DOCSLIB.ORG

KV 2/961 – 962, Part I Englandspieland Nordpolaffair

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
KV 2/961 – 962, Part I Englandspieland Nordpolaffair Reference abstracts of KV 2/961 – 962, Part I As to prevent for a too extensive document, I have decided to divide it into two sections. Englandspiel and Nordpol affair This document contains materials derived from these latter files Its purpose: is to be used as a kind of reference document, containing my personal selection of report sections; considered being of relevance. My input: I have in almost every case created transcripts of the just reproduced file content. However, adding my personal opinion; always accompanied by: (AOB, My comment) Please do not multiply this document Remember: that the section-copies still do obey to Crown Copyright This document is of an extraordinary content; in which personal fates of many brave men have been brought at stake, due to severe ignorance on the British S.O.E. side. Please consider before studying this file: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Englandspiel English version https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Englandspiel German language version https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Englandspiel Dutch language version As to confront you with a wider spectrum in this intriguing complex matter, I would like to proceed, after Giskes’ second chapter, in due course, with: Huntemann’s Case and Schreieder’s case By Arthur O. Bauer Giskes, Obstlt. Herman (Nordpol Spiel)(England Spiel) PF 601712 KV 2/961-1, page 2 6.5.45 To S.O.E. re Oberstleutnant (Obstlt.)Giskes and Uffz. Huntemann 16.5.45 Extract from report on Huntemann re Giskes, Filed 2.6.45. KV 2/961, page 3 20.5.45 To 12th AG asking for Giskes to be sent to UK as Category A case KV 2/961, page 8 Extract from OSS X-2 Paris report dated 22.5.45 on Edmund Grosskopf (PF 601671), former member of Abwehr III F (AOB, counter espionage) Lyons and FAK 313 (Front Aufklärungskommando 307 ‘Bonn’) (AOB, where the first ‘3’ points at, of course, the operational Abwehr section III; and the third number onto the European region) This Kommando performed only line crossings and hardly brought any information. It produced in all six monthly reports with the only result of a good propaganda to deceive the Americans about the Rundstedt Xmass offensive, (AOB, Ardennes Offensive which started on 16 December 1944) ↓ ↓ ↓ KV 2/961-1, page 10 PF 601712 (Giskes) PF 601832 (Huntermann!)(Giskes deputy) 18th June 1945 Dear Major Delaforce, As spoken on the telephone this morning, I am sending you a copy of the progress Report on the case of Giskes and Huntermann. You will. Of course, be receiving the Camp 020 Interim Report when it appears. Verbeck, although important, is not being treated as urgent, so I do not imagine you will be receiving reports this week. Yours sincerely, L.M. Bingham (Miss). Major J. Delaforce S.O.E. ↓ KV 2/961-1, page 12 War Room From S.C.I. Brussels (B.S.) Subject Giskes, Herman Josef, Obstl. @ Dr. Gerhardts @ Dr. German @ Gluck We have received from S.C.I. Paris, two short extracts from the 12 AG Interrogation Report on Giskes, Obstlt. of FAK 307 (AOB, Frontabwehrkommando) .. As FAK and some of its FATs (AOB, Frontabwehrtrupp) operated for a considerable time in Belgium, we should appreciate it very much if you could send us copies of the Interrogation Reports on Giskes. Two copies of the reports would be desirable. The following pages concern FAK 307 + FAT 363 also Belgium Liege, + FAT 364 Gent (Ghent) personnel; which is in my perception not of relevance. ↓ ↓ KV 2/961-1, page 38 + 39 F.A.T. (FAT) 365 Address: Driebergen, Holland, in the buildings in which Referat III F, Ast Niederlande, was situated. After the formation and transfer of FAK 307 to Brussels, FAT 365 remained in the buildings previously occupied (AOB, Beukenhorst?) by Referat III F of Ast Niederlande. To my knowledge the Trupp remained until the last (AOB, bis zum Ende) in Driebergen. About the beginning of October 1944, the Trupp was transferred from command FAK 307 to FAK 306, so that FAK 307, from this time onwards was no longer represented in Holland. The Trupp Commander, Major Kiesewetter, was replace for reasons of ill-health, about February 1945, by younger officer (name unknown). 1 Major Kiesewetter Truppenführer. … 2 Hptm. Schoewitz Deputy Truppenführer. Came to FAT 365 in Summer 1944, from the Eastern Front. 3 Hptm.Droegsler Hilfsoffizier. … 4 Uffz. Bodens @Opdenboom … 5 Uffz. Dr. Hensel … 6 Uffz. Hüttner Came to FAT 365 in Spring of 1944, where he remained until the end (April 1945). Huntermann believes that prior to his transfer to FAT 365, he was a Sonderführer (Sdf.) in the Ast- Paris Giskes, however, thinks he might have been with Ast- Niederlande IIIc. 7 Gefr. Harger … 8 Ogfr. Schroeder … 9 Fw. Kock 1941/43 O.C. M/T with Ast-Niederlande. Sent to FAT 365 in March 1944 as Hauptfeldwebel where he stayed until the end. Was employed there in administrative work. Huntemann states that in additions to the above, there were also ten soldiers acting as drivers, guards, etc. ↓ ↓ ↓ KV 2/961-1, page 41 + 42 Funkabwehr, Aussenstelle Brussels Personnel 1 Oblt. Lorentzen O/C of the Funkabwehr in Brussels, Aussenstelle of the Wehrmacht Nachrichten Verkehr, Fu III Berlin, 1943/44. Previously Leiter of Außenstelle Paris. From Autumn 1944 in Kreuznach, then Berlin and finally Norway. 2 Uffz. Helmerich November 1944 – March 1945, was with FAT 307 as Liaison Officer with the Wehrmacht Nachrichten Verkehr. Replaced Huntemann at FAK to leave the latter free to act as instructor to the FAK schools. His mission was to run W/T deception but no such opportunity arose. 3 Uffz. Miersenann Address Amsterdam. Was already at the Funkabwehr Aussenstelle Brussels, when Huntemann went there. He did not go back to his unit on the evacuation of Brussels on 3rd. September 1944, but probably went over to the Americans or English. (Engländer). His parents, of German descent, lived in Amsterdam, where they had a fur business. Miersemann reported of his own accord on the outbreak of the war to the German Wehrmacht. His work consisted of interrogation of captured agents on their codes etc. January/February 1944, was transferred to Ast-Niederlande, III F for a few weeks as Liaison Officer to the Wehrmachts Nachrichten Verkehr (AOB, WNV/Fu III?) Seen only once or twice by Giskes. 4 Uffz. Richter Known only to Huntemann. Was already in Brussels at the Funkabwehr when he arrived there and retreated with his unit on the evacuation of Brussels. KV 2/961-1, page 45 + 46 “Some of the information given regarding Lindemans (King Kong) is new to us. There had Hitherto been no evidence that Lindemans gave away or could have given away any Allied military plan. The theory that he had been responsible for passing information regarding the Arnhem operation was based on a misunderstanding of the information from Most Secret Source (AOB, = decrypts of Enigma communication) Nor were we previously aware of the fact that Lindemans had been put in touch with agents who were parachuted into northern Dutch province. (AOB, Lindemans had also access to Prince Bernard’s Staff in Brussels, for it Lindemans passed the frontier between liberated Holland and still kept occupied Netherland). The incident to which Giskes refers may well relate to the penetration of the organisation which the S.O.E. attempted to set up in the spring of 1944, when the organisation which had hitherto succeeded was proved to be utterly penetrated. I am, however, somewhat surprised by Giskes’ statement that the attempt to play back S.O.E. agents was immediately spotted in England. An attempt was after the arrest of Lindemans to warn S.O.E. organisation in Holland of the Fact that his brother might be working for the Germans. I am not quite sure what signal was sent but so far as I can recollect it was not in the form described by Giskes. On the other hand, the guess that he was given away by another agent (no doubt Verloop) is of course correct. I realise that it will take a lot of time to complete these cases. I should, however, be grateful if progress report could be issued from time to time dealing with general III, mat??? E.g. activities of Amt VI Z (AOB, Mil Amt, the successor of the Amt Ausland/Abwehr of OKW) and the old Abwehr III D. (AOB, counter intelligence) Leitstelle III West, relations of III with R.S.H.A. (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), long term plans if any, general instructions on penetration matters, machinery for deception through controlled agents, particulars of deception plans and cases. Such progress reports on the more central III organisation, as distinct from the local activities in Holland and the FAK’s will be most useful in the interrogating Obst. Reile (AOB, once in Paris) who was just arrived at C.S.D.I.C. (AOB, = Combiner Services Detailed Interrogation Centre) (UK) 9th June 1945 ↓ ↓ KV 2/961-1, page 47 To: Major S.H. Noakes 11th June, 1945 21th Army Group Giskes and Huntemann. I sent to you on the 8th June a Camp 020 Progress Report on this case. For reasons which you will readily appreciate (understand) para No. 2 at the bottom of the first page of this report should be deleted and destroyed. The allegations are of course under immediate investigation here. Stamped 12 Jun 1945 (AOB, what might have once caused this advice? There exist two option, something concerning the way the interrogation had been accomplished, or a kind of reference which might point at MSS!) ↓ ↓ KV 2/961-1, page 53 – 57 ↓ In the case of Hermann Giskes 5.6.45 Investigation of this case commenced on 30th May 1945.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 0714685003.Pdf
    CONTENTS Foreword xi Acknowledgements xiv Acronyms xviii Introduction 1 1 A terrorist attack in Italy 3 2 A scandal shocks Western Europe 15 3 The silence of NATO, CIA and MI6 25 4 The secret war in Great Britain 38 5 The secret war in the United States 51 6 The secret war in Italy 63 7 The secret war in France 84 8 The secret war in Spain 103 9 The secret war in Portugal 114 10 The secret war in Belgium 125 11 The secret war in the Netherlands 148 12 The secret war in Luxemburg 165 ix 13 The secret war in Denmark 168 14 The secret war in Norway 176 15 The secret war in Germany 189 16 The secret war in Greece 212 17 The secret war in Turkey 224 Conclusion 245 Chronology 250 Notes 259 Select bibliography 301 Index 303 x FOREWORD At the height of the Cold War there was effectively a front line in Europe. Winston Churchill once called it the Iron Curtain and said it ran from Szczecin on the Baltic Sea to Trieste on the Adriatic Sea. Both sides deployed military power along this line in the expectation of a major combat. The Western European powers created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) precisely to fight that expected war but the strength they could marshal remained limited. The Soviet Union, and after the mid-1950s the Soviet Bloc, consistently had greater numbers of troops, tanks, planes, guns, and other equipment. This is not the place to pull apart analyses of the military balance, to dissect issues of quantitative versus qualitative, or rigid versus flexible tactics.
    [Show full text]
  • P1120793 Secret Cabinet Office
    P1120793 SECRET CABINET OFFICE HISTOMCAL SECTION HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE W.J.M. MACKENZIE VOLUME I NOTE This history is bound in four volumes, of which the contents are:- VOLUME I Table of contents, Preface, Part I (Chapters 1-4) and the earlier Chapters (5-8) of Part 11. VOLUME II Remainder of Part 11 Chapters (9-15) VOLUME III The earlier Chapters (16-24) of Part III VOLUME IV Remainder of Part III (Chapters 25-29 Conclusion; and Appendices SECRET THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF H.B.M. GOVERNMENT, and is issued for the information only of these officials who are con- cerned with its contents. The official in possession of the document will be responsible for Its safe custody and when not in use it is to be kept under lock and key SECRET Copy No. /5. P1120794 SECRET HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE BRITAIN and THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS in EUROPE BY VW.M. Mackenzie Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. Historical Branch Cabinet Office, London, S.W. 1. S.47699 SECRET P1120795 SECRET CONTENTS Page PREFACE 1 PART I : ORIGINS CHAPTER I 1. D. Section Major Grand seconded, April 1938 2 His directive 3 2. Electra House Sir Campbell Stuart consulted, September 1939 5 Department E.H. set up, January 1939 6 Its functions and control 6 3. M.I.(R) G.S.(R) set up, March 1938 7 Lt.Col. Holland appointed, December 1938 9 D/M Section approved, March 1939 10 D/M Section becomes M.I.(R), September 1939 11 Its duties 11 SECRET P1120796 VOLUME I (continued) SECRET PART I (continued) Page CHAPTER II THE WORK OF D.SECTION 1.
    [Show full text]
  • C:\Myfiles\Genealogy & Family\Family Books\WW2 Timeline
    A World War II Timeline A Perspective from within The Netherlands Compiled by Jo Kruithof - December 2004 01 12 April 1945 Canadian troops liberate the town of Steenwijk, where I was staying with my family at the time I was six years old then. A World War II Timeline a Perspective from within The Netherlands INTRODUCTION This document is based entirely on information and pictures found on the Internet. It is a brief illustrated timeline of the events of World War 2, as seen from within the Netherlands. When I first came across a basic timeline on the (Dutch) web site http://hetillegaleparool.nl, it occurred to me that, if I ever got around to writing up my life’s story, this would paint a good picture of the background against which I lived my first six years. However, before it would be any use to my descendants, I would either have to translate it, or find an alternative in the English language. Any writings presenting the unique view of the war by Dutch people living in the Netherlands is much more likely to be in Dutch than in English (and a quick scan of the Net supported this notion), so I decided on the translation option. In the process of checking out a few facts, events and names, I came across large amounts of other material, but I have only used those bits and pieces that helped to flesh out my timeline into a record that can be read and understood by those who weren’t there or who haven’t heard the stories from parents or older relatives.
    [Show full text]
  • Confidence Men the Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 By
    Confidence Men The Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 by Brett Edward Lintott A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of History, in the University of Toronto © Copyright by Brett Edward Lintott, 2015 Abstract Confidence Men The Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 Brett Edward Lintott Doctor of Philosophy Department of History University of Toronto, 2015 This dissertation provides an analysis of the Mediterranean double-cross system of the Second World War, which was composed of a number of double agents who were turned by the Allies and operated against their ostensible German spymasters. Utilizing many freshly released archival materials, this study assesses how the double-cross system was constructed, why it was an effective instrument, and how it contributed to Allied success in two areas: security and counter-intelligence, and military deception. The focus is thus on both organization and operations. The chapters cover three chronological periods. In the first — 1941-42 — the initial operational usage of a double agent is assessed, along with the development of early organizational structures to manage and operate individual cases as components of a team of spies. The second section, covering 1943, assesses three issues: major organizational innovations made early that year; the subsequent use of the double agent system to deceive the Germans regarding the planned invasion of Sicily in July; and the ongoing effort to utilize double agents to ensure a stable security and counter-intelligence environment in the Mediterranean theatre. The third and final section analyzes events in 1944, with a focus on double-cross deception in Italy and France, and on the emergence of more systematic security and counter-intelligence double-cross operations in Italy and the Middle East.
    [Show full text]
  • Loyalty and Secret Intelligence: Anglo–Dutch Cooperation During World War II
    Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2018, Volume 6, Issue 4, Pages 159–167 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v6i4.1556 Article Loyalty and Secret Intelligence: Anglo–Dutch Cooperation during World War II Eleni Braat Department of History and Art History, Utrecht University, 3512 BS Utrecht, The Netherlands; E-Mail: [email protected] Submitted: 25 April 2018 | Accepted: 21 June 2018 | Published: 28 December 2018 Abstract Secrecy and informal organisation produce, sustain, and reinforce feelings of loyalty within intelligence and security ser- vices. This article demonstrates that loyalty is needed for cooperation between intelligence partners as well as within and between services. Under many circumstances, loyalty plays a larger role in the level of internal and external collaboration than formal work processes along hierarchical lines. These findings are empirically based on the case study of Anglo–Dutch intelligence cooperation during World War II. By demonstrating that ‘loyalty’ critically affects the work of intelligence com- munities, this article contributes to current and future research that integrates history, intelligence studies, and research on emotions. Keywords emotions; history; informal organization; intelligence; international relations; loyalty; secrecy; World War II Issue This article is part of the issue “Interdisciplinary Approaches to Studying Emotions within Politics and International Rela- tions”, edited by Alex Prior (University of Leeds, UK) and Yuri van Hoef (Utrecht University, The Netherlands). © 2018 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction of intelligence primarily focus on the (at times spectacu- lar) operational history of services, putting adventurous Secret intelligence is the missing dimension in the his- agents and their handlers in the limelight, who seem to tory of international relations, as Christopher Andrew act in a strategic and calculated manner.
    [Show full text]
  • Nieuw Licht Op Liquidaties. Knokploegen in Rotterdam 1944-1945
    Nieuw licht op liquidaties. Knokploegen in Rotterdam 1944-1945 001-006 Nieuw licht op liquidaties.indd 1 17-03-2015 10:13:30 001-006 Nieuw licht op liquidaties.indd 2 17-03-2015 10:13:30 Nieuw licht op liquidaties. Knokploegen in Rotterdam 1944-1945 New insight into liquidations. Fighting units in Rotterdam 1944-1945 Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam op gezag van de rector magnificus Prof.dr. H.A.P. Pols en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties. De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op vrijdag 1 mei 2015 om 11.30 uur door Albert Willem Oosthoek geboren te Rotterdam 001-006 Nieuw licht op liquidaties.indd 3 17-03-2015 10:13:31 Promotiecommissie Promotoren: Prof.dr. P.T. van de Laar Prof.dr. L.C. Winkel Overige leden: Prof.dr. H.A.M. Klemann Prof.dr. C.R. Ribbens Prof.dr. P. Romijn 001-006 Nieuw licht op liquidaties.indd 4 17-03-2015 10:13:31 Albert Oosthoek Nieuw licht op liquidaties Knokploegen in Rotterdam 1944-1945 Uitgeverij Aspekt 001-006 Nieuw licht op liquidaties.indd 5 17-03-2015 10:13:31 De uitgave van dit boek werd financieel ondersteund door de J.E. Jurriaanse Stichting, de G.Ph. Verhagen-Stichting en de Stichting Organisatie van Effectenhandelaren te Rotterdam. Foto omslag voorzijde: J.C. Tetenburg, commandeur van de Ordepolitie, werd op 31 maart 1945 op de Hoflaan door leden van de LKP-Rotterdam geliquideerd. De opdracht ervoor was op 24 maart gegeven met als reden: verraad en diensten aan de vijand.
    [Show full text]
  • Peter Tazelaar
    Peter Tazelaar “Neen, ’t was geen vlucht, die U deed gaan.”1 Er waren eens drie vrienden die naar Engeland voeren: de later wereldberoemde Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema (‘Soldaat van Oranje’), de bijna onbekende Chris Krediet en een ‘Zeeuwse Soldaat van Oranje’. Het drietal trad in dienst bij de Britse geheime dienst en ondernam in 1941 en ’42 een aantal mislukte pogingen om contact met Nederland te leggen. De ‘Zeeuwse Soldaat van Oranje’ was Peter Tazelaar. Tazelaar was een avonturier, een man met een hekel aan aandacht, heersend burgergeleuter en opsmuk. Geboren op 5 mei 1920 in Fort de Kock in het westen van Sumatra, bracht hij zijn jeugd door in Nederlands-Indië, waar zijn vader een hoge ambtenaar was. Aangespoord door diens vader meldde de 18-jarige Tazelaar zich als adelborst op het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine (KIM) in Den Helder. Maar hij accepteerde geen orders, dus een carrière bij de marine was niet langer dan één opleidingsjaar beschoren. Het enige dat hem aansprak was het in de muur gebeitelde KIM-adagium ‘Kennis is macht, karakter is meer’ in de hal van het hoofdgebouw van Willemsoord: het komt op mentaliteit aan, niet op de strepen die op het uniform worden gedragen.2 Na zijn voorspelbare falen als adelborst vestigde hij zich tijdelijk bij familie in Groningen en deed enkele halfbakken pogingen op de koopvaardij. Toen de oorlog uitbrak wilde hij iets doen. Hij belandde bij de Ordedienst (OD), de verzetsclub van Oom Alexander in Den Haag, maar het verzet had ook dringend behoefte aan contact met Engeland. Tazelaar kreeg de opdracht naar Londen te gaan.
    [Show full text]
  • P1130084 983. SECRET 2. Holland the Chronological Pattern Of
    P1130084 983. SECRET 2. Holland The chronological pattern of Resistance in Holland is rather different from that usual in Western Europe. S.O.E.’s efforts to establish contact were entirely unsuccessful until the spring of 1944, and there was not the usual steady growth from the days of 'Torch' to those of 'Overlord'. Dutch Resistance was not in a position to contribute much to 'Overlord', and luckily not much was required of it. But the situation continued to improve during the summer, and there was a first great crisis at the time of the Arnhem landing, Operation 'Market'. The Arnhem landing failed, and Holland was then of necessity abandoned to its most bitter winter of the whole war. Perhaps one-third of the country was free, the rest was almost in the front line; even when the Armes paused for breath savage underground war continued in Holland. Reorganisation in London We have followed (1) S.O.E. Is early plans to the point of their complete collapse in the winter of 1943-44. One result of the disaster was a thorough reorganisation in London. On the British side Cdr. Johns was in January 1944 appointed Regional Director for the Low Countries, in February Major Bingham was replaced by Lt.Col. Dobson (previously of the Belgian Section) as officer in charge of the Dutch Section. On the Dutch side there was no change in the arrangements for the secret intelligence branch (B.I.) which was still the field of M. Van't Sant, acting through Major Somer: but the military side was turned upside down.
    [Show full text]
  • From Olympian to Secret Agent the Remarkable Career of Jonkheer Ernst W
    Modul 1/6 Anhang No. 1 FROM OLYMPIAN TO SECRET AGENT THE REMARKABLE CAREER OF JONKHEER ERNST W. DE JONGE by Tony Bijkerk Introduction: In the movie Soldier of Orange 1 (1978), Paul VERHOEVEN'S epic tale about six Dutch classmates torn apart by Worldwar Two, Ernst de JONGE is featured briefly but colourfully. As President of the Leidse Student Society, he is seen early in the film inflicting some damage on freshman Erik Hazelhoff ROELFZEMA with a very hot, very füll soup terrine. First he spooned out the soup over ROELFZEMA'S head, then he poured it from the bowl, then he crowned the Roeivereniging NJORD, with a culmination young man's head with it. as rowers for their homecountry in the Berlin Olympics in 1936. Mr. HARDEMAN Erik Hazelhoff ROELFZEMA is played in wrote this booklet in memory of Ernst de the movie by Rutger HAUER and Ernst de JONGE. JONGE by Jeroen KRABBE. In the book Soldaat van Oranje, on However, in this book very little is which this movie was based, our subject mentioned about de JONGE'S experiences as a secret agent in the Second Worldwar. But Ernst de JONGE receives more mentions - fortunately the eider brother of Ernst de especially when Hazelhoff ROELFZEMA drops him and another secret agent off at the JONGE -Marien de JONGE, himself a colonel in the Royal Dutch Army - had already written Dutch coast near Katwijk during the night of 5 23 to 24 February 1942, to Start work as an extensive biography, which included secret agents for the Allied Forces in everything currently known about the occupied territories.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction by Professor Jeremy Black, Department of History, University of Exeter
    Adam Matthew Publications is an imprint of Adam Matthew Digital Ltd, Pelham House, London Road, Marlborough, Wiltshire, SN8 2AG, ENGLAND Telephone: +44 (1672) 511921 Fax: +44 (1672) 511663 Email: [email protected] SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, 1940-1946 Series 1, Special Operations in Western Europe Part 1: France: The Jedburgh Teams and Operation Overlord, 1944-1945, Part 2: France: Political and Planning Files, Circuits and Missions, 1940-1947 Part 3: Germany, 1936-1945 Part 4: Holland, 1940-1949 Part 5: Italy, 1941-1948 Introduction by Professor Jeremy Black, Department of History, University of Exeter Without doubt this is one of the most fascinating and important collections to appear in microfilm for many years. It is at once an account of dedication and bravery, an approach to the Second World War that emphasises the role of individuals, and a fundamental source for an aspect of the conflict that is too readily underrated in favour of a simple emphasis on the quantity of resources. The SOE was crucial in challenging German control of occupied Europe, both by encouraging resistance and by more direct activities. Formed in July 1940 in order to encourage resistance and ‘to set Europe ablaze’, the Special Operations Executive was divided into ‘country’ sections and worked with the governments-in-exile in Britain. The political context varied greatly, as did the tasks the SOE had to fulfil. Liaison with partisan groups was part of a major attempt to build up resistance, not least by providing supplies and communication links. The role of the resistance, of course, is a matter of some controversy.
    [Show full text]
  • Dutch Agents 1940 – 1945 1
    Dutch Agents 1940 – 1945 1 Dutch agents 1940 – 1945 By Frans Kluiters (New Version, September 2008)1 This is a comprehensive list of secret agents who infiltrated into the Netherlands on behalf of the Allied intelligence and action services during the period 1940 – 1945.2 It results from my research over the past twenty years, and was originally intended to help me find my way in the welter of names, code names and aliases mentioned in the literature on Second World War intelligence. The list is a compilation of material from old and new open sources and archives. Some forty years ago researcher G.P. van der Stroom made a similar list on the basis of secondary sources, which was used by L. de Jong for his official history of the Netherlands during the Second World War. Van der Stroom’s list was incomplete and contained some errors, but, having much of the same source material at my disposal, I started to compile my own list. In the 1990’s part of the archives of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) became available for research. However, these original documents often only contained the code names or aliases of their action agents, which makes it difficult to comprehend the meaning of these papers. That is why Ihave listed all the various code names and aliases of the agents, I have come across. A problem is that MI6 archives are closed to researchers. This means that information on intelligence agents can only be found in secondary sources and some Dutch archives. Therefore names and details of agents who were active in the Netherlands, but do not figure in these sources or in the available archives, may also be lacking in my list.3 There is a reason for assuming this, as major Desmond Morton, Winston Churchill’s personal assistant, wrote to Churchill in October 1941: ‘Various personal dislikes and intrigues figure in the story of which the essential point is whether the Dutch Secret Service has a right to demand particulars of British Secret Agents working in Holland.
    [Show full text]
  • An Assessment of the Special Operations Executive's Wireless
    Communicating with the European Resistance: an assessment of the Special Operations Executive’s wireless facilities in the UK during the Second World War By DERWIN GREGORY SUMMARY: This article presents for the first time an examination of the Special Operations Executive’s (SOE) UK-based communication facilities. Established in 1940, SOE was responsible for coordinating all acts of sabotage against the enemy overseas. This was only possible with the aid of a reliable communications link with the Resistance. By examining SOE’s Home Stations, this article will demonstrate the value the organization placed in reliable wireless communications. INTRODUCTION representatives operating within occupied Europe. In July 1940, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) Communications were also vital for reporting enemy was formed with a remit to activities, arranging for the extraction of personnel, coordinating operations and organizing missions.3 organize movements in enemy-occupied coun- Without this direct link, SOE’s agents and the wider tries comparable to the Sinn Fein movement resistance would have been isolated in hostile territory.4 in Ireland, to the Chinese Guerrillas operating In order to communicate with the European against Japan, to the Spanish Irregulars who Resistance, it was essential that trained radio oper- played a notable part in Wellington’s cam- ators were embedded within their networks. These paign or — one might as well admit it — to the agents would have been provided with wireless sets by organizations which the Nazis themselves have SOE.5 They would then communicate back to ‘Home 1 6 developed. Stations’ established by the organization in the UK. Although SOE did not gain control of their own wire- Although SOE only existed operationally for 71 months, less networks until 1942, by the end of the war they at its maximum size it employed 10,000 men and 3,200 had invested heavily in developing modern communi- women.2 Throughout the Second World War, the organ- cation facilities.
    [Show full text]