Briefing Paper August 2019

WHO IS FIGHTING WHOM IN TRIPOLI? How the 2019 Civil War is Transforming Libya’s Military Landscape Wolfram Lacher

Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 1 Credits and contributors

Series editor: Matt Johnson About the author ([email protected]) Wolfram Lacher is a senior associate at the German Institute for International and Copy-editor: Alex Potter Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. He has worked on and conducted research in ([email protected]) Libya since 2007, including in a previous capacity as an analyst at a business risk consultancy from 2007 to 2010. He has authored and co-authored numerous re- Proofreader: Stephanie Huitson ports, academic articles, and book chapters on the post-2011 conflicts in Libya ([email protected]) and security issues in the Sahel–Sahara region. He studied Arabic and African Cartography: Jillian Luff languages, history, political science, and conflict and development studies in (www.mapgrafix.com) Leipzig, Paris, Cairo, and London, and holds a PhD in political science from Hum- boldt University in Berlin. His book Libya’s Fragmentation will be published by I.B. Design: Rick Jones Tauris in April 2020. ([email protected]) Layout: raumfisch.de/sign berlin Acknowledgements Print: nbmedia, Geneva The author would like to thank Alaa al-Idrissi for his assistance in researching this Briefing Paper.

Front cover photo Fighters loyal to the GNA walk on the front line outside Tripoli, May 2019. Source: Reuters

2 SANA Briefing Paper August 2019 Overview Introduction On 4 April 2019 forces loyal to ‘Field Mar- The offensive that Khalifa Haftar launched in April 2019 to shal’2 Khalifa Haftar, leader of the self- capture the Libyan capital, Tripoli, triggered the largest mo- styled Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF),3 bilization of fighters in western Libya since the revolutionary launched a large-scale offensive from LAAF bases in central and eastern Libya war of 2011. This latest round of civil war is transforming the to capture the capital, Tripoli. The move landscape of armed groups fighting in and around Tripoli, caught armed groups in western Libya by surprise, allowing Haftar’s forces to provoking new rifts within and between communities, and advance into Tripoli’s southern outskirts laying the ground for future political struggles. This Briefing in the first few days of the operation. Paper examines the identities and interests of the forces Thereafter, the offensive stalled as armed groups across western Libya mobilized fighting each other over control of Tripoli. It shows that the under the umbrella of the internationally divides of 2011 are central in structuring the two opposing al- recognized Government of National liances and shaping the motivations of many forces involved Accord (GNA) to counter Haftar’s forces. After initial successes by GNA-aligned in the war. forces, a stalemate settled in from late April onwards. Only in late June did GNA- aligned forces score an important victory against the LAAF with the capture of Gharyan (80 km south of Tripoli), the Key findings LAAF’s key forward base for its Tripoli operation. The bulk of the forces fighting against Haftar come from Prior to Haftar’s offensive, political the same communities that supported the 2011 war actors and armed groups in western Libya were divided. A handful of armed groups against Muammar Qaddafi. Haftar’s forces from western in Tripoli exerted disproportionate influ- and southern Libya often come from communities that ence over state institutions in the capital, provoking resentment across Libya, in- were perceived as loyalist in 2011 and experienced that cluding in western cities that hosted war as a defeat. major military forces. But efforts by some western Libyan factions to launch Contrary to widespread misconceptions, the forces fight- an offensive against the Tripoli militias ing Haftar are mostly not standing militias, but volunteers. failed to mobilize broad support: most leaders of armed groups in western Libya Political Islamists form a negligible element among them, were distrustful of one another, and were whereas hardline Salafists are a key component of Haf- reluctant to join what they saw as a strug- tar’s forces. Known criminals are active on both sides of gle over spoils. Haftar’s offensive has radically altered the conflict, but they are more essential to Haftar’s forces. this political landscape, uniting political and military factions that had been in Haftar’s offensive united a multitude of groups in opposi- ­rivalry or open conflict with one another tion to him. Until then, some of them had been in conflict for the previous few years. It has also with one another. While they are currently1 cooperating in provoked a large-scale mobilization of volunteers who had long gone back to an unprecedented way, their competition over positions civilian life, or are fighting for the first and budgets in Tripoli could soon re-emerge as a key is- time. These forces are drawn from mainly sue. Meanwhile, Haftar’s alliance may be more fragile than the same communities and have many of the same leaders as those that supported is generally assumed. the revolutionary armed groups against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011. Continuing war could cause much greater damage to Lib- The motivation that unites these forces ya’s social fabric than it has to date. The conflict has pro- is reminiscent of 2011, and stresses their voked sharp rifts within and among communities in west- common objective of preventing the re- establishment of a dictatorship. On the ern Libya, and deepened the divide between the eastern other side of the divide, the western and western parts of the country. Major military advances Libyan forces that Haftar has mobilized are recruited primarily from communities by either side risk involving indiscriminate inter-commu- that experienced the 2011 revolution as nal reprisals, or acts of revenge within communities. a defeat.

Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 3 This Briefing Paper analyses the wide- themselves against their former revolu- on opposite sides of past divides. Among ranging changes in western Libya’s politi- tionary brothers-in-arms, Zintanis en- them were Misratan militia leaders who cal and military landscape that have been couraged the formation of armed groups opposed the GNA, but also Zintani com- set in motion by the mobilization for and in communities that had been consid- manders loosely affiliated with the GNA. against Haftar’s offensive. The first part ered the political ‘losers’ of the 2011 war, Another faction involved was the 7th Bri- provides an overview of the conflicts in including the Warshafana, Si’aan, and gade from Tarhuna, also known as the western Libya that formed the back- Nuwail (Lacher, forthcoming). ‘Kaniyat’ after the three brothers from the ground to the current war. The second These two camps disintegrated during al-Kani family who controlled it. On paper part analyses the composition of the two the negotiations over the December 2015 the 7th Brigade was loyal to the GNA, but opposing alliances, as well as the diverg- Libyan Political Agreement that estab- the Kani brothers’ political affiliation ing interests and emerging tensions lished the GNA. Rifts emerged within ­remained unclear. Finally, attempts to within them. The Briefing Paper is based cities that had previously been united in build an alliance against the Tripoli mili- on 35 interviews held in June 2019 with their support for either of the two camps. tias also included armed groups from the GNA officials and officers, commanders, The divide between supporters and oppo- Tripoli suburb of Tajura that opposed the and members of armed groups, as well nents of the GNA supplanted the rifts of Special Deterrence Force (SDF), the militia as local observers in Tripoli and Misrata. the 2011 and 2014 wars (ICG, 2016). that controlled Mitiga airport in Tripoli In addition, the paper draws on previous Divisions in western Libya multiplied (Lacher and al-Idrissi, 2018). field research, as well as telephone con- further after the GNA moved to Tripoli in In late 2017 and early 2018 several versations with actors on both sides of March 2016. State institutions fell under attempts to launch a joint operation the divide prior to and during the current the influence of four large armed groups against the Tripoli militia cartel failed at conflict. from Tripoli that gradually dislodged their the last minute. One reason was distrust rivals from the capital, establishing what among the disparate forces that were was virtually a cartel. This even alienated ­involved in these attempts. Another was factions that had supported the formation that proponents of military action found Western Libya’s complex of the GNA (Lacher and al-Idrissi, 2018). it difficult to mobilize within their own divisions The GNA’s support base in western communities. The principal military forces Libya increasingly narrowed, with one in western Libya did not consist of the Before Haftar united most western Libyan significant exception: in June 2017 Prime standing militias that fought for control forces against him, multiple divisions Minister Faiez al-Serraj appointed Usama of Tripoli, but of armed groups that were structured the political and military land- al-Juwaili as commander of the western generally demobilized. In line with public scape in the region—the product of suc- military region, thereby co-opting the opinion in their cities, the leaders and cessive wars and changing political most powerful player in Zintan and under- fighters of such armed groups had grown alignments. The deepest rifts were those mining Haftar’s influence. Together with weary of war and were reluctant to enter of the 2011 war, when cities such as Mis- other Zintani commanders who had what they saw as a struggle over the pre- rata and Zintan and the Amazigh towns fought against Qaddafi in 2011, Juwaili dation of state wealth.5 became strongholds of revolutionary had long displayed aversion towards When in August 2018 the Kaniyat forces. These forces stigmatized some Haftar. He would henceforth compete for ­finally launched an offensive, only a neighbouring communities as regime influence with Haftar’s supporters in handful of Misratan militia leaders joined loyalists because they had failed to rise Zintan (Lacher, forthcoming). it, as did only one small group from up against Qaddafi and had provided With Zintan divided and Juwaili dis- Zintan. Other Misratan and Zintani forces fighters for units of auxiliaries that the lodging Haftar’s units from the War- deployed to Tripoli without supporting the regime organized on a tribal basis. After shafana area in November 2017, Haftar’s attackers and converted their neutrality the 2011 war, feelings of collective defeat western Libyan allies were confined to into political influence—most notably in and humiliation remained widespread in two types of constituencies: members of the person of Fathi Bashagha, a Misratan such communities (Collombier, 2016; communities that had experienced the power broker who became interior minis- 2017; Lacher, forthcoming). 2011 revolution as a defeat, and follow- ter in the aftermath of the conflict. While With the Qaddafi regime’s collapse, ers of the hardline Saudi Salafist Bashagha formed a counterweight to the the revolutionary forces—and newly preacher Rabi’ al-Madkhali, whose doc- cartel, the militias’ influence over Tripoli formed armed groups that pretended to trine stresses the imperative of absolute institutions nevertheless remained largely be ‘revolutionaries’—strengthened their obedience to the ruler. Madkhalist unbroken (Badi, 2019). military dominance by taking control of Salafists formed the core of Haftar’s sup- In January 2019 the Kaniyat tried for a state arsenals. Subsequently they porters in Zintan and neighbouring second time to push into Tripoli by force. evolved into state-sanctioned units that Rujban, two revolutionary strongholds of This time its former allies from Misrata expanded thanks to lavish government 2011. Haftar’s influence was strongest in did not join the attack and the Tripoli funds. Power struggles within the revolu- towns that hosted both Madkhalists and ­militias rapidly defeated it, with backing tionary coalition compounded rivalries supporters of the Qaddafi regime, for ex- from Juwaili. Isolated and without allies, over control of the security sector (Lacher ample Sabratha, Surman Tiji, and Badr the Kani brothers began looking to Haftar and Cole, 2014). (ICG, 2019; Wehrey, 2019).4 for support.6 Over time two competing camps Meanwhile, anger grew across western Other actors in the Tripoli security emerged whose confrontation escalated Libya over the stranglehold Tripoli militias landscape also secretly negotiated with into civil war in mid-2014. In western exerted over state institutions. Politicians Haftar in the months preceding the April Libya Zintani forces were the only major and leaders of armed groups began 2019 offensive. Haftar’s expansion in component of the former revolutionary forming alliances to change the balance southern Libya during January and Feb- coalition to side with Khalifa Haftar’s self- of power by force. Such resentment ruary heightened expectations that he declared army in eastern Libya. To defend brought together actors who had been would next attempt to gain a foothold in

4 SANA Briefing Paper August 2019 Tripoli.7 Southern Libya had experienced with armed groups in Zawiya that had ceding the offensive, suggest that Haftar’s an unprecedented deterioration in secu- been amenable to siding with Haftar, initial plan to capture Tripoli relied on a rity conditions and service delivery. persuading them to stick with the GNA. number of erroneous assumptions. ­Haftar’s largely peaceful takeover of key Juwaili also coordinated with command- In the night of 4 April, a battalion of southern cities and oil fields therefore ers from Misrata and Tripoli to counter a the 106th Brigade10—headed by Haftar’s met with widespread approval in the potential advance by Haftar’s forces. son, Khaled, and considered the best region. Public opinion in western Libya Few expected an all-out offensive to take armed and most loyal to Haftar among was also mostly supportive, adding to the Tripoli, even in the days before the opera- his forces—took over Checkpoint 27 be- arguments in favour of coming to some tion started, as Haftar’s forces built up in tween Tripoli and Zawiya (Abdallah and kind of agreement with Haftar. The con- the Jufra area.9 As Haftar’s forces entered Nasr, 2019).11 Just east of this checkpoint text appeared even more favourable to Gharyan and descended towards Tripoli lies Janzur, a Tripoli suburb that hosts such an agreement after Haftar’s tentative on 4 April, neither those who had pre- the headquarters of the United Nations understanding with Serraj on the forma- pared to side with Haftar nor those who Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The tion of an interim government, at a meet- were mobilizing to confront him knew battalion’s mission apparently was to ing in Abu Dhabi in late February. Key how key leaders of armed groups in and reach the immediate vicinity of the Misratan figures negotiated with Haftar’s around the capital would react to the UNSMIL base, where adversaries would representatives over the allocation of offensive. find it difficult to attack because of the ministerial and military command posts, UNSMIL presence.12 To enable this plan, while various militia leaders from Tripoli Haftar had met with representatives of a and Zawiya discussed their possible co- How Haftar’s Plan A failed key Zawiya faction in the weeks leading operation with Haftar or his emissaries.8 up to the offensive and had reached an At the same time, however, Haftar’s The events of the operation’s first 24 understanding with Naji Gneidi, the leader opponents in western Libya prepared hours, seen in conjunction with the nego- of Fursan Janzur, the armed group con- their defences. Zintan’s Juwaili held talks tiations that took place in the weeks pre- trolling Janzur.13 Once an LAAF advance

Photo 1 Fighters from a Misratan armed group allied to the GNA prepare their ammunition before heading to fight Haftar’s forces on the outskirts of Tripoli, April 2019. Source: Mahmud Turkia/AFP Photo

Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 5 Map 1 Greater Tripoli (as of 19 August 2019)

Area under control of Mediterranean Sea GNA-a€liated forces GNA-a€liated forces Misrata Area under control of Tajura LAAF-a€liated forces Mitiga International Tripoli Contested area Zawiya Front line TRIPOLI Sabratha Group strength nd Ring Road Zintan eco (number of combatants) S C Amazigh towns >500 oa sta 100–500 l H Eastern and Abu ig <100 hw Central Libya Slim ay Tajura

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Qasr ben Ghashir Tripoli InternationalInternational LAAF-a€liated forces Tarhuna Zintan and Rujban Sabratha, Sorman and Ajeilat 5 km Eastern and Southern Libya

Source: Wolfram Lacher (base map data source: OpenStreetMap) Base map data source: OpenStreetMap party had gained a foothold in Tripoli, suspected of colluding with Haftar, such The forces fighting Haftar: other Tripoli militia leaders who had been as the deputy defence minister and the in talks with Haftar could be expected to deputy director of the intelligence not merely an alliance of switch sides. In addition, some Misratan service.19 convenience politicians had met Haftar in his head- With these setbacks, Haftar’s attempt quarters outside Benghazi during March to quickly gain a foothold in Tripoli and The alliance to resist Haftar’s offensive and assured him that Misratan armed trigger defections had failed. But during has brought together groups that had groups would not intervene against his the first few days of the war the resistance stood on opposite sides of political di- forces’ entry into Tripoli.14 to Haftar’s forces remained weak and vides, and in some cases had recently Confounding these expectations, uncoordinated. On the second day of the fought each other. Yet it is not merely an forces of the Zawiya faction that had been offensive the mainly eastern forces that opportunistic alliance: these forces are in talks with Haftar surprised his soldiers had come from Gharyan reached al-Swani, united by ties that originate in the 2011 at Checkpoint 27, capturing 128 of them just south-west of Tripoli. The next day war against Qaddafi (see Figure 1). and causing the rest to flee (Abdallah the Kaniyat from Tarhuna joined Haftar’s and Nasr, 2019).15 After discovering Naji offensive—contrary to promises the Kani Gneidi’s collusion with Haftar, his lieu- brothers had given to Misratan leaders Who is fighting against tenants in Fursan Janzur tried to capture only the day before—and pushed into Haftar? him, and set his house on fire when they the Wadi al-Rabi’ area to the south-east did not find him. Gneidi escaped to of the capital.20 The forces currently fighting Haftar over- Gharyan with about 15 close loyalists.16 By then, however, armed groups whelmingly trace their origin back to the The Misratan-dominated Anti-Terrorism across western Libya had begun mobiliz- 2011 war. Many are deeply rooted in local Force (ATF) mobilized on 4 April to coun- ing to counter Haftar’s offensive. The communities and are highly cohesive due ter the LAAF advance.17 So did a small failure of his initial plan locked Haftar to their collective struggle in 2011. group of fighters from two Tripoli groups— into the role of an outside aggressor that the Tripoli Revolutionaries Battalion (TRB) he had sought to avoid. With responsi- Tripoli groups and the Nawasi Battalion—which set out bility for the war so squarely on Haftar’s to confront Haftar’s forces at the foot of shoulders, much of western Libya united The militias that dominated Tripoli’s se- the mountains north of Gharyan.18 Tripoli behind the GNA to defend the capital curity landscape in recent years—and are militias also began to arrest officials against the attack. largely post-revolutionary formations—

6 SANA Briefing Paper August 2019 form a minor component of the forces al-Rabi’ and al-Zatarna (see Map 1). The Figure 1 opposing Haftar. The largest contingent of fighting power of most Tajuran armed Origins of GNA-affiliated fighters on 21 fighters from Tripoli (around 300) —and groups does not lie in the small standing the greater Tripoli front lines one that has suffered heavy losses—is militias they had fielded prior to the war, that commanded by Abdelghani ‘Ghaniwa’ but in combatants who have remobilized al-Kikli, who has for years headed militias after having returned to civilian lives in the Abu Slim district of the capital. years earlier. They and their social sur- Kikli’s forces are fighting on the front roundings remain firmly rooted in a belief around Tripoli International Airport (see in the 2011 revolution.28 Map 1). They include fighters from the tight-knit community of Kikla.22 Next in terms of numbers are the TRB Western Libyan groups and SDF. The TRB is virtually unrecogniz- Among groups from the region to the west able from its shape in 2017 and 2018, and south of Tripoli, one of the smallest when the group’s commanders were no- contingents of fighters has an outsized Misrata Nalut torious for their role in predatory eco- role: that of Zintani forces led by Usama Tripoli groups Other Amazigh towns nomic activities. The most infamous TRB al-Juwaili. Zintani anti-Haftar fighters (excl. Tajura) Sabratha and Ajeilat commanders were killed or forced into only number around 100, because the Tajura Zintan exile in an internal purge in late 2018 and town is divided between opponents and Zawiya Others early 2019 (Badi, 2019). The mobilization supporters of Haftar, and roughly the Gharyan against Haftar in April 2019 saw the same number of Zintanis are fighting for return of the group’s historical com- Haftar. The internal divide is new for Total: approximately 5,750 fighters manders from 2011, who had kept their Zintan, which was united in both the Note: Figure 1 does not include Misratan forces de- distance from the group’s activities in struggle against Qaddafi in 2011 and the ployed in Sirte and on the southern front, nor forces recent years.23 These former command- fight against the Misratan-led Libya Dawn retained in Zawiya and Amazigh towns to prevent of- ers brought with them fighters from the coalition in 2014. The rift has unsettled fensives from neighbouring towns. Source: Author 31 Nafusa Mountains town of Nalut, where the community and, as a result, the vast the TRB had formed and fought in 2011. ­majority of potential Zintani fighters have Those currently fighting in the ranks of not mobilized.29 Figure 2 the TRB are a tight-knit group, and few The Zintanis’ allies in the forces Origins of 527 GNA-affiliated fighters among the salaried militiamen that TRB fighting Haftar are acutely aware that killed prior to 30 July 2019 commanders had recruited in recent they need to avoid alienating Zintan, lest years are on the front lines.24 the bulk of the town’s forces join Haftar’s The SDF is the militarily most power- offensive.30 This explains why Juwaili, in ful Tripoli militia, but the bulk of the force addition to being the commander of the refrained from joining the fight against western military region, was also ap- Haftar until mid-June 2019. The group’s pointed as head of the joint operations detractors had long suspected Madkhal- room of all GNA-affiliated forces in Tripoli. ist Salafist commanders in the SDF of It also explains why forces from Amazigh colluding with Haftar. In mid-June a group towns have shied away from attacking the of fighters approximately 150–200 strong al-Wutiya air base, which is controlled by under the command of Mahmoud Hamza fighters from Zintan and Rujban who are Misrata Amazigh towns entered the war to oppose Haftar, clarify- loyal to Haftar. ing the SDF’s stance.25 The largest contingent of fighters in Tripoli Gharyan Several Tripoli groups are participat- the region comes from Zawiya. Approxi- Zawiya Kikla ing in the fighting in smaller numbers, mately 400 fighters from Zawiya are de- Zintan Others including the Nawasi, Bab Tajura, and ployed on various front lines, most of them Source: Unpublished list of names of killed fighters al-Dhaman battalions, as well as Fursan around the airport. Many are members of compiled on behalf of senior commanders in GNA- Janzur. All four have been notorious for armed groups that trace their origin back affiliated forces, cross-checked by author the predatory practices that characterized to the 2011 war, such as the Faruq and the Tripoli ‘militia cartel’ in its heyday. Martyr Mohamed al-Kilani battalions, They are all deployed on the Ain Zara and which had mostly been demobilized prior Salaheddin fronts (see Map 1)—except to the April 2019 offensive. Two Zawiyan itself to pre-empt a possible attack by Fursan Janzur, who are fighting on the groups currently have a number of Islam- Haftar loyalists based in neighbouring Sa- airport26 front.27 ist ideologues among their commanders: bratha and Surman.32 Finally, several medium-sized groups the Faruq Battalion and the fighters of the Smaller in numbers than the Zawiyan from Tajura that had been on bad terms Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room, forces, fighters from Gharyan and Nalut with the cartel militias prior to Haftar’s of- who are deployed at the Ain Zara front. nevertheless form sizeable contingents of fensive have mobilized: Bashir Khalfalla’s Dozens of combatants and officers from approximately 200 each. A 150-strong (‘al-Bugra’) Rahbat al-Duru’ Battalion, Zawiya have also joined the forces of the Naluti battalion is deployed at the airport which numbers around 200, as well as western military region under Juwaili, front and about 40–50 combatants from the smaller Usud Tajura, al-Rawased, and which are deployed between Tripoli and the town are fighting with the TRB in Ain Fath Mekka battalions. They are deployed Gharyan. In addition to fighters at the Zara.33 Haftar’s capture of Gharyan with on the easternmost front lines of Wadi front, significant forces remain in Zawiya the help of local militia leader Adel Da’ab

Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 7 In Sirte, as well as forward bases near al-Sdada, Bir Dufan, and Abu Njem, Many commanders see the Misratan groups have deployed approxi- mately 550–600 vehicles—the number of fighters being four times that of vehicles. government as infiltrated by officials They include around 40 former BDB mem- bers, as well as other fighters from central, southern, and eastern Libya.42 with ties to Haftar, and as deeply Since the conflict started a common misperception among Western diplomats corrupt and incompetent.” and foreign observers has been that Mis- ratan mobilization has been limited to date.43 But although there is still poten- initially drove approximately 70 Gharyan deployed in both Tripoli and Sirte or on tial for further mobilization if the threat fighters out of their town. As they fought the southern front. All but a fraction of from Haftar’s forces increases, the present under Juwaili’s command to regain con- Misratan fighters who are now participat- discussion shows that Misratan partici- trol of Gharyan their numbers grew: after ing in the war had gone back to civilian pation in the war is considerable. This is the town was recaptured the force had life years previously, and only mobilized further confirmed by the number of Mis- grown to at least 200 fighters.34 Approxi- in reaction to Haftar’s offensive.37 ratan fighters killed in the conflict: mately 150 fighters from Sabratha and The largest concentration of Misratan almost 200 by end of July 2019, represent- Ajeilat form part of Juwaili’s Zintani forces, forces is on the Wadi al-Rabi’ front, where ing more than a third of all fighters killed the Zawiyan forces at the airport, and the approximately 1,200 fighters have mobi- in the ranks of GNA-affiliated forces (see Misratan-dominated ATF in Wadi al-Rabi’. lized under the ATF, which is an adminis- Figure 2). These fighters were inactive and demobi- trative and command structure compris- lized prior to Haftar’s offensive.35 ing a part of the forces that fought the Fighters from the east and The National Mobile Force is deployed non-state armed group Islamic State (IS) at the airport and Salaheddin fronts. in Sirte. Around 40 Misratan battalions south Groups from Amazigh towns that fought operate under the ATF in Wadi al-Rabi’. Most of the forces mentioned above are in the war against Qaddafi formed the These battalions originated in the 2011 rooted in particular western Libyan com- force in 2011. Under routine conditions, war, and have largely retained their inter- munities. They are often deeply embed- the National Mobile Force has around nal composition and leadership. Each has ded in such communities, with ties among 60–70 fighters at the front at any given its own base at the front line.38 combatants reinforced by relationships moment, but they rotate every few days, Several large Misratan groups de- of kinship, friendship, or proximity. so the force that has joined to date is ployed in Salaheddin are known for their Fighters from southern, central, and approximately 120–140 strong. Sepa- previous hostility towards the GNA: the eastern Libya whom Haftar’s forces have rately from the National Mobile Force, al-Marsa, al-Tajin, and al-Sumud battal- uprooted from these regions have joined smaller groups of fighters of 30–60 each ions, which together have approximately western Libyan groups. These include from the Amazigh towns of Jadu and 500 fighters at the front.39 Salah Badi, mostly civilian members of the BDB and Yefren have joined armed groups from the leader of the al-Sumud Battalion, is of armed groups from Ajdabiya and the Tripoli at the Ain Zara and Salaheddin subject to UN sanctions for his ‘leading Jufra region, but also dozens of military fronts. About the same number of fighters role’ in the August 2018 Tripoli conflict, officers from the east. Most see their from Yefren and Nalut have joined when he had supported the Kaniyat’s struggle in Tripoli as a prelude to their ­Juwaili’s western military region and are ­offensive—and fought against the Tripoli return to eastern Libya. The fact that deployed in the Gharyan area. The pri- armed groups at whose side he is now ­Haftar’s forces destroyed or confiscated mary reason why so few have joined the fighting (UNSC, 2018b). These forces and reoccupied the properties of Benghazi war from these towns, as well as from ­include former members of the Benghazi families whose members had fought Kabaw, Nalut, and Zuwara, is that they Defence Battalions (BDB). Since their against Haftar is a powerful motivation face potential threats from forces loyal to ­deployment to the front, these groups for many of these fighters.44 Haftar in neighbouring towns and bases. have reacted negatively to attempts to The principal southern Libyan group The majority of potential fighters from the integrate them into formal GNA command fighting in the Tripoli area is Tubu com- Amazigh towns therefore remain in their structures.40 batants under the command of Hassan communities to forestall advances by Two large Misratan forces are fighting Musa, who have joined Zintani forces.45 these Haftar-affiliated forces.36 at the airport front: the al-Mahjub Bri- Like Musa himself, many are veterans gade—which has around 800 fighters of the 2011 war against Qaddafi. Having Misratan forces deployed—and Brigade 166. Both are ­initially supported Haftar’s campaign in umbrella organizations that comprise a Benghazi in 2014 and subsequently Misratan forces form by far the largest number of battalions that formed in 2011 fought with the militia leader Ibrahim al- contingent among the various groups on the basis of individual neighbour- Jadhran against Misratan forces in early fighting Haftar. They are deployed at all hoods in Misrata. Like most other Misra- 2015, this group has since been consist- Tripoli front lines, as well as in Sirte and tan battalions, these forces last mobi- ently opposed to Haftar.46 to the south of Misrata, from where they lized in 2016 for the war against IS in Finally, fighters from southern Libya harass Haftar’s supply lines. The larger Sirte; most of their fighters had returned and beyond have also joined armed Misratan brigades, such as al-Mahjub, to civilian life and remobilized in reaction groups for payment, rather than out of al-Halbus, and Hatin, often have groups to Haftar’s offensive.41 commitment to the cause of fighting

8 SANA Briefing Paper August 2019 Map 2 North-western Libya (as of 19 August 2019)

Area under control of GNA-aƒliated forces Mediterranean Sea Area under control of LAAF-aƒliated forces Contested area Zuwara TRIPOLI Mitiga International

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G

50 km

Source: Wolfram Lacher (base map data source: OpenStreetMap) against Haftar. Such fighters include mem- eight major groups of different origins resentment of the Tripoli militias that have bers of the Tuareg and Mahamid commu- are deployed on the semi-circular front exercised disproportionate influence in nities, many of whom do not have Libyan around Tripoli International Airport. Some state institutions in recent years. For citizenship. But such paid hirelings make of these groups comprise a number of many, the war against Haftar has merely up a very small proportion of the forces subgroups. Although most liaise with the deferred the conflict with these Tripoli fighting to protect Tripoli.47 GNA’s official command structure, the groups. Given this context, some groups battalions on this and other fronts are suspect others of seeking to conserve effectively autonomous in their decision- their own arsenals and let their allies Command, coordination, making. Their leaders emerged out of the ­exhaust theirs, in anticipation of a future groups themselves—often as early as in struggle among themselves.49 and integration the 2011 or 2014 wars—rather than being Secondly, distrust towards the govern- The forces now fighting Haftar include appointed by the GNA. The GNA army ment runs even higher among the armed groups that had been hostile to each command has made gradual progress in groups. This is partly due to the fact that other and had even fought each other connecting the armed groups to the the government’s composition is largely over the past years: in 2014–15 Zintani formal chain of command. Nevertheless, unchanged from the period preceding forces had fought against most of the most day-to-day coordination takes place Haftar’s offensive. Ministers and senior groups they are now allied with, while in directly among field commanders rather officials were appointed in an effort to 2017–18 some Misratan groups had on than through official command structures. accommodate diverse political factions, repeated occasions clashed with armed This creates challenges in the direction including ones that were—and in some groups from Tripoli. These forces also in- of operations. Commanders frequently cases, remain—on good terms with clude many groups that had until recently recount how they agreed on plans for a Haftar. Many commanders therefore see been opposed to the GNA. Unsurprisingly, coordinated attack, only to be abandoned the government as being infiltrated by relations between some of these groups by one of the groups involved when the officials with ties to Haftar or his regional are sometimes tense and marked by a time came.48 backers. They also perceive the govern- lack of trust. But in light of this history, Several factors explain such coordina- ment as deeply corrupt and incompetent, the degree of integration and coordination tion problems. Firstly, relations between and frequently blame the lack of progress among them is even more remarkable. some of the forces are marked by distrust, on the battlefield on the weakness of On most front lines numerous groups owing to previous conflicts between them. ­political leadership. Demands that key of different local origins fight in immedi- Misratan politicians and commanders, officials be dismissed are frequent. Most ate proximity to one another. For example, for example, do not hide their continuing commanders, however, are acutely aware

Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 9 that they cannot replace Prime Minister are reluctant to use their own stocks of integrated in Zintani-led forces south of Serraj, because this could jeopardize the ammunition—which in many cases are Tripoli—between al-Aziziya and Gharyan— Tripoli government’s status as the inter- substantial. together with combatants from Zawiya nationally recognized authority in Libya.50 The government’s contribution to date and the Amazigh towns. Small groups of Another source of distrust towards the has focused on filling key gaps in its mili- fighters from Jadu have joined the Bab government is the fact that the authorities tary capabilities through support from Tajura Battalion in Ain Zara; similarly, have provided only limited support to Turkey. This notably includes a number small groups from Nalut have joined the the armed groups fighting the war. This of Turkish-made Bayraktar combat TRB in the same area. The forces de- particularly applies to ammunition and drones—at least three of which Haftar’s ployed under the ­Misratan-dominated funds to compensate for vehicles and warplanes and drones have destroyed to ATF in Wadi al-Rabi’ also include fighters heavy weapons that are destroyed in the date, but more are in operation—as well from Sabratha and eastern Libya, as well fighting. The government appears to have as armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as armed groups from Tajura—all of which real difficulties in importing ammunition and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). only joined these forces after the start of due to the UN arms embargo; instead, it Turkish officers are widely believed to the war.60 Such instances of incorpora- tries to source ammunition from the local operate the drones. The armed groups tion could potentially serve as a starting market. In the first weeks of the war top have not competed over who controls the point for the creation of properly inte- GNA officers issued cheques to com- drones, since they lack the expertise to grated forces—units that no longer have manders for them to purchase ammuni- operate them.57 an attachment to a particular community, tion on the local black market. Such pur- The distribution of the APCs and but have a common esprit de corps and chases also included acquisitions from ATGMs has increased tensions among loyalty to a unified command structure. commanders in Haftar’s forces.51 GNA-affiliated forces. The APCs were dis- Four months into the war these prob- tributed in equal proportion to the com- lems persist. Since June, the command manders of the three military regions— Extremists and criminals? in charge of supplies and training has Western, Tripoli, and Central. Some Libyan media and foreign governments moved to a system where it buys ammuni- Misratan commanders, however, com- that support Haftar have sought to portray tion from the armed groups upon inspec- plained that since they had deployed far the forces fighting Haftar in Tripoli as tion, then returns half of the ammunition more forces, they should also be given a being dominated by extremists and crimi- to the group that has supplied it and much greater number of APCs than Tripoli nals.61 To a lesser extent some interna- keeps the other half. In this way the army armed groups.58 Similar tensions have tional media coverage has also sup- command is gradually building up ammu- also emerged over the allocation and con- ported such claims (Kirkpatrick, 2019a). nition stocks of its own.52 The command’s trol of funds for the treatment of wounded The narrative has been sufficiently influ- conservative stance towards armed fighters abroad.59 ential for France to insert language into a groups’ demands for ammunition may be The longer the war continues, the European Union statement to express partly a means of reducing wasteful use. more demands for government support ‘concern at the involvement of terrorist But according to field commanders and and rivalries over its allocation could and criminal elements in the fighting, close observers, the government is still come to define the politics among GNA- ­including individuals listed by the UN not meeting the needs of the armed affiliated forces. Commanders with privi- Security Council’ (European Council, 2019; groups on the battlefield.53 leged access to state budgets and foreign Viscusi, 2019). Language of this type has While the arms embargo may explain support could seize the opportunity to since been a recurrent feature of interna- the government’s cautious approach to strengthen their own forces, potentially tional statements on the situation in Libya. ammunition, its failure to replace de- creating new, more powerful militias. These claims are misleading. Among stroyed vehicles and compensate armed Libyans who are subject to UN sanctions, groups for heavy weapons destroyed by Bottom-up integration Salah Badi is the only one involved in the enemy fire causes greater frustration fighting. Badi was sanctioned for partici- among commanders. These armed groups A remarkable development since the war pating in a military offensive that was led mostly built up their stocks of heavy weap- began is the extent of integration among by the Kani brothers—who are now fight- ons during the 2011 war and in its imme- numerous groups in the battlefield. Sepa- ing with Haftar—and whose consequences diate aftermath, and therefore consider rate units have chosen to fight together for civilians and the political process in the weapons to be theirs. The army com- and small groups of combatants have Libya were far less serious than that led mand has only paid compensation for a joined armed groups of different local ori- by Haftar, who has not been sanctioned.62 fraction of the ‘technicals’54 destroyed so gins. This process of integration is largely Moreover, contrary to what some reports far—estimated to be in the hundreds55— the work of armed group commanders have asserted, Badi is not ‘a (hardline) and none for heavy weapons. Some themselves rather than of the official ­Islamist commander’ (Kirkpatrick, 2019a); smaller battalions have already depleted command structure. It is generally based in fact, Badi himself denies he is an Islam- substantial parts of their arsenals in this on personal ties among commanders that ist, and there is no evidence to contradict way and now lack firepower 56. often go back to the 2011 war. him.63 This lack of government support To give a few examples: at the air­ Media reports have repeatedly leaves the army command with little to port front, forces from Zintan are fighting claimed that three other listed individu- offer in exchange for cooperation by ­together with their erstwhile enemies als have joined the forces fighting Haftar: armed groups. It also fuels suspicions of 2014—the Amazigh fighters of the Abderrahman al-Milad from Zawiya and among fighters and commanders that the ­National Mobile Force, Fursan Janzur, Ahmed al-Dabbashi from Sabratha, who government seeks to exhaust the armed and forces from Zawiya. Fighters from have both been sanctioned for their in- groups’ arsenals in order to strengthen its Gharyan and Sabratha were also the volvement in people smuggling, as well authority. As a result, the armed groups ­Zintanis’ enemies in 2014, and are now as Ibrahim al-Jadhran, who has been

10 SANA Briefing Paper August 2019 sanctioned for his repeated attacks on the militias that engaged in unprecedented (UN News, 2019; Hill, 2019). But the mili- oil ports in the east (Al-Marsad, 2019a; predation on state institutions after the tias that engage in such predatory prac- 2019b; Al-Hurra, 2019). But while Milad establishment of the GNA in 2016—and tices now form a minority in the forces and Dabbashi initially did join the fighting, were tacitly supported in this by Western fighting Haftar. other commanders quickly persuaded governments and UNSMIL until this state Media reports also use the participa- them to withdraw due to the negative of affairs provoked renewed conflict in tion of fighters from the BDB as evidence ­attention they attracted, and Interior Tripoli (Lacher and al-Idrissi, 2018). Some of the presence of extremists (Kirkpatrick, Minister Fathi Bashagha charged several groups are also engaged in the business 2019a). The BDB was a group of fighters units with searching for and arresting of extorting and exploiting migrants who from Benghazi that formed in Misrata in them.64 Jadhran issued a statement in were confined in official detention centres, 2016 and led several offensives towards support of the resistance against Haftar’s after they were intercepted by the Libyan the Haftar-controlled east. The group ini- offensive, but has not taken part in the Coast Guard in operations that European tially included some former members of fighting. Misratan forces that include states supported (Amnesty International, extremist group Ansar al-Sharia—a group fighters from Jadhran’s hometown, 2017; Micallef, Horsley, and Bish, 2019). that the UN and United States has desig- ­Ajdabiya, have kept their distance from The issue received widespread attention nated as an al-Qaeda affiliate—or allied Jadhran and his core followers, which after an air strike that foreign warplanes itself with such individuals in its eastern they now estimate to be no more than 30 most likely carried out in support of Haf- offensives. It also comprised former in number.65 tar’s forces killed 53 people in a detention members of the Benghazi Revolutionaries There is no doubt that some of the centre in Tajura on 2 July. The detention Shura Council (BRSC), a coalition that groups and individuals involved in the centre was next to a base of the al-Dhaman ­included both Ansar al-Sharia and non- fighting, while not listed by the UN Secu- Battalion, which effectively controlled the jihadist armed groups and was formed rity Council, have a record of criminal ac- detention centre and forced detainees to in 2014 in response to Haftar’s operation tivities. This notably applies to the Tripoli help with the maintenance of its weapons in Benghazi.66 The vast majority of BDB

Photo 2 Fighters loyal to Haftar receive food at a holding station in Zawiya, Libya, after being captured by GNA-allied militias, April 2019. Source: Mahmud Turkia/AFP Photo

Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 11 have not returned to join the war, fearing they would be arrested on their return.76 The anti-Haftar forces are The current war provides a much more difficult environment for extremist groups than the civil war of 2014–15. If some held together by the unifying threat western Libyan forces displayed ambigu- ity towards Islamist and jihadist groups they face, but Haftar needs to win to up until 2015, this has long ceased to be the case. The most important develop- ment to change perceptions of jihadist keep his coalition together.” groups was the 2016 fight against IS in Sirte. For the armed groups who partici- pated in this conflict there could no members were not extremists, however, Similarly, pro-Haftar Libyan media longer be any tolerance for those who but were motivated by the desire to fight have focused on Ziyad Balam, a revolu- had allowed IS to establish itself in Libya. what they saw as the injustice they and tionary commander from Benghazi who At the same time the dominant militias their families had suffered at the hands in recent years was at times allied with in Tripoli turned hostile towards Islamist of Haftar’s forces (Toaldo and Fitzgerald, the BDB (Al-Marsad, 2019b). Contrary to forces—partly out of ideological motiva- 2018). By mid-2018 the BDB had divided what such media reports claim, Balam is tions, partly as a result of struggles over into several factions after disagreements not an extremist, was never a BRSC territory (Lacher and al-Idrissi, 2018). over strategy. The core group in a military member, and is not even participating in Aversion towards the Muslim Brother- base at al-Sdada, south of Misrata, the current Tripoli war. Early on in the hood also became ubiquitous among purged its ranks of individuals with an conflict he announced he was joining the western Libyan armed groups for what extremist background and cut ties with battle, but other commanders quickly they saw as the Brotherhood’s political Jadhran, with whom the BDB had been persuaded him to withdraw.72 According opportunism in the post-Qaddafi era.77 allied in several eastern offensives.67 to a former leading figure in the Benghazi As a result, there is now a widespread Two groups of former BDB members armed groups from which Balam came, hostility to Islamist ideologues among are participating in the current fighting. ‘Ziyad isn’t fighting. He sometimes comes the forces fighting Haftar in and around One, led by Col. Mustafa al-Sharkasi, is to the front, takes some pictures, then Tripoli. Unnerved by the media allega- fighting with Salah Badi’s Sumud Battalion goes back to Istanbul.’73 tions that they are Islamists, commanders in Ain Zara.68 According to GNA counter- Pro-Haftar media outlets have pub- frequently raised the issue in interviews terrorism officials and commanders on lished many other reports that mislead- with the author, and almost unanimously the Ain Zara front, there is no evidence of ingly lump anti-Haftar fighters from stressed that they would not accept the presence of extremists among them.69 Benghazi together as ‘terrorists’. The task ­Islamists in their forces.78 There are some The other group has joined Misratan of such media outlets has been made exceptions, however. A few groups from forces on the southern front. Misratan easier by the fact that distinguishing ex- Zawiya and Sabratha appear to remain commanders of these forces say they tremists from ordinary fighters can at open to radical Islamists. In May 2019 screened BDB members to make sure times be difficult due to their past ties an LNA air strike that targeted the facility none with a known extremist background within the BRSC and continuing social of the al-Faruq Battalion in Zawiya killed was among them—a step that reflects relations among them—for example, in an IS member from Sabratha, raising both a change in attitudes towards ex- the form of public expressions of condo- questions over why he had been present tremist elements among Misratan armed lences. In recent years this proximity had at the location—an occurrence made all groups over the past years and an aware- also led militias and law-enforcement the more puzzling by the fact that al-Faruq ness that the presence of extremists could agencies in Tripoli and Misrata to regard had fought against IS in Sabratha in quickly become a liability for them.70 all fighters from Benghazi who had found 2016.79 The overall picture, however, is More generally, pro-Haftar media refuge in western Libya with suspicion.74 one of unequivocal intolerance for jihad- outlets tend to describe all fighters from In the current war many fighters from ists in the forces fighting Haftar. Benghazi who have joined GNA-affiliated Benghazi have joined armed groups from forces as extremists (Al-Marsad, 2019d). Tripoli as individuals rather than in This is highly misleading and often in- groups, and have begun to regain the Who is fighting for Haftar? volves fabricated claims. One report, for trust of Tripoli factions. Law enforcement example, described a young combatant and intelligence professionals working Judging from the fighters in Haftar’s from Benghazi who was killed in the for the GNA and its attorney general rely forces who GNA-affiliated groups have fighting as a former inmate of the notori- on the cooperation of commanders and taken prisoner, the bulk of the forces ous Abu Slim prison and a suspect in the combatants to monitor suspected ex- Haftar sent to Tripoli were initially from assassination of the former US ambassa- tremists and individuals thought to retain the east. Over the first month of the oper- dor to Libya in 2012 (Al-Marsad, 2019c). ties with extremist groups.75 Their detailed ation, however, this changed, and since But the person in question had been too information on such individuals suggests then at least half of the forces fighting for young to be imprisoned under Qaddafi, that the extent to which extremists may Haftar in the Tripoli area are from western law enforcement agencies had not con- be present among the forces fighting and, to a lesser extent, southern Libya.80 nected him to the death of the US am- Haftar is a matter of isolated cases rather By far the most important contingent of bassador, and he was not known as an than of cells or groups. Many Libyan fighters from western Libya is from extremist among friends from Benghazi fighters who are known to have ties to IS ­Tarhuna, and more specifically from the and fellow combatants from Tripoli.71 or Ansar al-Sharia are based in Turkey and Kaniyat militia—which operates as the

12 SANA Briefing Paper August 2019 9th Brigade since its integration into The bulk of Haftar’s eastern forces, how- of Ajeilat, Sorman, al-Asabea and Bani ­Haftar’s LAAF (Dale’, 2019). As a result, the ever, have tended to follow the line prop- Walid; and the Magarha tribe in southern conflict has not only deepened societal agated by pro-Haftar media, according to Libya.89 Another marginalized community divides between eastern and western which revolutionaries are synonymous among which Haftar’s forces have re- Libya, but has also taken on the character with extremists and criminals. Former cruited is that of the Mahamid of southern of a western Libyan civil war whose divi- Qaddafi regime loyalists have gained Libya, most of whom arrived from Chad sions largely match those of the 2011 war. prominent positions in Haftar’s power during the Qaddafi era. Mahamid fight- structure, increasing fears among many ers have joined the 128th Battalion led by eastern protagonists in 2011 that Haftar Hassan al-Zadma, which also includes Eastern forces is leading a counter-revolution (Lacher, combatants from the oil crescent, as well forthcoming). Most of the eastern forces active in the as a small number of Awlad Suleiman Tripoli area come from units that are par- from southern Libya and the Sirte area. An Awlad Suleiman militia from Sabha ticularly closely linked to Haftar’s inner Western and southern forces circle and have therefore been favoured initially participated in the offensive with the modern weaponry Haftar has The groups that Haftar has mobilized in before withdrawing in June. This was the th obtained from foreign states (UNSC, 2017; western and southern Libya come pre- 116 Battalion led by Massoud Jiddu, a 2018a). These include the 106th Brigade dominantly from communities that were commander who is well known for his headed by Haftar’s son, Khaled; the 73rd collectively stigmatized and marginalized role in recruiting Chadian and Sudanese 90 Brigade headed by Saleh al-Quta’ani; and by revolutionaries as supporters of the mercenaries. the Tareq ben Ziyad Brigade led by Omar former regime after 2011.85 Unlike what Unlike Tarhuna’s Kaniyat, these Mraje’. These units’ members mostly happened in eastern Libya, the 2011 war groups generally do not have broad-based come from eastern Libya, particularly the divided western and southern Libyan community support. Bani Walid, for ex- Benghazi area. All three units—but most cities and communities into ‘revolutionar- ample, is deeply divided over pro-Haftar notably the Tareq ben Ziyad Brigade— ies’ and ‘loyalists’. These divisions grad- forces’ use of the town’s airport. Even also include Madkhalist Salafists (ICG, ually receded after the 2014–15 civil war, deeper divisions exist in Sabratha, from 2019, p. 13; Harchaoui and Lazib, 2019; but they have been revived once more. where most former revolutionaries— Wehrey and Badi, 2019).81 The same ap- The most important example is Tar- among them migrant smuggling kingpin plies to the contingent of fighters from huna, where Qaddafi had heavily recruited Ahmed al-Dabbashi, who contrary to Ajdabiya, which is the most sizeable after for his regime’s protection units. After claims is not participating in the Tripoli those from Benghazi. An officer from the 2011 the city found itself with a large war—were forcibly dislodged in October Ajdabiya area, Fawzi al-Mansuri, com- number of military professionals who had 2017 by a coalition of Haftar supporters mands operations on the Wadi al-Rabi’ served in Qaddafi’s forces, but it had no and former regime loyalists who are now front.82 weapons or significant representation in fighting for Haftar.91 There are signs that Haftar faces limits successive transitional governments. The groups that have joined Haftar’s in his efforts to mobilize fighters in east- From 2015 onwards the Kani brothers forces from Sabratha, Sorman, Tiji, and ern Libya. Among these signs is the fact drew on this reservoir of unemployed Badr are dominated by Madkhalist Sala­ that key eastern units, such as the Saeqa soldiers to staff their militia, which even- fists.92 This also applies to many of those Special Forces, have sent very few fighters tually established exclusive control over who have joined Haftar from two former to the Tripoli battlefield. Contrary to pre- Tarhuna—a singular feat among western revolutionary strongholds: Zintan and vious operations in Benghazi, Darna, and Libyan cities.86 During their unsuccessful Rujban.93 In all these towns Madkhalist southern Libya, Saeqa Special Forces attempts to enter Tripoli by force in preachers have made significant inroads commander Wanis Bukhamada has been August 2018 and January 2019, they imi- in recent years and provided staunch conspicuously absent from the battle in tated Haftar’s military rhetoric, claiming support for Haftar (ICG, 2019). Part of the Tripoli. In addition to a reportedly heavy that they represented the ‘army’ and Madkhalist Subul al-Salam Battalion from death toll, several hundred men from their adversaries the ‘militias’. But their al-Kufra in Libya’s far south-east has been eastern Libya were taken prisoner in the attitude towards Haftar remained unclear sent to Sabratha to bolster local forces Tripoli area in the operation’s first weeks, until the day they joined his operation in there.94 which may explain the reluctance to join Tripoli. Concomitantly with their entry into In addition to hardline Salafists, an- the war. Nevertheless, eastern forces de- the war, the Kaniyat absorbed yet more other notable category among western ployed to Tripoli in rotations—fighting for officers of Qaddafi’s security forces—who Libyan groups in Haftar’s Tripoli operation three weeks, then returning home for had previously been with Haftar’s forces are known criminals who have faced two—at least until the fall of Gharyan in in the east—and were renamed the LAAF’s arrest warrants since long before they late June 2019.83 Since then the supply 9th Brigade.87 The perception among GNA- started fighting for Haftar. Four figures lines between eastern Libya and the affiliated forces that Tarhuna by and large from Bani Walid who have joined the war Tripoli front lines have become much supports the war in Tripoli makes it diffi- on Haftar’s side are subject to arrest more vulnerable and the rotation of units cult for Tarhunan fighters to withdraw: warrants issued by the GNA attorney more difficult.84 as one observer from Tarhuna put it, ‘they general in recent years for their alleged Few among Haftar’s eastern forces are now defending Tarhuna in Tripoli’.88 involvement in criminal cases related to fought against Qaddafi in 2011. Three Several other groups that have mobi- migrant smuggling, including two inci- prominent figures did play a role in the lized to fight with Haftar come from com- dents in which migrants were killed in revolutionary forces in 2011: Haftar him- munities that were among the ‘losers’ of Bani Walid.102 The leader of an armed self, Bukhamada, and Abdesselam al- the 2011 war. They include the Si’aan group from Zintan who is fighting for Hassi, who until July 2019 was the com- communities of Tiji and Badr; the Warsha­ Haftar at Tripoli International Airport, Ab- mander of operations for the Tripoli war. fana area south-west of Tripoli; the towns delmonem Dardira, is wanted for his role

Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 13 Box 1 Drones and other new weaponry entering Libya since April 2019

Since the beginning of Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli both sides in the equipment to interfere with Haftar’s foreign-operated drones (Middle conflict have acquired sophisticated new weapons and their foreign East Monitor, 2019).101 In addition to combat drones, both sides supporters have significantly stepped up their direct involvement— have also obtained a variety of surveillance drones from their foreign all in violation of the UN arms embargo on Libya. Each attempt by backers (Magdy, 2019; Binnie, 2019a; Kenyette, 2019). foreign powers to ensure the superiority of their Libyan allies has prompted the foreign backers of the opposing side to increase their support. Air strikes in support of Haftar’s forces by Chinese-made Wing Loong drones, which were almost certainly owned and operated by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), began less than two weeks after Haftar started his offensive (Delalande, 2019; Nichols, 2019). ­Initially these strikes occurred only at night, causing several weeks of speculation about their origin among GNA commanders.95 After Haftar’s forces lost control of Gharyan in late June 2019, his foreign supporters increased the intensity of air strikes: drone strikes began occurring more frequently and also during the daylight hours. In addition, foreign warplanes began attacking the positions of GNA- affiliated forces: one of the first such strikes was that on a migrant detention centre in Tajura on 2 July, which killed 53 migrants (UN News, 2019).96 Throughout the offensive the heavy use of ATGMs

and laser-guided artillery shells by Haftar’s forces caused heavy Photo 3 A GNA officer displaying US-made Javelin missiles and other casualties in the ranks of GNA-affiliated forces.97 Haftar’s foreign ­weaponry to journalists, Gharyan, June 2019. Source: @BurkanLy Twitter supporters had already supplied his forces with such guided weap- account, 29 June 2019 ons during previous operations, while GNA-affiliated forces had very few of them (Delalande, 2017). The most surprising discovery among the foreign-supplied weaponry in Libya since April 2019 has been that of several US-made Javelin ATGMs, which are powerful guided weapons that are subject to tough US end-use restrictions. The missiles, which did not include the command launch units needed to fire them, were found in an LAAF base after GNA-affiliated forces captured Gharyan (Walsh, Schmitt, and Ismay, 2019). It later emerged that the United States had initially sold the missiles to France. This revelation forced the French government to admit that the missiles were intended to pro- tect French troops deployed in Libya, contradicting its earlier denials that it had deployed forces with Haftar’s units for his Tripoli offensive Photo 4 A fighter from the Ruhbat al-Duru’ Battalion of Tajura wielding Metis (Schmitt and Walsh, 2019; Guibert and Bobin, 2019). ATGM. Tripoli July 2019. Source: @rahbatajoura Twitter account, 15 July 2019 In response to Haftar’s foreign-backed offensive, GNA officials obtained support from Turkey. Commanders of GNA-affiliated forces openly trumpeted the arrival of dozens of Turkish APCs in mid-May 2019. At around the same time Turkish-made Bayraktar combat drones began operating in support of GNA-affiliated forces (Megerisi, 2019; Al-Atrush, 2019b).98 Foreign drones and warplanes supporting Haftar’s forces repeatedly destroyed Turkish combat drones on the ground, but Turkey has continued to supply more drones to replace these losses. Turkey also provided Russian Federation-made Metis ATGMs (see Photo 4).99 Reacting to the deployment of Turkish combat drones, the LAAF— again, almost certainly through the UAE—obtained several Russian Pantsir mobile air defence batteries (Binnie, 2019b). GNA-affiliated forces claimed to have destroyed one of these batteries on its way to the battlefield, but several more are in operation.100 The downing

of a Wing Loong drone south of Misrata in August 2019 has provoked Photo 5 APCs arrive in Tripoli port from Turkey, May 2019. Source: @BurkanLy speculation that GNA-affiliated forces may have acquired jamming Twitter account, 18 May 2019

14 SANA Briefing Paper August 2019 in the kidnapping of the parliamentarian Qaddafi regime loyalists have been an Guibert and Bobin, 2019). This makes it Suleiman Zubi in 2014, who was held important component of Haftar’s power almost impossible for GNA-affiliated captive for more than two years (Al-Wasat, structure for years, but he mobilized addi- forces to trust international stakeholders 2016a).103 The leader of an armed group tional support from this constituency by to act as honest brokers, let alone en- of former regime loyalists in Sabratha and launching his offensive on Tripoli. Many force an agreement and hold Haftar to Ajeilat who has joined Haftar’s forces, supporters of the former regime may hope account should he violate it. Mohamed al-Shtiwi, is accused of numer- to use Haftar to obtain both weapons and Short of a ceasefire agreement be- ous murders in Ajeilat (Akhbar Libya, a foothold in Tripoli before turning on tween Misratan and Tarhunan forces that 2017; Elmanassa, 2018). The Kani brothers their ally.108 would end the conflict in Tripoli without also face arrest warrants for their alleged This alliance could founder if Haftar a wider political deal, this means that responsibility for numerous extrajudicial fails to make progress. Militias from fighting is currently the only way forward executions in public—a practice that was southern Libya and criminal elements for the combatants. In view of the societal key to their establishment of control over from western Libyan towns probably divides this conflict has created or deep- Tarhuna—as well as the killing of 12 mem- joined the war expecting a quick victory. ened, the continuing war risks causing bers of a single family in the town in 2017 Contrary to western Libyan groups that much greater damage to Libya’s social (Al-Marsad, 2017; Libya al-Ahrar, 2019).104 are fighting Haftar, many have the option fabric than it has to date. Any major vic- The involvement of criminal elements to withdraw—and some, such as the tory for GNA-affiliated forces—such as the and hardline Salafist groups is being felt ­militia from Sabha led by Massoud Jiddu, capture of Tarhuna or Sabratha—could on the ground. In areas where armed have already done so.109 Sudanese and result in indiscriminate reprisals by mem- groups from Tarhuna, Bani Walid, or Chadian mercenaries have served Haftar bers of another community or members southern Libya are active, looting by well in supporting his largely unopposed of the same community taking revenge ­elements of Haftar’s forces is rampant, expansion in the oil crescent and southern on one another. Any major advance by and a market for stolen white goods has Libya, and in securing remote outposts Haftar’s forces would bring them to com- emerged in Tarhuna. But theft of this that are rarely attacked. They are less munities that are overwhelmingly hostile kind is absent in areas under the control likely to accept an engagement that in- to them. To establish control they would of Madkhalist-dominated groups from volves heavy losses, even less so if events have to resort to highly destructive war- Sabratha, Sorman, or Ajdabiya.105 in Sudan open up the possibility of some fare or brutal repression. And should A final component of Haftar’s forces of them returning home. GNA-affiliated forces succeed in seizing are mercenaries from neighbouring Chad There have already been signs of ten- Haftar’s bases in western Libya, the divide and Sudan. Judging from the prisoners sions among the various forces in Haftar’s between east and west would become the taken by GNA-affiliated forces, Haftar’s alliance—often between the eastern units key fault line of the conflict, and separa- commanders have to date mostly shied that closely follow orders from Haftar’s tion could become a much more realistic away from using hired fighters at the front command structure and the more inde- scenario. lines, instead using them to secure rear pendent western armed groups. Rumours The longer the war continues, the bases in Gharyan and Jufra. When GNA- abound that several western command- more struggles over power and resources affiliated forces seized Gharyan in a sur- ers—among them the Warshafana officer are likely to play out within the two oppos- prise operation they captured approxi- Massud al-Dhawi and the notorious leader ing alliances—but particularly so in the mately 120 prisoners, half of whom were of the ‘Brigade of Arabism’ from Ajeilat, GNA-affiliated anti-Haftar alliance, which Sudanese and Chadian mercenaries.106 Mohamed al-Shtiwi—might have been lacks a central arbiter. While many fight- As Haftar faces limits to the mobilization killed by their rivals in Haftar’s coalition ers in GNA-affiliated forces are still unpaid of additional Libyan recruits, he may rely (Al-Wasat, 2019; al-Shabaka al-Arabiya, volunteers and government support in the more heavily on foreign fighters. In early 2019). form of funds, ammunition, and weapons July a large group of fighters from Darfur has to date been limited, this is likely to arrived in Tarhuna.107 At about the same change as the war drags on. A first indi- time Haftar also began recruiting mem- Outlook: conflicts to come cation of such change came with the bers of pro-government Darfur militias, August 2019 order by Prime Minister in addition to the Darfur rebels who have A negotiated settlement to the war in Serraj to pay out a one-off sum of LD been part of his forces for years (de Waal, Tripoli currently appears to be out of 3,000 (USD 810) to each fighter involved 2019; Radio Dabanga, 2019). reach. Even if both the commanders of in the war against Haftar (GNA, 2019). the GNA-affiliated forces and Haftar con- Leaders of armed groups with privileged cluded that they could not gain by con- access to state funds or foreign assis- A fragile alliance tinuing the war, there is no credible third tance could well use it to expand the fire- party that could guarantee the imple- power of their own groups and turn them The alliance Haftar has mobilized to fight mentation of a deal and thereby help into new state-sanctioned units. In this in Tripoli may be more fragile than that of overcome the distrust between the two way powerful new militias could arise his opponents. The anti-Haftar forces are sides. Western governments and UNSMIL from the current war. held together by the unifying threat they have refrained from taking any steps The sacrifices fighters and their fami- face, but Haftar needs to win to keep his against Haftar, despite the fact that he lies are making in the war against Haftar coalition together. started the war. In addition to continuing also provide a basis for new political The Kaniyat are a very recent addition military support from regional backers struggles. As after previous conflicts, com- to Haftar’s forces, and if they were to such as Egypt and the UAE, Haftar has manders of strong or victorious factions withdraw from the war on the basis of a also enjoyed support from key Western and their political representatives are ceasefire agreement, it would be impos- governments such as those of France and set to demand their share of positions in sible for him to continue the war. Former the United States (Kirkpatrick, 2019b; government, the administration, and the

Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 15 security forces. Politicians associated Abbreviations and Army (LNA) (Eljarh, 2014). This name has with the forces fighting Haftar repeatedly since been used in the international media. call for the formation of a crisis govern- acronyms But in months the LAAF became the name ment—or at least for the replacement of by which Haftar’s forces generally referred APC Armoured personnel carrier to themselves in Arabic, and which fea- certain officials whom they accuse of ATF Anti-Terrorism Force tured on their official documents. For this ­insufficient fervour in the war effort. Such ATGM Anti-tank guided missile reason this report uses LAAF. Neither LNA struggles have been kept in check to date BDB Benghazi Defence Battalions nor LAAF is the official name of the Libyan by the general realization that fundamen- BRSC Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura army under current Libyan law. tally reshuffling the government could Council 4 Author interviews with community leaders jeopardize its status as Libya’s interna- GNA Government of National Accord and observers, Nalut and Zawiya, Novem- tionally recognized authority. But amid HoR House of Representatives ber 2018; ICG (2019). mounting resentment among fighters and IS Islamic State 5 Author interviews with leaders of armed groups and community leaders, Misrata, commanders over perceived incompe- LAAF Libyan Arab Armed Forces Zintan, and Nalut, March, April, and Novem- tence and corruption in the government, LNA Libyan National Army (see also LAAF) politicians are likely to seize the opportu- ber 2018. SDF Special Deterrence Force 6 Author interviews with leaders of armed nity to advance their interests. The rival- TRB Tripoli Revolutionaries Battalion groups and an observer of Tarhunan origin, ries that would inevitably ensue could UAE United Arab Emirates Tripoli and Misrata, January–February 2019. threaten the cohesion of the anti-Haftar UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission 7 Author interviews with politicians and alliance. in Libya leaders of armed groups, Misrata and The issue of the post-war balance of Tripoli, February 2019. power in Tripoli looms large in the on­ 8 Author interviews with Western diplomats, going conflict. The war has brought large Tunis; author phone interviews with poli- forces to Tripoli that had left the capital Endnotes ticians and observers from Tripoli, Zawiya, and Misrata, March 2019. years ago, including groups from Misrata, 1 Throughout this Briefing Paper terms such 9 Author phone interviews with command- Zawiya, and the Amazigh towns. Some as ‘currently’ and ‘to date’ refer to its time ers and community leaders from Zintan, may not easily give up their new foothold of writing, July 2019. Misrata, Tripoli, and the Amazigh towns, 2 The controversy over Haftar’s military rank in Tripoli after the war. Many had resented March–April 2019. is closely linked to the struggle over politi- the excesses of the handful of militias that 10 This Briefing Paper uses ‘brigade’ for cal legitimacy between rival Libyan adminis- controlled much of Tripoli in recent years, groups that are particularly large—usually trations. In 2013 Haftar was among dozens but this is not to say that they would not of military officers who were retired by more than 500 combatants—and ‘bat- engage in similar predation if they gained the—then still unified—Libyan authorities. talion’ for all smaller ones, irrespective of control of state institutions. Clearly, how- After he announced a coup attempt in the names they themselves give their ever, many commanders in the forces February 2014, the authorities issued an groups. currently defending Tripoli expect a con- arrest warrant for him. He launched his 11 Author phone interview with an observer frontation with the Tripoli militias in a Benghazi operation in May 2014 in open from Zawiya, April 2019. 12 Author phone interviews with Western future phase of the conflict. rebellion against the government and diplomats, April 2019. The challenge of negotiating widely without holding an official position (Eljarh, 13 Author phone interview with an observer acceptable security arrangements for 2014). In March 2015 the House of Repre- sentatives (HoR) in Tobruk promoted Haftar from Zawiya, March 2019; author inter- Tripoli will once again become an issue to fariq (lieutenant general) and appointed views with commanders and observers if the threat to the capital from Haftar’s him as general commander of the armed from Tripoli, Tripoli, June 2019. forces recedes. Indeed, negotiating such forces of the eastern government. This 14 Author interviews with Misratan politi- arrangements would likely have to be part position was created specifically for Haftar;­ cians, Tripoli and Misrata, June 2019. of any agreement among western Libyan it is superior to the chief of staff and is 15 Author phone interview with an observer forces to end the fighting. No progress has ac­­countable—on paper—only to the HoR from Zawiya, April 2019. been made since the August–September president, not to the government (Al-War- 16 Author interviews with commanders and observers from Tripoli, Tripoli, June 2019. 2018 conflict in forming regular units that falli, 2015). The Tripoli government recog- 17 Author phone interviews with Misratan could ensure the security of state institu- nized neither Haftar’s appointment nor his promotion. The HoR was split at the time, commanders and politicians, April 2019. tions and citizens in the capital. Like this with only about half of its members typi- 18 Author phone interview with a commander previous conflict, the current war could cally attending sessions in Tobruk, while involved in the group of anti-Haftar fighters, also offer an opportunity to negotiate about half of the members of the former April 2019. more ambitious solutions to Tripoli’s long- parliament continued to meet in Tripoli 19 Author phone interviews with command- lasting security dilemma. With an array and contested the HoR’s legitimacy. Haftar ers and observers from Tripoli, April 2019. of newly empowered military forces pre- exerted substantial influence over the HoR 20 Author interviews with Misratan politicians sent in the capital, however, the obstacles in Tobruk, a city that was located in terri- and commanders, Tripoli and Misrata, to any such solution will be formidable. tory he controlled (ICG, 2016; author inter- June 2019. views with active and boycotting HoR mem- 21 All estimates are of the number of fighters bers, Misrata, Tripoli, and Tobruk, October participating in the war, not the nominal 2014, January and April 2015). In September strength of groups. Estimates are based 2016 HoR president Agilah Saleh single- on multiple sources and observations, and handedly promoted Haftar to field marshal have not simply been adopted from group (Al-Wasat, 2016b). commanders at face value. 3 When Haftar started his rebellion in 2014 he 22 Author interviews with commanders of initially called his group the Libyan National Tripoli armed groups, observers with close

16 SANA Briefing Paper August 2019 ties to Tripoli armed groups, and an advisor 43 Author interactions with European diplo- end of the day allied to al Qaeda’ (Laessing to Abdelghani al-Kikli, Tripoli, June 2019. mats, London, Brussels, and Tunis, April– and Irish, 2019; Vespierre, 2019). The Unit- 23 Author interviews with former and current June 2019. ed Arab Emirates (UAE) minister of state TRB commanders, Tripoli, March and 44 Author interviews with BDB leaders and for foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, has ­November 2018 and June 2019. officers from eastern Libya, al-Sdada and explicitly referred to Le Drian’s statements 24 Author interviews with TRB commanders Tripoli, November 2018 and June 2019. in his own comments about ‘the extremist and an observer with close ties to the TRB, 45 Author phone interview with observer from militias in Tripoli’ (Gargash, 2019). Tripoli, June 2019. Murzuq, June 2019; author interview with 62 Author interview with Salah Badi, Tripoli, 25 Author interviews with observers with Zintani commander, Tripoli, June 2019. June 2019. close ties to Tripoli armed groups, Tripoli, 46 Author interviews and phone interviews 63 Author interview with Salah Badi, Tripoli, June 2019. with Hassan Musa and Tubu observers, June 2019. 26 Hereafter, references to the ‘airport front’ Tunis and Tripoli, January 2015, March 64 Author interviews with officers and leaders refer to Tripoli International Airport. 2017, and June 2019. of armed groups from Zawiya, the GNA 27 Author interviews with commanders of 47 Author observations and interviews with counter-terrorism coordinator, and Fathi anti-Haftar forces, Tripoli, June 2019. commanders of and combatants in GNA- Bashagha, Tripoli, June 2019. 28 Author interviews with Misratan com- affiliated forces, Tripoli, June 2019. 65 Author interviews with Misratan com- manders and observers with close ties to 48 Author interviews with commanders of manders, Tripoli, Misrata, and al-Sdada, Tajuran armed groups, Tripoli, June 2019. GNA-affiliated forces, Tripoli, June 2019. June 2019. 29 Author interviews with officer and com- 49 Author interviews with politicians and 66 Author interviews with BDB commanders mander from Zintan, Tripoli, June 2019. commanders, Tripoli and Misrata, June and former leaders in armed groups from 30 Author interviews with politicians, com- 2019. Benghazi, Tripoli, Istanbul, and al-Sdada, manders, and observers from Misrata and 50 Author interviews with politicians and com- March and November 2017 and November Amazigh towns, Tripoli, June 2019. manders, Tripoli and Misrata, June 2019. 2018. 31 Author’s observations and estimates 51 Author interviews with commanders and 67 Author interviews with Misratan and BDB based on multiple interviews and phone officers of GNA-affiliated forces and Inte- commanders, Misrata and al-Sdada, interviews with commanders, combatants, rior Minister Fathi Bashagha, Tripoli, June ­November 2018. and observers, Tripoli and Misrata, June– 2019. 68 Author interview with the former leader of July 2019. 52 Author interviews with commanders and a Benghazi armed group, Tripoli, June 2019. 32 Author interviews with officers, command- officers of GNA-affiliated forces, Tripoli, 69 Author interviews with a TRB commander, ers, and an observer from Zawiya, Tripoli June 2019. the GNA counter-terrorism coordinator, and Tunis, June 2019. 53 Author interviews and phone interviews and the former leader of a Benghazi armed 33 Author interviews with commanders from with commanders of and combatants in group, Tripoli, June 2019. Nalut and observers with close ties to GNA-affiliated forces and observers with 70 Author interviews with Misratan command- Tripoli armed groups, Tripoli, June 2019. close ties to these forces, Tripoli, June– ers, Misrata and al-Sdada, June 2019. 34 Author interviews with a Gharyan combat- July 2019. 71 Author interviews with an advisor to the ant and a Zintani commander working 54 These are usually open-backed four- lead investigator in the Attorney General’s closely with Gharyan forces, Tripoli, June wheel-drive vehicles with heavy or medium Office and a former leader of Benghazi 2019. weapons mounted on them. armed groups working with the GNA counter- 35 Author interviews with commanders of 55 Author interviews with commanders of terrorism coordinator, Tripoli, June 2019. GNA-affiliated forces and a combatant GNA-affiliated forces and Interior Minister 72 Author interview with the GNA counter- from Sabratha, Tripoli, June 2019. Fathi Bashagha, Tripoli, June 2019. terrorism coordinator, Tripoli, June 2019. 36 Author interviews with commanders and 56 Author interviews with commanders of 73 Author interview with a former leader of observers from Amazigh towns, Tripoli, and combatants in GNA-affiliated forces Benghazi armed groups, Tripoli, June 2019. June 2019. and observers with close ties to these 74 Author interviews with leaders of armed 37 Author interviews with commanders in forces, Tripoli and Misrata, June 2019. groups and BDB commanders, Tripoli, Misratan armed groups, Tripoli and Mis- 57 Author interviews with commanders of Misrata, and al-Sdada, March–April and rata, March–April 2018 and June 2019. GNA-affiliated forces and politicians with November 2018. 38 Author observations and interviews with close ties to GNA-affiliated groups, Tripoli 75 Author interview with the former leader of an ATF front commander, battalion com- and Misrata, June 2019. See Al-Atrush Benghazi armed groups working with the manders, and combatants, Wadi al-Rabi’, (2019a). GNA counter-terrorism coordinator, Tripo- June 2019. 58 Author interviews with commanders of li, June 2019. 39 Author interviews with commanders in GNA-affiliated forces and observers with 76 Author interviews with the GNA counter- GNA-affiliated armed groups from Tripoli close ties to GNA-affiliated groups, Tripoli, terrorism coordinator and the former and Misrata, Tripoli, June 2019. June 2019. leader of Benghazi armed groups working 40 Author interviews with Salah Badi and a 59 Author interview with an observer from with the GNA counter-terrorism coordina- senior officer in the GNA command struc- Zawiya, Tunis, June 2019. tor, Tripoli, June 2019. ture, Tripoli, June 2019. 60 Author observations, and interviews with 77 In Libyan public opinion the Muslim 41 Author interviews with commanders and commanders of and combatants in GNA- Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction combatants in al-Mahjub Brigade and affiliated forces, Tripoli, June 2019. Party is widely seen as sharing responsi- Misratan observers close to the city’s 61 With regard to the forces fighting in Tripoli, bility for the political deadlock in the armed groups, Tripoli and Misrata, Novem- France’s foreign minister, Jean-Yves Le General National Congress during 2013 ber 2011, April and September 2016, Drian, has promoted the idea that the and early 2014 that eventually caused the March and November 2018, and June attitudes of some groups ‘linked to politi- post-Qaddafi transition process to fail. 2019. cal Islamism’ are unclear regarding jihadist Many leaders of armed groups in western 42 Author observations, and interviews with groups (Le Drian, 2019). In what resembles Libya view the Brotherhood in the same commanders of Misratan forces in Sirte a concerted effort, unnamed French diplo- way. But, more specifically, many believe and on the southern front, Misrata and mats have repeatedly told reporters that that the Brotherhood helped to provoke al-Sdada, June 2019. some groups fighting in Tripoli are ‘at the the escalation into civil war in mid-2014,

Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 17 and then cynically exploited the ensuing 90 Author phone interview with an Awlad related criminal cases in which they are negotiations to gain a share in the GNA, Suleiman politician, July 2019. In January suspects. thereby betraying the armed groups that 2019 Jiddu was among 37 Libyan, Suda- 103 Author interviews with community leaders, had led the war. Author interviews with nese, and Chadian nationals for whom Zintan, April 2016. leaders of armed groups, Tripoli, Misrata, the attorney general in Tripoli issued 104 Confidential letter from the Attorney Gen- Zawiya, and Nalut, 2014–19. arrest warrants for their alleged involve- eral’s Office to the GNA Presidency Council 78 Author interviews with commanders of ment with Chadian and Sudanese armed seen by the author, 15 May 2019; author GNA-affiliated forces, Tripoli and Misrata, groups operating in Libya. Jiddu featured interview with an observer of Tarhunan June 2019. on the list of those to be arrested as being origin, Tripoli, March 2018. 79 The IS member, Safwan Jaber, had been a member of the ‘Chadian opposition’ 105 Author phone interviews with residents imprisoned in the al-Juddaim prison in (­Attorney General’s Office, 2019). of Qasr ben Ghashir and Ain Zara, and an Zawiya since 2016. Officials and military 91 Author interviews with a group of former observer of Tarhunan origin. officers from Zawiya claim that Jaber had revolutionaries, a migrant smuggler, a 106 Author phone interviews with Misratan recently been transferred to the al-Faruq politician, and a fighter in GNA-affiliated and Zintani commanders involved in the facility due to renovation work at al-Juddaim, forces (all from Sabratha), Misrata, Zawiya, operation, July 2019; see also Arabi21 and that the prison’s director had refused and Tripoli, March and November 2018 (2019) and Libyan Pen (2019). Haftar’s to take him back after the work had been and June 2019. reliance on Sudanese and Chadian merce- completed. Local sources in Zawiya, how- 92 Author interviews with community leaders naries is well documented (UNSC, 2017; ever, claim that Jaber had been in military and observers, Nalut and Zawiya, Novem- 2018a). fatigues when his body arrived at the ber 2018. 107 Author phone interviews with an observer hospital after the air strike on 13 May, which 93 Author interviews with GNA-affiliated of Tarhunan origin, commanders of GNA- would seem to contradict the hypothesis army officers from Zintan and Rujban, affiliated forces, and a politician from that he was held prisoner at the facility. Tripoli, June 2019. southern Libya, July 2019. Author interviews with the commander of 94 Author phone interviews, residents of 108 Author phone interview with a former the western military region, Usama al- Sabratha and Zawiya, June 2019. senior official in the Qaddafi regime, Juwaili; military officers from Zawiya; a 95 Author phone interviews with command- April 2019. combatant from Sabratha; and a local ers in GNA-affiliated forces, April 2019. 109 Author phone interviews with southern observer from Zawiya, Tripoli and Tunis, Libyan politicians and observers from 96 GNA interior minister Fathi Bashagha June 2019. Bani Walid, April–May 2019. accused the UAE of having carried out 80 Author interviews with commanders of the strike with F-16 warplanes, without GNA-affiliated forces, Tripoli; author phone offering tangible evidence (Balkiz, 2019). interview with a Benghazi resident with Doubtlessly, however, the precision and References close ties to senior LAAF officers, June 2019. power of the Tajura air strike—and other, 81 Phone interview with Benghazi resident Abdallah, Walid and Jihad Nasr. 2019. ‘Dozens similar strikes over the following weeks— with close ties to senior LAAF officers, of Members of Haftar’s Forces Taken Pris- was such that the LAAF air force cannot June 2019. oner in Zawiya, Close to Libya’s Capital’ be at its origin. The bomb crater at the 82 Phone interview with Benghazi resident [in Arabic]. Anadolu News Agency. 5 April. Tajura migrant centre was consistent with with close ties to senior LAAF officers, Akhbar Libya. 2017. ‘Attorney General’s Office that of a 500 pound bomb. The warplane June 2019. Orders Arrest of Commander of Arabism that carried it out likely was either an F-16 83 Phone interviews with a resident of Qasr Militia’ [in Arabic]. 26 October. or a Mirage 2000, owned and operated ben Ghashir and a Benghazi resident with Al-Atrush, Samer. 2019a. ‘Libya’s Haftar Orders either by Egypt or—more likely—by the close ties to senior LAAF officers, June 2019. “Harsh Response” after Surprise Loss of 84 Phone interviews with local observers in UAE (author interviews and phone inter- City.’ Bloomberg. 29 June. western, central, and eastern Libya, July views with Western diplomats, foreign —— . 2019b. ‘Libya Hit Haftar Forward Airbase 2019. weapons experts, and commanders in after Receiving Turkish Drones.’ Bloom­ 85 During the 2011 civil war communities GNA-affiliated forces, July 2019). berg. 26 July. rapidly became categorized as collectively 97 Author interviews with commanders in Al-Hurra. 2019. ‘Five People Who Are Wanted ‘revolutionary’ or ‘loyalist’. Although these GNA-affiliated forces, Tripoli, June 2019. Internationally Fight in Libya’ [in Arabic]. categorizations concealed splits within 98 Author interviews with commanders in 26 April. communities, they became self-reinforcing GNA-affiliated forces and observers with Al-Marsad. 2017. ‘With Names … Details of as the war continued, and had lasting close ties to GNA command structures, Massacre in Tarhuna that Claimed Lives consequences for the post-Qaddafi era Tripoli, June 2019. of Eight Members of a Single Family; Mu- (Lacher, forthcoming). 99 Author interviews with commanders in nicipal and Elders Councils Refuse to 86 Author interviews with advisors to the GNA-affiliated forces and observers with Comment’ [in Arabic]. 17 April. Kani brothers and an observer of Tarhunan close ties to GNA command structures, ——. 2019a. ‘Jadhran Announces His Support origin, Tarhuna and Tripoli, March 2018. Tripoli, June 2019. for GNA Forces in Their Battle against the 87 Author interviews with commanders of 100 Author interviews and phone interviews Army and Promises Them “Victory” in GNA-affiliated forces, a Misratan com- with commanders in GNA-affiliated forces Tripoli’ [in Arabic]. 6 April. munity representative, and an observer of and Western diplomats, June–July 2019. ——. 2019b. ‘With Video. The Terrorist Ziyad Tarhunan origin, Tripoli and Misrata, June 101 Author phone interviews with command- Balam Joins GNA Forces in Tripoli Battle and 2019. ers in Misratan armed groups and foreign Vows Revenge for Ben Hamid’ [in Arabic]. 88 Author phone interview with an observer weapons experts, August 2019. 10 April. of Tarhunan origin, June 2019. 102 Confidential letter from the Attorney ——. 2019c. ‘Suspect in US Ambassador Mur- 89 Author interviews and phone interviews General’s Office to the GNA Presidency der Case Dies in South Tripoli Clashes’ with local observers from Bani Walid, the Council seen by the author, 15 May 2019. ­[in ­Arabic]. 25 May. Nafusa Mountains, Sabratha, and southern The letter lists the names of four people ——. 2019d. ‘Names and Pictures … Another Libya, as well as commanders in GNA- from Bani Walid allegedly involved in the Group of Fatalities and Injuries from affiliated forces, Tripoli and Misrata, fighting—two of whom were later killed Benghazi and Darna Shura Councils in June–July 2019. at the front—and the migrant-smuggling- South Tripoli Battles’ [in Arabic]. 2 June.

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Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 19 About the SANA project

The Security Assessment in North Africa is a project of the Small Arms Survey to support those engaged in building a more secure environment in North Africa and the Sahel-Sahara region. The project produces timely, evidence-based research and analysis on the availability and circulation of small arms, the dynamics of emerging armed groups, and related insecurity. The research stresses the effects of armed conflicts in the region on community safety. The Security Assessment in North Africa receives ongoing funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. It has previously received grants from Global Affairs Canada, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Federal Foreign Office, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the US State Department. For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org/sana

The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to ­generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is an associated programme of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries. For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org

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A Briefing Paper of the Small Arms Survey/Security Assessment in North Africa project, with support from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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