Aristide and the Briand, Gustav Stresemann Unity of Europe

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Aristide and the Briand, Gustav Stresemann Unity of Europe EUROPEAN STUDIES teachers' series 9 . ·: .. ::RegioJUil: ·problems in Britain and the EEC ·.. ·. ·. Al'istich ·Jiriud, ·Gtlstav Stresemann · · · ...... the r$lty ·or Europe '· ' ' ' ' I . ' . .··•··.· .· Nonlic Jiltegratlon after World War ll · · ·Teaching.. ·EBope in British schools Published unde,. the auspices of the Centre to,. Contemporary European Studies, University ol Sussex In association with the £u.-opean Oommunity Information Sert~ice European Studies, 9, 1970. Aristide Briand, Gustav Stresemann and the unity of Europe Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann formulated proposals for a united federal Europe as early as the late 1920's and early 1930's at a time when Europe was threatened by fascism and the world economic depression. They served as an inspiration to resistance leaders and as an intellectual point of departure for the post-war fathers of Europe. Aristide Briand, born at Nantes in 1862, and and in 1907 at the age of twenty-nine he was elected Gustav Stresemann, born in Berlin in 1878, had one to the Reichstag for the first time. thing in common from the beginning, they were both sons of innkeepers. Their early careers were, however, very different. Briand studied law in Paris, where he The war of 1914-1918 very much identified himself with socialist politics. Together with Jean Jaures he founded "L'Huma­ Both men supported the war, Stresemann more nite." At this time he was very far to the Left and at enthusiastically than Briand. Stresemann at that time the Nantes conference of the socialist party in 1894 was one of the National Liberals of whom it could he secured the adoption of the idea of the General truly be said that they were more national than Strike. His acceptance of a ministry in 1906 brought liberal. His support of the "annexationist" claims of about his inevitable exclusion from the socialist party the High Command was very popular within his still wedded to the idea of no co-operation with the own party and in 1917 Stresemann became Chair­ bourgeois state. In the classic French tradition he man of the Parliamentary Party though not of the then moved steadily to the right. In 1909 Clemenceau nationa,l party organisation. fell from power and Briand became Prime Minister for the first time. He was to hold the office ten times in all. The post-war world Stresemann's rise though meteoric by the standards of Imperial Germany was much slower. After three The careeTs of both men suffered a temporary and a half years at the Universities of Berlin and eclipse in the immediate post-war period. Briand had Leipzig, he completed his Doctorate in 1900 with a been displaced by Clemenceau in 1917 and he took dissertation on the Berlin beer industry. Having little part in French public life again until 1921. decided upon a career in business he then accepted a Stresemann's fall, identified as he had been with the post as assistant to the chairman of the German goals of the militarists, was more far-reaching. He chocolate makers' union in Dresden. Within a few was excluded from the Democratic Party, the first years he had made an outstanding success of this successor party to the National Liberals. He then ventUTe. In 1903 he joined the National Liberal Party promptly set up a party of his own, the German 1 Peoples Party, the D.V.P. Between 1918 and 1923 he which was accepted in 1926. In the same year Briand, remained a monarchist and carried on an essentially Stresemann and Chamberlain were jointly awarded nationalist opposition to the Weimar Republic. the Nobel Prize for Peace. especially after the signature of the Ver~sailles Treaty. In 1920, for instance, he was prepared to support the Kapp Putsch which overthrew the legitimate government. Gradually he came to realise that the Briand's proposals for a "federal bond" Republic was a necessity, mainly through his expe­ rience as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Com­ The background to the Briand proposal<S was mittee of the Reichstag. He became what was often provided by the cordial nature of Franco-German called a "Vemunftrepublikaner"-a republican in relations and the ideas of Count Coudenhove­ mind if not in heart. Calergi. Coudenhove-Calergi published his book Immediately after taking office as Chancellor in "Pan-Europa" in 1923 and very quickly became October 1923 Stresemann was faced with a grave intimate with Herriot and Briand. Herriot espoused crisis in Franco-German relations, due to the con­ the idea of a United States of Europe as early as 1925. tinued French occupation of the Ruhr. Stresemann, despite the nationalist nature of his past and much Briand became converted more slowly but at the of his support, decided to abandon the policy of meeting of the League Council in Madrid-in June passive resistance ~to the French. While this step cost 1929- he talked over the idea of an initiative in this him the Chancellorship he was retained as Foreign direction with Stresemann. Briand announced his Minister and the decision proved to be the beginning project on 5 September 1929 at the lOth session of the end of the Ruhr crisis. New elections brought of the League of Nations assembly. Briand spoke men of the moderate Left, Herriot in France and with the two-fold authority of his personal prestige MacDonald in Britain, to office. In the new climate and of his position as French foreign minister when the Locamo agreement was signed in October 1925. he said: "I ,fuink that among peoples constituting geo­ Locamo graphical groups like the peoples of Europe, there should be some kind of federal bond; it should be The Locamo agreement was a high point in the possible for them to get in touch at any time, history of interwar Europe and was felt at the time to confer about their interests, to agree on joint to have ushered in a new era. The essence of the resolutions and to establish amongst themselves agreement was to provide a solution to the Franco­ a bond of solidarity which will enable them, if German problem. It was an ingenious solution that need be, to meet any grave emergency that might reconciled the French desire for security with the arise. This is the link I want to forge. Obviously, German wish for the recovery of a place in the this association will be primarily economic, for community of Europe; Britain and Italy were to act that is the most urgent aspect of the question, as guarantors not of France, of Belgium or of and I think we may look for success in that Germany, but of the frontiers between the first two direction. Still, I am convinced that, politically and the last. While the treaty thus guaranteed and socially also, this federal <link might without Germany's western frontier, it did not do so in the affecting the sovereignty of any of the nations East where Stresemann refused to enter into any belonging to such an association do useful work; engagements. It did, however, usher in a new era of and I propose during this session to ask those Franco-German unity, the more especially since one of my colleagues who here represent European of the preconditions for France had been German nations to be good enough to consider this renunciation of her claims on Alsace-Lorraine. question unofficially and to submit it to their Stresemann, like Adenauer later in relation to the governments for examination, so that these Saar, accepted this without demur since the terri­ possibilities which I see in the suggestion may tories were lost in any case. In the new climate of be translated into realities later." friendship, Briand was one of the prime movers of the German candidacy of the League of Nations, Briand's proposal was supported by Stresemann 2 who characteristically supported Briand's speech a federation elastic enough to respect the independ­ while attacking the Versailles settlement. ence and national sovereignty of each while guaran­ teeing to all the benefits of collective solidarity." "Why should the idea of uniting all the elements that can bring the countries of Europe together 3. ~~The principle that the economic organisation be impossible ? ... I absolutely reject any politi­ of Europe should be directed towards ... a rap­ cal ideas directed against other continents and prochement of the European economic systems anything that could be interpreted as an eco­ effected under the political supervision of the gov­ nomic autarchy of Europe, but it does seem to ernments acting in concert." me that a great deal has not been done that M. Briand, or perhaps the anonymous drafters at could still be done. How many things there the Quay d'Orsay, were at pains to forestall two are that appear so extraordinarily arbitrary possible criticisms that the plans might interfere with about Europe and its construction from the eco­ the sovereign independence of states and the func­ nomic point of view ... The Treaty of Versailles tions of the League of Nations. has created a large number of new states. I do not propose to discuss the political aspects of The proposed federation then was to be a moral the Treaty of Versailles; I assume that my views union of Europe based upon the existence of the on it are known. But I should like to emphasize solidarity established between the states of Europe. the economic aspect and say that this treaty, The participating states were not required to sur­ while creating a large number of new states, render any powers to the federal authority, but were entirely ignores the question of their incorpora­ merely to undertake to get into touch regularly in tion in the general economic system of order to examine in common all questions likely to Europe.
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