Reference abstracts of

KV 2/961 – 962, Part I As to prevent for a too extensive document, I have decided to divide it into two sections.

Englandspiel and Nordpol affair

This document contains materials derived from these latter files

Its purpose: is to be used as a kind of reference document, containing my personal selection of report sections; considered being of relevance.

My input: I have in almost every case created transcripts of the just reproduced file content. However, adding my personal opinion; always accompanied by: (AOB, My comment)

Please do not multiply this document

Remember: that the section-copies still do obey to Crown Copyright

This document is of an extraordinary content; in which personal fates of many brave men have been brought at stake, due to severe ignorance on the British S.O.E. side. Please consider before studying this file: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Englandspiel English version

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Englandspiel German language version

https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Englandspiel Dutch language version

As to confront you with a wider spectrum in this intriguing complex matter, I would like to proceed, after Giskes’ second chapter, in due course, with:

Huntemann’s Case and Schreieder’s case

By Arthur O. Bauer

Giskes, Obstlt. Herman (Nordpol Spiel)(England Spiel) PF 601712

KV 2/961-1, page 2

6.5.45 To S.O.E. re Oberstleutnant (Obstlt.)Giskes and Uffz. Huntemann 16.5.45 Extract from report on Huntemann re Giskes, Filed 2.6.45. KV 2/961, page 3

20.5.45 To 12th AG asking for Giskes to be sent to UK as Category A case KV 2/961, page 8

Extract from OSS X-2 Paris report dated 22.5.45 on Edmund Grosskopf (PF 601671), former member of Abwehr III F (AOB, counter espionage) Lyons and FAK 313 (Front Aufklärungskommando 307 ‘Bonn’) (AOB, where the first ‘3’ points at, of course, the operational Abwehr section III; and the third number onto the European region) This Kommando performed only line crossings and hardly brought any information. It produced in all six monthly reports with the only result of a good propaganda to deceive the Americans about the Rundstedt Xmass offensive, (AOB, Ardennes Offensive which started on 16 December 1944)

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KV 2/961-1, page 10

PF 601712 (Giskes) PF 601832 (Huntermann!)(Giskes deputy) 18th June 1945 Dear Major Delaforce, As spoken on the telephone this morning, I am sending you a copy of the progress Report on the case of Giskes and Huntermann. You will. Of course, be receiving the Camp 020 Interim Report when it appears. Verbeck, although important, is not being treated as urgent, so I do not imagine you will be receiving reports this week.

Yours sincerely, L.M. Bingham (Miss). Major J. Delaforce S.O.E.

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KV 2/961-1, page 12

War Room From S.C.I. Brussels (B.S.) Subject Giskes, Herman Josef, Obstl. @ Dr. Gerhardts @ Dr. German @ Gluck We have received from S.C.I. Paris, two short extracts from the 12 AG Interrogation Report on Giskes, Obstlt. of FAK 307 (AOB, Frontabwehrkommando) .. As FAK and some of its FATs (AOB, Frontabwehrtrupp) operated for a considerable time in Belgium, we should appreciate it very much if you could send us copies of the Interrogation Reports on Giskes. Two copies of the reports would be desirable. The following pages concern FAK 307 + FAT 363 also Belgium Liege, + FAT 364 Gent (Ghent) personnel; which is in my perception not of relevance.

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KV 2/961-1, page 38 + 39

F.A.T. (FAT) 365 Address: Driebergen, Holland, in the buildings in which Referat III F, Ast Niederlande, was situated.

After the formation and transfer of FAK 307 to Brussels, FAT 365 remained in the buildings previously occupied (AOB, Beukenhorst?) by Referat III F of Ast Niederlande. To my knowledge the Trupp remained until the last (AOB, bis zum Ende) in Driebergen. About the beginning of October 1944, the Trupp was transferred from command FAK 307 to FAK 306, so that FAK 307, from this time onwards was no longer represented in Holland. The Trupp Commander, Major Kiesewetter, was replace for reasons of ill-health, about February 1945, by younger officer (name unknown). 1 Major Kiesewetter Truppenführer. … 2 Hptm. Schoewitz Deputy Truppenführer. Came to FAT 365 in Summer 1944, from the Eastern Front. 3 Hptm.Droegsler Hilfsoffizier. … 4 Uffz. Bodens @Opdenboom … 5 Uffz. Dr. Hensel … 6 Uffz. Hüttner Came to FAT 365 in Spring of 1944, where he remained until the end (April 1945). Huntermann believes that prior to his transfer to FAT 365, he was a Sonderführer (Sdf.) in the Ast- Paris Giskes, however, thinks he might have been with Ast- Niederlande IIIc. 7 Gefr. Harger …

8 Ogfr. Schroeder … 9 Fw. Kock 1941/43 O.C. M/T with Ast-Niederlande. Sent to FAT 365 in March 1944 as Hauptfeldwebel where he stayed until the end. Was employed there in administrative work. Huntemann states that in additions to the above, there were also ten soldiers acting as drivers, guards, etc.

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KV 2/961-1, page 41 + 42

Funkabwehr, Aussenstelle Brussels Personnel 1 Oblt. Lorentzen O/C of the Funkabwehr in Brussels, Aussenstelle of the Wehrmacht Nachrichten Verkehr, Fu III Berlin, 1943/44. Previously Leiter of Außenstelle Paris. From Autumn 1944 in Kreuznach, then Berlin and finally Norway. 2 Uffz. Helmerich November 1944 – March 1945, was with FAT 307 as Liaison Officer with the Wehrmacht Nachrichten Verkehr. Replaced Huntemann at FAK to leave the latter free to act as instructor to the FAK schools. His mission was to run W/T deception but no such opportunity arose. 3 Uffz. Miersenann Address Amsterdam. Was already at the Funkabwehr Aussenstelle Brussels, when Huntemann went there. He did not go back to his unit on the evacuation of Brussels on 3rd. September 1944, but probably went over to the Americans or English. (Engländer). His parents, of German descent, lived in Amsterdam, where they had a fur business. Miersemann reported of his own accord on the outbreak of the war to the German Wehrmacht. His work consisted of interrogation of captured agents on their codes etc. January/February 1944, was transferred to Ast-Niederlande, III F for a few weeks as Liaison Officer to the Wehrmachts Nachrichten Verkehr (AOB, WNV/Fu III?) Seen only once or twice by Giskes.

4 Uffz. Richter Known only to Huntemann. Was already in Brussels at the Funkabwehr when he arrived there and retreated with his unit on the evacuation of Brussels. KV 2/961-1, page 45 + 46

“Some of the information given regarding Lindemans (King Kong) is new to us. There had Hitherto been no evidence that Lindemans gave away or could have given away any Allied military plan. The theory that he had been responsible for passing information regarding the Arnhem operation was based on a misunderstanding of the information from Most Secret Source (AOB, = decrypts of Enigma communication) Nor were we previously aware of the fact that Lindemans had been put in touch with agents who were parachuted into northern Dutch province. (AOB, Lindemans had also access to Prince Bernard’s Staff in Brussels, for it Lindemans passed the frontier between liberated Holland and still kept occupied Netherland). The incident to which Giskes refers may well relate to the penetration of the organisation which the S.O.E. attempted to set up in the spring of 1944, when the organisation which had hitherto succeeded was proved to be utterly penetrated. I am, however, somewhat surprised by Giskes’ statement that the attempt to play back S.O.E. agents was immediately spotted in England. An attempt was after the arrest of Lindemans to warn S.O.E. organisation in Holland of the

Fact that his brother might be working for the Germans. I am not quite sure what signal was sent but so far as I can recollect it was not in the form described by Giskes. On the other hand, the guess that he was given away by another agent (no doubt Verloop) is of course correct. I realise that it will take a lot of time to complete these cases. I should, however, be grateful if progress report could be issued from time to time dealing with general III, mat??? E.g. activities of Amt VI Z (AOB, Mil Amt, the successor of the Amt Ausland/Abwehr of OKW) and the old Abwehr III D. (AOB, counter intelligence) Leitstelle III West, relations of III with R.S.H.A. (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), long term plans if any, general instructions on penetration matters, machinery for deception through controlled agents, particulars of deception plans and cases. Such progress reports on the more central III organisation, as distinct from the local activities in Holland and the FAK’s will be most useful in the interrogating Obst. Reile (AOB, once in Paris) who was just arrived at C.S.D.I.C. (AOB, = Combiner Services Detailed Interrogation Centre) (UK)

9th June 1945

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KV 2/961-1, page 47

To: Major S.H. Noakes 11th June, 1945 21th Army Group Giskes and Huntemann. I sent to you on the 8th June a Camp 020 Progress Report on this case. For reasons which you will readily appreciate (understand) para No. 2 at the bottom of the first page of this report should be deleted and destroyed. The allegations are of course under immediate investigation here.

Stamped 12 Jun 1945 (AOB, what might have once caused this advice? There exist two option, something concerning the way the interrogation had been accomplished, or a kind of reference which might point at MSS!)

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KV 2/961-1, page 53 – 57

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In the case of Hermann Giskes 5.6.45

Investigation of this case commenced on 30th May 1945. Giskes has been an active Abwehr III (counter Intelligence) officer since the Autumn of 1938, and the case is of such properties that, up to the present, it has only been possible to skirt the fringes in very general terms. One aspect of the case, linked with Huntemann, and concerning the “Nordpol” affair (AOB, = Nordpol Spiel) in itself requires special investigation, for which purpose S.O.E. has supplied the brief. It has not yet been possible to check the information which Giskes is supplying, and with this reservation, progress to date is as follows:- Giskes, who by profession was connected with the tobacco trade, was put in touch with Ast-Hamburg (AOB, = Ast X) in September 1938 by Major Feldmann. His application for employment with the Abwehr was accepted in November 1938m and commenced duties with effect from January 1939, under Hptm. Dr. Uecker (Ücker) of Referat IIIc 1, Ast- Hamburg, in the zone covered by General Kdo. 10. (AOB, Generalkommando X, also designated Ast-X). IIIc dealt with reports covering General Kommando X zone supplied mostly through official; channels by the civilian population. There was constant liaison with Major Feldmann of Referat III F (Counter Espionage), whose main preoccupation at that time was the breaking down of English Secret Service organisation in Holland. Dating back to this period, Giskes recalls the following events in which he participated under orders from Feldmann:- “1)A man of about 50 years of age (AOB, Protze alias Onkel Richard) who was set up in The Hague and in the Summer of 1939 was put under Ast-Münster. I received orders to go to Holland to obtain from him 2,500 Dutch florins (Guilders!) which he was holding as an advanced pay. I could not get the sum and left after twodays without results, after having introduced him to Major von Rosenberg of Ast-Münster, III F, who was to be in charge of him. We heard later from Münster that he had placed himself at the disposal of the English Stelle in the Hague. (AOB, Protze (Onkel Richard), was formerly (up to 1938) the head of Abwehr Section III F in Berlin. He even was the creator, but ultimately found to be too old for the job. But was ancient to Giskes. He then took up the job establishing something in the Netherlands since) … 3)A certain Jansen, living at Nimwegen (Nijmegen) where he had a post-box belonging to Referat III F Hamburg. He was, as far as I can remember, also an agent of the English Stelle in the Hague.”

The outbreak of war found Giskes attached to Ast-Münster, where he was employed in forming and organising Abwehr III sections. January 1940, in forming and organising Abwehr III sections. January 1940, in conjunction with Hptm. Christiansen, (AOB, apparently not to be mistaken with the Highest Military Commander Christiansen in the Netherlands), Giskes ran Referat III F (Counter Espionage) . In this connection, he was employed to a certain extent with Christiansen in clearing up a French Intelligence Service in Copenhagen, which was run through the French Commercial Attaché’s office. Giskes (AOB, he might then still being a Major) visited Copenhagen in May 1940 (AOB, Denmark was since early April 1940 occupied by German forces, and for the time being were ruled by their own civil administration) in May 1940 to recover Ast funds which Ast employee had embezzled. At the end of May 1940, he visited Milan (Milano, Mailand) to see one Fürstenau with whom a female III F agent of the Ast was living. The agent’s name was Rieke and she brought information about an English Intelligence centre in Leghorn, for which she was well paid, Another reason for Giskes’ visit was the fact that information had been received from the German Consul (Konsul) in Genoa to the effect that a certain Meyer, who had arrived there, with family from England, had applied to Feldmann for assistance. In the result, Giskes managed to assist Meyer in returning to Germany, after overcoming passport difficulties, and this man had then the intention of studying wireless. Giskes claims that he has no idea what eventually (letztendlich) became of the man. Mid-June 1940, Giskes was transferred to Ast Paris (AOB, Alst Paris?) to take over the duties of Referat IIIc 2 and remained there until August 1941. This section was responsible for all suspects spy cases in the greater Paris area and the Departments of the Seine and Seine/Oise. Cases outside this area were passed onto the appropriate III F Stelle. On the average , the Stelle comprised 6/8 officers or Sonderführer (Sdf.), with about 6 N.C.Os (non commissioned Officers) as Abwehr assistants, and clerks, orderlies, drivers, etc: As part of Ast-Paris, the Hotel Lutetia was used for offices. For personnel, see … In a written report, Giskes states: “The clearing up of suspicious cases that became known were almost always attended by the V-Men (AOB, V-Mann = Vertrauensperson, someone to be relied upon) of various kinds stationed in Paris; they were under instructions from the G.F.P. (AOB, Geheime Feldpolizei ≈ MP) officials, and people from the Abwehr. My officers and Abwehr assistants had, almost without exception, one or several such contacts. These were, in the main, not completely trustworthy, working for money or other advantages and sometimes moved from one German Dienststelle to the other. I refused in all cases to make personal acquaintance with such people, and can therefore not assist in their identification. The major of a small suburb (Montmerecy?) gave good information of a general political nature at the time. Also a Reichsdeutscher (AOB, whose nationality is German) called Kraus, who was busy in Paris at the time, had good connections with French people and brought some good reports. Of the very numerous, but for the most part unimportant, suspicious cases, I can recall a few. For instance, the case of Mrs. Deegan of the U.S.A. Embassy in Paris. With the help of the Embassy secretaries, she had assisted English soldiers who were in flight (auf der Flucht) in civilian clothes through Paris. These soldiers, or officers, were able to remain for longer periods in Paris before they were caught. They were tried (trialled?) in all cases as prisoner-of-war, and sent to prisoner-of-war camps. Mrs. Deegan and two secretaries of the Embassy were obliged to leave Paris after the cases were cleaned up. “ At the time a case cleared (Aufgeklärt) up by Referat III F concerned an English Intelligence agent in the U.S.A. Embassy. Several spy cases were handed over to Referat III F at the time I left Paris. I recall the name of a Marquis D’Harcourt. I do not know anything about the result of this case. Concerning Kraus, Giskes will be interrogated in detail. Meantime, this statement of the man is attached at .. In August 1941, Giskes was transferred to III F Ast-Niederlande, and his former duties with Ast-Paris (Alst-Paris) were handed over to major Feil. Between this date and the end of the year, Giskes was mainly occupied in reorganising the III F section. In the Spring of 1942, the British W/T agent, Lauwers (AOB, Lauwers was a Dutchman on behalf of the exile Dutch Government in London and their secret section)(But the executives was accomplished by the British S.O.E. (SOE), and this latter services bear the responsibility for the disastrous outcome of the Nordpol Spiel, as well as the connected Englandspiel), was apprehended, turned round, and played back. (AOB, it was not that simple. Here the Abwehr was not directly involved, but the S.D. and police Kriminalkommissar Josef Schreieder. The latter was already involved in espionage like actions in Holland. Schreieder did set-up a very clever trick. The Germans blew-up something in the Rotterdam harbour. Now when Lauwers, was caught during his W/T operation in his Fahrenheitstraat domicile, Schreieder bluffed and forecasted some of the contents of Lauwers’ W/T message. This moment was crucial in the whole story) His arrest was brought about entirely by information supplied by Ridderhof to Uffz. (Willi) Kup (Kupp?) of III F (?). (AOB, We later in our Survey will also have to deal with Huntemann’s file, the latter was far more acquainted with these details than was Giskes). Sub-agents of Ridderhof were:- Graan Van den Berg (unwittingly) Biermann (unwittingly) (for deceptions, see Appendix … Ast-Niederlande agents. S.D. (SD) agents: Slachter Poos (both men were Dutch policemen, working for Schreieder’s S.D. section Binnenhof 4) This was the start of the ´Nordpol´ affair (Spiel) (AOB, which was mainly the responsibility of Schreieder! The Abwehr concerned military intelligence, which the Nordpol and England Spiel in most cases was not), which continued until Autumn 1943. (AOB, after Dourlein and Ubbink´s escape from the Haaren Seminary camp on 29/30 August 1943, the Germans were aware that the ´game´ was more or less over; it nevertheless took a quite long time before these men reached England via France, Spain, and Portugal)(AOB, please don’t forget that the Netherlands was ruled by a Civilian - ‘political jurisdiction’ - this in contrast to Belgium and France. Therefore the execution of force was relying on the S.D. more than on the military jurisdiction. Schreieder in his post war book, pointed it: that military complex was mainly involved on the execution of operational matters, was to facilitate the droppings and the according military coordination; whereas after a dropped person touched Dutch soil, the S.D. took over operation and coordination) “This modus operandi made it possible to continue the game until the first three, then two of the ‘Nordpol’ prisoners escaped from the Sipo detention, in Autumn of 1943, and the game thereby became blown to the enemy. This led to a severe Conflict with a corresponding sharp exchange of letters, between C-in-C Holland and the Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer (Harster or Naumann). The last of these letters from the Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer to the C-in-C (AOB, Christiansen?) culminated in the suggestion that the Abwehr officer responsible for the affair, namely myself, was to blame for the fact that the matter had been blown to the enemy; “owing to the fact that, up to the present, he was obstructed sentence being passed on the prisoners.” (AOB, this in legal terms was not according the very facts. The prisoners at Haaren Seminar Camp, were kept in a solitary environment without contact to outside. All was under supervision of the S.D. or likely police departments. All was agreed upon by a grant on behalf of Himmler himself, in which he guaranteed that those held there were not prosecuted. However, after the escapes of Dourlein and Ubbink Himmler revoked his grant and since the story went wrong. Most of the men ended up in Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Though, Schreieder managed to save some of those involved for special purposes, out of the deathly trajectory. His excuse: he might need them for future investigations) The exchange or correspondence took place at the end of December 1943 or beginning of January 1944. (AOB, however, the mutual understanding between Giskes and Schreieder was astonishingly good (pragmatic?). This cooperation may be regarded the nucleus of the success of Nordpol/England Spiel) The continuation of my work in Holland was then, for all practical purposes, at an end and I came to the conclusion that the S.D. intended to have me locked up and disposed of in some manner. Help came to me in the middle of January 1944 when the creation of FAKs and FATs from former Abwehr III F Dienststellen was ordered. According to this order, I had to form FAK 307m which was to be a type of regimental unit and not a Dienststelle. Brussels had been selected as the H.Q. of this FAK. With this order in my pocket (auf Sack) I was able to cut away from Holland as a Truppenkommandeur, was no longer under suspicion of the RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) and dependant on its satellites (Institutions) in Holland. The remaining sections “of the military Abwehrstellen, including Ast-Niederlande, were taken over between the beginning (AOB, after 12 February 1944) and middle of 1944 (AOB, we should take 20 July, failed assassination attempt on Hitler, as the breaking point in history) by the Sicherheitspolizei, and the officers etc. so long as they were agreeable to the RSHA (Amt IV and Amt Mil) whether they wanted to or not, were put under command of the C.O. of the local Sipo.”(Sicherheitspolizei) Personnel of the Sipo, known to Giskes are:- 1 O.C. of the Sipo and S.D. in Holland during 1942 and 1943 – Standartenführer, latterly Brigadeführer Harster. From the Autumn of 1943, onwards, his successor was S.S. Brigadefüher Naumann. 2 Leiter of Abteilung III for the whole Dutch area run by the Stelle in The Hague during 1943 and 1944 was S.S. Obersturmbannführer Deppner. 3 Leiter of Referat IV/E (AOB, RSHA Amt IV e) was Obersturmbannführer Schreieder (AOB, his Police rank in 1944 was: Kriminaldirektor) This Section was connected with all matters dealing with espionage, cases of sabotage and armed resistance. 4 S.S. Hauptsturmfüher Knoop was amongst others employed under Schreieder. Giskes states:- “From a service point of view, I was actually only concerned with (3) Schreieder, and occasionally in connection with the constant friction, with Deppner. Schreieder was a calm ‘Kriminalrat’ of the good old school who did not wear S.S. uniform. In case of Schreieder, I was always quite certain that prisoners who came within the framework of his personal jurisdiction were not unduly roughly treated. Knoop, on the other hand, who came under his command, savoured more of the usual S.S. methods. The Leiter of III, Deppner (see 2 above) was rather was rather a typical S.S. product. Barely at the age of 30 he had a powerful position which contrasted unpleasantly with the lack of experience of life generally. Any sort of cooperation, whether on a Service basis or any other form, was quite impossible for me with this man, and the Section mentioned at (1) above.” … Ast-Niederlande personnel, together with a note on the Funküberwachungsstelle der Orpo (Ordunungspolizei) (W/T intercept), as obtained from interrogations of both Giskes and Huntemann (AOB, the latter is an interesting person, albeit his Uffz. Rank, he was regarded of such relevance (despite of) that he was among those transported to and from England: Kaltenbrunner, Kuebart, Giskes and others. In the Kew (National Archive) file information on Huntemann he was even noticed as Giskes’ deputy!) (AOB, I Deo volente, would like to dedicate our attention onto this man, but we first have to digest the 3 volumes on Giskes) During the course of his employment with FAK 307, Giskes came into contact with Lindemans @ King Kong. Separate data, as supplied by both Giskes and Huntemann on this man is attached at Appendix .., and it is interesting to note the claim that Lindeman was responsible for supplying advance information to the FAK (AOB, FAT 363, in Driebergen?) about the Allied airborne landings in the Arnhem (German spelling Arnheim) and Eindhoven areas.

Meantime, detailed interrogation is proceeding (in Camp 020). As already pointed out, the dimensions of this case are extensive, and it is anticipated that some time must elapse before a complete report on the case can be made available.

Camp 020/5.6.45.

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KV 2/961-1, page 63

Organisation of Ast-Niederlande as given by Giskes & Huntemann

Leiter: June 1940 – August 1943: Obst. Hauswaldt August 1943 – summer 1944: Obst. Heuser

Gruppe I: Leiter until autumn 1942: Major Merker Subsequently vacant. I. Heer: Hptm. Koehler I. Luft: Major Merker (until autumn 1942) I. Marine: vacant since 1942. Subsidiary Stelle in Amsterdam: Kapt.Lt. Strauch I Wirtschaft IWi Hptm. Scharrer I N: - I G: Hptm Stein, forging

Gruppe II: There was no Gruppe II in the Ast-Niederlande

Gruppe III: Leiter until autumn 1943 Obstlt. Hempel Leiter from autumn 1943: Obstlt. Von Soppe. III Heer: Obstlt. Mahrmann III Luft: Obstlt. Von Roland Hilfsoffizier: Hptm. Untermann (until app. end 1942) III Marine: Korv.-Kapt. Meinke (until about end of 1943 Korv.-Kapt. Nennecke (from 1943) Subsidiary Stelle in Rotterdam: Hptm. Christiansen. IIIc Obstlt. Hutterer (Hütterer?)(until autumn 1942) Sdf. K Crone (K = Kompanieführer Hptm) Hilfsoffizier: Hptm Fischer (until appr. October 1942) Hptm. Muellejanz (mentioned by Huntemann but never seen by him) III N - III Wi (AOB, Wirtschaft, economics) Maj. Meyer-Rodenberg (until Augsut 1941)

(formerly Major) Obstlt Giskes (from August 1941) III F: Obstlt. Giskes (from August 1941)Hptm. Gehmacher (until October 1941 Sdf.???jaaks (until early 1942 Maj. Kiesewetter (from 1942-44 Hptm. Wurr (from 1941-44) Hptm. ?Reckel (from abt. Oct. 1942- beginning 1943.) Rittmeister Noelle (from mid 1942 to end of 1942 Hptm. Weber von Ostwalden (1943) Hptm. Droegsler (from 1943-1944) Sdf. Dr. Hensel. Sdf. Huntemann (see his file later) Hptm. Busse (until March or April 1942) Also: Uffz. Kup(p?) Gfr. Harger Gfr. Christmann Uffz. Bodens Ogfr. Schroeder.

KV 2/961-1, page 64

Secretaries: Vorzimmer Leiter: Frl. Meiners (previously Vorzimmer III F)

Vorzimmer Leiter III:

III Heer: -

III Luft: Frl. Von Waltersdorf (until app. mid’42)

III Marine: Frl. Baeume (Bäume) IIIc: Frl. Custodis (later A.B.P. Cologne (Köln)

III N: -

III F: Vorzimmer Frl. Scherrer (unt. Mid-Oct 42) Frau Stolterfoth (from mid Oct 1942)

Office: Frl. Janssen (Geheime Haushalt Kasse)

Secretaries: Frl. Dürenberg (until abt. Feb.1942)

Frl. Schotten (until abt. Beg. 1943)

Frl. Ihne

Frl. Eiling.

Miscellaneous: Büro – Officer: Hptm. Brettmann Uffz. Müller

Secretary: Frl. Guhl.

Zahlmeister: Stabszahlmeister Decker (until appox. Mid 1943) Oberzahlmeister Wessels (from about mid-1943)

Secretary: Two secretaries. Names unknown.

Stelle ‘P’ Kapt, z. S. Richard Protze @ Onkel Richard.

Kartei: Frau Frenzel.

Registry: Frau Dehmen Frl. Kadur.

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KV 2/961-1, page 65

Stelle ‘P’- Niederlande:

Stelle-P was the Dienstelle of Kapt z. See Richard Protze. It was an independent unit directly under the command of Abr. III, Section III-F in Berlin, but for administration matter it was attached to Ast-Niederlande. Its H.Q. was as follows: 1940 – 42 Wassenaar near The Hague. 1943 Bilthoven 1944 in the area of Nymegen (Nijmegen) From September 1944 onwards the unit was incorporated within FAK 306m but from the technical point of view was independent. Personnel of Stelle-P consisted only of Kapt.z.S. Protze @ Onkel Richard, and an elderly lady who attended to his typing and ran his household. (AOB, she was his mistress since mid 1920s) I do not know her name. She was generally called “Tante Lene”. Stelle-P never was considered to have any importance from the Abwehr point of view. In the Abwehr it was regarded as a sinecure or “Bonbon” for the over 65 years old Kapt. Protze, who was still a quite robust and a few good contacts. (AOB, he established in the early 1930s Abt. III F, and had been replaced (succeeded) by Rohleder in 1938) Protze was a retired officer, was already living in Holland in 1939. He was an old friend of Admiral Canaris (AOB, Head of the Ausland/Abwehr between 1935 and 12 February 1944), from their cadet days. And it was said that he had been an instructing officer. Allegedly Protze is the man who had developed the German III F service from its inception. Before 1939 (=1938) he had worked for a number of years with Abt. III, Section III F in Berlin. (He created section III F) In spite of his age Protze was ambitious and was rather disappointed that he had been made O.C. of the Ast-Niederlande. He had little contact with officers of the Ast. When one did meet him occasionally he gave the impression of being a charming old gentleman with whom one could converse, but one never heard a word from him about his service work. In the Summer of 1944m when Ast-Niederlande was dissolved or taken over by the Sicherheitspolizei Stelle-P was ordered to work together with FAK 307, with H.Q. at the time in Brussels. This annexation, however, did not take place on the account of the evacuation of Belgium and Stelle-P then became attached to FAK 306. I last saw Kapt. Protze in the spring of 1944 in Bilthoven.

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KV 2/961-1, page 65

W/T intercept unit of the Ordungspolizei in Scheveningen. (Funkbeobachtungsstelle, or Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo) Information given by Giskes. „Task of this unit was the tracing of, and listening to, enemy W/T traffic. Establishing, by listening, of W/T agents traffic, reception of two way traffic, of local enemy W/T agents by RDF (HF/DF) methods. Arresting W/T agents in conjunction with the Sipo. The results of the above missions were reported to III F for the purpose of analysis from an Abwehr point of view. In establishing W/T ‘play’ with the enemy, all technical data for the reception and establishment of traffic was procured, or dealt with, by the Fu-B-Orpo, and the traffic of the agents concerned, or the official appointed to carry this out, was supervised by Fu-B-Orpo. (AOB, in another file designated: Funkmessdienst; the word Funkmess was also used in conjunction to radar related matters). The Fu- B-Stelle received the text of the W/T messages from the Stelle which was running the W/T ‘play’, i.e. III F or the Sipo. Between 1940-1943 Oblt. Der Orpo Heinrich (AOB, Heinrich was quite frequently referred onto in Schreieder’s book “Englandspiel”), was the O.C. (Officer in Command) from 1943 onwards a Hptm .. (name forgotten by Giskes) The Stelle had roughly 30 official at its disposition, the greater part being W/T and W/T intercept specialists. In 1943, H.Q. was transferred to Driebergen near Utrecht, In Autumn of 1944 a large portion of the technical material was lost by an air attack, near Zwolle, whilst it was in the process of being transferred to Northern Holland. The unit was equipped with fluctuating number of RDF (DFing) cars. Generally speaking, however, there was only one at disposal. From 1942 onwards portable Nahfeldpeiler (AOPB, this was a set where the DF loop was fit about the chest and neck under a coat or that like. The wrest-watch actually was the signal-strength indicator (meter))(short range RDF sets) were operated, which are said to have produced good results. Results obtained in the local RDFing of enemy W/T operators varied considerably. Sometimes the fixing of enemy W/T bases succeeded surprisingly quickly, in other cases many months often elapsed, and there were cases when no results were achieved at all. As a non-technical man the reasons for this are not clear to me. During 1942/43, on the average, two to three active W/T agent sets were continually under observation. This figure increased gradually from the beginning of 1944 onwards. I estimate that from the summer of 1941 until mid 1944 about 12 enemy agent transmitters in Holland were recognised, pin-pointed and captured through the purely technical means of the Fu-B-Stelle.” KV 2/961-1, page 83

Agents of Ast-Niederlande

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1 George Ridderhof @ Van Vliet V-Mann for III F, Ast-Niederlande, since before December 1941, working under Uffz. Kup (Kupp?). About the middle of 1943 (Sept.) moved to Brussels; after the evacuation of Belgium went to FAK 306 by whom he was posted to Groningen. He was a typical profiteer, he has had many occupations and has been in many different countries; he was a stoker (Heizer), musician, manufacturer, merchant, Rechercheur, jeweller agent and broker. After the war he intended to go to Brussels where he was said to have an interest in the Rubber factory Hoff in Brussels-Jette. Hoff, however, is said to have no knowledge of Ridderhof’s activities with the German Abwehr.

2 Graan V-Mann for III F, Ast-Niederlande, since before December 1941, working under Uffz. Kup; also acted as sub-agent to Ridderhof. Left about the middle of 1942 as he was not interested in and was not suitable for the work. Seen by Huntemann at The Hague in 1942, Home address: The Hague.

3 Van den Berg Member of a Resistance Group details of which he unwittingly supplied to Ridderhof, in whom he had complete trust. Was arrested by the S.D. in The Hague in the early part of March 1942, a few days before Lauwers. Formerly a Captain in the Dutch Army. Home address: The Hague

KV 2/961-1, page 84

4 Biermann, Sgt. Huntemann remembers having seen the name of Sgt. Biermann in reports made by Uffz. Kup, but has never seen the man. Biermann apparently belonged to the same organisation as Lauwers and (Thijs) Taconis. (AOB, The latter is a key figure in the England Spiel (Norpol Spiel))

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KV 2/961-1, page 85 + 86

Personnel of the B-Stelle, Orpo (W/T intercept).

1Heinrich, Lt. Leiter of B-Stelle, Orpo, in Holland, first in Scheveningen and or Olt. later in Driebergen, until the summer of 1943, when he went on an officers’ course in Berlin or Oranienburg. Giskes does not know whether and when he returned to Holland.

2Lienhardt, Hptm. Leiter of B-Stelle, Orpo, in Holland, stationed at Driebergen, from summer 1943 until 1944 (in succession to Heinrich). In autumn of 1944 is believed to have held a similar position in North Holland. (AOB, I suppose, meant was Friesland und Groningen, and not the Dutch province Noord-Holland) Ludwichowski Seen by Huntemann from March 1942 till about the end of 1942 Polizeimeister in Scheveningen and Driebergen, where he worked on the coding and sending of messages in connection with the Nordpol affair.

Rudolph, Polizeimeister Seen by Huntemann from March 1942 till March 1944 in Scheveningen and Driebergen, where he worked on the coding and sending of messages in connection with the Nordpol affair.

Kirschke Polizeimeister. Seen by Huntemann March 1942 till March 1944, in Scheveningen and Driebergen where he worked on the coding and sending of messages in connection with the Nordpol affair. Piehl, Polizeimeister Seen by Huntemann March 1942 till March 1944, in Scheveningen and Driebergen where he worked on the coding and sending of messages in connection with the Nordpol affair. Kloss, Polizeimeister Seen by Huntemann March 1942 till March 1944, in Scheveningen and Driebergen where he worked on the coding and sending of messages in connection with the Nordpol affair.

↓ KV 2/961-1, page 90 + 91

Information obtained from Huntemann on Lindemans. On the 15th September, 1944, the Friday before the Arnheim (Arnhem) landing, Huntemann was with Kiesewetter in his office in Driebergen; about 4.30 p.m. the telephone rang and Huntemann heard Kiesewetter in his office at Driebergen mentioning “CC” (AOB, the German cover-name for Lindemans alias Kin Kong and say he knew nothing about him). Huntemann knowing of “CC” as Giskes’ best agent, interrupted and informed Kiesewetter of this. Kiesewetter, who, it appeared was speaking to Ast-Hilversum, accordingly told them to send “CC” at once to Driebergen, and he was brought immediately by car. Before he arrived, Huntemann had left and so did not see him at the time. Before he went, however, Kiesewetter told him that “CC” had important information and had asked for Giskes, who was then at Dersdorf bei Bonn. On the Saturday, 16th September, Huntemann saw “CC”(Lindemans) drive off at about 12 noon in a car belonging to FAT 365, on his way to Eindhoven. Huntemann understood that he intended to cross the lines near Eindhoven and to return in about a week’s time. Lindemans had been in Eindhoven prior to going to Hilversum (whence he had come to Driebergen) and had there been in touch with two employees of Philips, with whom he was to get in touch again. On the same day, 16th September, Huntemann was told by Kiesewetter that Lindemans had brought information about an Allied air-borne action which was expected shortly in the Münster/Dülmen area, but did not mention Arnheim. (Arnhem) This was all that Huntemann knew at the actual time of the (Arhneimlandings). Later, in February 1945, Giskes spoke to him of Lindemans, saying he was afraid he was dead and had probably been betrayed by Nelis (a minor agent with whom Lindemans had worked). He spoke very highly of Lindemans, calling him his best agent and saying that, compared with him, Ridderhof was very small fry. He then told Huntemann that Lindemans had given ?? the information about Arnheim landing: Giskes had apparently been very annoyed that he was not informed when Lindeman came from Hilversum to Driebergen as Giskes would have come any distance to obtain information from him. It was Huntemann’s opinion that Giskes thought very highly indeed of Lindemans. Huntemann then told how Giskes first got in touch with Lindemans: at the beginning of 1944m Kup was told by an agent named Nelis that he knew of a “big man”, an English agent”, who had a brother who had been arrested by the S.D. and was in prison in Scheveningen. This man was willing to work for the Abwehr if his brother was revealed. The release was arranged by Schreieder and the brother (whose name Huntemann did not know) went to work in Rotterdam. So far as Huntemann knows, he never worked for the G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) but dealt in black market transactions and , in this connection, kept a close touch with Kup, who used to go and visit him frequently at Rotterdam. The agent who was known as “CC”, then started work for Giskes and was a great Success. He was run entirely by Giskes and was a great success. He was run entirely by Giskes and was a great success. He was run entirely by Giskes through Kup and his work was kept absolutely secret. Wurr also spoke to Huntemann of Lindemans as a very important man. Later,, in 1945, Huntemann heard “CC” referred to as King Kong.

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Information obtained from Huntemann on Lindemans The only time Huntemann had any personal contact with Lindemans was at the end of August 1944 (probably the 29th) when he went from Brussels to Lille with him. Lindemans was to return to Brussels the same day. Very little conversation took place between the two men, as Huntemann had been told by Giskes that he did not want them to become intimate. The only matters discussed were the point were the point where Huntemann was to be dropped, If they were stopped by the Germans, Huntemann was to do his talking; if by members of the Resistance, Lindemans would deal with the matter, as he knew the password (at this time it was “Vive la Belgique, la Belgique liberté). Huntemann did not know how Lindemans knew this. Huntemann did not know of Lindemans crossing the lines more than at once, nor had he heard that Lindemans delivered crystals to W/T agents. He did not know whether Lindemans had been instructed to act as stay-behind agent in Brussels, but Kiesewetter told him that Lindemans had told him (Kiesewetter) that he went to the Hotel Metropole where on the 4th floor was a W/T station. Huntemann did not know whether he had been told to do this, but certainly stayed in Brussels. Additional Information given by Huntemann on Lindemans. Huntemann was seen in his cell on 2.6.45 and stated that on the Saturday in question Kiesewetter told him that “CC” had got the information about the information about the air-borne landing at the Hotel Metropole in Brussels. Huntemann does not know how. The area where the landing was to take place was said by Kiesewetter to be in Westphalia, in a triangle bounded by Münster/Dülmen and another town which Huntemann does not know the name. Later, in February 1945m Giskes told Huntemann that “CC” had actually blown the Arnheim (Arnhem) operation. KV 2/961-1, page 92 - 93

Personnel and agents of S.D. Holland.

1 Brigadeführer Harster O.C. of Sicherheitspolizei and S.D. Holland. About the autumn of 1943 and subsequent to his activities in Holland, Harster is believed to have taken over a Kommando in Italy/ Earlier history is unknown.

2 Brigadeführer Naumann Successor of the above as O.C. Sicherheitspolizei and S.D. in Holland. Prior to taking up these duties, in about the autumn of 1943, Naumann was employed as O.C. a Sipo section on the Eastern front. (AOB, consequently he committed the according atrocities there)

3 Deppner Obersturmbannführer Leiter III (AOB, not equal to the Abwehr III sections) of the Sicherheitspolizei and S.D. Holland in 1943 and 1944. A brutal S.D.-man and Nazi; did all he could to further the S.D. at the expense of the Abwehr; untrustworthy and secretive.

4 Schreieder Obersturmbannführer Leiter of Referat IV E (RSHA) of the Sicherheitspolizei and S.D. in Holland from 1940-45. Well-intentioned, but often prevented from carrying out promises by Deppner. Tried to establish good relations with the Abwehr and was not in entire agreement with the S.D. on many matters. Previously Kriminalrat in a Lake Constance (Bodensee) town.

Knoop Hauptsturmführer Employed as Kommissar with Referat IV E of Sicherheitspolizei and S.D., The Hague. Took up employment there about 1942 and was still there in 1944. A fanatical Nazi and S.D. man, unpleasant in his handling of prisoners and uncooperative towards the Abwehr. A farmer by profession, comes from Westphalia.

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KV 2/961-1, pages 94-95

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RAW/KV/3265 4th June 1945

Dear Wilson, I must apologize for being somewhat dilatory in writing to inform you of the call which was paid upon me by Jack Hughs and Speyer from Camp 020; I am afraid that ever since they were here I have been rushed off my feet, and had no time to commit myself to paper. When Hughs and Speyer came, I was able to tell them a little about the sort of thing they might expect during the interrogations of Giskes and Huntemann, but this, however, could only be a brief summary. More importantly I think, I have furnished them with a complete report of the S.O.E. (AOB, really?) operations in Holland with which these two Germans were concerned. This report gives every detail of agents’ identities, missions, dropping bodies etc., etc, and I have also supplied them with the complete set of traffic for which Huntemann and Giskes were jointly responsible. To these I am shortly going to add an appreciation of codes, conventions etc., which were in use at the time; this will be of a fairly non-technical nature, and is being specially written for the purpose by our Signals Directorate. I have also arranged that 020 can refer to me at any time when they may have a query to raise, and Jack Hughs has in fact rung me up this evening to ask how our agents were treated when they were in the prison in Haaren. I hope that these arrangements will meet with your approval, and feel that really this is the only way of getting the maximum out of these characters, although of course it will mean a considerable amount of work for Hugh and Speyer, which, however, they do not seem to mind. I have already received your PF 601832/B.1.W. of the 1st June, enclosing a progress on the case of Huntemann, and will much appreciate receiving these from time to time as the case progresses. Yours sincerely, For R.A. Wells, Major D.I. Wilson, Esq., SHAEF War Room Ryder Street. KV 2/961-2, page 2

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Offive of Assistant Chief og Staff G-2 Forward Headquarters, GBI/CI/CS/383.4-2. 2nd June 1945 Subject: Supreme Commander’s Certificate. To War Office (M.I.5.) (Attn: H.P. Milno Esq. Reference your PF 601815 (Friedrich Olmes) PF 610832 (Huntemann) PF 601712 (Giskes) PF 601833 (Kuebart Obstlt. finally Leiter Abw I) PF 601879 (Heinz Jost) The Supreme Commander’s certificate in respect of Friedrich Olmes, Gerhardt Huntemann, Hermann Giskes, Wilhelm Kuebart, and Heinz Jost is enclosed herewith. (AOB, please be aware: that those men had only been given for a limited period of time for investigation in Camp 020; and should be returned to US G-2 in Germany) For the A.C. of S G-2.

Signed: W.E. Viney Cpt. G.S.C. For H.G. Sheen Colonel GSC G-2 CI KV 2/961-2, page 3

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 31 May 1945

Certificate

The Supreme Commander has ordered that the undermentioned persons, believed to be German nationality, be transferred from Continental Europe to the United Kingdom for interrogation, on completion of which they are to be returned in military custody to the Theater of Operations. Friedrich Olmes Gerhardt Huntemann Herman Josef Giskes Wilhelm Kuebart Heinz Jost. (AOB, Please bear in mind my latter comment down on the previous page)

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KV 2/961-2, page 4

For PF 601712/Giskes.H. Extract from monthly summary of current cases at Camps 020 & 020R. 1st June 1945 Hermann Giskes. Obstlt. Herman Giskes @ Dr. Gerhardts was captured in civilian clothing while hiding in the buildings at Wiehl which had been used as the training-school for agents of FAK 307. After a brief preliminary interrogation in the Field he arrived at Camp 020 on the 24th May, Giskes was put in touch with Ast Hamburg (Ast-X) in September 1938 by Major Feldmann. He began working for the Abwehr in January 1939 in Referat III c1 Ast Hamburg. He was in constant liaison with Feldmann of III F (counter espionage)whose main preoccupation at that time was breaking down British Secret Service organisations in Holland. Giskes has given certain details of this which are under investigation. At the outbreak of war he was forming and reorganising Abwehr III sections at Ast Münster, and investigating a French Intelligence Service in Copenhagen. In June 1940 he was transferred to Ast Paris III c2 until August 1941, being responsible for suspected spy cases in the greater Paris area and adjoining departments. In August 1941 Giskes was transferred to III F Ast-Niederlande where he had an extremely successful career in penetrating and breaking up Allied resistance organisations; in particular a large circuit of S.O.E. wireless transmitters was operated under his direction. In January 1944 whom the III FAKs and FATs were created out of the former III F Dienststellen Giskes formed and commanded FAK 307 with its headquarters at Brussels. FAK 307 and FATs under its control were, until the German collapse in the Ruhr, very active in training and despatching agents for a variety of missions many of which combined penetration with espionage targets. Preliminary investigation indicates that Giskes is providing a mass of useful and accurate information. He gives every appearance of being fully cooperative; it is apparent that he is a bitter enemy of the Gestapo and did all he could not only to save captured Allied agents from ill-treatment but also to try and have their live spared. KV 2/961-2, page 8 (AOB, Please be aware, that these files running backwards in time)

PF 601712/ W.R.C.4A. 26th May, 1945

Dear Mrs. Doble. On May 1st I wrote you asking for assistance in bringing to C.S.D.I.C. (Combiner Services Detailed Interrogation Centre) (UK) Obstlt Hermann Giskes who was in the hands of 12th Army Group, I have subsequently learnt that this man was in civilian clothes at the time of his capture and he has accordingly not been granted P/W status and has been transferred to Camp 020. (AOB, the real jurisdiction is quite different) I am very sorry to have troubled you unnecessarily in the matter, but unfortunately the original telegraphic report on which I wrote to you did not indicate his status. Yours sincerely, D.I. Wilson Senior Commander D.R. Doble, ATS, M.I.19(a)

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KV 2/961-2, page 30

War Room Outgoing telegram Typed 1730 hour 12.5.45 Dispatched 13.5.45/1145.13.5.45 WRX Channel C.S.S. (X-2) To: 12th Army Group From: War Room Reference 12th 385

Would welcome your advice whether Giskes would be likely to be more productive if treated as P/W at CSDIC (UK) or if sent to 020

(AOB, notice also KV 2/961-2, page 8)

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KV 2/961-2, page 31 + 32

P.A. in PF 601712 (Giskes) Name Giskes Original in PF 601832 Huntemann … Dated 16.5.45 Original from 1st US Army Extracted on 30.5.45 Initial contact with Abwehr:- Huntemann got in touch with Miss Adrienne Von Ehrenbach, a former colleague of his. Miss Ehrenbach knew Giskes at that time connected with Ast Paris. She convinced Giskes that Subject (Huntemann) was an extremely useful man, where upon the former notified the military authorities that Subject upon induction should be assigned to the Abwehr. On 6 Nov. 1941 Subject was inducted in the 3 Kompanie Landschützen Ersatz Battalion III. After a short basic training course Subject was transferred on 10 December 1941 to Scheveningen, Holland, where he reported to Giskes, who in the meantime had also been transferred to Holland from France. “Nordpol”. In early March 1942 Subject received a message from Major Giskes written in German, with the instruction to translate this into imperfect English ( as spoken by a foreigner). This message contained certain information about a “reception Committee”. Subject translated the message and a few days later received an English message from Giskes to be translated into German. This continued for some time, until Subject was briefed by Giskes about the true state of affairs. Willy Kup, Abwehr agent George Ridderhof, who had been in prison and had met a member of the Dutch underground, who had given him a message for the Dutch underground movement. The information was passed via Kup to Major Giskes. Giskes, however did not believe Ridderhof’s story that the Allied plane would drop sabotage equipment and agents in a certain area. Ridderhof was however instructed to penetrate this organisation. With the help of Beobachting (Beobachtung) – Observations Stelle of the Orpo (DFing and interception finder unit) they were able to arrest the W/T agent Hubertus Lauwers (Fahrenheitstraat The Hague) in the Hague and hand him over to the Gestapo IV E (AOB, Schreieder’s book is giving a better explanation. Schreieder was engaged at the Sipo or S.D and not a member of the Gestapo! But had his office at Binnenhof 4) Giskes managed to obtain permission to talk to Lauwers (AOB, Most likely, in cooperation with Schreierder. Schreieder and Giskes, cooperated mutually extremely well, which might have been the main reason for the quite long lasting success of the England Spiel, or Nordpol Spiel) and consequently was able to “turn” him (AOB, more likely was it that Schreieder who dealt with the Lauwers complex) After having given him the assurance that none of the agents coming from England would be executed for espionage. (AOB, again, Giskes was not in the position to arrange this. Again Schreieder, via his Chief, must have contacted the RSHA in Berlin. It came to a special guaranteed “pardon” stated in a letter om behalf of Himmler, in which was stated that all those concerned would not be prosecuted, but kept insulated at a section of the Haaren Seminary Convent. But after the escape of Dourlein and Ubbink, at the end of August 1943, Himmler decided that his guarantee was invalid since. And almost all were sent to the deadly Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Only: Beatrix Terwindt – Lauwers and Jordaan, were kept to Schreieder’s disposal; motivation: he might need them still. Albeit, that at least Lauwers and Jordaan ended up in Concentration Camp at Oranienburg/ Sachsenhausen) Consequently they were able gradually to control all the W/T sets and were in W/T communication with England for the best part of two years. One day the England proposed sending a plane to land in Holland and instructed the organisation to find a suitable landing point. S.D. decided to select a field but to mine it, so that the plane would blow up on landing. Giskes however refused this plan. (AOB, here we encounter the general split of responsibly. The actual military involved enemy aerial activities, was handled (controlled) by the military services; but catching the dropped agents, which was an extremely critical moment, as just at the first particular instance, they wanted to know about the security codes and other crucial information). For two years the Abwehr was able to supply the British with false information. For their service Giskes and Huntemann both received the Kriegsverdienskreuz mit Schwertern I Class.

In March 1944 a complete reorganisation of the Abwehr was effected. All embers of III F were incorporated in FAK 307 and FAT 365. Giskes, Hptm Wurr, Uffz. Kup, Uffz. Hamm and Subject (Huntemann) were incorporated into FAK 307 and transferred to Brussels. Huntemann applied for permission to find out what had happened to the 42 agents locked up in Haaren. He discovered from department IV E in Zeist that contrary to Giskes promise (AOB, it was actually Himmler’s!) Lauwers and Jordaan had been transferred to Oranienburg, He managed to visit Jordan and gave him a message from Giskes who wished to employ him for post war use. He was to contact Giskes at the Gasthaus Zum Stern in Elten, Rhineland and to ask for Dr. Gerhardt. Jordaan however refused to have anything more to do with Giskes, Huntemann was unable to find Lauwers.

In mid-October 1944. Huntemann received an order from Giskes to find a suitable location for an agent school to be started by FAK 307. The Gasthof Schoettler in Reblin, near Herscheid was selected. Giskes. Obstlt. Hermann alias Dr. Gerhardt (AOB, but that was Giskes’ alias!) Alias Dr. Gernoth alias Gluck. Worked in Abwehr II (sabotage) from Hamburg against Holland prior to the War. Worked in Paris as IIc until 1941. Then III F in Scheveningen, alter to The Hague and Driebergen. The C.O. of FAK 307 in March 1944. H.Q. in Brussels. In September to Roermond, Holland. In October 1944 to Dernsdorf near Bonn. Last location in Hueinghausen near Luedenscheid (Lüdenscheid).

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To be continued with KV 2/962-1

KV 2/962-1, page 7 - 16

Reports on the Investigation into the “Nordpol”Affair Based on the interrogations of Giskes and Huntemann.

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Nordpol Investigation. 1General Situation in Ast-Niederlande. In August 1941, Giskes was transferred from Alst-Paris to Ast-Niederlande, with the rank of Obstlt. Major, and appointment of Leiter Referat III F. On taking up his new appointment he found that the entire section needed reorganisation, as many of the officers were quite incapable and in addition, many of the NSB members (AOB, The NSB was the Dutch Nazi Party) members of the section (Zivilangestellten) of the section were using their positions merely to terrorise their own nationals; moreover, Giskes had to reckon with the hostile attitude of the Sipo and the SD towards the Abwehr. This hostility became more acute every year until, as we will see later, Giskes’ life was even in danger. As there was a German civil administration (AOB, headed by Reichskommissar: Seyß-Inquart) in Holland as opposed to a Wehrmacht administration in the other occupied countries, internal security was completely in the hands of the Hoehere SS und Polizeiführer, and, theoretically at least, the work of III F (counter-espionage) was confined entirely to military matters and was not executive. The Abwehr had no powers of arrest, and so in all cases where action was necessary it was taken by the Sipo. (Sicherheitspolizei) For purely disciplinary matters Giskes found that he was subordinated to the Leiter of Ast-Niederlande, but, as regards his own activities, he was responsible to a certain Obst. Rohleder (AOB, Rohleder succeeded Protze in 1938 as Leiter Abteilung III F in Berlin. While Giskes was still in Paris Rohleder had painted a gloomy picture of the unsatisfactory state of affairs of III F at The Hague (Den Haag), and had charged him with the task of reorganising the Referat. On arrival Giskes made sweeping changes and restaffed his section with men recommended to him for their capabilities, amongst these being a certain Huntemann. (AOB, I doubt this story, as several reference are pointing at a different sequence of circumstances) 2British activities in Holland in summer 1941. It was known through RDF (HF/DFing), operated at that time by the Funk-Abw., that two enemy transmitting stations were active and there were active and there were constant rumours about sea communications between Holland and the U.K. Prior to Giskes’ arrival, a seaplane had endeavoured to land off the Dutch coast and, in a brush with the German police, several of the latter were killed. It is thus evident that at this stage British espionage and resistance activities in Holland were on a small scale, at least as far as III F were aware. 3Arrest of W/T Operators. At the beginning of September 1941, as a result of RDF (DFing), a W/T operator was arrested in Bilthoven district and on him was found a series of messages, signed AC. The messages were of a purely intelligence nature. This matter was handled entirely by the SD, and III F were not told of the identity of the arrested agent, but Giskes thinks that he was a Dutch naval cadet, whose name may have been Ter Haak or Laak. A second operator, whose name Giskes believes was Van der Reyden, was arrested probably in January 1942. This man agreed to act as a double agent, but the attempt by the SD to play back proved abortive. This case also had handled exclusively by the Sipo, and the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo, who had replaced the Funk-Abwehr towards the end of 1941.

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4 Arrest of Ebenezer.

Amongst those handling counter0espionage and counter resistance agents in III F, was a certain Uffz. Kup, who had been employed by the Referat since the German occupation of Holland in 1940. Sometime in the late summer or early autumn 1941 a certain george Ridderhof @ Van Vliet, an agent of Kup, had been imprisoned in Amsterdam for the illicit dealings in gold and diamonds. Whilst serving his term of imprisonment Ridderhof made the acquaintance of a man, name unknown to Giskes or Huntemann, who was apparently a member of an indigenous resistance group. When Ridderhof was released he was asked by the unknown to make contact with his wife. Ridderhof reported this to Kup who in turn informed Giskes. The latter then gave instructions that Ridderhof was to attempt to penetrate this group by contacting the addresses. In due course reports came in from Ridderhof as follows:- a About the beginning of December 1941, Ridderhof reported that a man with a motor-boat intended to make an escape to the U.K. and that he required petrol for the journey. Ridderhof was given 25 litres of petrol from III F and the Sipo had the starting point watched. But nothing transpired and Ridderhof later reported that the man had departed from a point other then the one which had previously been decided upon. Enquiries were made at the man’s home address, near to the Abwehrstelle on the corner of the Parkweg and Hoogeweg 10?, and it was established that the man’s name was Maas and that he had been absent from home for some three months. b In January 1942 the broadcasting by London of the Wilhelminalied (AOB, Wilhelmus) was to be the signal that a motor boat would be arriving at Scheveningen to pick up certain members of the Dutch Resistance Movement (Verzet) to take them to the U.K. On the appointment day, plain-clothes police were on the beach and arrested Dutch patriots who were awaiting the motor-boat, which never failed to arrive. c Later in January 1942, Ridderhof reported that he was in touch with a certain Capt. Van den Berg, a Dutch Army reserve officer, living in the Hague, who was connected with a resistance organisation at Vierlingsbeek, near Nijmegen. Reports on this organisation were to the effect that arms and explosives were hidden in churches and monasteries in the neighbourhood. A sub-agent, Graan, was charged with the surveillance of this group.

Again, later, Ridderhof reported that the organisation expected an aeroplane to arrive from the U.K. to drop sabotage material, and gave the locality but not the exact position of the dropping ground. Upon hearing this, Giskes, who at this time was sceptical , said to Kup” Gehen Sie zum Nordpol mit solchen Geschichten”(It is for this reason that the code name Nordpol was given by III F to the cover the subsequent turning and playing back of S.O.E. agents.

Huntemann, who had recently been discharged from hospital, was accordingly sent to Assen to keep observation. Towards the end of February 1942, a British ‘plane was seen one night, during the full moon, circling in the vicinity, and later it was learnt

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4 Arrest of Ebenezer

In fact two containers had been dropped. On this occasion there was a genuine Dutch reception committee headed by Capt. Van den Berg, and a certain Sgt. Bierman. Only one container was found by the committee which was taken to a warehouse nearby; Van den berg then went to Ridderhof, living at the time in The Hague, and asked and asked him to arrange for the transport of the material to his (Ridderhof’s) flat for safe keeping; Ridderhof obliged. This incident, when reported to Giskes, convinced him that there was a W/T operator in direct touch with the U.K., especially as prior to this date the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo had intercepted, but not deciphered, signals in the The Hague area. Furthermore, Ridderhof had also given information, gleaned from Van den Berg, to the effect that two British agents had been dropped at the end of 1941 in the area of Assen. It was therefore decided by Giskes that intensive efforts would have to be made to locate and arrest the operator. Accordingly, the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo was given this task as a first priority, and the area in which the operator was finally narrowed down to the vicinity of Laan van Meerdervoort, The Hague. A raid was organised in the district and one Hubertus Matheus Gerardus Lauwers @ Ebenezer was arrested on the 6th March 1942. (AOB, I might be that Giskes party did the main job, but as already had been explained, it was Scheieder’s men (actually Haubrock) who did the job. Why? Because the Abwehr lacked the power to act on the level of police matters!) He had evidently become aware that the raid was in progress and after throwing the W/T set into the garden, left the house with Teller, the proprietor. Kup, who was taking part in the raid, had been furnished by Ridderhof with a personal description of Ebenezer, which had been obtained from Capt. Van den Berg, and apprehended him in the street. Both men were conducted to Teller’s house where the W/T set was found in the garden, and Giskes had a short interview with Ebenezer. The latter was then conveyed to the so-called Oranje Hotel, where Dutch patriots were imprisoned. At first he was confined in the S.D. section of the prison, but about a month afterwards, on Giskes representation, he was transferred to the Wehrmacht section where condition were better.

5 Implications of Ebenezer’s arrest. Interrogation of Ebenezer by Kriminalrat Schreieder, and to lesser extent by Giskes himself, convinced the latter that if British intentions were realised and numerous well equipped sabotage and resistance groups were created, an extremely dangerous military situation would arise, particularly if these measures if these measures succeeded simultaneously in all the Western occupied countries. For this reason, therefore Giskes, decided to concentrate the activities of this Referat on the hindering or preventing of any such plans.

6 Employment of Double Agents. An Abwehr Abteilung III directive from Berlin, circulated during the early part of of the war, laid down the objects to be achieved in playing back captured agents, as follows:- a) To maintain contact with Allied espionage agents and their H.Q.’s in order to ascertain missions, and enemy intentions. b) Deception (Procedure given …) c) To control any Allied organisation and thus prevent the growth of a sister organisation unknown to the Germans. d) To penetrate organised escape routes. (III F were not interested in individuals who escaped haphazardly as these matters were handled by the Sipo.

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7 The ‘turning’ of Ebenezer. Shortly after Ebenezer’s arrest, Kup asked permission to visit him in prison, and on return informed Giskes that Ebenezer was prepared to work for the Germans. Giskes maintained that no physical force was used to turn him. (AOB, of course, here being neglected Schreieder’s involvements. Why was Lauwers so cooperative? The reason was, that he trusted his security code would be then false (or invalid) and the British station was herewith informed that he was no longer at liberty; but they did not respond at all upon his warnings! The fatal consequences were - that > 50 agents sent to the continent were mostly instantly captured! Neglecting the impact on several resistance- and even Governmental groups. In other words a great disaster was initiated) Giskes also personally visited him in prison, and with Schreieder guaranteed his life as well as the lives of any subsequent Allied agents, who might fall into German hands through treachery. (AOB, please bear in mind, that this granted guarantee, was to be backed by the highest hierarchy in Germany. Apparently a letter did exist, in which Himmler, head of all police and SS organisations, did promise that those involved, would be saved from prosecution, albeit, that they were to be kept in solitary captivity. After Ubbink and Dourlein’s escape end of August 1943, Himmler revoked his promise) Ebenezer on accepting the proposal to work for the Germans, told both Giskes and Schreieder that he had been assured by a certain Colonel Blunt, before leaving the U.K. that in the event of arrest he was at liberty to accept any proposal put forward by the Germans to save his life; for, at the most, it would be discovered within three weeks if he were working under control. Ebenezer accordingly accepted the German proposal and, on the 18.3.42, sent his first message of German origin. This message requested further supplies and stated that the location of a previously agreed dropping point was too dangerous. (Ebenezer CXG 18.3.42. refers)(AOB, might this notice pointing at then existing British receptions?) Three further messages all dated 15.3.42 – CXG 14 containing information about a ship’s crew, money and a reference to Brandy, CXG 15 dealing with political and industrial information, and CXG 16 containing information about the position of the ‘Prinz Eugen’ (name of the German ship, which was also among the ships that broke through the Straight of Dover on 11/12 February 1942, also known as “Channel Dash”) - all of which had been previously composed by Ebenezer and found on him after arrest, were allowed to go forward by the Germans.

The information as to the locality of the Prinz Eugen was found on reference to Referat III M (Marine) to be false, but Giskes denies that prior to this date false information had been passed to Resistance Groups for onward transmission. He declares that as far as he can remember Ebenezer had received the information from his organiser, Thijs Taconis @ Catarrh, who in turn probably obtained it from Van den Berg as the latter was believed to have certain sources among the Port Authorities and dockyard workers in Rotterdam.

8 Distibution of Functions. Giskes was responsible for the general policy of the playing back Ebenezer and subsequent W/T operators captured , but the non-technical detailed conduct of the traffic, i.e. preparing drafts of messages, seeing London signal received answers, keeping traffic on the right lines, and when necessary the notional killing of operators etc., was the sole responsibility of Huntemann, who was struck of all other duties until the termination of traffic on 1st April 1944. (AOB, traffic did not really flew after February 1944, after Ubbink and Dourlein’s arriving in London. But as a “joke” on behalf of the Germans, a message was sent; quoting from Guy Liddell’s diaries: to Majors Bingham, Blunt and Co., “Thank you for your long mutual co-operation. In case you should come to the Continent, I shall receive you with the same, as your agents,” he noticed it in his diary, on 21 December 1944). The messages were drafted by Huntemann and then taken to the Fu-B-Stelle of the Orpo which was always in close proximity to III F. The B Stelle was solely responsible for the enciphering and deciphering of all signals and for the actual transmission. In this connection it is interesting to note that only 2 S.O.E. W/T operators ever actually transmitted, namely Ebenezer for about 3 months after capture, and Trumpet (see below). All traffic with these exceptions was conducted by trained operators of the B-Stelle.

The actual arrest and custody of the agents were entirely Sipo responsibilities, but of course both Giskes and Huntemann had access to them when necessary. (AOB, the great success of Nordpol and Englandspiel affairs were mainly contributed to the excellent cooperation between Giskes and Schreieder; maybe the most successful of all endeavours, on the German side)

An account of the procedure and the division of the responsibility during a Dropping is given in Annexure …

9 Arrest of Catarrh. About the 18th March 1942, Thijs Taconis @ Catarrh was arrested by the Sipo in Arnhem while trying to effect the rescue of a member of his group who had been taken prisoner by the Germans. Neither Giskes nor Huntemann know much about the circumstances of the arrest as the entire affairs was handled by the Sipo, but it appears that at the time of his arrest the Germans were unaware of his identity and it was only at a later date that they realised the importance of their capture. Giskes had an interview with him at the prison at Scheveningen (AOB, “Oranje Hotel”) the day after he had tried to escape, but Catarrh refused to give details about himself, and it was only at a later date, when he had been convinced that the whole organisation had been ‘blown’, that he could be induced to give details of his mission. As he was not a E/T operator he was not of much interest to Giskes and Huntemann, but Giskes expresses considerable respect for his standfast (Standfestigkeit) and soldierly behaviour.

10 Arrest of Watercress. On the 19th March 1942, S.O.E. signal CXG 21 to Ebenezer advised that an independent agent was to be expected from the 24th March 1942 onward, together with 3 containers with the result that Albert Arnold Baatsen @ Abor @ Watercress was received on the 27th March near Steenwijk by a Dutch reception committee working for the SD control. Among those taking part in the reception were the Dutch subjects Schlachter (Schlagter), Poos and Ridderhof; the latter was drunk and his behaviour was such that his attendance on future occasion of this nature was forbidden by the Germans. The “safe” arrival of Watercress was acknowledged in Ebenezer’s CXG* 24 of the 28th March 1942 to London. Watercress voluntarily offered his services to the Germans and was even prepared to undertake a mission abroad for the SD. He was used, however, by the Sipo for spying on his fellow prisoners at Haaren to which all captured agents were sent after a short stay at Scheveningen prison. * AOB, we may assume that this concerned British traffic designations.

11 Arrest of Lettuce, Trumpet and Turnip. Early in April 1942 III F was informed by the Feldgendarmerie that a dead parachutist had been found in a field N.W. of Holten; it appeared that he had hit his head on a stone water-through (Trog) on landing. From tracks in the neighbourhood of the body there were ground for the believing (Annahme) that other agents had landed at the same time. Early in May the Sipo, on information receiver from a certain Dr. Stemkel of the Incasso and Hypotheek Bank, Utrecht, arrested Goswigen Hendrik Gerard Ras @ Lettuce and Johan Jordaan @ Trumpet. The arrests were effected by the Sipo, and Giskes thinks that the informant acted unwittingly. About the same time the Sipo also arrested Leonardus Andringa @ Turnip on information supplied by a woman (name unknown) in Utrecht. The informant is thought by Giskes to have acted unwittingly.

Interrogation of the three agents produced the full story of the Dropping Operation on the 28th March and established the identity of the dead man, a W/T operator named John @ Swede. The latter’s signal plan was found on Turnip which enabled the Germans at a later date to operate a notional, locally recruited operator named Swede

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11 Arrest of Lettuce, Trumpet and Turnip (continued)

Moreover, under interrogation the three captured man gave the numbers of the Dutch S.O.E. agents who had completed their training and who could therefore be expected to be arriving in not the distance future. In addition, personal descriptions, aliases, an estimate of W/T operator. Saboteur, clandestine press, organiser etc. were obtained Thence-forward the German devoted a good part of the interrogation of the captured agents to the obtaining of his type of information, with the result that they generally knew whom to expect in the (near) future; the information obtained enabled them to impress captured agents captured agents during interrogation with their seeming omniscience.

It must be remembered that toward the end of April (1942), B-Stelle (Orpo) had been aware that clandestine were taking place, but they had been unable to decipher the messages.

The first controlled message on the Trumpet link was transmitted on the 5th May 1942 (CGX 14)(AOB, the latter, likely additionally implemented British details) proposing a new Dropping Point.

12 Leek and W/T Operator. On the 5th April 1942 Barend Kloos @ Leek was dropped with his W/T set was damaged and although these tow agents were not, like the others, apprehended immediately, they were never able to get in touch with the U.K. They were eventually arrested at a date unknown to Giskes and Huntemann. Huntemann recollects that after his arrest, London was asked for a replacement of the W/T set on other link, and this was furnished. The Hack transmitter was first operated on the 22nd August 1942 by the Germans, but Heck himself never operated.

13 Arrest of Potato. On the 19th April Johannes Henricus (Hendricus?) Marie De Haas @ Pyl (Pijl) @ Potato arrived in Holland by a sea-operation. On the 24th April Trumpet in CGX 7 reported to London that he was in touch with Patato, contact having been established through Turnip, but that he could not contact Ebenezer. At this date Trumpet had not been arrested although his signals had been intercepted by the B-Stelle. On Trumpet’s arrest, in early May, the Germans were able to decipher the Trumpet messages that they had intercepted, and it is probable, according to Giskes and Huntemann, that Potato’s arrest by the Sipo (AOB, Schreieder’s service) was due to information furnished by Trumpet. First Pptato message sent, CGX 14 on the 5th May 1942, refers to a dropping point.

14 Meeting of Carrot and Turnip. On the 15th May London. In CGX 17, advised Trumpet of a meeting place where he was to contact George @ Carrot who had arrived in Holland on the 27th February 1942. The name of the rendezvous was sent in a elaborately coded message, but was decoded by the B-Stelle and found to be in The Bodega, (AOB, a more genever or Port wine like drinking visitors) Leidschepoort (AOB, just adjacent to the Leidseplein Police office), Leidsche Plein, Amsterdam..

For some reason he was to contact George @ Carrot who had arrived in Holland on the 27th February 1942. The name of the rendezvous was sent in an elaborately coded message, but was decoded by the B-Stelle and found to be the Bodega, Leidsche Poort, Leidsche Plein, Amsterdam.

For some reason unknown to Giskes and Huntemann, the Sipo decided to send Turnip, not Trumpet, to the rendezvous and Turnip was able to warn Carrot that his two companions were members of the Sipo. (AOB, I highly doubt that humans are able to express signals versus particularly involved police branches; though some warnings due to human posture might have been expressed). Carrot thus succeeded in escaping through a lavatory (window), eventually arriving in the U.K. on 2nd September 1943. (AOB, most routes were passing, exhaustingly, through:- France, Spain and Portugal, before arriving in England)

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15The Situation in May 1942.

It had, at this period, become evident to Giskes from interrogations of captured agents that SO.E. was trying to build up a well organised sabotage organisation capable of operating throughout Holland. Groups were to be formed by the various organisers by recruitment among, N.C.O.s of Dutch Army, railwaymen and dockyard hands, for sabotage of railways, harbour installations, dockyards, locks and bridge; Regions and missions had been allotted as follows:- Catarrh: Provinces of N. and S. Holland and Gelderland. Watercress Special mission not divulged by S.D. (SD) to III F Lettuce Utrecht area Leek Overijssel area Potato Establishment of a sea communication between Holland and U.K. Suitable landing places were to be recommended in the area of Katwijk and later Egmond aan Zee.

Giskes gave consideration to the possibility of using the organisers, already arrested, for forming Germans controlled Resistance groups; this would have ensured that the best and most resistant elements in the population would be known and could, therefore, be arrested at any time when it was thought necessary, but he decided that such action was too great a risk to the security of his controlled W/T links.

16Beetroot and W/T operation. On the 1st of May London Ebenezer in Message No. 36 of the impending arrival of the two agents, and the 29th of May Herman Parlevliet @ Beetroot and his W/T operator Antonius Van Steen were both dropped to the customary S.D. reception near Steenwijk.

Giskes described these two men being excellent agents and it was only at much later stage that these divulged under interrogation, that they were Eureka instructors. (AOB, Eureka, was a successful British radio beacon, upon which an aircraft could point exactly at a dropping point); on addition they were to assistants to Watercress.

17Parsnip and Spinach.

On the 15th June London advised Trumpet (Message No. 28) of the impending arrival of two further agents and accordingly on the 22nd June (1942), Johan Jacob van Rietschoten (Parsnip) And his W/T operator Johannes Jan Buizer @ Spinach were dropped to a German reception near Holten. Interrogations showed that Parsnip had an independent mission (the Province of) North Holland (this Province covered Amsterdam up to Den Helder) whilst Spinach was to act as W/T operator, not only to Parsnip, but also to Potato (AOB, Johannes Henricus (Hendricus?) Marie De Haas @ Pyl (Pijl) @ Potato), who had notionally been using Ebenezer, as London apparently feared that too much traffic on the Ebenezer link might endanger the latter who, of course, had been arrested on the 6th March 1942.

Huntemann decided, from this that London regarded that Ebenezer as being the best operator.

The “safe” arrival of Parsnip and Spinach was notified to London on the 24th June in Trumpet 77.

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18 Marrow and W/T Operator. On the 15th June London, in No. 61 to Ebenezer, advised the field to stand by from the night of the 24th June onwards to receive two bodies with one result that, on the night of the 26th June, George Louis Janbroes @ Marrow and his W/T operator Joseph Bukkens (Bakkers) @ Smit @ Marrow (AOB, were duly arrested), near Wezep. Ebenezer acknowledged the “success” of the operation on the 27th June 1942, adding “Smit” staying with us some time”.

19The six main links.

Although during the Nordpol affair the German operated many Links, (at one time they were operating 15) the 6 main links over which fresh arrivals were advised were as follows:- Ebenezer, Marrow, Trumpet, Heck, Swede, Spinach, accounts of whose arrests have been given above.

An account of the Apollo and Brutus affair advised over Golf is given in Annexure ..

At a conference at which S.O.E. and M.I.5 were represented it was decided that it was unnecessary to give an account of arrest of the arrests of subsequent agents as they present little interest, the procedure being monotonously identical with that already described, i.e. London advising departure to the Germans with the result S.D. reception.

S.O.E. however put forward a written questionnaire and, at a subsequent conference, a verbal questionnaire to fix a basis for future interrogations, Annexure ..

20Reasons for closing the “Nordpol”.

At the end of August 1943, two of the captured S.O.E. agents, Pieter Dourlein @ Sprout, and Johan Bernard Ubbink @ Chive, escaped from Haaren and eventually reached the U.K. via Switzerland. (AOB, wasn’t it via Spain and Portugal!)

When in October 1943, London intimated that Holland could expect no further deliveries owing to commitments elsewhere, Giskes was certain that these two men had either reached the U.K. or had some conveyed to London the information that the entire S.O.E. organisation in Holland was German-controlled. During the next two months from London was of a non-committal character and Giskes concluded that the “Nordpol” possibilities were at an end. Confirmation that S.O.E. was aware of what had happened came through the arrest, at the beginning of 1944, of the Heintje Group, which took place in Amsterdam through R.D.F. (HF/DFing) of one of the W/T operators. (It is interesting to note that at this period relations between S.D. and Abwehr were so strained that III F were only informed of this group after its arrest, and the subsequent attempt to play it back was entirely handled by the S.D.) . (AOB, Schreieder was still rather involved in the penetration of the Dutch various Resistance Groups, actually up to the final end)

The Heintje Group had been sent by the Dutch S.I.S. in London and had been briefed for an espionage by Major Somer. According to Giskes and Huntemann, this group had received, towards the end of November 1943, a W/T signal from London that the sister organisation, the S.O.E. Resistance Movement, was completely under German control and further, that two agents who had been in Haaren had reached London. This information of course, became only available in early 1944 when the group was arrested and the intercepted traffic could be deciphered. Giskes intended to close the “Nordpol” affair immediately, with a message to London, giving the news that all those agents who had been notionally killed were in reality still alive. However, Abt. III F refused permission for this and sent orders that the closing message must be breath a spirit of confidence in the final victory of German arms, and in the certitude of repelling any Allied invasion in Holland. Accordingly, the closing signal to this effect was transmitted to London, not inappropriately, on the 1st April. Thus the “Nordpol” affair which had lasted a little over two years. (AOB, a certain: contradiction in terms! We know that Giskes escaped from SS fear in late 1943, and headed since FAT 307 instead. Thus he was not involved directly any more. Secondly: on 12 February, Admiral Canaris was dismissed and the Abwehr was forest increasingly to merge with RSHA Amt IV the SS controlled Intelligence Service, headed by Schellenberg)

KV 2/962-1, page 17 - 18

Deception and Policy of XX agents German Policy and Procedure. The passing of ‘Spielmaterial’ to the enemy intelligence services was a regular part of the functions of the Abwehr, All Dienststellen carrying out this work kept on hand a regular stock of such material in order to be able to comply, within a reasonable time, with any request for information that might be made by W/T by the Allies.

For definite deception purposes, prepared material was distributed by higher authority i.e. C-in-C West, Ic Army Groups, OKW Seekriegsleitung) (SKL) to the III F. Referats concerned, for passing on to the Allies where possible through several independent channels.

Each time contact was made with the Allies, no matter in what manner, Abw. Abt. III had to be informed and authority obtained for maintaining this contact. All enemy requests for information had to be reported immediately to Abt. III together with suggested replies. Material for drafting replies was collected by III F with the help of other branches of the Ast (Ast-Niederlande) and had then to be submitted for approval to the relevant military authority, e.g. Luftgaukommando Holland. When this approval had been obtained, the suggested answer was telephoned to Abteilung III D in Berlin for approval. If, however, time pressed (Zeitdruck), the information was often supplied and III D’s authority obtained afterwards. All material regarding economic or political conditions in Germany, or the sphere of activity of another Ast, was supplied by III D.

When information on any specific target was required, a member of III F had to assume the role of an agent in order that only such information should be sent as could normally be procured by a real agent.

Deception. The intelligence branches of the highest military authorities in the occupied countries could give information to the relevant Ast for passing to the Allies, but in such cases the onus of informing III D lay with the organiser, e.g. the intelligence branch of the service concerned.

Referat III D. This was a small section in the OKW at Berlin (Tirpitzufer) consisting of the Leiter, Obst. Schaffer (Schäffer?), one technical assistant and a female secretary. With the gradual eclipse of the Abwehr this section lost its importance and its role in the RSHA was only a small one. (AOB, but we must regard that this commenced after 12 February 1944, after the couple Vermehren defected in Istanbul (Istambul) to the British)

From 1943/44 onwards ‘Spielmaterial’ was distributed entirely by the Ic branch of the higher Wehrmacht H.Q. e.g. C-in-C West, Army Group B. etc.

There was apparently however no very fixed policy after the eclipse of the III D with regard to ‘Spielmaterial’ and some very curious incidents occurred; for example in January/February 1944 Giskes heard (AOB, because he no longer was engaged at III F, but headed FAT 307 instead)that films seized in Brussels were forwarded through G.I.S. (German Secret Service) channels by mistake immediately after they had been developed.

One Source of ‘Spielmaterial’. In this connection Giskes states that genuine seized espionage material was always a good source of ‘Speilmaterial’. The Dutch and Belgian I.S. were in habit of forwarding in triplicate by three different means, and it was established that copies of seized material had always been sent through other channels it was then forwarded in order to inspire confidence in the German-controlled channel.

Nordpol ‘Spielmaterial’.

During the Nordpol (Englandspiel) affair, Giskes states, that at various dates which he cannot remember, information was passed about the position of German warships, coastal batteries on the island of Beveland, the positions of H.Q. of Divisions alleged to be in Holland; in addition reports on the Dutch armament industries were also sent.

These reports were, of course, additional to the normal current traffic which had been sent over the 3.0 E? links. For such routine traffic Giskes gave Huntemann a free hand (Freiehand) and, unless it was necessary to forward answers to questions on specific military targets or troop movements etc. no other authority was required; but as has been stated above this latter type of message had to be referred to the relevant authority and III D for their approval.

Copies of all signals sent or received had to be sent monthly to Ausland/Abwehr Abteilung. III.

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↓ KV 2/962-1, page 19

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Statement by Huntemann.

“Preparations for any description of a Dropping Operation.

During moon periods in the morning and afternoon London broadcast warning signals as to whether a operation was to take place. The times were given by certain figures, Three different messages, of fifteen figures each, indicated the dropping of agents, the dropping of stores, or scrubbing.

If in the morning a signal was given announcing the dropping of stores or agents, the actual confirmation came through late in the afternoon. If, however, the morning signal was negative, no further signal was sent and the operation was scrubbed.

As soon as a positive warning order came through in the morning it was duty of Hptm. Wurr to warn the relevant branches of the impending operation, namely the Ast (- Niederlande) itself (III F (counter espionage) was always located at some distance (vicinity) from the other sections of the Ast, S.D. The Hague, the Orpo, and, at a later period, any army units in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground.

In the beginning when it was only a question of one operation during a signal night, the necessary action was taken by III F and S.D. alone and the following procedure was adopted. The four lights were held by members of the III F (the senior officer present holding the white light at the apex of the triangle) whilst the S.D. waited at a certain distance from the dropping ground and only intervened if complications arose. As soon as agents left the plane, member of the III F who were holding the lamps withdrew, and S.D. using Dutchmen in its service, occupied the dropping ground and arrested the agents. It was an unwritten law that whoever was in charge of the light arrangements, was also in charge of the operation, and for this reason it never happened that the S.D. ever got hold of a lamp even to help out temporarily.

When dropping operations increased and, when often 4 – 6 took place during a single night, the problem of occupying all the dropping grounds became a difficult one, since there were only 5-6 officers on the strength of III F, who were often not all available. Recourse was then made to other to other officers employed in the Ast who were then used for this purpose. As also there were not enough of these, at a later date, members of the B-Stelle Orpo were used, who often came to the scene in all available strength. It was so arranged that on only one occasion was the S.D. in charge of the operation.

When in the morning an operation was signalled, Hptm. Wurr warned the Ast so that they could make available the necessary number of officers and also the S.D. so that they could do the same.

The passing of this information to the interested branches was done by telephone in a disguised form. The dropping grounds which had already been selected by Wurr were given cover names such as “Koorgragen”, “Brandheide”, “Wochenendhaus”, etc. These cover names, together with a detailed description of the dropping ground and route of approach, were notified in writing of the branches concerned.

The word “Damen” was used to indicate agents. Thus a telephone warning to the S.D. (AOB, Schreieder’s office) of an impending operation would be something like this: →

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“Preparation for and description of a dropping operation (contd.)

“We would like to invite you this evening to a little party at Wochenendhaus. We shall have some guests and be delighted if you could come. A couple of “Damen” are also coming. Bring a couple of partners for them or they may be bored”. The B-Stelle Orpo was not warned by telephone, but orally as they were always close to where III F was located. They of course knew that an operation was planned before III F, as it was they who operated the W/T sets, but consultations had to take place with them over the availability of their men.

As the lack of personnel became more and more acute (the same men could not be out three nights running, especially as their normal daily duties remained to be carried out which would have meant that they got no sleep) Hptm. Wurr, on choosing a new landing ground approached units in the neighbourhood and asked for the loan of ½ officers for the night when an operation was planned. This request was always gladly granted and we got the greatest support from these units in Steenwijk, Wezep etc. and before returning in the morning were well looked after. For these army officers a parachute operation was a new and unheard of thing and a very pleasant break in dull daily routine. But for another reason also, units in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground had to be warned, namely on account of the experience gained from France and Belgium when receptions not under Abwehr control took place (AOB, thus on behalf of Schreieder’s S.D.), it had been ordered that all the units were send out strong bicycle patrols at night especially in lonely heath (Heide) country to look for suspicious light and people wandering about, and to search for reception committees and if necessary shoot immediately. After such a patrol had almost attacked a reception committee under Major Kiesewetter at Rolde near Assen (AOB, the Drente province capital), it was decided that in future, all units near a dropping ground must be warned of the operation, although such a measure was obviously undesirable on security grounds.

At first, night-fighter units, i.e. XII Fliegerkorps, were warned of impending dropping operations in order to obviate the possibility of any aeroplane destinated for us being shot down. Later this fighter “protection” was dropped, as it would have become noticeable, if these ‘planes were never attacked. Later they would again reported to the night fighters, but no longer protected and were treated in the same way as other ‘planes. In one instance a ‘plane was shot down immediately over the dropping ground by a night-fighter, so that the reception committee only just managed to get to a safety in time, and on one occasion a ‘plane crashed on its right wing whilst coming in to drop. Evidently it was too slow and low. Two of the pilots were saved from burning ‘plane by Hptm. Wurr and his men, and brought to the Luftwaffe hospital in Amsterdam. A W/T operator (Funker) was also employed on the dropping ground after representations had been made by the Luftwaffe, and he kept in contact with the night-fighter organisation, signalling as soon as the ‘plane had dropped its load and was making off, the idea being that the ‘plane had dropped its load and he was making off, the idea being that the ‘plane should then be chased by night-fighters which were then taking off. However, this produced no results and this arrangement was dropped. III F, in any case was against it, as we feared that W/T signalling in the immediate neighbourhood of the dropping ground might be endanger matters.

After all sections concerned had been advised by Hptm. Wurr to the effect that one or several droppings were to be expected for the following night, the places notified within III F. O.C. on the dropping point was a member of III F section, even if, in addition, a higher ranking officer was ordered from Ast-Hilversum to act as his assistant. Only if nobody on the spot was taken over by an officer from Hilversum.

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KV 2/962-1, page 21

“Preparations for and Description of a Dropping Operation (cont.).

If toward the late afternoon it was established through a repletion by London (AOB, on a BBC broadcast) of the definite signals, that a parachutage would take place during the course of the evening, Hptm. Wurr again notified the sections concerned, and after this there was nothing more to do. In the written description of the dropping point, which the Stellen concerned received from us, the approach route, its duration, time of the rendezvous, camouflage parking place, were accurately stated. When the parachutages took place at dropping points north of Amersfoort this was nearly always the place – the RV for III F Driebergen, Ast-Hilversum, SD.-The Hague was nearly always the Hoevelaken crossroads, about 5 km behind Amersfoort. Generally speaking, the Orpo-Stelle travelled in III F transport, as both sections lay close to one another.

On arrival in the vicinity of the dropping ground, which had to be approached without lightsm the transport was parked and camouflaged with parachutes, at pre-determined points underneath trees. The SD personnel generally selected a position for themselves in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground, and the members of III F took up their positions on the ground, according to the direction of the wind. If the ‘plane was to be expected after midnight everybody had to be ready in their position by 2330 hours, after lamps had been given a brief test.

Light had been extinguished immediately after the drop had occurred in order to make observation difficult for the ‘plane in case it made a second flight over the ground. At the beginning of the Nordpol affair it was up to the Abwehr to attend to caring away of the material, whilst the SD were responsible for the collection of the agents. However, the SD attempted systematically, and with success, to take the matter out of Abwehr hands. Whilst at first all the material was put at Abwehr disposal, later it was reduced to half, again later this was whittled down to half the weapons, and ultimately this was reduced to what the SD considered it good for the Abwehr to have. About the end of 1942 the SD took over the carting away of the containers, and from then onwards the Abwehr had to be satisfied with what the SD permitted them to have. The Orpo-B-Stelle in Driebergen wanted to participate in the distribution of the weapons and they were catered for by the SD in this respect.

The return journey from the dropping ground had to take place at the earliest possible moment and the transport had to disappear before the farm workers went out to the fields.

The arresting of the agents generally occurred after a short greeting at the exact moment when they were endeavouring to release themselves from their parachute harness. Later the SD decided to conduct the agent to specially reserved houses in the vicinity of the landing ground where they arranged a large reception party celebration with the supposed chiefs of the organisation. During the course of these celebrations the agents generally became fairly loquacious and were interrogated by Dutchmen who were in the employ of the SD service. When the agents eventually became tired and turned in for the night they were arrested, This new procedure may have been motivated by the reaction on the part of the agent Arie who maintained after his arrest, that the reception committee was supposed to send a W/T message to London, composed in the terms which follow, at the earliest opportunity, to indicate that he had arrived safely – “Elvira arrived at station 57 minutes late”.

This message was not despatched, because I had the instinctive feeling that there was something not quite in order with it. I therefore created the story that Arie’s brainstorm which notionally led to his ultimate death. Later it transpired that the message with “Elvira” really was a warning and there was something about it not order. I assume that Schreieder introduced the variation in arresting the agents on account of this incident. In other words, they were only arrested after they had told everything to the supposedly genuine reception committee.” KV 2/962-1, page 24 - 30

Christina Lindemans. NB. An account of Lindemans’ activities in not strictly relative to the Nordpol affair, but has been included for convenience.

Giskes first meeting with Lindemans.

In February 1944, whilst Giskes was in Brussels in connection with the formation of FAK 307 (Frontabwehrkommando), he learned from Kup that Nelis (London Camp 020 case) had made the acquaintance of a man who previously worked for the Belgian Intelligence Service and who was now prepared to change sides in exchange for the release of his brother imprisoned by the Germans in Rotterdam. Giskes instructed Kup to go further into this matter, and as result Giskes decided to see this man (Christian Lindemans) himself.

The first meeting took place in a house near Jardions Botaniques, Brussels, which was the billet of some of the Abwehr Hilfsoffiziere of III F, Brussels. Those present at the meeting were Giskes, using the name of Dr. German, his Adjutant Hptm. Wurr (Walter), Kup (Willy) and Nelis who brought Lindemans to the house, The meeting lasted about two hours, during which time Lindemans gave an account of his past activities with the Belgium and French Resistance and escape organisations. In addition he produced for inspection various papers and documents including Grenzübertrittscheine (AOB, border-crossing allowances) for Holland, Germany and France, made out in a false name which Giskes no longer remembers. Lindemans also showed a large quantity of blank documents which he used in his role as passeur, and various German Dienststellen stamps. Lindemans explained that in that in the autumn of 1943 he had enlisted the aid of this brother Hendrick Lindemans for his escape routes. The latter, however, had been caught by the Sipo and was now in Rotterdam prison awaiting death. Christian Lindemans thereupon told Giskes that if his brother Hendrick (Hendrik?) were to be released he would give the Germans whole-hearted cooperation.

At the conclusion of the meeting Giskes told Kup to verify the facts about Hendrick Lindemans and, at a further meeting which took place in the same house about 8 days later, Giskes was able to tell Christian Lindemans that Hendrick would be released in return for his services. Accordingly Hendrick was released very shortly afterwards and Christian Lindemans started work for the G.I.S.

During the period February to August 1944 while Lindemans was working for FAK 307, Giskes had occasion to see him only about five times. Lindemans was handled exclusively by Kup, Giskes merely giving the general direction to the latter and leaving to Lindemans and Kup the ways and means of fulfilling the orders.

The Main Task given to Lindemans.

1 To give to Hptm. Wurr the names and details of all Resistance and espionage movements with which he had come into contact, in France, Holland and Belgium. Giskes states that the mass of material supplied was so great that it took Wurr two or three weeks to sort it out. 2 To go to Holland and make contact with his Dutch Resistance friends and ascertain their future activities. It is possible that the organisation CS VI (AOB, the meaning was actually an address: Corelli straat number 6, in Amsterdam) was penetrated by Lindemans.

3 To make contact with the Belgium Resistance movement and to find out details about the missions that they were receiving from London.

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Christian Lindemans (contd).

Shooting of Lindemans.

About the end of April 1944, Lindemans happened to be in the Devisenschutzkommando office in Rotterdam apparently aroused the suspicion of a girl employee who called the police. On their arrival, Lindemans was asked to produce his papers and as he put his hand into his pocket he was shot by the police who thought that he was about to produce a revolver.

Lindemans was taken to hospital and on arrival there, the police were dismayed to find the document showing him to be an employee of the Abwehr, The matter was reported through the Sipo channels to Giskes who instructed Kup to get Lindemans out of hospital without letting the Dutch hospital staff know that it was the Germans who were engineering his removal. Kup did this in such a way that the Dutch believed Lindemans to be a member of the Resistance movement who was being freed by his friends. Giskes then decided that it was impossible for Lindemans to continue working in Holland as his Resistance friends would think it very suspicious if once having been in the hands of the police were still able to move about freely without danger of arrest. Giskes therefore decided that Lindemans must now work only in Belgium. (AOB, we should also consider Huntemann, Schreieder and other sources, such as Lindeman’s file)

Resistance in Belgium.

Lindemans had good Resistance contacts in Antwerp and Malines and he frequently reported on the activities of these groups to Giskes who, however, decided to take no action, as he wished to build up and maintain Lindemans’ contacts so that at proper moment Lindemans would have received the full confidence of the Resistance and so be able to give really important strategic information, such as the date of the Allied invasion. Giskes had received from Leitstelle-III-Wet, and Ic Militärbefehlshaber Belgium, a directive to find out the intentions of the Armée Blanche and the instructions that they were receiving from London in connection with the Allied invasion. Giskes’ policy was apparently justified as, about the 25th August, Lindemans reported that the main Allied thrust would be directed against the Lille and Charleroi district were to come into the open (offen). Lindeman further declared about the end of August that the Allies would be in Brussels about the morning of 4th September. It is interesting to note that German estimates of resistance strength in Belgium varied between 15,000 and 50,000 and the German general Staff were never able to evaluate the potential danger of Resistance.

Giskes’ last meeting with Lindemans.

Giskes last saw Lindemans on the 2nd September 1944, at his office in Brussels, and gave him a mission to stay behind in Belgium and try to penetrate the British I.S. with thhe idea of finding out their plans for the placing of Allied agents behind the German lines in Holland. The same day, Giskes went to Leitstelle-III-West, which was at that time in Liege (Lüttich, Luik), returning to Brussels on 3rd September. That evening he went to Antwerp taking Kup with him, who had apparently made rendezvous with Lindemans, at a Custom house (Zollgebäude) on the Belgo-Dutch frontier. Lindemans failed to keep the rendezvous. Giskes believed that after their last meeting in Brussels Lindemans may have decided to go to Antwerp.

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Christian Lindemans (contd).

Lindemans’ return to Holland.

Later, on 20th September, Giskes received a telephone call from FAT 365 in Driebergen, which was then under FAK 306, saying that Lindemans was in Holland.

Before departure, Giskes had told Lindemans that if he managed to get back through the lines, on contacting German troops he was to ask for FAT 365.

About ¾ weeks later Giskes received a written report from FAT 365 in which appeared that Lindemans had crossed the lines near Eindhoven on the 15th September, having been given by the Allies the mission to contact Resistance in Eindhoven and give them orders that the Allies would be occupying the town in the near future and that no action from them would be required. Lindemans had been taken to Fallschirm A.O.K. (Armeeoberkommando) Ic, and gave the following information:-

1) That a British attack in the direction of Eindhoven was imminent. So far as Giskes can remember the date and time were 17th September, morning.

2) That for this attack large forces of airborne troops were standing by. The exact place where these troops were to be employed was not given. After contacting the A.O.K. Ic, Lindemans went to Driebergen and FAT 365 and thence back to Eindhoven and through the lines. The report further stated that during his stay in Brussels Lindemans had made Allied contacts at the Hotel Metropole. He mentioned two British Intelligence officers whose names, Giskes cannot remember. Lindemans reported also that the 21st Army Group H.Q. was in Antwerp, and gave other unimportant details, such as an account of living conditions in Belgium.

Lindemans’ Finances.

Giskes states that Lindemans always seemed to have plenty of money. From Kup he received in all about 100,000 Belgium francs and about 1,000 Dutch guilders. Lindemans apparently always had large sums of money on him, which Giskes believes he got from the various Resistance groups. It was never clear to Giskes why Lindemans continued to work for the Germans.

Written statement by Giskes on Lindemans.

Giskes has submitted the following statement on Lindemans:- “A report by FAT 365 in Driebergen reached me towards the end of October 1944, and I remember the following about the information given by Lindemans:

Lindemans had reported to Fallschirm A.O.K. Ic on the 15th September 1944 that: 1) The English attack in the direction of Eindhoven was imminent (as far as I can remember Lindemans gave the time and date as being early on 17th September).

2) For the attack which was imminent, large forces of airborne troops were standing by. (The place or sector where these troops were to be committed was not given).

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Christian Lindemans (contd).

“Lindemans on the same day had also given to FAT 365 a quantity of other information of a military nature, but it was of little importance.

The source of the information in paras 1) and 2) above was not shown in the report from FAT 365. I do not know if Fallschirm A.O.K. Abteilung Ic had questioned Lindemans on this.”

Information from Huntemann on Lindemans.

The following information on Lindemans was supplied by Huntemann:

Lindemans was handled exclusively by Kup and Huntemann only saw him on two occasions; first while driving from Brussels to Lille on 30th/31st August 1944, in his company. On this occasion, it was agreed between them that if they were stopped by German troops, Huntemann should answer and if by the Resistance, Lindemans, as he knew the password (namely “Vive la Belgique, vive la Belgique Liberée”). Huntemann does not know what Lindemans was doing in Lille.

The second occasion when Huntemann saw Lindemans was on 15th September 1944, in the office of FAT 365 (at Beukenhorst?) in Driebergen. Whilst Huntemann was in the office of Kiesewetter, the latter received a telephone call from Hilversum saying that Lindemans (CC) (King Kong?)had returned there. Kiesewetter then requested that Lindemans should be sent immediately to Driebergen. Huntemann had to go away but on returning at 2100 hrs, he found Kiesewetter and the remainder of the Abwehr personnel busy writing a report on the information supplied by Lindeman.

It appeared, according to Huntemann, that Lindeman had received a mission from an officer in the Hotel Metropole at Brussels to go and contact four leading personalities of the Dutch Resistance organisation in Eindhoven and to deliver to them orders to the effect that their organisations was to cease activities as the Allies would be in Eindhoven within a few days. Huntemann is not sure whether it was on this occasion or later that Kiesewetter told him that Lindemans had reported an eminent airborne attack in the Münster/Dülmen area.

It is pointed out that such difficulty has been encountered in the attempting to reconstruct, under interrogation, the actual contents of Lindemans’ reports concerning the imminent airborne attack in Holland. In the first place, Giskes was not at Driebergen on the 15th September 1944, and secondly, Huntemann’s memory is confused concerning the events. It has been thought advisable, therefore, to conclude, for what it is worth, Huntemann’s own statement on the subject:

“I know from statements from Giskes that one day, probably at the end of 1943m or beginning of 1944m that the V-Mann Nelis, who was being run by Uffz. Kup, stated that he was in contact with a very important English agent who said he was prepared to place his extensive knowledge at the disposal of the German Abwehr and to cooperate with them in an active manner, provided that his brother, who was being held by the SD in Scheveningen prison, would be released.

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Christian Lindemans (contd).

Information from Huntemann on Lindemans (contd).

“I assume that thereafter a few conversations took place between this English agent, known as “CC” and Kup, and perhaps also on one occasion with Giskes. At any rate, Giskes arranged for the release by the SD (Schreieder) of “CC’s” brother, who, as far as I know, had been imprisoned on account of some non-political matter. “CC” (King Kong?) thereupon entered into the service of the FAK 307 (AOB, Leiter was Giskes) and was run by Uffz. Kup. The matter was “Chef-Sache”, i.e. nobody, apart from those participating in the case, was to receive any information. Hptm. Wurr must, however, have a closer knowledge of the affairs as the files in connection with a great deal of interest.

Very great success were evidently achieved through “CC”, was often told that the Nordpol affair had been quite harmless in comparison to the information which “CC” was supplying. Sometime in February 1945 at Wiehl, Giskes gave me, when we were having a private conversation, the number of more important people who had been arrested through “CCs” cooperation. I believe that the figure mentioned was 311 or thereabout.

Amongst other things, during a raid, “CC” was shot at by the SD (Giskes was suspicious at the time that the SD had done this purposely to put us at a disadvantage). He was in hospital, in pain I believe and was set freely by a genuine Dutch resistance organisation and brought to Brussels. The whole story of his release, however, had been conducted by Uffz. Kup. The first attempt failed as “CC” had just been taken into the X-ray room, but the second attempt succeeded a few days later. (AOB, please notice the this story jumps backwards in time)

I personally saw “CC” on two occasions. On the first occasion, I drove him from Brussels to Lille in a camouflaged car of FAK 307. This was on the 30th or 31st August 1944. (AOB, This story has already been dealt with before, besides the camouflaged car) “” CC”was picked up but not introduced to mem at a house in the vicinity of Avenue Louise, by Kup, who accompanied us on the journey. I knew, however, from what Giskes had said that “CC” would travel with me. I drove at the time to Lille to be present at the expected parachutage in connection with the case “Falken-Kapelle” and “CC” had a mission which was not disclosed to me. The matter was urgent and he needed the car for a whole day in Lille as as he has to get back to Brussels the same evening. He put me down at Grand Place de Lille, at about 11 o’clock in the afternoon. At the same time, a certain amount of danger was involved of driving a lone car on the Brussels-Lille road. Many triangular shaped nails (kraaiepoten) lay on the road for the purpose sabotaging the tyres, and many surprised attacks were taking place by terrorists who also appeared on the scene wearing German uniforms. It was therefore agreed between “CC” and myself that in the event of the car being halted by the German Wehrmacht, I was to do the talking, but if the car on the other hand was stopped by civilians or terrorists, he was to take charge of the conversation. He had the necessary papares to produce for such an event, and knew the password “Vive la Belgique la Belgique liberée”. However, we were not stopped an route.

(AOB, omitted, because this had been dealt with before about Driebergen and Huntemann)

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Christian Lindemans (contd).

“the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber, to Major Kiesewetter, asking whether he knew a certain Herr German. Kiesewetter denied knowledge of this name. As I knew that German was a seldom used cover name of Giskes, I interrupted Kiesewetter (AOB, Uffz. Huntemann interrupting Major Kiesewetter, was delicate) and explained this to him. Thereupon, Kiesewetter affirmed on the telephone that he knew a Herr German, and Hilversum (Nest or Abwehrnebenstelle) immediately replied that a certain “CC” had reported there and desired to speak to Herr German concerning an urgent matter. Kiesewetter than requested that “CC” should be sent immediately to Driebergen by car.

I had an appointment in Zeist (only a few km distance) with Kriminalrat Schreieder and only got back to Driebergen at about 21.00 hrs. I found Kiesewetter and the remainder of his Abwehr personnel of the Trupp busy compiling a report concerning the information brought by “CC”. If I am not mistaken, Kiesewetter had meantime been to Hilversum and had also only just returned. From what Kiesewetter and the remainder of those present related to me, and from what I remember in connection with the drawing up of the report = which I do not completely read through – I know that “CC” had brought very important information. “CC” had succeeded in getting in touch with the enemy intelligence service and, in fact, after the occupation of Brussels, had immediately gone to the Hotel Metropole where an important Staff had set up its H.Q. (AOB, wasn’t it also where the Dutch Prince Bernhard had its quarters?) There he enquired for an Intelligence Service officer, but there was none there at the time, and after a long period of waiting, a Captain arrived, who had set himself up in a room on the 4th floor. Moreover, in a room on the 4th floor, a W/T station had also been installed.

From this officer, “CC” was given orders for four leading personalities of the Dutch Resistance Organisation, all of whom were employed with Philips in Eindhoven, and was instructed to deliver the orders personally to them. The order was to the effect that their organisation was to cease activities as in any case the Allied forces would be there in a few days’ time, En route for Hilversum, “CC” had already handed over these orders in Eindhoven, at which point he had crossed the lines.

After having now considered the matter at some length, I am not altogether clear as to whether Kiesewetter told me at the time that “CC” had reported on the eminent airborne landing in the area of Münster/Dülmen. It may be perhaps that Kriminalrat Schreieder, who always knew about many rumours and new events, and with whom I had just had a lengthy conversation, had told me about this. Certainly, nothing was talked about in my presence that evening and the following day concerning as imminent airborne landing in the Arnhem area. I am quite certain about that. Only much later, about February 1945, Giskes told me on an occasion in Wiehl during a private conversation that “CC” had been a perfectly amazing V- Mann, as he had reported about the entire Arnhem undertaking beforehand.(im voraus). The fact that at the time that I did not learn from Kiesewetter about the Arnhem (Arnheim) action does not necessarily mean that there was any mistrust of me; I had his complete confidence. In the confusion of that particular evening – at periods he was not there, and at times I was also absent – all those present were conversing confusedly about “CC’s” reports – he may perhaps have taken it for granted that I also knew already at the time about the report. I must practically assume this now, since he came to me from time to time and said that the reports which “CC” (= Lindemans) had brought were quite amazing. I took this, however, to refer to the fact that “CC” had managed to play the double game with the enemy intelligence service.

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Christian Lindemans (contd).

“Next morning I did not see Kiesewetter as he was in Hilversum, More over, I only saw “CC” again the morning after Kiesewetter’s return, and I do not exclude the possibility that “CC” was together with Kiesewetter in Hilversum, but this is only an assumption of my part. Immediately after a real “CC” drove with a car belonging to FAT 365 to the vicinity of Eindhoven from which point he again intended to cross the lines. He had the intention to return about a week later. From that date onwards, FAK 307 has neither seen nor heard anymore about him.

Much later, Giskes told me – I think it was February 1945 in Wiehl – that he feared that Nelis had betrayed “CC”, as Nelis and “CC” had become enemies, and Nelis knew precisely the role which “CC” had played. And, the idiots at FAT 365 (in Driebergen) had sent. Of all people, this man Nelis, through the lines to Belgium, from whence of course, he did not return.” (AOB, by then Lindemans (“CC”) was already for a long time in British custody) Hendrik Lindemans. Giskes believes that this man, after release from prison, went as a voluntary worker to Germany where he had relations.

Jan Lindemans. Giskes believes that he was connected with the Resistance Movement. Christian Lindemans stayed with Jan when in Holland, and Kup could contact him at Jan’s address. Giskes is emphatic that Jan did not work for the Abwehr and that he never received money from it. Jan probably knew that Christian was working for the Germans but did not know the nature of the work. Giskes believes Jan to have been a patriotic Dutchman. KV 2/962-1, page 31 – 32

Translation of a joint statement by Giskes and Huntemann.

Apollo and Brutus.

In the autumn of 1943 (September) (AOB, the long before Ubbink and Dourlein reached England and S.O.E had been warned of the disasters), London enquired, over the station “Golf”, whether we were in a position to slip through from Belgium to Holland two agents who had a special mission. For the purpose, London asked us to give a contact address in Brussels and passwords. III F gave the necessary information.

Uffz. Kup was commissioned to arrange the contact address and prepare details of the clandestine journey. He was assisted in his work by the V-Mann Ridderhof. London had not informed us when, and by what route, the agents were to arrive in Belgium.

During the next moon period (early October?) London asked over the station “Golf” whether Apollo and Brutus reached Brussels. They were to have started the day before. The name Apollo and Brutus were first given to the agents in the London message. Some days later, Ridderhof reported that Brutus had reached Brussels, had confided in him, and no suspicious concerning his good faith.

Brutus had told Ridderhof the following concerning the journey:- The plane which was to drop him and Apollo in Belgium had apparently made a forced landing after being hit by Flak (AOB, Flugzeugabwehrkanone, well known expression in the U.K. as well). After landing, it had begun to burn, and Apollo, the crew and hem had jumped out and lost sight of each other. He had been able to rescue a case which he concealed in a wood in the vicinity of the landing place. He then made his way to Brussels where he reported at the address given, Thereupon, Ridderhof and Brutus carried out a two days’ search for the case, but without success, as Brutus could not find the place again.

After being given a change of cloths by Ridderhof in Brussels, Brutus expressed his urgent desire to get to Holland; he was slipped over the Belgian-Dutch frontier by V-Mann De Wilde (@ Widdering) (AOB, could this man have been Anton Van der Waals?) a safe crossing having been previously arranged with the frontier post at Baarle-Nassau (a tiny Belgium territory within the Dutch Province of Brabant) by III F. From Eindhoven (?) he travelled to Amsterdam accompanied by Ridderhof.

Contact was maintained through fixed rendezvous with Ridderhof. After several days he was taken by Ridderhof to a small genuine Dutch Resistance Group in the immediate vicinity of Doorn. (AOB, not to far from Driebergen) This group was ran by a certain Bram van Oord, with whom Brutus took up permanent residence. Nothing was yet know to III F of this actual mission. (AOB, Apparently, ran via Schreieder’s channels)

Meantime, a few days after the arrival of Brutus, Apollo made an appearance at the Brussels Safe House. Apollo had likewise lost everything and the forced landing, W/T apparatus, crystals, papers and money, It was agreed between Brutus and Apollo, that Apollo should remain in for a bit in Brussels, as his mission could not be carried through without the lost equipment. Apollo was then to return as quickly as possible to London, and after replacement of his equipment, start off fresh for Holland. Suitable messages given this intention were sent to London over the station “Golf”. England raised objections to Apollo’s return, but then agreed to let him journey back through a Paris address. Apollo was thereupon sent to France in company with Arnaud (Uffz. Christmann III F Niederlande) (AOB, this isn’t a name found in Holland) I no longer

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Apollo and Brutus (contd).

“remember how and by what route he continued his journey from there.

Apollo took with him amongst other things, several reports from Brutus concerning his present activity in connection with his mission. These reports went from Brutus to Apollo, via Ridderhof, and through this III F received exact knowledge of Brutus’ mission in Holland, as follows:- United distribution of the illegal Dutch press according to the general directive which Brutus had brought with him from London; also the publication of articles in the Dutch secret press, which Brutus had brought with him from London in the form of micro-films. (AOB, and he had lost everything after the crash?)

Through the activities of Brutus and their observation by Sipo, in about December 1943 or January 1944 several facts about the illegal Dutch press were acquired. As the more important information which was expected did not come to light , however, and the necessary supervision of Brutus became increasingly difficult, Sipo arrested him and a few known members of the organisation. Nothing was actually known of the results of thetrial at III F, at any rate nothing can be recollected by the writers of this.

Apollo was sent back to England, principally in order to lat a genuine English agent return, one who had had actual contact with the Dutch groups run by London. III F hoped for a restoration of the apparently shaken trust in the Dutch organisation founded in London. It was also hoped that London’s confidence in Ridderhof might thus be restored.

(AOB, our aim is Englandspiel and Nordpol affairs. There are stories following up since. But I have to skip these stories in our current context)

(AOB, however the following statements have to be dealt with!)

KV 2/962-1, page 36

Huntemann’s Account of the Visit to Oranienburg.(concentration camp)

After hearing from Kriminalrat Schreieder (AOB, During the course of event, like others, also Joseph Schreieder got career promotion) in Driebergen about the 19 September 1044, in reply to my question, that Lauwers and Jordaan had been taken to the Oranienburg Concentration Camp. (AOB, please notice: that after the debacle of the Englandspiel endeavour, his role of Spiel-leader had decreased; due to the historical circumstances) I reported this news to the Kommandoführer. As their detention there was contrary to every promise made by the S.D., (AOB, please remember: that all relied upon a written guarantee once commenced by Heinrich Himmler himself. He simply nullified this after Ubbink’s and Dourlein’s escape from the Haaren Seminary Camp, on 30 August 1943). As their detention there was contrary to every promise made by the S.D., Giskes instructed me (Huntemann) to propose to the S.D. (AOB, in casu, Schreieder; who was also effected from the political changes within the RSHA) that they should they should be immediately released from the concentration camp (AOB, don’t be too naive: The major change in German rule was the failed assassination attempt on Hitler on 20 July 1944. Thereafter, only revenge was what counted, in the line of the Judge-slaughter Roland Freisler); if necessary I was to go myself to Oranienburg and arrange for the release on me highly reassuring explanations concerning the treatment of the two prisoners. They were accommodated in Stufe I, i.e. they were well treated and looked after and lived the same as every free worker in Germany except that they were accommodated in the Camp. (AOB, is this according reality?)

I thereupon explained to Schreieder that I was commissioned to procure the release of the prisoners. In consequence, after waiting for two days, I received from Schreieder a document, signed by him, from the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei and S.D. in the Hague, to the Oranienburg Concentration Camp, in which the Concentration Camp was instructed to deliver to me the two prisoners for my disposal. Schreieder added verbally that the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) in Berlin and the Concentration Camp in Oranienburg had been advised in advance by teleprint (Telex, Fernschreiben). On the evening of the same day Schreieder again rang me up and said that a telegram had just arrived from the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Berlin, stating that under no circumstances could the two prisoners be placed at the disposal of FAK 307.

In spite of this, I went to Oranienburg, where the release to me of the two men was flatly turned down, on the grounds that Lauwers and Jordaan had been engaged in work of secret weapons and thus knew official secrets, and their release could only take place at the end of the war. On the pretence that it was urgently necessary to interrogate them on an Abwehr matter, I finally managed to arrange for the two men to be brought before the next day. When I went again to Oranienburg the next morning it turned out that Lauwers was nowhere to be found. It was presumed that he had been sent off to Rathennow as a worker. Jordaan was thereupon brought before me. The “interrogation on an Abwehr matter” was naturally a pretext to see for myself that Jordaan was actually there and what was his state of health; I also whished to hear his own story concerning his position there and find out any new possibilities for getting him out of the camp. Jordaan appeared very badly cared for and extraordinary depressed. Concerning Lauwers’ whereabouts, he only knew that he was working with an Arbeidskommando outside the Camp. As things stood, I could give Jordaan no hope of imminent release from the Camp through our intervention, we to were completely at the mercy of the Reichssicheitshauptamt. Jordaan than said that he and Lauwers knew well, for their own observation, to what an extent the Sipo were always frustrating any efforts on their behalf of III F. However, he had arranged with Lauwers that as soon as the H.Q. in London all that had happened. Further, he wished, and Lauwers too, to see me again after the war in happier circumstances, and for this reason gave me his home address in Haaksbergen, Huis de Bleek.

As is understandable, I too desired to know that after the war Jordaan was at home again and well, as my inability to improve his position at that time depressed me greatly. When I I left I had the impression that my visit had at least convinced him that he was not entirely abandoned.

On my return I reported to the Kommmando on the result of my journey. The Kommandoführer now also saw no possibility of undertaking anything in this matter which would lead to a positive result.

On my first interrogation by the U.S.A. Military Authorities (MIC) on 24th April in Goettingen (Göttingen), I reported to the American Interrogation officer that in the Oranienburg Camp there were two English agents, called Lauwers and Jordaan, who belonged to the Dutch Section of the British Intelligence Service and who therefore should be taken over to London immediately after the liberation. The same officer told me ten days later, in the Schwarzenborn Camp, that Jordaan had been found by the Americans. He had been taken to an American hospital as he was very weak and had to recuperate, There was no trace whatsoever of Lauwers.

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↓ KV 2/962-1, page 44

Custody of Captured S.O.E. Agents (contd).

In about September or October 1942, all Nordpol (Englandspiel) agents were taken to the special at Haaren (Seminary). From this date onwards all arrested agents were conducted straight to Haaren, where they were interrogated, except those who appeared to have received special missions, e.g. Johan Gruen (AOB, likely: Groen) @ Brutus and a female agent named Fekix @ Chicory (AOB, Beatrix Terwindt)(for details on her please consider: https://www.englandspiel.eu/agentendetail.php?ID=Terwindt%20%20&taal=nl ),who were first interrogated at Binnenhof 4 by Schreieder.

After the escape from Haaren in December August 1943 of Parship, Cabbage (Dourlein and Ubbink) Macrosse (AOB, only the two aforementioned did escape!), all Nordpol (Englandspiel) agents, with the exception of Ebenezer, Trumpet and Felix (AOB, Lauwers, Jordaan and Beatrix Terwindt) were transferred early 1944 to a prison at Assen, and thence at some later date, unknown, to camps in Germany. (AOB, actually: Mauthausen now Austria) (AOB, why were not all suffering? Because on Schreieder’s request: that these few might likely be necessary in further investigations)

In m-d September 1944, Schreieder told Huntemann that Trumpet and Ebenezer had also been sent to Germany, and that they were at Sachsenhausen Camp. At the same time, Schreieder professed ignorance of the whereabouts of the other Nordpol agents. Nevertheless he promised to make enquiries, but III F were never informed of the results. (AOB, strange, Huntemann is certainly aware that III F did no longer exist, and its service (counter espionage) had been succeeded by (RSHA) Amt Mil, which meant controlled by the SS, and its Leiter Schellenberg). As Giskes felt a special responsibility for Ebenezer and Trumpet (Lauwers and Jordaan) as a result of the promises that had been made to them, he ordered Huntemann to visit them at this camp. An account of Huntemann’s visit is given in …

Notes on S.O.E. Agents. It must be emphasised that the actual handling of the agents after arrest was entirely an SD responsibility, and for this reason both Giskes and Huntemann are not good sources of information on the behaviour and personalities of the captured agents; in fact, many of them were never even seen by Giskes or Huntemann. (AOB, I suppose Schreieder, should possess a better picture of what happened)

Ebenezer: Is described by Huntemann as being crafty and moody. He was only prepared to cooperate as a result of a definite promise made that none of the agents caught through his treachery would receive the death penalty. The promise that his own life would be spared made no impression on him, and it was impossible to turn him by threats of this nature. He was absolutely convinced that London would be aware that he was operating under control within three weeks. In fact he stated that a certain Colonel Blunt had assured him that this would be the case before he left the U.K. Special pains were taken to school a B-Stelle (- Orpo) operator in Ebenezer’s transmitting idiosyncrasies, as it was feared that if he should become aware of the seriousness of the position that his behaviour had entailed, he would at no matter what cost, take steps to inform London. He never concealed his dislike of the Germans.

Trumpet (Jordaan) Is described as being a man of little initiative and with a dislike for hard work. He appeared to be completely disinterested in his situation and Huntemann had the impression that, even if free, he would have been a poor agent. During imprisonment he was subject to frequent fits of depression and for that reason Huntemann arranged for him the share a cell with Ebenezer (Lauwers)

(AOB, please consider - that this reflects Huntemann’s vision, recorded a few weeks after Germany’s surrender on 8th May 1945)

KV 2/962-1, page 45

Notes on S.O.E. Agents (contd).

Catarrh (Thijs Taconis): Is described by Giskes as being a man of outstanding courage and determination. No promises or threats would induce him to provide information or to cooperate in any way. After the failure of an attempted escape he refused to give his parole not to escape again. Any information that he did provide, was given, when he was quite sure that it would do no harm to his cause.

Felix (Beatrix Terwindt): a female agent who behaved very well, and from whom it was almost impossible to obtain information. When London proposed an address in the Hague for her to contact, Schreieder (AOB, notice that not Abwehr III F (Giskes) but Kriminalkommisar Schreieder of the Sipo, dealt mainly with her) promised her liberty if she consent to act as an SD agent in making contact. She refused Schreieder’s proposal, preferring imprisonment where, however, she was well treated, according Huntemann. (AOB, it was Schreieder who saved actually her life, after most of her colleagues had been sent to Mauthausen Camp; where they never returned from. In post war days, she defended Schreieder - against the opinion of her fellow comrades)

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Watercress (Baatsen): Too delicate and being skipped.

Beetroot (Herman Parlevliet) & Van Sittard: Former members of the Marechaussée. Described as excellent agents who, at initial interrogations, convinced the Germans that they were people of very minor importance. When, in a signal from London at a later date, it was made clear to the Germans that the pair were “Eureka” instructors, they were further interrogated, but both claimed to have forgotten their knowledge of the subject and the Germans were obliged to send the first set captured to Berlin, for expert examination before they could work (with) it.

… … Schreieder expressed the opinion that the quality of agent sent, progressively deteriorated.

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KV 2/962-1, page 46 + 47

Allied Agents arrested in Holland not connected with Nordpol. Englandspiel Early 1941, a Dutch naval cadet whose name may have been Ter Haak or Laak. (AOB, the famous agent dropped was the Naval Adelborst: Lodo van Hamel. Of whom we possess genuine wartime process-papers) Sometime later, Van der Reijden who agreed to act as a double agent, was played by the Sipo with Success.

De Jonge (leader) Were arrested by Sipo about May or June 1943. Radema (W/T) They had arrived by M.T.B. (Motor Torpedo Boat) at the beginning of 1943 and had landed near Katwijk. Their mission was purely espionage, and III F with Radema’s assistance tried to establish contact. London must, however, have been aware of what was happened since, after several schedules, the traffic stopped.

Oordt (W/T) Was caught by R.D.F. (HF/DFing) of the Orpo on Whit? Monday 1942.

Alblas (W/T) Call sign TBO. Dutch cadet or sub-lieutenant. Worked with success for a long time in Holland. All the efforts of the Orpo and Sipo were frustrated by his caution and skill. Was arrested in a trap set by the Sipo in the house of his girl friend in The Hague. He did not give any information about his mission or the other members of his group and next to Taconis was the best and most valuable agent whom London sent to Holland and who fell into German hands.

Niermeier (W/T) Was arrested by the Sipo in Amsterdam after his address had become known through the Nordpol traffic. He had for several months frustrated the efforts of the Orpo (R.D.F and shadowing) who had brought special equipment to Holland for this purpose.

Heintje I, II, III, IV A group of agents arrested by the Sipo about Feb/March 1944 after Heintje II and III had been captured in Amsterdam on consecutive days whilst transmitting. Arrests were due to R.D.F.(Radio Direction Finding) The Sipo tried to play them back (The Sipo “Egmont” affair)(AOB, do not confuse with Wirsing’s famous Egmont letters), but London closed the traffic after several weeks with the message referring to the last message send by III F in the Nordpol case. (AOB, on 1st April 1944, ending Nordpol and Englandspiel affairs, by the way, I consider more likely sent on behalf of the Sipo!) Bergmann Was found dead in a shot down aircraft in the Zuiderzee IJselmeer some time in the summer of 1943 had a large sum of foreign mony and a letter of introduction from Capt. Zomer (Somers?) to a certain Bürgemeister (Mayor) in Holland. His companion saved himself on a Dutch ship and escaped

KV 2/962-1, page 48

Captain Aben and Jonkheer Gevers-Deynoot.

In the spring of 1943 Kriminalrat Schreieder of the SD, The Hague, came one day to Referat III F and explained that his V-Mann, Captain Aben (British Interrogation Camp 020 case) had received instructions from the British Embassy in Stockholm to bring to Sweden the former police president of the Hague, Jonkheer Van Gevers-Deynoot. Schreieder was willing that Gevers-Deynoot should go to Stockholm as he hoped to arrest him on return to Holland and thus learn the instructions that the latter had received from the British Embassy. Schreieder had instructed Aben to engage Gevers-Deynoot a large number of Leica films. Gevers-Deynoot as a cook felt that it would be difficult to conceal these and had asked Aben to put them in the ships safe in the Captain’s cabin. Aben thereupon brought the films to Schreieder who showed them to III F (AOB, were both services in the vicinity of Aben’s ship at Delfszijl?) in order to determine whether they could be allowed to go forward to the British Embassy. On examinations, the films were discovered to be exceptional importance and under no circumstances could they be allowed to fall into enemy hands. The films were accordingly replaced with old paper and the sealed up envelope was given to Aben for safe custody. The problem now presented itself how to get rid of the package en route and at the same time not to let Gevers-Deynoot know that Aben was working for the Germans. It was therefore decided to stage a surprise search of the ship. Korvetten-Kaptitän Nennecke of the Referat III M (Marine) of Ast-Niederlande, was entrusted with the arrangements and Huntemann and some SD official boarded a tug and accosted the “Hollandia” and another ship sailing in convoy with her. The two ships were ordered to lay to and anchor, and the search of the second ship began. The unusual proceedings were, of course, noticed by those on board the “Hollandia” and Aben called Gevers-Deynoot to his cabin and told him that under such circumstances he could not keep the package in the safe. He then ??re suggested to Gevers-Deynoot that the latter should take it and (keep?) it somewhere else. Gevers-Deynoot replied that he was unable to find a hiding place on board and agreed that the package should be thrown over the side (over boord), and this was done in the presence of Gevers-Deynoot. One of the Naval Guards on board the “Hollandia” had however noticed the jettisoning of the package and reported the matter to Capt. Nennecke. An enquiry” was therefore held and in Aben’s cabin, the latter was declaring that he was smuggling cigarette papers to Sweden and had thrown them overboard to avoid unpleasantness with the customs authorities. The “Hollandia” with Gevers-Deynoot onboard was then allowed to proceed. It is not known to Giskes or Huntemann if Gevers-Deynoot returned to Holland from Sweden.

KV 2/962-1, page 49

Personalities of S.O.E. known to Giskes. The only names recollected by Giskes are – Lieut. Colonel Blunt Miss successor Major Bingham Miss Bond Lieut. Knight Funk-Horchdienst and Fluko-Horchdienst. The Funk-Horchdienst knew some of the call signs of aircraft carrying agents to the Continent. According to Giskes trial flights were made in the afternoon prior to the operation of that night, and it was in many cases possible to intercept traffic between the aircraft and its controlling station (over England). When this traffic was reported to Giskes, he concluded, and was generally right, that an operation would take place that night. The Fluko-Horchdienst were given special orders to plot the course, of single low- flying aeroplanes, and in this way, from their reports, Giskes was able to get a general picture of the scope of dropping operations.

KV 2/962-1, page 50

Description of Miscellaneous Officials. Ustuf. May (Sipo) Seen by Giskes between February 1942 and March 1944 in the Hague, Driebergen and Haaren. At that time he was responsible for the examination of agents in W/T and codes for the Nordpol affair (AOB, genuinely he belonged to Schreieder’s ‘Büro’) and therefore lived chiefly in the Haaren Camp, where the prisoners were brought. A fanatical Nazi, who however treated the prisoners well and with great care. …German; aged about 38; strong build; height about 1.74m; light brown hair; wore civil clothes; seldom uniform; speaks with German with Swabian accent. … Ostubaf. Willy Lages Seen 1942/43 in Amsterdam where he was Leiter of the Amsterdam Aussenstelle of the Sipo and the SD. German; aged about 40; slender, athletic build; height about 1.80m …wore S.S. uniform. (AOB, Willy Lages, got life sentence in Holland, and was released in 1966 on humanitarian grounds; as he suffered from cancer and his expected remaining life was limited. Belonged to the: “Vier van Breda”; where they were kept imprisoned)

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KV 2/962-1, page 59

Data on Giskes, during interrogation at Camp 020 Name: Giskes, Obstlt. Christain Names: Hermann Joseph

Aliases: Dr. Gerhardt; Dr. German; Gluck

Spy name:

Date and Place of Birth: 28.9.1896, Krefeld

Nationality: German

Occupation: Regular Army Officer

Date of Arrival At Camp 020

Last Permanent Address: Hamburg, Mittelweg, 10

Languages: German, some French some English

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KV 2/962-1, page 60 – 73!

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↓ Early Life. 1896 Born on 28 Sept. in Krefeld (Rheinland); son of merchant Wilhelm Giskes And Maria, nee Bermes

1902 Preparatory school in Krefeld

1905-10 Gynasium School in Karthaus near Trier (matriculated).

1913-14 Höhere Handelsfachschule (commercial college) in Krefeld.

1914 1st October, army volunteer with Field Artillery Regt. 31 in Hagenau (Alsace) 1914 December, transferred to the 2.Bavarian Ski Battalion.

1915 Campaigns in the Carpathians, South Tyrol and Serbia

1916 Western Front (Rheims, Verdun), severely wounded mid-July. Bavarian Militärverdienstorden 3rd Class with swords, and Iron Cross 2nd class.

1917 March, Reserve Lieutenant. Instructor with the Gebirgs-Jäger-Ersatz battalion in Immenstadt (Allgäu), unfit for service on the front until April 1918.

1918 Mother died

1918 From April till 12th October on the Western front with Inf. Regiment 471 (Rheims-Aragonnes-Marne-Rheims) as Coy (Kompanie) Commander of the 10th Coy.; October as 2nd command. French prisoner-of-war at Vaudetre s. Suippe on 12th October. Subsequently in an officers’ P/W camp at Chateauroux (Indre).

1919 In officers’ P/W camp at Chateauroux (Indre);

1920 Released from P/W camp, went to Krefeld. Entered father’s business (Tabacco Factory, Wilh. Giskes Krefeld).

1921-26 Partner in above firm.

1925 December, married Anna, nee Nolten, from Krefeld, daughter of Ferdiand Nolten owner saw-mill in Krefeld. Wife now living in Schäfhuysen, Kreis Moers, Rheinland

1926-38 Own business: importer of leave tobacco, and dealer in tobacco products with residence in Krefeld.

1936 Compulsory training as Res. Offz. With I.R. 39 Wesel (Oblt. d. Reserve)

1938 Compulsory training as Res. Offz with I.R. 77 Cologne (Köln) Hptm. d. R.)

1938 In August, Giskes met an old skinning friend, a certain Hptm. v. Feldmann, who had become a regular officer in the German Army in 1935. Feldmann suggested to Giskes that he should rejoin the Army and explained that he was in the Abwehr in charge of Referat III F of Ast Hamburg (Ast-X) and a new Referat III.C (2) was being formed in which there would be vacancy for a Captain (Hauptmann)

Giskes at that time was not fully aware of the functions of the Abwehr and decided to think the matter over. In September 1938, however, he had taken his decision and applied for reinstatement in the German Army; his reasons were the increasingly difficult economic conditions in the tobacco trade due to import restrictions (saving foreign currencies), and the constant friction between himself and the local Nazi chieftains owing to his refusal to join the (Nazi) party on religious and political grounds.

1939 Father died.

1939 His application was accepted and he was instructed to report to Leiter Hamburg on 1st January 1939 for six months’ probationary service. He was given the rank of Hptm.

April 1939 At the end of April Giskes was made the Leiter of Referat III C2 which took over the security of the protected places

KV 2/962-1, page 64 + 65 (smal part) I also have skipped a page

Transfer to Paris. June 40 On the way back to Hamburg Giskes stopped in Berlin to see Obst. Rohleder of Abw. Abt. III who told him that he was to be transferred to Paris.

1940 Alst Paris, then in the process of forming, and accordingly on June 16th Giskes reported to Maj. Lorscheider who was to be Gruppenleiter III of the Alst. KV 2/962-1, page 67 partially

Ast-Niederlande.

Aug. 1941 Giskes was transferred to Ast-Niederlande in August 1941 and appointed Leiter Referat III F with the rank of Obstlt.? (AOB, by then he must have been Major, as his final rank for years thereafter was Obstlt.) He found that he was responsible , for administration purposes, to be Leiter of the Ast who was a member of the staff of the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber in den Niederlanden but, for purely Abwehr matters, he was to deal with his friend Rohleder of Abw, Abt. III F (AOB, in Berlin). KV 2/962-1, page 68 partially

1940 Spanische Reiter. This was the code name given to the investigation of infiltration and escape lines between Holland, Brussels and the Swiss frontier, The investigation was carried out out by Maj. Kiesewetter assisted by Bodens and Hagemann and it was discovered that the organisation was the Dutch consul in Berne (Bern), a certain Van Tricht; in addition a number of safe houses on the Belgian-Dutch frontier were uncovered and the occupants arrested. KV 2/962-1, page 68 contd.

Location of Referat III F Niederlande. August 1941 – May 1942 Hoogeweg 10 Scheveningen May 1942 – November 1942 Plein The Hague November 1942-March 1944 Driebergen Hoogstraat (Beukenhorst?) KV 2/962-1, page 73

Reliability of Information. Giskes is a German officer and was a very astute member of the Abwehr. He is intelligent and realises that the fact that he was taken into plane clothes, trying to avoid capture, has prejudiced his position considerably; this circumstance has probably rendered him more to cooperative than he might otherwise have been. He also is aware that the information that he gives can be checked, with the result that he has been found to be a fruitful and accurate source. He was directly responsible for the arrest of a number of S.O.E. agents in Holland, but interrogation of one of the agents now in the U.K. bears out Giskes’ contention that he did his utmost to protect them from the ministration of the Sipo. … Giskes now is a middle-aged man with no prospects in a chaotic Germany; it is thought unlikely that he has, or knows of, any long terms for the rehabilitation of the Abwehr, but he might, if released, gravitate towards such movement if it existed now, or in the future. Giskes, although strongly anti-Nazi at whose hands he has a certain extent suffered, is before everything a German officer, and as such, could be a danger in the future in the future if he were to come under the influence of brother officers working for the resurrection of a pre-Nazi Germany. (AOB, they couldn’t imagine the US sponsored Organisation Gehlen, the forerunner of the Bundesnachrichtendienst. As they hardly could have imagined, that just 10 years later Germany would be a partner to Brittany and soon thereafter becoming a NATO partner) KV 2/962-1, page 75

Abwehr Abt. III Berlin. 1 Obst i.G. von Bentivegni Gruppenleiter III 1938 July-1943: Sept. 1943/Jan. 44 (AOB, the latter facts are due to Bentivegni’s desire to become a General, for it he had to join a Generalskurs; as well as commanding first a Division on the Eastern Front) 2 Obst.i.G. Heinrich, (AOB, succeeding Bentivegni, he was not the right man and also suffered from a car incident; that is the reason why Bentivegni had to return to his previous job) 3 Obst. Rohlder was only Leiter of Section III F (counter espionage)

4 Kapt.z.See Meisner Ref. III-West (in France, in 1942 he was appointed KO Leiter in Switzerland, in Bern)

KV 2-962-1, page 83

S.D. (SD) Holland. (as given by Giskes and Huntemann) 1 Brigadeführer Harster O.C. Sipo and S.D. Holland (until Autumn 1943) 2 Bbrigadeführer Naumann, successor to Harster 3 Ostubaf. Deppner, Leiter III (AOB, notice RSHA Amt IV designation) 1943/44 4 Ostubaf. Schreieder, Leiter Referat IV E (1940-45) 5 Hptstuf. Knoop, Kommissar with Referat IV E (1942/44) 6 Sipo Kommissar Frank, 1st Assistent to Schreieder 1943 Mar.43/Mar. 44) 7 Frl. Elisabeth Geigerseder Secretary (1942/43)

Conclusion of KV 2/961 – 962 1 Part

On 29 January 2019