Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

The Battle for Benghazi WP The Limits of Stabilization by Military Means

Nizar Sarieldin S

After being on the sidelines of the transition process for more than two years, Benghazi has been turned into a major battlefield over the past nine months for the competing parties in Libya. Yet, even a victory by the forces fighting on behalf of the government of Tobruk over Islamist forces backed by the rival administration in Tripoli is unlikely to stabilize the situation in eastern Libya, let alone solve the deep crisis that has all but ended the political process since summer 2014. Rather, it is liable to lead to increasing competition – and perhaps violent conflict – among the different elements of the fragile coalition now backing the Tobruk government as well as intensify momentum leading toward the breakup of Libya as a unitary state. The fight for Benghazi therefore illus- trates the limits of stabilization by military means. Germany and its European partners should support a unity government, which the current talks in Geneva are aimed at. They should also desist from contributing to a further escalation by supporting actors who push for military solutions.

In the fall of 2014, forces of the so-called hold of Darna, located halfway between the Libyan National Army (LNA), under the two eastern cities. At the same time, the con- command of General Khalifa Haftar, suc- flict has driven Islamists in the east into ceeded in pushing Islamist and jihadist an ever-closer alliance with the rival govern- forces out of much of Benghazi – Libya’s ment in Tripoli, which is liable to lead to a second city and the main urban hub of the further radicalization of the leadership in eastern region. Although the conflict there the country’s capital. After being on the side- is currently at a stalemate, it appears likely lines of Libyan politics for the first two years that Haftar’s forces, which are nominally of the transformation process, Benghazi has acting on behalf of the internationally thus been turned into a battleground mirror- recognized Libyan government of Tobruk ing the larger confrontation in the country. (but are actually based in Bayda), will be able to consolidate their hold over the city. Some factions in the Bayda government are Roots of the Struggle already pushing to extend the campaign Since the end of 2011, Benghazi has suffered and launch an assault on the Islamist strong- from a political vacuum and a deteriorating

Nizar Sarieldin is a fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” SWP Comments 8 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of February 2015 the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Ph.D. grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

1 security situation. The persistent failure of not only were these two militias allowed Libya’s new rulers to reestablish military to remain in Benghazi, they were also sanc- or police forces capable of reinforcing state tioned to operate on behalf of the state. control has undermined the authority of These decrees ignited the conflict between successive governments. Instead, new politi- revolutionary and Islamist militias on the cal bodies such as the National Transitional one side and remnants of the former Libyan Council (NTC) and the General National Army on the other. In September 2012, Congress (GNC) and its successive govern- following the attack on the US diplomatic ments have only aggravated the situation compound in Benghazi by Islamist militias, by choosing to invest in a multitude of which resulted in the killing of US Ambas- armed non-state actors with different – sador Christopher Stevens, citizens called and often contradictory – mandates. for a popular uprising against the militias Indeed, already at the start of 2012, the in the city, and for the dissolution of any city had witnessed large-scale attacks by armed force that would not integrate into various militias on state security forces’ the country’s army. The results were bloody facilities, army sites, and on foreign diplo- clashes, with 11 people killed on both sides, matic missions, which eventually resulted marking a decisive turning point in Bengha- in the evacuation of all foreign representa- zi’s internal dynamics. The militias, once tions. The violence and lawlessness have popular and respected for their fight against been attributed to groups seeking to lever- the Qaddafi regime, came to be seen as a age their role in the revolution for political threat to the city’s future. or financial advantage. By the end of the In parallel, a series of assassinations 2011 civil war, many of the city’s militias targeted ex-Qaddafi army figures, which had taken over – at times by force – the seemed to be a recurrence of the killing of former regime’s arms stocks and appropri- General Abd al-Fattah Younis in July 2011, ated its military bases, using them partly the chief of staff of the NTC, which was the as a prison and as investigation offices. For de facto government during the 2011 up- example, the Zintan Martyrs Brigade took rising. The assassination campaign acceler- over a camp of the Air Force unit in the ated at a steady pace during 2012 and 2013 city. They then pressured the government and reached a peak of some 50 people – to authorize these takeovers. from military figures to activists and ordi- In reaction, the first post-revolutionary nary citizens – every month in early 2014. government under interim Prime Minister Benghazi scored the highest number of Abdurrahim El-Keib (in office from Novem- violent deaths in all of Libya (in 2014: 1,471, ber 2011 to November 2012) approved the out of a country tally of 2,825), although creation of two new security forces from no suspects were identified or arrested. the ranks of the militias, among them the Judiciary institutions were also attacked, two major Islamist and jihadist ones. First, causing the courts to suspend work. on 22 February 2012, the Supreme Security Indeed, it seems that the targeting of the Committee was established. Acting under judiciary was aimed at paralyzing the state the Interior Ministry, it was given a one- institutions and later replacing them with year mandate to establish security in the Sharia courts. Even though there is no defi- city. Second, on 8 August 2012 came the nite evidence that Islamists were behind formation of the Libya Shield Forces (LSF), the violence, many observers have sug- which was to be an interim force aimed at gested that these assassinations have been integrating the rebels into the army, acting driven by revenge, or with the aim of estab- under the Defense Ministry. Yet, many saw lishing parallel army and police forces and these new formations as an attempt by then replacing the state institutions might the revolutionary and Islamist militias to have been the real motive. Violence against replace the police and army. With this, the security apparatus can also be under-

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2 stood against the background of the history and took control of the capital, which forced of hostility between Islamists and army of- the newly elected HoR to flee for the safety ficers, which dates back to the 1990s, when of Tobruk near the Egyptian border. the Qaddafi regime used the army to mete In Benghazi, the immediate result of out brutal repression against the Islamists. Haftar’s assault was that revolutionary and Hence, the rising hostility toward the Islamist militias set their differences aside Islamist and revolutionary militias among and united under the umbrella of the Ben- the population, the absence of an effective ghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC). state security apparatus, and the rise in the This council later fragmented into three levels of violence and clashes all prepared groups, which, however, upheld their strong the ground for “Operation Dignity” (Kara- coordination within the BRSC. Further- ma), launched by General Haftar in May more, as the crisis on the national level 2014, with the declared intention of waging escalated, the Misrata-led alliance came to “war on terrorism” in Benghazi and restor- see the BRSC as a useful ally that would ing security to the city. tie down its opponents’ forces, which may have otherwise impeded its own move to consolidate military control over the capital. Misrata-Islamists Alliance It therefore provided funding and arms to Haftar’s offensive occurred at a point in the Benghazi factions. With joined forces time when the political transition in Libya and Misrata’s backing, the BRSC initially was already on the verge of breaking down. succeeded in repelling the attack and driv- While an alliance formed between powerful ing Haftar’s forces out of most of the city militias based in Libya’s third largest city by the end of July. Yet, in October 2014, a (Misrata) and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)- second offensive by Haftar – now supported affiliated Justice and Construction party – by groups of fighters recruited from the which insisted that the tenure of the GNC local population – succeeded in dislodging and the government, which it dominated, the BRSC from much of the city. would not end in February 2014, as claimed by the National Forces Alliance (NFA) – the latter pushed for immediate elections and Benghazi Dynamics began drawing massive levels of popular Thus far, the conflict in Benghazi has been support, in particular in Tripoli. a complex power struggle over legitimacy With the onset of the Karama campaign, of representation. It has manifested itself an increasing number of army units de- in two main camps, with a variety of diverg- clared loyalty to Haftar. The Al-Qaqaa and ing interests among the different players of Al-Sawa’iq militias from Zintan – foes of these camps. Although neither of the two the Misrata militias – issued an ultimatum, camps rejects Sharia rule, the anti-Islamist giving GNC members five hours to evacuate camp would give a subordinate role to reli- the premises, tender their resignations, and gious authorities in what they call a civil transfer authority to the Supreme Court. The state. Yet, within the Karama coalition, Islamists regarded such steps as an attempt there are divergencies with regard to a fed- to stage what they called “the Egyptian eral vs. a unitary state in Libya. scenario” in Libya, i.e., a coup. The Misrata- Tribal orientations have not played a led alliance saw its hitherto clear military major role in this to date. However, the superiority increasingly challenged and propaganda of both sides has attempted to finally agreed to hold elections for a new exploit tribal dynamics to whip up support. House of Representatives (HoR) at the end of In reality, neither commanders nor fighters June 2014. Yet, after suffering a defeat in on either side are exclusively affiliated the elections, they launched their own mili- to specific tribal groups, but rather are tary operation under the title “Libya Dawn” recruited from a diverse range of the city’s

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3 tribes. The city is a hodgepodge of tribal lished on 20 June 2014. In essence, there are groups, with almost half the tribes being three different groups in the anti-Haftar of western origins and the rest stemming camp: the Islamic-leaning, the jihadist, and from Bedouin tribes from the east. However, revolutionaries with mixed ideological historically, families of Misratan origin leanings. have dominated trade and business in the Besides Ansar al-Sharia (AS), the backbone city. Also, those families that have left the of the Islamist and revolutionary forces in city fled due to their political orientations Benghazi is made up of LSF 1, 2, and 7. The rather than tribal territorial logic. Support- LSF were set up as a temporary vehicle for ers of the Islamists and revolutionaries integrating former rebel fighters into a co- leave areas controlled by Haftar for Misrata hesive national force, but it has clashed with and Tripoli, whereas those who move away other government-sponsored forces, such as from areas ruled by the Islamists take refuge Saiqa, the Special Forces unit of the Libyan in the eastern coastal cities controlled by Army, over control. By the end of 2013, the Haftar’s allies. LSF had fragmented again into its compo- Yet, media based in Misrata or sympa- nents. In general, the alliance is hobbled by thetic to the political positions of its leader- a chaotic chain of command and the absence ship have highlighted reports of attacks of well-funded structures. Its strength stems against Misratan families affiliated with mainly from its ideological zeal as well as Islamists and the revolutionary camp. the combat experience and strategic capabil- Haftar’s propaganda, mainly carried by the ities that many of its fighters gained during federalists, in turn has been emphasizing the conflicts in Mali and Syria. the Misratan roots of Islamist fighters and AS, whose real stronghold is in the town the businessmen supporting them, and of Darna, some 300 km to the east of Bengha- has therefore called on Misratans to leave zi, is explicitly cooperating with the LSF Benghazi and the eastern region. Thus, and seeking to use the LSF’s military weight both sides have stressed the tribal compo- to establish an Islamic state in Benghazi. It nent in the struggle. A prolonged conflict is also using the BRSC as a front, since many in Benghazi is therefore certain to deepen residents of Benghazi reject AS due to its regional and tribal divisions between the ideological orientation and the declared east and the west of Libya. This plays into opposition of its former leader Mohamed the hands of those pushing for a federaliza- al-Zahawi to a democratic state, security in- tion of the country, or even its breakup into stitutions, and the political process as such. two or more sovereign units – a trend that Although the BRSC groups are united is liable to hasten the spiral of violence. in their goal to prevent Haftar from taking Most importantly, the violence against over the city, there are clear differences in families and individuals that has been car- the tactics they apply. AS and other jihadis, ried out by both rival forces has already led such as the Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam, to further polarization. It is set to increase which has declared its allegiance to the the rifts in Benghazi’s social fabric and Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, radicalize society – leaving little chance for have espoused suicide bombings, car bombs, stabilization. and the beheading of opponents, whereas other militias have followed more conven- tional tactics of guerrilla combat. Revolutionary and Islamist Forces The war in Benghazi has resulted in the Haftar’s anti-Islamist campaign in Benghazi radicalization of formerly non-ideological urged the eight major militias in the city groups. This is clearly what happened with to set aside their ideological differences and Wissam Bin Hamid, a prominent command- political rivalries and to combine their fire- er with great personal authority. Hamid power into a single coalition, the BRSC, estab- developed from a simple car mechanic to a

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4 rebel commander in 2011, to a leader of the Revolutionary and Islamist Forces Islamist-affiliated LSF, and then to a leader of the jihadist-oriented coalition of rebel Benghazi militias in the beginning of 2014. Today, he Islamic- Revolution- heads the BRSC. His adoption of the jihadist Darna leaning and aries Shura Militia – narrative was a result of AS indoctrination Revolution- Council (BRSC) Islamic State of him and his fighters, as the relationship ary (IS) between AS and Hamid has been close since the 2011 revolution. Ansar al-Sharia Battar Militia Furthermore, although there are ideo- logical differences between the jihadists in Benghazi and Darna and the MB-affiliated Libya Shield Ansar al-Sharia Forces (LSF) (Darna) parties in Misrata and Tripoli, confronting a common enemy in the forces of Haftar Cyrenaica and the Tobruk-based government means Benghazi Pro- Martyrs tective Force – that Libyan Islamists might increasingly be Muslim Brother converging into a homogeneous bloc that Militia February 17 is likely to be ever more difficult to engage with. Already, the prime minister of the Raffallah Sahati non-recognized Tripoli-based government, Omar al-Hassi, is on record calling AS a “simple, beautiful, friendly idea.” Saraya Malek Within the BRSC, dozens of fighters from the AS stronghold of Darna are known to Zintan Martyrs have joined the struggle in Benghazi. How- ever, their form of organization and com- mand chain are not clear since the BRSC To sum up, all these coalitions started was squeezed out of much of the city, while out as tactical and temporary measures but few BRSC-controlled pockets still exist in have led to a convergence of ideological some Benghazi neighborhoods. The posi- positions over time among many of the tion of the BRSC with regard to AS remains fighters. Alliances throughout the country unclear since the UN Security Council are mostly forged and maintained against blacklisted the group on 19 November 2014, common enemies, and are hence subject to which was followed by a call for actors change as the balance of power and tactical from within the Misrata alliance to dissolve interests shift. Group loyalties in Libya are the brigade. It is plausible that the BRSC primarily to factional commanders of dif- will go along with this position and de- ferent political persuasions or ideologies nounce AS in public while continuing to rather than to the state. harbor them for the sake of their common The external support that the BRSC re- interest in the battle over Benghazi. Simi- ceives also varies from one group to another. larly, the Tripoli government can also be Qatar is apparently channeling money and expected not only to continue its political weapons through Sudan to the Misrata-led support for AS as a major element of the operation Libya Dawn. Turkey has stronger BRSC, but also to cooperate with the jihadists affiliations with the Libyan MB and hosts in Darna in order to maintain a firm base many of its members. Meetings of GNC rep- in the east. This would allow it to simulta- resentatives with Turkish officials are being neously fight Haftar and the Tobruk-based held in Turkey, and fighters from Misrata’s government, preventing either of them Libya Dawn and from the BRSC openly travel from striking out further west. there for medical treatment.

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5 Haftar’s Allies removed because they had reached retire- Gen. Khalifa Haftar, 72, lived for 20 years ment age, they saw it as another attempt to in exile in the United States after leading a replace them with Islamist and revolution- failed rebellion against Qaddafi from 1987 ary forces by the GNC. Out of 400 officers to 1990. Before that, he served in the Libyan who had been forcibly retired, 129 declared Army under Qaddafi and had even partici- their support to Haftar and were later re- pated in the 1969 coup that brought Qad- instated by the newly elected parliament. dafi to power. In 2011, he returned to Libya Second, the Benghazi-based Saiqa Forces, to join the revolution and emerged as one as well as Air Force units in the east, also of the prominent commanders on the side lent support to Haftar. These were a great of the rebels. He was appointed as a field military asset, especially since the span of commander by the NTC. During his retire- control of Haftar’s LNA was limited, as its ment, he first took a stance against the units are largely marked by tribal and Tripoli government and the Chief of Staff in regional loyalties, such as to the al-Obeidat a televised statement on 14 February 2014. and al-Barasa. It is worth noting here, that He also proposed a five-point plan to rescue the Saiqa units, although they fight under the nation: the suspension of the GNC and Haftar’s command, are considered loyal the government, and the establishment of a to Abdullah al-Thini, a former army com- presidential committee and a defense coun- mander and the prime minister of the cil, which he intended to head. He did not Tobruk government. receive significant support though. Third, the Barqa Supreme Military Coun- Three months later, Haftar exploited the cil is an alliance of tribal armed groups chaos and tension in Tripoli, where the GNC based in different eastern cities that see was pressured to dissolve and where tension control over Benghazi as being a key step between Zintani and Misratan militias was in realizing their federalist ambitions. on the rise: He launched air and ground Besides these armed units, Operation assaults against Islamist and revolutionary Dignity is supported by ordinary residents militias in Benghazi under Operation Dig- of Benghazi who turned to armed struggle nity. In doing so, he formed a rival army and formed the so-called Shabab al-Manatiq leadership (the General Leadership of the (literary “Districts’ Youth”). When the mili- Libyan National Army) against the Chief of tary offensive started, local youths in civilian General Staff of the Libyan Army, and thus clothes attacked checkpoints set up by the triggered the split of state institutions. He BRSC. These groups may pose a future risk won the support of politicians, diplomats, to stability, as they will eventually demand army units, and tribes that wanted him to a political reward for their role, which may impose order and rein in the country’s rebel- potentially put at risk exactly what Haftar’s lious armed groups. The change in support campaign is aiming to achieve. for Haftar – from his first attempt in Feb- The so-called LNA that Haftar controls ruary to the second in May – suggests that began with small units of the Libyan Army, although many refused to support his per- but since then it controls all the units and sonal political ambitions, they approved of bases in the eastern region, especially after his offensive against the extremist militias, coopting Chief of Staff Abd al-Raziq al- which they perceived as a real threat. Nadouri. On the political level, Haftar’s There are three main blocs that joined forces have been officially endorsed by the Haftar’s fight. First, there were a number internationally recognized HoR in Tobruk. of defectors from Libyan Army and police They have merged, at least partially, with units, who were enraged over the govern- the Libyan Army under a mandate from the ment’s silence on the assassinations against parliament. Yet, political actors in Tobruk members of the army and angry about their are evidently harboring second thoughts forced retirement. Although they had been about the ambitions of the general. Rela-

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6 tions remain ambivalent with al-Thini, who Anti-Islamist Forces had previously accused Haftar of trying to stage a coup. The distrust between the two Libyan men is still palpable, as both claim owner- Al-Thini National ship of the “war on terrorism” in the coun- Government Army (LNA) try. Furthermore, the lingering bad blood between al-Thini and Haftar is a sign of a rift between top commanders in the Libyan Defense Minister Army. On 5 January 2015, Chief of Staff Col. Masoud al-Nadouri ordered the arrest of Col. Masoud Rahouma Rahouma, the acting defense minister in Libyan Army Air Force al-Thini’s government, over an arms ship- Chief of Staff Chief of Staff Tribal Gen. Abd ment that was going to the Saiqa force Col. Saqr Militias al-Raziq without the knowledge of the Chief of Staff al-Joroushi al-Nadouri or Haftar. Although Saiqa is part of the Karama campaign, they have complained Saiqa Special to the government that Haftar is not pro- Forces Libyan Army Col. Wenis Units viding its units with enough ammunition, Bu-Khamada leading to the loss of fighters. A proposal advanced by Haftar and his Under Haftar’s command commanders to unify the military leader- Districts’ Youth Armed group Under government command ship against the BRSC by forming a Su- Under split command preme Military Council, to be headed by Haftar himself, further fueled suspicions refused to endorse Haftar, the initiative was and fell flat due to resistance from inside interpreted as an attempt to prop up addi- the HoR. Lawmakers were apparently con- tional military figures that would undermine cerned that such a new military body might Haftar’s claim to leadership and balance the soon seek to sideline the elected parlia- power he had been assembling. The political ment, in particular if it were to be headed wrangling in the background may also ex- by Haftar, who has already insinuated that plain the slow advancement of military he might take charge if the HoR proved operations in Benghazi as Haftar attempts incapable of performing its duties. Further- to weaken cohesion among Saiqa forces, more, after the decision of the HoR to re- which are said to be the least loyal to him. instate 129 officers who had been retired On the regional level, Egypt, which views by the GNC, many fear that Haftar will the presence of hardline extremists near now feel emboldened to resist any further its western border as a direct national secu- attempts at civilian oversight. rity threat, has deepened its involvement Another potential crack in the anti- and willingness to offer military support Islamist camp emerged in December 2014. to Haftar through the Tobruk-based govern- This is when the NFA bloc, HoR members ment. Egypt also fears what it sees as a from the east, and several members of the mounting threat as a result of the cooper- al-Obeidat tribe (one of the major eastern ation and alignment of Libya’s MB with tribes, with lands extending from the Egyp- jihadist networks that had beheaded Egyp- tian border to Tobruk and the highlands tian workers. In general, Egypt has sup- atop Darna) encouraged Major General Sulei- ported the idea that toppling MB or Islamist man Mahmoud al-Obeidi – a senior com- rule would require forming a military coali- mander who had likewise been forcibly tion with Haftar. Also, competition between retired by the GNC – to propose an offensive the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar in Darna, the jihadist stronghold of the east- led to continued support of both states to ern region. Since al-Obeidi had previously opposing sides, with Qatar supporting Mis-

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7 rata and the Islamists, and the UAE sup- rity personnel – is liable to further increase porting the anti-Islamist current. the challenges of (re)establishing any form Although what is left of the HoR (some of central state control. Also, even if the cam- 125 members) is, for now, united in its sup- paign were to be successful in its primary port for the LNA and Operation Dignity, goal of rolling back and containing jihadist before long the different priorities of the and revolutionary militias, divergent inter- political factions will probably lead to ests and suspicion over potential political realignments of alliances and differences ambitions of its commander are likely to that have the potential to generate conflict lead to the fracturing of the fragile alliance and further violence. In particular, the NFA that is currently sustaining the Tobruk-led and Haftar on the one side and the federal- government. In addition, the example of ists and eastern tribes on the other are the BRSC serves to show that increased mili- likely to work at cross-purposes: Although tary pressure will prompt groups with dif- the former are striving to reassert their ferent degrees of ideological commitment

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und position within the framework of a uni- to close ranks and converge on the more Politik, 2015 tarian Libyan state, they do not agree on radical positions. It might also further con- All rights reserved national politics, and the latter have no solidate the alliance between these groups These Comments reflect interest in pursuing war in the western and the Tripoli-based government and is solely the author’s views. region. Rather, consolidation of the rival liable to empower the most radical currents SWP government in Tripoli and a progressive in the latter. Thus, the prospects of restoring Stiftung Wissenschaft und establishment of parallel administrative the political process on the central state Politik German Institute for structures would serve their purpose of level will become even more remote, and International and creating a separate state. the already strong momentum for the break- Security Affairs The most obvious example of the poten- up of the country will be further reinforced. Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 tial conflict of this configuration thus far To the degree that external actors (such 10719 Berlin was the public quarrel between Haftar’s as Egypt, the UAE, or Western countries) Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 deputy, Col. Saqr al-Joroushi, and the com- become further involved in the conflict www.swp-berlin.org mander of the so-called Petroleum Defense (e.g., with aerial attacks on Islamist strong- [email protected] Guards, Ibrahim Jadhran, who set up the holds), eastern Libya may turn into yet ISSN 1861-1761 Cyrenaica Political Bureau in 2013 and se- another theater of conflict that attracts the cured control of the eastern oil ports. Amid volunteers of international jihadism and the attacks by the Misrata-led Libya Dawn provides for their radicalization and con- to seize control of the oil ports, Joroushi version into hardened fighters that will directed a verbal attack against his nominal come to plague the region and Western coun- ally Jadhran, calling him a “terrorist.” The tries in the near future. In other words, intolerance of the LNA vis-à-vis groups that there is a serious concern that Libya is devel- do not submit to its command demon- oping into fertile ground for a repetition of strates the urge to exert maximum control the Islamic State scenario in Iraq and Syria. over fragmented forces, which is liable to Hence, Germany and its European partners lead to multiple violent conflicts with local should play an active role in UN-sponsored and regional powers and stakeholders. talks and refrain from supporting actors who push for a military solution. Rather, they should push for a unity government to Conclusion emerge from the dialogues and assist it in Haftar’s campaign in Benghazi and beyond stabilizing its rule and asserting its power clearly shows the limits of an approach that over political decision making. In addition, seeks stabilization through military means. they should play an active role in talks with Empowering and arming additional non- regional actors (Qatar, Turkey, UAE, Egypt) state actors – such as the Districts’ Youth, and aim at convincing them not to impede the federalists, or discontented former secu- reconciliation and compromise in Libya.

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