Ger­ many’s illegal rearmament program was to be her own

49, Phipps to Sargent, 9 December 1933, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No, 125, 50, Reich Chancellor to Phipps, 11 December 1933= German Foreign Policy, series C, ii. No, 117, 51, Memorandum by the Foreign Minister, 9 December 1933, Ibid,, series C, ii. No, 112, 123 sovereign business, and subjected to no foreign Power8s interference. Once again, reshuffle and deal--but changing 52 the rules at will , . , , Two days later, Hitler took the French and British Governments completely by surprise with another unexpected demand: The German Government is ready to enter into agreements, » = 0 crowned by a system of recipro­ cal and general non-aggression pacts, . , , which stipulate the rejection of force for the solution of all European questions, and which can thus be of service to the maintenance of world peace. The German Government is ready to conclude such pacts with all States surrounding G e r m a n y , 53 Eden explained the overall, confusing effect of this new German offer upon British Foreign policy: Opinion in France was now hardening, and with it the conviction that Germany’s rearmament should be denounced publicly, under Article 213 of the Versailles Treaty, His Majesty’s Govern­ ment did not like this action, but they could not stand in the wings refusing to join in French protests, while Hazi demands grew larger as well as louder. The position was complicated by clever moves from Hitler, who made offers of non­ aggression pacts to his neighbors, although

52, During this same conversation, von Heurath noted: HM, Poneet read to me a memorandum on those points which he had recorded after his last conversation with the Chancellor, It contains a remark about the possibility of Germany’s return to the League of Nations, to the effect that Germany will not join the League again until it has been thoroughly reformed, 1 told Poncet that this edited version was incorrect, for we had no intention whatever for the time being of rejoining the League,” Ibid, 53, Reich Chancellor to Phipps, 11 December 1933, Ibid., series G, ii. No. 117, 124 Austria was not among them. Some action must be taken which would at least expose realities, even if there were slight hope that it would have more encouraging consequences 054 On 20 December Phipps sent a further statement as to Great Britain0 s official position in connection with Hitler8s 24 October proposals, explaining that His Majesty8s Government could not accept the arguments on which the Ger­ man Government based their claim for 300,000 men involving, in its turn, a correspondingly large total of arms. In the British Draft Convention parity between Germany and the metropolitan force of France was proposed at 200,000 men. Parity on this basis seemed to His Majesty8s Government to 55 be the proper comparison. Ten days later the British Government got wind of the forthcoming French reply to Hitler8s suggestions. It was to insist on, as the basis for all future disarmament negotiations, the specific pro­ posals of 14 October--or nothing at all. The London Foreign Office only moaned: The French communication now about to be delivered , , , will have the effect of making it easy for the Germans to say (as foreshadowed) that they have already refused the October pro­ posals, that the French say they will consider nothing else, and that it is therefore useless

54, Eden, 57, 55, Phipps to German Chancellor, 20 December 1933, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. Enclosure, No, 1407 " 125 to continue negotiations* The Germans will therefore not be brought into the open, but will cover themselves behind the French response, „ „ „ 056 It was this French tenacity that welcomed in the New Year-- in addition to greeting the last six months of all serious efforts towards general disarmament *

56* Vansittart to Tyrell, 30 December 1933, Ibid,, second series, vi. No, 148, CHAPTER V

BRITISH MEMORANDUM OF 29 JANUARY 1934

The new year opened with a mild entreaty by the German Foreign Minister0 He suggested to the British Gov­ ernment that, "we must all have patience until cycle of weak French Governments had ended and a really strong Government emerged» Herr Hitler realised this also only too well*" The continual fluctuations within the French parliamentary system, to a great extent, prevented the French from exerting an effective hard line of pressure upon the "illegal evaders,n On 19 January Hitler told Ambassador Phipps that because of the inability of the weak French Government to disarm, it would be "insane61 to hold any further disarmament 2 conference until the autumn at the earliest, That same day the German Chancellor replied to Great Britain’s official position expressed 20 December, regarding his earlier proposals of 24 October 1933: Germany can only express their surprise that the British Government will not recognize that

10 Phipps to Simon, 8 January 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 166. 2. Phipps to Simon, 19 January 1934. Ibid., second series, vi. No. 190b 126 127 Germany is the only State which, in fact, has carried out the obligation to disarm laid down in the Treaty of Versailles 0 , „ the disarma­ ment of Germany has not brought with it a simi­ lar disarmament of her neighboring states . „ <, „ The number of 300,000 men corresponds with the army strength which German needs in view of the length of her land frontiers and of the strength of her neighbours1 armies ; = „ „ The German Government are therefore unable to see by what right this figure is looked upon as a "most formidable increase6 and that it could have a 6disastrous effect6 on the public opinion of Europe , » „ o The German Government for their part can only repeat that they desire nothing more urgently than the most complete and uni­ versal disarmament possible and that Germany o „ 0 would be ready to carry it through if all other States would similarly carry it througho3 Hitler's reply was not encouraging, especially with his new "universal disarmamentn twist„ Its sole purpose was to exert further pressure upon the former Allies to initiate additional proposals. But Hitler knew full well that France would never accept such a vague idea as the circumstances of the time clearly rendered such an idea unworkable. Hitler continued to "reshuffle the pack" at will.

3. Phipps to Simon, 19 January 1934. Ibid., second series, vi. No. 191. 4. On 22 January Phipps sent the following telegram to Simon; "A few weeks ago the Fuhrer said to Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador, that if the French chal­ lenged him he would meet them, losing if necessary 600,000 men; but inflicting still greater damage on them. To me he once murmured softly that in case of French aggression he would show no resistance and would appeal to the world. I cannot tell which course he would really follow . . . =" Phipps to Simon, 22 January 1934. Ibid., second series, vi. Ho. 195. 128 On 22 January England asserted itself anew,. Ambas­ sador Phipps recommended the following course of action: The main trend of'German foreign policy with reference to disarmament at present is a firm intention to rearm. To meet this 1 can only see two courses to pursue: (1) Sanctions, or (2) the conclusion of a Convention with Ger­ many, granting her limited, gradual and controlled rearmament. Either of these courses, to be successful, im­ plies a united front against undue German pre­ tentions. The Germans must, in fact, be made to fear that their failure to be reasonable over (2) will find them confronted with (1). At present this fear is non-existent, for they bank on.our all too palpable differences and inertia . ... . Meanwhile, rearmament proceeds, until the time arrives . . . when the military aeroplanes are produced and flown openly.5 The following day the British Government received word from M. Leger, the Secretary General of, the French Foreign Ministry, that his Government had positive informa­ tion from a reliable German source that Germany, "intended, come what might, to have 300,000 men with the colours by 6 April." In addition, the source also revealed the Nazi Government1s intent to create, at the same time, a new force disguised possibly as police, which would in effect provide Germany over and above the national army with a ■■ 7 professional army as efficient as the present Reichswehr.

5. Ibid. 6. Campbell to Simon, 23 January 1934. Ibid., second series, vi. No. 199. 7. Ibid. 129 Simon now began to realistically face the situation-- although it was far too late* On 26 January he wrote Phipps agreeing that time was certainly favoring Hitler, He also conceded the fact that recent private communications be­ tween the Powers ms only leading to further delay--because Germany probably had no intention to agree to disarmament in the end = = „ ="and all the time her rearmament prepare- 8 tions advance,88 Two days later the British Government answered the German reply of 19 January relating to Britain8s initial objections over Hitler8s 24 October proposals, Germany8s previous assertion that she was the only State to have carried out the obligation to disarm laid down in the Peace Treaty of Versailles was categorically refuted by England, "Without discussing what Germany has done or has not done," His Majesty8s Government claimed that England, during the years which had elapsed since the Treaty, had carried out more than her full measure of disarmament in land, sea, and air forces. Nevertheless, His Majesty8s Government "consider that there are now more important purposes to be served than 9 the pursuit of an unprofitable historical argument,"

8, Letter from Simon to Phipps, 26 January 1934, Ibid,, second series, vi. No, 212, 9, Simon to Phipps, 28 January 1934, Ibid,, second series, vi. No, 223, 130 The "more important purposes to be served," did not, un­ fortunately, include the purpose of investigating and act­ ing accordingly in connection with the question of what "Germany has done or has not done" militarily since 19190 On 29 January Great Britain produced their Memoran- 10 dum on Disarmament, which had been composed four days earlier: "It was an admitted compromise = = = reluctant recognition was given to the inevitability of some German 11 rearmament0M In essence, the Memorandum0s intention was still towards partial disarmament by the armed Powers, aimed at providing equality of rights at a level lower than that proposed by.Hitler» It limited German troops to 200,000, instead of 300,000 asked for by Hitler on 24 October, How­ ever, Germany was to be allowed tanks up to six tons. While the Memorandum called for the abolition of military and naval aircraft, the document admitted that Germany

10, "The German replies to the British and French notes, made known on 19 January, showed no sign of con­ cession, They complained that the heavily armed powers would not disarm as they had promised to do at Versailles, The only convention which Germany could accept in these circumstances was one which allowed her to rearm to the level of others. In these conditions, His Majesty8s Govern­ ment produced their Memorandum of 29 January,Si Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The River side Pres s7'^1^2T7™^T <> 11, Ibid, The "reluctance" of Great Britain was unquestioned proof of her new "compromise" being an un­ desired "recognition" or sanction of an evil: -illegal Ger­ man rearmament. However, Eden incorrectly implied that no other alternative existed because of the fact that this par­ ticular "evil" was inevitable. Evil is not inevitable. Metaphysically speaking, evil exists by choice, that is,only 131 should be entitled to parity by the end of ten years, the duration of the proposed Convention. However, this parity would still have meant a marked German inferiority in re- 12 lation to her neighbours, many of whom were in alliance. On 30 January Hitler acknowledged the British Memorandum.o He announced in the Reichstag that the new British proposal "recognised that the conception of victors 13 and banquished was a thing of the past." Its contents would be examined in the spirit of his statement on foreign policy of 17 May last. However, on the following day Ger­ many announced that she could never agree to remaining de- 14 fenseless for two years in the vital sphere of aviation. That same day, 31 January, Ambassador Phipps tele- gramed home "of a more general character on the present position and future trend of German foreign policy." Phipps felt that German’s foreign policy comprised the following aims: (1) Fusion with Austria; (2) Rectification of the eastern frontiers; (3) Some outlet for German energy to­ wards the south or east; (4) The recovery of some colonial

when the good is consciously sacrificed or "compromised" upon. And vice versa. 12. Eden, 61-62= 13. Phipps to Simon, 30 January 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. Ho. 236. 14. Phipps to Simon, 31 January 1934= Ibid., second series, vi. No. 240. 132 foothold overseaso Although, "the German problem has been complicated by the vary comprehensible reluctance of human _ 15 nature to face inconvenient facts," such as Nazi Germany believing neither in the League nor in negotiation, Hitler6s foreign policy could be summed up in one word: "rearmament„" In order to achieve this goal, the Chancellor must continue to discard the disarmament stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles which were forever standing in his way. If he found that his simple and direct methods aroused no real opposition, then the tempo of his advances would further increase. However, in the last analysis Hitler9s growing demands would only be brought to a halt by a "united front abroad, though the time is not far distant when even a 16 threat of force will prove ineffective," The British Government was well aware of the fact that its Memorandum would be a bitter pill for the French 17 to swallow, CM 2 February, the French Government ex­ pressed their distaste: M. Daladier remarked that our Memorandum seemed to combine from French point of view

15, One wonders if Phipps could have meant other than, "human nature," more specifically, "Great Britain?" The sentence, historically speaking, would then have be­ come more meaningful, 16, Phipps to Simon, 31 January 1934, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No, 241, 17, "I explained to M, Daladier that His Majesty's Government had been led to put forward their scheme by 133 the worst of every other and referred, to. more favourable aspect of German proposal of 24 October last as enabling France to maintain indefinitely her present margin of superior­ ity =, = o As to the German plan, 1 said he must not take it for granted that His Majesty’s Government would participate in a convention which contained no disarmament what­ soever o . „ .18 That same day the French told the English Government that

they "knew for a fact16 that German plans were now complete for splitting the various units composing the Reichswehr into three, the two-thirds shortage in each unit to be made good by men already trained in the S,3e and S»A, The process would be complete by the end of April when Germany would have 28 divisions as against 20 divisions comprised in the French metropolitan army. On 5 February the British Government recognized that, "the real opposition to our proposals will in the long run come from the Germans and not from the French . » « „

strong necessity of preventing collapse of the Disarmament Conference . 0 = „ It was useless to go on offering Ger­ many what we knew she would refuse * * * soon she would listen to nothing at all „ » » and if nothing were done Germany would denounce Part V of the Treaty of Versailles coco In these circumstances it was inevitable that our proposals should be in some respects disagreeable to France but™ o c o if there was to be agreement there must be fur­ ther sacrifices in several quarters but would these sacri­ fices not be meanwhile out-weighed by the natural advantage of avoiding a situation which must eventually lead to a general race in arms?M Campbell to Simon, 2 February 1934, Ibid,, second series, vi, Ho, 245, 18, Ibid. . 19, Campbell to Simon, 2 February 1934, Ibid.,, second series, vi. No, 251, 134 it is the Germans who are the danger of the future and not 20 the French,H Nevertheless, England now saw little hope for the success of their effort of 29 January: “We may hope, though we can hardly expect, that our present Manoran- 21 dum will succeed,“ The following day the House of Com­ mons discussed the Government6s Memorandum, Concluding debate, Eden said that Great Britain had reached the point of no return: We believe that the general balance of this document is just and therefore it should be maintained and not be departed from , , , , I am convinced that, unless the nations of the world will accept the proposals of this memoran­ dum dr something like it, then there will not be a Disarmament Convention,22 On 7 February Phipps reported that Hitler8s popu­ larity with the German masses had, if anything been en­ hanced by the events of January, The reason for this was, contrary to all expectations and to the warnings of the over-cautious, Hitler had recently obtained a greater measure of recognition for Germany8s claims than any of his predecessors, Phipps pointed out the fact that of the wide­ spread opposition to Hitler within Germany, it remained

20, Letter from Vansittart to Campbell, 5 February 1934, Ibid,, second series, vi= No, 255, 21, Ibid, 22, Eden, 62, utterly ineffeetive--only because it was of the ink and paper variety, "rather than arguments of a violent nature 23 which the Nazis understand,," The next day, Phipps entertained Joachim von Rib- bentrop, not yet appointed German Commissioner for Disarma­ ment . The latter stated that in addition to the Memorandum totally unacceptable aviation proposals, the German Govern­ ment felt that the British plan constituted a sort of "Kuh 24 Handel," Phipps, in vain, replied that any compromise might be so described. However, Germany must remember that the Memorandum provided for the gradual destruction of the offensive weapons of the heavily armed Powers, This pro­ vision gave Germany more than she had asked for or even expected. In addition, how could the French be brought to accept such proposals unless there were some sort of German

23, Phipps to Simon, 7 February 1934, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. Mo, 258, 24, "The fact is that when a German complains of 8Kuh Handel1 he simply means that the maximum German claim has not been satisfied at the outset. Even if it were, the Germans would make strenuous efforts to get something more, as is shown by the fact that all the subordinates of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs are now bitterly com­ plaining that we only propose to give 6 ton tanks to Ger­ many whilst only destroying gradually the larger tanks and guns of the heavily armed Powers, All of this regardless of the fact that Hitler himself was quite willing to leave all heavy offensive weapons intact and only asked for these small tanks. The German appetite, in fact, is insatiable: the biggest beefsteak is merely a hors d 8oeuvre for them," Phipps to Simon, 8 February 1934, Ibid,. second series, vi Mo. 262, 136 counter-concession in return? What were two years in the 25 lifetime of a country or even of a man? On 9 February Great Britain again examined the

s h a k y premises of her foreign policy. The Government issued a Memorandum on the Possibility of a French Demand for an Investigation into the State of German Rearmament * ^ 2^ - under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles. This document contained the following embarrassing but probable situations that might come about with France in the very near future: In the first instance, the French Government may wish to do no more than provoke at Geneva a discussion which will secure publicity for the facts about rearmament as stated in the French dossier. But once embarked upon such a course, it would be difficult for France, without loss of face, to avoid its developing into a demand upon Germany by the Council of the League for an investigation, and we are bound, therefore, to assume such a development, It must here be observed that a difference between Britain and France on such an issue would place us in a most unsatisfactory position. We should have been divided from France on a critical matter, on

25= Ibid,

26, "Article 213 provides that 8 so long as the . present treaty'remains in force Germany undertakes to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary,8" Memorandum on the Possibility of a French Demand for an Investigation into the State of German Rearmament under Article 213 of the Treaty of Ver- sailles, 9 February jJ347 Ibid,, second series, vi. No, 264, , 137 which it would be difficult for us to maintain that the French contention was unjustified. Further, unless we were extremely careful, we might _ be regarded as indifferent to German re­ armament, which would certainly be rapidly con­ tinued and would already have included the alleged military training in the associations of 2 % million men in defiance of the provisions of the treaty. Were the Council to decide in favour of a demand upon Germany for an investigation neither we nor the French can well suppose that, in her present temper, Germany would admit it upon her terri­ tory, In fact the probability must be foreseen that Germany might retort by formally repudiat­ ing Article 213 and with it possibly the whole of Part V of the treaty. Such an open challenge by Germany might again place His Majesty* s Government in a very diffi­ cult position, especially if, as is possible, public opinion in France had been aroused by these occurrences to the point of demanding im­ mediate coercive measures against Germany in­ volving the employment of force on German terri­ tory, 2 / The next day, von Neurath circulated the following instructions to all German Ambassadors: For the immediate future, it is important to keep open for discussion the points in the Eng­ lish proposal which are unsatisfactory to us, i,e, air armament and duration of the convention, and to keep separate the League of Nations question as not being subject for current negot iations = 28

27, Ibid, 28, "It is wrong and unjustified that England should wish to make our re-entry into the League of Nations a pre­ liminary condition for a settlement of the disarmament ques­ tion, This again reflects the view that, to prove its good will, Germany must also assume general commitments of a of a political kind in the settlement of the disarmament question. Why indeed is membership in the League of Nations not demanded of the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States?” Circular of the Foreign Minister, 10 February 1934, German Foreign Policy, series C, ii. No, 245, 138 The immediate return of Germany to the Dis­ armament Conference is also out of the ques­ tion, since a general convention cannot be brought about with out the prior agreement of the Great Powers on all essential points On 12 February M„ Avenol, the Secretary General of the League of Nations, in a conversation with Simon, em­ phasized that, in view of the increasing rhythm of German rearmament, it was essential to press on with the work of the Conference as soon as possible, although the French Government had no real illusions on the subject and were quite well aware of the fact that the Germans would rearm up to the point to which they intended to ream, "whatever .30 anyone might do," Avenol also brought to the Foreign Secretary*s attention, the point made in the recent French report to the President of the Conference: "The French Government could not possibly accept an immediat e reduct ion of their armaments accompanied by an immediate rearmament of the Powers disarmed by the treaties , , „ , i„e,, the French Government could have nothing to do with Gemany* s 31 rearmament," Simon now began to have serious doubts as to the Memorandum*s prospects of success.

29, Ibid, 30, If the Germans were, in fact, believed to re­ arm "whatever anyone might do," then why did the French ad­ vocate further Conference work? Were the French now col­ lapsing before Germany's "inevitable" illegal rearmament? Or was this suggestion a French concession to British pres­ sures? 31, Conversat ion between Simon and M, Avenol, 12 February 1934, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No, 271, ~...... 139 Three days later, the British Air Ministry issued their own official tabulation of all known illegal German aircraft in existence or under construction since 1 February 1934 "having the characteristics of the military types 32 shown»" On 16 February, Ambassador Phipps wired from Berlin the following; "My informant admitted that the German objections to the British air proposals were due to fear of control which would disclose considerable progress 33 in German rearmament in the. air 0 ” Later, that very same day, the English Ambassador sent possibly the most discouraging telegram to date: In view of French reply of 12 February the Chancellor is said to be now convinced that heavily armed Powers cannot be expected to disarm below existing level and that a con­ vention would therefore tie no hands but Ger­ many 1 s for the next decade„ A convention would thus only be of value in that it would legalise German rearmament„ Failing a con­ vention Germany obtains a complete free hand by default„ He does not think anything can be gained by further notes or even a conference. He is in no hurry as , = „ time is on his side=34

32= *' (A) InJSxisten^ (B) IMsr^nstruction 167 fighters 41 fighters 67 bombers 2 1 bombers 42 G=P= or re- -- G= P= or re- conn a i s an c e connaisance 276 62 A report, as yet unconfirmed, has been received which states that 300 J=U= 528s (3 engine aircraft) have been ordered by the German Air Ministry," German Aircraft having Characteristics of Modern Military Aircraft. 15 February 1934= Ibid,, second series, vi= Annex III, No, 313, 33, Phipps to Simon, 16 February 1934, Ibid,, second series, vi. No, 285, 34, Ibid, 140 In these depressing circumstances of February 1934, with all their gloomy and dismal portentions, Great Britain took one last hopeful step forward. On 16 February, with his Government11 s Memorandum of 29 January tucked securely under his arm, along with their blessings, Eden set forth on a good-will tour of the continent with but one purpose: to secure as much support for the Memorandum as possible. In this way, a disarmament convention might after all be finally realized. However, Eden was under no false .35 illusions. Geographically, he thought his journey should begin in Paris, continue to Berlin and to Rome, and end in Paris, In this way he would try first to establish con­ fidence in his purpose among the new French Ministers and then, if he was able to record any progress in Berlin, he hoped to get endorsement in Rome and discuss the result to best advantage on his return to Paris, Just before Eden set out, von Neurath told the English Ambassador in Berlin that, in the German Government0s view, the key to the whole 36 disarmament question lay in Paris,

35, l$I thought my best chance of success, and this was slender, was to get specific proposals from Germany, sufficiently moderate to make them acceptable in a con­ vention, To do that, Germany8 s appetites had to be restrain­ ed and Hitler would have to accept the retention of heavier weapons by the armed powers," Eden, 64, 36, Ibid, 141 The British salesman along with his staff left Lon­ don 15 February 1934 and had luncheon in Paris with the

French Ministers on 17 February0 Eden recorded in his memoirs: "After lunch we had three hours of talk = „ „ = My dominant impression at the end of the meeting was of 37 France’s unhappy political condition." The Paris discussions of 17 February showed that the chief French concern was with German para-military activities: It could not be said that these formations numbering about 1 ,2 0 0 , 0 0 0 strong had no mili­ tary value. Thanks to these formations the Germans could put 700,000 to 800,000 men into the field at once , , . , In his own view [M, DoumergueJ , such formations should be suppressed altogether. The point was not

37, "The negotiations in Paris „ „ » were further complicated by the fantastic . . „ 1Stavisky Affair® which destroyed the Ghautemps Government in the first weeks of 1934o" Ibid,, 62e M, Serge Alexandre Stavisky drew up a scheme wherein the Credit Municipal de Bayonne was author­ ized to issue bonds to the value of fifty million francs, Stavisky8s enterprise was approved by the relevant Ministers of the Republic in Paris and the bonds were issued. After a few months, however, suspicion was aroused and it was quickly discovered that the counterfoils did not tally with the amount of bonds issued--to the tune of several million Francs 1 Stavisky was soon apprehended— but the damage was done. Riots followed and the Government’s hours were num­ bered, The extent and ramifications of the scandal havocked the reputation of parliamentary government in France, The "Stavisky Affair" directly affected Eden’s Paris talks of 17 February: "This was a blow to my own work, I had now to face the virtual certainty that neither M, Doumergue nor M, Louis Barthou, the new Foreign Minister, would have had time to study the details of the -disarmament position, still less to bring an impartial judgment to bear, fully preoccupied as they must be with their country’s scandals," Ibid,. 64, 142 whether or not the Germans would be willing to suppress them, but whether or not they had a military character* Everyone knew that they were military in character*38 M* Barthou, the new Foreign Minister, then brought up the matter of effectives in addition to the questionable pro­ bationary period of two years in respect to aviation* The general effect of the United Kingdom Memorandum was that for all practical purposes, France would be disarming while Germany rearmed * While France would be destroying certain guns and tanks during the first year, Germany would simul­ taneously be receiving similar materials which the French Government felt, at present, she had no right to* The French public and Parliament were greatly disturbed over this feature of the Memorandum* In addition, the only re­ maining element of the October 1933 probationary period was the two year period in respect to aviation* The British Government were taking this precaution, Barthou assumed, be­ cause they were not vulnerable from the air, but they deprived the French of their probationary period in respect of land 39 armaments* As a final objection, the French Ministers felt that what was chiefly Lacking in the United Kingdom proposals was security: If it were asked why the French Government resisted reduction in its armaments, the reply

38= Tyrell to Simon, 18 February 1934* British Foreign Policy* second series, vi* Enclosure* No* 297. 39* Ibid* 143 was because the British Memorandum offered them nothing in return0 It contained noth­ ing about sanctions9 but merely a proposal for consularion „ 0 „ » And what action would be taken as a result of such consularion? On this point the Memorandum said nothing» The Declaration of 11 December 1932 contained a reference to security as well as to equality of rights. In spite of this, the United Kingdom Government had given the French nothing in the matter of security , . , , The French view was 8no disarmament unless there is se­ curity, 8 The real problem at issue was the insufficiency in the matter of security,40 Eden now weakly contested the above French objection with the following: This was certainly not the view held by His Majesty8s Government, In their opinion, a great advance had been made , , , , The Memorandum proposed consularion in the event of a breach of the convention itself , , , the French criticism now appeared to be that all that was promised was consulation and that no promise was made that any act ion would be taken. One thing at least that was clear, no Government in the United Kingdom could contemplate giving security as part of a convention which made no provision for disarmament,41 Eden’s evaluation of these Paris talks, nevertheless, con­ tained some hope for success, They revealed that the chief French concern was with German para-military activities and the retention of their own war material, France also wished for further understanding in respect to security, On the first two points Eden would have to now try and get a con­ tribution from Berlin, As to the last, might Britain not be 42 able to do something?

40, Ibid, 41, Ibid, 42, Eden, 67, 144 Before leaving on the second leg of the British Memorandum trip for Berlin, Eden discussed the recent talks with the German Ambassador in Paris on 19 February, He in­ formed his" host of the fact, that should there be no success in finding a formula for agreement in the matter of para­ military organizations between Great Britain and France, "he would view the future course of disarmament negotia- 43 tions with pessimism and fear a failure of the conference," The German Ambassador sympathized accordingly, pointing out that it was unfortunate that a man like M, Barthou, who owed his career to the war and the post-War mentality, was no longer capable of adopting a new outlook and of realizing that the period of the vanquished and the victors was over. In fact it would be a pity if the French could not bring themselves to understand that the present German Govern­ ment and particularly the Reich Chancellor had adopted as the chief maxims of German policy "the respect for promises given and the honoring of obligations assumed under a treaty." Eden vigorously agreed and declared that "the English Government was absolutely convinced that these were 44 the maxims of the Reich Chancellor," Immediately afterthis "comforting" conversation, Eden flew directly to Berlin with his Memorandum,

. 43. The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry, 19 February 1934. German Foreign Policy, series , C, ii. No, 268. 44. Ibid. 145

That afternoon9 20 February, Ambassador Phipps and Eden called on Hitler,, It was Eden’s first meeting with 45 the German Chancellor0 Herr Hitler said that the precondition of an international guarantee must be the pos­ sibility of self-defence, and this was all that Germany asked for . „ „ 0the point which des­ troyed the British Memorandum’s value was the proposal as regards air armaments . . . they were unacceptable because not only would Ger­ many be defenceless for two years, but would require two years more in order to organize her air force, that is, four years in all* This could not be considered equality of r i g h t s „46 The British representative interrupted saying that His Majesty’s Government were well aware that it was very dif­ ficult for Germany to accept the proposal in regard to air armaments. But the problem was to reconcile the German de- mand for equality, regarded by them as a great people’s birthright, with France’s demand for security, "which was founded upon fear and deepened by memory." Eden further pointed out to Hitler, that it would assist if assurances 47 could be given about the S.A. and S.S. Hitler then declared . . . if a convention were concluded, he was prepared to give

45. Eden, much to his surprise, found Hitler ex­ tremely well informed in matters of foreign policy. "Hitler knew what he was speaking about and, as the long interview proceeded, showed himself completely master of his subject. He never once had need to refer either to von Neurath or to any official of the Wilhelmstrasse." Eden, 69. 46. Meeting held in Chancellor’s Room, 20 February 1934.. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. Enclosure, no. 2. Ho. 304. 47. "Mr. Eden observed that the difficulty of the S.A. and S.S. was . . . psychological to the French. Perhaps 146 guarantees for the future to the effect that the S„A„ and S 0 S„ would have no arms, receive no instruction in the use of arms, take no part,in manoeuvres and undergo no training by officers of the army. The fulfillment of these assurances would be subject to verifica­ tion by a system of control, and he (unlike the French) had no doubt that such control could be easily made effective = . . . What went on in the S.A. and S.S. could not escape supervision .... Naturally, a dissolution of these formations was out of the question.48

Eden then raised the important matter of Germany8 s early return to the League of Nations: Hitler said that the question of Germany’s return to the League could not be combined with the question of a disarmament convention. He would prefer to discuss this question indepen­ dently of His Majesty’s Government’s Memorandum. Germany left the League because she was not recognised as a Power having equality of rights .... If such equality was re-established, he would be prepared to treat with His Majesty’s Government the question of Germany’s return to the League=49

Summing up his renarks, the Chancellor said that he was prepared to accept the British Memorandum as a basis and to do his utmost to meet the views of His Majesty’s the explanation was that the Germans were such good mili­ tary material that when they put on uniforms people at once began to be afraid. Herr Hitler said that he doubted whether the Germans were such good military material as the French thought. The truth was that Germans » . = liked discipline and organisation. History had shown that they were more peaceful than their neighbors . = . . 61 Ibid. 48. Ibrd. 49. Ibid 147 Government„ In addition, short of dissolving the S,A. and S»So, which was quite impossible, he would do everything to prevent their having a military character, Furthermore, Hitler was ready to agree to France retaining her offensive weapons for five years, after which France would begin to abolish them. If Britain were to increase their guarantee of security to France, he would not regard this as an un­ friendly act. But as far as Germany’s return to the League was concerned, this question must be subject to the solution of the question of disarmament and, above all, of that of equality of rights, Eden’s reaction was one of prudent hopefulness: There was no denying the potential value of the offers he had made as a counterpart to his demand in the air: the future guarantees of the para-military organizations and the agree­ ment on the retention by the allies of their heavy weapons, These were two of the most critical points in dispute,50 On 21 February, the next day. Hitler and Eden had a second long conversation at the Embassy, Hitler stated: As regards aviation, he must maintain, his demand for the defensive measures, The number of Germany’s defensive aircraft must be cal­ culated in some proportion to the combined air forces of her neighbors , , , , He proposed to ask for 30 percent of the combined number of military aircraft possessed by Germany’s neigh­ bors or 50 percent of the metropolitan air forces of France--whichever figure was less , , , ,

50, Eden, 72, 148

If these demands were denied9 all other concessions made to Germany were w o r t h l e s s . 51 Hitler then went on to reiterate his complete agreement to postpone the disarmament of heavily armed Powers until the end of the fifth year of the proposed ten year convention. After this period, as stipulated in the British Memorandum, their disarmament would be carried out during the second five years of the conventions In addition, the Chancellor once more mentioned as a counterpart to his request for immediate defensive aircraft, his perfect willingness to ensure the future non-military character of the S.Aa and S.S. under the four heads given, through a supervised, in­ ternational system of control. Hitler concluded by em­ phasizing that what he had just put forward was not practical equality of rights, but something very much less. His com­ promise would consist in Germany defining the non-military characteristics of the S.A. and S.S. and the French agreeing to a modification of the proposal as regards air armaments. Moreover the French would not begin to disarm until after the fifth year, though there would be disarmament after 52 that time. Before the talks broke up. Hitler curiously

51. Conversation held at His Majesty’s Embassy in Berlin, 22 February 1934= British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. Enclosure. Ho. 305= 52. Ibid.

\ 149 suggested to his British guests that it was altogether un­ necessary for His Majesty's Government to tell the world what he had proposed, but they might use his proposals as 53 material for a new compromise. Eden took note and duly 54 informed his Government. When von Neurath asked if Eden would return directly home after his stopover in Rome, the British statesman replied that the French Ministers had told him that they were not ready to give him a detailed view on the Memorandum and had asked him to stop on his way back in 55 order that they might do so. 56 Eden left Berlin on 23 February not dissatisfied: It seemed to us that the Chancellor had at­ tempted to meet our points of criticism .

53. "The Chancellor asked that these proposals should not be put forward as coming from the German side or even disclosed as representing German point of view but that His Majesty's Government should themselves suggest them as proposals which experience of my tour would indicate as being likely to gain immediate acceptance by several powers. If this were done he could accept them at once.. . . ." Phipps to Simon, 21 February 1934= Ibid., second series, vi. No. 303. 54. "I do not propose to make Hitler's proposals known either to the Italian or French Governments, but only tell them what difficulties the German Government sees in our Memorandum without indicating solution proposed. I should be glad to know if you approve of this course." Ibid. 55. Conversation held at His Majesty's Embassy in Berlin, 22 February 1934. Ibid., second series, vi. En­ closure. No. 305 = 56. "In concluding a letter to the Prime Minister on the night of 22 February, I wrote: 'Our view here is that the Chancellor's proposals were much better than Phipps or I expected . . . of course the air aspect raises a 150 Hitler5s offer of supervised control of S„A* and SoSc could do something to meet French fears9 so would an agreement that the French should retain their own heavy armaments. A consequence was to restore to France, in effect, the two-state convention for which she asked„ 1 was glad to get Germany5 s acceptance of a ten year period for the convention, for this had been one of the objectives much insisted on by my col­ leagues before I left London0 57 Upon arriving in Rome on 24 February, Eden found 58 certain telegrams awaiting him from the Foreign Office in London: "Their contents surprised me„ One of them, ad­ dressed to Phipps, began": Your telegram No. 78 [Document Mo. 303, 21 Februaryputs us in a position of great

formidable difficulty. But should not we be much better off with such a Convention than with none at all? Maybe that is the true alternative. 815 Eden then writes, "I might have added that it would be a gain to end the existing impossible treaty Versailles position and to fix definitely a limit for German armaments . . . the reason for this was that the agreements, as they emerged from my talks with Hitler, did not call for any concessions from France and ourselves, while the armament they allowed to Germany was to be limit­ ed, regulated and observed." Eden, 79-80. This last sen­ tence of Eden's represents, even at this late stage of the game, British thinking at its most wistful form. Hitler's proposal for defensive military aircraft, regardless of it being "limited, regulated and observed" is a demand upon the greatest of all French concessions: extending a green light to illegal German rearmament--if the 'Impossible treaty" was still law in 1934, Eden is suggesting that for France, in 1934, to denounce the Treaty of Versailles would be of no real concession on her part. 57. Ibid., 77. 58. "We have taken 1,000 as approximately the num­ ber of military aircraft claimed by Germany at once on a calculation based on either of the two alternatives given by Hitler." Simon to Phipps, 23 February 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 311. 151 embarrassment„ The proposals contained in it are such as we could not possibly ourselves put forward and sponsor „ „ 0 it would mani­ festly be not only unwise but hopeless for His Majesty0s Government to put forward a sugges­ tion that Germany should begin at once with a fleet of 1,000 aeroplanes. Such a suggestion would raise the loudest outcry in France „ = » and would certainly result in driving a wedge between us and France . , , „ His Majesty8s Government themselves could not moreover con­ sider a proposal which would destroy the whole character of their draft, entailing a rearmament race rather than disarmament » „ „ „ In all these circumstances we feel that , „ the Chancellor should either himself make his pro­ posals openly and officially, or that His Majesty0s Government should be free to com­ municate them to the French and Italian Govern­ ments as coming not from His Majesty8s Govern­ ment but from the German Government,59 60 Eden8s reaction was of more than surprise. In his memoirs he stated that this particular telegram from home would have had no importance, except that it showed a lack of confidence in his handling of the tour. And if this lack of confidence on the part of the British Foreign Office were to seep out, the French might have been discouraged from paying any fur­ ther attention to Eden, or what mattered more, to the pro­ posals that he had brought. To Eden, "this tactical aspect

59, Simon to Phipps, 23 February 1934, Ibid,, second series, vi. No, 308, 60, "What made the indignation expressed in the London telegrams hard to excuse was that 0 governmental quarters8 were completely with out any alternative policy and were unable to face up to the grim reality if no agree­ ment were reached, as events were soon to show," Eden, 84, 152 of the business had little significance in comparison with 61 the substance of the Chancellor0s suggestions=M Neverthe­ less, on 24 February Eden quickly sent from Rome an apolo­ getic note to the Foreign Office, Although he deeply re­ gretted having put his Government in "a position of great

embarrassment, 61 he reassured his superiors that at no time had he ever suggested that Hitler8s proposals should be sponsored by His Majesty8s Government, much less ever en­ courage Hitler to think likewise, "1 fully recognize that 62 my task is one of enquiry.,,r That very same day, while Eden was preparing for his forthcoming interview with Mussolini, the English Am­ bassador in Berlin received the following, uneasy telegram from London:1* While our own nes. papers are necessarily being given no information by His Majesty8 s Government, the press everywhere is being fil­ led with German propaganda wrongly asserting that France is wrecking the prospects of the British Memorandum by refusing all disarmament, while Germany is represented as making the most helpful contributions On 24 February Phipps likewise informed his Government of further German dishonesty; It is notorious that Germans have already got large numbers of defensive military

61, Ibid,, pp, 81 and 83, , A , . 62, Drummond to Simon, 24 February 1934, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No, 316, 63, Simon to Phipps, 23 February 1934= Ibid,, second series, vi. No, 309, 153

aeroplanes, between 400-500 perhaps9 and, convention or no convention, they mean to use them , o = » Moreover, General von Blomberg claims that Germany, having been granted 8Gleichberechtigung§ is showing great moderation in demanding only 50 percent of the French air force® 64 On 26 February, before meeting lfIl Duce," Eden had a halt hour 8 s morning talk with Pope Pius XI in his room® His Holiness felt it impossible to believe that even if Germany meant war, she would be in a position to wage it for ten or fifteen years, at least® Eden respectfully in- 65 terrupted, voicing his own personal estimate: five years® Later that same day, Eden met Mussolini® The Italian dictator said that the whole question of whether or not there was to be a convention depended entirely upon Che attitude of the French Government® He kept repeating how important it was that a settlement should be reached on armaments at the earliest possible moment, otherwise the German demands were certain to increase® In his view, the convention ought to provide for a limitation of German rearmament, such rearmament consisting of defensive weapons only. The reason for this was, of course, that the Germans, as he had observed, had already rearmed and that no one

64® Phipps to Simon, 24 February 1934= Ibid®, second series, vi® No® 314. 65® Eden, 84® 6 6 154 could prevent them* However, "II Duce11 did mention that the only way to now stop illegal German rearmament was by war.

Eden then brought to his host 8 s attention Hitler8 s aviation proposals, emphasizing that they created very great difficultieso Mussolini replied that it should be remembered that Germany had four frontiers to defend» However, taking everything into consideration, it must not be forgotten that by Hitler8s proposals, the French were obtaining a system of control of armaments, assurances about the S 0 A o and 8 „8 o, and in addition, a postponement of French dis­ armament for five years0 .In fact, the French Ambassador had given him the impression that these concessions went far to meet French fears0 At the conclusion of the conversation Signor Suvich, the chief Italian Ambassador said that he thought the French objected not only to French disarmament, but equally to Ger­ man rearmament as well, especially if the latter, as indi- 6 7 cated in the British Memorandum, were to begin at once„ The German Ambassador to Italy, who

6 6„ Mussolini8s position was almost identical to Great Britain8so Both countries, for all practical pur­ poses, had by February 1934, denounced the Treaty of Ver­ sailles through moral default= The pressure on Treaty- abiding France was now to be immense= 67* The above account of Eden8s interview with Mussolini is taken from Eden8s Facing the Dictators, ppc 85-88. 155 attended, but did not participate in this Eden-Mussolini talk, wired home his immediate impressions the following day: Eden was visibly under the impression that Berlin was adopting a clear line with all sin­ cerity, o o o he discussed the German position with remarkable fairness and impartiality, 0 0 » especially with regards to Germany6s extremely liberal offers for the supervision of the S0Ao and SoSo » » c the compactness of the views of the German Chancellor, who, 0 » « manifested a firm determination to insist on minimum demands while stressing his desire for an understanding, made all the more of an impression on Eden since he had encountered in Paris great unsteadiness and was unable to ascertain any responsible government position, other than a certain fun­ damental intrasigenceo^B Was Eden falling into a trap? Aside from Eden8s question­ able gullibility and France8s unpreparedness, due to her unstable parliamentary system with all its recent govern­ mental scandals, Hitler8s clever diplomatic maneuvering was remarkably effective for he had practically convinced Eng­ land and Italy that German rearmament, regardless of the Treaty of Versailles, was inevitable and unstoppable, and therefore, legal=

Eden flew back to Paris on 28 February0 The next morning he met M 0 Doumergue, the French Premier, and M. Barthou for the second time. M. Doumergue opened the dis­ cussion by referring to Hitler9s proposed supervision of the

6 8 0 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Minister, 27 February 1934. German Foreign Policy, series C, ii. No. 203 o 156 SoAo and S0So He stated that supervision under the four heads defining their non-military character would merely change their appearance, but would do nothing to limit their numberso Also, how was the execution of these rules to be supervised once they were applied? And if it were proved that they had not been duly fulfilled, there would have to be sanctions. This was essential. There was no provision for anything of this kind in the German proposals. The German proposals could therefore not be said to satisfy 69 French preoccupations. M. Barthou then referred to cer­ tain reports from Germany showing that the S.A. were being increased, and an account of the military training of the

S.A. and B .6 . Here, Eden defended Hitler’s proposal. The reports to which M. Barthou had just referred were arguments not against, but for a convention. But as we had now reached the point where at no cost to themselves in equipment, no8 even one gun, the French could get a convention which would tie Germany to definite figures limit­ ing her armaments in a fashion which would give France a superiority she was otherwise unlikely to have. This was the kind of convention Barthou had told me before, on my way to Berlin, he thought better than none. So did I.'O M» Barthou now said nothing. M. Doumergue then turned to

69. Meeting in Paris in President of the Council’s Room, 1 March 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 324. 70. Eden, 91. 157 the question of aviation* As regards Hitler's demands for defensive aircraft, the French government were not at all inclined to see Germany in possession of any military force* There could be no doubt as to the view which French public 71 opinion would take of the proposal* Germany!s reply regarding the League of Nations was not encouraging* The Powers who entered the League showed their devotion to the ideal of peace* Neither French nor world public opinion would understand why it was that Ger­ many refused to have anything to do with a body whose func­ tion it was to organize peace* They would remember that it was nations who desired war, such as Japan, who withdrew 72 from the League* And then there was the Chancellor's suggestion that French disarmament should be postponed during the first period* M* Doumergue thought this particular proposal lost a good deal of its value once the principle of German re- 73 armament was admitted* The point upon which he must again insist which stood before all others, was that of effective sanctions* At this point, Eden noted that here was an

71= Meeting in Paris in President of the Council's Boom, 1 March 1934* British Foreign Policy, second series, vi* No* 324* 72= Ibid* 73= The principle of German rearmament, according to the Treaty of Versailles, was defined by law as illegal* To sanction any aspect of this unlawful activity, while the Treaty of Versailles was still lawfully in effect, was to sanction evil* Upon this moral premise, France remained unshakable* 158 argument which had not been mentioned on his outward journey. Mo Doumergue retorted that as a matter of common sense, it was unreasonable to ask France to disarm without giving her effective guarantees against sudden aggression. For as experience had shown, in the event of war, sanctions were eseential because consultation alone would not be an 74 adequate protection, Eden now asked the two French Ministers what their Government expected in the way of effective sanctions and guarantees, M, Barthou remarked that he was not able to give a full reply on behalf of the French Government con­ cerning this particular point "which stood before all others," Owing to pressure of work, there had been no 75 opportunity for a meeting of Ministers, At this point Eden suddenly realized the gravity of the situation: My mission had been to get the views of the three Governments on our Memorandum, X knew the German view and the Italian view, but not the French , , , , This question was all the more pressing because I had come to Paris a second time to learn the views of the French Govern­ ment , o , , What was I to report? It would be a pity to have to return with information so incomplete,76

74, Meeting in Paris in President of the Council's Room, 1 March 1934, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi, No, 324, 75, Eden. 90, 76, Ibid, 159 At this unexpected outburst, "Mo Doumergue looked embar­ rassed and perplexed011 M 0 Barthdu then said that the essen­ tial point was whether the French Government accepted, in any form, the principle of German rearmament 0 This was a very grave question upon which only the Government as a whole could reach a decision0 He begged Eden to give them a few days or even a few weeks= In concluding, M, Doumergue gently hinted that perhaps the right course would be to continue the conversations but under the motto: slow and sure. Eden, disturbed and exasperated, replied to the contrary: "It seemed to me that the longer the solution 77 was delayed, the more difficult it would became«" Eden8s reaction to this irresponsible French un­ preparedness was one of sympathetic indignation: In Berlin and Rome, the men I met were com­ pletely in command of their subject, familiar with its every detail and ready to take de­ cisions,, In France « 0 = on this occasion the Ministers were overcharged with parliamentary business and had no particular knowledge or training in the subjects they discussed?Sand no sufficient command of them o « o „ In

77= Ibid, 78= The "overcharged" Ministers had more than adequate knowledge in the subjects they discussed. At least they knew that while the Treaty of Versailles was still law, the principle of German rearmament was il­ legal, and therefore not subject to any nation's unlawful sanction. This "particular knowledge" was apparently more than the British or Italian Governments possessed— or cared to admit. 160 these days of France's internal crisis 0c0 » the truth seemed to me to be that the Gov­ ernment were still ruling under the impact of the Stavisky scandals and depended upon Doumergue1s reputation for their survival* While all this was going on, the Ministers had no time to consider, much less to take decisions on, issues upon which France's life might depend* They had instead to prevaricate and to pretent, and 1, if only out of politeness, had to conform by not observing the bare evidence that my hosts had not done their homework,79 On the afternoon of 1 March Eden flew home. During the flight he speculated as to any further progress that the British Memorandum might make in the future, in ad- dition to the grave need that now had to be faced: French security* I could see no further progress, except that we should find out more clearly from the French what security proposals they wanted and try to help them to take a de­ cision on our Memorandum* I had suggested

79= Eden, 91-92* Eden also informs the reader of the great moral and historical lesson to be learned from his Memorandum tour: "Through their failure to take de­ cisions at this juncture in their fortunes and in the first year of Hitler’s power, the allies lost an oppor­ tunity to circumscribe Hitler by armament which would have deprived his later actions of some specious pretext, and reinforced allied authority and justification in resisting them* An opening was missed * * * it remains true today [l962jj, that if the Western democracies are to make head­ way against communist and other like-minded dictatorships, they must find men who have the capacity, courage and experience, and give them time to know their subjects as the dictators know them. They must also have the organiza­ tions at their command to enable them to prepare their policies in advance and together* They then may interpret and determine events, instead of confusedly pursuing them," Ibid,. 92, to my colleagues before 1 left on my tour 161 that I should.ask the French a question on these lines, but the Foreign Secretary had been against it„ He said that care would be needed if any question of this kind were put to the French, in order that it should be quite clear that we did not propose to go any further» 1 was now quite sure that we had to do better than that„80 On the evening of 1 March, Eden found the Government ^hesitant to take decisions and the outlook murky0 Ho course was apparent which would advance agreement on our Convention, only a virtual certainty that if decisions were not taken 81 soon, any opportunity glimpsed on my tour would be gone011 On 3 March the German Secretary of State, von Bulow, happily wired the following to the German Ambassador in London: “Eden has repeatedly stated here in Berlin that if France should refuse a commitment to take effective dis­ armament, measures, the entire proposal of the English

80 o Iblda . 94 o Even before Eden left on his trip, Simon virtually eliminated any chances of the Memorandum6 s success in Paris by officially ruling out any further Eng­ lish guarantees pertaining to "that matter above all else"— French security0 Herein lies the fault of the Memorandum1 s pending doom0 81o "I asked my colleagues to consider whether o o o perhaps now we could tell France that, in our opin­ ion, it would be better to have a convention with the Ger­ man modifications than to have none at all = 0 « « I also thought that we ought to re-examine" our position on security in order to try to help the French= There was, however, little response to rny suggestions and our moves, when they came, were tentative and "slow0 It would not be just to ascribe their reluctance merely to British dislike of .definite commitments for an uncertain future= There was much genuine anxiety about what was to happen to France, o" o o all recognized there might be, dangerous conse­ quences from the internal dissensions which were racking the French nation at this time0" Eden, pp0 93-95= 162 82 Memorandum would immediately become invalid." Prime Minister MacDonald, on 6 March, made a very significant declaration of the foreign political situation before the Belgian Senate in Brussels. As he saw it, there were only two possible ways of preventing further illegal German rearmament: by recourse to the League Council under Article 213 or by preventive war. He regarded the first alternative as hopeless because Great Britain and Italy were opposed to it. The second alternative he considered to be far worse than "the ill it sought to cure." Mac­ Donald then want on to criticize the statesmen responsible for the Treaty of Versailles. "How could twenty-seven Powers for the moment 0allied and associated0 hope to suc­ ceed where Napoleon had failed?" Their illusions had long since vanished. For England, France and Italy had in fact at the end of 1932 fll December] been "forced" to recognize Germany8s right to equal treatment. Germany was quick to take note of Bden°s London re­ ception and the differences among England0s foreign policy

82. von Bulow to Hoesch, 3 March 1934. German Foreign Policy, series C, ii. No. 296= 83. Clark to Simon, 7 March 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 334. It was because of simi­ lar speeches of this nature that encouraged Germany to con­ tinue pressing additional demands for illegal rearmament. Needless to say, the English Nationalist press attacked this particular speech of their Prime Minister0s as an apparent conversion on his part to a "policy of surrender." 163 makers o On 7 March the German Ambassador in Paris informed the Foreign Ministry of his following observations: ''It should not be overlooked that in England opinion is strongly divided as to the advisability of Eden8 s trip » » o = More­ over, it should not be forgotten that at the moment the English Government is not very strong and that sharp dif- 84 ferences of opinion appear within the Cabinet»" This German information was most helpful to Hitler,, The next day, Simon and Eden met with Hoesch, the German Ambassador to London„ Hoesch pointed out that the "concessions1' relayed by Hitler to Eden on his recent tour were the final limit and maximum proposals that Germany could offer, Simon immediately reminded the German Ambas­ sador that Hitler5s demand for an immediate air force of 1,000 aeroplanes was anything but a "concession" and repre­ sented a very serious additional rearmament stipulation which was raising very strong objections in Great Britain as well as in France, Moreover, His Majesty's Government were much dis­ appointed at the Chancellor's attitude as regards Germany's return to the League of Nations, As regards Germany's de- mand for authorized air armament, Simon trusted that in the interests of an agreement it could be revised, Hoesch

84, The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry, 7 March 1934, German Foreign Policy, series C, ii. No, 301, 164 bluntly concluded that the figure of 300,000 for the new army could not be reduced, and therefore was subject to no revision in connection with the German demand for air 85 armaments. Before the House of Commons on 14 March, Iden gave an account of his journey muted by the failure to get an answer from France. He reminded the House that days had long passed when Great Britain could choose whether to in­ volve herself in Europe or not. He stated that if no agree­ ment over the Memorandum were reached, England would have to rearm more speedily than any other Power, because she had already disarmed so much. The most effective contribution Britain could make in securing an effective convention 86 would be to help France by more definite offers on security. Simon then rose before the House and put forward for approval Eden8s recommended line of future policy for Geneva: "(1) We stand by Convention as amended by our Memorandum, (ii) We are prepared to accept Hitler’s amendments, or some­ thing. like them, on condition Germany returns to League. (iii) If France can accept the above we are prepared to help her by accepting guarantees of execution or something 87 analagous.,? .

85= Simon to Phipps, 8 March 1934= British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 339= 86. Eden, 95. 87. Ibid., 96. 165 These proposals were not well received« The major­ ity of the members condemned them and argued, "as usual for 88 a policy of negation*" They did not want further Euro­ pean commitments which Eden1s third suggestion entailed* Some of the members even considered the Disarmament Gon- 89 ference as already a failure* On 21 March His Majesty8s Government issued a Memorandum on Germany8 s Illegal Rearmament and its effect on British Policy. In this document, the Government stated outright, that for all practical purposes, Part V of the Versailles Treaty was dead. It was a belated confession already known to Germany since 19231 In July 1932 Germany officially put forward her claim to equality of rights" in armaments. In discussion how this claim could be met,

88* The result of this ’"negation policy” is brought out very clearly by Eden: "'The outcome, however, was clear enough. I had to leave for Geneva without anything new in policy to offer on our part. As a result, there was nothing I could do at Geneva in April but repeat the old themes, * * * o" Ibid., 98. 89. Winston Churchill was one of these pessimistic "realists*” Shortly after the Foreign Secretary delivered his speech, Churchill responded with the following effort: "The Disarmament Conference has brought us steadily nearer . . . to a pronounced state of ill-will than anything that could be imagined . * . in the end what have we got? We have not got disarmament * We have the rearmament of Ger­ many* That is the monstrous offspring of this immense labor--the rearmament of Germany . * . . It is always an error in diplomacy to press a matter when it is quite clear that no further progress is to be made *" Winston S. Churchill, While England Slept 1932-1938 (New York: G.P. Putnam1s Sons/ 1938), 108-109* 166 His Majesty’s Government in the United King­ dom declared on the 18th September, 1932, that they could ’give no countenance nor encourage­ ment to the disregard of treaty obligations,’ and that ’the correct position under the Treaty of Versailles is that Part V is still binding and can only cease to be binding by agreemento’ Further, a declaration, signed on the 11th December, 1932, by the United Kingdom, French, German, Italian and United States Governments, stated that one of the principles of the Disarmament Conference should be ’the grant to Germany of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations, and that this prin­ ciple should find itself embodied in the Disarmament Convention „ c = c It is clearly understood that the methods of application of such equality of rights will be discussed by the Conference,, ’ His Majesty’s Government have long been disinclined to try to secure the literal enforcement of Part V of the Treaty» They were guided, especially after the withdrawal of the Control Commission [1927], by the practical difficulty of securing such en­ forcement and by the set back to European reconciliation which such attempts would in their opinion have involved, They considered that the disarmament clauses had achieved their main object, i»e., the reduction of Germany to such a condition of military impotence as to render her incapable of waging an aggressive war against her neighbors within a measurable period of time oo.o It might almost be said that we had become so accustomed to German breaches of Part V of the Treaty that we were inclined to take them for granted and to regard them as inevitable. Familiarity had bred contempt, and public opinion in this country had almost forgotten the real purpose of Part V, which was to destroy and prevent the re-creation of the military power of Germany; and thus prepare the conditions in which alone general disarmament would be pos- s rb le o o o o To judge from the way things are moving it is unlikely that France will now be satisfied (she might have been some time ago) with a vague system of collective ’guarantees for the execution of the 167 Conventiono8 It looks as though in return for her signature to a convention she will now require for her security some tangible pledge of direct British support and col­ laboration, o o 0 an early Convention for legalising Germany8s illegal armaments is certainly to be desired, and it would be worthwhile making certain sacrifices in order to obtain France's consent thereto. But the only basis on which such a Convent ion could be satisfactorily negotiated would be on the basis that Germany started by being in the wrong; that Germany was the petitioner; and that the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles had a serious and long standing grievance against Germany, on account of her flagrant violation of her treaty obligations , , , , But it is becoming increasingly clear that even if the Conference is saved, it cannot pro­ duce a universal Disarmament Convention: at most a limited Convention may emerge for legal­ izing Germany's illegal armaments, in return for her acceptance of certain temporary restrictions with regard to them. It is clear that Herr Hitler is most anxious to obtain a Convent ion on these lines, not in order to disarm his neighbours, but in order to obtain formal recognition of Germany's present illegal armaments , , , , If a breakdown of the Disarmament Conference results in general and uncontrolled rearmament, the question of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles will at once obtrude Itself into every diplomatic negotiation in which France and Germany are in­ volved, Part V is, for practical purposes, dead Events are moving fast, and the time for saving something from the wreckage of the Disarmament Conference is growing short, Circumstances have altered, and we are now faced with a tacit repudia­ tion by Germany of the limits set to her armaments by the Peace Treaty, which has become flagrant and may soon become dangerous, It is therefore highly desirable tfhat an early decision should be reached, ^

90= Memorandum on Germany8 s Illegal Rearmament and its Effect on British Policy, 21 March 1934, British Foreign Policy,second series, vi. No, 363, 168 From this crypt of confusing, contradictory and self-defeating premises in which Britain0s foreign policy "lay in state86 the 6Requiem for the Disarmament Conference6 was now composed = Its performance was but only a few months away. CHAPTER VI

THE-END

By the middle of March 1934 any international agreement pertaining to Great Britain8 s Memorandum of 29 January looked slim indeedo . The French were more insist­ ent than ever in demanding an applied system of effective guarantees and would hear of no legalizing in any form German rearmament„ On the other hand, the Nazi Government continued to offer Hitler's "concessions" as their final and unalterable offer» The tired English were soon to be brought to an unhappy impasse— an impossible choice between French demands or their Memorandum as modified by Hitler's proposalso , On 21 March Ambassador Phipps reported of an in­ teresting speech delivered earlier by Goring at Potsdam on 9 March: Goring said that the spirit of Prussia would continue to govern the destiny of Germany0 It had enabled Germany to defy the world and would again bring her to greatness« Germans should be proud to be regarded abroad as a nation of militarists, for they knew that with the return

169 170 of the Prussian spirit of devotion to duty the Reich had regained its honour„1 Phipps” only comment was that he for one could not help but feel rather grateful to Goring0 For if nothing else, the Nazi General had supplied a resounding negative to the British pacifists” repeated question, "Cannot the Prussian 2 leopard change its spots?" Three days later Phipps sent a telegram concerning the reaction of SCA0 Headquarters to the French refusal of Hitler's proposed supervision of para-military bodies: Military Attache has reliable information that SoA. Headquart ers are very relieved that ex-allied Powers have not accepted offer to submit S0Ao to control since an immediate im­ position of control would wreck their present system of training men for Reichswehr and would interfere with either future activities * * . « Instructions are being issued to prepare a second set of files in all S 0A. offices as existing correspondence is incriminating 0 3 On 26 March Hitler further complicated the pro­ ceedings » In a conversation with Simon, the German Ambas­ sador said that Hitler was prepared to contemplate a Euro­ pean agreement guaranteeing the due observance of the proposed Arms Convention by the use of financial and

1, Phipps to Simon, 21 March 19340 British Foreign Policy, second series, vi„ Footnote no0 1, No* 3TdT™ 2 0 Phipps to Simon, 21 March 1934= Ibid., second series, vi= No. 360. 3. Phipps to Simon, 24 March 1934. Ibid., second series, vi. No. 365. 171 economic sanctions„ However, the Chancellor now insisted that such a European guarantee must be undertaken by all European States, including Soviet Russia and Great Britain. in addition, the international supervision must be world 4 wide. The next day both officials engaged in conversa­ tions again. This time Hoesch stated flatly that "it was impossible for Germany to make any further direct or in­ direct offers to France,11 who regularly obtains concessions, subsequently minimizes them, and for the rest of the time persists without change in its negative position. In these circumstances, the Ambassador was authorized to continue all further discussions with His Majesty’s Government only on the condition that the Foreign Minister assured him of nstrictly confident treatment with respect to Germany’s position and above all promised not to communicate their 5 statements either officially or unofficially to Paris." Simon concurred, only asking Hoesch to do likewise. On 4 April the English Ambassador in Berlin in­ formed the Foreign Office of Germany’s Military Budget for 6 1934. Emboldened, Hitler had it passed by his cabinet on

4. Simon to Phipps, 26 March, 1934. Ibid., second series, Bo. 366= 5. The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry, 27 March 1934. - German Foreign Policy, series G, ii. Bo. 360. . 6. "The figures reveal the following substantial increases in the estimates of the two services and of the 172 23 March, and then for reasons untold, revealed it to the world in the official ’Reichsgesetzblatt8 of 26 March0 Britain's reaction to this "ill-timed11 and impru­ dent German diplomatic move was little short of outright anger: His Majesty's Government are very seriously concerned by the heavy increases in the Navy, Army, and Air Ministry estimates published 26 Marcho The Army increase is very heavy and that for the Air Ministry represents an increase of 250 per cent on the 1933 figure The following day Phipps informed von Neurath that not only was the British Government perturbed over the Budget figures but that the total estimates were now the subject of questions addressed to the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons, enquiring what was the purpose of the

Air Ministry; Army - Increase: 174,560,900 from 472,002,650 to 646, 563,550 reichmarkSo Navy - increase: 50,000,000 from 183,004,350 to 233, 004,350 reichmarkSo Air Ministry - increase: 131,764,400 from 78,321,900 t o 210,086,300 reichmarkSo making a total increase of 356 m i l l i o n reichmarks » o » » The Air Ministry estimates show the largest proportional in­ crease c All items have leapt up = o = = Total expenditure by the Air Ministry has risen from 44 million reichmarks for 1932 to 79 million reichmarks for 1933 and 210 million reichmarks in the present year." Phipps to Simon, 4 April 1934„ British Foreign Policy, second series, vio Ho, 3740 70 Was Hitler perhaps so confident that he now could afford to possibly torpedo all chances for the real­ ization of a disarmament convention,and thereby foil his adversaries8 attempts to even limit and restrict his present illegal rearmament? So Simon to Phipps, 6 April 19340 British Foreign Policy, second series, vio No0 375„ 173 expenditures and whether any breach of the Treaty of Ver­ sailles was involved or intended. The English Ambassador then requested His Excellency, "to be as so good as to supply me with detailed information, which is not given in the 8Reichsgesetzblatt6 as to the reasons for these increases at the present timeo" This was accordingly done on 9 10 April, In Paris on 10 April, the British Ambassador told the disturbed French that if Germany would seek to justify this further military expenditure by claiming that it was necessary in order to transform the Reichswehr into the new short-service army contemplated in recent disarmament discussions that the question would at once arise whether Germany was claiming to make this transformation without

9, The British Ambassador in Germany to the For­ eign Minister, 7 April 1934, German Foreign Policy, series G, ii, No, 384, 10, "Baron von Neurath tells me . , , that the big increase in the Army estimates was due to the heavy expense entailed by the forthcoming transformation of the German Army into a short-term body. The Naval increase was due to the replacement of very old cruisers which were no longer sea-worthy and were called 8floating coffins8 by the fleet. These cruisers were merely to replace the old ones and were not in addition to any allowed under the Treaty, 160 mil­ lion marks of the Air budget were to be spent chiefly on transforming one-motor aeroplanes into three-motor planes for purposes of safety, and on organising a modern system of night-flying which requires expensive lighting of aero­ dromes, etc,; 50 millions of marks were to be spent on the organisation for air protection, concrete pillars, etc," Phipps to Simon, 9 April 1934, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No, 382, 174 regard to the reaching of an arms agreement at all0 If so, this was a claim to act outright in disregard of the Peace 11 Treaty= The English Government were now cautiously draw­ ing closer to France8s point of vieWo The very same day in Geneva, Britain6s representa­ tive, Eden, had an interesting interview with Henderson, the President of the Disarmament Conference, concerning the proposed 28 May meeting of the General Commission. Eden said that what was of chief interest to His Majesty°s Govern­ ment was what was to happen to the British Memorandum between now and the proposed meeting. The British Government had still received no further reply from the French Government concerning the questions put to them earlier about their Memorandum. His Majesty8s Government wished to bring the French to the point, as well as prevent any further pos­ sible changes of position on the part of the Germany, and if nothing were to be done at Geneva until 23 May there would be only too ample opportunity for delay^on the part of France or changes in the German position. Eden forgot to mention that this was now all the more important if one

11. Simon to Tyrell, 10 April 1934. Ibid., second series, vi. Ho. 389. 12. Interview between Eden and Henderson, 11 April 1934. Ibid.. Enclosure. Ho. 390. 175 took into consideration the recently published German Military Budget„ On 16 April, the French representative at Geneva, Mo Massigli, told Eden that despite the announcement of the sharply increased defense budget of Germany, his Government was still in doubt as to the value of a disarmament con- 13 ventiono However, the dreaded blow came the very next day. On 17 April the final decision came and it brought to an end negotiations which had now been in progress for five monthsc Special com­ plaint was made by the French Government that Germany 1without waiting for the results of the negotiations which were still in progress, has wished to impose its determination to continue every form of rearmament within limits of which it claims to be the sole judge=6 ^ On 29 April the expected firm reactions of the German Government were clearly revealed to the English Ambassador in Berlino Ribbentrop, who, on 18 April had been appointed through Hitler as 11 Special Commissioner for Armaments Question,t$ plainly pointed out that the French had most unreasonably banged the door. Unless His Majesty's

13o Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press,”"l962) , 987 14, Ibid,. 99, Eden explained what action might have prevented this deadly French move: "A firm British offer of guarantees of execution might have tipped the scale, but we did not make it. The German attitude stif­ fened, following the French rejection of further negotia­ tions, " 176 Government could persuade the French Government to abandon their present attitude, he did not see how the negotiations could proceed. Phipps only replied that Germany6 s request for an immediate air force based on 50 percent of France8s was not so modest a demand as at first sight it appeared. A large proportion of the French air force consisted of what was described as ,8tin kettles,86 whereas naturally every aeroplane of the new German air force would be up to date and in every way efficient. That fact could not be ignored. Phipps then begged the question by suggesting: Would it not be possible for the German Government to join His Majesty8s Government in their reasonable and moderate attitude, thus setting a good example and contenting themselves with far fewer military aeroplanes than they originally demanded, for a limited time, within which strenuous efforts would be made to obtain the total abolition of military aircraft?15 The "Special Commissioner" promptly rejected the suggestion. Any such step would be. quite impossible. "Germany," he said, "had from the outset of the discussions put all her cards on the table: she had made her highly reasonable demands not in order to bargain, but merely to set forth her require- 16 ments for bare purposes of self-defence." Indeed, he

15. Phipps to Simon, 29 April 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 412. 16. Ibid. 177 strongly indicated that if no Convention were signed, Ger­ many's offer to accept modest percentages of her neighbours'

I . air forces would lapse and she would remain free from any limitation, Phipps informed the Foreign Office that he, "was unable to shake Herr von Ribbentrop in any way," That same afternoon Phipps called on- the German Foreign Minister, von Neurath, The latter said that it was absolutely hopeless, much less foolish to even expect France to accept the double operation of her own disarmament and German rearmament, In fact, disarmament itself was but an empty dream: Tell your Government that all now depends on them. They must show determination and courage, and again take the initiative, and all will yet be well, X know it is hard for them after all this time to have to confess that disarmament is still an empty dream, but all sensible people in England will recognize that f a c t , 18 Here was a questionable conclusion, Germany now suggested

17, Ibid, Eden evaluated Ribbentrop as follows: "Ribbentrop was essentially a saelsman and his ideas of statesmanship and diplomacy began and ended there, His task was to sell Hitler*s Government, but above all, Hitler, I never had cause to doubt , „ , that his methods would be completely ruthless. His tragic weakness, for himself and for his country, was that he could not understand. He had not the intellectual equipment to enable him to learn of other countries, , , , , He was without imagination and it was his instinct to run in blinkers. So that the one man who might have undeceived Hitler, toadied him," Eden, 99, 18, Ibid» 178 that the entire future success of the Disarmament Confer­ ence was to be totally dependent on Great Britain *s further initiative! England8s moral default had just about run its full deserved course0 On 30 April9 in a conversation with the Conference President in the Secretary of State's room at the House of Commons, Simon regretfully remarked that no answer had yet come from the French Government concerning the British Memorandumo And by refusing to answer Britain's questions, it was they who had thrown matters into confusion» Hender­ son then pointed out to the Foreign Secretary, that the French simply wanted a written declaration that His Majesty's 19 Government would stand loyally by the League of Nationso Only four days earlier in Paris, General Weygand of the French General Staff had told the British Military Adviser, Colonel Heywood, that Germany could not be trusted to observe faithfully any vital international undertakings„ Therefore, any limitation agreement, like the British Memo- 20 randum, "must necessarily place France at a disadvantage," It was also known to the French Government that Germany would very soon be able to field a force of twenty-eight divisions. In light of these factors, the French General

19, Conversation with Henderson in Secretary of State's Room at House of Commons, 20 April 1934, Ibid,, second series, vi. No, 414, 20, Campbell to Simon, 30 April 1934, Ibid,, second series, vi. Enclosure, No, 416, 179 was now all the more convinced that the only thing which could ensure peace would be the clear knowledge that Great Britain would definitely be at the side of France if Ger­ many attacked her. Furthermore, in the event of such a German attack, as in 1914, the position today, from a mili­ tary point of view was very much worse than in 1914, For now, even if the British Government made up its mind to join in the war a fortnight earlier than it did in 1914, it would take at least a month to draw up the plans and make the necessary arrangements = This delay would be very re- 21 grettable and might have serious consequences, On 3 May the German Foreign Minister issued a memorandum curiously stating that perhaps there was still some chance of a successful convention, "especially since there were really no longer any major differences between the proposals of the English Government = = , or the German 22 requests," Five days later in a conversation with Hender­ son, the British Foreign Secretary discoIsed the fact that the French Government were unable to make known the posi­ tion that they were likely to adopt at the forthcoming 28 May meeting of the General Commission at Geneva, However, the French stand might conceivably be that, not only was

21, Ibid, 22, Memorandum by von Neurath, 3 May 1934, German Foreign Policy, series G, ii. Mo, 435, 180 no progress being made with disarmament, but that Germany was rearming without consent; and that it was now essential, therefore, to combine, not for purposes of disarmament, but for purposes of security* Henderson then remarked that, based on information from Simon, it seemed that the present French policy would imply a complete reversal of the past decisions of the Conference* Eden, who also was attending this talk, confirmed that this was probably so, and that the grounds for such a reversal of French policy were due to illegal German rearmament* Henderson answered that if this was so, what had the French Government meant when they had agreed to the Declaration about equality of rights of 11 December 1932? Eden quickly replied that the French might now argue that German rearmament had destroyed all 23 possibility of security* During the early part of May, Ribbentrop was per­ sonally sent by Hitler to conduct further negotiations with the English* On 10 May he was accordingly received by Simon and Eden* Eden opened the discussion, remarking that it would be almost impossible to induce France to reduce her air force by granting Germany one half its strength* In any case, Eden flatly stated that "England would have to

...... — i . ■ 23* Conversation with Henderson in Secretary of State's Room in House of Commons, 8 May 1934* British Foreign Policy, second series, vi* No* 419* 181 o 24 embark on a considerable rearmament program in the air0" Eden then told the "Special Commissioner" that "frankly public opinion in England was distinctly uneasy as to Germany8s intentions» The Budget figures had made a bad impression and the public had also not failed to note the lack of any positive declaration of an intention to return 25 to the League„M At this point, Simon brought up the question of Germany8s Military Budget and its untimely publication--at a time when Great Britain had hoped to obtain from France a commitment with regards to guarantees of execution* Ribbentrop maintained that the French outcry over the German Budget was merely a "pretext *" Simon in turn, asked the "Special Commissioner" if his Government would go through with their Military Budget regardless of whether or not a convention was concluded* "To this, how- 26 ever, I did not give him the clear answer that he desired*" But Ribbentrop did mention to his hosts that if Geneva prov­ ed a failure, the idea of disarmament would be buried for good* Furthermore, Germany8s demands stood clear and un­ changed and represented a minimum which was backed up by the entire German people* Eden then remarked that it would be very difficult to come to any sort of disarmament decis­ ion at Geneva, "since no one knew in the least what France

24* Unsigned Memorandum by Ribbentrop, 10 May 1934* German Foreign Policy, series G, li* Ho* 443* 25* Minute by Eden, 10 May 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi* No* 421= 26= Unsigned Memorandum by Ribbentrop, 10 May 1934* German Foreign Policy, series G, li, No* 443* 182 27 was planning to do „11 However, possibly a new plan mu Id <- be the right thing in order to get the Disarmament Confer­ ence discussions going againo Ribbentrop in concluding the discussion, agreed with this last suggestion but cooly re­ peated that "the German demands were, of course, unalter- 28 able." No less encouraging was Ribbentrop6s 14 May inter­ view with Lord Stanhope of the Foreign Office— even though "there were really no longer any major differences between the proposals of the English Government . . . or the Ger­ man requests." On the questionable activities of the S.A. and S.S., the "Special Commissioner" said that because "young Germans6 feelings were circumscribed and their wishing to burst the bonds which had so long been imposed on them, His Majesty8s Government must overlook the matter when young Germans took part in night marches in order to 29 make themselves fitter." In a minute dealing with this interview, Stanhope, pointed out that, "It is worth re­ marking that night marches are amongst the most difficult

27. Ibid. . 28. Ibid. "We showed no sympathy with his views . . . . The interview ended coldly, for Ribbentrop, having repeated what he had come to say, was impervious to the views of others." Eden, 99. 29o Minute by Lord Stanhope, 14 May 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 424. 183 of military operations, and if they imply any more than marching at night along a road the performance of night marches reveals a high standard of military training and 30 efficiencyo M On 26 May the German Ambassador, Hoesch, called upon Simon in order to urge, on behalf of his Government, the expediency of adjourning the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, The former said that he had understood from Rib- bentrop that Simon had indicated such an adjournment might not be out of the question, and that Ribbentrop had upon this reported to Hitler, Simon then, much irritated, re­ marked that the "Special Commissioner" was quite mistaken in believing that he had ever given any encouragement to 31 the idea of adjournment. In fact, "Simon emphasized rather sharply he had not made one single statement to the German Commissioner for Disarmament from which the latter could have inferred that the English Government 32 would be able to go along with the idea of adjournment,V The Foreign Secretary'then pointed out Great Britain6s reasons for not advocating adjournment. He stressed in

30, Ibid, 31, Simon to Phipps, 26 May 1934, Ibid,, second series, vi, No, 432, 32, The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry, 27 May 1934, German Foreign Policy, series C, ii„ No, 467, 184 particular that British public opinion in its impatience ab out long fruitless negotaitions would not be content with a simple adjournment, but would demand real action in some direction or other. In addition, “adjournment would also meet with resistance from others since it would be widely 33 considered to be in the sole interest of Germany,“ Hoesch then remarked that his Governments proposal of an adjournment had been simply a suggestion with the pur­ pose of avoiding much more disagreeable developments, such as, for example, France's definite rejection of the idea of concluding a convention in order thereby to intimidate England by brusque rearmament measures and to push her in­ creasingly closer to the idea of an alliance and a final 34 estrangement from Germany,81 Simon took note of this German apprehension, only to point out that because of Germany's very absence from Geneva, the solution to the entire problem was made all the more difficult. On 28 May Simon flew to Geneva and joined Eden, for what proved to be the final meeting of the Disarmament 35 Conference, The “funeral services81 were held accord­ ingly when the General Commission assembled the following

33, Ibid, 34, Ibid, 35, Eden, 102, However, that afternoon Simon and Eden had a revealing conversation with Henderson:" “Mr, 185 day® The President of the Conference, in his opening speech, admitted that "the present situation of the Gonfer- 36 ence is really critical." He was followed by Norman Davis, the United States® delegate, who announced that America, although anxious to co-operate in the preserva­ tion of peace, would not participate in European political negotiations and settlements and would not make any commitment whatever to use its armed forces for the settlement of any dispute any­ where. In other words, the policy of the United States is to keep out of war, but to help in every possible way to discourage and prevent w a r . 37 The next day the British Foreign Secretary delivered his speech; The President has asked us for an expres­ sion of our views, but if speeches are to be

Eden asked how it was possible for any agreement to be reached in view of the fact that the French would not agree to any immediate German rearmament, while the Germans would not agree to a convention which failed to authorize some immediate German rearmament. Simon then brought up the fact which had to be faced; in his letter of 10 April he had given the French Government every opportunity of stating their requirements in the matter of security and they had failed to do so . . . . He himself was afraid that the French did not want an agreement at all. To the French mind security had nothing to do with disarmament. Security was only interesting to them to the extent to which it would assist them against Germany. If an attempt were made to combine security, with equality of rights, the French would have none of it. Their-attitude now was that under no cir­ cumstances would they agree to German rearmament." Con­ versation between Simon, Eden, and Henderson at Hotel de la Paix, 28 and 30 May 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. Enclosure. No. 434. 36, Ibid. 37. Ibid. 186 useful they must deal with the realities which now face us. The essential fact is this: Last November the Bureau of the Disarmament Confer­ ence unanimously decided that the work of the Conference must be suspended for a period in order to permit of parallel and supplementary efforts being carried on between different States, mainly through the diplomatic channel. His Majesty8s Government in the United King­ dom have, during the last six months, been very closely associated with these efforts. I would recall to your attention-- (1) the United Kingdom memorandum of the 29th January, (2) the visits of my colleague, Mr. Eden, to Paris, Berlin and Borne, (3) the written statement textually approved by the German Government which we obtained of the modifications in our memorandum, which Germany was prepared to accept, and which included the concession to heavily armed Powers that there should be nb dis­ armament for the first five years of a ten-year convention, and (4) the efforts which we have made to ascertain whether there were any conditions in which this combination of proposals could be made the basis of agreement. . . . But these efforts have not produced a new basis of agreement, and the President pointed out to the Bureau the day before yesterday--I quote his words— that, 8in view of the opinion expressed in the French memorandum of the 17th April, it seemed that the diplomatic negotiations between the Powers could hardly be carried on any further.6 In its statement of views of the 16th April the German Government defines the rearmament for which it stipulates in the proposed Convention, at the same time declaring that it would agree to the postponement of the redactions of armaments of other Powers until the end of the fifth year of a ten years8 convention. If, therefore, an in­ ternational agreement is to be reached, either this claim must be modified, or this claim must be conceded. We may hold the view that Germany8 s withdrawal from the Conference was unjustified, and that her action since that time about arma­ ments has yet further aggravated the situation— but all that does not alter the issue to be de­ termined. If we really desire to do business in 187 the Disarmament Conference, it is essential that this issue should be faced and dealt with now by those principally concerned,, Germany claims that the Convention, if it follows the general lines which have already been approved by the vote of the General Commission, should accept a level of German armament, higher than that provided in the Peace Treaties to the extent indicated in the document of the 16th April„ The question;; is— is that a possible basis of international agreement ? On the other hand, it appears from the docu­ ments which have been exchanged in the course of these diplomatic communications that France would desire to stand fast by the limits sug­ gested at the meeting of the Bureau on the 14th October last. . . . unless it is possible for the Confer­ ence to agree upon suggestions such as those in the Memorandum or something very like them, then I do not myself believe that a Disarmament Convention can be realised. He have to choose between the chance that remains of agreement on the lines 1 have above indicated and a breakdown in the whole of this Vast effort, with the con­ sequences of an unlimited competition in armaments and dangers to the future of the world which no man can measure. The time is long past when we can delude ourselves into imagining that by a pious expression of our desire to reach agree­ ment we are promoting agreement. While we talk, the world does not stand still. His Majesty8 s Government are prepared to de­ vote all their energy and weight to bringing about general international agreement on the subject of armaments if such agreement is in existing circumstances in any way possible to be achieved. But while we will still co-operate in any new effort which really contains prospects of producing general agreement, there is one thing which we will not do. Me will not lend ourselves to the indefinite continuance of vague and in­ conclusive discussions justified by nothing better than the sanguine hope that after all something in the way of a solution may still turn up. 1 sum up the position of His Majesty8s Government by declaring that while there can be no justification for going on in a spirit of pious and undefined optimism, there is the most (.

188 urgent need of deciding now what we can do and doing it without delay. We must introduce some realism into our idealism, and we owe it to our­ selves and to one another, „ , , to contribute the most candid expression of our views at this most critical juncture,38 Mo Barthou then immediately followed the British 39 Foreign Secretary administering all but the %ast rites o'* The speech was a stern warning that France would consider only her own interests and an emotional attack on Germany and on the British Foreign Secretary, with a thrust or two for Henderson, Barthou referred to Simon8 s speech of 14 October last, in which the Foreign Secre­ tary had opposed immediate German rearmament, and wanted to know why Germany* s withdrawal from the Conference and League should make that position untenable, Barthou in closing drew attention to German Budget estimates. Who threatens Germany? Not France,40 Some hours later, Henderson, stunned, told Simon and Eden that if M, Barthou* s speech represented the final French attitude, further discussion at any rate at the pres ent was quite useless. Taking into consideration the

38, Speech of Simon in the General Commission, 30 May 1934, British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No, 436, 39, ifM, Barthou*s speech outpaced my worst fears. Appallingly witty at the expense of his allies, at its close, his audience was either convulsed with laughter or suspended in horror, according to mood and sense of responsi bility , . , , As I wrote in my diary that night: * It will be grand material for our isolationists at home, and almost converted me into one,811 Eden, 103, 40, Ibid, 189 divergence of view that had been made evident that morning, the President of the Conference said he was now ready to announce that a few weeks interval was needed, during which he would himself take soundings in various quarters and then a definite decision would have to be reached whether to close down the Conference altogether« Both Simon and Eden agreed that some immediate drastic action of this 41 sort was called forc On 31 May in a broadcast from Geneva, Eden summed up the conclusion to be drawn from M. Barthou's speech the day before: "There were no guarantees which would enable France to legalize any immediate German rearmament, without 42 which the German Government would not sign the Convention.n The Foreign Secretary and Eden could do little else but responsibly face reality: Simon left Geneva two days later j^2 June] and I stayed behind to see what could be done to pick up the pieces . « . = It seemed to me that the hope of an arms agreement was now so remote as to count for little in our councils. I be­ came, in consequence, the more concerned about our own defences.43 On 2 June Eden sent home the following telegram: It is Mr. Henderson8s present intention to try to secure from the Bureau authority to

41. Patteson to Vansittart, 31 May 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 437. 42. Eden, 104. 43. Ibid., 106. 190 enable him to do what he can to overcome the present Franco-German differences suspending activities of Converence meanwhilee Person­ ally I do not believe French and German posi­ tions can be reconciled at present at any rate. ^ Two days later the Bureau sat for more than four hours and failed to reach any agreement as to the future of the Conference. Even an attempt to secure agreement upon composition of the drafting committee, in addition to mak­ ing proposals for some sort of future, work of the Conference failed completely. After this fruitless sitting, Henderson, quite dejected, told Eden privately that he was now con­ vinced that the French did not wish for success of the Conference as at present constituted; still less for the return of Germany to it. Furthermore, the French Govern­ ment cared nothing for disarmament and their sole ambition was the use of the Disarmament Conference for their own 45 security proposals designed to encircle Germany. After this discouraging talk with the President, Eden was soon approached by Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Secretary and leader of the "neutral" group at Geneva. He asked Eden if the British Government was prepared to go beyond pro­ posals in their 29 January Memorandum in respect to

44. Patteson to Simon, 2 June 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 440. 45. Patteson to Simon, 5 June 1934. Ibid., second series, vi. No. 441. 191 guarantees of execution, Unless they were, Sandler felt that there was no possibility of agreement as yet between the Great Powers, Eden then replied that M, Barthou had made it quite clear on 30 May that no guarantees of execu­ tion would make it possible for France to agree to any im- 46 mediate rearmament of Germany, That evening the British representative wrote of his immediate impressions: We are probably in the closing days of the Conference, While opinion generally appreciates the extent of our efforts, doubts as to our at­ titude to the guarantees of execution are one ground of criticism which can be urged against us , , , , I am extremely anxious that we should emerge from the closing stages of the Conference, if such they be, without reproach,47 On 7 June, in connection with a speech Eden was to deliver the following day before the Conference, Simon ex­ tended from London a Hguiding thread,91 He urged his colleague to put before the Bureau the notion that it would be perfectly useless to consider supervision, guarantees of execution or kindred subjects unless there was a Disarmament Convention to which these matters could be applied. Fur­ thermore, it was the withdrawal of Germany from the Con­ ference and the League which had rendered infinitely harder and perhaps even impossible the progress in the work of disarmament. For this very reason, the Foreign Secretary

46, Patteson to Simon, 5 June 1934, Ibid,, second series, No, 442, 47, Ibid, 192 urged Eden to insist on behalf of His Majesty's Government that it was now completely out of the question to resume further discussion of French topics unless some prospect of ultimate success could be assured by the return of Ger­ many "to her place at the Disarmament Conference, which in the opinion of His Majesty's Government she was not justi- 48 fied in quitting," Simon further stated that if Germany still refused to return there would be no possible hope in ever getting on with the international regulation of arma­ ments 0 The responsibility therefore would and must be hers: You will see that the object of my sug­ gestions is to avoid the appearance of wrang­ ling at Geneva while Germany, on whose shoul­ ders the main responsibility rests, looks on and profits. For' it would not be in the in­ terests of this country to remain handicapped in self-protection by a continuing but fruitless discussion, while a rapidly and ominously re­ arming Germany continues on her course,^ That very same day Hitler gave orders "that until further notice there should be no public statements on the dis­ armament question, either orally or in writing, by prominent persons. Matters must now be kept quiet in this field for 50 a certain period,H

48, Simon to Patteson, 7 June 1934, Ibid, second series, vi. Ho, 443, 49, Ibid, 50, Memorandum by an Official of Department II, 7 June 1934, German Foreign Policy, series C, ii. Ho, 487, 193 Four days later in a conversation with the British Military Adviser, Colonel Heywood, the Chief of the French General Staff, General Gamelin, stated that the progress of German rearmament was such that he now believed that by 1935 Germany would be able to mobilise an army of 100 divis­ ions: nSuch an army would enable Germany to fight an of­ fensive war on the Polish or Czechoslovakia!fronts, or both, or to attack on the Western front on a 250 km front 51 o o o o $i On 13 June Hitler8s final official position re­ garding the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations was announced by von Bulow, the German Secretary of State: The disarmament negotiations of Geneva have, in our view, contributed nothing to the solution of the difficulties which stand in the way of an agreement in the disarmament question» It has been once more demonstrated at Geneva that real progress cannot be made without settling the quest ion of equality of rights which cannot be achieved by negotiations at a conference. The resumption of discussions at Geneva, which France so strongly promoted, has led as we anticipated to a hardening of the situation: M= Barthou himself with his outbursts against Germany has done anything but prepare the ground for an understandingo A return to the conference can be considered by Germany only if the realization of equality of rights is secured . . . . We are of course willing, now as before, to negotiate about it. In doing so, however, we cannot yield anything further from our demands for the adjustment of our armament position to that of other

51. Clark to Simon, 14 June 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. Enclosure. No. 456. • 194 countries, since in the course of the direct talks of the last months, from which we had hoped for an understanding, we had already reached the limit of our concessions „ s .<> « In the question of the League of Nations our positions remain unchanged, „ . „ , All rumors to the effect that we are already carrying on talks regarding our return to the League of Nations are without foundations <>52 On 20 June the British Ambassador at Rome informed his Government of a further example of Germany"s final posi- 53 tion regarding disarmament 0 On 3 July His Majesty*s Gov­ ernment were informed that all activities in any way connected with national defense in Germany had been declared secret. And that any German citizen caught indulging in any sort of

description ot explanation of his work would pay the penalty 54 of those committing high treason. Nonetheless, informa­ tion regarding prohibited arms revealed that there had been

52. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 13 June 1934, German Foreign Policy, series G, ii„ ' No. 506. 53. In Venice on 19 June, Hitler met Mussolini for the first time. Aside from Hitler * s ’’weak tears, ” the Chancellor repeated to "II Duee11 his well known demand that the French could keep their present superiority in offensive weapons if Germany would be allowed immediate defensive armaments. When the Italian Ambassador remarked to von Keurath that this was all very well but that mean­ while, wasn't Germany rearming very fast? "Von Neurath replied that such rearmament was within the limits of defensive arm— laid down by Herr Hitler but he added Ger­ many would not reduce her demands by one man or by one rifle.n Drummond to Simon, 20 June 1934. British Foreign Policy, second series, vi. No. 462. 54e Colonel Thome to Phipps, 3 July 1934. Ibid., second series, vi. Enclosure, No. 483. 195 in Germany a gradual systematic formation of cadres, of experimental units at first, of special schools of instruc­ tion later, and more recently of actual units. Furthermore, German motor manufacturers are busily engaged in producing suitable types of engines, systems -of suspension, wheels and tracks, which can be applied to the production of the new German tank. Standardization is being enforced in the component parts of mechanised vehicles of all types, o o o o-5-5 Ten days later Churchill stood before the House of Commons to say that he had heard enough: I am very glad that the Disarmament Confer­ ence is passing out of life into history. One of the greatest mistakes that can be made is to o . o mix up disarmament with peace. When you have peace you will have disarmament . . . there is no greater danger £to peace^ than equal forces. If you wish to bring about war, you bring about such an equipoise that both sides think they have a chance of winning. If you want to stop war, you gather such an aggregation of force on the side of peace that the aggressor, whoever he may be, will not dare to challenge.56

55. Ibid. 56= Winston S. Churchill, While England Slept 1932-1938 (New York: G. P. Putnam'sSons, 193877 123. CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, one can see that international law and its interpretation was a fundamental problem that con­ fronted disarmamento Germany, from the earliest, maintained that the Preamble to Part V of the Versailles Treaty im­ plied similar Allied disarmament "in order to render pos­ sible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations 0 « <, Although Germany believed she had every reason to expect Allied disarmament in the near future, the Allies, nevertheless, allowed themselves the legal prerogative in deciding when such an "expected" step should occuro However, when Glemenceau at the peace table finally agreed to the demilitarization of the Rhineland in exchange for American and British guarantees, the French "security-seekers*11 were satisfied* But when some months later the United States and Great Britain both withdrew from the Triple Guarantee, France felt that from this time on her security lay in her armaments--and to disarm in view of her isolated position would be suicidal* Thus, France, as early as 1920, unlike disarmament-minded England, was adverse to carrying out her implied obligation according to the Preamble of Part V. This French reluctance 196 197 Increased further German post-Mar frustration,. The Treaty of Locarno in 1926 did little to allevi­ ate French fears* Although illegal German rearmament was well known to England and France by 1924, it is quite probable that this infraction did not disturb the French as much as their old fears of a powerful, industrialized, and strongly populated, Prussian Germany = On the contrary, it is also just as probable that German rearmament was to the French by 1926 a potential manifestation of previous French fears* However, Briand and the French Government were wil­ ling to overlook this last thesis in favor of Austen Chamberlain6s more prudent and realistic approach at Locarno* It is sometimes contended that Great Britain and France chose to overlook illegal German rearmament in 1926 in hopes of appeasing the more important German grievances which would make Germany more willing to turn to arms* Although the Treaty of Locarno granted Germany the status of an exonerated nation in the League, in addition to securing her mutual guarantees of defence, German illegal rearmament persisted apace* British "realism" and French "appeasement" had not come to grips with the paramount German frustration: the "illegality" of German rearmament as stipulated in Part V of the Versailles Treaty* Apparent­ ly, the German frustrations satisfied at Locarno did not 198 take into account Germany0 s most important grievance,, The ill-defined Preamble to Part V and France's literal reading of the provision, were to further obstruct all future British efforts to meet Germany's principal grievance0 By the middle of 1932, republicanism in Ger­ many was for all practical purposes dead--while illegal rearmament was very much alive„ France, acutely aware of Germany's infraction more than ever before, was slowly beginning to feel the repercussions of the depression= Disarmed England, having considered earlier the urgent need of an arms agreement, suggested a Disarmament Conference at Geneva in early February. Four months later, von Papen, in accordance with the Preamble to Part V, demanded equality of rights, i.e. the legal right to rearm, for Germany. By July, Germany saw fit to quit the Disarmament Conference. On 11 December a Declaration was drawn up by Great Brit­ ain, France and Germany as a basis for granting equality of rights to the latter— but only "within a system of security.89 Although Germany soon returned to the Confer­ ence, she nevertheless continued to undermine this essential "French condition" by rearming further--while at the same time demanding that the Declaration must immediately lead to the actual granting of equality of rights! France was forever reminding Great Britain that Germany's con­ tinual rearmament was violating the "system of security" 199 stipulation and therefore Germany8 s grievance could not be legally satisfiedo England, meaning well, continued to downplay both France8s warnings and Germany8s persistent infractionso By 30 January 1933, Part V of the Versailles Treaty, in addition to the Five Power Declaration of. 11 December 1932 were both meaningless--only German rearmament and Hitler were meaningful. In June 1933, the Disarmament Conference adjourned until October because of the failure of the second reading of the MacDonald Plan, In the meantime, the British Ambas­ sador to Berlin, Rumbold, was constantly warning the Foreign Office of the futility in appeasing Hitler, The Ambassador8s admonitions stemmed from his personal observations of Hit­ ler8 s Mein Kampf being ruthlessly manifested throughout the Reich, On 10 May Brigadier General A, C, Temperley submitted his revealing memorandum on Germany and Disarma­ ment , This document was the most critical appraisal yet submitted concerning the state of Germany8s expanding, illegal rearmament activities. When Hitler told the world seven days later that unless Germany was granted full equality of rights in respect to arms, he would take Germany not only out of the Conference but the League of , Nations as well |which he did on 14 Octoberjj , the British Government could only reply by submitting in January 1934 another document of appeasement. In the face of illegal 200 German rearmament and increasing French hostility towards any disarmament plan suggesting the reduction of France8s only guarantee, her army--one may say that from 10 May 1933 until 2 September 1939, His Majesty8 s Government pursued a foreign policy of irresponsible appeasement: 81 To see danger, however, is not enough; one must be prepared to do something extremely unpleasant about it, and it is just 1 there that as a nation Great Britain failed =88 By January 1934 France was confronted with great economic ills and a divided government racked with scandals. The Stavisky Affair and the accompanying riots of 6 February not only undermined France’s parliamentary system, but brought about a foreign policy, confused and devoid of any crucial weight. Her consistent party changes in Government rendered ministers unable to hold office long enough to grasp the complicated but essential, rapid developments in foreign affairs. France’s contributions in the last months of the Disarmament Conference were completely negative. She would not budge from her 14 October 1933 posi­ tion- -an arrangement which Germany absolutely refused to recognize, much less accept--while regularly placing before the British dossiers warning of Germany1s continual state

1. Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession (London: Hutchinson, 1958), 507. 201 of illegal armamentso Like frightened householders who hear a burglar below, the British and French Govern­ ments discussed what preventative measures they should take, picked up a poker :and then put it down again, shouted downstairs that if the burglar did not make off, they would fall upon him, or at least call the police; even considered parleying with him, perhaps pro­ posing that if he left the fish knives, they saw no objection to his taking other cutlery in reason; at last, fell back on deriving what comfort they might from the thought that at any rate he did not know the formula for opening the safe02 1 in the last analysis, the failure of the Disarmament Conference in June 1934 was due largely to Great Britain’s irresponsible appeasement after 1933 and France’s political disintegration by 1934 as an effective instrument of for­ eign policy— in the face of illegal German rearmament and Hitlero

2 0 Malcolm Muggeridge, The Sun Never Sets: The Story of England in the Nineteen Thirties (Hew York: Random House, 1940), 346o BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Dalton, Hugh, The Fateful Years» London: Muller, 1957„ Eden, Anthony, Facing the Dictators0 Cambridge, Massa­ chusetts: 'The Riverside Press, 1962, Francois-Pdncet, Andre, The Fateful Years: Memoirs of a French Ambassador in Berlin. 1931-1938, New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1949, Hesse, Fritz, Hitler and the English, London: Wingate, 1954, " ™ Jones, Thomas, A Diary with Letters 1931-1950, London: Oxford Uniyersity Press,1954, Petrie, Sir Charles A, The Life and Letters of the Right Honorable Sir Austeh Chamberlain, 2 Vols, London: Cassell,1939-1940, Simon, John A,, 1st Viscount Retrospect, London: Hutchinson, 1952, Sutton, Eric,' Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries. Letters, and Papers = New York: Macmillan, 1935, Vol, 1, Vansittart, Lord, The Mist Procession, London: Hutchin­ son, 1958, .

Secondary Works: British and Diplomat ic Hist ory

Angell, Norman, Peace with the Dictators? London: Harper, 1938, '...... Carr, Edward H, Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Treaty of Versailles to the Outbreak of the War, New York: Longmans, 1939, , The Twenty Years8 Crisis. 1919-1939, London: Macmillan, 1940, Churchill, Winston. S, The Gathering Storm, Boston: Houghton. Mifflin, 1948, 204 Craig, Gordon A 0 and Gilbert, Felix (edso)0 The Princeton, Mew Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953 Einzig, .Paulo Ann easement Before „ During, and After the War« London; Macmillan, 1942» Furnia, Arthur H „ The Diplomacv o f Apneaseaent; Analo- French Relations and^the Prelude to World War 11, 1931-1938o Washington: University Press, 1960» Gilbert,- Martin and Gott, Richard0 The Appeasers. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 19630 Hogan, Willard No Xnternational Conflict and Collective Securityo Kentucky:University"of Kentucky Press, 1955 „

Jordan 9 Mo- ‘Mo 'Gn+aair Tartr! ‘hh& Problemo. London: Oxford University Press, 1943 Kennedy, John F o New York: Funk, 1940 Lederer," Ivo. J0 (ed0)0 The Versailles Settlement: Was It Fordoomed to Failure? Bdstdn.: D0 Co Heath, 1960o McElwee, William0 Britain’s Locust Years. 1918-19400 London: Faberand Faber, 1962= Namier, L0 B„ Europe in Decay 1936-19400 Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 19630 Raymond, John (ed«)» The Baldwin Agea London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 19600 Rowse, A0 Lo All Souls and Appeasement» London: Mac­ millan, 19610 * The End of An Epoch* London: Macmillan, 1947e Set on-Wat son, Robert ¥«, Britain and the Dictators* Mew York: Macmillan, 19387 Shotwell, James To and SaIvin, Marinae Lesson on Security andDisarmament: From the History of the Leagueof Nations * Mew York: King’s Grown Press, 19490 Taylor, A* J« P0 The.Origins of the Second World Waro London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961, 205 The Trouble Makers— Dissent over Foreign Policy. 1792-1939oLondon: Hamish. Hamilton, 1957„ Toynbee, Ao Jo Survey of International Affairs 1932-19330 London: Oxford University Press, 1933-19340 Year Book of the Disarmament Information Committee 1932o Geneva: Office of Disarmament:, 1933 „

Secondary Works: Germany

Bullock, Alan0 Hitler: A Study in Tyranny0 New York: Harper, 19530 Clark, Ro T» The Fall of the German Republic0 New York: Russell and Russell, 19640 Craig, Gordon A; The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640- 1945o NewYork: OxfordUhiversity Press, 19561 Dawson, William Harbutt 0 Germany Under the Treaty0 London: George Allen and Unwin, 1933„ Hi1Ison, Normano I Speak of Germany: A Plea for Anglo- German Friendshipo London: George Routledge and Sons, 1937„ Laurie, Arthur P„ The Case for Germany0 Berlin: Inter- nalionaler ^erlasl 19390 Lutz, Hermanno German-French Unity Basis For European Peace0 Chicago: Henry Regnery, 19570 Turner, Henry Ashby, Jr0 Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic0 New Jersey: Princeton Uhiversity Press, 1963o

Whittlesey, Derwent S0 et0 a l l New York: Farrar, 1942„ Williams, Wythe0- Riddle of the Reich» New York: Prentice- Hall, 19410...... '.. ' 206 Secondary Works: General Studies

Banse,. Ewaldo Germany Prepares for War: A Nazi Theory of "National Defehseo" New”YofEl Harcourt, Brace

. 1934 „ ...... :...... ' Butler, HaroId0 The Lost Peacec New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942T ^ ^ Butler, Rohan B 80o The Roots of National Socialism 1783- 1933o London: Faber and Faber, 19410

Churchill, Winston Bo Amid These Storms: Thoughts and Adventures0 -Nw York: Charles Scribner8s Sons, 19327 Cranston, Alan MacGregor„ The Killing of the Peaceo New York: The Viking Press, 19450

Ebray, Alcideo A Frenchman Looks at the Peace* London: Regan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 19270 Felling, Keith0 The Life of Neville Chamberlain* London: Macmillan, 1946* Goddard, Sir Victor* The Enigma of Menace* London: Stevens and Sons, 1959* Greenwood, H* Powys* The German Revolution* London: George Routledge and Sons, 1934* Grimm, Frederick* The Significance of This War* Berlin: Terramare Office, 1940* « Versa!lies in Liouidat ion * Berlin: Terramare Office, 1938* Hayter, Sir William* The Diplomacy of the Great Powers* London: Hamish Hamilton, 1959* Heinz, Heinz A* Germany8s Hitler* London: Hurst and Blackett, 1934* Hinsley, F* H* Power and the Pursuit of Peace* Cambridge: The University Press, 1963* Jessup, Phillip C* The International Problem of Governing Mankind. Claremont, California: Grant Dahlstrom, 1947* 207 Kohn«, Hanso Making of the Modern French Mind. New York: Do Van Nostrand9 1955= Micaud, Charles A 0 The French Right and Nazi Germany. Durham, North Carolina: Durham University Press, 1943 o Miller, Doug® You Can81 Do Business With Hitler,, Boston: Little, Brown, -1941 o Minshall, Colonel To H® What to Do With Germany® London: George Allen and Unwin,194I® Muggeridge, Malcolm® The Sun Never Sets: The Story of England in the Nineteen Thirtieso _New York: Random House, 1940„ Orton, Wiiliam0 Twenty Years8 Armisticeo New York: Farrar and Rinehart,. 1938 e Pinson, Kpppel S c Modern Germany: Its History and Civiliza­ tion ® New York: Macmillan, 19540 Rauschning, Hermann0 The Revolution of Nihilism: Warning to the West * New York: Longmans, Green, 19390 Roberts, Bechhofer® Stanley Baldwin: Man or Miracle? New York: Greenburg, 1937® Schwary, Dr® Paul® This Man Ribbentrop® New York: Julian Messner, 1943® Shotwell, James T® On the Rim of the Abyss® New York: Macmillan, 1936® ® What Germany Forgot® New York: Macmillan, 1940® Steffs, Johann Peter® Disarmament® Kohn: Gilde-Verlag, 1933® Stirk, S® D® The Prussian Spirit 1914-1940® London: Faber arid Faber, 1941® Taylor, A® J® P® The Course of German History® New York: Coward-MeGann, 1946® ’ Toynbee and von Rheinhaben® The Treaty of Versailles and After® New York: Oxford Press, 1935® 208 Wegerer, Alfred von0 A Refutation of the Versailles War Guilt Thesiso New York:Alfred A 0 Knopf, 19307 Merth, Alexandere France in Ferment„ London: Jarrolds Publishers, 1935o

Wright, Gordono France in Modem Timeso Chicago: Rand McNally, 19607 Young, Go Mo Stanley Baldwin0 London: Rupert Hart-Davis,

1952o ';" ': ...... Ziff, William B«, The Gentlemen Talk of Peace0 New York: Macmillan, 1944 0

Articles

Angell, Nomano . "Why the Disarmament Deadlock?15 Nine- lemtii^ntur^. Vol. 116 (July, 1934), 16-28o Chelwood, Viscount Cecil of, and Davis, Norman H0 ’’Disamament and Texts of Official Documents,11 International Goneiliator» Volo 285 (December, 1932), '459-525 o.... Cohen, Bernard Lande. "Can the Germans Rightfully R e a m ? North American Review, Vol0 237 (March, 1934), 224- 231=.... "Disamament Conference Fights For Life." The Literary Digest. Volo 112 (16 June 1934), 14= Dulles, Allen W= "Gemany and The Crises in Disarmament,,s Foreign Affairs. Vol= 12 (January, 1934), 260-270» Fuller, Jo Fo C0 ^Disarmament arid Delusion," Current History. Vo1= 36 (September,1932), 649-654= Kennedy, J= R= "Disarmament and The British Plan,11 Nineteenth Century. Vol= 113 (May, 1933), 568-575= Nevins, Allen= "The Breakdown at Geneva," Current History. Volo 39 (January, 1934), 449-452= Soloveytchik, George = "Ms Barthou8s Foreign Policy,15 Nineteenth Century, Vol= 116 (August, 1934), 141-

i5io"'m”'...... • ■ 209 Steeds Wickhamo "Peace or War: Is There a British Policy?" The Contemporary Review, Vol, 144 (December, 1933), 641-650 o...... •.*..... Stone, Shepard. "The Reaming of Germany," Current History, Vol. 39 (December, 1933), 295-301. White, Freda. "The Deadlock in Disarmament," Nineteenth Century„ Vol. 115 (May, 1934), 485-495.