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Confidence Men the Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 By Confidence Men The Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 by Brett Edward Lintott A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of History, in the University of Toronto © Copyright by Brett Edward Lintott, 2015 Abstract Confidence Men The Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 Brett Edward Lintott Doctor of Philosophy Department of History University of Toronto, 2015 This dissertation provides an analysis of the Mediterranean double-cross system of the Second World War, which was composed of a number of double agents who were turned by the Allies and operated against their ostensible German spymasters. Utilizing many freshly released archival materials, this study assesses how the double-cross system was constructed, why it was an effective instrument, and how it contributed to Allied success in two areas: security and counter-intelligence, and military deception. The focus is thus on both organization and operations. The chapters cover three chronological periods. In the first — 1941-42 — the initial operational usage of a double agent is assessed, along with the development of early organizational structures to manage and operate individual cases as components of a team of spies. The second section, covering 1943, assesses three issues: major organizational innovations made early that year; the subsequent use of the double agent system to deceive the Germans regarding the planned invasion of Sicily in July; and the ongoing effort to utilize double agents to ensure a stable security and counter-intelligence environment in the Mediterranean theatre. The third and final section analyzes events in 1944, with a focus on double-cross deception in Italy and France, and on the emergence of more systematic security and counter-intelligence double-cross operations in Italy and the Middle East. ii The dissertation demonstrates both the strengths and weaknesses of this double agent network, and its contribution to Allied success in the Mediterranean. It also establishes the double-cross system’s position as an integral component of the larger Allied intelligence victory in the Second World War, by analyzing its relationship with cryptanalysis, with the broader intelligence imperatives of MI5 and MI6, and with the German intelligence officers who were essential, if unwitting, collaborators in the system which allowed the Allies to control a substantial segment of the German spy network in the Mediterranean. iii Acknowledgements In Robert Graves’s retelling of classical history, the young Claudius, future Roman Emperor, is introduced to the historian Livy by his tutor, Athenodorus. Claudius, who is fascinated by history, and Livy’s works in particular, is taken aback when the legendary historian suggests that the young man should become an historian himself. It had never occurred to Claudius that he could write the very history which he absorbed so eagerly. As a young boy, deeply fascinated by peoples who lived hundreds and thousands of years ago, I tried to imagine what personality lay behind the granite images of Egyptian pharaohs and within painted portraits of famous and legendary people. It never occurred to me that I could write history myself, and certainly not original, meaningful historical scholarship. Even in my initial years as an undergraduate the thought of becoming an historian did not seem possible. Luckily, I had several Livys and Athenodoruses who encouraged, advised, and pushed me to explore my interests and abilities. I would like to take this chance to acknowledge them, and the others who have made this thesis possible. My thesis supervisor, Denis Smyth, was a model mentor and guide. His continual devotion to me and this topic helped make the thesis what it is. His rigour and attention to detail greatly improved the writing and quality of the argument as successive draft chapters crossed his desk. It was an honour to work with him and I will always remember our time together fondly. Lori Loeb and Wesley Wark served as valued members of my supervisory committee and, from my comprehensive exams and on through the thesis process, they both provided important advice and guidance which improved my work. I thank both of them for their dedication. I am also grateful to the three people who agreed to review my thesis and act as external examiners at my defence. John Ferris of the University of Calgary offered important suggestions and did so from a position of great knowledge and authority. It was an honour to have someone of Professor Ferris’s stature review my work and take part of the defence. Similarly, it was a privilege to have Margaret MacMillan of the University of Toronto and the University of Oxford as a reviewer. I have admired her historical scholarship for many years. Finally, it was a pleasure to work with Jim Retallack of the University of Toronto. Ever since I met Jim in my first year at U of T he has taken a sincere interest in my work, and I have gained much from our relationship over the years. Many other members of the U of T History Department Faculty have been valued colleagues and teachers, including Carol Chin, Doris Bergen, Vasilis Dimitriadis, Eric Jennings, Kenneth Mills, and Ronald Pruessen. iv Several other people contributed, in various ways, to the research and writing of this thesis. I thank the staff of the United Kingdom’s National Archives, who provided such an efficient and immensely valuable archival experience. Similarly, the staff at the United States’s National Archives at College Park were very helpful in providing navigation through their more complex system of record retrieval. The staff of the Imperial War Museum branches in London and Duxford were excellent resources. I thank in particular Stephen Walton of the Duxford branch, who on two occasions was good enough to drive me to and from the train station, and also provided me with a comfortable research space at their facility. During my trips to London I stayed in the very fine accommodations provided by the Victoria League for Commonwealth Friendship. I thank Trudi Camilleri for providing such a friendly and welcoming place to live in a far off city. Before I came to the U of T I spent several fruitful years at McMaster University. Martin Horn, Pamela Swett, Wayne Thorpe, and Marshal Beier were all important teachers, and did much to encourage and challenge my abilities. There are many friends who made the last 8 years especially enjoyable ones: Amanda Brooks, Nathan Cardon, Stephanie Cavanaugh, Chris Chambers, Madeleine Chartrand, Arielle Cheifetz, Veronique Church-Duplessis, Dagomar Degroot, Geoffrey Hamm, Stacy Hushion, Michael Llewellin, Jonathan McQuarrie, Bradley Meredith, Andrew Robinson, Daniel Rosenthal, Elizabeth Shaw, David Stiles, Michael Wilcox and others. Special thanks go to everyone at the Wednesday Night History Hockey Game, which has been an integral part of my life since I first joined in 2008. Every week during this thesis (except when in another country) I looked forward to playing with or against Michael Wayne, John Marshall, Oliver Sutherns, and others who are mentioned above. Finally, my parents Patricia and Barton Lintott have always been strong, if somewhat bemused, supporters. I thank them along with my sister, Margaret. My mother and father-in- law, Joan and Michael Achong were willing to have their daughter marry a 27 year old student, and have been more enthusiastic supporters than I would have hoped. Their daughter Marissa, deserves the greatest appreciation. We met while I was still an undergraduate, and since then she has been a constant companion who has shown unflagging interest in my occasionally esoteric historical ventures. I dedicate the thesis to Marissa because, while the past is interesting, I have to live in the present, and she makes this world a much better one. Brett Lintott Hamilton, Ontario May 2015 v Table of Contents Glossary p.vii Codenames of Military Operations and Deception Plans p.xi A Note on References and Sources p.xiii Introduction p.1 Chapter 1 The End of the Beginning Double Agent Operations from the Outbreak of War to November 1942 p.30 Chapter 2 Rule by Committee The Development of the Mediterranean Double-Cross System p.78 Chapter 3 The Fake Siege of Gibraltar Security and Counter-Intelligence in 1943 p.127 Chapter 4 “Anybody but a damn’ fool would know it is Sicily” Strategic Deception and the 1943 Mediterranean Campaign p.172 Chapter 5 Caught in a Web of Spies Security and Counter-Intelligence in Italy and the Middle East, September 1943 - May 1945. p.228 Chapter 6 “There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact” Mediterranean Deceptions in 1944 p.270 Conclusion p.310 Bibliography p.326 vi Glossary AAI Allied Armies in Italy. The Allied army group in Italy from March to December 1944. AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters. Allied command covering the central and western Mediterranean. ‘A’ Force British military organization responsible for planning and implementing deception in the Mediterranean theatre. Abt I / II / III Abteilung. Each a section of the Abwehr responsible for espionage, sabotage, and counter-espionage, respectively. Abwehr Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. The espionage service of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). Amt VI Foreign intelligence office of the RSHA. Ast Abwehrstelle. A main Abwehr station in home or occupied territory. B Branch / B Division The counter-intelligence section of MI5. B1A Double agent section of MI5 B Division. B1B ISOS analysis section of MI5 B Division. B Section Counter-intelligence section of ISLD. C The head of MI6. Chicken feed True information passed to the enemy in an effort to build up the credibility of a double agent. CICI Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq. DMI Director of Military Intelligence. DMO Director of Military Operations. vii DSO Defence Security Office / Officer.
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