WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN Sept-Nov1940 Begin Between the 10Th and 15Th October and to Be Concluded by Th E End of the Month

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WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN Sept-Nov1940 Begin Between the 10Th and 15Th October and to Be Concluded by Th E End of the Month CHAPTER 7 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIG N HEN, during the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations in 1929, M r W Bruce as Prime Minister of Australia emphasised that no treat y would be acceptable to the Commonwealth unless it adequately safeguarded the Suez Canal, he expressed that realisation of the significance of sea communications which informed Australian thoughts on defence . That significance lay in the fact that all oceans are but connected parts o f a world sea on which effective action by allies against a common enem y could only be achieved by a common strategy . It was as a result of a common strategy that in 1940 Australia ' s local naval defence was denude d to reinforce offensive strength at a more vital point, the Suez Canal an d its approaches. l No such common strategy existed between the Germans and the Italians, nor even between the respective dictators and thei r commanders-in-chief . Instead of regarding the sea as one and indivisible , the Italians insisted that the Mediterranean was exclusively an Italia n sphere, a conception which was at first endorsed by Hitler . The shelvin g of the plans for the invasion of England in the autumn of 1940 turne d Hitler' s thoughts to the complete subjugation of Europe as a preliminary to England ' s defeat. He became obsessed with the necessity to attack and conquer Russia . In viewing the Mediterranean in relation to German action he looked mainly to the west, to the entry of Spain into the war and th e capture of Gibraltar as part of the European defence plan . Raeder, on the other hand, continued to stress the decisive strategic influence of war in the Mediterranean, and the opportunity it offered fo r concerted action with Italy to deliver fatal blows against the British . Towards the end of July 1940, the German Army and Naval Staff s proposed alternatives to the invasion of England should that operation be postponed. The Army proposed that the Italians should be supporte d in North Africa with two Panzer divisions. The Navy emphasised that the object of German-Italian warfare should be to drive the British from the Mediterranean, and secure Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. "Preparations for this operation must be begun at once so that they are completed before the U.S.A. steps in. It should not be considered of secondary importance, but as one of the main blows against Britain."2 Meanwhile the Italian offensive in North Africa hung fire . By the 4th October, when Mussolini and Hitler met at the Brenner, Mussolini told his ally tha t he had ordered the second stage of the attack (to Mersa Matruh) to 1 German naval strategy, based primarily on destroying British sea communications by submarin e warfare, aimed also at preventing offensive British fleet concentrations by causing defensiv e dispersal of forces . Writing after the war, the German Admiral WeIchold stated : "The view of the German Admiralty was that the operational use of all available surface vessels was t o bind as many British warships to the Atlantic as possible so as to assist the U-boat campaign . Furthermore the attacks of German cruisers and battleships in the Atlantic and the appearance of German raiders in every sea aimed at pinning down as much British sea power and wa r potentiality as possible . The amount of tonnage sunk was only a by-product of this policy." s Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1945), 6 Sep 1940. 286 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN Sept-Nov1940 begin between the 10th and 15th October and to be concluded by th e end of the month. Hitler offered him "specialist forces" for the attack, but Mussolini replied that he would need no help for the second stage . He reserved the right to let Hitler know what he would need for the thir d —the conquest of Egypt. Hitler's main preoccupation continued to be his plan for an attack o n Russia, as a prelude to which he proceeded, politically and by military infiltration, to secure control of the Balkans . Here his program was interrupted when the Italians, instead of attacking in North Africa, invade d Greece on the 28th October. This brought the Balkans into unwante d prominence, and widened the field of British activity in the Eastern Mediter - ranean. Britain took immediate advantage of this by occupying Crete, raising in Hitler's mind apprehensions of air attacks from there on th e Rumanian oil fields. On the 4th November 1940, Raeder learned tha t as a result of the Italian action Hitler had decided that so far as th e Eastern Mediterranean was concerned, two divisions of troops were t o be prepared to support the Italian offensive in Greece if necessary, but n o "specialist forces" were to be sent to Libya, as "an Alexandria offensive in conjunction with Italian preparations is not possible until the summe r of 1941 . But after the capture of Mersa Matruh the German air forc e was to attack the fleet at Alexandria and mine the Suez Canal ."3 The German Naval Staff was less sanguine as to probable developments in Libya . They felt some concern at the situation, and in an appreciation presented to Hitler on the 14th November stated that after tough enduranc e the British could be expected to go over to the offensive, and that he r main effort will undoubtedly be directed towards the African and Mediterranean area . Firstly she will strengthen her Suez position, then offensive action in Libya and Abyssini a is possible . The German Admiralty Staff sees no occasion for anxiety, but ' n order to remove the threat from the Mediterranean and African areas considers it essential to embark on political and military precautions including the final settle- ment of the relationship with France. 4 Within little more than three weeks of the presentation of this apprecia- tion, the British proved its accuracy by taking offensive action in Liby a and Abyssinia. II The Italian advance into Egypt, begun with great reluctance by Marshal Graziani on the 13th September 1940, 5 and harried, but no t seriously opposed by the withdrawing British, halted just east of Sidi Barrani, where the Italians established themselves in a series of fortifie d camps extending from the coast some fifty miles inland to the escarpment . The British had anticipated a further Italian move towards Mersa Matruh . 8 Vice-Adm Assmann's "Headline Diary" . ' Assmann, "Headline Diary" . Graziani, some weeks before the advance began, told Ciano : "We move towards a defeat which , in the desert, must inevitably develop into a rapid and total disaster . " Ciano remarked of the advance : "Never has a military operation been undertaken so much against the will of th e commanders . " Ciano, Diary . Dec1940 PLANS FOR BRITISH OFFENSIVE 287 It did not, however, take place, and plans were accordingly laid for a n attack on the Italian positions . The topography lent itself admirably to combined service operations, since it confined the Italian communications to a narrow coastal strip with a particularly vulnerable bottleneck a t Halfaya Pass just west of Salum, where the escarpment comes down t o the coast and the road was open to bombardment from the sea . Final plans for the British offensive, which was to be commanded b y Lieut-General O'Connor6 under the direction of General Sir Henry Mait- land Wilson, 7 were discussed at a conference at Cairo attended by Admira l Cunningham on the 4th December. It was then the view of General Wavell 8 that it would probably only be possible to conduct an operation lasting four or five days, "since that appeared to be the limit for which supply arrangements could be made". He told Cunningham, however, that he was "determined to go all out if the Italians showed signs of making off" . Naval plans and preparations allowed for three initial stages . The first was the destruction or capture of enemy forces in the vicinity of Sidi Barrani, in which the naval role was to provide harassing bombardment. The second was the raiding of Italian communications and installations farthe r west in the region of Buq Buq, when the navy would assist by bombard- ments along the coast and landing stores near Sidi Barrani. The third stage envisaged the enemy retreating up the escarpment roads at Halfaya an d Salum. Orders for naval operations, initially conducted under the directio n of Rear-Admiral H. B. Rawlings, embraced stages one and two . The bombarding ships were Terror, which had been brought down from Sud a Bay, and the gunboats Aphis and Ladybird, with a covering force o f destroyers . Advance preparations for the landing of supplies in stag e two were based on earlier preparations for a British retirement to the eas t in which Mersa Matruh had been envisaged as cut off by land and supplie d by sea, with the result that a basis of a supply organisation was already in existence there and at Alexandria . Stage three was "largely an optimisti c hope and one which in any case could only follow some time later",9 but a force consisting of Barham, Valiant, Illustrious, York and Calcutta (Force "C"), with destroyers, was detailed to bombard in this stage if required. Cooperation between the land and sea forces was provided b y the appointment of liaison officers, and the naval officer at O'Connor' s headquarters was an Australian, Lieut-Commander Green . l s General Sir Richard O 'Connor, GCB, DSO, MC. Comd 6 British Div 1940, Western Deser t Force 1940-41, British Troops in Egypt 1941, VIII Corps 1944 ; AG to the Forces 1946-47 .
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