CHAPTER 7

WESTERN CAMPAIG N

HEN, during the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations in 1929, M r W Bruce as Prime Minister of emphasised that no treat y would be acceptable to the Commonwealth unless it adequately safeguarded the , he expressed that realisation of the significance of sea communications which informed Australian thoughts on defence . That significance lay in the fact that all oceans are but connected parts o f a world sea on which effective action by allies against a common enem y could only be achieved by a common strategy . It was as a result of a common strategy that in 1940 Australia ' s local naval defence was denude d to reinforce offensive strength at a more vital point, the Suez Canal an d its approaches. l No such common strategy existed between the Germans and the Italians, nor even between the respective dictators and thei r commanders-in-chief . Instead of regarding the sea as one and indivisible , the Italians insisted that the Mediterranean was exclusively an Italia n sphere, a conception which was at first endorsed by Hitler . The shelvin g of the plans for the invasion of England in the autumn of 1940 turne d Hitler' s thoughts to the complete subjugation of Europe as a preliminary to England ' s defeat. He became obsessed with the necessity to attack and conquer Russia . In viewing the Mediterranean in relation to German action he looked mainly to the west, to the entry of Spain into the war and th e capture of Gibraltar as part of the European defence plan . Raeder, on the other hand, continued to stress the decisive strategic influence of war in the Mediterranean, and the opportunity it offered fo r concerted action with Italy to deliver fatal blows against the British . Towards the end of July 1940, the German Army and Naval Staff s proposed alternatives to the invasion of England should that operation be postponed. The Army proposed that the Italians should be supporte d in North with two Panzer divisions. The Navy emphasised that the object of German-Italian warfare should be to drive the British from the Mediterranean, and secure Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. "Preparations for this operation must be begun at once so that they are completed before the U.S.A. steps in. It should not be considered of secondary importance, but as one of the main blows against Britain."2 Meanwhile the Italian offensive in North Africa hung fire . By the 4th October, when Mussolini and Hitler met at the Brenner, Mussolini told his ally tha t he had ordered the second stage of the attack (to ) to

1 German naval strategy, based primarily on destroying British sea communications by submarin e warfare, aimed also at preventing offensive British fleet concentrations by causing defensiv e dispersal of forces . Writing after the war, the German Admiral WeIchold stated : "The view of the German Admiralty was that the operational use of all available surface vessels was t o bind as many British warships to the Atlantic as possible so as to assist the U-boat campaign . Furthermore the attacks of German cruisers and battleships in the Atlantic and the appearance of German raiders in every sea aimed at pinning down as much British sea power and wa r potentiality as possible . The amount of tonnage sunk was only a by-product of this policy." s Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1945), 6 Sep 1940.

286 CAMPAIGN Sept-Nov1940 begin between the 10th and 15th October and to be concluded by th e end of the month. Hitler offered him "specialist forces" for the attack, but Mussolini replied that he would need no help for the second stage . He reserved the right to let Hitler know what he would need for the thir d —the conquest of . Hitler's main preoccupation continued to be his plan for an attack o n Russia, as a prelude to which he proceeded, politically and by military infiltration, to secure control of the Balkans . Here his program was interrupted when the Italians, instead of attacking in North Africa, invade d Greece on the 28th October. This brought the Balkans into unwante d prominence, and widened the field of British activity in the Eastern Mediter - ranean. Britain took immediate advantage of this by occupying , raising in Hitler's mind apprehensions of air attacks from there on th e Rumanian oil fields. On the 4th November 1940, Raeder learned tha t as a result of the Italian action Hitler had decided that so far as th e Eastern Mediterranean was concerned, two divisions of troops were t o be prepared to support the Italian offensive in Greece if necessary, but n o "specialist forces" were to be sent to , as "an offensive in conjunction with Italian preparations is not possible until the summe r of 1941 . But after the capture of Mersa Matruh the German air forc e was to attack the fleet at Alexandria and mine the Suez Canal ."3 The German Naval Staff was less sanguine as to probable developments in Libya . They felt some concern at the situation, and in an appreciation presented to Hitler on the 14th November stated that after tough enduranc e the British could be expected to go over to the offensive, and that he r main effort will undoubtedly be directed towards the African and Mediterranean area . Firstly she will strengthen her Suez position, then offensive action in Libya and Abyssini a is possible . . . . The German Admiralty Staff sees no occasion for anxiety, but ' n order to remove the threat from the Mediterranean and African areas considers it essential to embark on political and military precautions including the final settle- ment of the relationship with France. 4 Within little more than three weeks of the presentation of this apprecia- tion, the British proved its accuracy by taking offensive action in Liby a and Abyssinia. II The Italian advance into Egypt, begun with great reluctance by Marshal Graziani on the 13th September 1940, 5 and harried, but no t seriously opposed by the withdrawing British, halted just east of , where the Italians established themselves in a series of fortifie d camps extending from the coast some fifty miles inland to the escarpment . The British had anticipated a further Italian move towards Mersa Matruh .

8 Vice-Adm Assmann's "Headline Diary" . ' Assmann, "Headline Diary" . Graziani, some weeks before the advance began, told Ciano : "We move towards a defeat which , in the desert, must inevitably develop into a rapid and total disaster . " Ciano remarked of the advance : "Never has a military operation been undertaken so much against the will of th e commanders . " Ciano, Diary .

Dec1940 PLANS FOR BRITISH OFFENSIVE 287 It did not, however, take place, and plans were accordingly laid for a n attack on the Italian positions . The topography lent itself admirably to combined service operations, since it confined the Italian communications to a narrow coastal strip with a particularly vulnerable bottleneck a t Halfaya Pass just west of Salum, where the escarpment comes down t o the coast and the road was open to from the sea . Final plans for the British offensive, which was to be commanded b y Lieut-General O'Connor6 under the direction of General Sir Henry Mait- land Wilson, 7 were discussed at a conference at attended by Admira l Cunningham on the 4th December. It was then the view of General Wavell 8 that it would probably only be possible to conduct an operation lasting four or five days, "since that appeared to be the limit for which supply arrangements could be made". He told Cunningham, however, that he was "determined to go all out if the Italians showed signs of making off" . Naval plans and preparations allowed for three initial stages . The first was the destruction or capture of enemy forces in the vicinity of Sidi Barrani, in which the naval role was to provide harassing bombardment. The second was the raiding of Italian communications and installations farthe r west in the region of Buq Buq, when the navy would assist by bombard- ments along the coast and landing stores near Sidi Barrani. The third stage envisaged the enemy retreating up the escarpment roads at Halfaya an d Salum. Orders for naval operations, initially conducted under the directio n of Rear-Admiral H. B. Rawlings, embraced stages one and two . The bombarding ships were Terror, which had been brought down from Sud a Bay, and the gunboats Aphis and Ladybird, with a covering force o f destroyers . Advance preparations for the landing of supplies in stag e two were based on earlier preparations for a British retirement to the eas t in which Mersa Matruh had been envisaged as cut off by land and supplie d by sea, with the result that a basis of a supply organisation was already in existence there and at Alexandria . Stage three was "largely an optimisti c hope and one which in any case could only follow some time later",9 but a force consisting of Barham, Valiant, Illustrious, York and Calcutta (Force "C"), with destroyers, was detailed to bombard in this stage if required. Cooperation between the land and sea forces was provided b y the appointment of liaison officers, and the naval officer at O'Connor' s headquarters was an Australian, Lieut-Commander Green . l

s General Sir Richard O 'Connor, GCB, DSO, MC. Comd 6 British Div 1940, Western Deser t Force 1940-41, 1941, VIII 1944 ; AG to the Forces 1946-47 . Regular soldier ; b . Kashmir, India, 21 Aug 1889. 7 Lord Wilson, GCB, GBE, DSO . GOC-in-C in Egypt 1939-40, 1941 , British Troops in Greece 1941, Allied Forces in Syria 1941, Persia-Iraq Comd 1942-43 ; C-in-C Middle East 1943 ; Supreme Allied Cdr, Mediterranean Theatre 1944 . Regular soldier; b . 5 Sep 1881 . s Field Marshal Rt Hon Earl Wavell, GCB, GCSI, GCIE, CMG, MC. GOC-in-C Middle East 1939-41, India 1941-43 ; Supreme Cdr SW Pacific Jan-Mar 1942; Viceroy of India 1943-47 . Regula r soldier ; b. 5 May 1883 . Died 24 May 1950. Admiral Rawlings, "Narrative of Operations" . 1 Cdr A . H. Green, DSC; RAN . HMAS Canberra 1939-40 ; comd HMAS's Warrego 1942, Napie r 1942-44, Norman 1945 . Of Melbourne; b. Surrey Hills, Vic, 23 Mar 1906.

288 7-15 Dec On Saturday, 7th December 1940, the day on which the stealthy British land advance across the 70 miles of desert began in preparation for th e assault on the 9th, Terror and Aphis left Alexandria and met Ladybird some 150 miles to the westward. By 11 p.m. on the 8th the three ship s were in position off Sidi Barrani and, assisted by flares dropped by aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, opened fire in a bombardment of about an hour and a half. Terror and Aphis had as targets strong-posts and motor transpor t in Maktila, the easternmost Italian camp; and Ladybird enemy concentra- tions at Sidi Barrani . Accurate but fruitless enemy counter-fire was experi- enced. On completion of the bombardment the ships retired to the east- ward. The British land attack began at 7 .15 a.m. on the 9th and was immediately successful. Before nightfall that day British troops had reache d the sea coast between Sidi Barrani and Buq Buq, and a naval bombard- ment arranged for that night was cancelled . Sidi Barrani was in British hands by dark on the 10th, and the Italians in full retreat to the westward . At Salum the road runs on flat land a few feet above sea level . Just to the westward the escarpment comes down to the coast, and the tawny sides of the high plateau fall almost sheer to the shore, with the roa d winding up in clear view from the sea . Bombardment of the escarpmen t roads by Terror and the gunboats, with destroyers and minesweepers joining in as occasion offered, began on the 11th . Heavy counter-fire was met, but at times the gunboats closed to 1,500 yards, using pom-poms and 3-inch guns with considerable effect on "the many targets, some of the m perfect, which offered along the road" . By sunset on the 11th the westward movement of the enemy had become a rout, and "troops could be see n throwing away their arms, whilst others were on the beach waving thei r shirts as a sign of surrender" . Participation by Australian destroyers began on the 11th December when Force "C" arrived in Salum Bay with Vampire, Voyager and Vendetta among the screening destroyers. The force was to bombard on the morning of the 12th, but a heavy sandstorm prevented the operation, and the ships returned to Alexandria . On the 15th December Captain Waller was made Senior Naval Officer Afloat for ships engaged on the operations in support of the army, wit h Vampire, Vendetta, Voyager, Waterhen, Terror, the gunboats, and a number of minesweepers and anti-submarine trawlers constituting th e Inshore Squadron under his command . The ships of the squadron per- formed a variety of tasks . They carried out and night offensive patrols; protected the supply ships and water carriers (some themselves acted as water carriers on emergency occasions) ; and generally maintained the essential sea supply lines to the rapidly moving battl e front. The strip of arid coastline presented in concentrated form the mai n combined operational problem of the Mediterranean, that of supply an d transportation by sea in the face of continuous and heavy enemy attack . This developing attack was mainly from the air, but it included also that by submarines, motor torpedo boats, and fixed and mobile shore artillery , while mines were a constant menace.

Dec-Ian OPENING OF OFFENSIVE 289 III The British captured Salum on the evening of the 16th December, an d main supply into the port began the following day . The roadstead was exposed to submarine and air attack but the enemy relied on the latter , and in the lack of shore anti-aircraft protection the main defence was provided by the anti-aircraft guns of the Inshore Squadron. On the 18th December appeared a further threat to ships at Salum when "Bardia Bill" , an 8-inch gun at that Italian stronghold, carried out its first bombardmen t of the roads . Until the fall of Bardia it and its fellows "kept up a desultor y fire except from 23rd to 25th December, employing spotting aircraft whic h from time to time were shot down by our fighters". Though bombin g and shelling did little actual damage, they demoralised the Levantine labour corps, and necessitated keeping all merchant ships under way clos e inshore during twilight and bright moonlight, with ships of the Inshor e Squadron to seaward of them as protection against torpedo bombers . All this delayed the landing of supplies ; but by the 24th December, by whic h date a threatened water crisis had been overcome by improvising supply by any vessel available, some 700 tons of petrol, 750 tons of water, and 400 tons of stores had been landed. They were quantities which, averaged on a daily basis, met military requirements . By the 27th December 365 tons of water and 150 tons of stores and provisions were being lande d daily, and at the end of the month the rate of discharge was such tha t reserves were steadily accumulating . Meanwhile the squadron continued its harassing bombardments o f enemy positions . Voyager, who in company with Vendetta supporte d Terror in that ship's bombardment of Bardia on the 16th December, wa s straddled by shells from an Italian battery of four guns, and had one ma n wounded. Vampire was on anti-submarine patrol near by, and at twiligh t with Voyager helped to drive off two torpedo bombers which ineffectually dropped their torpedoes at a range of about 3,000 yards . The period was one of intense activity and hard work for the squadron . Of the four destroyers, only three were usually simultaneously available , and Waller shifted from ship to ship as occasion demanded . Vampire was absent for three weeks from the 19th December, when she went t o Alexandria for engine repairs. Wryneck replaced her in the squadron o n the 28th December, but the number was again reduced to three on the 30th, when Waterhen collided with and sank the anti-submarine trawle r Bandolero, 2 and did herself damage which necessitated a month in dock at Port Tewfik for repairs . Diamond and Dainty of the 10th Flotilla joined , each for three or four days only, on the 29th December 1940 and th e 1st respectively. On the 2nd January the bombarding forc e was strengthened by the arrival at Salum of the gunboat Gnat.3 She had reached Alexandria from Bombay, and her fitting out, which include d mounting her guns after passage, was completed on the 1st January . Her

n HMS Bandolero, trawler (1935), 913 tons; sunk 30 Dec 1940. 3 HMS Gnat, gunboat (1915), 625 tons, two 6-in . guns, 14 kts; torpedoed off Bardia, 21 Oct 1941 .

290 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN Dec-Ian gun trials were carried out in a bombardment of Bardia, "perhaps a measure", Admiral Rawlings remarked in his narrative, "of the improvised nature of certain affairs" . There were sunny days of exquisite colour, when the sea, varying i n hue from palest jade to deepest blue, was fringed with glittering surf along the yellow shore . There were grey wintry days of northerly gales ; and blinding days of fierce southerlies when sandstorms reduced visibilit y to a few hundred yards and those above deck in the destroyers peere d through sand goggles and described their job as "sand-groping" . There were brief hours of leave in captured Italian ports, when official and unofficial "rabbiting" (souvenir hunting) parties were organised . On such occasions the destroyers added to their anti-aircraft armament with Italia n Breda guns and ammunition which were to stand them in good stead later . The westward advance by water kept pace with that of the army by land . It was impracticable to run convoys or to give close escort to individua l ships, and from Alexandria and Mersa Matruh the supply ships hugge d the coast for protection. In the van of the advance the bombardment force s paved the way for land assaults and harried the retreating Italians, an d by night gun fire, star shells, and aircraft flares marked the area of encounter in brief vivid flashes . Enemy air attacks, in which mines were dropped in addition to bomb s and torpedoes, continued. A diarist in Waterhen, at Salum on Christmas day, recorded : Torpedo attack by aircraft . 3.30 p.m. attack by 24 bombers escorted by 18 fighters. First salvo missed Waterhen 40 yards clear on starboard side. Chakla near-missed and leaking. Many soldiers killed on shore . Great dog-fight by Gladiators, severa l bombers and Italian fighters shot down by our fighters. Last Italian fighter escape d from two Gladiators by a vertical dive from about 8,000 feet and made off at se a level (a good effort) . 7.15 p.m. torpedo attack by aircraft turned away by fire fro m Waterhen's main armament. Nine p.m. left Sollum on patrol to westward of Bardia . The Italians also endeavoured to use the inshore route to transpor t supplies but with scant success, and a number of their ships, small auxiliar y schooners of around 150 tons, were destroyed or captured by destroyer s of the squadron . Three hours after leaving Salum on Christmas nigh t Waterhen intercepted the Tireremo Diritto, and sank her by gun fire after removing "24 men and four officers, one Fascist officer and one dog" , together with Christmas mail for the Italian garrison at Bardia. At 1.45 a.m. on the 30th December Voyager intercepted the Zingarella (190 tons) , which hove to when a shot was fired across her bows . The weather wa s too bad to go alongside or lower a boat, but when hailed the Italian s replied that they had English prisoners on board . "At this moment," recorded Morrow, Voyager's captain, a sergeant of the Queen's Own shouted that he had the situation in hand, and he and eight of his regiment had 100 Italians battened down below. I told him to collect all mail, correspondence, and confidential papers and to tell the captain to follow me; whereupon he replied: "We'll see to that ."

Dec-Ian PLANS FOR CAPTURE OF BARDIA 291 Voyager took Zingarella—which was armed with two .303 machine-gun s "not manned at any time"—into Salum and turned her over to Terror. "I consider," remarked Morrow, "that the sergeant of the Queen's Ow n acted in a most efficient and capable manner and with great presence of mind." In the early hours of 1st January 1941 Dainty, on her first patrol with the squadron, captured Tiberias (237 tons) and Maria Gio- vanna (255 tons) and sent them into Salum with prize crews . At 4 a.m. on the 22nd of the month Stuart and Vampire, patrolling north of to intercept the Italian cruiser San Giorgio4 should she attempt to leav e there, met instead the schooner Diego bound for with barrels of lubricating oil. She was searched and her total complement of eight removed, after which Vampire sank her by gun fire while Stuart provided cover. IV Military and air plans for the capture of Bardia were completed on th e 31st December 1940, and called for naval cooperation in harassing fire and bombardments. Voyager and Dainty supported Terror and the gun- boats in a bombardment of the northern defence area on the 2nd January . At 7 a.m. the following day the two destroyers joined the screen of th e fleet off Sidi Barrani, and Warspite, Valiant and Barham carried out a heavy bombardment as part of the actual assault on the fortress . The object of the operation was "to neutralize and harass the sector

i Saj m •Bed.a/Fomm Mersa Matru h Antelat C Y R E N A I C A I E G Y P T A gedabia f MILES 50 25 50 100 150 200 101LES__

north of the main Bardia-Tobruk road in which large concentrations o f mechanical transport and tanks had been reported, and to prevent the formation of a counter-attacking force" while the army and air forc e attacked from the south and west . The bombardment, Cunningham later reported, succeeded in its principal object, for the morale effect of th e

' San Giorgio, Italian cruiser (1910), 9,232 tons, four 10-in guns, 22 kts ; reduced to a wreck at Tobruk, Jun-Dec 1940.

292 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN Jan-Feb1941 fire sent the enemy to the ground at once. They stayed in their shelters to be taken prisoner when the troops arrived the day following . By the 5th January Bardia was in British hands . Stuart, her refit in Malta completed, was now ready to rejoin the 10th Flotilla and, his ship again available, Waller was relieved as Senior Naval Officer, Inshor e Squadron. He and his successor, Captain Hickling,5 left Alexandria in Vendetta on the 7th January and the following day entered Bardia i n Ladybird. On the 10th Stuart reached Alexandria from Malta and th e Australian destroyers, with the exception of Waterhen repairing at Port Tewfik, joined her there and Waller transferred to her from Vendetta. The following day the four ships sailed on the screen of Barham and Eagle for an operation in the Aegean. Bardia was in full use as a subsidiary port to Salum by the 15t h January, and on the 19th Cunningham reported to the Admiralty that i n the last ten days the Inshore Squadron had ferried 35,000 Italian prisoner s of war to Alexandria, besides supplying stores to Salum and Bardia a t the rate of 500 tons daily ; and that preparations were in hand for usin g the harbour at Tobruk as soon as possible after its capture . For the remainder of January and throughout February Vendetta was escortin g convoys in the Aegean, but Stuart, Vampire and Voyager were back with the Inshore Squadron in time for the assault on Tobruk . In a two-day spell in Alexandria before they joined the squadron on the 21st January , Stuart's company made the acquaintance of the newly-formed Australia n Forces Club established there by the Comforts Fund . "Within a few minutes of reaching the city we were sampling a glass of Australian beer. It was our first Australian liquor for fifteen months, and it was thoroughl y appreciated," recorded a rating. The 6th Australian , supported from the sea by Terror, Gnat, Stuart, Vampire and Voyager, broke into the outer defences of Tobruk at dawn on the 21st January, and before noon on the 22nd the tow n and harbour were in British hands . The port was in good condition with its services little impaired, and Rawlings recorded that : Even the power station was working. Two distilling plants ashore were serviceable and there was a large stock of good water in the cisterns sufficient to meet th e army's requirements for some considerable time . In short, if the Italians had omitte d to festoon the town with banners inscribed with the welcome Bene arrivati, 0 Inglesi, it certainly must be conceded that they handed over the as a goin g concern. For over a week after its capture Tobruk was free from air attack . Work was pressed ahead to establish the port as the main supply base , a matter of urgency as on the 30th January General O'Connor stated that his plan was to advance rapidly on Benghazi. The success of the operation depended on supplies, and he asked for the supply of store s from Tobruk to a maximum . By the 5th February, on which date Captain

6 Vice-Adm H. Hickling, CB, CBE, DSO ; RN. (HMS's Glasgow 1913-16, Lowestoft 1916-17. ) Comd HMS's Glasgow 194042, Raleigh 1944 ; on planning staff for "Mulberry" artificial harbours for invasion of Normandy ; NOIC "Mulberry B" Jun-Aug 1944 . B. 17 Sep 1892 .

Jan-Feb GERMAN MOVES IN THE BALKANS 293

Hickling was succeeded as S .N.O. Inshore Squadron by Captain Poland, 6 Tobruk was handling 1,000 tons of stores daily ; and at Derna, which th e army entered on the 30th January, 150 tons of cased petrol was dail y being off loaded. The three Australian destroyers had a brief and unexpected break fro m squadron duties at this time . On the 6th February Stuart arrived from Alexandria off Tobruk in company with Wryneck during a particularly blind sand-storm . Waller anchored both ships by asdic and soundings . When they eventually entered port Stuart was ordered to return to Alex- andria immediately. There, on the 7th February, Stuart, Vampire and Voyager were visited by Mr Menzies, then on his way to England fro m Australia . Ten years later, when again Prime Minister and addressin g the Naval Cadets at Flinders Naval Depot on passing-out day from th e college, Mr Menzies recalled that visit: I inspected several naval ships in Alexandria harbour during 1941 with th e Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham . As we approached Stuart, Sir Andrew said to me : "And now you are going to meet one of the greatest captains who ever sailed the seas—his name is Waller ." 7

V By now other factors had begun to shape events . German moves in th e Balkans indicated the imminence of an attack on Greece and stimulate d the offer of British aid to that country at the expense of operations i n Libya. The Italian collapse in North Africa roused apprehension in th e German High Command and caused Hitler to reconsider his decisio n not to send ground forces to the help of his ally there . On the 10th January 1941 Churchill told Wavell that nothing must hamper the capture of Tobruk, but that "thereafter all operations in Libya are sub- ordinated to aiding Greece" . Wavell conferred with the Greek Premier, General Metaxas, and the Commander-in-Chief, General Papagos, in Athens from the 13th to the 17th January, and offered British groun d forces to help against possible German aggression . The offer was declined on the grounds that the landing of British forces in Greece would likel y provoke German aggression without being strong enough to check it . The British Government thereupon modified its views regarding Libya, an d decided to push on to Benghazi . The reaching of this decision coincided with one by Hitler—recorded by Assmann in his "Headline Diary" of the 18th January—to "try everything to prevent Italy ' s loss of North Africa " . Metaxas, the Greek Premier and "strong man" of that country, died on the 29th January. He was succeeded by M. Koryzis, Governor of the National Bank who, though a good administrator, had no political back - ground and lacked strength in leadership . On the night of the 6th February Benghazi fell to the British . The following day the new Greek Government

6 Vice-Adm Sir Albert Poland, KBE, CB, DSO, DSC ; RN . (HMS New Zealand 1913-17 .) Comd HMS's Black Swan 1939-40, Liverpool 1940-41, Jervis and Capt (D) 14 Flotilla 1942-43 ; Cmdre (D) Eastern Fleet 1944-46. B . 18 Jun 1895 . 7 Waller's son, Cadet-Midshipman J . C. Waller, was one of those who graduated from the Colleg e on this occasion .

294 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN Jan-Feb asked Britain what help she could give to Greece in the event of a German attack. This change of Greek policy had immediate effects . The British War Cabinet told Wavell that no operations were to be undertake n beyond the frontier of Cyrenaica "which should be held with the minimu m possible force necessary to secure the flank of our Egyptian base", an d that the largest possible army and air forces must be sent from the Middl e East to Greece . The withdrawal of forces from Cyrenaica for transport to Greec e began in February in the belief that there was not likely to be any seriou s threat to British positions in Cyrenaica before May at the earliest . But by early February, the landing of a German light armoured division a t had already begun . In the east, German aircraft from the Dode- canese dropped the first mines in the Suez Canal on the 30th January 1941 . Incidentally the resultant blockage of the canal delayed the passage o f Waterhen to the Mediterranean after completion of her repairs at Port Tewfik. In the west German aircraft made their appearance a few day s later. Tobruk had its first on the 31st January, when three larg e monoplanes (Heinkels or S-79's) carried out attacks on ships in the harbour from about 300 feet . A second and heavier raid by about twelve aircraft, some of which mined the harbour and approaches, occurred a t dawn on the 4th February . For some days from about the 12th February Tobruk was neglected by enemy aircraft, which concentrated their attacks on Benghazi. With the capture of Benghazi, the work of the destroyers "to maintai n the security of the sea communications between Alexandria and th e advanced bases by escorting personnel and larger supply ships and b y constant patrols of the sea routes" in cooperation with corvettes and mine - sweepers, intensified . Mines, including those dropped by aircraft, were an increasing menace . The destroyers sank numbers by rifle fire, an d Stuart's 1st Lieutenant, Robison, offered a prize of two ounces of tobacco to the first man to report one . At 7 p .m. on the 11th February when patrolling off Tobruk, those on Stuart's bridge heard cries from the dark water, and picked up a stoker clinging to wreckage from the South African trawler Southern Floe, 8 which had been mined at four o'clock that morn- ing. In company with Vampire and Voyager, Stuart searched the area fo r four hours but found no more survivors . The following day the thre e destroyers formed part of the harbour clearance force sent to Benghazi . They arrived there in the darkness of the morning of the 13th, and from 5.30 to 6.45 a.m. watched a heavy air raid on the port, where anti-aircraf t defences were hopelessly inadequate. To assist with the defences, Terror, escorted by Stuart and Vampire, reached Benghazi on the 17th. In the inability of the army to provide anti-aircraft guns, the old monito r was the main defence of the port against air attack, but was unable to cope with the rising scale of the German onslaught. Because the army could not furnish anti-aircraft defences for both ports Cunningham refused

8 HMSAS Southern Floe (1936), 344 tons.

Feb-Apr TOBRUK AND BENGHAZI 295 General Wilson's proposal to make Benghazi the main supply base instea d of Tobruk, but agreed to run convoys there provided there was sufficient anti-aircraft protection available while ships were unloading . Two ships of the first convoy—all the port could handle at the time—reached Ben- ghazi on the 18th February . But adequate anti-aircraft protection was no t available, and the withdrawal of aircraft to reinforce Greece had left onl y one fighter squadron in western Cyrenaica . 9 Enemy dive bombing attacks intensified, and it was decided to sail the two ships back to Tobruk . The convoy left Benghazi in the evening of the 19th February, and Stuart, hurrying from Tobruk to join the escort, of which Voyager also forme d part, was dive-bombed and machine-gunned in four separate attacks b y four Heinkel aircraft, but suffered only minor structural damage fro m near misses. The air attacks on Benghazi reached their maximum on the 22n d February, when Terror suffered severe damage from a near miss, and her captain reported to Cunningham "I consider it only a matter of tim e before the ship receives a direct hit" . She was sailed at dusk for Tobruk , in company with the corvette Salvia' and the minesweeper Fareham,2 and Cunningham told Wavell and Longmore that "in view of the scal e of air attack, inadequate defences, and damage to H .M.S. Terror, I have withdrawn H.M. Ships from Benghazi" . Terror did not reach Tobruk . Dive-bombed and mined leaving Benghazi, she was the victim of a final dive-bombing attack at 10 .30 a.m. on the 23rd February off Derna . Her back was broken, and after a fruitless attempt to tow her she was abandoned and sunk. Her loss epitomised the situation that had arisen. It stood for more than the end of a notable old veteran, and for more than th e little ships which had been and were to be sunk, from just the same cause, whils t on their business of supplying the army and the air . It pointed to the fact that i t was an enemy of a very different calibre whom we now had to face : an enemy who was not to be bluffed by A.A. defences that were "on the way", or who would no t be turned from his purpose as the Italians had been turned . And the inability of th e navy to use Benghazi was, in the not distant future, to mark more than the givin g up of our most advanced supply base, for with it we were to lose, no t only the control of Cyrenaica, but the possibility of opening up the Mediterranean routes in the spring of 1941 . It suggested also the need to limit the employmen t of makeshift in combined operations today . 3 During the period of occupation of Cyrenaica, and throughout the sub- sequent withdrawal operations, the Australian destroyers were mainl y employed escorting troop convoys to Greece . Only one of the ships , Waterhen, was with the Inshore Squadron based on Tobruk from the 23r d February to the 5th March, when she too left to take part in the Aegea n operations. Not until April were the ships back with the Inshore Squadron .

9 The necessity of providing adequate port defences was continually pressed on the army, bu t by this time "they, poor men, could do nothing, as most of their anti-aircraft guns were bein g withdrawn to be sent to Greece " . Cunningham, p. 310. 1 HMS Salvia, corvette (1940), 955 tons, one 4-in AA gun, 17 kts; sunk by U-boat off Egypt, 24 Dec 1941 . 'HMS Fareham, minesweeper (1918), 710 tons, one 4-in gun, 16 kts . 3 Rawlings, "Narrative" .

296 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN Feb-Apr On the 24th February the 10th Flotilla suffered its first loss of a ship , when Dainty was sunk in an air attack off Tobruk . By the 30th March it was apparent that the army would be forced to withdraw in Cyrenaica before strong enemy forces from . Plans for this eventuality had been outlined at a conference on the 21st March, when the navy's part was stated to be to make the port of Benghaz i useless to the enemy in the case of withdrawal, to prevent the enemy usin g other small ports, and to maintain Tobruk . Demolitions were carried out , and the naval base party withdrawn from Benghazi on the 3rd April, an d from Derna on the 7th. On the 10th began the defence of Tobruk, invested by the enemy . Withdrawal from Salum was effected on the 12th April , after successful demolitions. Along the African coast the navy's main preoccupation now becam e supporting the army by bombarding enemy positions, and supplying Tobruk. Of the Australian destroyers Stuart, Vendetta, Voyager and Water- hen were thus employed during the first half of April . Vendetta and Waterhen left Alexandria for Tobruk on the 4th of the month, and unti l the 14th were based on Tobruk . Each night about 7 o'clock they left harbour to patrol, and returned around 6 a .m. next day . The days in harbour were a succession of air attacks, the destroyers, with steam on their main engines, swinging ship to bring their guns to bear . In the week from and including the 7th April, Waterhen's diarist recorded th e daily daylight air attacks as twelve, fourteen, nine, thirteen, sixteen, si x and, on the 13th : "harbour constantly attacked during the day ." The following day, the 14th, was Easter Monday, Waterhen's "last day in Tobruk during the light hours" . She and Vendetta returned from patrol at 6.15 a.m. to find the aerodrome under heavy attack by dive bombers . Both ships were attacked as they passed through the gate, but neither was damaged though bombs fell close . At 10.30 a.m. the hospital ships Vita and Devonshire entered the harbour. Vita embarked British and Aus- tralian wounded and sailed at 5 p .m. At 5 .30 p.m., when leaving the swept channel, she was attacked by eight or ten dive bombers, near-missed, and severely damaged with the engine room flooded to sea level . Waterhen and Vendetta immediately sailed to her assistance, and the first-named too k her in tow to an anchorage two miles outside the gate . Shortly after midnight, the tow having broken on a number of occasions, Waterhen proceeded alongside Vita, port side to, while Vendetta circled the two ships, and "Vita's 430 patients were transferred to the warship by th e light of burning candles . Throughout these difficult operations the seaman- ship of H.M.A.S. Waterhen was, records the master of Vita, magnificent."4 By 1 .50 a.m. on the 15th April embarkation was completed, and Waterhen, with Vita's wounded and medical staff, proceeded to Alexandria, where

'H . St George Saunders, Valiant Voyaging (1948), pp . 53-4. Waterhen's record of those rescued is " 432 wounded, 6 nursing sisters, 30 sick berth attendants, and 6 medical officers ". Twelve months later, almost to the day, Vita was to repay this debt to the RAN when she rescued th e survivors of HMAS Vampire, sunk by Japanese aircraft in the Bay of Bengal . (See Chapter 1 of Volume II of this history.)

13-20 Apr NAVY SUPPORTS WITHDRAWAL 297 she arrived at 5 p .m. With the departure of her consort, Vendetta carried out a sweep towards Dema. Meanwhile units of the Inshore Squadron carried out bombardments, in one of which, at this period, Stuart took part. During the evening of the 13th, she and Griffin were detached from a force which had been sweeping the coast, met the gunboat Gnat shortly before 3 a .m. on the 14th, and went to Salum to support the army. On shore the enemy was pressing eastwards, and the extent of his advance was not known in the destroyers . At daylight on the 14th, Waller recorded, the two destroyers went in to Salum Bay to see which side was in possession : At 6.3 a.m., at a range of about 5,000 yards, the question was quickly solved fo r me by several well-directed salvos from a field gun battery fired at the destroyers . Battery on the escarpement south of Salum. Destroyers replied and retired beyond battery's range. Then disposed destroyers on a bombardment course and line of bearing, firing at batteries meanwhile. 6.14 a.m. Gnat opened fire at town. The destroyers bombarded effectively until 8 .15 a.m. Griffin firing on transport on the winding road coming down to the town, while Stuart concentrated on an area behind the fort . They then withdrew to protect Gnat from air attack, and at 11 a .m. retired to Alexandria for fuel . Gnat, who was damaged by the fire of a mobile shore battery, proceeded to Mersa Matruh . During the night of 16th-17th April Vendetta, patrolling to the west- ward with Greyhound, destroyed a schooner of some 300-400 tons, loade d with explosives, off Apollonia, some 40 miles west of Derna . Engaged with gun fire she was quickly ablaze, and within a few minutes blew up . On the 19th Stuart, Voyager, Waterhen and Coventry left Alexandria with Glengyle5 for a raid on Bardia. Number Seven Commando, with a smal l detachment of the Royal Tank Regiment, was landed from Glengyle soon after 10 p.m. on the 19th and carried out demolitions . No opposition wa s met, and the force sailed for Alexandria at 5 a .m. on the 20th, but sixty-seven commandos who lost their way on shore had to be left behind . The following month the regular "Tobruk Ferry Service " by destroyer s of the Inshore Squadron was instituted, and was the main occupation o f the original Australian destroyers for the remainder of their stay in the Mediterranean . The Western Desert campaign emphasised once again the value to a n army on land of command of the sea on its flank, especially in providin g efficient and flexible lines of communication . Wavell, in his dispatch on the campaign, said : The maintenance problem in this quick-moving operation over a distance of 50 0 miles would have been insurmountable without the navy's assistance in keepin g open the sea supply lines and opening up of Salum, Bardia and Tobruk, thereb y shortening the lines of communication and releasing motor transport for the vital task of stocking up successive field supply depots.

6 The "Glen" ships, Glengyle, Glenearn, and Glenroy, of the Glen Line, were modern merchan t ships of 9,000 tons and a speed of 17 knots which had been converted into "landing ship s infantry" (LSI) each equipped to transport and land one battalion on a hostile beach.

298 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN Ap r The campaign disclosed a weakness in interservice peacetime training, which had concentrated on the problem of assault from the sea an d neglected the combined operational problem of supply and transportation by sea. This was the main problem in the desert campaign, and indeed in all Mediterranean operations . On the naval side the shortcomings were obvious in the lack of suitable ships for the carriage of specialised cargoe s such as heavy lifts, water, and petrol ; in the absence of any organisation for the taking over and running of an operational port as opposed to it s defence; and in the inability to counter the enemy's preponderance i n the new element of sea power—power in the air. These lacks were me t so far as possible with improvisation, which is not a satisfactory substitut e for preparation. Yet improvisation, backed by the resources of the human spirit which responded so well to the calls made upon it, could perhaps have sufficed to consolidate the victory gained . In a widening war with its growing threat to the Middle East, it was the dispersal of British strength caused by the decision to go to the aid of Greece which, at tha t juncture, robbed victory in Cyrenaica of its fruits .