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A Quick Guide to Libya's Main Players

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A Quick Guide to Libya's Main Players A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS Introduction Introduction Political Actors In Libya there are very few truly national actors. The vast majority are local Armed Groups players, some of whom are relevant at Jihadists the national level while representing the interests of their region, or in most cases, their city. Many important actors, particularly outside of the largest cities, also have tribal allegiances. Since the summer of 2014, political power has been split between two rival governments in Tripoli and in Tobruk, with the latter having been recognised by the international community before the creation of the Presidential Council – the body that acts collectively as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces - in December 2015. Several types of actors scramble for power in today’s Libya: armed groups; “city-states”, particularly in western and southern Libya; and tribes, which are particularly relevant in central and eastern Libya. A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS Introduction Egyptian-aligned, self-described anti- Brotherhood is the largest component Islamist general Khalifa Haftar, who while Musa al-Kuni represents southern Political Actors leads the Libyan National Army (LNA). Libya. Armed Groups There is an ongoing movement among a large number of members of the HoR Finally, Mohammed Ammari represents Jihadists to change the location of the House to a the pro-GNA faction within the GNC (the more neutral place in Libya. “Tripoli parliament”), and Fathi al-Majburi is an ally of the head of the Petroleum PRIME MINISTER AL-SARRAJ AND THE Facilities Guards (PFG) headed by Ibrahim GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL ACCORD Jadhran. Prime Minister al-Sarraj is not a strong Two very important steps in consolidating figure on his own, but some of the al-Sarraj’s power base have been the other eight members that make up his pledge of loyalty by the two major Tripoli- Presidential Council have close links to based economic institutions (the Central powerful stakeholders. Bank and the National Oil Corporation) and the statements of support by several His deputy Ahmed Maiteeq, who served municipalities in the West and South of by Mattia Toaldo have expressed their support for it in a a short stint as prime minister of Libya the country. written statement. before being hit by a court ruling, ONE COUNTRY, THREE GOVERNMENTS represents the powerful city-state of In al-Sarraj’s government, two ministers The rival Government of National Misrata, which is the biggest backer of stand out for the role they can play or At the moment Libya has three centres Salvation headed by Prime Minister the GNA from both a political and military have already played. Firstly, the Minister of power. The first is the Presidential Khalifa Ghwell - resting on the authority standpoint. Misrata’s militias were a of the Interior Al-Aref al-Khuja has a Council (PC), which has been located of the General National Congress (GNC), crucial component in the downfall of police background and is in close contact in the Abu Sittah navy base, a stone’s the resurrected parliament originally Gaddafi and are still one of the two most with Tripoli’s militias. Secondly, the throw from central Tripoli, since 30 March elected in 2012 - is also based in Tripoli, relevant military forces in the country. Minister of Defence Mahdi al-Barghathi, 2016. The PC is headed by Fayez al- although it no longer controls any who is an army colonel from the same Sarraj – a former member of the Tobruk relevant institutions. The vast majority Another important deputy is Ali Faraj Libyan National Army of Haftar but Parliament, where he represented a of the members of the GNC (also known al-Qatrani who represents General politically distant enough from him to be Tripoli constituency – and it was borne as the “Tripoli Parliament”) have been Haftar who in turn heads the LNA – the accepted by other groups – and, in fact, out of the signing of the UN-brokered moved across to the State Council, a other large military force. Al-Qatrani is rejected by Haftar himself. Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in consultative body created under the LPA currently boycotting the meetings of the December 2015. According to this which convenes in Tripoli. PC on the grounds that it is not inclusive Finally, within the power structure, a agreement, the PC presides over the enough. crucial role is played by the Temporary Government of National Accord (GNA), The third centre of power is made Security Committee (the TSC) which has which is currently based in Tripoli. The up of the authorities based in Tobruk Al-Qatrani is a close ally of another conducted the security negotiations that GNA should be endorsed by the House and al-Bayda, which also have to member of the Presidential Council, allowed the PC to move peacefully to of Representatives (HoR) which was concede power to the GNA. The House Omar Ahmed al-Aswad who represents Tripoli on 30 March. Eventually, the TSC previously based in Tobruk but could of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk the city-state of Zintan in western Libya. according to the LPA should be replaced move elsewhere to guarantee the safety is the legitimate legislative authority Zintan played a very important role in the by a proper National Security Council. of its members some of whom have under the LPA, while the government fall of Gaddafi-controlled Tripoli in 2011 repeatedly reported being stopped from of Abdullah al-Thinni operates from and has good relations today with the ABUSAHMAIN, GHWELL AND THE voting and threatened by members the eastern Libyan city of al-Bayda and UAE. “TRIPOLI GOVERNMENT” hostile to the GNA. For this reason, at should eventually concede power to the time of writing, the HoR has still not the GNA once this is voted into office by A third deputy is Abdessalam Kajman The speaker of the General National voted on the government, although on Parliament. The Tobruk and al-Bayda who aligned with the Justice and Congress Nouri Abusahmain and the two occasions a majority of its members authorities are under the control of Construction Party of which the Muslim prime minister of the “Government of A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS Introduction National Salvation” Khalifa Ghwell come in the South of the country, his more territorial hinterland for any opposition to major Libyan actors respond to input from the cities of Zwara and Misrata powerful ally in the East is Ibrahim the regime in Cairo. from Ankara or Doha the way that Tobruk Political Actors respectively. Their military support base Jadhran, the head of the PFG. A aligns itself with Cairo’s policies. Armed Groups is the Steadfastness Front (Jabhat al- controversial figure, Jadhran fought Nevertheless, over time Egypt has put out Samud) of Salah Badi. While they have against the militias from the city of at least two statements that contradict Jihadists received some weapons from Turkey in Misrata in the past and is criticised this position. On the one hand, diplomats the past, they were never controlled or by many Libyans for instigating and and the MFA have given assurances influenced by Ankara in the slightest. upholding a blockade of oil fields of their support to the UN-led political Initially they represented the Libya between 2013 and 2014. He now process; on the other, the security Dawn coalition which involves Islamists, supports the PC, mostly because of a apparatus has supported Haftar even the city-state of Misrata, and several personal disagreement with general when it was clear that he was on a other western cities (including parts Haftar that erupted early in 2015. It is collision course with UN-backed unity of the Amazigh minority). Both Ghwell unclear whether all of the PFG stands efforts. and Abusahmain have been hostile to behind Jadhran. the GNA and have been subjected to UNITED ARAB EMIRATES sanctions by the EU because of this. THE ISLAMIC STATE GROUP IN LIBYA Their support base has gradually shrunk Although sharing some of the same although they still retain some capacity Also called Tandhim ad-Dawla (the goals as Egypt, the UAE has a more to disrupt al-Sarraj’s activities here and Organisation of the State) by Libyans, ISIS nuanced position on the situation in there, particularly if popular support for now controls the central Mediterranean Libya. Reportedly, it has been more him decreases or if some of the militias coast of Libya around the city of Sirte. supportive of UN negotiations and now supporting him decide to switch It has carried out attacks in all major ultimately less engaged on Libya since sides. Libyan cities, including the capital Tripoli. its intervention in Yemen. Nevertheless, ISIS also has a presence in other parts Emirati weapons are still delivered to HAFTAR, AGUILA SALEH, AND THE of Libya, such as Derna, Benghazi and both Haftar and the militias of the city- TOBRUK POWER CENTRE Sabratha, although it has suffered state of Zintan, according to a report significant setbacks in all three cities from a UN panel of experts. Moreover, The link between the head of the armed since the beginning of the year. the UAE’s political influence should forces Khalifa Haftar and the Speaker not be underestimated. The Libyan of the Tobruk parliament Aguila Saleh REGIONAL ACTORS ambassador to Abu Dhabi, Aref al- Issa is very strong. Haftar rules from his Nayed, is ideologically one of the most headquarters in Marj (in eastern Libya) EGYPT important figures on the Tobruk side. and has strong military control over He was even touted as potential prime both the al-Bayda government and the No other Arab country plays as powerful minister at one point.
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