ADVANCE to BENGHAZI PT E R the Swift Fall of Tobruk a Rapid Move

CHAPTER 8

ADVANCE TO BENGHAZ I

PT E R the swift fall of Tobruk a rapid move against Dema and Mechil i A was begun with the dual object of taking these places and roundin g up remaining Italian troops in Cyrenaica . In Tobruk there was much to be done; in addition to the colossal problems of feeding, hygiene an d transport of so many Italian prisoners, there was the task of making th e town fit for use as a harbour of strategic importance . The possession of Tobruk by the attackers would simplify problems of transportation, fo r most of the vehicles of the force were now decrepit, and a sea base woul d assist greatly in the dash westward to Derna and beyond . The medical arrangements had to allow for the service of the Tobruk area itself, for the provision of a forward base for casualties of the engagements pending , and for the field requirements of the force pursuing the Italians . FROM TOBRUK TO DERNA The 16th Brigade of the 6th Australian Division was left temporarily in Tobruk, and on 25th January Major Saxby was appointed as A .D.M.S. of the town area and Major Dawkins took his place as D.A.D.M.S. of the 6th Division. For the present we must leave the internal economy o f Tobruk area, and see what other dispositions of the Australian medica l services were necessary. Colonel Disher explored the town's medica l possibilities and during the 25th and 26th January examined the whole position in consultation with Colonel Smyth, D .D.M.S., XIII Corps . He also took the opportunity of reviewing the events of the last few days with the staffs of the field units so that the lessons of the action might b e clearly realised by all who participated . The main dressing station of the 2/ 1st Ambulance moved into a suitabl e building in the main street of the town, with "B" Company of the 2/7t h Ambulance attached . Smyth agreed that the first Australian surgical tea m should go to this M.D.S., and that patients could be sent there from the rest station which had been set up by the remainder of the 2/7th Fiel d Ambulance to serve the 17th Brigade area . No moves of medical units were put into effect immediately after th e Tobruk action, but motor ambulances were distributed among convoy s to go forward, and warnings of possible movements were given. It was apparent that events in forward areas might call for rapid adjustment o f the available field medical units . The 2/2nd Field Ambulance after satis- fying some urgent requirements from the excellent Italian equipment in Tobruk, was ready to move on towards Derna and with "A" Company o f the 2/7th Ambulance left in a strangely varied collection of vehicles . On 25th January Fumell set up an M .D.S. twenty miles from Derna . The headquarters of the 2/7th Field Ambulance was then in tents along th e main road to the west, leaving the operating team with the 2/1st M .D.S. in Tobruk .

158 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T The field operating centre which had performed the surgical work fo r the forward areas during the assault on Tobruk was of course now no longer forward in location. It had fulfilled a final function in holdin g patients not able to travel, and now somewhat attenuated, held only eight patients. These men were moved by motor ambulance on 25th January so as to allow the rear party of the 2/7th Field Ambulance to rejoin the headquarters of the parent unit . Dental officers and staff attached to field ambulances were sent back to the divisional rest area for th e time being, where they were able to do valuable work . A building was also chosen in Tobruk as suitable for a casualty clearin g station, and later for a hospital ; there was accommodation here for nurses. During the temporary lull in the Bardia-Tobruk area, arrangements wer e made to evacuate Italians from the hospitals, and send them by road t o Bardia, if able to travel . Others waited the arrival of ships in Tobruk . It was now possible for sick and wounded from the British armoured division, as well as Australian casualties, to pass back through the Aus- tralian units . Meanwhile British and Australian forces had advanced on Dern a seventy-five miles westward from Tobruk, while most of the British wen t to Mechili . The Italians had a strong force of defenders round the pleasan t seaside town of Derna, which lies on a flat area at the foot of the steep escarpment. Access to the town from both east and west was by a steep winding road. On the eastern side the hairpin bends rivalled or surpassed the "Seven Sisters" well-known to travellers to Jerusalem . A difficult feature of the topography was the presence of unusually deep and precipitous ravines : of these the most formidable obstacle was the Wad i Dema, on the eastern side, regarded by the Italians as a natural defence. Thirty miles south-west of Dema the Italian armour defended the inlan d routes. The British armoured division, reduced considerably by the great strain of their vehicles and relying on reinforcements expected durin g February, advanced to meet the Italian force at Mechili . To the 6th Division was assigned the task of taking Derna : the 16th Brigade had bee n left in Tobruk. The 19th Brigade proceeded towards Derna, and by mid - night on the 25th January most of one company of the 2/4th Battalion had crossed the Wadi Derna, which did not prove so formidable a n obstacle as the Italians had hoped, and had taken up positions on the far side with little enemy resistance . So far as the medical services were concerned, the whole position was tactically different from that in Bardi a and Tobruk. Any stiff resistance in Mechili and Derna would necessitate the establishment of two main dressing stations thirty miles apart and the supply of field ambulances for two sectors . This would be difficult to carry out with transport as shaky as it was . With the vehicles available the fiel d ambulances could only move men and material separately, and were thus forced to duplicate each move . Reinforcements were needed too ; the 2/1st Field Ambulance was forty-one men short, and the 2/2nd Fiel d Ambulance almost as many .

ADVANCE TO BENGHAZI 159 A different type of country lay ahead . The 2/2nd Field Ambulance occupied an open site twenty miles from Derna in hilly country intersecte d by gullies and dotted with trees . The risks of air raids called for dispersal of tents and provision of slit trenches. This was demonstrated by earl y experiences in the area . Lieut-Colonel Furnell was able to save the life of one man by digital pressure of the brachial artery while sheltering hi m in a slit trench and then getting him to a dressing station. In spite of these hostile demonstrations the Italians did not seem likely to put up a stron g resistance, and the attacking forces were on a tide of victory . As the onward movement was expected to be quick, the British and Australia n troops would be medically served by mobile sections of field ambulances , which had proved their worth, and by their use would also ease some o f the strain on transport. When Disher moved up with the divisional headquarters on 27th January to the Derna area he found the 2/ 1st Field Ambulance stagin g post, about twenty miles on from Tobruk, in working order ; in the same area a British surgical team was established . A little over twenty mile s from Dema was the M .D.S. of the 2/2nd Field Ambulance with "B" Company of the 2/7th Ambulance still attached, well dispersed in ope n country. In front of them were three mobile sections each with a battalion . Here no definite advanced dressing station was established, for in thi s country the mobile sections were regarded of greater value than the con- ventional and relatively less mobile parent units. The vehicles of the 2/2n d Field Ambulance were found to be very lame indeed, as were those o f many units : drivers accepted towing and being towed with resignation . It was now found that the position ahead was still uncertain, thoug h rumours were current that the Italians had evacuated Mechili . Smyth could not state plans more accurately at this stage, but agreed that it wa s wise to bring up two surgical teams to Tmimi staging post, in the regio n of the little coastal town of Bomba . This post was the junction for clearing the Derna and Mechili areas . Accordingly Major Smith 's Australian team and a British team were brought up, the latter to clear the British armoure d division. The weather was very bad again, with wind of gale force an d clouds of dust. But in spite of uncomfortable conditions, and uncertaint y about the exact position there were some indications that no stiff engagement lay ahead. Notwithstanding this hope, no chances were taken. Some of the areas around Derna were very difficult . Both the 17th and 19th Brigade areas presented problems in the rendering of medical services . In the deep wadis, particularly Wadi Derna, precipitous slopes could b e escaped only by detours . Mines and booby traps were a hazard in spite of precautions, as for instance when Captain J . J. Ryan had to attend men in the open under shell and machine-gun fire after foremost troops ha d walked into a mine . The news of the Italian escape from Mechili was confirmed . The 7th British Armoured Division had not succeeded in encircling the Italia n armour, but this was no longer an obstacle to progress, as it was disperse d over the inland desert tracks leading westward . This altered the situation,

160 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAST and the Headquarters Company of the 2/7th Field Ambulance, which had reached Ain el Gazala on 27th January, was now not needed a t Mechili. On 28th January the position continued to be indefinite, and the field medical units were still dispersed over considerable distances, though i n the main converging on Derna. The headquarters of the 2/1st Field Ambulance was in Tobruk, but its other companies were moving up , one to relieve the company of 2/2nd Ambulance at the Tmimi stagin g post, the other to be attached to the 2/7th Ambulance . The headquarters and "A" Company of the 2/2nd Ambulance were still east of Derna , with mobile sections out with the 19th Brigade, and was being joined by its "B" Company on relief : "A" Company of the 2/7th Ambulance wa s still attached here while the main body of the unit was coming up t o Derna. It will be seen that, although the sub-division and attachment of the components of these units might seem a complicated arrangement, it afforded means of caring for considerable numbers of casualties, shoul d these occur at Derna, and yet a redistribution or recrystallisation could be made at any time to provide service for the force when it was free to move on westward after the disintegrating Italian forces . On the 29th the Tmimi staging post was set up with a surgical team attached, under Julian Smith , and a blood bank in charge of Lieutenant Harrington, R.A.M.C. Colonel Smyth arranged to have blood flown to the landing ground at Tmimi . The armoured division had an A.D.S. at Mechili, so all needs were covered. THE ENTRY INTO DERNA The position was changed on 30th January when a patrol of the 2/11t h Battalion entered Derna without opposition. The main road into Derna had been destroyed in one place by the Italians, but engineers promised a speedy repair within twenty-four hours . The collapse of Derna meant that there would be onward movement, and that medical units could no w be established in the town to act as a forward medical base . In the mean- time the use of three rooms in a building near the aerodrome was obtained , and "B" Company of the 2/7th Ambulance moved forward to set up a n A.D.S. The remainder of this unit was held there with the object o f entering Derna as soon as possible . Three drivers and a mobile sectio n were also sent on foot into Derna to make contact with the R .M.O. of the 2/11th Battalion, Captain Ryan, and to try to acquire vehicles tha t would serve as ambulances for the use of the dressing station being established in Derna . They could then evacuate the sick from the R .A.P. to the dressing station, drive the patients to the break in the road, and carry them by hand across the gap to a post on the other side whenc e they could be taken by ambulance to the 2/7th Field Ambulanc e advanced dressing station, and thence to the main station farther back. Casualties were not expected but arrangements were necessary, for injuries from land mines might be encountered at any time. Now that safer use of good or fairly good roads was possible, a despatch rider was found very useful, working from the 2/2nd Field Ambulance,

ADVANCE TO BENGHAZI 161 though the ambulance convoy cars were also most helpful in taking messages. On 31st January the engineers, faithful to their promises, ha d the road to Derna open . The 2/7th Field Ambulance formed an M.D.S. there in an admirable Italian hospital building, which had been occupie d by the detachment sent in advance . This building had 200 beds and room for 100 more, ideal for a hospital or C.C.S. There were other hospitals available in this attractive town, which was found rather dirty but wa s soon cleaned up. The Arabs not only defiled but looted Derna, and the fleeing Italians added to the confusion. Early action was necessary to prevent further looting . Le Souef's ambulance had the additional task o f taking an inventory of the medical supplies available in Derna . These Italian supplies, left undisturbed after evacuation by the enemy, prove d most helpful, and tided our services over many shortages . Exact location s of units were not easy to work out . The advance had been too rapid fo r the supply of maps to keep pace with it, and only a few captured Italia n maps were available. There were no casualties though there were som e extensive minefields . The divisional area extended from Tobruk to Dern a and on 31st January the headquarters moved to Martuba, south of Derna . Medically it was covered by three field ambulances .

ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES During January important changes had been made in the general administration of the A.I.F. in the Middle East. Brigadier S . R. Burston, as D.M.S., A.I.F. was responsible for A .I.F. medical administration as a whole; Colonel W. W. S. Johnston and Major W. P. MacCallum were appointed as D.D.M.S. and D.A.D.M.S. respectively of the I Australian Corps, and Colonel J . Steigrad became A.D.M.S. of the base area i n Palestine. The Australian troops under corps control were widely dispersed, and included the 6th and 7th Divisions, and the newly formed 9t h Division drawn partly from units just returned from England. On the 28th January the corps headquarters started for Ikingi Maryut, where i t was to be located before moving to Cyrenaica to take command there . On the 30th the 2/5th Australian Field Ambulance arrived in Tobruk , thus freeing the 2/1st Ambulance for forward movement . The 2/5th under command of Lieut-Colonel A . H. Green was attached to an advanc e party of the 18th Brigade of the 7th Australian Division . Two corps units were also being moved to Tobruk, the 2/2nd C .C.S. from Bardia, and the 2/3rd Field Hygiene Section which would then relieve the 2/1s t Field Hygiene Section for work in forward areas . In a conference hel d at Cairo on 30th January between the British and Australian medical administrators the plan of bringing up an Australian hospital to Tobru k was also discussed, so as to allow the C .C.S. to move up into Cyrenaica at a later date.

CONDITIONS AT DERNA Meanwhile medical affairs were being stabilised in Derna . Now that things were quieter there, the question of dental work was raised by

162 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T Colonel J . E. Down, A.D.M.S. Dental, who had just arrived . Even in these early days the problem of dental work in forward areas was seriously debated. On the one hand dental officers were valuable for emergency work with field ambulances. Australian dental officers had been appreciated not only by Australian but British troops, in spite of meagre supplies, for some dental material had been left behind at Sidi Haneis h owing to lack of transport vehicles with other much regretted medica l equipment and stores. Further, dental officers had proved most valuable during the stressful times in action in field ambulances and had assiste d in theatres and given anaesthetics ably and over long periods. On the other hand it is admitted that only emergency dental work can be don e during these times and meanwhile the much needed maintenance dental work, which can really be properly carried out only in areas where me n can be spared and circumstances are more favourable, steadily accumu- lated. The excellent facilities provided by the buildings in Derna and the ordnance and medical supplies collected for hospital use made the site a valuable one for a forward C .C.S., so the 2/7th Field Ambulance was deputed to act as such. Any augmentations of staff were to be made up from a British field ambulance or the 2/5th Australian Field Ambulanc e when these came up. This would allow patients evacuated from the division to recuperate for a day or two amid pleasant surroundings befor e passing on to the much barer tented hospital in Tobruk. Two surgical teams could be concentrated in the hospital building where there wer e two modern well fitted operating theatres. There was only one doubt, whether evacuation would be difficult over the secondary roads, especially from the 17th Brigade area on the inland flank, but on examination it seemed that even these roads were better than some recently used . The motor ambulance convoy would have no trouble in evacuating direct t o Tobruk and patients able to be returned to their units would be sent to a base reception camp at Tobruk. It had been found that rest camps or similar organisations were of grea t value in saving manpower even if established for a few days only . Once a soldier was on the "X list " through illness, and made the long trek to a hospital in the base area, a still longer trek awaited him and a considerabl e loss of time before he regained his unit . In this case, after discharge from hospital in Egypt he would go to the base depot in Palestine before h e was redrafted . This moving of men over the chessboard, sometimes per - forming the "Knight 's Gambit" as Colonel Butler pointed out in th e 1914-1918 war, is one of the great difficulties in the relations of medical services with manpower . With a rapidly moving force, great distances , difficult country and meagre transport facilities, it is small wonder tha t such problems arise. R.A.M.C. personnel were better off in this respect , as it was competent for the D .D.M.S. of a corps to recommend up t o fourteen days furlough without placing a man on the "X list" . Australian medical administrators at times wished that they could do this with their own officers . The ruling at this time was that a soldier was placed on the

ADVANCE TO BENGHAZI 163 "X list" if admitted to a hospital but not if admitted to a camp receptio n station. In order to save wear and tear on the ambulance cars up and dow n the long winding hill into Derna it was arranged that the 2/2nd Fiel d Ambulance use their own transport to send patients only as far as th e top of the escarpment where a relay from Derna would pick them up . In the brief period before the next move took place, opportunity wa s taken to send a company of the 2/ 1st Field Ambulance to help establis h the hospital at Derna . This help was welcome, but really another purpos e was served, for it enabled more of the hard-worked ambulance men to enjoy such amenities as pleasant scenery and much wanted hot baths . Units closer to the sea had also not neglected opportunities of sea bathing . Care was specially necessary about drinking water, and the routines wer e checked with more than usual caution, as cases of typhoid fever had bee n detected among prisoners.

THE PURSUIT TO BENGHAZ I The immediate task of the attacking force was the pursuit of a rapidl y retiring enemy. The 19th and 17th Brigades pressed on, leaving the 16th Brigade in the Tobruk area, still guarding prisoners and clearing an d salvaging very considerable quantities of useful material . Visions of a pleasant sojourn in the neighbourhood of Derna vanished with the retreat- ing enemy: the two brigades converged on Giovanni Berta on foot, th e 17th coming up from the south . Touch was lost with the Italians, and when the tired infantry reached Giovanni Berta there were none to resist the m either in this neat little town or in neighbouring settlements . On 2nd February arrangements were made for the brigades to go forward in vehicles, and the A.D.M.S. had to make his dispositions in accordanc e with the heightened movement . From the 31st January to 3rd February the 17th Brigade marched more than seventy miles over stony ground, an d arrived with sore feet and tired bodies. Many of the men complained tha t the army issue socks were hard and hurt their feet; private supplies of home-made socks were shared with happier results . On 3rd February the M.D.S. of the 2/2nd Field Ambulance was sited south of Giovnan i Berta, with a good road to Derna . During the night light rain fell and the gathering clouds promised more. The countryside was more fertile here ; at first undulating with rocky outcrops, farther on it was more cultivated , with arable land and orchards with almond trees in blossom . On the 4th, the 2/7th Field Ambulance moved on with the 19t h Brigade, and hospital arrangements in Derna were taken over by a Britis h field ambulance . On this date the British armoured division was south o f Benghazi, after a rapid dash across the desert . From now onwards movement was almost incessant . All the ambulance convoy cars were needed west and south-west of Derna to keep up with the enemy 's retreat, and special arrangements were made by Smyth for British ambulance convo y cars on the Derna-Tobruk run . The northern road from Derna ran through Cyrene to Barce ; this had suffered severe damage, therefore the

164 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T alternative road was used, running inland through Slonta, Marawa and Tecnis. The almost continuous movement made it more than ever necessary to look ahead . Thus in establishing an A.D.S. of the 2/2nd Field Ambulance west of Giovanni Berta the site had to be considered as a possible M .D.S. for the future, and later as a staging post for rearward evacuations. Vehicles continued to show the stress of the campaign an d breakdowns were frequent . The 2/7th Field Ambulance was now largely dependent on captured vehicles. These formed half the establishment of the 2/2nd Field Ambulance and the 2/ 1st Field Ambulance also had some. An effort was now made to have the scattered rearward medical post s relieved from the eastern areas, so that they might concentrate the unit s stretched like elastic over many miles ahead . The 2/7th Ambulance during this phase had its elements scattered over a distance of more than a hundred miles. On 5th February the main body of the 2/2nd Field Ambulance moved some sixty miles to Slonta, and while the divisiona l headquarters moved from Slonta to Tecnis, the 19th Brigade went on to Barce. Fortunately there were very few casualties, those being chiefly du e to injuries by mines . Furnell acquired some good equipment, including a good folding operating table and other supplies . By this time the 19th Brigade was nearing Benghazi, and there wa s difficulty apparent in assembling even a composite field ambulance to service it. Advance British troops had now reached as far as El Agheila, far past Benghazi, and on the 6th a British and Australian party entered the town of Benghazi, whose surrender was formally taken next mornin g by Brigadier H . C. H. Robertson of the 19th Brigade. Rain was a more formidable obstacle to the oncoming 6th Division than the enemy at thi s stage, heavy downpours slowed progress and bogged vehicles . However, the main parties of the 2/2nd and 2/7th Field Ambulances managed to reach Tecnis and were pressing on. An unfortunate delay occurred here when Major M . A. Rees, O.C. "A" Company, 2/2nd Field Ambulance , who had been placed under orders of the 19th Brigade, was left strande d on the top of a pass waiting instructions . Disher took it upon himself to order them forward . With great toil this was accomplished throughou t the night; practically every vehicle had to be manhandled out of a bog , only to be bogged again. It was reported that in some of the vehicles i n difficulties radiators and even engines were exchanged during these trying weather conditions. Disher and Dawkins pressed on, and thus missed the worst of the rain and mud of this more fertile countryside, and after a n uncomfortable journey reached El Abiar by nightfall . Here they found that the 19th Brigade was moving on past Benina, towards Ghemines, thirty miles south of Benghazi . The only medical care of the brigade was supplied by the R .M.Os. and a mobile section attached to each battalion , and Disher therefore suggested to senior divisional officers that they shoul d try to make contact with any other ambulance parties which coul d strengthen the medical position .

ADVANCE TO BENGHAZI 165 Early next day, 7th February, Captain Dorney of the 2/2nd Fiel d Ambulance reached Benina, and leaving most of his mobile section ther e without transport travelled right on to Ghemines, where Dawkins established a post with only a single battalion ahead . Captain H . C. Johnston's mobile section of the 2/2nd Field Ambulance was not far behind an d was used to supplement a post organised by Dawkins in a school. The rest of the ambulance was still in the rear toiling through mud . The rein- forcing medical parties thus arrived promptly to serve the 19th Brigade , though by this time the Italian forces had ceased to resist . There were no Australian casualties ; only a few Italians needed attention . Had circumstances been different there might have been more serious cause fo r anxiety. Though the value of mobile sections had been again demonstrated in supporting a rapidly moving occupying force, the positio n became hazardous when the fast moving body of troops was anywher e up to fifty miles away from the main body of the field ambulance . Some possible drawbacks to the brigading of field ambulances were apparent, in particular the risk of the brigade losing contact . It was therefore desirable that the A.D .M.S. should keep informed of the movements of hi s ambulances. By this time the 2/1st Field Ambulance was freed from its obligation s in Tobruk and on 9th February, after delays with bad roads and the problem of obtaining enough petrol, "B" Company arrived at Barce and next day went on to Benghazi . Hither they had been preceded by the commander, Lieut-Colonel Cunningham, who was appointed senio r medical officer of Benghazi . He chose the La Salle Hospital as a suitabl e site for an M.D.S. and arranged to open 200 beds . The first patients were admitted on 11th February and two surgical teams, one British and one Australian, were ready to begin work . The 2/7th Field Ambulance with two Australian surgical teams was established at Barce and began work in an Italian hospital two miles south of the town. The 2/2nd Field Ambulance, less one company, had a dressing station at Tocra and was working in Benghazi, though handicapped by the illness of two medical officers. At this stage I Australian Corps came into the picture . On 13th February, corps headquarters had arrived from Egypt at El Abiar, and two days later took over the command from XIII British Corps . Colonel Smyth, who had been acting as D .D.M.S. XIII British Corps in which capacity he had been most cooperative and helpful to the Australia n medical services, now became D .D.M.S. Cyrenaica Command (Cyrcom) .

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN CYRENAICA By now the 2/2nd Australian C .C.S. had reached Tobruk and was working in an Italian hospital . The hospital which the 2/7th Field Ambulance had established at Barce, was occupying a good stone building , so well adapted for the purpose that the 2/4th A .G.H. was being brought up there. It was further proposed that the 2/1st C .C.S. should come up to Benghazi; as an initial move the light section was brought up to work

166 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T with a surgical team . A corps rest station was formed to be worked b y part of the 2/1st Field Ambulance at Tecnis . Some concern was fel t about the safety of the hospital in Benghazi as the number and intensity of the air attacks were increasing. On the night of 13th February a larg e mine was dropped which wrecked numbers of houses and damaged on e hospital and caused a number of casualties . Major-General Burston, D.M.S., A.I.F., was visiting the headquarters of Cyrenaica Force and th e Australian Corps at this time : appropriately, he was promoted while in the forward areas. He advised Cunningham to complete the evacuation of the hospital, which was already being carried out, as quickly as possible . Cunningham remained in the building with a few of the staff in order t o clear up all details personally, and on the night 15/16th February h e and a medical orderly were killed in another air raid . His influence as the first Australian ambulance commander in this war was far-reachin g and his loss was keenly felt. Captain F. D. Stephens was buried in rubble by the same explosion but fortunately was not seriously hurt . The headquarters and "B" Company of the 2/ 1st Australian Field Ambulance then took over a completed civil hospital in another area o f Benghazi from the 2/2nd Field Ambulance . It was necessary now to consider seriously the possible responsibilities involved in bombing raids , with regard to casualties, and the corps undertook this duty . There were some 3,500 to 4,000 troops in the town area, together with naval personnel. This number was expected to increase to 8,000, but did not includ e Australian troops, who were outside the town area . In addition there wa s the problem of the prisoner-of-war patients who became almost uncon- trollable with fear during bombing raids . As many of the latter as were fit to leave hospital were transferred to the cage, after examination b y Lieut-Colonel Salter, who had been appointed as S .M.O. Benghazi in place of Lieut-Colonel Cunningham . Salter had been given command o f 2/2nd Field Ambulance, and Colonel Furnell was appointed as A .D.M.S. of the newly formed 9th Division, now mustering in Palestine and Egypt . A discussion of all the medical arrangements took place between Major- General Burston, Colonel Smyth, Colonel Johnston, Major MacCallum and Colonel Disher . It was decided to clear the Italian prisoners from th e Colonial Hospital at Benghazi as far as possible, freeing fifty beds for emergency and facilitating the performance of urgent surgery . Near Tocr a one hundred beds were available in a camp reception station whic h serviced the 19th Brigade . Just north of Benghazi at Coefia a forward operating centre was established by 2/2nd Field Ambulance . Here fifty patients could be held, but where possible they were sent on to Barce . On 18th February the light section of the 2/1st C .C.S. arrived at Benghazi : having no transport of its own proved a certain handicap, but it was a welcome addition to th e medical resources of the division . The site of this centre was a pleasant one, and well camouflaged, quite suitable for a C .C.S., with good wate r supply, and solid buildings among trees and grass .

ADVANCE TO BENGHAZI 167 REORGANISATION OF MEDICAL SERVICE S Now that temporary stabilisation had been reached in Cyrenaica i t seemed as if hospital arrangements could be satisfactorily made in spite of the long distance from the base . The maintenance of sea communicatio n was of course important . This would simplify the question of suppl y and reinforcement of evacuation of sick and wounded . By bringing up part or whole of a casualty clearing station and a general hospital, th e burden would be lifted from field ambulances of maintaining hospitals with an organisation meant for work of a different character. But the position could not be regarded as really stable, and adequate medica l care of the forward combatant units was most necessary, not only t o provide for the present dispositions but for any possible future actions . The complicated shuffling and interchanging of little blocks of fiel d ambulances had been the only means of dealing with involved situations, but now a simplification of the methods was desirable . The staffs of fiel d ambulances of the 6th Australian Division were scattered over 300 mile s of country, with posts and detachments stationed at Derna, Slonta, Tecnis , Barce, Tocra, Benghazi and the areas still further forward. The 2/5th Field Ambulance under Lieut-Colonel A . H. Green had been brought up from Egypt three weeks earlier and had been helping in reorganisatio n of the local medical services . Some of its officers had been on detachmen t to 2/2nd Field Ambulance in Benghazi, and had profited greatly fro m the experience recently gained by the staff of that unit . Colonel Johnston now proposed to bring the 2/5th Ambulance to Derna, which woul d help the scattered units to concentrate their components to some extent . Besides, the medical units were now feeling one minor, but not unim- portant strain, incident on a more static role, that of compiling returns . The formations interested in records of all sorts included not only division, corps and A.I.F. Headquarters M.E., but also the Cyrenaica Command . It must be realised too that though war surgery is reduced to a mini- mum during quieter periods, the nature of surgical work changes . Surgeons in operating units are keen to take the opportunity to carry out non- urgent work so as to increase the efficiency of men whose disabilities nee d attention. It is questionable how far it is wise to extend this principl e when far from a base . The surgical repair of hernia, haemorrhoids et cetera will throw an added burden on nursing orderlies and cannot well be done with meagre establishments. Another feature of the surgical work at this period was that, although battle casualties were few, they were often of serious nature, being due to injuries received in isolate d thrusts by armoured vehicles in forward areas, or in bombing raids . The position on 19th February was as follows . The 3rd British Light Field Ambulance ran an A .D .S. and M.D.S. in forward areas ; Australian units maintained a medical inspection centre in Benghazi, a forward operating centre outside the town with surgical team attached, a cam p receiving station in Tocra, a hospital in Barce, and staging posts i n Tmimi and Slonta shortly moved to El Faidia. In addition a combine d rest camp and convalescent depot was established at Tecnis for all troops

168 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T in the area. The 2/1st Field Hygiene Section was also working fror^ the Benghazi centre and had the task of distributing men among the scattered units to help to raise the hygiene sense of the division. After the experiences of rapid movement in the desert the corporate an d individual conscience in the lowly but necessary matters of hygiene an d sanitation had relaxed vigilance . Even the divisional headquarters line s were found to be far from satisfactory. Flies could be expected any time now that the end of winter was approaching and Major Mackerras' s survey had found a number of varieties which could act as vectors o f dysentery and similar diseases. It was possible to revert to an improved type of sanitation in this area, and deep trench flyproof latrines wer e constructed which proved satisfactory . Water supplies were fairly adequate , but it was noticed that after prolonged use wells gave water of increasing saline content . More help was asked for forward areas, and "B" Company of th e 2/2nd Field Ambulance was detailed to proceed some 150 miles sout h of Benghazi. This thinned out the field ambulances still further, as ther e had not yet been time to bring up the 2/4th A.G.H. to Barce to free the 2/7th Field Ambulance, immobilised there with hospital number s steadily creeping up . The dissipation of the forces over a wide area had a bad effect on unit transport also, for this period, like that of a ship i n port, would normally have been a good opportunity for mechanical over - haul of the vehicles . As much as possible was done : at Barce a capture d Italian recovery vehicle proved very useful and was being employed b y 2/7th Field Ambulance to rehabilitate its own means of transport . Demands for dental treatment were coming in from all the units an d dental officers were doing their best to supply it. Two were working at Barce at the hospital . Since 20th February there were signs that the temporary lull was no t likely to last long. Beds available were as follows : Benghazi 50, El Coefia 100 to 200, with a forward operating centre, Tocra 100, Barce 600 to 800, and Derna 250 to 300. Forward of Benghazi the needs were growin g too, for air attacks were more frequent and heavy, vehicles, even individua l vehicles, being the objective of dive-bombing and machine-gunning . South of Benghazi there was need for more staging posts for the distances were great. In this forward area from Benghazi to El Agheila the Britis h armoured brigade was located, with Savige's 17th Australian Infantry Brigade. It was evident that the 3rd British Light Field Ambulance was very little to service these formations, even with the forward component s of the 2/2nd Australian Field Ambulance . Lieut-Colonel H. C. Godding, A.D.M.S. of the armoured division, provided extra ambulance cars at the M.D.S. of the 2/2nd Ambulance and also at a staging post at Ghemines . CORPS HEADQUARTERS RETURNS TO EGYP T The 19th Brigade was withdrawn and the light section of the 2/1s t C.C.S. was recalled to Egypt as part of a number of other changes . A

s 4

G. Berta, Dern a \\ EtFaidia l i Slont a 1\ \ --~ ` /` Tecnis i\ \ Martub a ` \ 1 / 2~1\Fd Amb \` \\ 1i

Casualty Clearing Station O (Heavy Section) Casualty Clearing Statio n (Light Section) © Main Dressing Station Advanced Dressing Sta. ® Field Ambulance rc Field Hygiene Section © Camp Receiving Station Staging Post Convalescent Depo t

S CAL F MILES 10 5 0 10 20 30 60 50 60 70 MILES OEM=

Cyrenaica, 21st February 1941 .

170 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T definite decision had been made that the 2/4th A .G.H., expected shortly at Barce, would not be moved farther forward . It was significant that Barce was regarded as the farthest westward point safe or desirable as a hospital site. All the surgical teams were withdrawn from Cyrenaica except that with the 2/2nd Field Ambulance. On 22nd February notification wa s received by the corps headquarters of its move back to Egypt, after handin g over command of its areas to the 6th Division. This resulted from the important decision to send a British Expeditionary Force to Greece, a move which involved the 1 Australian Corps, as the 6th and 7th Aus- tralian Divisions were on the tentative Order of Battle . It had been known for some time that the 9th Division was to replace the 6th in Cyrenaica , ostensibly to afford the 9th Division an opportunity of gaining experienc e in desert campaigning . A more important reason emerged, as the 6th Division was needed for inclusion in "Lustre" Force for the operation s in Greece. By 23rd February the move of the 19th Brigade had eliminated th e need for a C.R.S. at Tocra, and a rest station at Tecnis ; these requirements could be filled by companies of the 2/ 1st Field Ambulance. The forward areas continued to depend upon two companies of the 2/2n d Field Ambulance, one five miles north, and the other thirty miles sout h of Agedabia, and the dispersed sections of the 3rd British Light Fiel d Ambulance . Smyth, Johnston and Disher agreed that the important point s of the dispositions were the retention of a hospital or equivalent at Barce , and of at least one surgical team, and the establishment of staging post s and adequately equipped medical units in the areas forward of Benghaz i to provide urgent surgical assistance as required . Finally on the 24th the I Australian Corps Headquarters handed over the command of the are a to the 6th Australian Division, and moved back to Egypt, where its next task lay with "Lustre" Force . Colonel Johnston and Major MacCallu m felt that they had made what they described as "a rather fruitless Odyssey" , for the formation had only controlled operations in Cyrenaica for less than ten days. The rear headquarters of the 6th Australian Division wen t to Soluch, south of Benghazi, and the forward headquarters were well dispersed out in the desert some miles south of Agedabia . Here the R.A.P. of the advanced divisional headquarters acted also as a staging post fo r any casualties in transit from the British armoured division to the mai n dressing station . MEDICAL READJUSTMENT S Not many casualties were occurring at this time ; they were chiefly due to German air attacks; one ambulance driver had lost a leg in this way. Though all surgical teams had been recalled, able surgical service was readily obtained from the field units in the area, but this depleted thei r strength, which was already fully employed in covering an area some 350 miles in length . Further depletion was caused by the death fro m illness of Major E . Bailhache of the 2/2nd Field Ambulance . Staging post s were really needed every thirty miles on the way back to Benghazi from

ADVANCE TO BENGHAZI 171 the forward area, but the problem was to supply them . A compromise was arrived at by moving the 3rd British Light Field Ambulance farther forward along the road from its original location, and equalising the spacing of other units concerned. The possession of fourteen ambulance cars by the British light field ambulance was a great help in evacuation . The Australian field ambulance staff appreciated the value of dispersa l in this area, and found it advisable to leave 300 yards between bivouac s and parked vehicles . Colonel Smyth, D.D.M.S. Cyrcom, now left the command and Colonel Walker took his place . The headquarters of the 6th Division moved on again and on 27t h February was once more in desert seventeen miles south of Agedabia, dug in and dispersed in sandhills the surface of which was at least les s unpleasant than the dust of the areas farther east . That evening word wa s received that troops including the 16th Brigade and one field ambulanc e were to return to Egypt by 4th March . As two ambulances were the n immobilised as hospitals at Barce and Derna and the third was forwar d with the troops this was not possible unless relief was furnished . Salter, commanding the 2/2nd Field Ambulance, was worried over an order t o return surplus Italian transport . As his forward mobile section was eighty - four miles from his headquarters, and as it was already difficult to carr y rations and water, it was doubtful what could be termed surplus. Vehicles were likely to suffer in air raids too ; the previous day the rear M .D.S. south of Ghemines had been subjected to air attack . The unofficial opinio n of divisional medical services was that if the instruction was not officially received till the unit was relieved it might not be a matter to be deplored . At the moment it seemed likely that the forward troops would take u p positions some thirty to forty miles farther on, which would then mean that the forward mobile section of the 2/2nd Field Ambulance would b e over 120 miles away from its parent body . Such help as could be afforded by the acquisition of a small Italian motor ambulance by the R.M.O. of the 2/1st Field Regiment was gratefully accepted ; in an artillery unit it was invaluable . The medical services of the 6th Division had to look afte r forces strung out for 350 miles, and this did not include the 16th Brigad e in Tobruk which was being looked after by the 2/5th Field Ambulance .

THE 9TH DIVISION RELIEVES THE 6TH DIVISIO N On 1st March the 2/ 1st Field Ambulance under the acting command of Major R. H. Russell began to collect its scattered companies and sections so as to join 16th Brigade at Tobruk preparatory to returnin g to form part of "Lustre" Force for Greece . These impending moves afforded good opportunity to exchange a few medical officers, with the object of adding to their experience in difficult types of work and groomin g them for future work in ambulances or administration . It was learnt two days later that relief of the 17th Brigade by the 20th Brigade of the 9th Division was to take place in a week 's time. The staff running the medical post in the Colonial Hospital in Benghazi was bein g relieved by the British, and sufficient equipment was being left in the

172 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T Colonial Hospital to cope with civilian needs . Most of the admission s here, as in the military hospitals were for sickness and not for wounds . The details of relief of the various medical units were not easy to arrang e from the distant base of Cairo, as it was hard to predict when relievin g units would arrive. However, it was not likely that such problems, simpl e by comparison with past experiences, would worry the divisional medica l services, even in an area so extended as Cyrenaica. One interesting sidelight on the effect of uncertainty on morale wa s afforded by the increasing degree of strain or anxiety noticeable in me n reporting sick to forward medical units . Knowledge that some units were returning, that changes were pending, and that enemy activity wa s increasing undoubtedly produced this uncertainty. On 7th March an advance party of the 2/4th A .G.H. arrived at Barce, and at least it wa s now known that the 2/7th Field Ambulance would soon be free to move back in accordance with the plan . The reason for the delay in the arrival of the 2/4th A .G.H. was remarkable—the unit had been shipwrecked . A digression may be made at this point to explain what had happened in the fulfilment of the plan to send a general hospital to Cyrenaica . While Burston was visiting the Western Desert he was impressed with the need for an Australian hospital in the area at that time, and the recommenda- tion of corps that a general hospital should be brought up was put int o effect. Accordingly the 2/4th A .G.H., under command of Colonel N. L. Speirs, which had arrived from Australia a few weeks before, was move d from Amiriya to Alexandria and thence onward by sea . On 25th February the unit embarked on a small ship Knight of Malta. This ship, know n locally as La Ballerina, struck bad weather at once, and impressed he r passengers neither by the conditions on board nor by her performance in a heavy sea, but Captain English, in command, had no choice but follo w orders. The O.C. troops, Major Sydenham-Clarke of the Queen's Royal Regiment, afterwards submitted a report on the conditions . Some 400 people were on board, but there were only 250 life-jackets, and a n inadequate number of life-boats and rafts . Radio silence was strictly enforced and therefore no wireless operator was carried . The men passed a wretched night tossed to and fro in the holds, which were awash . Next day they were accommodated in other parts of the ship, and a meal was contrived in relays without cooking facilities and with only such utensils as were carried, plus a few dixies obtained by the embarkation officer . Sanitary accommodation was totally inadequate . Fortunately five nurses who should have accompanied the unit were not on board ; apparently the movement control officer was unaware that the nurses were at Kantara and not in camp with the unit at Amiriya. At 4 o'clock in the morning of 3rd March, the ship grounded on the only stretch of sandy beach in the vicinity . By then the weather had abated and it was clear moonlight. Major Clarke ordered the radio silence to be broken, using two R.A.F. operators on board . Lieut-Commander T. M. Hackett, R.N.R., who was in control of operations and landing , acted promptly with great coolness and resource. By 9.30 a.m. all men

ADVANCE TO BENGHAZI 173 were ashore and a few hours later the unit set out to march to Bardi a fourteen miles across the desert. Help was soon available from Bardia ; rations, baggage and equipment were salvaged successfully, and shifte d by camels and donkeys some 600 yards across the sandhills over an extemporised road, using mattresses to cross a lagoon. An armed Polish guard gave valuable assistance in guarding the equipment. In a few days all the valuable equipment had been transported by waiting lorries t o Tobruk, where the unit assembled by the 9th . The successful conclusion of this dangerous adventure of shipwreck was highly creditable to al l concerned . Delayed, but not deterred, the 2/4th A .G.H. reached Derna on 10th March and arrived at Barce the next day, and on the 12th the unit took over the hospital from the 2/7th Field Ambulance . In hospital were then 350 patients, imposing a heavy task on the personnel of a fiel d ambulance. To add to their trials, the septic tank system of the hospita l building had overflowed . The hospital unit proceeded to unpack its salvaged equipment, but within ten days the staff were advised not t o continue unpacking in view of a probable move back to Tobruk . Meanwhile, units of the 9th Australian Division had arrived, and on 10th March Colonel Disher handed over to Colonel Furnell, who ha d been appointed A.D.M.S. of the incoming division . It was now possible to arrange reliefs and withdraw the various elements of the field medical units of the 6th Division so that they might assemble in Egypt preparatory to sailing for Greece . Indeed before all the units could be concentrate d embarkation had already begun . While on his way back from the desert Disher was able to discus s various aspects of the desert medical arrangements with others who had handled patients evacuated from forward areas . Steigrad's report on Aus- tralian patients in British hospitals in Egypt was also available, an d Furnell had reported on the general comfort or otherwise of patient s during evacuation . Certain elements of these reports concerned matter s of administration in which difficulties occurred such as records, pay, welfare services and medical boarding. In the case of base hospital treatment, ideas and standards varied, but the general care of the patient s was good. Conditions prevailing over the primary routes of evacuatio n were not always as satisfactory as could be wished . Furnell made som e recommendations concerning comfort, in particular stressing the importance of adequate morphine dosage : it was of course clear that civil standards in comfortable hospitals cannot be attained where wounde d are moved over long routes by rail and road. Good sea transport fro m Libya produced much higher standards of comfort for the patients . But considering the necessarily extemporised nature of many of the arrangements, the standard of work was good . It was fortunate, of course, tha t the casualty rate was low . We must now leave the 6th Division and follow the fortunes of th e 9th Division in Cyrenaica. At the end of February, the 20th and 26th Brigades were transferred from the 7th Division to the 9th Division i n exchange for the 18th and 25th Brigades . The latter were fully equipped

174 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T except for motor transport and were trained . It was planned to send the 20th Brigade forward while the 24th and 26th, which were deficien t in equipment, trained in the Derna-Tobruk area . THE 9TH DIVISION MEDICAL UNIT S It will be seen that the position was entirely altered at the beginnin g of March. The medical units of the 6th Division, which had learned in th e hard school of experience during the past two months, were now to extend that experience under quite different conditions, while those of th e 9th Division which replaced them in Cyrenaica were faced by a situation in which there were ominous features . By the middle of March it wa s known that strong German forces were not only in Tripolitania but furthe r forward, and an attack appeared certain. The 2/8th Field Ambulance under Lieut-Colonel B . S. Hanson, too k over from the 2/2nd Field Ambulance in the area south of Ghemines . On 12th March there were further evidences of activity in this area : the advanced divisional headquarters was attacked from the air, and attack s were repeated when the site was moved. This ambulance was at this time the only Australian medical unit forward, but was sufficient to servic e the 20th Brigade, which was in the Marsa Brega area, MILES 112 O Ghemines and the 2/3rd Field Company R .A.E. The M.D.S. was situated on a bare rocky plain without protection ; wide dispersion was necessary for safety, and the ambulance's 104–© 2'8 Fd Am b tents were dug in, though the ground was a mixture of 99OMagru m

sand and stone, affording poor hold for tent pegs in _+ 2'1313 n strong wind. Operating and resuscitation centres were organised, and a dental surgery fitted up in a converte d Italian ambulance . Advanced dressing stations, being 59 © 3 LtBFd Am b in sandy desert, consisted of an "R.D." tent as the medical centre, with men dispersed in bivouacs .

It was recognised that great care was necessary in 6 Agedabi a matters of hygiene, especially as the troops were relatively stationary. It was easy for ground to be foule d and the increasing number of flies and dungbeetle s were a menace unless precautions were taken . The ambulance set-up provided for resuscitation and sur- o 9Aust Div gical treatment, though lighting facilities were not 25 good. Two other field ambulances were expected, but p z'eFdAm b Fr h neither was likely to arrive forward at once . The 2/3rd 20 - ee Fe nc Field Ambulance under command of Lieut-Colonel © Morcobe.Sect.

M. L. D. McKeon was at Ain el Gazala on 19th 12 20 Bde March, and opened a camp hospital there to serve to +2'i7B n the 26th Brigade of the 9th Division, and was engaged in ambulance training . The 2/ 11th Field Ambulance 2'155n o u a . A. Parry on 19th March was + under Lieut-Colonel T Cyrenaicau Mars Brag, only just moving from Palestine to Egypt . It had been 12th March 1941 . (Lent by N . L. Speirs) The 2/4th Australian General Hospital, Tobruk . (K . F. Russell ) A ward of the 2/4th A .G.H . Tobruk, after a high level bombing attack .

(Lent by N . L . Speirs ) "Z" Ward, Tobruk .

ADVANCE TO BENGHAZI 17 5 thought that the 2/5th Field Ambulance, which had been some time a t Tobruk, might come forward as the corps field ambulance, but altere d plans cancelled this, and early in March, the unit was sent back t o Egypt. The 2/4th A .G.H. was still working in Barce Hospital. The 2/4th Field Hygiene Section was at Gazala with the remainder of the division . At the end of the third week in March British, Australian and Ne w Zealand troops were assembling in Greece, the German tide was threaten- ing to turn against the forces in Cyrenaica, and units of the 8th Australia n Division had settled in and were training in Malaya . Berbera had bee n recaptured and British Somaliland was regained by British forces, an d the detached episode of Giarabub had occurred . This small but interestin g action in a desert oasis merits a brief digression . THE GIARABUB INCIDENT South from the coast of Salum runs the Egyptian border . About 160 miles from Salum and just on the western side of the frontier lies the oasi s of Giarabub, and over seventy miles to the east is the larger oasis o f Siwa. Both these fertile areas are in depressions which, like the larg e Qattara Depression still farther to the east, are below the level of th e sea. Giarabub is historically important to the Senussi, who adhere to th e teachings of Mohammed ben Ali el Senussi, whose tomb is in the loca l mosque. Its oasis is contained by rising mounds of sand, and to the nort h is overlooked by an escarpment . Siwa was defended by the British to forestall an Italian move and in November 1940 a squadron of 6t h Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment relieved the British infantry there . In the middle of December 1940, the greater part of this Australian uni t went to Siwa and proceeded to patrol between Siwa and Giarabub and t o harass the convoys to the latter. Once the British advance in the deser t began, Giarabub was really in a state of siege . Medical arrangements for the cavalry regiment provided a miniatur e R.A .P . with each squadron . Owing to the wide dispersal of the elements of a squadron it was essential for each to have its own transport, whic h evacuated casualties either to the R .A.P. or direct to the dressing station. Though radio communication was available, this was not possible durin g operations, and therefore the R.M.O. could not inform a field ambulanc e of his whereabouts . In fact the R .A.P. often carried out functions similar to those of a mobile section of a field ambulance . Owing to the necessity for being ready to move at very brief notice, it was even necessary some - times for patients to be carried with the R.A .P. till further evacuation wa s possible. Squadron ambulances were camouflaged and not marked with the re d cross lest this should reveal the position of the squadron . From Siwa , air transport could be obtained if required, and on occasion the 200 mil e journey to Mersa Matruh was thus covered in prompt and comfortabl e fashion. From Giarabub evacuation could be made by a 15-cwt . truck, or later by a four bed ambulance, seventy miles to Siwa where there wa s an Egyptian hospital . An R.A.M.C. medical officer was at the Siwa base , G

176 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T and a corporal was stationed there also . There were some desert sores seen at first, but those gave little trouble later in spite of a curtailed water supply, 3 quarts per man per day for all purposes . This ration di d not allow much washing of the person and none of clothes . The use of captured Italian blankets was forbidden owing to their occasiona l infestation by pediculi. Rations were good, care being taken to secure supplies of fresh Australian butter, and oranges when available, and th e men were encouraged to eat raw onions . The weekly ration convoys were used to evacuate patients on occasion, but the R .M.O., Captain A. F. Janes, did not consider this desirable, particularly in the case of battl e casualties. The road was bad and the ambulance waggons could not exceed 10 miles per hour . The health of the men was very good in thi s isolated spot, and by care and high morale a good standard of hygien e was maintained . After the fall of Bardia, Brigadier Morshead, just arrived from England with the 18th Australian Infantry Brigade, made a reconnaissance an d reported favourably on a plan to cut off supplies from Giarabub . Accordingly the siege was tightened, helped by a long range desert grou p of British and New Zealand troops . During 18-20th March a plan fo r the capture of Giarabub was put into effect, and carried out successfull y by Brigadier Wootten on 21st March under difficult weather conditions . The Australian casualties in this engagement numbered less than 100, an d the existing organisation had no difficulty in ensuring their preliminary treatment and return to the base. This action though small was of some tactical importance in its removal of an Italian threat on the flank. Medically the most significant and interesting part of the episode was th e successful maintenance of a high standard of health and hygiene unde r conditions of monotony and isolation, owing largely to the work of Captai n Janes.