Wojciech Roszkowski Post-Communist Lustration in Poland: a Political and Moral Dilemma Congress of the Societas Ethica, Warsaw 22 August 2009 Draft not to be quoted
1. Introduction
Quite recently a well-known Polish writer stated that the major dividing line in the Polish society runs across the attitude towards lustration. Some Poles, he said, have been secret security agents or collaborators or, for some reasons, defend this cooperation, others have not and want to make things clear1. Even if this statement is a bit exaggerated, it shows how heated the debates on lustration in Poland are. Secret services in democratic countries are a different story than security services in totalitarian states. Timothy Garton Ash even calls this comparison “absurd”2. A democratic state is, by definition, a common good of its citizens. Some of them are professionals dealing with the protection of state in police, armed forces and special services, all of them being subordinated to civilian, constitutional organs of the state. Other citizens are recruited by these services extremely rarely and not without their consent. In totalitarian states secret services are the backbone of despotic power of the ruling party and serve not the security of a country but the security of the ruling elites. Therefore they should rather be given the name of security services. They tend to bring under their control all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life of the subjects of the totalitarian state, becoming, along with uniformed police and armed forces, a pillar of state coercion. Apart from propaganda, which is to make people believe in the ideological goals of the totalitarian state, terror is the main vehicle of power, aiming at discouraging people from any thoughts and deeds contrary to the said goals and even from any activity independent of the party-state. Of course, it is still to be found out what the limits of indoctrination and coercion should be. It is obvious that no state organization is free from certain forms of intervention in private lives of its citizens. Nobody should deny that school instruction or arresting criminals are justified forms of such intervention3. But there is a clear difference between measures that serve the good of free citizens and their security as a whole on then one hand and measures serving the security of the ruling group and its control over the society at the cost of civil liberties and even fundamental human rights on the other hand.
1 “O afirmacji polskości. Rozmowa z Jarosławem Markiem Rymkiewiczem”, [On the Affimation of Polish Identity. Conversation with Jarosław Marek Rymkiewicz], Teologia Polityczna,Vol. 5, Summer 2009-Autumn 2010, p. 15. 2 Timothy Garton Ash, The File. A Personal History, quoted according to the Polish edition: Teczka, (Kraków: Znak, 1997), p. 233. He was astonished to find that the British MI5 kept a file on him as well, but this should come as no surprise since he had had so many contacts in Communist countries that a secret service of a democratic country should have wanted to make sure about his loyalty. Anyway, he was rated as a “person not to be rated among enemies”. Ibidem, p. 230. 3 Cf. e.g. Leszek Kołakowski, Mini wykłady o maxi sprawach, [Mini-Lectures on Maxi-Topics] (Kraków: Znak, 2009), p. 78.
1 Apart from democratic or totalitarian nature of states in which secret services operate there is also a question of state sovereignty. There are a number of sovereign totalitarian states which ultimately could claim that secret operations are meant to strengthen their sovereignty, somehow similarly to democratic sovereign states. The common denominator of offense here would be the service to foreign powers. Therefore, even in democratic states, high officials are carefully verified in this respect. But the Communist system was organized as a network of states subordinated to the Soviet Union (“Socialist community”), so the security apparatus in each satellite country was obliged to render services to the services of the Soviet Big Brother. In other words, it was obvious for the functionaries of the security services that the interest of their own country came second after the interest of the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding, these functionaries were usually working at their own will. “Usually” is a key word here, because sometimes it is difficult to determine the range of their freedom of choice. Various forms of pressure could be applied to make people cooperate with the security apparatus. Moreover, some people decided to cooperate with the Communist security services, without entering a regular payroll of the Ministry of Interior. In Poland these people were called “secret collaborators” (tajny współpracownik, TW), “operational contacts” (kontakt operacyjny, KO) or otherwise. After the collapse of the Communist system in Poland, a heated public debate was opened on how to assess collaboration with the former security apparatus, but the legislation process was long and complicated. The first attempt to start lustration was made by the Jan Olszewski government in May 1992. Rushed by some MPs, his Minister of Interior, Antoni Macierewicz, produced a temporary document which raised hysterical opposition and led to the collapse of the Olszewski government. The anti- lustration coalition, including post-Communists, the Democratic Union (Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronisław Geremek, Adam Michnik), Liberals (Donald Tusk), and Peasants (Waldemar Pawlak) formed a new government. After years of post-Communist rule and relinquishment, on 11 April 1997 a moderate law was passed which limited lustration to people aspiring to public offices and subordinated the process to a special Lustration Court. Contrary to the German solution, the Polish law was based on the concept that collaboration with Communist services was not an offense in itself but that it should be disclosed while aspiring to a public office. Those who submitted a false statement would be banned from the office, those who confessed their collaboration would not. The Polish law was perhaps the most liberal among post-Communist countries and raised a lot of objections. A number of cases have shown that the Lustration Court was helpless. Leaks were used for political purposes and the security archives were partly opened for court proceedings. Various arguments were raised either to condemn or to justify collaboration with the Communist secret services. Consolidation of Communist security archives within the Institute of National Rememberance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN), created on the ground of the law passed on 18 December 1998, did not solve the problem. When during the lustration procedure the Spokesman of Public Interest turned to the IPN for respective files, he received only the materials that were accepted by the Office of State Protection (Urząd Ochrony Państwa, UOP). It only took the former agents to formally continue cooperation with the UOP to be free from any investigation. Under post-Communist rule, in 2003 an additional agreement was signed between the IPN and the newly created Agency of Internal Security (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego,
2 ABW) and Agency of Intelligence (Agencja Wywiadu, AW) on creation of the IPN special collection of files released only with the consent of the three institutions. In practice the access to most sensitive files was limited to a null4. Nevertheless leaks continued and individual cases were considered in the media without an attempt to formulate a more general pattern of moral assessment of the phenomenon. Despite a strong opposition of opponents, there was a growing conviction that it is impossible to found a viable democracy without disclosing security agents in politics, media and other important spheres of social life. In 2006 an attempt was made by the Jarosław Kaczyński government to implement lustration, rising the temperature of the debate. On 16 October 2006 the law was passed by the Lower House. After the President submitted his amendments, the law was passed but soon after it came into force it was sent by a post-Communist politician to the Constitutional Tribunal who found the law unconstitutional in May 20075. Under the new government of Donald Tusk, emerged after the 2007 election, the problem remains unsolved but its importance cannot be denied.
2. Some important cases
The Case of Wałęsa. Perhaps the best known case is that of the former “Solidarity” leader, president of Poland and an international icon, Lech Wałęsa. Rumours about his cooperation with Communist services and about his attempts to destroy this documentation circulated for years. In 2008 a book by two historians connected with the IPN, Sławomir Cenkiewcz and Piotr Gontarczyk, concerning Wałęsa’s involvement with the security agents, raised political emotions to a new extreme6. The book, based on a profound archival research, stipulated that the 2000 verdict of the Lustration Court, in which Wałęsa, then presidential candidate, was found not guilty of cooperation with the SB, was, to say the least, lacking grounds. The authors have proved that between 1970 and 1976 Wałęsa contributed to the evidence of the security apparatus but they found no evidence of any further cooperation. Moreover they have shown that during his presidential years 1990-95 Wałęsa did his best to destroy compromising materials7. Wałęsa vigorously denied the accusations but from time to time he confessed this involvement, only minimizing its range and importance. Major commentators and the public opinion were divided between those who condemned Wałęsa, those who were ready to accept the ambivalent truth about Wałęsa and those who defended him at all costs. The hardliners, such as Krzysztof Wyszkowski, one of the founder of the Gdańsk Free Trade Unions of the 1970s, claimed Wałęsa had been a harmful SB agent, while
4 Jan Piński, „Fikcja lustracyjna”, [The Lustration Fiction] Wprost, 11 May 2008, p 28-29. 5 Andrzej Paczkowski, „Koncepcja ograniczonej lustracji przyniosła Polsce więcej szkód niż korzyści”, [Limited Lustration Brought Poland More Harm Than Good], Dziennik, 2 June 2006; Zbigniew Romaszewski, „Lustracyjny sąd czy samosąd” [Lustration Court Or Lynch?], Rzeczpospolita, 26 January 2007; Mariusz Jałoszewski, Marcin Czekański, „ Krytyka lustracji na stu stronach”, [Hundred Pages of Criticism of Lustration], Rzeczpospolita, 19 June 2007. 6 Sławomir Cenckiewicz, Piotr Gontarczyk, SB a Lech Wałęsa, [The Security Service and Lech Wałęsa] (Gdańsk-Warszawa-Kraków: IPN, 2008); „Tajemnice teczki TW Bolka”, [Secrets of the TW Bolek File], Rzeczpospolita, 17 August 2008. 7 Sławomir Cenckiewicz, Piotr Gontarczyk, „Żołnierze Wałęsy”, [Soldiers of Wałęsa], Wprost, 6 July 2008, p. 84-86.
3 writer Stefan Chwin was of the opinion that Wałęsa’a biography was a little flawed but that he would stay an eminent personality in the Polish history. Even before the book was published Wałęsa’s advocates were extremely emotional in his defense and in their attacks on the IPN8. First, Cenckiewicz and Gontarczyk were denied the moral right to deal with Wałęsa’s biography. Second, they were accused of methodological mistakes. Third, their work for the IPN was allegedly scandalous enough. Fourth, they were accused of slandering a Polish hero in the eyes of Western public opinion9. One of the commentators even compared the case of Wałęsa to the Dreyfuss affair10. In their book Cenckiewicz and Gontarczyk stated that the security man who was Wałęsa’s leading officer, Edward Graczyk, had died. When in November 2008 the IPN discovered that he still lives, the anti-lustration faction immediately accused Cenckiewicz and Gontarczyk of hoax and questioned their general statements. The problem was that both historians presented lots of documentation proving Wałęsa, under pseudonym “Bolek” had cooperated with the Security Service (Slużba Bezpieczeństwa, SB) in the years 1970-76 and Graczyk’s testimony could only verify these documents. The cream of the joke was that Graczyk was found dead by the Lustration Court in 2000, when Wałęsa was declared “clean”. Both historian did not verify the finding by the Lustration Court concerning Graczyk but this does not change the credibility of their other findings. Moreover, Graczyk testified that Wałęsa was “Bolek”11.
Military Intelligence Service. After 1989 the former Military Intelligence Service (Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne, WSI), remained almost untouched. Does this mean that its functionaries suddenly changed their loyalty? This is a rather unlikely conclusion for a group of some 3 thousand officers of the Polish Army, of which about 300 top personnel graduated from the Soviet schools or underwent training at the GRU or KGB headquarters in Moscow. This was, for instance, the case of the last commanders of the WSI, Generals Edmund Buła, Bolesław Izydorczyk, and Marek Dukaczewski, as well as Rear-Admiral Kazimierz Głowacki. It is interesting that in the second half of the 1980s many high WSI officers were undergoing GRU courses concerning perestroika and its impact on military intelligence operations. Perhaps this is why General Buła, later sentenced to several years in prison for ordering destruction of sensitive documentation
8 Without reading the book, Władysław Frasyniuk, once a “Solidarity” leader in Wrocław, remarked: “You do not talk with people like that, you slap them in the face”. Cf.: “Kogo chce obciążyć legenda “Solidarności”? [Whom Does the “Solidarity” Icon Want to Hold Responsible?], Rzeczpospolita, 20 May 2008. 9 Marek Migalski, „Jak zdyskredytować historyków”, [How To Discredit Historians], Rzeczpospolita, 23 May 2008; Bernadeta Waszkielewicz, „Byłem w amoku” [I Saw Red], Rzeczpospolita, 27 August 2008; Jarosław Stróżyk, „Jak rozumieć Wałęsę?” [How to Understand Wałęsa?] Rzeczpospolita, 4 December 2008; “Kmicic stoczniowy. Rozmowa Stefana Chwina z Barbarą Szczepułą”, [Kmicic
4 of Communist services, ordered microfilming of extensive files, probably also for his Soviet masters. What were the unreformed WSI activities? Their new tasks—protecting security of new democratic Poland—were performed without success. By 2005 the new Counterintelligence Service failed to catch even a single foreign spy. If some were in fact caught, this was due to the operations of the reformed Office of State Protection. Historical links with Soviet services made several officers continue cooperation with their Russian counterparts. Two highest ranking officers sentenced in this connection were: Lieutenant-Colonels Zbigniew Hydzik and Czesław Wojtkun. A number of other pathologies were recorded, such as: interference with the media and business by means recruitment of agents and influencing legislative processes, embezzlement of public funds, influencing privatization to the benefit of their personnel, investing operation funds in private enterprises, and so on12. A democratic state cannot afford spending public money on such harmful activities, so the Law and Justice government, formed after the 2005 election started dismantling the WSI and creating a new Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service. When the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) government liquidated the WSI and prepared a special report, the anti-lustration journalists and politicians raised alarms that the report damaged the Polish secret services and put the life of their agents at risk13. Although the report included several mistakes, the general accusation has never been proved and some sources indicated that as a result of the liquidation of the WSI the credibility of the Polish intelligence increased14.
Media. The lustration law of 2006 provided for lustration of journalists. The reason was that many journalists were clearly steered by secret services with the aim to influence public debates and to shape public opinion in a way favourable for them. In many cases the anti-lustration mood was a result of press and TV campaigns in which supporters of lustration and transparency but also of increasing the efficacy of the state machinery were presented as maniacs. Apart from the post-Communist media, such as
12 Sławomir Cenckiewicz, Piotr Woyciechowski, „Jak likwidowaliśmy Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne” [How We Liquidated the Military Intelligence Service], Rzeczpospolita, 29 November 2006. One of key eminences grises among WSI officers was Colonel Aleksander Lichocki, graduate of KGB courses in Moscow who was an expert of the Military Property Agency, and very frequently served as a go between for the WSI circles and media. Teresa Wójcik, “Informator pułkownik Lichocki”, [Informer Colonel Lichocki], Gazeta Polska, 18 June 2008. 13 The report on liquidation of the WSI has probably the longest title in modern history: Raport o działaniach żołnierzy i pracowników WSI oraz wojskowych jednostek organizacyjnych realizujących zadania w zakresie wywiadu i kontrwywiadu wojskowego przed wejściem w życie ustawy z dnia 9 lipca 2003 r. o Wojskowych Służbach Informacyjnych w zakresie określonym w art. 67. ust. 1 pkt 1 – 10 ustawy z dnia 9 czerwca 2006 r. „Przepisy wprowadzające ustawę o Służbie Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego oraz Służbie Wywiadu Wojskowego oraz ustawę o służbie funkcjonariuszy Służby Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego oraz Służby Wywiadu Wojskowego” oraz o innych działaniach wykraczających poza sprawy obronności państwa i bezpieczeństwa Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. http://www.wsi.emulelinki.com/ 14 This is, e.g. the standpoint of Professor Marek Chodakiewicz from the Institute of World Politics in Washington D.C. Cf. also: Małgorzata Subotić, Bernadeta Waszkiewicz, “WSI były groźne, ale nie rządziły”, [WSI were Dangerous but They Did Not Rule], Rzeczpospolita,17/18 February 2007; “WSI werbowały dla Rosjan. Tomasz Sakiewicz i Teresa Wócik rozmawiają z Antonim Macierewiczem”, [WSI Recruited for the Russian. Tomasz Sakiewicz and Teresa Wójcik Talk to Antoni Macierewicz], Gazeta Polska, 12 September 2007.
5 the daily Trybuna, weeklies Polityka and pornographic tabloid Nie of Jerzy Urban, and the monthly Przegląd, the leading role in these campaigns was played by the daily Gazeta Wyborcza whose editor-in-chief, Adam Michnik, had been a leading figure of the democratic opposition but later frequently worked hand in hand with some of the former Communists. For instance it came as a shock to millions of Michnik’s admirers from the 1980s, when in 2004 Urban disclosed frequent wining and dining with him. The most dramatic case of the consistency of the anti-lustration attitude of Gazeta Wyborcza took place in 2008, when it was disclosed that a man by the name Lesław Maleszka still worked for the daily. In 2001 a group of Maleszka’s friends from the time of the Student Solidarity Committee (Studencki Komitet Solidarności, SKS), established in 1977 after the murder of their colleague Stanisław Pyjas by the secret police, gathered evidence showing that Maleszka, one of the leaders of the SKS, had been a long time SB agent under the pseudonym “Ketman” and had supplied the security officers with most important information about the group and its members. It seemed likely that Maleszka’s information could have led to Pyjas’s murder. A movie “Three Pals” (Trzej Kumple) on the Pyjas affair, shown on TV in 2008, shocked the public opinion. In the movie Maleszka did not hide his collaboration with the SB and appeared as a Gazeta Wyborcza editor. This was too much for some of the Gazeta Wyborcza journalists who left but Adam Michnik failed to comment and to change his attitude toward lustration15. There were other collaborators of the Communist secret services among influential media people, such as deputy program director of the largest private TV channel, TVN, Milan Subotić, who vigorously denied the accusation, and Bogusław Wołoszański, an extremely popular author of historical documentaries, who confessed he had collaborated with the Communist intelligence16. When the new lustration law came into force in March 2007, journalists were expected to submit declarations that they had not cooperated with Communist services. Among journalists who refused to do so were some of the most popular pundits: Ewa Milewicz, Jacek Żakowski, Wojciech Mazowiecki and Piotr Najsztub. Żakowski stated that “past cooperation is for me not the most important criterion of credibility”. Anothet TV star, Tomasz Lis, was even more explicit: “The Maleszka case is a stick in the hands of supporters of lustration who mythologize a really marginal issue”17. Whether lustration is a marginal issue or not may be judged by the case of Lew Rywin who collaborated with the 2nd and 6th Departments of the Ministry of Interior at he least in the years 1982-86. In 1989 he became deputy head of the Polish Radio and TV. In July 2002, when a new media law was being prepared by the post-Communist
15 Andrzej Kaczyński, „Prawda o „Ketmanie” i „Monice”, [The Truth about „Ketman” and „Monika”], Rzeczpospolita, 30 January 2006; „Akta mówią prawdę. Anna Maruszeczko rozmaia z Ewą Zając”, [Files Tell the Truth], Ozon, 8 February 2006, p. 8-9; Roman Graczyk, „Co jest lepsze niż prawda?” [What Is Better Than Truth?], Rzeczpospolita, 31 May 2006; Aleksander Kaczorowski,”Mój kolega ‘Ketman’, [My Colleague ‘Ketman’], Newsweek Polska, 6 July 2008, p. 28-31. 16 Luiza Zalewska, „Agenci bezpieki – niezaplanowane scenariusze”, [Security Agent—Unplanned Scenarios], Dziennik, 11/12 August 2007; Piotr Gontarczyk, „Bogusław Wołoszański – agent wywiadu PRL”, [Bogusław Wołoszański – Agent of the Communist Polish Intelligence], Rzeczpospolita, 17 January 2007; Piotr Gontarczyk, „Co Służba Bezpieczeństwa zleciła Bogusławowi Wołoszańskiemu”, [What Did the Security Service Order Bogusław Wołoszański to Do?]; Rzeczpospolita, 18 January 2007. 17 Quoted according to: Leszek Misiak, „Prześwietlić czwartą władzę”, [To X-Ray the Fourth Power], Gazeta Polska, 9 July 2008.
6 government of Leszek Miller, Rywin offered Michnik to help shape the law in a way favourable to the Gazeta Wyborcza for a huge bribe. Not satisfied with the offer, after 5 months of considerations Michnik announced their recorded conversation what resulted in a scandal. The Polish Parliament produced a special investigation committee to explore the issue. The committee’s proceedings led to the collapse of the post- Communist party and a dramatic political change of 200518.
The Catholic Church. Some embarrassing cases were also recorded among Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, and Roman Catholic bishops and popular priests. The most spectacular one referred to the Catholic Bishop Stanisław Wielgus. In December 2006 he was appointed the New Archbishop of Warsaw, despite hints from the IPN that he had collaborated with the Polish Communist intelligence. Several journalists, including those closely connected with the Catholic Church, objected his appointment and referred to the pretty univocal documentation stored at the IPN. Bishop Wielgus denied these allegations but when they proved to be really strong, he confessed he had talked with the security people before leaving for a scholarship abroad. The radical Radio Maryja followers vigorously defended Wielgus. The same line was adopted by Gazeta Wyborcza, as usually opposing lustration. Through separate diplomatic channels, probably not without good offices of the presidential palace, the evidence concerning Wielgus’s links to the Communist intelligence was sent to the Holy See which exercised strong pressure for Wielgus to resign. On the day of his ingress in early January 2007, with President Lech Kaczyński present, the Warsaw Cathedral became a scene of an upsetting show. While Radio Maryja followers were ready to applaud the new Archbishop, he declared he would not assume the office. Amongst loud protests from the crowd, the outgoing Archbishop, Cardinal Józef Glemp added fuel to the fire by indirectly supporting Wielgus19. Amongst hints that many other Catholic bishops and priests had been involved in a secret cooperation with the Communist services, the Conference of the Polish Episcopate created a special commission but its final conclusion was that all these cases are clear for the Church authorities and that there is no need to explore the matter any further. This standpoint left many priests and Catholic journalists unsatisfied. For instance Rev. Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski published an extensive book on this matter and continued his own investigations20.
Artists, Scholars and Writers. Soon after Ryszard Kapuściński, one of the best known Polish journalists and writers, died, his files surfaced which showed his cooperation with the Polish Communist intelligence abroad in the years 1965-72 and perhaps even longer. Although he mostly informed about foreigners, some of this information might have been harmful to these people. The inner history of his involvement, and his own as well, was explained by another popular journalist, Wojciech
18 Piotr Pałka, „Przychodzi esbek do Lwa Rywina”, [An SB Man Comes to Lew Rywin], Rzeczpospolita, 17 May 2007. 19 Abp Wielgus: Poprzez uwikłanie skrzywdziłem Kościół, [Through My Involvement I Harmed the Church], 6 I 2007. http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,53600,3832204.html. Cf.also: Rzeczpospolita, Gazeta Wyborcza, Dziennik, and Nasz Dziennik, 4-8 January 2007. 20 Ks. Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, Księża wobec bezpieki na przykładzie archidiecezji krakowskiej, [Priests and the Security Service in the Cracow Archdiocese], (Kraków: Znak, 2007), 592 pp.
7 Giełżyński, who confessed he had been a source of information to the Communist intelligence. Both cases are definitely less dramatic than that of Maleszka, but they show how deep the penetration of Communist services in the journalist community was21. And cooperation with these services was not as harmless as some claim. Writer Marek Nowakowski, contributor to uncensored periodicals in the 1970s, wrote: “Disclosed confidents frequently minimize their role. Well, they just harmlessly babbled. No, they lie! They made my life more complicated: for instance passport refusals, trouble with publishing etc. Those whom I recognize—“Samantha” or “Marian”—had good jobs. They wanted more (…) Better life, foreign trips. It was no longer the time of physical tortures in security prison cellars, not a matter of life or death”. Considering mean motifs of the TW engagement Nowakowski stresses with bitterness that these pitiful figures were steered by some security generals, colonels and heads of security departments and that the latter “live quiet and respectful lives. Without remorse, anxiety or moral embarrassment”. Nowakowski noticed that Captain Krzysztof Majchrowski who constantly appeared in his files and who finally advanced to the rank of general, published essays in Życie Literackie, viciously attacking Nowakowski’s prose22. The same Majchrowski led a number of TW writers, of whom Wacław Sadkowski and Kazimierz Koźniewski were the most productive and supplied the security officers with enormous amounts of information23. Lustration strongly divided the scholarly community. The issue was not as marginal as it may seem. According to some surveys, the number of TWs at the Warsaw Polytechnical University was 49 in 1982, at the Cracow University there were 18 TWs, 25 “operation contacts” and 11 service contacts in 1981, and at the Catholic University of Lublin there were 39 TWs in 198324. The 2006 lustration law stipulated that professors would have to declare whether they had cooperated with the SB or not. In early 2007 a wave of protests went through Polish universities. Open letters were voted by whole scholarly boards of university departments and research institutes, gaining a majority support in many cases. This was, for instance the case of the Department of Political Studies of the Silesian University in Katowice, whose dean, Piotr Iwanek, had been a TW under the pseudonym “Piotr”25. The Warsaw University Senate adopted a resolution very critical of the 2006 law. Also the Law Department of the Cracow University had problems with one of its
21 „Kapuściński – kontakt wywiad PRL”, [Kapuściński – Contact of the Communist Polish Intelligence], Rzeczpospolita, 21 May 2007; „Teczka pisarza”, [Writer’s File], Newsweek Polska, 27 May 2007, p. 23-29; „Przeszłość męczyła Kapuścińskiego. Tomasz P.Terlikowski rozmawia z Wojciechem Giełżyńskim”, [The Past Was Haunting Kapuściński. Tomasz P.Terlikowski Talks with Wojciech Giełżyński], Rzeczpospolita, 23 May 2007; Bronisław Wildstein, „W świetle sprawy Kapuścińskiego”, [In the Light of the Kapuściński Case], Rzeczpospolita, 2/3 June 2007. 22 Marek Nowakowski, „Szpiegowali mnie przyjaciele”, [It Was Friends Who Spied on Me], Dziennik, 29 January 2007. 23 Joanna Siedlecka, „Teczka pracy konsultanta ‘Olchy’” [Working File of Consultant ”Olcha”], Rzeczpospolita, 4/5 August 2007. 24 „Akademicy w sieci SB. Rozmowa z Antonim Dudkiem”, [Academia in the SB Network], Rzeczpospolita, 26 March 2007. 25 Artur Grabek, „Były agent wstrzymywał lustrację na uczelni”, [Former Agent Arrested Lustration At the University], Dzennik, 31 July 2007.
8 professors, Jarosław Reszczyński, who had been very active as an SB agent in the Pyjas affair in 197726. In September 2008 it turned out that one of the most prominent Polish scholars, discoverer of first planet outside the solar system, Aleksander Wolszczan, candidate for the Nobel Prize, had worked for the SB in the years 1973-88. He did not deny facts but claimed that he had done no harm to anyone and that his cooperation with the SB was a condition of going abroad27. In reply several scholars argued that their foreign trips were not subject to any SB blackmail28. Finally, many scholarly boards decided not to submit lustration declaration before the final verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal. Since the verdict annulled the lustration law, journalist, scholarly and artistic communities were no longer obliged to do anything.
Other Cases. There were several cases concerning important politicians. Longtime leader of a radically anti-Communist Confederation of Independent Poland (Konferedacja Polski Niepodległej, KPN), Leszek Moczulski, accused of collaboration with the security apparatus in 1992, was found guilty in September 2006. The Lustration Court of second instance decided that in the years 1969-77 he had “methodically collaborated with the Security Service under the pseudonym “Lech” and was paid for reporting on his colleagues from the weekly Stolica that he worked for. Moczulski claimed that his documentation was forged, but the court decided to the contrary29. Another important case which leaked out without a formal investigation was that of post-Communist Minister of Defense Stanisław Dobrzański from the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL). His file included excessive information that he passed to the SB on the “Solidarity” activities in the National Library in the 1980s. When the lustration law entered into force in 1997 he withdrew from political life into business. In 2001 he was appointed head of the Polish Power Network of which he knew very little30. Despite limited access to IPN files, journalists were able to identify a number of other leading post-Communist politicians as SB TWs or operational contacts, perhaps most prominent of them being former Speaker of the Senate Longin Pastusiak31. The story of Zyta Gilowska, Minister of Finance and Vice Premier in the Jarosław Kaczyński government in the years 2006-2007, was different. Her file surfaced surprisingly during the Law and Justice rule because her long time friend, Witold Wieczorek, who worked for the SB had managed to take away her file from the archive and to keep it in his hands. The file included reports from their private conversations.
26 „Lustracja na uniwersytecie skłóciła profesorów”, [University Lustration Disturbed Professors], Rzeczpospolita, 29 March 2007; Piotr Pałka., „Donosił na polonistów, uczy prawników”, [He Denounced Polish Students and Teaches Lawyers], Rzeczpospolita, 24 May 2007. 27 „Profesor Wolszczan był agentem SB?” [Professor Wolszczan Was an SB Agent?], Rzeczpospolita, 18 Sepember 2008, Marek Oramus, “Powrót z gwiazd”, [The Return from Stars], Polska Times, 22 September 2008. 28 Maciej Marosz, „Naukowcy nie musieli donosić”, [Scholars Did not Have to Report], Gazeta Polska, 26 November 2008. 29 „Moczulski ponownie uznany za agenta SB” [Moczulski Found SB Agent Again], Życie Warszawy, 13 September 2006. 30 It was then when minister Wiesław Kaczmarek, who appointed him, made his famous remark: “Staszek wanted to try his best in business. Should I not have given him a chance?” Dorota Kania, “Kabel w Bibliotece”, [A Spy in the Library], Wprost, 2 December 2007, p. 32-33. 31 Marcin Dierżanowski, “Niedolustrowani”, [Not Lustrated Enough], Wprost, 5 July 2007, p. 24-27.
9 Since this could not have been rated as a willing cooperation, Gilowska was found not guilty of the “lustration lie”. The question however remains why she was so naïve to make friends with someone of whose work for the Communist militia she knew during the martial law (1981-83)32. Another story refers to the right-hand man of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Michał Boni. Before receiving ministerial portfolio in 2007 he confessed that in 1985 he had signed a declaration of cooperation with the SB. His confession and apology were presented by a private TV channel as his personal tragedy. Jacek Żakowski of Gazeta Wyborcza sighed with relief foreseeing the end of “agentomania” but a number of doubts about Boni’s sincerity remain. First of all, the reason why he decided to sign the said declaration was that SB caught him with a woman that was not his wife and he wanted to avoid the effects of this happening. Second, when in 1992 Minister Macierewicz put Boni on his list among other SB agents, a wave of protests was raised under the slogan that “irresponsible people want to set fire on Poland” and Gazeta Wyborcza published a poem by Wisława Szymborska “Nienawiść” (Hatred). Third, when in 2006 doubts were raised whether Jacek Kuroń should have negotiated with the SB while in a prison cell, Boni wrote: “Delators and those who had no time or nerve in that hour of trial and today seek an easy excuse for their cowardice, should now keep quiet”33. Moral authorities who oppose lustration may speak up but they should at least have a clear past.
3. Opinions
Opponents of lustration in Poland coined a term „wild lustration” which they applied to any lustration at all. This is an example of verbal abuse serving a political goal. In fact it is an attempt to turn things upside down. Those who tried to implement legal principles of lustration—with better or worse effects—were labeled “wild lustrators” by those who had had secret access to the security files and frequently used the acquired knowledge for their own purposes. One should not forget that some people, belonging to the Gazeta Wyborcza circle, including its editor-in-chief Adam Michnik, were allowed to penetrate the Polish security archives in early 1990 or that Hipolit Straszak, the right-hand man of the editor-in-chief of Nie, Jerzy Urban, himself ill-famed spokesman of the martial law government, had been a high security officer who helped Nie publish of lots of materials from the security files. In the media turmoil that broke out after the publication of the Sławomir Cenckiewicz and Piotr Gontarczyk book on Lech Wałęsa in 2008, few people noticed that Minister of Interior Krzysztof Kozłowski confirmed the fact that he had ordered collection of information on Wałęsa during the presidential campaign of 1990. The cream of the joke is that nowadays Kozłowski is a vigorous opponent of lustration34.
32 Dariusz Wilczak, „Z teczką i bez teki”, [With a File and Without Portfolio], Newsweek Polska, 16 July 2006, p. 30-31; Mira Suchodolska, „Czuję gniew”, [I Feel Anger], Newsweek Polska, 13 August 2006, p. 18-24. 33 Mikołaj Wójcik, „Twierdzi, że nie krzywdził”, [He Claims He Did Not Harm Anyone], Dziennik, 2 November 2007; Jan Pospieszalki, „Telenowela Michała Boni”, [TV Series of Michał Boni], Rzeczpospolita, 5 November 2007; Jacek Żakowski, „Koniec lustracyjnej czarnej mszy”, [The End of the Blach Mass of Lustration’, Rzeczpospolita, 5 November 2007. 34 Cenckiewicz, Gontarczyk, SB a Lech Wałęsa, s. 166.
10 Opponents of lustration frequently adopt reductio ad absurdum, claiming they deny revision of history in which the SB would have an overwhelming influence on the democratic opposition. Exaggeration in showing that the security apparatus had so many agents in the “Solidarity”—they say—blurs its legend. They ask: “have we really been led by agents and scoundrels”? This seems a logical conclusion from the fanatic eagerness of “lustrators”. But, on the other hand, does this mean that we should not make attempts to establish a true history of the democratic opposition and “Solidarity”?35 The anti-lustration campaigns were frequently led by Gazeta Wyborcza. Some of its journalists, criticizing the “rhetoric of hatred”, argue that TWs “were not Soviet agents. They were normal people. Showing, like those propaganda functionaries of historical policy and political history, Communist Poland as similar to the Nazi occupation, is a historical lie (…) We have a grudge against those 30-year-old Hunweibin from the IPN who listen to the demagoguery of the President, Prime Minister [the Kaczyński brothers – WR] and their propaganda transmitters, such as Messrs Legutko and Krasnodębski [well known professors of philosophy - WR]”36. Not all opponents of lustration are so aggressive. Sociologist Hanna Świda- Ziemba said opponents of lustration declarations were frequently in favour of lustration but against forcing people to testify against themselves or to plead their innocence. It should be the other way around, she says, guilt should be proved37. But this would be against the logic of the 1997 lustration law anyway. Would the former agents accuse themselves without pressure? Who should start investigation about these matters? A moderate critic of the 2006 lustration law, sociologist Ireneusz Krzemiński stressed that it was a “scandal that the academic community could never afford at least a symbolic self-purification”38. On the other hand philosopher Barbara Skarga claimed that lustration was mainly striking at „the most worthy citizens, always independent in their thoughts and deeds” and that lustration was aimed at “trampling their freedom and dignity”, as well as at “subordination of citizens to the orders of political power”39. One cannot help wondering how independent police informers could have been. A free and respectful citizen should not hide his or her past. Of course there is a huge difference between a longtime collaboration whose effect was a lot of damage to many people on the one hand and an unwilling discussion with the security people on the other hand. It is to be regretted that both the most eager lustrators, who lacked legal precision, and enemies of lustration, who twisted words and lied, have distorted moral sensitivity, necessary in such a delicate matter as lustration.
35 Cf. for instance: Tomasz Pompowski, „Akta bezpieki kryją wielkość i słabość dawnej opozycji”, [Security Files Include the Greatness and the Meanness of Former Opposition], Dziennik, 26/27 August 2006; Aleksander Hall, „Prawda nie leży w rynsztoku”, [Truth Cannot Be Found in the Gutter], Gazeta Wyborcza, 31 August 2006. 36 Ryszard Legutko, „Kto, jak nie profesorowie, powinien podlegać lustracji?” [Who Else than Professor Should Undergo Lustration?], Rzeczpospolita, 3 April 2007; Zdzisław Krasnodębski, „Duchota na uniwersytetach”, [Sultry Weather at Universities], Rzeczpospolita,17 April 2007. 37 „Uniwersytet na straży wartości. Witold Głowacki rozmawia z Hanną Świdą-Ziembą”, [University Protecting Values. Witold Głowacki Talks to Hanna Świda-Ziemba], Dziennik, 10 April 2007. 38 Ireneusz Krzemiński, „Naukowca kłopoty z lustracją”, [Scholar’s Trouble with Lustration], Rzeczpospolita, 26 March 2007. 39 Barbara Skarga, “Tysiąc barw demokracji” [Thousand Colours of Democracy], Gazeta Wyborcza, 19-20 May 2007 r.
11 Even before the Cenckiewicz and Gontarczyk book was released for circulation, an open letter was signed by a number of celebrities, including Władysław Bartoszewski, Jerzy Buzek, Bronisław Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Adam Michnik, Wisława Szymborska and Andrzej Wajda, in which the signatories opened fire on both historians and on the IPN, using the strongest moral arguments possible. In reply another group, including for instance Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Ryszard Legutko, Jadwiga Staniszkis and Bronisław Wildstein stressed that at the moment nobody had a chance to read the incriminated book and that an atmosphere was being created endangering the freedom of research40. The debate continued for months, during which moral hysteria prevailed over common sense. Paradoxically, most of those who defended Wałęsa were usually critical of attempts to combat false clichés about Poland41. The case of Archbishop Stanisław Wielgus has shown a strange anti-lustration coalition of Gazeta Wyborcza and Radio Maryja. Jacek Żakowski discovered that Polish “Neo-Conservatives” pretend to be Christians but in fact they are guided by hatred42. It seems that his criterion of being a Christian is to defend lies. But what should he do with the Pope? On the Radio Maryja side, Rev. Professor Czesław Bartnik, spoke about “cleansing” of the Catholic Church through “killing priests”. He attacked an “anti-Church corporation”, including some Catholic media, as well as certain Dominican and Jesuit priests who demanded transparency in Church nominations and full explanation of Wielgus’s engagement with the Communist services. His most bizarre argument was that Wielgus “could have thought that the relevant documentation no longer exists”43. Bartnik seemed to overlook the fact that the said corporation was led by Pope Benedict XVI who forced Wielgus’s resignation. Equally strange argument was raised by a radical Catholic activist Jan Maria Jackowski who claimed that disclosing the truth about Wielgus journalists hit the Church whose vision was not founded on an “earthly perspective”. Did he really mean that the concept of truth was only “earthly”? What about Christ who frequently referred to the concept of truth44? Archbishop Kazimierz Nycz made it clear: “People who betrayed should confess, apologize, realize their weakness and only then can continue working for the homeland”45.
40 In their letter the signatories wrote that Wałęsa is a „Polish moral asset” and that it is hard to understand intentions of people who follow a slander campaign against Wałęsa on the grounds of secret police archives. They called both historians “memory policemen violating truth and fundamental moral principles”. They appealed to all Poles to resist “the campaign of hatred and defamation against Wałęsa which destroys the Polish national memory”. Cf. Rzeczpospolita, 23 May 2008. 41 One of the few who showed common sense was Bronisław Wildstein who stated that Wałęsa’s strategies of the 1980s were sometimes controversial and his presidency in the years 1990-95 even more, but that these were strategies of a leader and not of a Communist agent. “Unfortunately--wrote Wildstein—Wałęsa behaves in a manner typical for the majority of the Polish leaders. Instead of facing the truth and showing that, despite the perfidy of the Communist system they could oppose it and win, the hero of our struggle for freedom quibbles and lies”. Bronisław Wildstein, „Bohater, który kręci”, [A Hero Who Quibbles], Rzeczpospolita, 14 June 2007. 42 Gazeta Wyborcza, 15 January 2007 r.; Polityka, 7 January 2007 r. 43 Czesław Bartnik, “’Oczyszczanie’ Kościoła poprzez zabijanie duchownych”, [Church Cleansing Through Killing of Priests], Nasz Dziennik, 13-14 January 2007 r. 44 Cf. e.g. John, 7, 28. 45 Bogumił Łoziński, „Abp Nycz: żeby służyć ojczyźnie, trzeba się rozliczyć z przeszłością”, [Archbiskop Nycz: In Oder to Serve the Homeland One Has to Settle Past Accounts], Dziennik, 25 August 2008.
12 Misinterpretations by the Gazeta Wyborcza circle are almost directly repeated by some Western journalists. Christopher Caldwell of the Financial Times, claimed that the problem with Polish lustration boiled down to the desire of the Jarosław Kaczyński government to introduce the rule of a hereditary aristocracy of opposition activists based on the principle of revenge. Did not he notice that the supporters of lustration are accused of being absent on the barricades of anti-Communism? Even Garton Ash, well informed in Polish affairs, availed of the opportunity to sting the Kaczyński brothers as if they defended the Archbishop. In fact, they acted to the contrary. Garton Ash also advised the Poles “not to cope with the past in courts”46. Opposing the lustration procedures in Poland, Garton Ash, author of an investigation concerning his own file in the Stasi archives, did not hide his moral disgust towards East German collaborators of this Communist security service. He quoted article 32 of the German law concerning the access to the Stasi archive which stipulates that the files stored there should be used for “political education” if they refer to “persons significant in contemporary history” on the condition that “no harm is done to the superior private interest of relevant persons”. This formula is in a way contradictory, since the said private interest may be harmed in the case of proved wrongdoings of these persons. Anyway, having carefully studied his own file, Garton Ash seems to have approved attempts to establish truth about his role and the role of those who reported on him47. Why ten did he oppose the Polish lustration? Was it worse than the German one? The key German “lustrator”, Joachim Gauck, spoke much more favourably of the Polish lustration48. Having observed extreme and sometimes groundless criticism of the 2006 lustration law by Western media, Władysław Bartoszewski remarked: “The truth is that the world should be shyly silent. It is only people who went through a similar totalitarian experience that have the right to discuss lustration”49. Nevertheless, when Bronisław Geremek called the new lustration law “humiliating for the majority of Poles” and declared in the European Parliament that he would not submit a new declaration of non- cooperation, he was loudly applauded by most MEPs and most European media50. Among those who joined attacks on the Polish lustration law was Alain Finkielkraut who defended Geremek and called the lustration procedures “typical for totalitarianism”51.
46 Financial Times, 14 January 2007 r.; Piotr Semka, "Dlaczego arcybiskup Wielgus ustąpił, czyli myślowe łamańce publicystów", [Why Archbishop Wielgus Stepped Down Or Intellecual Acrobatics of Some Journalists], Rzeczpospolita, 15 January 2007; “Nie tędy droga. Timothy Garton Ash w rozmowie z Elżbietą Isakiewicz”, [This Is Not the Way. Timothy Garton Ash Talks to Elżbieta Isakiewicz], Neewsweek Poland, 13 May 2007, p. 22-23. 47 Garton Ash, Teczka, p. 121-123. 48 Joachim Gauck, „Prawda nigdy nie szkodzi”, [Truth Never Harms], Rzeczpospolita, 24/25 May 2008. 49 Władysław Bartoszewski, „Świat nie rozumie Polski”, [The World Does Not Understand Poland], Dziennik, 13 April 2007. 50„Europa będzie bronić Geremka”, [Europe Will Defend Geremek], Rzeczpospolita, 26 April 2007; „Geremek mandatu nie odda”, [Geremek Will Not Give Up His Mandate], Dziennik, 26 April 2007. As a result of the anti-lustration hysteria raised at this point with regard to Poland, Zdzisław Krasnodębski ironically suggested that someone should defend the rights of the “victims” of the German Stasi purges. Zdzisław Krasnodębski, “Ręce precz od agentów Stasi!”, [Hands Off the Stasi Agents!], Rzeczpospolita, 4 May 2007. 51 Krzysztof Iszkowski, “Jestem przerażony polską lustracją”, [I Am Horrified by Polish Lustration], Dziennik, 13 June 2007
13 It seems to the contrary. Hardly any of the top SB people had trouble with the Polish jurisdiction after 1989. As of 2007, several dozen top security officers received pensions in the amount of 7.5 thousand zlotys, that is more than double the average Polish pay52. As compared with sometimes very humble lives of those whom they persecuted, this comes as a violation of the basic sense of justice. But there is something more than that. Living their prosperous lives former security officers can frequently earn extra money for selling their knowledge about TWs or using this knowledge to influence democratic politics. This is the real heritage of totalitarianism. When a radical lustration and de-Communization law was first drafted in 1991, it stipulated resignation of all the nomenklatura appointed officials and security officers from their contemporary positions. The law was not adopted in the lack of sufficient parliamentary support. Today it is right to say that the key actors of an overwhelming majority of financial and other scandals in transforming Poland were former nomenklatura and security officers53. While former TWs are publicly stigmatized, the former officers live quiet lives. Here are some examples. Włodzimierz Furmański joined the Militia and worked for the SB since 1974. He graduated from the Law Department of the Toruń University and extramural “university of Marxism-Leninism” in Płock, working in the investigation section of the SB. In 1985 he was sent to Moscow for additional training. Frequently praised by the superiors, in 1990 he was negatively verified by the new UOP. For the past 10 years he has been a legal adviser of the Wyszogród town council and a member of the board of the Housing and Municipal Economy Company. Aleksander Mleczko, a long time SB officer, commanded a group that shot Bogdan Włosik during an anti-martial law demonstration in Nowa Huta in 1982. Later he headed a department in the Cracow SB branch. In 1988 he went to Moscow for a two-week instruction. Negatively verified in 1990, he worked in private security firms, but when the post-Communists came to power in 1993 he advanced again. For some time he was even Deputy Finance Minister. Nowadays he is an expert in spending European Union money. Barbara Borowiec who had planted a false diary aimed at compromising Rev. Andrzej Bardecki from the Tygodnik Powszechny, and consequently Pope John Paul II, runs an art gallery. Former Former head of the Tarnobrzeg SB, Zbigniew Łyczek, involved in the struggle against the Catholic Church, is a provincial teacher54. The 2006 lustration law, annulled by the Constitutional Tribunal, was not perfect, but the Tribunal went far beyond correcting it. The Polish Ombudsman Janusz Kochanowski passed a very interesting analysis of the Tribunal’s lengthy explanation. Kochanowski was ready to accept some amendments. For instance, he stressed that lustration should be limited to people who exercise widely understood public power. Unlike the lustration law it should therefore exclude managers of private companies. On the other hand Kochanowski stated that taking public power at its real value, rectors of private universities should be treated the same way as those of state universities. Kochanowski also pointed at the inconsistency of the Tribunal who excluded from
52 Michał A.Zieliński, ”Czas na tych, którzy werbowali”, [Time For Those Who Recruited], Rzeczpospolita, 5/6 May 2007. 53 Maciej Korkuć, „Barbarzyńcy w archiwum” [Barbarians in the Archive], Wprost, 11 June 2006, p. 30-31. 54 Agnieszka Rybak, Izabela Kacprzak, „SB to tylko epizod”, [SB Was Just an Episode], Rzeczpospolita, 9/10 August 2008.
14 lustration journalists and included barristers, both being professions requiring public trust. Kochanowski found unacceptable the formula “dignity before truth”, declared by the Tribunal’s chair, Jerzy Stępień, and questioned the Tribunal members’ impartiality, since many of them were known for their political attitude towards lustration and some would have problems with lustration themselves55.
4. Conclusions
A historian remembers memory, whether he or she deals with politics or not. Memory may sometimes be awkward but it is essential for a healthy society in which everybody should be equal before the law and in which public safety and credibility should be based on truth. Those who now sympathize with or justify former security informers seem to forget that their information could have led to arrest or loss of job. The fact of life is that responsibility is the foundation of moral health and that neither a historian nor anyone else can avoid consistent moral assessment. Any moral assessment of cooperation with Communist services must take into account several dimensions. First, the range of free will in undertaking cooperation must be explained. Sometimes, especially in the years of Stalinist rule up to 1956, those who decided to cooperate were defending their lives. At that time the cost of such a cooperation could have also been somebody else’s life. Was it right to save one’s life at the costs of other lives? I do now wish anyone to face such a devil’s alternative. Later on many of those who decided to cooperate had been caught because of an offense (e.g. speeding or betraying a spouse) and started cooperating to avoid trouble. In such cases, especially considering the scope of damage done as a result, it is difficult to defend such behavior. Another kind of blackmail could consist in conditions posed by the security apparatus and connected with foreign trips. Passports were stored by the police and very often granting a passport was connected with an offer of cooperation. In some cases this was a condition of professional development. Kapuściński would never become a widely known journalist without going abroad. Archbishop Wielgus would not become an expert in patristic literature. Wolszczan would probably be unable to discover his planets. Perhaps the effect should be weighed at the same scale with costs. But first of all, a person should be ready to make this judgement and not escape from any responsibility whatsoever. Sad to say, very rare are cases of public remorse for past involvement with the Communist services. And what about those whose cooperation resulted from a desire to have a higher standard of living? Here it is hard to defend the effect of cooperation even if the cost was small. What do the Poles think about lustration? After the Constitutional Tribunal smashed the lustration law, 73 percent of respondents favoured opening of IPN archives for all, whether with or without access to intimate private information56. According to a public opinion survey of January 2009, 78 percent of respondents denied former security collaborators the right to hold public offices and only 18 percent were in favour. General
55 „Broniąc konstytucji, Trybunał ją naruszył. Joanna Lichocka rozmawia z rzecznikiem praw obywatelskich Januszem Kochanowskim”, [Defending Constitution the Tribunal Violated It. Joanna Lichocka Talks with Obmudsman Janusz Kochanowski], Rzeczpospolita, 21 May 2007. Cf. also: Jacek Bąbka, „Równi i równiejsi przed Trybunałem”, [Those Equal and More Equal Before the Tribunal], Gazeta Polska, 16 May 2007. 56 Dziennik, 14 May 2007.
15 access to all security files was supported by 19 percent, 34 percent of respondents favoured access by everybody but not to all files, 24 percent only to scholars and journalists, and only 16 percent opposed any access to these files. As many as 59 percent of respondents supported the idea of a Lustration Office attached to the IPN aimed at passing a judgment on who had collaborated with the security apparatus and who had not57. As to the lustration of the Catholic Church, some fundamental questions should be remembered. First, personal decisions are the Church responsibility. Second, personal mistakes erode the trust of the believers. Third, truth is crucial in Church’s teaching. We may not know the whole truth about Archbishop Wielgus’s activity, but the truth is that he signed an agreement of cooperation with the security service what was contrary to the interest and policies of the Polish Catholic Church. The truth is also that he denied this cooperation, later he confessed he had cooperated and finally he withdrew this confession. Ultimately, even if the pursuit of truth is not always free from mistakes, a Christian cannot avoid it. It was no one else than Christ who expected us to make “yes” a “yes”, and “no a “no”58. Political power must protect justice. There should be no collective responsibility but this does not exclude responsibility as such. Even if lustration will never be perfect, just as the exercise of justice is never perfect, it does not mean that the exercise of justice should be suspended. The hell raised by the opponents of lustration in Poland was groundless. Contrary to their claims, the purpose of lustration was to increase and not to decrease the level of transparency in public life, as well as limitation of a “wild lustration” that has been taking place since 1989 thanks to the access of some people to the security files. It is not irrelevant whether elected politicians are in fact steered from behind the scene. It is not irrelevant whether justice is done to those who committed offenses. Though imperfect, justice should be the backbone of any democratic state. More than that: a community needs common values. In order to keep these values it is necessary to evaluate behavior according to certain patterns. It is necessary to tell good from evil, to name some attitudes shameful and other attitudes worth following. On the one hand, radical fans of lustration tend to cultivate the culture of suspicion. If the Communist security services had had such an overwhelming knowledge and influence on the “Solidarity”, as one author claims, “Solidarity” would have quickly ceased to exist. On the other hand, the anti-lustration faction is totally inconsistent. They want the heroes of democratic opposition to be treated as unblemished angels but at the same time they show that attitudes of both sides of the conflict—the Communists and the democratic opposition—could be justified. This anomy was best illustrated by Adam Michnik who called General Czesław Kiszczak, the martial wartime Minister of Interior and architect of repression of that time, a “man of honour”59.
57 Karol Manys, “Jaka przyszłość lustracji?” [What Is the Future of Lustration?], Rzeczpospolita, 19 January 2009. 58 Matthew, 5, 33-37. 59 Agnieszka Romaszewska, „Fechtunki cudzą prywatnością”, [Fencing with Someone Else’s Privacy], Dziennik, 8 September 2006.
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