DOCSLIB.ORG

Libya Dec16.Indd

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Libya Dec16.Indd A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS Introduction Introduction Political Actors In Libya there are very few truly national actors. The vast majority are local Armed Groups players, some of whom are relevant at Jihadists the national level while representing the interests of their region, or in most cases, their city. Many important actors, particularly outside of the largest cities, also have tribal allegiances. Since the summer of 2014, political power has been split between two rival governments in Tripoli and in Tobruk, with the latter having been recognised by the international community before the creation of the Presidential Council – the body that acts collectively as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces - in December 2015. Several types of actors scramble for power in today’s Libya: armed groups; “city-states”, particularly in western and southern Libya; and tribes, which are particularly relevant in central and eastern Libya. A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS Introduction Egyptian-aligned, self-described anti- Brotherhood is the largest component Islamist general Khalifa Haftar, who while Musa al-Kuni represents southern Political Actors leads the Libyan National Army (LNA). Libya. Armed Groups There is an ongoing movement among a large number of members of the HoR Finally, Mohammed Ammari represents Jihadists to change the location of the House to a the pro-GNA faction within the GNC (the more neutral place in Libya. “Tripoli parliament”), and Fathi al-Majburi is an ally of the head of the Petroleum PRIME MINISTER AL-SARRAJ AND THE Facilities Guards (PFG) headed by Ibrahim GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL ACCORD Jadhran. Prime Minister al-Sarraj is not a strong Two very important steps in consolidating figure on his own, but some of the al-Sarraj’s power base have been the other eight members that make up his pledge of loyalty by the two major Tripoli- Presidential Council have close links to based economic institutions (the Central powerful stakeholders. Bank and the National Oil Corporation) and the statements of support by several His deputy Ahmed Maiteeq, who served municipalities in the West and South of by Mattia Toaldo have expressed their support for it in a a short stint as prime minister of Libya the country. written statement. before being hit by a court ruling, ONE COUNTRY, THREE GOVERNMENTS represents the powerful city-state of In al-Sarraj’s government, two ministers The rival Government of National Misrata, which is the biggest backer of stand out for the role they can play or At the moment Libya has three centres Salvation headed by Prime Minister the GNA from both a political and military have already played. Firstly, the Minister of power. The first is the Presidential Khalifa Ghwell - resting on the authority standpoint. Misrata’s militias were a of the Interior Al-Aref al-Khuja has a Council (PC), which has been located of the General National Congress (GNC), crucial component in the downfall of police background and is in close contact in the Abu Sittah navy base, a stone’s the resurrected parliament originally Gaddafi and are still one of the two most with Tripoli’s militias. Secondly, the throw from central Tripoli, since 30 March elected in 2012 - is also based in Tripoli, relevant military forces in the country. Minister of Defence Mahdi al-Barghathi, 2016. The PC is headed by Fayez al- although it no longer controls any who is an army colonel from the same Sarraj – a former member of the Tobruk relevant institutions. The vast majority Another important deputy is Ali Faraj Libyan National Army of Haftar but Parliament, where he represented a of the members of the GNC (also known al-Qatrani who represents General politically distant enough from him to be Tripoli constituency – and it was borne as the “Tripoli Parliament”) have been Haftar who in turn heads the LNA – the accepted by other groups – and, in fact, out of the signing of the UN-brokered moved across to the State Council, a other large military force. Al-Qatrani is rejected by Haftar himself. Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in consultative body created under the LPA currently boycotting the meetings of the December 2015. According to this which convenes in Tripoli. PC on the grounds that it is not inclusive Finally, within the power structure, a agreement, the PC presides over the enough. crucial role is played by the Temporary Government of National Accord (GNA), The third centre of power is made Security Committee (the TSC) which has which is currently based in Tripoli. The up of the authorities based in Tobruk Al-Qatrani is a close ally of another conducted the security negotiations that GNA should be endorsed by the House and al-Bayda, which also have to member of the Presidential Council, allowed the PC to move peacefully to of Representatives (HoR) which was concede power to the GNA. The House Omar Ahmed al-Aswad who represents Tripoli on 30 March. Eventually, the TSC previously based in Tobruk but could of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk the city-state of Zintan in western Libya. according to the LPA should be replaced move elsewhere to guarantee the safety is the legitimate legislative authority Zintan played a very important role in the by a proper National Security Council. of its members some of whom have under the LPA, while the government fall of Gaddafi-controlled Tripoli in 2011 repeatedly reported being stopped from of Abdullah al-Thinni operates from and has good relations today with the ABUSAHMAIN, GHWELL AND THE voting and threatened by members the eastern Libyan city of al-Bayda and UAE. “TRIPOLI GOVERNMENT” hostile to the GNA. For this reason, at should eventually concede power to the time of writing, the HoR has still not the GNA once this is voted into office by A third deputy is Abdessalam Kajman The speaker of the General National voted on the government, although on Parliament. The Tobruk and al-Bayda who aligned with the Justice and Congress Nouri Abusahmain and the two occasions a majority of its members authorities are under the control of Construction Party of which the Muslim prime minister of the “Government of A QUICK GUIDE TO LIBYA’S MAIN PLAYERS Introduction National Salvation” Khalifa Ghwell come in the South of the country, his more territorial hinterland for any opposition to major Libyan actors respond to input from the cities of Zwara and Misrata powerful ally in the East is Ibrahim the regime in Cairo. from Ankara or Doha the way that Tobruk Political Actors respectively. Their military support base Jadhran, the head of the PFG. A aligns itself with Cairo’s policies. Armed Groups is the Steadfastness Front (Jabhat al- controversial figure, Jadhran fought Nevertheless, over time Egypt has put out Samud) of Salah Badi. While they have against the militias from the city of at least two statements that contradict Jihadists received some weapons from Turkey in Misrata in the past and is criticised this position. On the one hand, diplomats the past, they were never controlled or by many Libyans for instigating and and the MFA have given assurances influenced by Ankara in the slightest. upholding a blockade of oil fields of their support to the UN-led political Initially they represented the Libya between 2013 and 2014. He now process; on the other, the security Dawn coalition which involves Islamists, supports the PC, mostly because of a apparatus has supported Haftar even the city-state of Misrata, and several personal disagreement with general when it was clear that he was on a other western cities (including parts Haftar that erupted early in 2015. It is collision course with UN-backed unity of the Amazigh minority). Both Ghwell unclear whether all of the PFG stands efforts. and Abusahmain have been hostile to behind Jadhran. the GNA and have been subjected to UNITED ARAB EMIRATES sanctions by the EU because of this. THE ISLAMIC STATE GROUP IN LIBYA Their support base has gradually shrunk Although sharing some of the same although they still retain some capacity Also called Tandhim ad-Dawla (the goals as Egypt, the UAE has a more to disrupt al-Sarraj’s activities here and Organisation of the State) by Libyans, ISIS nuanced position on the situation in there, particularly if popular support for now controls the central Mediterranean Libya. Reportedly, it has been more him decreases or if some of the militias coast of Libya around the city of Sirte. supportive of UN negotiations and now supporting him decide to switch It has carried out attacks in all major ultimately less engaged on Libya since sides. Libyan cities, including the capital Tripoli. its intervention in Yemen. Nevertheless, ISIS also has a presence in other parts Emirati weapons are still delivered to HAFTAR, AGUILA SALEH, AND THE of Libya, such as Derna, Benghazi and both Haftar and the militias of the city- TOBRUK POWER CENTRE Sabratha, although it has suffered state of Zintan, according to a report significant setbacks in all three cities from a UN panel of experts. Moreover, The link between the head of the armed since the beginning of the year. the UAE’s political influence should forces Khalifa Haftar and the Speaker not be underestimated. The Libyan of the Tobruk parliament Aguila Saleh REGIONAL ACTORS ambassador to Abu Dhabi, Aref al- Issa is very strong. Haftar rules from his Nayed, is ideologically one of the most headquarters in Marj (in eastern Libya) EGYPT important figures on the Tobruk side. and has strong military control over He was even touted as potential prime both the al-Bayda government and the No other Arab country plays as powerful minister at one point.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Haftar's Calculus for Libya: What Happened, and What Is Next? ICSR Insight by Inga Kristina Trauthig
    Haftar's Calculus for Libya: What Happened, and What is Next? ICSR Insight by Inga Kristina Trauthig In recent days, a battle for Tripoli has At the time of writing, fighting is been raging that bears the forlorn ongoing. On Sunday, 8 April, Tripoli’s possibility of regression for Libya as a only functioning civilian airport at Mitiga whole. A military offensive led by was forced to be evacuated as it was General Khalifa Haftar, commander of hit with air strikes attributed to the LNA. the so-called “Libyan National Army” These airstrikes took place the same (LNA) that mostly controls eastern day that the “Tripoli International Fair” Libya, was launched on April 3, to the occurred, signalling the formidable level dismay of much the international of resilience Libyans have attained after community. A few days after the launch eight years of turbulence following of the military campaign by Haftar, Qaddafi’s overthrow. some analysts have already concluded that “Libya is (…) [in] its third civil war since 2011”. The LNA forces first took the town of Gharyan, 100 km south of Tripoli, before advancing to the city’s outskirts. ICSR, Department of War Studies, King’s College London. All rights reserved. Haftar's Calculus for Libya: What Happened, and What is Next? ICSR Insight by Inga Kristina Trauthig What is happening? Haftar had been building his forces in central Libya for months. At the beginning of the year, he claimed to have “taken control” of southern Libya, indicating that he was prepping for an advance on the western part of Libya, the last piece missing.
    [Show full text]
  • The Crisis in Libya
    APRIL 2011 ISSUE BRIEF # 28 THE CRISIS IN LIBYA Ajish P Joy Introduction Libya, in the throes of a civil war, now represents the ugly facet of the much-hyped Arab Spring. The country, located in North Africa, shares its borders with the two leading Arab-Spring states, Egypt and Tunisia, along with Sudan, Tunisia, Chad, Niger and Algeria. It is also not too far from Europe. Italy lies to its north just across the Mediterranean. With an area of 1.8 million sq km, Libya is the fourth largest country in Africa, yet its population is only about 6.4 million, one of the lowest in the continent. Libya has nearly 42 billion barrels of oil in proven reserves, the ninth largest in the world. With a reasonably good per capita income of $14000, Libya also has the highest HDI (Human Development Index) in the African continent. However, Libya’s unemployment rate is high at 30 percent, taking some sheen off its economic credentials. Libya, a Roman colony for several centuries, was conquered by the Arab forces in AD 647 during the Caliphate of Utman bin Affan. Following this, Libya was ruled by the Abbasids and the Shite Fatimids till the Ottoman Empire asserted its control in 1551. Ottoman rule lasted for nearly four centuries ending with the Ottoman defeat in the Italian-Ottoman war. Consequently, Italy assumed control of Libya under the Treaty of 1 Lausanne (1912). The Italians ruled till their defeat in the Second World War. The Libyan constitution was enacted in 1949 and two years later under Mohammed Idris (who declared himself as Libya’s first King), Libya became an independent state.
    [Show full text]
  • Medical Conditions in the Western Desert and Tobruk
    CHAPTER 1 1 MEDICAL CONDITIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT AND TOBRU K ON S I D E R A T I O N of the medical and surgical conditions encountered C by Australian forces in the campaign of 1940-1941 in the Wester n Desert and during the siege of Tobruk embraces the various diseases me t and the nature of surgical work performed . In addition it must includ e some assessment of the general health of the men, which does not mean merely the absence of demonstrable disease . Matters relating to organisa- tion are more appropriately dealt with in a later chapter in which the lessons of the experiences in the Middle East are examined . As told in Chapter 7, the forward surgical work was done in a main dressing statio n during the battles of Bardia and Tobruk . It is admitted that a serious difficulty of this arrangement was that men had to be held for some tim e in the M.D.S., which put a brake on the movements of the field ambulance , especially as only the most severely wounded men were operated on i n the M.D.S. as a rule, the others being sent to a casualty clearing statio n at least 150 miles away . Dispersal of the tents multiplied the work of the staff considerably. SURGICAL CONDITIONS IN THE DESER T Though battle casualties were not numerous, the value of being able to deal with varied types of wounds was apparent . In the Bardia and Tobruk actions abdominal wounds were few. Major J.
    [Show full text]
  • WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN Sept-Nov1940 Begin Between the 10Th and 15Th October and to Be Concluded by Th E End of the Month
    CHAPTER 7 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIG N HEN, during the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations in 1929, M r W Bruce as Prime Minister of Australia emphasised that no treat y would be acceptable to the Commonwealth unless it adequately safeguarded the Suez Canal, he expressed that realisation of the significance of sea communications which informed Australian thoughts on defence . That significance lay in the fact that all oceans are but connected parts o f a world sea on which effective action by allies against a common enem y could only be achieved by a common strategy . It was as a result of a common strategy that in 1940 Australia ' s local naval defence was denude d to reinforce offensive strength at a more vital point, the Suez Canal an d its approaches. l No such common strategy existed between the Germans and the Italians, nor even between the respective dictators and thei r commanders-in-chief . Instead of regarding the sea as one and indivisible , the Italians insisted that the Mediterranean was exclusively an Italia n sphere, a conception which was at first endorsed by Hitler . The shelvin g of the plans for the invasion of England in the autumn of 1940 turne d Hitler' s thoughts to the complete subjugation of Europe as a preliminary to England ' s defeat. He became obsessed with the necessity to attack and conquer Russia . In viewing the Mediterranean in relation to German action he looked mainly to the west, to the entry of Spain into the war and th e capture of Gibraltar as part of the European defence plan .
    [Show full text]
  • Libyan Municipal Council Research 1
    Libyan Municipal Council Research 1. Detailed Methodology 2. Participation 3. Awareness 4. Knowledge 5. Communication 6. Service Delivery 7. Legitimacy 8. Drivers of Legitimacy 9. Focus Group Recommendations 10. Demographics Detailed Methodology • The survey was conducted on behalf of the International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research by Altai Consulting. This research is intended to support the development and evaluation of IRI and USAID/OTI Libya Transition Initiative programming with municipal councils. The research consisted of quantitative and qualitative components, conducted by IRI and USAID/OTI Libya Transition Initiative respectively. • Data was collected April 14 to May 24, 2016, and was conducted over the phone from Altai’s call center using computer-assisted telephone technology. • The sample was 2,671 Libyans aged 18 and over. • Quantitative: Libyans from the 22 administrative districts were interviewed on a 45-question questionnaire on municipal councils. In addition, 13 municipalities were oversampled to provide a more focused analysis on municipalities targeted by programming. Oversampled municipalities include: Tripoli Center (224), Souq al Jumaa (229), Tajoura (232), Abu Salim (232), Misrata (157), Sabratha (153), Benghazi (150), Bayda (101), Sabha (152), Ubari (102), Weddan (101), Gharyan (100) and Shahat (103). • The sample was post-weighted in order to ensure that each district corresponds to the latest population pyramid available on Libya (US Census Bureau Data, updated 2016) in order for the sample to be nationally representative. • Qualitative: 18 focus groups were conducted with 5-10 people of mixed employment status and level of education in Tripoli Center (men and women), Souq al Jumaa (men and women), Tajoura (men), Abu Salim (men), Misrata (men and women), Sabratha (men and women), Benghazi (men and women), Bayda (men), Sabha (men and women), Ubari (men), and Shahat (men).
    [Show full text]
  • Libya's Fight for Survival
    LIBYA’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL DEFEATING JIHADIST NETWORKS September 2015 ! ! ! TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD 3 ESSAY ONE COMPETING JIHADIST ORGANISATIONS AND NETWORKS 6 Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya Stefano Torelli and Arturo Varvelli ESSAY TWO POLITICAL PARTY OR ARMED FACTION? 31 The Future of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Valentina Colombo, Giuseppe Dentice and Arturo Varvelli ESSAY THREE MAPPING RADICAL ISLAMIST MILITIAS IN LIBYA 53 Wolfgang Pusztai and Arturo Varvelli ESSAY FOUR THE EXPLOITATION OF MIGRATION ROUTES TO EUROPE 73 Human Trafficking Through Areas of Libya Affected by Fundamentalism Nancy Porsia ABOUT THE AUTHORS 87 BIBLIOGRAPHY 89 2 LIBYA’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL DEFEATING JIHADIST NETWORKS LIBYA’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL 3 DEFEATING JIHADIST NETWORKS FOREWORD ! ! This publication is a compilation of four different essays, edited by Dr. Arturo Varvelli PhD, which from part of a series of studies undertaken by EFD to analyse the nature and spread of the phenomenon of radicalisation in the European Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods. It focuses on Libya and assesses the current situation on the ground through a number of diverse and varied prisms. It identifies patterns and trends as well as specific local and regional developments in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the situation of radicalisation in post-Ghadaffi Libya and the extent to which this may be contributing to regional as well as international instability Months of acute political turmoil in Libya following the fall of the Qaddafi regime, compounded by a weak national identity as well as legacies from the civil war in 2011 which ended Qaddafi’s 42-year rule, have resulted in Libya becoming a failed state with a strong radical Islamist presence.
    [Show full text]
  • IMC Libya Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Assessment Report
    IMC Libya Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Assessment Report November 2011 Prepared by: Dr. Inka Weissbecker, IMC Global Mental Health and Psychosocial Advisor ([email protected]) and Colleen Fitzgerald, MSW, IMC Libya MHPSS Program Manager ([email protected]) 1 | P a g e Contents 1. Assessment Goals II. Psychiatric Services in General Hospitals 2. Assessment Methodology III. Mental Health Services through General Health 2.1. Site Visits, Interviews and Focus Group Clinics Discussions IV. Informal Service Providers 2.2. Assessment Instruments Local Non-Governmental Organizations 3. Assessment Results The School System 3.1. Sociopolitical Context and Recent Developments Traditional Healers 3.1.1. Recent Crisis in Libya V. Self-Care 3.1.2. International Medical Corps in Libya 3.4. The Educational System and Training 3.2. Mental Health and Psychosocial Context Opportunities 3.2.1. Prevalence of Mental Illness 3.4.1. Medical Professions 3.2.2. At Risk and Vulnerable Groups 3.4.2. Psychologists and Social Workers 3.2.2. Mental Health Related Problems, Coping and 3.5. International Organizations Involved in MHPSS Community Sources of Support Work 3.2.3. Attitudes Towards People with Mental Illness 4. Conclusions 3.2.4. Help-Seeking Patterns 5. References 3.3. The Mental Health System 6. Appendixes 3.3.1. General Health Care Appendix 1: MH PHC Integration Checklist 3.3.2. Mental Health Care in Affected Areas Appendix 2: Tool for Mental Health Related Problems, I. Inpatient Psychiatric Facilities Coping and Community Sources of Support 1. Assessment Goals The aim of this assessment was to: obtain an understanding of the mental health context (e.g.
    [Show full text]
  • REVIEW of the TERRORIST ATTACKS on U.S. FACILITIES in BENGHAZI, LIBYA, SEPTEMBER 11-12,2012
    LLIGE - REVIEW of the TERRORIST ATTACKS ON U.S. FACILITIES IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA, SEPTEMBER 11-12,2012 together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS January 15, 2014 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE United States Senate 113 th Congress SSCI Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012 I. PURPOSE OF TIDS REPORT The purpose of this report is to review the September 11-12, 2012, terrorist attacks against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya. This review by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter "SSCI" or "the Committee") focuses primarily on the analy~is by and actions of the Intelligence Community (IC) leading up to, during, and immediately following the attacks. The report also addresses, as appropriate, other issues about the attacks as they relate to the Department ofDefense (DoD) and Department of State (State or State Department). It is important to acknowledge at the outset that diplomacy and intelligence collection are inherently risky, and that all risk cannot be eliminated. Diplomatic and intelligence personnel work in high-risk locations all over the world to collect information necessary to prevent future attacks against the United States and our allies. Between 1998 (the year of the terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania) and 2012, 273 significant attacks were carried out against U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel. 1 The need to place personnel in high-risk locations carries significant vulnerabilities for the United States. The Conimittee intends for this report to help increase security and reduce the risks to our personnel serving overseas and to better explain what happened before, during, and after the attacks.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya's Conflict
    LIBYA’S BRIEF / 12 CONFLICT Nov 2019 A very short introduction SERIES by Wolfgang Pusztai Freelance security and policy analyst * INTRODUCTION Eight years after the revolution, Libya is in the mid- dle of a civil war. For more than four years, inter- national conflict resolution efforts have centred on the UN-sponsored Libya Political Agreement (LPA) process,1 unfortunately without achieving any break- through. In fact, the situation has even deteriorated Summary since the onset of Marshal Haftar’s attack on Tripoli on 4 April 2019.2 › Libya is a failed state in the middle of a civil war and increasingly poses a threat to the An unstable Libya has wide-ranging impacts: as a safe whole region. haven for terrorists, it endangers its north African neighbours, as well as the wider Sahara region. But ter- › The UN-facilitated stabilisation process was rorists originating from or trained in Libya are also a unsuccessful because it ignored key political threat to Europe, also through the radicalisation of the actors and conflict aspects on the ground. Libyan expatriate community (such as the Manchester › While partially responsible, international Arena bombing in 2017).3 Furthermore, it is one of the interference cannot be entirely blamed for most important transit countries for migrants on their this failure. way to Europe. Through its vast oil wealth, Libya is also of significant economic relevance for its neigh- › Stabilisation efforts should follow a decen- bours and several European countries. tralised process based on the country’s for- mer constitution. This Conflict Series Brief focuses on the driving factors › Wherever there is a basic level of stability, of conflict dynamics in Libya and on the shortcomings fostering local security (including the crea- of the LPA in addressing them.
    [Show full text]
  • Gaddafi Supporters Since 2011
    Country Policy and Information Note Libya: Actual or perceived supporters of former President Gaddafi Version 3.0 April 2019 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the basis of claim section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment on whether, in general: • A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm • A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) • A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory • Claims are likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and • If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts. Country of origin information The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2013.
    [Show full text]
  • A Strategy for Success in Libya
    A Strategy for Success in Libya Emily Estelle NOVEMBER 2017 A Strategy for Success in Libya Emily Estelle NOVEMBER 2017 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE © 2017 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Contents Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................1 Why the US Must Act in Libya Now ............................................................................................................................1 Wrong Problem, Wrong Strategy ............................................................................................................................... 2 What to Do ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2 Reframing US Policy in Libya .................................................................................................. 5 America’s Opportunity in Libya ................................................................................................................................. 6 The US Approach in Libya ............................................................................................................................................ 6 The Current Situation
    [Show full text]
  • How the EU Is Facing Crises in Its Neighbourhood Evidence from Libya and Ukraine
    How the EU is facing crises in its neighbourhood Evidence from Libya and Ukraine Deliverable 6.1 (Version 1; 31.03.2017) Prepared by: Project acronym: EUNPACK Project full title: Good intentions, mixed results – A conflict sensitive unpacking of the EU comprehensive approach to conflict and crisis mechanisms Grant agreement no.: 693337 Type of action: Research and Innovation Action Project start date: 01 April 2016 Project duration: 36 months Call topic: H2020-INT-05-2015 Project website: www.eunpack.eu Document: How the EU is facing crises in its neighbourhood: evidence from Libya and Ukraine Deliverable number: 6.1 Deliverable title: Working paper on EU policies towards Libya and Ukraine Due date of deliverable: 31.03.2017 Actual submission date: 31.03.2017 Editors: Luca Raineri, Alessandra Russo, Anne Harrington Authors: Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik, Roman Petrov, Luca Raineri, Pernille Rieker, Alessandra Russo, Francesco Strazzari Reviewers: Morten Bøås, Participating beneficiaries: SSSUP, JMCK, NUPI, IRMC Work Package no.: 6 Work Package title: Crisis response in the neighbourhood area Work Package leader: Francesco Strazzari Work Package participants: SSSUP, JMCK, NUPI, IRMC, UManchester Estimated person‐months for deliverable: 5 Dissemination level: Public Nature: Report Version: 1 Draft/Final: Final No. of pages (including cover): 65 Keywords: European neighbourhood, Libya, Ukraine, crisis 2 How the EU is facing crises in its neighbourhood Evidence from Libya and Ukraine EUNPACK Paper Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik, Roman Petrov, Luca Raineri, Pernille Rieker, Alessandra Russo, 1 Francesco Strazzari 1 This paper was prepared in the context of the EUNPACK project (A conflict-sensitive unpacking of the EU comprehensive approach to conflict and crises mechanism), funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no.
    [Show full text]