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Libya Poll January 2019

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Libya Poll January 2019 Public Opinion Survey: Fifteen Municipalities of Libya December 31, 2018-January 31, 2019 Detailed Methodology • The survey was conducted on behalf of the International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research by Altai Consulting under the supervision of Redstone Scientific. • Data was collected between December 31, 2018 and January 31, 2019 through computer-assisted telephone interviews conducted from a call center in Tripoli. • The sample consists of a total 4,636 respondents aged 18 and older, with cell phone access, and from one of the targeted 15 municipalities in Libya. IRI has worked with these municipalities (with the exception of Derna) through training on organizational development, public relations, and project management since 2014. • A sample of 300 was set for each municipality. A gender quota and age category cap were also used to enhance representativeness. • A random-number generator was used to generate syntactically-correct numbers in lots of 10,000 at a time. Respondents were then screened for municipality to ensure that they were from one of the targeted areas, and also for gender and age. • The confidence interval for the sample in each municipality is not more than plus or minus 5.6 percent at the mid-range with a confidence level of 95 percent. • The actual sample size and confidence interval for each municipality at the mid-range with a confidence level of 95 percent is as follows: Al Bayda (n=310, +/-5.6%); Benghazi (n=304, +/- 5.6%); Derna (n=307, +/-5.6%); Ghadamis (n=311, +/-5.6%); Ghat (n=306, +/-5.6%); Misrata (n=305, +/-5.6%); Sabha (n=308, +/-5.6%); Sabratha (n=302, +/-5.6%); Shahat (n=315, +/-5.5%); Sirte (n=313, +/-5.5%); Souq al Jouma (n=305, +/-5.6%); Surman (n=314, +/-5.5%); Tajoura (n=306, +/-5.6%); Tobruk (n=318, +/-5.5%); Tripoli Center (n=312, +/-5.5%). • The response rate was 19 percent. • The information in this report has been compiled in accordance with international standards for market and social research methodologies. Figures in charts and tables may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 2 Outlook Would you say that things in your local area are heading in the right direction or the wrong direction? East West South 10% 11% 11% 9% 11% 8% 15% 13% 15% 15% 17% 15% 13% 14% 13% 22% 20% 21% 36% 28% 29% 27% 31% 33% 44% 34% 37% 37% 64% 71% 68% 69% 70% 57% 58% 58% 56% 53% 51% 46% 49% 48% 50% 23% 21% Sirte Ghat Derna Sabha Tobruk Shahat Misrata Surman Al Bayda Tajoura Benghazi Sabratha Ghadamis Souq al Jouma Tripoli Center Right direction Wrong direction Don't know/Refused to answer *NOTE: Circled numbers denote figures of interest 4 In general, why do you think that things are heading in the right direction? (Asked of those who responded right direction; spontaneous response) East West South 2% 7% 7% 1% 5% 7% 4% 5% 10% 2% 8% 1% 8% 1% 10% 1% 1% 5% 14% 1% 15% 5% 16% 5% 3% 2% 19% 1% 6% 12% 2% 7% 3% 8% 6% 9% 1% 10% 8% 9% 4% 10% 3% 10% 5% 2% 7% 7% 8% 1% 3% 5% 8% 13% 21% 14% 21% 14% 15% 21% 18% 23% 23% 23% 22% 19% 25% 18% 5% 21% 22% 19% 61% 62% 59% 59% 57% 60% 60% 56% 56% 55% 52% 55% 45% 47% 37% Sirte Ghat Derna Sabha Tobruk Shahat Misrata Surman Al Bayda Tajoura Benghazi Sabratha Ghadamis Souq al Jouma Tripoli Center Improved security Greater freedom & opportunity for civic engagement Improved economy Better service delivery Other Don’t know/Refused to answer *BASE: Al Bayda (n=211); Benghazi (n=210); Derna (n=163); Tobruk (n=180); Shahat (n=184); Misrata (n=213); Sabratha (n=155); Sirte (n=143); Souq al Jouma (n=178); Surman (n=154); Tajoura (n=148); Tripoli Center (n=174); Ghadamis (n=155); Ghat (n=71); Sabha (n=63) In general, why do you think that things are heading in the wrong direction? (Asked of those who responded wrong direction; spontaneous response) East West South 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 5% 1% 2% 1% 4% 2% 1% 1% 3% 3% 3% 4% 6% 2% 9% 5% 1% 4% 3% 9% 3% 3% 6% 2% 4% 3% 3% 3% 6% 8% 2% 3% 5% 4% 1% 5% 3% 3% 7% 2% 4% 8% 5% 2% 2% 4% 4% 1% 1% 10% 9% 7% 8% 2% 3% 16% 4% 13% 8% 16% 6% 5% 18% 13% 10% 12% 5% 11% 13% 20% 6% 7% 13% 6% 24% 6% 10% 9% 7% 11% 10% 7% 6% 15% 16% 11% 9% 13% 16% 8% 12% 15% 16% 10% 20% 9% 13% 22% 23% 17% 14% 36% 25% 13% 27% 8% 63% 57% 53% 49% 26% 47% 44% 42% 40% 40% 36% 29% 28% 28% 30% 11% Sirte Ghat Derna Sabha Tobruk Shahat Misrata Surman Al Bayda Tajoura Benghazi Sabratha Ghadamis Souq al Jouma Tripoli Center Lack of security Economy Poor service delivery Poor infrastructure Corruption/Nepotism Poor leadership Poor health Other Don’t know/Refused to answer *BASE: Al Bayda (n=69); Benghazi (n=61); Derna (n=109); Tobruk (n=90); Shahat (n=90); Misrata (n=64); Sabratha (n=101); Sirte (n=137); Souq al Jouma (n=82); Surman (n=107); Tajoura (n=113); Tripoli Center (n=97); Ghadamis (n=114); Ghat (n=195); Sabha (n=220) 6 Thinking now about the following, would you rate the situation in your area as good or bad? And would you say very good or very bad or just good/bad? ECONOMY Very good Somewhat good Somewhat bad Very bad Don't Know/Refused to answer East West South 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 6% 3% 3% 12% 12% 16% 19% 18% 15% 17% 17% 19% 16% 18% 22% 19% 20% 20% 28% 20% 19% 26% 34% 31% 32% 26% 26% 18% 21% 28% 27% 34% 36% 43% 46% 44% 46% 52% 40% 44% 47% 45% 42% 42% 44% 41% 40% 42% 15% 14% 10% 8% 10% 8% 8% 8% 12% 10% 6% 7% 5% 5% 3% Sirte Ghat Derna Sabha Tobruk Shahat Misrata Surman Al Bayda Tajoura Benghazi Sabratha Ghadamis Souq al Jouma Tripoli Center 7 Thinking now about the following, would you rate the situation in your area as good or bad? And would you say very good or very bad or just good/bad? POLITICAL STABILITY Very good Somewhat good Somewhat bad Very bad Don't Know/Refused to answer East West South 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 8% 6% 6% 6% 7% 5% 5% 8% 8% 13% 12% 15% 9% 9% 12% 17% 18% 19% 13% 17% 24% 20% 18% 12% 14% 23% 38% 14% 18% 23% 21% 24% 24% 29% 24% 30% 21% 22% 48% 50% 52% 51% 34% 51% 49% 47% 46% 49% 40% 46% 44% 47% 35% 25% 22% 19% 19% 15% 13% 13% 10% 8% 8% 7% 6% 5% 5% 5% 1% 3% Sirte Ghat Derna Sabha Tobruk Shahat Misrata Surman Al Bayda Tajoura Benghazi Sabratha Ghadamis Souq al Jouma Tripoli Center 8 Thinking now about the following, would you rate the situation in your area as good or bad? And would you say very good or very bad or just good/bad? SECURITY Very good Somewhat good Somewhat bad Very bad Don't Know/Refused to answer East West South 3% 1% 3% 2% 3% 3% 2% 1% 3% 2% 1% 1% 2% 8% 5% 8% 8% 9% 8% 12% 15% 9% 11% 12% 16% 15% 20% 9% 11% 10% 15% 19% 18% 39% 19% 19% 16% 26% 21% 26% 19% 22% 34% 51% 54% 56% 54% 55% 51% 53% 33% 55% 52% 55% 47% 51% 37% 38% 32% 26% 24% 21% 25% 16% 17% 15% 12% 12% 11% 12% 14% 11% 7% 2% Sirte Ghat Derna Sabha Tobruk Shahat Misrata Surman Al Bayda Tajoura Benghazi Sabratha Ghadamis Souq al Jouma Tripoli Center 9 Thinking now about the following, would you rate the situation in your area as good or bad? And would you say very good or very bad or just good/bad? AVAILABILITY OF ELECTRICITY Very good Somewhat good Somewhat bad Very bad Don't Know/Refused to answer East West South 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 6% 12% 15% 11% 11% 13% 14% 16% 14% 19% 19% 26% 31% 12% 34% 36% 20% 21% 23% 28% 41% 24% 32% 31% 31% 40% 46% 35% 41% 37% 36% 52% 51% 49% 32% 47% 49% 42% 42% 46% 41% 28% 30% 26% 30% 17% 24% 16% 13% 11% 12% 11% 9% 8% 2% 5% 5% 4% 8% 2% 2% Sirte Ghat Derna Sabha Tobruk Shahat Misrata Surman Al Bayda Tajoura Benghazi Sabratha Ghadamis Souq al Jouma Tripoli Center 10 Thinking now about the following, would you rate the situation in your area as good or bad? And would you say very good or very bad or just good/bad? EDUCATION Very good Somewhat good Somewhat bad Very bad Don't Know/Refused to answer East West South 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 3% 2% 1% 2% 3% 4% 3% 1% 2% 7% 6% 9% 10% 11% 11% 9% 12% 13% 9% 11% 16% 14% 20% 11% 13% 10% 18% 31% 20% 17% 19% 17% 27% 17% 27% 16% 22% 18% 46% 54% 62% 56% 33% 56% 57% 58% 57% 58% 57% 51% 53% 45% 58% 30% 28% 22% 24% 17% 14% 10% 12% 12% 9% 8% 9% 11% 7% 6% 3% 6% Sirte Ghat Derna Sabha Tobruk Shahat Misrata Surman Al Bayda Tajoura Benghazi Sabratha Ghadamis Souq al Jouma Tripoli Center 11 Thinking now about the following, would you rate the situation in your area as good or bad? And would you say very good or very bad or just good/bad? HEALTHCARE Very good Somewhat good Somewhat bad Very bad Don't Know/Refused to answer East West South 2% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 1% 1% 2% 3% 2% 1% 1% 2% 8% 10% 10% 8% 13% 12% 19% 19% 12% 17% 16% 18% 20% 25% 14% 25% 38% 23% 18% 25% 30% 24% 26% 22% 21% 30% 39% 36% 26% 52% 51% 53% 37% 53% 45% 50% 46% 51% 46% 44% 52% 42% 35% 41% 22% 21% 23% 17% 13% 12% 9% 9% 8% 7% 7% 4% 5% 7% 4% 3% 1% Sirte Ghat Derna Sabha Tobruk Shahat Misrata Surman Al Bayda Tajoura Benghazi Sabratha Ghadamis Souq al Jouma Tripoli Center 12 Thinking now about the following, would you rate the situation in your area as good or bad? And would you say very good or very bad or just good/bad? SUPPLY OF DRINKING WATER Very good Somewhat good Somewhat bad Very bad Don't Know/Refused to answer East West South 1% 1% 3% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2% 8% 6% 7% 9% 9% 10% 8% 12% 9% 16% 16% 16% 14% 20% 21% 8% 13% 16% 13% 15% 19% 17% 20% 16% 30% 23% 26% 18% 17% 21% 35% 50% 54% 54% 53% 58% 55% 53% 52% 51% 45% 52% 39% 46% 51% 37% 33% 23% 25% 13% 17% 17% 14% 15% 14% 15% 17% 12% 8% 10% 8% Sirte Ghat Derna Sabha Tobruk Shahat Misrata Surman Al Bayda Tajoura Benghazi Sabratha Ghadamis Souq al Jouma Tripoli Center 13 Thinking now about the following, would you rate the situation in your area as good or bad? And would you say very good or very bad or just good/bad? PROVISION OF LAW AND ORDER Very good Somewhat good Somewhat bad
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