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ADVANCE to BENGHAZI PT E R the Swift Fall of Tobruk a Rapid Move

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ADVANCE to BENGHAZI PT E R the Swift Fall of Tobruk a Rapid Move CHAPTER 8 ADVANCE TO BENGHAZ I PT E R the swift fall of Tobruk a rapid move against Dema and Mechil i A was begun with the dual object of taking these places and roundin g up remaining Italian troops in Cyrenaica . In Tobruk there was much to be done; in addition to the colossal problems of feeding, hygiene an d transport of so many Italian prisoners, there was the task of making th e town fit for use as a harbour of strategic importance . The possession of Tobruk by the attackers would simplify problems of transportation, fo r most of the vehicles of the force were now decrepit, and a sea base woul d assist greatly in the dash westward to Derna and beyond . The medical arrangements had to allow for the service of the Tobruk area itself, for the provision of a forward base for casualties of the engagements pending , and for the field requirements of the force pursuing the Italians . FROM TOBRUK TO DERNA The 16th Brigade of the 6th Australian Division was left temporarily in Tobruk, and on 25th January Major Saxby was appointed as A .D.M.S. of the town area and Major Dawkins took his place as D.A.D.M.S. of the 6th Division. For the present we must leave the internal economy o f Tobruk area, and see what other dispositions of the Australian medica l services were necessary. Colonel Disher explored the town's medica l possibilities and during the 25th and 26th January examined the whole position in consultation with Colonel Smyth, D .D.M.S., XIII Corps . He also took the opportunity of reviewing the events of the last few days with the staffs of the field units so that the lessons of the action might b e clearly realised by all who participated . The main dressing station of the 2/ 1st Ambulance moved into a suitabl e building in the main street of the town, with "B" Company of the 2/7t h Ambulance attached . Smyth agreed that the first Australian surgical tea m should go to this M.D.S., and that patients could be sent there from the rest station which had been set up by the remainder of the 2/7th Fiel d Ambulance to serve the 17th Brigade area . No moves of medical units were put into effect immediately after th e Tobruk action, but motor ambulances were distributed among convoy s to go forward, and warnings of possible movements were given. It was apparent that events in forward areas might call for rapid adjustment o f the available field medical units . The 2/2nd Field Ambulance after satis- fying some urgent requirements from the excellent Italian equipment in Tobruk, was ready to move on towards Derna and with "A" Company o f the 2/7th Ambulance left in a strangely varied collection of vehicles . On 25th January Fumell set up an M .D.S. twenty miles from Derna . The headquarters of the 2/7th Field Ambulance was then in tents along th e main road to the west, leaving the operating team with the 2/1st M .D.S. in Tobruk . 158 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T The field operating centre which had performed the surgical work fo r the forward areas during the assault on Tobruk was of course now no longer forward in location. It had fulfilled a final function in holdin g patients not able to travel, and now somewhat attenuated, held only eight patients. These men were moved by motor ambulance on 25th January so as to allow the rear party of the 2/7th Field Ambulance to rejoin the headquarters of the parent unit . Dental officers and staff attached to field ambulances were sent back to the divisional rest area for th e time being, where they were able to do valuable work . A building was also chosen in Tobruk as suitable for a casualty clearin g station, and later for a hospital ; there was accommodation here for nurses. During the temporary lull in the Bardia-Tobruk area, arrangements wer e made to evacuate Italians from the hospitals, and send them by road t o Bardia, if able to travel . Others waited the arrival of ships in Tobruk . It was now possible for sick and wounded from the British armoured division, as well as Australian casualties, to pass back through the Aus- tralian units . Meanwhile British and Australian forces had advanced on Dern a seventy-five miles westward from Tobruk, while most of the British wen t to Mechili . The Italians had a strong force of defenders round the pleasan t seaside town of Derna, which lies on a flat area at the foot of the steep escarpment. Access to the town from both east and west was by a steep winding road. On the eastern side the hairpin bends rivalled or surpassed the "Seven Sisters" well-known to travellers to Jerusalem . A difficult feature of the topography was the presence of unusually deep and pre- cipitous ravines : of these the most formidable obstacle was the Wad i Dema, on the eastern side, regarded by the Italians as a natural defence. Thirty miles south-west of Dema the Italian armour defended the inlan d routes. The British armoured division, reduced considerably by the great strain of their vehicles and relying on reinforcements expected durin g February, advanced to meet the Italian force at Mechili . To the 6th Division was assigned the task of taking Derna : the 16th Brigade had bee n left in Tobruk. The 19th Brigade proceeded towards Derna, and by mid - night on the 25th January most of one company of the 2/4th Battalion had crossed the Wadi Derna, which did not prove so formidable a n obstacle as the Italians had hoped, and had taken up positions on the far side with little enemy resistance . So far as the medical services were concerned, the whole position was tactically different from that in Bardi a and Tobruk. Any stiff resistance in Mechili and Derna would necessitate the establishment of two main dressing stations thirty miles apart and the supply of field ambulances for two sectors . This would be difficult to carry out with transport as shaky as it was . With the vehicles available the fiel d ambulances could only move men and material separately, and were thus forced to duplicate each move . Reinforcements were needed too ; the 2/1st Field Ambulance was forty-one men short, and the 2/2nd Fiel d Ambulance almost as many . ADVANCE TO BENGHAZI 159 A different type of country lay ahead . The 2/2nd Field Ambulance occupied an open site twenty miles from Derna in hilly country intersecte d by gullies and dotted with trees . The risks of air raids called for dispersal of tents and provision of slit trenches. This was demonstrated by earl y experiences in the area . Lieut-Colonel Furnell was able to save the life of one man by digital pressure of the brachial artery while sheltering hi m in a slit trench and then getting him to a dressing station. In spite of these hostile demonstrations the Italians did not seem likely to put up a stron g resistance, and the attacking forces were on a tide of victory . As the onward movement was expected to be quick, the British and Australia n troops would be medically served by mobile sections of field ambulances , which had proved their worth, and by their use would also ease some o f the strain on transport. When Disher moved up with the divisional headquarters on 27th January to the Derna area he found the 2/ 1st Field Ambulance stagin g post, about twenty miles on from Tobruk, in working order ; in the same area a British surgical team was established . A little over twenty mile s from Dema was the M .D.S. of the 2/2nd Field Ambulance with "B" Company of the 2/7th Ambulance still attached, well dispersed in ope n country. In front of them were three mobile sections each with a battalion . Here no definite advanced dressing station was established, for in thi s country the mobile sections were regarded of greater value than the con- ventional and relatively less mobile parent units. The vehicles of the 2/2n d Field Ambulance were found to be very lame indeed, as were those o f many units : drivers accepted towing and being towed with resignation . It was now found that the position ahead was still uncertain, thoug h rumours were current that the Italians had evacuated Mechili . Smyth could not state plans more accurately at this stage, but agreed that it wa s wise to bring up two surgical teams to Tmimi staging post, in the regio n of the little coastal town of Bomba . This post was the junction for clearing the Derna and Mechili areas . Accordingly Major Smith 's Australian team and a British team were brought up, the latter to clear the British armoure d division. The weather was very bad again, with wind of gale force an d clouds of dust. But in spite of uncomfortable conditions, and uncertaint y about the exact position there were some indications that no stiff engage- ment lay ahead. Notwithstanding this hope, no chances were taken. Some of the areas around Derna were very difficult . Both the 17th and 19th Brigade areas presented problems in the rendering of medical services . In the deep wadis, particularly Wadi Derna, precipitous slopes could b e escaped only by detours . Mines and booby traps were a hazard in spite of precautions, as for instance when Captain J .
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