The Forgotten Battlefields of Libya
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WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN Sept-Nov1940 Begin Between the 10Th and 15Th October and to Be Concluded by Th E End of the Month
CHAPTER 7 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIG N HEN, during the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations in 1929, M r W Bruce as Prime Minister of Australia emphasised that no treat y would be acceptable to the Commonwealth unless it adequately safeguarded the Suez Canal, he expressed that realisation of the significance of sea communications which informed Australian thoughts on defence . That significance lay in the fact that all oceans are but connected parts o f a world sea on which effective action by allies against a common enem y could only be achieved by a common strategy . It was as a result of a common strategy that in 1940 Australia ' s local naval defence was denude d to reinforce offensive strength at a more vital point, the Suez Canal an d its approaches. l No such common strategy existed between the Germans and the Italians, nor even between the respective dictators and thei r commanders-in-chief . Instead of regarding the sea as one and indivisible , the Italians insisted that the Mediterranean was exclusively an Italia n sphere, a conception which was at first endorsed by Hitler . The shelvin g of the plans for the invasion of England in the autumn of 1940 turne d Hitler' s thoughts to the complete subjugation of Europe as a preliminary to England ' s defeat. He became obsessed with the necessity to attack and conquer Russia . In viewing the Mediterranean in relation to German action he looked mainly to the west, to the entry of Spain into the war and th e capture of Gibraltar as part of the European defence plan . -
Brevity, Skorpion & Battleaxe
DESERT WAR PART THREE: BREVITY, SKORPION & BATTLEAXE OPERATION BREVITY MAY 15 – 16 1941 Operation Sonnenblume had seen Rommel rapidly drive the distracted and over-stretched British and Commonwealth forces in Cyrenaica back across the Egyptian border. Although the battlefront now lay in the border area, the port city of Tobruk - 100 miles inside Libya - had resisted the Axis advance, and its substantial Australian and British garrison of around 27,000 troops constituted a significant threat to Rommel's lengthy supply chain. He therefore committed his main strength to besieging the city, leaving the front line only thinly held. Conceived by the Commander-in-Chief of the British Middle East Command, General Archibald Wavell, Operation Brevity was a limited Allied offensive conducted in mid-May 1941. Brevity was intended to be a rapid blow against weak Axis front-line forces in the Sollum - Capuzzo - Bardia area of the border between Egypt and Libya. Operation Brevity's main objectives were to gain territory from which to launch a further planned offensive toward the besieged Tobruk, and the depletion of German and Italian forces in the region. With limited battle-ready units to draw on in the wake of Rommel's recent successes, on May 15 Brigadier William Gott, with the 22nd Guards Brigade and elements of the 7th Armoured Division attacked in three columns. The Royal Air Force allocated all available fighters and a small force of bombers to the operation. The strategically important Halfaya Pass was taken against stiff Italian opposition. Reaching the top of the Halfaya Pass, the 22nd Guards Brigade came under heavy fire from an Italian Bersaglieri (Marksmen) infantry company, supported by anti-tank guns, under the command of Colonel Ugo Montemurro. -
(June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies A Stepping Stone to Success: Operation Battleaxe (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine Mike Bechthold On 16 February 1943 a meeting was held in Tripoli attended by senior American and British officers to discuss the various lessons learned during the Libyan campaign. The focus of the meeting was a presentation by General Bernard Montgomery. This "gospel according to Montgomery," as it was referred to by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, set out very clearly Monty's beliefs on how air power should be used to support the army.1 Among the tenets Montgomery articulated was his conviction of the importance of air power: "Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly certain principles regarding the use of air power." Montgomery also believed that flexibility was the greatest asset of air power. This allowed it to be applied as a "battle-winning factor of the first importance." As well, he fully endorsed the air force view of centralized control: "Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resource into small packets placed under the control of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct command over air striking forces." Montgomery concluded his discussion by stating that it was of prime importance for the army and air 1 Arthur Tedder, With Prejudice: The war memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder (London: Cassell, 1966), p. -
'Something Is Wrong with Our Army…' Command, Leadership & Italian
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies ‘Something is wrong with our army…’ Command, Leadership & Italian Military Failure in the First Libyan Campaign, 1940-41. Dr. Craig Stockings There is no question that the First Libyan Campaign of 1940-41 was an Italian military disaster of the highest order. Within hours of Mussolini’s declaration of war British troops began launching a series of very successful raids by air, sea and land in the North African theatre. Despite such early setbacks a long-anticipated Italian invasion of Egypt began on 13 September 1940. After three days of ponderous and costly advance, elements of the Italian 10th Army halted 95 kilometres into Egyptian territory and dug into a series of fortified camps southwest of the small coastal village of Sidi Barrani. From 9-11 December, these camps were attacked by Western Desert Force (WDF) in the opening stages of Operation Compass – the British counter-offensive against the Italian invasion. Italian troops not killed or captured in the rout that followed began a desperate and disjointed withdrawal back over the Libyan border, with the British in pursuit. The next significant engagement of the campaign was at the port-village Bardia, 30 kilometres inside Libya, in the first week of 1941. There the Australian 6 Division, having recently replaced 4 Indian Division as the infantry component of WDF (now renamed 13 Corps), broke the Italian fortress and its 40,000 defenders with few casualties. The feat was repeated at the port of Tobruk, deeper into Libya, when another 27,000 Italian prisoners were taken. -
VICTORY at SIDI BARRANI 28 Nov-6 Dec Preparations That Were Being Made Around Them
CHAPTER 6 VICTORY AT SIDI BARRAN I HE stage was now set for the opening of the desert battle which Genera l T Wavell and his subordinates had discussed before the Italian invasion of Greece. Thus far the new theatre of war had made relatively smal l demands on Wavell's and Longmore's forces, and the Italian Army's failure to overcome the Greeks lowered an already low estimate of it s efficiency . Although Western Desert Force was still greatly outnumbered by General Bergonzoli's army, it had received useful reinforcements . It will be recalled that in October two tank regiments from England ha d joined the 7th Armoured Division, bringing its two armoured brigade s each to their proper strength of three regiments ; and the 7th Royal Tank Regiment had arrived, equipped with heavy "Matilda" tanks to be use d with infantry to break into strong defensive positions . In September the 4th Indian Division had been completed by adding to it the 16th Britis h Brigade ; in November its own third brigade arrived . In the Matruh Fortress was assembled a force equal to two infantry brigades . The 4th Ne w Zealand Brigade, had, since September, been in reserve either at Dab a or Bagush ; and on the edge of the Delta were the 6th Australian Division , now more or less complete, and the Polish brigade . Thus in three month s the forces west of Alexandria had increased from two weak divisions t o three at full strength or close to it, plus four infantry brigades ; and within a few weeks the New Zealand and the 7th Australian Divisions woul d be complete, in units if not equipment, and the 2nd Armoured Divisio n would have arrived. -
Airpower and Ground Armies : Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Airpower and ground armies : essays on the evolution of Anglo-American air doctrine. 1940- 1943/ editor, Daniel R Mortensen. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. Air power-Great Britain-History. 2. Air power-United States-History. 3. World War, 1939-1945- Aerial operations, British, 4. World War, 1939-1945-Aerial operations, American. 5. World War, 1939-1945-Campaigns-Africa, North. 6. Operation Torch. I. Mortensen, Daniel R. UG635.G7A89 1998 358.4’03-dc21 97-46744 CIP Digitize December 2002 from 1998 Printing NOTE: Pagination changed Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. Table of Contents Page DISCLAIMER ..................................................................................................................... i FORWARD........................................................................................................................ iii ABOUT THE EDITOR .......................................................................................................v INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. vi GETTING TOGETHER ......................................................................................................1 -
South African Prisoner-Of-War Experience Following the Fall of Tobruk, June 1942
Historia 56, 2, November 2011, pp 94–112 Narratives from North Africa: South African prisoner-of-war experience following the fall of Tobruk, June 1942 Karen Horn* Introduction This article aims to present to the reader previously unknown narratives of former prisoners of war (POWs) immediately following the fall of Tobruk in June 1942. The intention is not to explain the events that led to the fall of Tobruk or to lay blame with any specific leader or Allied nation involved in the Western Desert Campaign. The focus is rather on the events during and following the battle, specifically the experiences of the South Africans who were captured and became prisoners of war. Of the 33 000 Allied soldiers captured on 21 June 1942, 10 722 were South Africans who were all part of the 2nd South African Infantry Division under command of Major General H.B. Klopper.1 Making use of oral testimony, published and unpublished personal memoirs, as well as post-war statements found in the Department of Defence Archives and in the Ditsong National Museum of Military History, the article hopes to portray events as experienced by the ordinary rank and file men, giving a different perspective from that usually portrayed in military history publications which for the most part focus on the perspectives of those in command. Through this approach it should also become possible to extract the individual experience from the general experience, as each of the former POWs understood and interpreted what was happening to them in unique ways. Internationally, research on the historical experience of POWs has increased with historians such as Moore and Fedorowich, Hately-Broad, Kochavi, Mackenzie and Gilbert beginning to investigate the topic.2 Most of these writers however, approach the topic thematically; most look at the treatment of prisoners by their captors. -
United States National Museum Bulletin 275
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTIO N MUSEUM O F NATURAL HISTORY UNITED STATES NATIONAL MUSEUM BULLETIN 275 The Rodents of Libya Taxonomy, Ecology and Zoogeographical Relationships GARY L. RANCK Curator, Mammal Identification Service Division of Mammals, U.S. National Museum SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION PRESS WASHINGTON, D.C. 1968 Publications of the United States National Museum The scientific publications of the United States National Museum include two series, Proceedings of the United States National Museum and United States National Museum Bulletin. In these series are published original articles and monographs dealing with the collections and work of the Museum and setting forth newly acquired facts in the field of anthropology, biology, geology, history, and technology. Copies of each publication are distributed .to libraries and scientific organizations and to specialists and others interested in the various subjects. The Proceedings, begun in 1878, are intended for the publication, in separate form, of shorter papers. These are gathered in volumes, octavo in size, with the publication date of each paper recorded in the table of contents of the volume. In the Bulletin series, the first of which was issued in 1875, appear longer, separate publications consisting of monographs (occasionally in several parts) and volumes in which are collected works on related subjects. Bulletins are either octavo or quarto in size, depending on the needs of the presentation. Since 1902, papers relating to the botanical collections of the Museum have been published in the Bulletin series under the heading Contributions from the United States National Herbarium. This work forms number 275 of the Bulletin series. Frank A. Taylor Director, United States National Museum U.S. -
Examining My Grandfather's War at El Alamein
A Private on the Public Stage: Examining My Grandfather’s War at El Alamein ‡ Laurie James Laker My grandfather, Eric George Laker, was captured at the Battle of El Alamein, North Africa, on October 27, 1942. He was held in a succession of prisoner of war camps across central Europe before the war ended in 1945. For the duration of his captivity he kept a diary, which he titled “Summary of Events: From 27th October 1942 to 24th May 1945.” At the time of his capture, he was 22 years old. Repatriated to England on May 24, 1945–he arrived home in Sussex at age 25, having been a prisoner of war for two years and seven months. While the bulk of the diary reflects upon his time as a prisoner of war, of chief importance and interest to me, however, is the specific focus that comes from the initial pages of this diary–The Battle of El Alamein. The Second Battle of El Alamein took place over a period of 20 days from October 23, 1942, until November 11, 1942. The second of the two great battles in North Africa, this latter engagement resulted in the Axis forces retreating and conceding defeat, despite Hitler’s insistence that Rommel “show [the German forces] no other road than that to victory or death” (Rommel and Hart 321). It was this battle that turned the tide of the second World War in favor of the Allies, marking a distinct revival in the morale of the Allied forces and 177 commanders–it was the first major offensive victory against the enemy since the start of the European war in 1939. -
Operation Crusader
DESERT WAR PART FOUR: OPERATION CRUSADER DATE: NOVEMBER 18 – DECEMBER 30 1941 Operation Crusader was conducted by the British Eighth Army against Axis forces in North Africa between November 18 and December 30 1941. The operation was intended to relieve the 1941 Siege of Tobruk; the Eighth Army tried to destroy the Axis armored force before advancing its infantry. The plan failed when, after a number of inconclusive engagements, the British 7th Armoured Division was defeated by the Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh. Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel ordered German armored divisions to Axis fortress positions on the Egyptian border but failed to find the main body of the Allied infantry, which had bypassed the fortresses and headed for Tobruk. Rommel had to withdraw from the frontier to Tobruk and achieved some tactical success in costly fighting. The need to preserve his remaining forces from destruction prompted Rommel to withdraw his army to the defensive line at Gazala, west of Tobruk and then all the way back to El Agheila. It was the first victory over the German ground forces by British forces in the war. PRELUDE Following the costly failure of Operation Battleaxe, General Archibald Wavell was relieved as Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command and replaced by General Claude Auchinleck. The Western Desert Force was reorganized and renamed the Eighth Army under the command of Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham, who was later replaced by Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie. The Eighth Army comprised two Corps: XXX Corps under Lieutenant General Willoughby Norrie and XIII Corps under Lieutenant General Reade Godwin-Austen. -
4 at BAY—THE EASTER BATTL E N 21St January 1941 a Small Group Of
CHAPTER 4 AT BAY—THE EASTER BATTL E N 21st January 1941 a small group of officers watched the assault O on Tobruk by the 6th Australian Division . One was Brigadier Mors- head, just arrived in the Middle East from Britain ; another was Lieut- Colonel T. P. Cook, who had been appointed to take charge of the base sub-area to be established there ; a third was Lieut-Commander D . V. Duff, who was later to be Naval Officer-in-Charge at Derna during th e "Benghazi Handicap" and still later in command of the schooners and other small craft running supplies to Tobruk during the siege . Brigadier Morshead spent several days, after Tobruk 's fall, inspecting the defences of the fortress . Thus he acquired a knowledge of their quality . Later, when the 9th Division's withdrawal from the Jebel country of Cyrenaica had become inevitable, it was invaluable to Morshead, foreseein g that the division would have to stand at Tobruk, to know what its defence s had to offer. Lieut-Colonel Cook's task of course involved his remaining in Tobruk . The base sub-area staff (which had been recruited mainly from the A .I.F. staging camp at Amiriya) moved into the town as soon as the harbou r was captured. On 29th January Brigadier Godfrey, who had been appointe d area commander,) established his headquarters in the town area and dele- gated the task of establishing the base to Cook . Within a fortnight, Godfrey was recalled to Palestine and Cook succeeded him as area commander . The speed with which the fortress was organised into a working bas e and provisioned during the next month was remarkable . -
Libya and Egypt
Luftwaffe Airfields 1935-45 Luftwaffe Airfields 1935-45 Libya (Tripolitania & Cyrenaica) & Egypt By Henry L. deZeng IV Benina/North 21.02.41 Shown: 10 hangars (7 of which are partially destroyed), administrative and related buildings, barracks, quarters, storage buildings and a number of others, airfield operations buildings and the munitions dump. Benina/South is at the bottom right of the photo Edition: March 2016 Luftwaffe Airfields 1935-45 Copyright © by Henry L. deZeng IV (Work in Progress). (1st Draft 2016) Blanket permission is granted by the author to researchers to extract information from this publication for their personal use in accordance with the generally accepted definition of fair use laws. Otherwise, the following applies: All rights reserved. No part of this publication, an original work by the authors, may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of the author. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. This information is provided on an "as is" basis without condition apart from making an acknowledgement of authorship. Luftwaffe Airfields 1935-45 Airfields Libya and Egypt Introduction Conventions 1. For the purpose of this reference work, “Libya and Egypt” means the borders that existed on 10 June 1940, the date Italy declared war on Britain and France, with hostilities commencing along the Libyan-Egyptian border the following day. 2. All place name spellings are as they appear in wartime German, Italian and Allied documents with the addition of alternate spellings where known, these mainly being transliterated spellings from Arabic.