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Operation Crusader

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Operation Crusader DESERT WAR PART FOUR: OPERATION CRUSADER DATE: NOVEMBER 18 – DECEMBER 30 1941 Operation Crusader was conducted by the British Eighth Army against Axis forces in North Africa between November 18 and December 30 1941. The operation was intended to relieve the 1941 Siege of Tobruk; the Eighth Army tried to destroy the Axis armored force before advancing its infantry. The plan failed when, after a number of inconclusive engagements, the British 7th Armoured Division was defeated by the Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh. Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel ordered German armored divisions to Axis fortress positions on the Egyptian border but failed to find the main body of the Allied infantry, which had bypassed the fortresses and headed for Tobruk. Rommel had to withdraw from the frontier to Tobruk and achieved some tactical success in costly fighting. The need to preserve his remaining forces from destruction prompted Rommel to withdraw his army to the defensive line at Gazala, west of Tobruk and then all the way back to El Agheila. It was the first victory over the German ground forces by British forces in the war. PRELUDE Following the costly failure of Operation Battleaxe, General Archibald Wavell was relieved as Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command and replaced by General Claude Auchinleck. The Western Desert Force was reorganized and renamed the Eighth Army under the command of Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham, who was later replaced by Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie. The Eighth Army comprised two Corps: XXX Corps under Lieutenant General Willoughby Norrie and XIII Corps under Lieutenant General Reade Godwin-Austen. The Eighth Army also included the Tobruk garrison with the 32nd Army Tank Brigade, and the Australian 9th Division which (in late 1941), was in the process of being replaced by the British 70th Infantry Division and the Polish Carpathian Brigade. Opposing them were the German and Italian soldiers of Panzergroup Africa under General Erwin Rommel, with the Afrika Korps under Lieutenant General Ludwig Cruwell comprised of 15th Panzer Division, 21st Panzer Division, 90th Light Africa Division and the Italian 55th Infantry Division “Savona”. Directly under the Italian High Command were the Italian XX Corps and XXI Corps. The Axis forces had built a defensive line of strong points along the escarpment running from near the sea at Bardia and Sollum and further along the border wire to Fort Capuzzo. Elements of the 21st Panzer and the Savona divisions manned these defenses whilst Rommel kept the rest of his forces grouped near or around the Tobruk perimeter where a planned attack on November 14 had been put back to November 24 due to supply difficulties. Initial Axis air support consisted of about 120 German and 200 Italian serviceable aircraft, but these could be reinforced quickly by transfer of units from Greece and Italy. A single German motorized division needed 360 tons of supplies per day, and moving them 300 miles took 1,170 2-ton Lorries. With seven Axis divisions, and air and naval units, 71,000 tons of supplies per month were needed. From February to May 1941, a surplus of 46,000 tons was delivered; attacks from Malta had some effect, but in May, the worst month for ship losses, 91 percent of supplies arrived. Lack of transport in Libya left German supplies in Tripoli, and the Italians had only 7,000 Lorries for deliveries to 225,000 men. A record amount of supplies arrived in June, but at the front, shortages worsened. OPERATION CRUSADER BEGINS Before dawn on Nov 18, the British Eighth Army advanced southwest from Mersa Matruh, Egypt, with the 7th Armoured Division at the spearhead. This main column of the offensive crossed the Egyptian-Libyan border near Fort Maddalena and then turned northwest. Meanwhile, the South African Division protected the southern flank, and the XIII Corps and the 4th Armoured Brigade held the area west of Sidi Omar to counter a potential Axis counter offensive through that area. The opening phase of the invasion was originally to be assisted by some of the 724 British and Commonwealth aircraft assigned to the operation, but all ground support missions were canceled due to unexpected bad weather. However, the torrential rain aided the Allied efforts by preventing Axis reconnaissance flights from being launched, which could have detected Crusader preparations. On the first day of the offensive the Allies met with no resistance. On the morning of Nov 19, the Italian “Ariete” Division halted the 22nd Armoured Brigade of the 7th Armoured Division at Bir el Gubi. Meanwhile, 7th Armoured Brigade and the 7th Support Group of the same division were able to advance towards Tobruk, capturing the Sidi Rezegh airfield during the process. On the offensive’s northern flank, 4th Armoured Brigade engaged 60 tanks of 21st Panzer Division supported by 88 mm guns. The following day, 22nd Armoured Brigade continued its fight with the Italian “Ariete” Division, while the 7th Armoured Brigade repulsed an infantry counter attack launched by the German 90th Light Infantry Division and the Italian “Bologna” Division at Sidi Rezegh. In the north, 4th Armoured Brigade fought a second tank battle with 21st Panzer Division, before the Panzers were temporarily withdrawn for refueling. In the afternoon of Nov 20, 4th Armoured Brigade engaged with tanks of the 15th Panzer Division. After losing around 40 tanks during the engagement, 4th Armoured was now reduced to around 120 tanks. At dusk, 22nd Armoured Brigade arrived on the scene, but it was too late to assist 4th Armoured Brigade. During the night, Rommel withdrew all his tanks northwest in order to launch a major counter attack on Sidi Rezegh. On Nov 21, the Allied garrison at Tobruk attempted a break out, taking the Axis forces by surprise. By mid-afternoon, the Allied advance from Tobruk had advanced about 3.5 miles. It was at this time that the Tobruk garrison learned that 7th Armoured Brigade, which was supposed to attack in the direction of Tobruk starting at 0830 hours, had changed its plans due to the unexpected presence of 200 German tanks to the southeast. Instead of a full offensive on Tobruk spearheaded by armor, the tanks of 7th Armoured Brigade turned to face the new German threat, leaving the attack to infantry. Without tanks the advance was slow, and by mid-afternoon the attempt to link up was abandoned. Meanwhile, German Panzer troops captured the airfield at Sidi Rezegh in the early afternoon, while fighting in the immediate area continued into the next day resulting in heavy tank losses on both sides. Heavy fighting also developed between New Zealand and Italian troops near Sollum, while troops of the Indian 7th Brigade captured Sidi Omar. On Nov 23, troops of the New Zealand 5th Brigade advanced toward Sollum, cutting off Axis supply routes from Bardia. Rommel now gathered the remainder of his two armored divisions together along with the Italian “Ariete” Division, and launched an attack (the Dash to the Wire) to cut off and destroy the rest of British XXX Corps. Brutal fighting led to heavy casualties on both sides. On Nov 23, the Italian High Command in Rome agreed to put the Italian XX Mobile Corps, which included the “Ariete” Division and the “Trieste” Division, under Rommel's direct command. The following day, German and Italian tanks sped for Sidi Omar, splitting the British XXX Corps. Pressing on, Rommel ordered further advances toward Sidi Azeiz, but the column was discovered and attacked by Allied aircraft. At Sidi Omar, 5th Panzer Regiment attacked positions manned by troops of the Indian 7th Brigade, which fought off repeated assaults with the help of their 25-pounder artillery; at the end of the day, 5th Panzer Regiment found itself exhausted. On Nov 26, German and Italian forces advanced on Fort Capuzzo. At dusk, they met with defenses manned by the New Zealand 5th Brigade. In the morning of Nov 27, Rommel withdrew the weakened 21st Panzer Division from the fighting on the Egyptian-Libyan border, redeploying it to Tobruk to help counter the Tobruk garrison's attempts to break out. En route west, the Division was harassed by troops of the New Zealand 22nd Battalion, delaying their arrival at Tobruk by a day. 15th Panzer Division, however, remained on the offensive. At Sidi Azeiz, the Division engaged in combat against outnumbered New Zealand troops, and captured the position along with 700 prisoners. Rommel personally oversaw this attack from the front. At this point, Axis forces were within four miles of the British Eighth Army's main supply base, but this fact was not known to Rommel until later. At noon, 15th Panzer Division reached Bir el Chleta, but was halted by the 22nd Armoured Brigade and Allied aircraft. By the early afternoon, it was clear to Allied leaders that the Axis offensive was beginning to lose steam. During that night, however, Rommel was certain that his tanks could still press on. For most of the following day, 15th Panzer Division engaged British tanks, and succeeded in pushing them back despite being outnumbered. Elsewhere, an Italian attack consisting of two motorized battalions near Tobruk saw the capture of a New Zealand field hospital, which resulted in the capture of 1,000 troops and 700 medical staff members. On Nov 29, 15th Panzer Division started westward south of Sidi Rezegh. In the afternoon, the Italian “Ariete” Division overran the New Zealand 21st Battalion at Point 175. In the evening, the South African 1st Brigade was placed under the command of the New Zealand 2nd Division, which launched an attack in attempt to recapture Point 175. On Nov 30, New Zealand 24th and 26th Battalions were battered by Axis attacks at Sidi Rezegh.
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