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University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies Legacy Theses 1999 The evolution of British intelligence assessment, 1940-41 Tang, Godfrey K. Tang, G. K. (1999). The evolution of British intelligence assessment, 1940-41 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/18755 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/25336 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY The Evolution of British Intelligence Assessment, 1940-41 by Godfiey K. Tang A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FLTLFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY CALGARY, ALBERTA JANUARY, 1999 O Godfiey K Tang 1999 National Library Biblioth4que nationale #*lof Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington OnawaON K1AON4 Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive pernettant Pla National Library of Canada to Blbliotheque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, preter, distciiuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette these sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/f&n, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format Bectronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriete du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protege cette these. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la these ni des extraits substantieis may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent gtre imprimes reproduced without the author' s ou autrernent reproduits sans son permission. autorisation, Abstract This dissertation examines the influence of intelligence assessment on British strategy and operations in the Second World War, during 1940 - 1941. Britain was at its most Werable during this period and the ability to forecast enemy intentions would be invaluable to British strategic decision-makers. British intelligence assessment was reorganised several times in this period. However, the secondary literature has failed to ask whether these reforms actually helped decision-makers formulate Britain's strategy for survival. The history of British wanime intelligence is generally approving of the Joint Intelligence Cornrniftee and its associated organs dedicated to assessment,firs the Axis Planning Staff and then the Joint Intelligence Staff. Conversely, their predecessor, the Future Operadons (Enemy)Staff, is associated with the twin failures of British amin Greece and Libya in 1941. Analysis of the accuracy of the forecasts of these bodies in 1940-41 suggest that the very conditions which motivated the British to attempt to forecast enemv strategy also crippled the accuracv of their forecasts. WhiIe evolutionary changes of British intelligence assessment would be important for future needs, the impact of saategic fomasting on British strategy in 1941 was marginal. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr. John Ferris for his able supervision; my tiiends for their support and their distractions; my sister for her long distance cajolery and backup; and my parents for their food and their love. List of Tables Table 1: Intelligence Faiiure and FO(E)S ............................................................. 67 Table 3: Intelligence Failure and APS ................................................................ 139 List of Fii Figure 1: The JIC System. January to March. 194 1 ..................... ..... .................... 40 Rgure 2: The JIG System, April 1941 to 1945 ..................................................... 69 List of Acronyms, Abbreviations and Codenames ACASO Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence) AI Air Intelligence APS Axis Planfiing Section ATB Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War BARBAROSSA German invasion of USSR BASEBALL. British occupation of Cape Verdes Islands CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CIC Combined Inteiligence Committee cos Chiefs of Staff DDMT Deputy Director of Military Intelligence DDNI Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence DM1 Director of Military Intelligence DM Director of Naval Intelligence Fa Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries Sub-Committee FELIX German attack on Gibraltar FOGP Future Operations (Enemy)Section GAF German Air Force (Lu-jhaffe) H-uMINT Human intelligence gathering IIC Industrial Intelligence Centre WO) Intelligence Staff (Operations) ISIC Inter-Service Intelligence Committee ESB Inter-Se~ceSecurity Board ISTD Inter-Service Topographical Department JIS Joint Intelligence Staff SIC Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (of the CoS) LUSTRE British expedition to Greece MARlTA Gerrnan invasion of Greece *MCC AWtaryCoordination Committee MEW Ministry of Economic Wadare ZviI A;MilitaryIntelligence m Xavd InteIligence Division List of Acronyms, Abbreviations and Codenames fcont.) OKH Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command) om Oberkomntaftdoder Kriegmrine (Naval High Command) om Oberkommando des Wehnnacht (High Command of the German Armed Forces) PUMA British occupation of Grand Canary Island PR Photographic reconnaissance PILGRlM British occupation of the Canary Islands RAF Royal Air Force RN Royal Navy SIC Scientific Intelligence Centre Srs Secret or Special Intelligence Service (or .W6) SIGINT Signals intelligence gathering Skl Seekriegsieitung (German Naval War Staff) SOE Special Operations Executive SONNENBLUME (Sunflower)German intervention in Libya SRC Situation Repolzing Centre THRUSTER Occupation of one of the Azores TIGER reinforcement of British forces in E,vt TORCH Anglo-Arnerican invasion of Nod Africa Chapter One: Introduction Part I: Historiography Throughout the history of conflict, opponents have sought to anticipate enemy action. Until the 20h century, intelligence gathering relied on human agents (ENMINT) and the volume of information gathered was relatively low. Moreover, individuals could make reasonably accurate assessments without need for elaborate bufeaucratic processes. Analysis. research and assessment could be effectively accomplished by the same person, and the need to separate intelligence gatherers and decision-makers was thus minimal. However, modem machine communications allowed greater voiumzs of information to be transmitted - and intercepted - at grearer speed. No individual could hope to discern all of the meaning fiom this mass of information; thus, bureaucratic organisations evolved systems for transforming information into useable intelligence. The system centring on the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIG) was the first bureaucratic orpisation dedicated to managing and assessing inter-service intelligence. Its role has been more praised than studied As noted by RaIph Be~etLa veteran of the British intelligence effort and respected scholar, historians have yet to answer important questions about these bodies and their role in British strategy: Was the JIC as much of a help to the Chiefs of Staff as it ought to have been? .--.Would some different arrangement have cieared the way for speedier decision-making? l This dissertation seeks to address these issues by focussing on the JIC's initial Ralph Bemet&'World War II Intelligence: The Last Ten Years' Work Reviewed" kom Intelligence Investigations: How UItra Changed Histom. (London: Cass, 19961, p- 60. -7 attempts to assess enemy capabilities and intentions in the Second World War. In the fust half of 1941, the Chiefs of Staff (CoS) formed and reformed several bodies for strategic assessment. Fitwas the Future Operadons (Enemy)Staff (FOES), who masqueraded as the German General Staff and reported directly to the CoS. After the failure of the FOES experiment, assessment was reorganised into the Axis Planning Staff (APS). They subsequently became known as the Joint Intelligence Staff (IIS) and were absorbed by the .JIC - this arrangement would last until the end of the war. The impact of the shifts in structure and methodology on the accuracy and the results of British assessment have yet to be examined. Concurrent to the organisational upheavals in British inteiligence assessment, Hitler enjoyed his period of greatest strategic fkeedom. From the fail of France in June, 1940 to the invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Gennany faced no active opposition on the continent and had the capability to strike in any direction. The British feared that Hitler wouid choose to concentrate his superior forces against the Mediterranean. which was their second most important war-fighting position, after the United Kingdom itself.' In theory, under these circurnstaaces intelligence could act as an important force muitiplier: accurate assessment of enemy intentions would help British decision-makers to deploy their limited forces against teal threats, while preventing diversions to false alarms. This paper seeks to determine whether British intelligence did in fact act as a force multiplier on the strategic plane; whether the assessments of FOES and APS were accurate and what influence they had Michael Howard,
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