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Home , Benghazi, Ibrahim Jadhran, Khalifa Haftar, Libyan National Army, Marj, Nouri Abusahmain

A QUICK GUIDE TO ’S MAIN PLAYERS

Introduction Introduction Political Actors In Libya there are very few truly national actors. The vast majority are local Armed Groups players, some of whom are relevant at Jihadists the national level while representing the interests of their region, or in most cases, their city. Many important actors, particularly outside of the largest cities, also have tribal allegiances.

Since the summer of 2014, political power has been split between two rival governments in and in , with the latter having been recognised by the international community before the creation of the Presidential Council – the body that acts collectively as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces - in December 2015. Several types of actors scramble for power in today’s Libya: armed groups; “city-states”, particularly in western and southern Libya; and tribes, which are particularly relevant in central and eastern Libya. A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS

Introduction Egyptian-aligned, self-described anti- Brotherhood is the largest component Islamist general , who while Musa al-Kuni represents southern Political Actors leads the (LNA). Libya. Armed Groups There is an ongoing movement among a large number of members of the HoR Finally, Mohammed Ammari represents Jihadists to change the location of the House to a the pro-GNA faction within the GNC (the more neutral place in Libya. “Tripoli parliament”), and Fathi al-Majburi is an ally of the head of the Petroleum PRIME MINISTER AL-SARRAJ AND THE Facilities Guards (PFG) headed by Ibrahim GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL ACCORD Jadhran.

Prime Minister al-Sarraj is not a strong Two very important steps in consolidating figure on his own, but some of the al-Sarraj’s power base have been the other eight members that make up his pledge of loyalty by the two major Tripoli- Presidential Council have close links to based economic institutions (the Central powerful stakeholders. Bank and the ) and the statements of support by several His deputy , who served municipalities in the West and South of by Mattia Toaldo have expressed their support for it in a a short stint as prime minister of Libya the country. written statement. before being hit by a court ruling, ONE COUNTRY, THREE GOVERNMENTS represents the powerful city-state of In al-Sarraj’s government, two ministers The rival Government of National , which is the biggest backer of stand out for the role they can play or At the moment Libya has three centres Salvation headed by Prime Minister the GNA from both a political and military have already played. Firstly, the Minister of power. The first is the Presidential Khalifa Ghwell - resting on the authority standpoint. Misrata’s militias were a of the Interior Al-Aref al-Khuja has a Council (PC), which has been located of the General National Congress (GNC), crucial component in the downfall of police background and is in close contact in the Abu Sittah navy base, a stone’s the resurrected parliament originally Gaddafi and are still one of the two most with Tripoli’s militias. Secondly, the throw from central Tripoli, since 30 March elected in 2012 - is also based in Tripoli, relevant military forces in the country. Minister of Defence Mahdi al-Barghathi, 2016. The PC is headed by Fayez al- although it no longer controls any who is an army colonel from the same Sarraj – a former member of the Tobruk relevant institutions. The vast majority Another important deputy is Ali Faraj Libyan National Army of Haftar but Parliament, where he represented a of the members of the GNC (also known al-Qatrani who represents General politically distant enough from him to be Tripoli constituency – and it was borne as the “Tripoli Parliament”) have been Haftar who in turn heads the LNA – the accepted by other groups – and, in fact, out of the signing of the UN-brokered moved across to the State Council, a other large military force. Al-Qatrani is rejected by Haftar himself. Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in consultative body created under the LPA currently boycotting the meetings of the December 2015. According to this which convenes in Tripoli. PC on the grounds that it is not inclusive Finally, within the power structure, a agreement, the PC presides over the enough. crucial role is played by the Temporary Government of National Accord (GNA), The third centre of power is made Security Committee (the TSC) which has which is currently based in Tripoli. The up of the authorities based in Tobruk Al-Qatrani is a close ally of another conducted the security negotiations that GNA should be endorsed by the House and al-Bayda, which also have to member of the Presidential Council, allowed the PC to move peacefully to of Representatives (HoR) which was concede power to the GNA. The House Omar Ahmed al-Aswad who represents Tripoli on 30 March. Eventually, the TSC previously based in Tobruk but could of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk the city-state of in western Libya. according to the LPA should be replaced move elsewhere to guarantee the safety is the legitimate legislative authority Zintan played a very important role in the by a proper National Security Council. of its members some of whom have under the LPA, while the government fall of Gaddafi-controlled Tripoli in 2011 repeatedly reported being stopped from of Abdullah al-Thinni operates from and has good relations today with the ABUSAHMAIN, GHWELL AND THE voting and threatened by members the eastern Libyan city of al-Bayda and UAE. “TRIPOLI GOVERNMENT” hostile to the GNA. For this reason, at should eventually concede power to the time of writing, the HoR has still not the GNA once this is voted into office by A third deputy is Abdessalam Kajman The speaker of the General National voted on the government, although on Parliament. The Tobruk and al-Bayda who aligned with the Justice and Congress Nouri Abusahmain and the two occasions a majority of its members authorities are under the control of Construction Party of which the Muslim prime minister of the “Government of A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS

Introduction National Salvation” Khalifa Ghwell come in the South of the country, his more territorial hinterland for any opposition to major Libyan actors respond to input from the cities of Zwara and Misrata powerful ally in the East is Ibrahim the regime in . from Ankara or the way that Tobruk Political Actors respectively. Their military support base Jadhran, the head of the PFG. A aligns itself with Cairo’s policies. Armed Groups is the Steadfastness Front (Jabhat al- controversial figure, Jadhran fought Nevertheless, over time has put out Samud) of Salah Badi. While they have against the militias from the city of at least two statements that contradict Jihadists received some weapons from Turkey in Misrata in the past and is criticised this position. On the one hand, diplomats the past, they were never controlled or by many Libyans for instigating and and the MFA have given assurances influenced by Ankara in the slightest. upholding a blockade of oil fields of their support to the UN-led political Initially they represented the Libya between 2013 and 2014. He now process; on the other, the security Dawn coalition which involves Islamists, supports the PC, mostly because of a apparatus has supported Haftar even the city-state of Misrata, and several personal disagreement with general when it was clear that he was on a other western cities (including parts Haftar that erupted early in 2015. It is collision course with UN-backed unity of the Amazigh minority). Both Ghwell unclear whether all of the PFG stands efforts. and Abusahmain have been hostile to behind Jadhran. the GNA and have been subjected to sanctions by the EU because of this. THE ISLAMIC STATE GROUP IN LIBYA Their support base has gradually shrunk Although sharing some of the same although they still retain some capacity Also called Tandhim ad-Dawla (the goals as Egypt, the UAE has a more to disrupt al-Sarraj’s activities here and Organisation of the State) by Libyans, ISIS nuanced position on the situation in there, particularly if popular support for now controls the central Mediterranean Libya. Reportedly, it has been more him decreases or if some of the militias coast of Libya around the city of . supportive of UN negotiations and now supporting him decide to switch It has carried out attacks in all major ultimately less engaged on Libya since sides. Libyan cities, including the capital Tripoli. its intervention in . Nevertheless, ISIS also has a presence in other parts Emirati weapons are still delivered to HAFTAR, AGUILA SALEH, AND THE of Libya, such as Derna, and both Haftar and the militias of the city- TOBRUK POWER CENTRE , although it has suffered state of Zintan, according to a report significant setbacks in all three cities from a UN panel of experts. Moreover, The link between the head of the armed since the beginning of the year. the UAE’s political influence should forces Khalifa Haftar and the Speaker not be underestimated. The Libyan of the Tobruk parliament Aguila Saleh REGIONAL ACTORS ambassador to Abu Dhabi, Aref al- Issa is very strong. Haftar rules from his Nayed, is ideologically one of the most headquarters in (in eastern Libya) EGYPT important figures on the Tobruk side. and has strong military control over He was even touted as potential prime both the al-Bayda government and the No other Arab country plays as powerful minister at one point. HoR in Tobruk. Also because of Haftar’s a role in Libya as Egypt. Testament to popular support in eastern Libya, very Egypt’s involvement in the region is TURKEY AND little happens in the HoR without his the regular travel Libyan leaders make approval. Recently, Haftar’s forces made to Cairo. The relationship between Neither Turkey nor Qatar have the same significant advances in Benghazi both Tobruk and Egypt is not just defined by level influence on the Government of against the Islamic State group (ISIS) and significant arms deliveries but also by National Salvation that Egypt and the against the Islamist-dominated Benghazi a shared political project: eradicating UAE have on the Tobruk side, although Revolutionary Shura Council. political and enhancing the they would like to think they do. Turkish autonomy of eastern Libya. For Egypt, companies have, according to the UN THE PETROLEUM FACILITIES GUARDS according to some authors, having panel of experts, delivered weapons AND IBRAHIM JADHRAN – the eastern region of Libya – to one side (the defunct Libya Dawn under the role of a leader that is friendly coalition) and Qatar has links with one While al-Sarraj’s support base is now to Egypt – Haftar for instance – would Libyan politician and former jihadist – concentrated mostly in the West and create a buffer zone with ISIS and a Abdelhakim Belhadj. Yet none of the A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS

Introduction by Mary Fitzgerald Political Actors The terms “army” and “militia” mean Armed Groups different things to different Libyans and this is one of the consequences of the Jihadists political power struggle that has roiled Libya since 2014.

HAFTAR AND THE LIBYAN NATIONAL ARMY

While Khalifa Haftar is recognised as general commander of the armed forces by the HoR in eastern Libya, his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) is a mix of military units and tribal or regional-based armed groups, and is not recognised as a proper army by all military personnel across the East or West of Libya. A number of senior military figures refused to join Haftar’s Operation Dignity against Islamists when it launched in May 2014. Some of these have since joined forces with his adversaries, whether cooperating with militias that comprised the Libya Dawn coalition in western Libya, or joining with local jihadist-led groups to drive ISIS out from the eastern town of Derna.

THE FORMER LIBYA DAWN

The Libya Dawn militia alliance that formed partly in response to Haftar’s Operation Dignity in summer 2014, and which drove then Dignity-allied militias from the western town of Zintan from Tripoli, no longer exists. The coalition was made up of both Islamist and non- Islamist militias, armed groups from Tripoli and the port city of Misrata, and fighters from other parts of western Libya, including from the Amazigh minority. It had fractured even before the UN-brokered deal aimed at establishing a unity government was signed late last year. A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS

Introduction TRIPOLI translated their scepticism into armed action. themselves from Haftar, while others 2014 and have been empowered as a remain supportive. Zintan’s militias, in result, taking over mosques and other Political Actors At present, Tripoli’s armed groups can MISRATA light of the losses they suffered in 2014, institutions. Similarly, within the BRSC, Armed Groups be broadly categorised in terms of are also assessing how they might fit into tensions have grown over its relationship whether or not they support the unity The prosperous port city of Misrata the changing order. with ISIS, and some of its backers have Jihadists government led by Fayez al-Sarraj that is home to Libya’s largest and most pushed for the BRSC to distance itself is currently trying to find its feet in the powerful militias. Misrata is not as BENGHAZI: HAFTAR, THE BENGHAZI from the group. capital. For now, a majority are either cohesive as its residents sometimes REVOLUTIONARY SHURA COUNCIL AND explicitly supportive of, or ambivalent claim. Local rivalries feed the power- ISIS THE PETROLEUM FACILITIES GUARDS towards, the unity government. Those in play between the city’s constellation of the latter category are waiting to see if armed groups. Prominent political and Fighting continues in Benghazi between Once present in several regions of Libya, their interests will be maintained under business figures in Misrata support the the forces that joined Haftar’s Operation the PFG has fallen apart and the term is the new dispensation. One of the most unity government, which includes the Dignity and their opponents, though now mostly used to refer to the forces important figures supporting the new prominent Misratan, Ahmed Maiteeq, the latter have been squeezed into a in eastern Libya under the command of government is AbdelRauf Kara, leader as deputy prime minister. This has handful of districts after a major Dignity Ibrahim Jathran, a former revolutionary of the Special Deterrent Force (or Rada) helped secure the backing of the main push in February resulted in several fighter. In 2013 his PFG took control of which is based in the Maitiga complex, armed groups from the city, including neighbourhoods being captured. the main oil export terminals in eastern also home to Tripoli’s only operating the two biggest – the Halbous and the Key to the anti-Dignity camp is the Libya and later attempted to sell oil. airport. Kara’s Salafist-leaning forces Mahjoub brigades. A wildcard in Misrata Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council The almost year-long episode cost Libya – which number around 1,500 – once is Salah Badi, a controversial former (BRSC), an umbrella group comprising a billions in lost revenues. While Jathran sought to present themselves as a type parliamentarian and militia leader who number of Islamist and self-described is often referred to as a federalist, he of police force for the city, targeting was a key figure in the Libya Dawn revolutionary factions. It also includes is not universally popular within the alcohol and drug sellers in particular. alliance in 2014 and who opposes the the UN-designated Ansar al-Sharia. wider movement seeking regional Now they focus their efforts on tackling UN-backed unity government. Misratan The BRSC fights alongside ISIS against autonomy for eastern Libya, and he ISIS cells and sympathisers in the capital. forces have attempted a containment Haftar’s forces. The BRSC’s ranks have can be better described as a political Kara’s men are currently forming a strategy to prevent ISIS from expanding been fed by youth radicalised by pragmatist, if not an opportunist. He has counter-terrorism unit with members of westwards from its stronghold of Sirte, Haftar’s campaign, which sought not alternately allied himself with both the army in western Libya who but they lack the capacity to eliminate only to eradicate Islamists of all stripes, HoR and its opponents in western Libya. refused to join Haftar. Armed groups ISIS entirely from the city. including the , but While Jathran initially claimed to be from the Suq al-Jumaa area of Tripoli, also took on an ethnic character at times, supportive of Haftar’s Dignity campaign, including the Nawasi brigade, are also ZINTAN AND THE TRIBAL ARMY targeting families of western Libyan his relationship with Haftar has since key to securing the unity government. origin in the city. soured to the extent he has accused The small mountain town of Zintan Haftar’s forces of trying to assassinate Another powerful figure in Tripoli is enjoyed outsized influence in western Both the Dignity and anti-Dignity camps him. The PFG has repelled several ISIS Haitham Tajouri, who heads the city’s Libya from 2011 until summer 2014 in Benghazi have experienced internal attacks on oil infrastructure in eastern largest militia. Tajouri, whose forces have when its militias were driven from Tripoli rifts. Within the Dignity camp, which Libya and Jathran currently supports threatened and intimidated officials since by Libya Dawn. As a result, Zintani comprises army units, militias and the UN-backed unity government. There 2012, is not a particularly political figure. forces lost control of key strategic sites, armed civilians, the most important are claims of dissent within the existing His priority is protecting the considerable including Tripoli’s international airport actor is the military special forces unit, PFG, and rumours that Jathran no longer interests he has accrued in the capital, which was destroyed in the fighting. known as Saiqa. The Saiqa is led by controls the entire eastern PFG, although and for now he remains ambivalent Some later joined with the so-called Wanis Bukhamada, a popular figure in the extent of this dissent is unclear. about the unity government. Tribal Army – comprising fighters from the city. Some Dignity commanders in the Warshefana region on Tripoli’s Benghazi have been critical of Haftar’s Tripoli’s Islamist-leaning militias, some of hinterland and other tribal elements leadership, including Mahdi al-Barghathi, which have links to figures from the now from western Libya – to confront Libya the designated defence minister of the defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Dawn-allied factions. Fighting later unity government. Also of concern to (LIFG), tend to be the most sceptical of the subsided due to local ceasefires. A many residents are the hardline Salafist unity government, though none have yet number of Zintani forces have distanced fighters that joined Haftar’s coalition in A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS

Introduction by Mary Fitzgerald Political Actors Libya is home to a range of jihadist Armed Groups groups, from the Islamic State group (ISIS) to al Qaeda-linked groups, to other Jihadists Salafi-jihadi factions. Some are wholly indigenous and rooted in particular locales while others – particularly ISIS affiliates – have many foreigners at both leadership and rank and file level.

THE LEGACY OF LIFG

Libya’s jihadist network can be divided along generational lines, starting with those who emerged in the 1980s. Many from that older generation fought against Soviet-backed forces in Afghanistan. These veterans later created a number of groups in opposition to , the largest of which was the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) which is now defunct. Several former LIFG figures, including its final leader, Abdelhakim Belhadj, played key roles in the 2011 uprising and went on to participate in the country’s democratic transition, forming political parties, running in elections and serving as deputy ministers in government. This did not sit well with the second and third generation of jihadists - among the former were those who fought in after 2003, among the latter were those who fought in after 2011 – who lean towards more radical ideologies and reject democracy as un-Islamic. The Libyans that have joined ISIS in the country tend to come from the second and third generations.

ISIS IN LIBYA

Local returnees from Syria helped form Libya’s first ISIS affiliate in the eastern town of Derna in 2014. Many had fought as part of ISIS’s al-Battar unit in northern Syria before returning home to replicate A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS

Introduction the model with help from senior non- sphere of influence throughout the the south and central/eastern regions, likely to define Libya’s jihadist milieu for Libyan ISIS figures. The leadership of ISIS surrounding region, taking control of largely through Libyans who once the forseeable future. Political Actors in Libya has always been dominated a series of small towns east of Sirte worked with them elsewhere, particularly Armed Groups by foreigners, and the group’s current from which it has mounted attacks on in , before returning home after leader is Abd al-Qadir al-Najdi, whose nearby oil infrastructure. However, as Gaddafi was ousted. Jihadists name suggests Saudi origins. He its leader al-Najdi admitted in a recent replaced an Iraqi whom the US claims it interview with an ISIS publication, Libya’s Ansar al-Sharia has run training camps killed in an airstrike in eastern Libya last array of armed groups and the rivalries for foreign fighters, including a significant year. between them has so far made it difficult number of Tunisians, travelling to Syria, for ISIS to expand much beyond Sirte’s Iraq and Mali. Individuals associated ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi hinterland. with Ansar al-Sharia participated in recognised the presence of ISIS in Libya the September 2012 attacks on the US in late 2014, declaring three wilayats or ISIS also had a smaller presence on the diplomatic mission in Benghazi. provinces: Barqa (eastern Libya), with outskirts of Sabratha, a coastal town Derna as its headquarters; Tarablus in western Libya, until a combination While they are, at the core, an armed (Tripoli), with Sirte as its headquarters; of US airstrikes and attacks by local group, Ansar al-Sharia adopted a and (southwestern Libya). forces - including former jihadists from strategy between 2012 and 2014 that that first generation - managed to focused on preaching and charitable ISIS was driven from its first headquarters uproot the militants earlier this year. work to build popular support and drive in Derna last year by a coalition of forces In Benghazi, those fighting Haftar’s recruitment. As a result, it became the which included the Derna Mujahideen Operation Dignity include Libyan and largest jihadist organisation in Libya, Shura Council, an umbrella group foreign members of ISIS. Although Sirte with its main branch being stationed in comprising fighters led by local jihadists is the group’s ostensible base, ISIS Benghazi. including LIFG veterans, who joined sleeper cells operate in Tripoli and other with army personnel who had rejected cities and towns in Libya. While the In response to Khalifa Haftar’s Operation Khalifa Haftar and his Operation Dignity Pentagon estimates there are over 6,000 Dignity, Ansar al-Sharia’s Benghazi unit campaign. More recently, the same ISIS fighters in Libya, the UN and many merged with other militias to form the alliance routed ISIS from its remaining Libyans believe that the number is lower. Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council redoubts on the outskirts of the town. (BRSC) in summer 2014. While Ansar ANSAR AL-SHARIA IN LIBYA al-Sharia is now the dominant force in ISIS began to build its presence in Sirte in the BRSC coalition, it has experienced 2015. Sirte, which was Gaddafi’s former Formed in 2012 by former revolutionary internal disarray due to the deaths hometown and one of the regime’s last fighters calling for the immediate of senior figures - including founder hold-outs during the 2011 uprising, is imposition of sharia law, Ansar al- Mohammed Zahawi – and the loss of a now an ISIS stronghold. Prominent ISIS Sharia’s first branch was set up in number of members through defection to cleric Turki al-Binali and other senior Benghazi, but affiliates have also ISIS. Other Ansar al-Sharia units across figures visited Sirte as the group began emerged in towns such as Derna, Sirte the country also experienced an uptick to consolidate control. It did so by and . While Ansar al-Sharia’s in defections as ISIS began to expand in reaching out to locals who felt aggrieved leadership tended to be drawn from Libya. With ISIS trying to further co-opt over the city’s marginalisation in post- Libya’s second generation of jihadists, existing networks, tensions have grown Gaddafi Libya. However, the group the majority of its rank and file were from between it and Ansar al-Sharia (and by met some resistance in summer 2015 the generation that came after it. The extension with the latter’s associates as a number of residents attempted UN put Ansar al-Sharia on its al-Qaeda in AQIM and Al-Mourabitoun) as they an uprising, which was then brutally sanctions list in 2014, describing it as compete for members and territory. quashed. Since then ISIS has tried to a group associated with Al-Qaida in However, in Benghazi they still fight impose a system of governance on the the Islamic (AQIM) and Al- together against Haftar’s forces. The city, using public executions to instil Mourabitoun. Both groups mentioned rivalry between ISIS and al-Qaeda fear. It has also sought to expand its also have a presence in Libya, both in associated groups like Ansar al-Sharia is