Briefing Paper August 2019 WHO IS FIGHTING WHOM IN TRIPOLI? How the 2019 Civil War is Transforming Libya’s Military Landscape Wolfram Lacher Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 1 Credits and contributors Series editor: Matt Johnson About the author ([email protected]) Wolfram Lacher is a senior associate at the German Institute for International and Copy-editor: Alex Potter Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. He has worked on and conducted research in ([email protected]) Libya since 2007, including in a previous capacity as an analyst at a business risk consultancy from 2007 to 2010. He has authored and co-authored numerous re- Proofreader: Stephanie Huitson ports, academic articles, and book chapters on the post-2011 conflicts in Libya ([email protected]) and security issues in the Sahel–Sahara region. He studied Arabic and African Cartography: Jillian Luff languages, history, political science, and conflict and development studies in (www.mapgrafix.com) Leipzig, Paris, Cairo, and London, and holds a PhD in political science from Hum- boldt University in Berlin. His book Libya’s Fragmentation will be published by I.B. Design: Rick Jones Tauris in April 2020. ([email protected]) Layout: raumfisch.de/sign berlin Acknowledgements Print: nbmedia, Geneva The author would like to thank Alaa al-Idrissi for his assistance in researching this Briefing Paper. Front cover photo Fighters loyal to the GNA walk on the front line outside Tripoli, May 2019. Source: Reuters 2 SANA Briefing Paper August 2019 Overview Introduction On 4 April 2019 forces loyal to ‘Field Mar- The offensive that Khalifa Haftar launched in April 2019 to shal’2 Khalifa Haftar, leader of the self- capture the Libyan capital, Tripoli, triggered the largest mo- styled Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF),3 bilization of fighters in western Libya since the revolutionary launched a large-scale offensive from LAAF bases in central and eastern Libya war of 2011. This latest round of civil war is transforming the to capture the capital, Tripoli. The move landscape of armed groups fighting in and around Tripoli, caught armed groups in western Libya by surprise, allowing Haftar’s forces to provoking new rifts within and between communities, and advance into Tripoli’s southern outskirts laying the ground for future political struggles. This Briefing in the first few days of the operation. Paper examines the identities and interests of the forces Thereafter, the offensive stalled as armed groups across western Libya mobilized fighting each other over control of Tripoli. It shows that the under the umbrella of the internationally divides of 2011 are central in structuring the two opposing al- recognized Government of National liances and shaping the motivations of many forces involved Accord (GNA) to counter Haftar’s forces. After initial successes by GNA-aligned in the war. forces, a stalemate settled in from late April onwards. Only in late June did GNA- aligned forces score an important victory against the LAAF with the capture of Gharyan (80 km south of Tripoli), the Key findings LAAF’s key forward base for its Tripoli operation. The bulk of the forces fighting against Haftar come from Prior to Haftar’s offensive, political the same communities that supported the 2011 war actors and armed groups in western Libya were divided. A handful of armed groups against Muammar Qaddafi. Haftar’s forces from western in Tripoli exerted disproportionate influ- and southern Libya often come from communities that ence over state institutions in the capital, provoking resentment across Libya, in- were perceived as loyalist in 2011 and experienced that cluding in western cities that hosted war as a defeat. major military forces. But efforts by some western Libyan factions to launch Contrary to widespread misconceptions, the forces fight- an offensive against the Tripoli militias ing Haftar are mostly not standing militias, but volunteers. failed to mobilize broad support: most leaders of armed groups in western Libya Political Islamists form a negligible element among them, were distrustful of one another, and were whereas hardline Salafists are a key component of Haf- reluctant to join what they saw as a strug- tar’s forces. Known criminals are active on both sides of gle over spoils. Haftar’s offensive has radically altered the conflict, but they are more essential to Haftar’s forces. this political landscape, uniting political and military factions that had been in Haftar’s offensive united a multitude of groups in opposi- rivalry or open conflict with one another tion to him. Until then, some of them had been in conflict for the previous few years. It has also with one another. While they are currently1 cooperating in provoked a large-scale mobilization of volunteers who had long gone back to an unprecedented way, their competition over positions civilian life, or are fighting for the first and budgets in Tripoli could soon re-emerge as a key is- time. These forces are drawn from mainly sue. Meanwhile, Haftar’s alliance may be more fragile than the same communities and have many of the same leaders as those that supported is generally assumed. the revolutionary armed groups against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011. Continuing war could cause much greater damage to Lib- The motivation that unites these forces ya’s social fabric than it has to date. The conflict has pro- is reminiscent of 2011, and stresses their voked sharp rifts within and among communities in west- common objective of preventing the re- establishment of a dictatorship. On the ern Libya, and deepened the divide between the eastern other side of the divide, the western and western parts of the country. Major military advances Libyan forces that Haftar has mobilized are recruited primarily from communities by either side risk involving indiscriminate inter-commu- that experienced the 2011 revolution as nal reprisals, or acts of revenge within communities. a defeat. Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? 3 This Briefing Paper analyses the wide- themselves against their former revolu- on opposite sides of past divides. Among ranging changes in western Libya’s politi- tionary brothers-in-arms, Zintanis en- them were Misratan militia leaders who cal and military landscape that have been couraged the formation of armed groups opposed the GNA, but also Zintani com- set in motion by the mobilization for and in communities that had been consid- manders loosely affiliated with the GNA. against Haftar’s offensive. The first part ered the political ‘losers’ of the 2011 war, Another faction involved was the 7th Bri- provides an overview of the conflicts in including the Warshafana, Si’aan, and gade from Tarhuna, also known as the western Libya that formed the back- Nuwail (Lacher, forthcoming). ‘Kaniyat’ after the three brothers from the ground to the current war. The second These two camps disintegrated during al-Kani family who controlled it. On paper part analyses the composition of the two the negotiations over the December 2015 the 7th Brigade was loyal to the GNA, but opposing alliances, as well as the diverg- Libyan Political Agreement that estab- the Kani brothers’ political affiliation ing interests and emerging tensions lished the GNA. Rifts emerged within remained unclear. Finally, attempts to within them. The Briefing Paper is based cities that had previously been united in build an alliance against the Tripoli mili- on 35 interviews held in June 2019 with their support for either of the two camps. tias also included armed groups from the GNA officials and officers, commanders, The divide between supporters and oppo- Tripoli suburb of Tajura that opposed the and members of armed groups, as well nents of the GNA supplanted the rifts of Special Deterrence Force (SDF), the militia as local observers in Tripoli and Misrata. the 2011 and 2014 wars (ICG, 2016). that controlled Mitiga airport in Tripoli In addition, the paper draws on previous Divisions in western Libya multiplied (Lacher and al-Idrissi, 2018). field research, as well as telephone con- further after the GNA moved to Tripoli in In late 2017 and early 2018 several versations with actors on both sides of March 2016. State institutions fell under attempts to launch a joint operation the divide prior to and during the current the influence of four large armed groups against the Tripoli militia cartel failed at conflict. from Tripoli that gradually dislodged their the last minute. One reason was distrust rivals from the capital, establishing what among the disparate forces that were was virtually a cartel. This even alienated involved in these attempts. Another was factions that had supported the formation that proponents of military action found Western Libya’s complex of the GNA (Lacher and al-Idrissi, 2018). it difficult to mobilize within their own divisions The GNA’s support base in western communities. The principal military forces Libya increasingly narrowed, with one in western Libya did not consist of the Before Haftar united most western Libyan significant exception: in June 2017 Prime standing militias that fought for control forces against him, multiple divisions Minister Faiez al-Serraj appointed Usama of Tripoli, but of armed groups that were structured the political and military land- al-Juwaili as commander of the western generally demobilized. In line with public scape in the region—the product of suc- military region, thereby co-opting the opinion in their cities, the leaders and cessive wars and changing political most powerful player in Zintan and under- fighters of such armed groups had grown alignments. The deepest rifts were those mining Haftar’s influence. Together with weary of war and were reluctant to enter of the 2011 war, when cities such as Mis- other Zintani commanders who had what they saw as a struggle over the pre- rata and Zintan and the Amazigh towns fought against Qaddafi in 2011, Juwaili dation of state wealth.5 became strongholds of revolutionary had long displayed aversion towards When in August 2018 the Kaniyat forces.