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Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za 3 FI :LU S :_U4 ~- Z )~f SAfe (J>a.-t 2) In 1884 when Ferdinand de Lesseps, builder and to make proper training possible, Auchin- of the Suez Canal became a member of the leck realized that he needed a pause of French Academy, he was welcomed by Er- about three months to reorganise his troops. nest Renan. In his speech Renan remarked Hence the Western Desert Force was recon- that not only had two inland seas been con- stituted as the Eighth Army under Genl Sir nected, but the site of a future battlefield had Alan Cunningham (who had left East Africa been marked. During the Second World War at the end of August 1941). The new Army his prediction came true when control of the had two Corps under command: the 13 Corps Middle East became of utmost importance under Lt Genl A. R. Godwin-Austen (Com- for the continuation of the Allied war effort: mander of 12 African Division in East Africa) the economic blockade of Europe and the and the 30 Corps under Lt-Genl V. V. Pope" defence of Allied oil supplies depended on to control the armoured forces. Fortified the Allies retaining Egypt and control of the areas were prepared along those already ex- Suez Canal. isting at Tobruk, Mersa Matruth and Bagush The Italian offensive near the end of 1940, to meet a possible Axis thrust from the was easily warded off but after the arrival of a North while these preparations were being implemented. German contingent (the Afrika Korps) and supplies, a successful offensive under Genl When 3 Fd Coy arrived in Egypt in August Rommel was launched in April 1941. During 1941, 1 SA Div was concentrated at Mersa this offensive Rommel's advanced troops Matruh. The unit established camp at Ami- managed to reach the Egyptian frontier where riya (near Alexandria) where most of its they occupied positions in the area round first month was spent completing an ord- Sollum and threatened the Egyptian frontier. nance Field Park Depot of 1 SA Div HQ and Genl Wavell (Commander-in-Chief of the training for desert warfare. On 1 September Allied forces in North and East Africa) re- Sgt Tomlinson and a party left for Mersa plied by launching operations 'Brevity' (May Matruh, where 1 SA Div was garrisoned, in 1941) and 'Battleaxe' (June 1941) to dislodge order to occupy billets set aside for the unit. them but failed on both occasions. After On 7 September Lt Swart's section followed, his last desert offensive it was thought ap- acting as an advance party while the rest propriate to appoint a new commander, Genl of the unit followed on the 9th. Auchinleck, former Commander-in-Chief of India, in his place. On reaching Mersa Matruh the unit was not brigaded until 6 October when the Company When Auchinleck assumed command in was attached to 2 SA Inf Bde, though offi- July, Hitler's troops were deeply involved in cial confirmation was not received until the Russia and Mr Churchill urged Auchinleck 13th. In any event the Company still re- to resume the offensive. Auchinleck realized mained under the operational command of that his troops needed to be re-organised, the CRE. trained and refitted first before an offensive could be launched to drive the Axis out of Meanwhile work at Matruh started almost Libya. He realized that one of the main immediately with the construction of several reasons for Wavell's failures was that Wavell bomb shelters and other works taken over had been obliged to fight with incomplete from the Australians. The shelters were com- forces and his 'repeated milking of units and pleted on 14 September and the next day formations to fit out one expedition after Lt Thomson's section left the unit to assist another", disorganised the Allied forces in the in the construction of Matruh's defences. end. Furthermore a continuous stream of Mersa Matruh was to play an important role reinforcements had reached the Middle East in Auchinleck's defence-offence policy. It was since the beginning of 1941, which was too to be strengthened to resist an Axis thrust large to absorb easily. To restore coherence into Egypt - then the Allied advance troops 31 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za could be withdrawn to give battle in the re- for over an hour before they could be gion of Mersa Matruh and simultaneously brought back in another boat. act as a jumping-off base for a later advance On 11 October orders were received for the to Tunisia. The port of Matruh was also of removal of 8 000 mines from a minefield strategic importance for the safety of Allied neal" Charing Cross Railway Station. The convoys in the Mediterranean. assignment was entrusted to Nos 1, 3 and When 1 SA Div arrived at Matruh, the divi- 5 Fd Coys and Lt Thomson was to be in sion found that despite the fact that the de- charge of 3 Fd Coy's detachment. Towards fences 'had been tinkered with at intervals the end of the month 1 SA Div received in- since before the war'," they had been left structions to evacuate Matruh and to under- to decay, wh:ch entailed much digging, wiring go intensive desert training prior to the launching of 'Operation Crusader' scheduled and laying of mines when the division was for ~.Jovember. 2 SA Inf Bde was to remain ordered to construct defenses for two posi- behind at Matruh to guard the defences and tions south of the inner post line. serve as reinforcement for the other two bri- The Matruh Box - as these fortified are(Js gades. Orders were also received for 3 Fd became known - was to be based on the Coy (attached to 2 SA Inf Bde) to take over Tobruk system of defence: section posts all the work being done by the other two were prepared which consisted of five Coys (including the removal of the mines) weapon pits with an all-round field of fire as they were to leave for desert manoeuvres. and insulated sleeping, supply and ammuni- Towards the end of October preparations for tion recesses - all connected by trenches, the forthcoming offensive were well on the camouflaged and wired in. 3 Fd Coy did way and intensive desert training commenced some of the wiring jobs and also laid anti- to accustom the attacking forces to living tank mines in front of these posts. and working under desert conditions. All Digging was one of the Company's most these preparations kept the Sappers occu- difficult problems. One could hardly make pied so that only small parties were released any impression on the hard limestone en- for training. On 19 October a subsection of countered at about 2 feet from the surface No 2 section 3 Fd Coy, SAEC left for train- and previous notions of 'the sandy nature ing with 1/2 FFB while a subsection of Sec- of the Western Desert vanished. Anywhere tion No 1 left to begin training with the Natal a pick struck, the ground gave out a metallic Mounted Rifles (N M R) the next day. ThesJ ring. The whole area was rock." On one desert manoeuvres which were carried out occasion Lt Swart's section had to return in the vast areas south and south-east of from the minefields because his section had Matruh were mostly based on navigation suffered considerably from foot trouble due (using the sun or a prismatic compass), to the amount of walking over rough stony fiag-signalling, desert formation and camou- ground. They were later relieved by Lt flaging. The subsections returned on the Smuts' section which armed, set and camou- 23rd and 24th respectively but it was flaged no less than 2200 mines in two days. not until 17 November that ten men could again be spared for desert manoeuvres with The Matruh fortification included a coastal the NMR. defense section to ward off any attacks made from the sea and the Company was called The Advance into Cyrenaica on to build magazines, concrete fire-con- trol posts, search light chambers for the coastal defence battery as well as 6-pounder On the night of 17/18 November 'Operation gun positions. On one occasion the unit had Crusader' began with the aim of recapturing to blast a submerged rocky ledge from the the whole of Cyrenaica and relieving the harbour mouth. Before the job was under- siege of Tobruk. The Axis forces managed taken Maj Palmer (OC 3 Fd Coy) and Capt to resist the onslaught but in the process Archibald (DCRE) undertook an inspec- their petrol and ammunition supplies dropped tion tour of the site. During their excursion dangerously and Rommel decided to retreat their boat became stranded on a submerged to the Gazala line, a previously prepared line rock and they were forced to remain there of defence. His whole force was to retreat 32 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za except for the frontier garrisons which had to holding role to prevent these frontier garri- remain behind to block the coastal road thus sons from breaking out to the south and en- keeping more than a division of Allied troops dangering the Army's main supply line fol- pinned down in that sector.
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