CENTER ON DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT & THE RULE OF LAW STANFORD UNIVERSITY
BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER - STANFORD UNIVERSITY PROJECT ON ARAB TRANSITIONS
PAPER SERIES Number 4, March 2014
PERSONNEL CHANGE OR PERSONAL CHANGE? RETHINKING LIBYA’S POLITICAL ISOLATION LAW
ROMAN DAVID AND HOUDA MZIOUDET
PROGRAM ON ARAB REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, CDDRL B r o o k i n g s
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BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER Saha 43, Building 63, West Bay, Doha, Qatar www.brookings.edu/doha T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s
I. Executive Summary ...... 1
II. Introduction ...... 3
III. The Political Isolation Law and its Alternatives ...... 4
IV. Assessing the PIL and its Reconciliatory Alternatives ...... 7
Establishment of a Trustworthy Government ...... ,..7
Political and Social Reconciliation ...... 9
Justice ...... 10
Human Rights ...... 12
International Impact ...... 13
V. Reconciliatory Systems and Libya ...... 14
Appendix: Advantages and Disadvantages of Personnel Systems ...... 16
Endnotes ...... 17 A b o u t T h e B r o o k i n g s D o h a C e n t e r
ased in Qatar, the Brookings Doha Center is an initiative of the Brookings Institution in Wash- Bington, D.C., that advances high-quality, independent policy analysis and research on the Middle East. The Center maintains a reputation for policy impact and cutting-edge, field-oriented research on socio-economic and geopolitical issues facing the broader Middle East, including relations with the United States.
The Brookings Doha Center International Advisory Council is co-chaired by H.E. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al Thani, former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the State of Qatar, and Brookings President Strobe Talbott. The Center was formally inaugurated by H.E. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani on February 17, 2008. It is funded by the State of Qatar. Salman Shaikh serves as its director.
In pursuing its mission, the Brookings Doha Center undertakes research and programming that en- gages key elements of business, government, civil society, the media, and academia on key public policy issues in the following four core areas:
(i) Democratization, political reform, and public policy; (ii) Middle East relations with emerging Asian nations, including on the geopolitics and economies of energy; (iii) Conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building; (iv) Educational, institutional, and political reform in the Gulf countries.
Open to a broad range of views, the Brookings Doha Center is a hub for Brookings scholarship in the region.
A b o u t T h e P r o g r a m o n A r a b R e f o r m a n d D e m o c r a c y a t S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y
he Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the TRule of Law at Stanford University examines the different social and political dynamics within Arab countries and the evolution of their political systems, focusing on the prospects, conditions, and possible pathways for political reform in the region.
This multidisciplinary program brings together both scholars and practitioners – from the policy making, civil society, NGO (non-government organization), media, and political communities – as well as other actors of diverse backgrounds from the Arab world, to consider how democratization and more responsive and accountable governance might be achieved, as a general challenge for the region and within specific Arab countries.
The program aims to be a hub for intellectual capital about issues related to good governance and political reform in the Arab world and allowing diverse opinions and voices to be heard. It benefits from the rich input of the academic community at Stanford, from faculty to researchers to graduate students, as well as its partners in the Arab world and Europe. A b o u t T h e B r o o k i n g s D o h a C e n t e r -S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r o j e ct o n A r a b T r a n s i t i o n s
he Brookings Doha Center - Stanford University “Project on Arab Transitions” – a joint Tinitiative between the BDC and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University (CDDRL) – aims to generate comprehensive analysis of the conditions impacting democratic transition in the Arab world. Because there have been so few democratic transitions in the Arab world historically, as well as a current lack of cross- regional studies on the topic, there is a real need for better understanding among Western scholars and policymakers and their Arab counterparts about what can and should happen next regarding Arab countries undergoing transition.
This project combines academic rigor, informed field research, and policy relevance to sys- tematically analyze and illuminate the nature of Arab transitions, focusing on issues such as electoral design, constitution-drafting, political party development, and national dialogue processes. By engaging Arab and Western scholars and practitioners from diverse back- grounds, this project provides new voices and original scholarship from the Arab region and beyond to help inform policy and development assistance to countries of strategic impor- tance.
Publications in the “Project on Arab Transitions” series include:
From Bad Cop to Good Cop: The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt Brookings Doha Center-Stanford Paper, Omar Ashour
Voting for Change: The Pitfalls and Possibilities of First Elections in Arab Transitions Brookings Doha Center-Stanford Paper, Ellen Lust
Drafting Egypt’s Constitution: Can A New Legal Framework Revive A Flawed Transition? Brookings Doha Center-Stanford Paper, Tamir Moustafa A b o u t T h e A u t h o r s
oman David is a professor at the Department of Sociology and Social Policy, Lingnan RUniversity, Hong Kong. He previously held various positions at Newcastle University, Oxford University, University of the Witwatersrand, and Yale University. For the past fifteen years David has worked in several areas of transitional justice, including lustration, victim reparation, truth commissions, international tribunals, and apologies in a number of countries.
David is the author of Lustration and Transitional Justice (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011) and winner of the the triannual Concept Analysis Award by RC01 on Concepts and Methods of the International Political Science Association in 2012. David is responsible for the theoretical framework of this paper, the analysis of the PIL, and the alternative proposal.
ouda Mzioudet is a Tunisian journalist currently working in Libya. She covered Hthe first democratic elections in Tunisia, the liberation of Tripoli in August 2011, the first democratic elections in Libya, and other events in both Tunisia and Libya.
Prior to the Tunisian Revolution, Mzioudet worked as professor of cultural studies and translation studies in the University of Tunis and the Central Private University in Tunis, and taught Arabic as part of the U.S. State Department Fulbright Foreign Language Teaching Program at Christopher Newport University in Virginia. Mzioudet is responsible for the elite interviews. E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, also cripple countries like Libya that suffer each of the transitioning countries faces from a lack of qualified professionals and the question of how to handle personnel talented political leaders, exposing them inherited from preceding authoritarian to the risk of becoming failed states. regimes. Personnel reform is a critical Reconciliatory approaches also increase aspect of political transitions and can trust in government and, through enabling affect a state’s security, legitimacy, and the retention of qualified personnel, may ability to function. Libya addressed boost the state’s performance and win this issue in 2013 with the adoption of further trust over time. its Political Isolation Law (PIL), which effectively disqualified anyone involved Reconciliation is badly needed in in Muammar Qaddafi’s regime from the Libya, but the PIL is divisive and new administration, armed forces, and risks institutionalizing historical other entities. divisions. Considering the effects of de-Baathification in Iraq, the broad The PIL was passed with strong support in applicability of the PIL could realistically Libya’s parliament and under significant create new destabilizing elements in pressure from the country’s militias. The Libya by swelling the number of “losers” law is an example of an exclusive system, of the transition. Socially, the PIL in which former regime officials are effectively passes judgment on individuals automatically banned from the new state and groups, putting them at risk of apparatus. While this method is common, discrimination. Reconciliatory systems, Libya’s democratization would be better conversely, have an enormous capacity to served by a reconciliatory system that is contribute to social reconciliation. They based on the principle of the conditional provide incentive for inherited personnel second chance. to make a commitment to the new regime and its rules. Personnel reforms usually seek to contribute to the establishment of a Personnel reforms are motivated by past trustworthy government, political abuses of power and are measures of and social reconciliation, transitional transitional justice. The PIL condemns justice, and human rights. An analysis of the old regime and is to be implemented personnel reform in Eastern Europe and by independent lawyers using judicial procedures, but it may also create new reconciliation in South Africa reveals injustices. It excludes large groups that a reconciliatory approach is more without considering individuals’ likely than the PIL to accomplish these behavior, and bars excluded personnel goals in Libya. from even non-government posts. Reconciliatory systems are based on People in transitioning countries are more confession and pursue restorative— likely to trust their governments if they rather than retributive—justice. The PIL have purged compromised individuals, is more efficient in processing a large but an exclusionary system may merely caseload, but it undermines social justice. reverse the roles of the regime and Reconciliatory systems are more sensitive opposition. An exclusionary approach can to individual redemption.
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 1 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law Human rights are important to the internal Libya needs a broad coalition government and external legitimacy of the regime. By that can agree on fundamental principles removing elected representatives from about the course of the country and major office, the PIL may violate citizens’ reforms, including personnel reform. rights of representation as enumerated Personnel reform—in order to serve the in the International Covenant on Civil interests of the Libyan people—needs and Political Rights, which Libya has to be based on inclusion rather than signed. There are also questions over exclusion and on reconciliation rather the rights of individuals to hold office than revenge. A reconciliatory system and to not testify against themselves. is the only approach that can facilitate The PIL should be subjected to a review reconciliation, retain qualified personnel, to assess its conformity to international uphold human rights standards, and serve human rights standards. Conversely, A as a positive example to others. reconciliatory system is a human rights- friendly approach that allows individuals Democracy requires democratic political to decide whether to pursue a position culture, and democratization should be that requires exposure. accompanied by social transformation. The exclusive nature of the PIL inhibits The Arab Spring countries continue to such a transformation. It merely influence one another, and similarities redistributes power and preserves the can be seen in the personnel reform past conflict. The application of the policies considered by Libya, Egypt, and PIL weakens the state and enlarges Tunisia. Of those, Libya’s PIL is the most the ranks of its opponents. To promote exclusionary, and its uncompromising democratic transformation, Libya and logic may affect the political situation other transitioning countries would in pre-transition countries like Syria. benefit from pursuing personal changes It signals to Bashar al-Assad that he rather than personnel changes. Nearly should reject compromise and warns three years after the fall of the Qaddafi opposition sympathizers that defecting regime, Libya again needs a fresh start. may not benefit them. Reconciliatory A reconciliatory system could provide it. methods can inspire other countries. While implementing them may seem unrealistic, particularly in the Middle East, it looked similarly daunting in South Africa, which has become an iconic model of political reconciliation. Libya now has an opportunity to provide a positive example.
Voices questioning the legitimacy of Libya’s revolution are growing louder as the country’s stalemate continues. The country faces major security issues and difficulty in building viable state institutions. The enactment of the PIL has further weakened Libya; even former Prime Minister Ali Zeidan has admitted the country is a failed state. The democratic transition is under threat.
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 2 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law I n t r o d u ct i o n
Personnel reform of the state apparatus in 2013. Libya’s newly elected General is undoubtedly one of the most critical National Congress (GNC) approved the political tasks in nascent democracies. law to deal with inherited personnel, effec- The inability to address the problem tively disqualifying anyone involved in of personnel inherited from past the regime of Muammar Qaddafi between regimes can undermine the prospect for 1969 and 2011 from the new administra- democratization, as shown by transitions tion and armed forces. Commentators in Chile in the 1990s, South Africa in have contended that the law undermines 1990-1994, and Slovakia in 1994-1998.1 national reconciliation, violates human At the same time, personnel reforms may rights, derails democratization, destabi- go wrong for a number of reasons. For lizes internal and external security, and instance, the law on background checks causes the collapse of numerous state of public officials in Hungary has not functions and public services in post- prevented the old elite from using their Qaddafi Libya.6 contacts to enrich themselves, the vet- ting program in Bosnia and Herzegovina Thus, it seems that the prospect for demo- circumvented the right to be heard, and cratic transition may be fatally hurt by the de-Baathification in Iraq has fuelled the implementation of such personnel 2 ethnic conflict. laws. The absence of personnel laws may do similar harm, resulting in abuses of Yet, in spite of its import for policymakers, power, violations of human rights, and a the topic of personnel policies has been continued lack of trust in the government neglected by academics. Scholars exam- and armed forces. How to overcome this ine institutional choices in the constitu- conundrum? This paper shall review the tional layout of the country, such as the Libyan Political Isolation Law of 2013 in advantages and problems of parliamen- light of the objectives of personnel reforms tary and presidential systems, unicameral in transitional democracies, and propose and bicameral legislatures, majoritarian an alternative model that could better or proportional representation, and con- serve the interests of Libya’s democrati- sociational models.3 They discuss civilian zation. It will contribute to the debate on control of the armed forces—a vital task personnel reform in nascent democracies in many post-military dictatorships4— in general and in Arab Spring countries in and enormous attention is devoted to the particular, providing a blueprint for other first democratic elections.5 This neglect Arab Spring countries. The PIL follows of personnel reform is striking given the the logic of traditional personnel policies fact that it impacts security, the everyday which exclude, to varying degrees, former operation of the state, and the legitimacy regime members, as in the examples of de- of state institutions to a similar extent as Nazification in postwar Germany or the oversight of the military, constitutional de-Baathification in post-Saddam Iraq. models, and elections. The proposed alternative is a reconcilia- tory approach based on the observation of Indeed, such a broad impact has been major institutional innovations in Eastern 7 attributed to Libya’s PIL, which was Europe, where the principle of the condi- passed under controversial circumstances tional second chance emerged.
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 3 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law T h e P o l i t i c a l I s o l a t i o n L a w a n d i t s A l t e r n a t i v e s
Libya’s Political Isolation Law, officially suspected of acting “against the revolu- Legislation No. 13 of 2013 of the Political tion of September 1st, 1969.” Qaddafi’s and Administrative Isolation, was passed rule lasted for more than 40 years, but by the GNC on May 14, 2013 and came in February 2011, following revolutions into force on June 5, 2013. The GNC is in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, large a 200-member unicameral legislature numbers of Libyans rose up against the which was freely elected in 2012 national authoritarian regime. After months of elections. Owing to the body’s electoral civil conflict, Qaddafi was driven from system, independent candidates were power and ultimately killed in October awarded 120 seats, while the National 2011. Alliance Forces of Mahmoud Jibril, which won the largest share of votes with 48 per- The PIL’s aim was to rid the Libyan cent, received 39 seats. Finishing second, political scene of people who worked the Justice and Construction Party, which directly or indirectly for the Qaddafi is the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s regime. Opponents of the law considered political party, won 17 seats for its 10 it to be excessive and punitive, but its percent of votes. Some 164 MPs voted proponents argued that it was necessary for the legislation, 4 were against, and 19 to bar those who participated in prolong- were absent from the vote, ing the Qaddafi regime for which aired on Libyan state over four decades. The GNC television.8 The PIL was passed passed the law shortly after at a time when the the April 2013 attack on the French embassy, (which The PIL was passed at a number of Libyan time when the number of followed the attack on the Libyan voices in favor of voices in favor of U.S. Consulate in Benghazi purging Qaddafi loyalists purging Qaddafi in September 2012), in an was growing. It came amidst atmosphere of growing calls from the Libyan public loyalists was discontent. It passed while to ban anyone who worked armed militias had placed growing. It came the GNC under a military under the Qaddafi regime. amidst calls from the Colonel Qaddafi became siege. The militias concur- the the de facto leader of Libyan public to ban rently blocked a number of other ministerial buildings the country after heading anyone who worked a coup-d’etat against King in Tripoli and were actively Idris on September 1, 1969. under the Qaddafi intimidating individual Through his comrades in regime. members of the GNC. The the Free Unionist Officers, involvement of the armed Qaddafi proclaimed the militias raises serious ques- Libyan Arab Republic, later establish- tions about the legitimacy of the law. ing a socialist-populist jamahiriya, or “republic of the masses,” as he termed it. The PIL disqualifies anyone who held any The regime spied on ordinary Libyans, of the state apparatus positions listed in suppressed opposition, detained dissent- Article 1, Category 1 of the law between ers, and imprisoned and tortured those September 1, 1969 and October 23, 2011
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 4 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law from holding any public positions in the laws that regulate the participation of new government. The disqualifying posi- people associated with the former regime tions specified include leading politi- in the successor political system.10 While cal, administrative, and security posts; scholars have viewed personnel laws ambassadors; chancellors of universities; through a prism of lesser or greater exclu- heads of student unions; researchers at sions,11 they have disregarded this major propaganda institutes; and anyone who institutional innovation, which introduces belonged to an international organization an entirely new dimension to the resolu- that threatened Libya. The law also dis- tion of the personnel conundrum.12 While qualifies those who exhibited the behav- unified Germany, the Czech Republic, iors listed in Category 2, which it says led and many other countries oscillated in to “the corruption” of political, economic, the degree of exclusion, Hungary and and administrative life in the country.” Poland have employed a variety of inclu- The list includes collaboration with the sive methods. Through these methods the regime resulting in human rights viola- discredited personnel have been given a tions, glorification of the Qaddafi regime, second chance: they could retain public taking a hostile position to the 2011 revo- employment under particular conditions. lution, committing criminal offenses, and using religion to support the regime. The condition for retaining public office under the Hungarian “inclusive” person- Article 2 specifies the range of positions nel system was exposure. People associ- that disqualified personnel cannot hold, ated with the old regime were given the but some are incompatible with positions option to either resign or to have their past listed in Article 1. Article 2 includes not roles and activities publicized. The new only leading state, administrative, and government could thus retain the quali- security positions, but also membership fied personnel and establish transpar- in judicial and legislative bodies, as well ency. Empirical evidence shows that the as leadership in the media, universities, method of exposure has positive, though and political parties. The law is admin- marginal, effects on establishing trust in istered by a special Commission for government.13 The positive gains resulting Implementing the Political Isolation Law from the transparency of government are Standards. Its members are supposed to counter-balanced by two negative factors. be Libyan nationals older than 35 years of First, the shaming of government officials age with legal training but without politi- by their exposure raises the question of cal affiliation, as stipulated in Article 5. why these people are not dismissed right away. Second, almost all of the exposed The PIL belongs to the category of exclu- officials deny, downplay, or excuse their sive personnel systems.9 Exclusive sys- involvement in the past. tems are defined as personnel systems which provide for the automatic exclu- The Polish “reconciliatory” personnel sion of officials associated with the old system offered a considerably more prom- regime from the state apparatus of the ising avenue than Hungary’s simple inclu- new regime. Though common, the dis- sive system. It also applied the principle missal of inherited personnel from the of the second chance, but was based on state apparatus is not the only path of per- the confession of the inherited personnel. sonnel reform in transitional countries. A person who aspired to hold a public Research has overlooked the significance post had to submit an affidavit that dis- of some Central European experiences closed all relevant activities and positions with lustration laws. Lustration laws can in the past regime. As the essence of the be defined as special public employment affidavits was published, the public had
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 5 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law an opportunity to scrutinize them. A spe- religious practices. Every culture stipu- cial prosecutor then verified the affidavits lates conditions for repentance, such as and, if a case raised suspicion, he or she the Islamic concept of tawba, involving handed it to the court, which made the expressions of remorse and promises to final decision about its completeness. If not return to previous, immoral actions. the individual disclosed all relevant facts, The revelations can be verified through he was given a second chance to hold a judicial system, a broad-based political public office. If he concealed any fact, he or parliamentary commission, or partici- was dismissed and barred from holding a pation of the public, which would come public post for ten years. Thus, collabo- forward with any relevant information. rating with the previous regime did not Various models of the reconciliatory result in exclusion in Poland; only subse- system have already been proposed for quently lying about past collaboration led Iraq15 and Myanmar.16 to dismissal.
The Polish reconciliatory personnel system resembles the South African truth and reconciliation process.14 While in Poland tainted personnel were given an opportunity to hold a public post in exchange for self-revelation, in South Africa gross human rights violators were offered amnesty for making a full disclo- sure of all relevant facts. Both countries thus incorporated the authentic personal experience of confessing wrongdoing into an essentially macro-political process to smooth complicated political transitions.
In reconciliatory systems, self-revelation serves as a loyalty test. It provides the inherited personnel with an opportunity to demonstrate that they are disassociat- ing themselves from the old regime and are willing to play by the rules of the new regime. It is a forum where they can pub- licly explain their past actions and motives and express that they have learned from their experiences and are changing their attitudes. Indeed, many people may have been forced to collaborate with authori- tarian regimes and may not have gained anything from their collaboration.
The reconciliatory method can be imple- mented in various forms. Self-revelation can take the form of written submis- sions, public hearings, an oath, or some combination of the three. In Libya, self- revelation could stem from cultural and
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 6 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law A s s e s s i n g t h e PIL a n d i t s R e c o n c i l i a t o r y A l t e r n a t i v e s
Having reviewed the types of personnel that are loyal, professional, and efficient. reform systems, the question of which Ideally, citizens would have confidence model best serves Libya’s democratization that the government and members of the can be examined. Public policies are tra- state apparatus are bound by law and will ditionally assessed against not act against their inter- whether they accomplish The establishment ests.19 Trustworthy govern- their purported objectives, ments can better implement but many have unintended of a trustworthy policies, enforce security, consequences that may not government is an and collect taxes than gov- have been desired or dis- ernments facing a crisis cussed. We shall therefore even more pressing of public confidence. The assess the competing per- and daunting task in establishment of a trustwor- sonnel policies in light of the thy government is an even objectives identified in the societies undergoing more pressing and daunting available literature. Based transitions from task in societies undergoing on our literature review, we transitions from authoritar- can distinguish five clus- authoritarian rule ian rule after experiencing ters of goals, effects, and after experiencing years of abuses of political areas of impact that tran- years of abuse in power.20 sitional personnel reforms may have: establishment power. In stable democracies, of a trustworthy govern- exclusive personnel systems ment, political and social reconciliation, would be the most efficient method of justice, human rights, and international reforming the state administration and 17 impact. We can thus examine the exclu- armed forces. Empirical research in tran- sionary PIL and reconciliatory alterna- sitional countries shows that new govern- tives against the extent to which similar ment and security departments are better systems have achieved these objectives. off without those who have been compro- To assess the likelihood of success, we mised in the past.21 Clearly, victims of the draw on analyses of personnel reforms Qaddafi regime would not like to seek in Eastern Europe and the reconciliation assistance from those officials who per- 18 process in South Africa. secuted them in the first place. In addition to these positives, however, exclusive per- sonnel systems have several drawbacks. ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRUSTWORTHY GOVERNMENT The first problem is that personnel change does not guarantee a change of political Trustworthy administration and security methods. Widespread dismissals can win forces are cornerstones of any democratic trust in the government among the former system. To ensure political stability and opposition but they can hardly reach the security, governments need laws, politi- entire society. Without additional reforms, cal decisions, and programs to be imple- an exclusionary system merely leads mented by bureaucracy and armed forces the former opposition and the former
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 7 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law government to switch roles.22 The regime the opposition National Front for the may change but the methods of politi- Salvation of Libya in 1981. He became cal exclusions remain in place. Indeed, head of parliament in August 2012, but an observer pointed out the similarity resigned from his post shortly after the between the PIL and the Revolutionary PIL was passed.25 Committees established by Qaddafi in 23 1969. The Revolutionary Committees Concern over the loss of political talent set up by Qaddafi could be compared to was echoed in an interview with Hajer al- the Stasi system set up by East Germany’s Gaied, a GNC member from the National Communist regime. These committees Alliance Forces (NAF).26 Although she aimed to control the daily lives of the was a member of the commission charged Libyan people and monitor dissent against with implementing the Political Isolation the Qaddafi’s regime. Law Standards, she found the final ver- sion of the law too excessive because it The second problem is that most transi- reached non-political positions such as tional countries—with the notable excep- those in academia, and was unfair to many tion of unified Germany—do not have a “Libyan patriots.” In her view, the way the sufficient number of qualified profession- PIL is being implemented will “deprive als available to replace large parts of the Libya of good and honest Libyans such state apparatus. This has been the case in as Mustafa Abduljalil (former president of the National Transitional Council) and Libya, which according to former Prime Mahmoud Jibril (president of NAF).” Minister Ali Zeidan (who may be affected by the law) lost a lot of middle manage- ment experts due to the application of Another interviewees, an academic who the law, weakening already fragile state originally supported the PIL, said he institutions.24 already found the law too excessive in general terms. He added, “At one point, we realized that there were people who Finally, the PIL depletes the pool of wanted to isolate school teachers when we political leaders. Prominent leaders play meant it to ... isolate the military, security, an important role in democratic transi- and diplomatic personnel who ideologi- tions. They are sources of cally supported the former personalized trust during the regime and participated in interim period before formal Most transitional its duration.”27 trust in government institu- countries do not tions is established. Libya have a sufficient Like exclusionary policies, does not have an abundance a reconciliatory system is of political talent; there is no number of qualified perfectly capable of estab- Aung San Suu Kyi, Nelson professionals lishing trust in govern- Mandela, Vaclav Havel, ment. Unlike in an inclusive Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, or available to replace system, the effect of a con- Muhammad ElBaradei who large parts of the fession of a government offi- can speak to the masses cial on establishing trust in and is known beyond the state apparatus. government is significantly region. The resignation of positive in a dataset from Muhammad Magariaf, the first permanent the three countries in Central Europe,28 chairman of the GNC, may be an example though it may be considerably weaker of such a loss of talent. Magariaf was the than that of dismissals.29 It is not surpris- President of the Government Accounting ing that a government department that Office and the Ambassador to India in the dismisses a compromised member may be 1970s before defecting and co-founding viewed in a better light than a department
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 8 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law that retains such a member, even if he At the political level, the PIL is very divi- has completed a proscribed reconciliation sive. Critics pointed out that the PIL insti- process. In the long term, however, pro- tutionalizes historical divisions, even ones viding an acceptable path for the inclusion that were originally artificial. The law of compromised, but qualified, personnel does not accurately reflect reality since into the new administration may boost the it excludes anyone who had at any time state’s ability to function and provide ser- vices, thereby winning public trust. worked in the Qaddafi regime, even if he emigrated, defected from the regime, sup- ported the uprising, or all three. It adopts a The implementation of a reconciliatory rigid conception of human nature, assum- system does not suggest that Qaddafi loy- alists should retain leading posts in new ing that all people somewhat associated Libya. Such a system would not suspend with the Qaddafi regime are unchangeable the standard selection criteria for hiring and incapable of moral development. The members of public administration and law also labels as enemies those who are armed forces. It would merely provide not enemies in the first place. In view of conditions for incorporating those experts, the consequences that de-Baathification professionals, and experienced personnel had in Iraq, it is not far-fetched to say the who are deemed qualified for the post but law has the capacity to transform allies were in some capacity at a certain point into enemies. in history associated with the Qaddafi regime. A reconciliatory system would not limit political leaders in their attempt The PIL also has the potential to aggra- to select particular officials for state posi- vate the so-called “spoiler problem.” tions. The PIL certainly does. According to Stephen Stedman, who coined the concept, the biggest risk to peace comes from various leaders and POLITICAL AND SOCIAL parties who emerge after a civil war RECONCILIATION ends.31 If these actors believe the ongo- ing transition threatens their interests Reconciliation should be considered an they will consequently try to undermine imperative of personnel reforms in soci- the peace. This problem has been identi- eties that are overcoming deep histori- fied in Egypt where a variety of spoilers cal divisions. Inherited divisions can be operate: from limited spoilers— who seek identified at the macro-political level and a share of power within a constitutional at the social level, and each have distinct framework—to total spoilers, who see the social dynamics that impact reconcilia- world in all-or-nothing terms.32 In Libya, tion. At the macro level, political elites the PIL would swell the number of losers should agree on basic principles of politi- of the transition by depriving former cal struggle, such as non-violence, respect for election results, and adherence to the regime members the opportunity to par- rule of law. At the societal level, recon- ticipate in the new system. The enforce- ciliation comprises inclusiveness, trust, ment of the PIL would even isolate some and tolerance.30 The prospect for rec- of the original winners of transition, espe- onciliation in Libya is hindered both by cially the militias, from the rest of the grievances from Qaddafi’s reign and more population. The prospect for the militias recent scars acquired in the aftermath of to enter the democratic process would the regime change. Deep resentment, become increasingly difficult, given their tribal divisions, and internal conflicts in unpopularity. the GNC and the government are among the major inhibitors of reconciliation at the political and social levels.
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 9 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law At the societal level, the law impacts process in South Africa. Although the the public perception of the people who South African reconciliatory process con- are penalized by its implementation. It cerned a limited number of cases, it has effectively passes judgment on the social been able to inspire reconciliation in the standing of the excluded person, labeling entire society.36 him or her as a persona non grata.33 This may lead to further social exclusion and The reconciliatory system, however, is discrimination against the person in the vulnerable to fundamentalist politics, labor market, or, depending on his or her which can appeal for a principled stance social status, may turn the person’s entire and offer swift, uncompromising solu- social group—such as a tribe or a politi- tions. Its application requires either strong cal party—against the proponents of the leadership or a broad collation of political law.34 Reconciliation is thus undermined forces, both being supported by prominent by the individual as well as collective players in society. In other words, the rec- consequences of the law. onciliatory system in itself cannot deliver reconciliation, but can give it a significant boost when the political will to reconcile is An interview with Abdulhakim Mounem, present. For instance, South Africa was on a Libyan civil society activist, was par- the verge of civil war and territorial disin- 35 ticularly telling. His opposition to the tegration before the Kempton Park nego- law was very much guided by human tiations paved the way for amnesty and the rights ideals and abstract principles of Truth and Reconciliation Commission.37 justice. In his view, “the PIL was done to The cessation of violence and the end of exclude political opponents from the NAF secessionist tendencies in the Free State and to benefit parties such as Justice and and in KwaZulu-Natal are evidence that Construction Party (an Islamist party). at least minimal social reconciliation has These were illegitimate, undemocratic, taken place. On the other hand, political and unethical practices.” Mounem went parties in Poland always undermined the on to criticize the exclusion of Mahmoud process of lustration; some viewed it as Jibril, the head of the NAF, who is from being too excessive, while others saw it as the same hometown and tribe, in a clear insufficient. The inability of major politi- demonstration of how sowing divisions cal actors on the left as well as the right to between leaders spills over to society and honor barely-reached agreements weak- polarizes their followers. ened the implementation of the system in Poland. Reconciliatory systems have an enormous
capacity to contribute to social reconcili- JUSTICE ation. The only way for inherited person- nel to be incorporated into the new regime is to forge an agreement with the former Transitional personnel reforms are moti- vated by the abuses of power of previous opposition about the illegitimacy of the regimes. Thus, they may inevitably be former regime. This presumes unequivo- seen as corrective measures which aim to cally distancing oneself from the previous rectify the deficiencies and injustices of regime and demonstrating a commitment the past. Although they do not take effect to the new regime and its rules. The rec- at the level of criminal law, they may be onciliatory tone at the macro-political considered measures of transitional jus- level is likely to reverberate at the indi- tice, whether they aspire to achieve mini- vidual level. Similar “spill over” effects mal justice,38 non-criminal sanctions,39 have been observed in the reconciliation or administrative justice.40 Undoubtedly,
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 10 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law the PIL can be considered a measure of “It should facilitate and support national transitional justice. It is a response to the reconciliation and transitional justice. But injustices of the Qaddafi era, during which the fact that it excludes a large section of the selection of personnel for public posi- people without considering their behav- tions was restricted by political criteria ior, I can consider it as unfair.” and allegiances, be they personal, tribal, or as a reward for a rendered service. The Assessing the alternative model in light of PIL sends a clear signal of condemning justice requires going beyond the notion of the old regime and its practices. On the retributive justice. Reconciliatory systems positive side, the law is gov- are based on confession, erned by judicial procedures which can be viewed as a (Article 9) and is supposed Reconciliation method of restorative justice to be implemented by inde- systems are based or a form of sanctions that pendent legal professionals are alternative to dismissal. (Article 5). Yet several sub- on confession, The ability of alternative stantive provisions of the which can be viewed sanctions to deliver justice law appear excessive as they depends on their expressive 43 even bar excluded person- as a method of power. What messages nel from posts far beyond restorative justice or do these measures convey? the state apparatus. Such How convincing are they? positions include the “chair- a form of sanctions Dismissals clearly signal manship and membership of that are alternative that a particular behavior is unacceptable, while con- governing bodies of politi- to dismissal. fessions signal a change in cal parties, entities, institu- behavior and moral devel- tions, and Commissions of a opment of the individual. Empirical political nature,” the presidency of higher research shows that confession increases education institutions, and “leadership the positive perception of the public about positions in various media and publish- justice, although this increase is consider- ing institutes” (Article 2). These are non- ably smaller than the effect of dismissal.44 state posts which should not be regulated by what is effectively a special public 41 Another dimension of justice is its proce- employment law. dural character. A transitional justice mea- sure may be viewed as fair in its essence Concerns about creating new injus- but it may violate due process guarantees. tices were apparent in an interview with Clearly, the PIL is based on sweeping col- Muhammad Younes Toumi, another lective dismissals, while reconciliatory supporter-turned-opponent of the law.42 systems adopt an individual approach. As a member of the GNC, Toumi headed The former is undoubtedly more effective the commission charged with drafting the in processing a larger number of cases in Political Isolation Law Standards. He later a short time span, but it also carries the became disillusioned, however, with the larger social risk of creating new injus- way it was manipulated by some political tices. By collectively labeling the former entities as well as public figures, such as personnel as tainted, it effectively inhib- Libya’s grand mufti Sadegh al-Ghariyani. its their prospects for participating in the labor market, undermining social justice. Toumi also deplored the pressure from To be sure, the claim that those who ben- some media outlets and young rebels efitted in the past should not retain their who wanted to turn the law into a tool of privileged public positions may be legiti- oppression. Consequently, he resigned mate, but people who underwent a change from the commission. “The law does not of heart a long time ago and defected or meet my expectations,” Toumi explained.
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 11 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law criticized the Qaddafi regime, such as On the other hand, some of the criticisms Magariaf and Abdul Jalil, are effectively of human rights groups seem to be too “punished” by the law as well. Hence, harsh. Although the PIL violates some reconciliatory systems, with their case- human rights, there is not a right to be by-case approach, are more sensitive to appointed to public office and to public individual redemption than the PIL, which employment. Article 25 of the covenant treats anyone associated with the former allows reasonable restrictions of the regime as unchangeable and intractable. right to take part in the conduct of public affairs. Although countries should not dis- 47 criminate in employment, the European HUMAN RIGHTS jurisdiction, for instance, takes into account the particular historical situation in a country under scrutiny.48 It is also The need to uphold human rights may significant that the UN vetting program in seem a controversial demand in the eyes Bosnia and Herzegovina did not conform of those who have been disappointed with to human rights standards.49 Most notably, the human rights record of major Western in order to facilitate a speedy reform of powers after September 2001. Nowadays the police force, the program suspended we can observe that countries which advo- the right to be heard and relaxed the stan- cate for human rights kill without trial, dard of proof.50 detain without trial, and torture detainees. Yet the political hypocrisy cannot com- promise the principle itself. Human rights To assess the PIL’s conformity to inter- still matter for the internal and external national human rights standards, it would legitimacy of the regime. Personnel be very useful to subject it, the process reform may impact human of its approval, and its application to a rights of the inherited per- judicial or constitutional sonnel as well as the victims To assess the PIL’s review. The NAF and some of the former regime. human rights activists and conformity to lawyers have actually come international human forward to challenge the law Libya is a party to the at the Constitutional Court. International Covenant on rights standards, According to Hajer al-Gaied, Civil and Political Rights of it would be very an NAF GNC member, the 1976, but the PIL infringes court should also look into on the right to vote as it useful to subject allegations that the final concerns the members of wording of the enacted law 45 it, the process of the GNC. By eliminating was manipulated and did not elected representatives it its approval, and match its approved version. invalidates the active right of citizens to vote and be its application represented by a particu- to a judicial or A reconciliatory system lar deputy, and the passive is a human rights-friendly right of the deputies to hold constiutitonal model of personnel systems. elected positions. In doing review. Although the Polish recon- so, it effectively alters the ciliatory method was chal- outcomes of elections and modifies the lenged at its Constitutional parameters of the free political contest. Tribunal on the pretext that the affidavits Moreover, the questionnaires that are col- submitted as conditions for public employ- lected from persons holding public posi- ment violated the right of the applicants tions may violate the right to not testify to not testify against themselves, the court against oneself.46 rejected that claim. It convincingly argued that this right could not be violated since
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 12 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law merely testifying did not constitute a pro- leading a political party for six to seven hibition to hold public office. The appli- years.53 Curiously enough, shortly after cants would be barred from holding office Libya began to apply the PIL, the support- if their testimonies were incomplete, ers of the Immunization Law in Tunisia inaccurate, or untruthful, but the law did backed down. The Immunization Law not force the applicants to be dishonest. is currently suspended and may not be Moreover, the applicants for public office enforced before the next parliamentary decided, on their own election, to undergo elections, which are tentatively scheduled the process during which they subjected for 2014. themselves to exposure. Finally, it has been recognized that the scope of privacy The contagion effect is not necessarily for public officials is considerably smaller 51 limited to legal development. The uncom- than in cases of private citizens. promising logic of the PIL may also affect the political situation in pre-transition countries like Syria. It may send a signal INTERNATIONAL IMPACT to the regime of Bashar al-Assad to ignore calls for dialogue and to fight to the very Political transitions among neighbor- end. Once gross human rights violations ing countries often affect one another. are committed, the threat of facing retribu- This so-called “contagion effect was tion may lead to defiance, not deterrence. first described in Latin America.52 The It also sends a signal to opposition sympa- existence of such effects can hardly be thizers within the government ranks that doubted in the Arab Spring countries, defecting from the regime will not guar- which continue to influence and inspire antee them a role in a future state. Once one another. We can expect that a major they are tainted, they may be excluded policy adopted in one country would and punished in the future, regardless of be emulated or avoided in another. An their support for the opposition. observable resemblance among a cluster of countries eventually emarges in one Reconciliatory methods can become an region, although it would be impossible inspiration for other countries in the to claim a causal link of influence in com- region and beyond. Middle East politics, plex political processes involving many characterized by strife and revenge, seem actors. to be in urgent need of reconciliation. The events in Egypt in 2012-13 show yet again The PIL affects and is affected by the that one group cannot use force to prevail situation in neighboring countries. It may over another. To be sure, implementing have been inspired by a similar exclu- a reconciliatory system may seem unre- sionary law in Egypt with the same name. alistic in many countries. The prospect The Egyptian Political Isolation Law was for any reconciliatory scenario in South approved in 2011 before it was invalidated Africa and Poland looked unrealistic, by the country’s Supreme Constitutional especially given the state of emergency Court the following year. A similar law was both countries experienced in the 1980s, adopted in neighboring Tunisia in 2013. as well as their complicated transitions.54 Although less exclusionary than Libya’s Yet both South Africa in 1996-2001 and PIL, Tunisia’s “Law for the Immunization Poland in 1999-2005 were able to imple- of the Revolution” seeks to bar persons ment reconciliatory systems.55 The South who worked in prescribed capacities in African truth and reconciliation process the Ben Ali regime or the former ruling has since become an iconic model of party during the past ten years from hold- political reconciliation. If Libya were to ing office under the new government or embrace a reconciliatory system, it too could provide an example for the future.
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 13 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law R e c o n c i l i a t o r y S y s t e m s a n d L i b y a
More than two years after the death of Libya appears to be in need of a broad Qaddafi, the voices questioning the very coalition government that would agree on legitimacy of the Libyan revolution are fundamental principles about the course growing louder in light of the country’s of the country and major reforms, includ- continuing stalemate. Libya faces increas- ing the demobilization of the armed mili- ing insecurity, uncertainty about its tia and the personnel reform of the state future, and difficulty in building a stable apparatus. Forging such a coalition would state apparatus with a viable police force, hardly be possible without the involvement army, and judiciary. Libya’s prospects for of and discussion among major interna- democratization are significantly hindered tional actors, including the United States, by the inability of any political force to France, the United Kingdom, and Qatar. It control the armed militias that often target would be nearly impossible if the efforts civilians, be they Qaddafi loyalists or opponents. The state apparatus, the police, of one of these actors are undermined by and the army are too weak to secure order, its allies. An international mediation that which is the most essential could help Libyans create another type of transitional function of the state. The The operation of operation of the state has council or a broader coali- been further weakened by the state has been tion government seems an the enactment of the PIL. further weakened inevitable precondition to Continued implementation pursue security and person- of the PIL puts Libya at risk by the enactment of nel reform. of becoming a failed state. the PIL. Continued Whether managed domes- The brief abduction of implementation of tically or with the help of former Prime Minister Ali the PIL puts Libya foreign countries, personnel Zeidan in October 2013 at risk of becoming a reform—in order to serve prompted many Libyans to the interests of the Libyan question the competence failed state. people—needs to be based of the representatives they on inclusion rather than elected two years prior and exclusion and on reconciliation rather to doubt the possibility of building viable than revenge.57 The implementation of a state institutions. The fact that some reconciliatory personnel system would politicians, including Zeidan himself, meet those expectations, providing a openly admit that Libya is a failed state number of advantages (see Appendix). confirms the government’s helplessness in restoring security. Zeidan’s opponents, Although a reconciliatory system may ini- including Muhammad Savan, the leader tially score lower in delivering trust and of the Muslim Brotherhood, and a group justice, it is the only system that would of ultra-conservative Salafis, are capital- be able to facilitate reconciliation, retain izing on the security lapse.56 If the prime qualified personnel, uphold human rights minister is not safe, how can an average standards, and serve as a positive example Libyan citizen protect himself from the to others.58 threats these militias pose? The demo- cratic transition in Libya is under threat.
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 14 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law The issue of personnel reform goes the officials, engage in a dialogue over beyond the scorecard of its advantages the past, and come to terms with their own and disadvantages and underpins a past. South Africa—a country that was broader political and social transforma- deeply divided along racial, religious, tion. Democratization cannot be reduced political, and social lines and experienced to organizing democratic elections, writ- a brutal regime and violent transition— ing a new constitution, and building shows this is not merely an idealistic hope political institutions. Formal rules are but a realistic option. conditions that are necessary but not suf- ficient for democracy. It is not unusual The public nature of a reconciliatory pro- for elections, which are declared free cess would bring additional advantages. and fair, to result in leadership that pub- Reform of the armed forces and state 59 licly opposes democracy and peace. administration includes “soft tasks such Democracy requires democratic political as overcoming the perception of their culture, amenability to compromise, and association with the former regime.”60 respect for human rights. It follows that if Revelations of inherited personnel, scruti- democracy requires democratic political nized for their authenticity by a transpar- culture, then democratization should be ent process with public participation, may accompanied by social transformation. provide the new government with a degree of legitimacy and enough breathing space The exclusive nature of the Political to consolidate the state apparatus. Nearly Isolation Law effectively inhibits such three years after the fall of the Qaddafi a social transformation. Similar to elec- regime, Libya again needs a fresh start. tions, it merely redistributes power and A reconciliatory system could provide it. enables the former opposition to gain control of the state apparatus. In doing so, it preserves the past conflict with the new actors finding themselves in the old process of exclusion. Political leaders and legions of bureaucrats, who have the expertise and willingness to contribute to the new system, are disqualified from political participation. The application of the PIL weakens the state and enlarges the ranks of its opponents.
In order to promote democratic transfor- mation, Libya and other transitional coun- tries would benefit from pursuing personal changes rather than personnel changes. A reconciliatory system can serve as a vehicle of such a transformation. It gives tainted officials an opportunity to publicly demonstrate whether they are willing to play by the rules of the new system. Such process is not foreign to Arab culture and is in accordance with the Islamic teaching on tawba. Observing the drama of confes- sion, the public has a unique opportunity to scrutinize the motives and actions of
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 15 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law A pp e n d i x : A d v a n t a g e s a n d D i s a d v a n t a g e s o f P e r s o n n e l S y s t e m s
Exclusive System: The Reconciliatory System: The Political Isolation Law Proposed Model 1. Building (+) Effective in building (+) Capable of building trustworthy trustworthy government trustworthy government, albeit government less efficient (-) Trust is limited to the sections (+) Trust can stem from all of the former opposition sections of society (-) Deprives the state of (+) Retains qualified personnel, experienced personnel which may win trust by effective (-) Deprives the country of delivery of services political leaders (personalized trust) 2. Reconciliation (-) Politically divisive (+) Reconciliatory effects on the (-) Political divisions spill over to macro-level (smoothing political society compromise) (+) Reconciliatory effects on the micro-level 3. Justice (+) A response to the injustices of (+) Alternative means of justice the Qaddafi era (restorative justice)
(-) Excessive provisions create new injustices 4. Human Rights (+) There is no right to be (+) Human rights friendly model appointed to public office; public (+) Confession does not violate the employment can be limited by right not to testify because it leads law to the second chance rather than constituting sanctions (-) Violates the right not to testify against oneself and the right to vote 5. Contagion (-) Sends a signal to those (+) Capacity to inspire other Arab dissatisfied with any pre- countries transitional regime not to defect
(+) Indicates an advantage (-) Indicates a disadvantage
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 16 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law E n d n o t e s
1 Roman David, Lustration and Transitional Justice: Personnel Systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 2 Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, “Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses: Reforming the Police, Courts, and Prosecutor’s Offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies, eds. Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2007), 181-220; David, Lustration and Transitional Justice. 3Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Choices for New Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 1 (1991): 72-84. 4 Omar Ashour, “From Bad Cop to Good Cop: The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt,” Brookings Doha Center-Stanford Paper, November 2012. 5 Ellen Lust, “Voting for Change: The Pitfalls and Possibilities of First Elections in Arab Transitions,” Brookings Doha Center-Stanford Paper, May 2012; Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003). 6 Anas El Gomati, “Why Libya’s ‘isolation law’ threatens progress,” CNN Global Public Square, 21 May 2013,
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 17 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006); David, “Lustration Laws in Action”; David, “From Prague to Baghdad”; David, Lustration and Transitional Justice; Choi and David “Lustration Systems and Trust.” 19 Russell Hardin, Trust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Kenneth Newton, “Trust and Politics,” in The Handbook of Social Capital, eds. Dario Castiglione, Jan W. van Deth, and Guglielmo Wolleb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 241-72. 20 Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Trust and Honesty in Post-Socialist Societies,” Kyklos 54, no. 2-3 (2001): 415–43. 21 David, Lustration and Transitional Justice. 22 David, “From Prague to Baghdad.” 23 Mohamed Eljarh, “Isolation Law Harms Libya’s Democratic Transition,” Foreign Policy: Transitions, 8 May 2013,
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 18 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law 49 Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, “Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses: Reforming the Police, Courts, and Prosecutor’s Offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies, eds. Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2007), 181-220. 50 Ibid, 190. 51 Lingens v. Austria, European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 9815/82, 8 July 1986. 52 David Pion-Berlin, “To Prosecute or To Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone,” Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 1 (1994): 105-30. 53 Alice Fordham, “Tunisia’s ‘immunisation of the revolution’ draft legislation fiercely debated,” The National, 28 June 2013,
Personnel Change or Personal Change? 19 Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law Brookings Doha Center Publications
2014
Personnel Change or Personal Change? Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law Brookings Doha Center – Stanford Paper, Roman David and Houda Mzioudet
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution Analysis Paper, Monica L. Marks
2013
Reconstructing Libya: Stability Through National Reconciliation Analysis Paper, Ibrahim Sharqieh
Kings for All Seasons: How the Middle East’s Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring Analysis Paper, F. Gregory Gause III
A Coup Too Far: The Case for Reordering U.S. Priorities in Egypt Policy Briefing, Shadi Hamid and Peter Mandaville
Brookings Doha Energy Forum 2013 Policy Paper Brookings Doha Center – Brookings Energy Security Initiative Report
The Challenge of Syrian Unity: Reassuring Local Communities and Framing National Consensus Syria Workshop Series Paper
Muslim Politics Without an “Islamic” State: Can Turkey’s Justice and Development Party Be a Model for Arab Islamists? Policy Briefing, Ahmet T. Kuru
A Lasting Peace? Yemen’s Long Journey to National Reconciliation Analysis Paper, Ibrahim Sharqieh
Toward a Strategic Partnership? The EU and GCC in a Revolutionary Middle East Event Briefing
A Rights Agenda for the Muslim World? The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Evolving Human Rights Framework Analysis Paper, Turan Kayaoğlu