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SUPPLEMENT to the LONDON GAZETTE, 15 JANUARY, 1948 Hardest Part of the Business, As It Is Likely to 2

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SUPPLEMENT to the LONDON GAZETTE, 15 JANUARY, 1948 Hardest Part of the Business, As It Is Likely to 2 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 15 JANUARY, 1948 hardest part of the business, as it is likely to 2. The enemy, however, may try to drive us entail stationing the bulk, if not the whole, of back from our present positions round Gazala our armoured force south of the Gebel Akhdar and from Tobruk, before we are ready to area to guard against any enemy attempt to launch our offensive. move north against the garrison of Bengasi, which itself must be strictly limited in size by 3. It is essential to retain Tobruk as a supply maintenance considerations. The operation base for our offensive. Our present positions should not be impossible, however, .though it on the line Gazala—Hacheim will, therefore, will be more difficult than in December last, continue to be held, and no effort will be as we shall not have a beaten and disorganized spared to make them as strong as possible. enemy to deal with as we had then. The impli- 4. If, for any reason, we should be forced at cation of this is that the operation is likely to some future date to withdraw from our present have to be much more deliberate. forward positions, every effort will still be made 10. Our immediate need therefore is to to prevent Tobruk -being lost to the enemy; but stabilise a front in Libya behind which we can it is not my intention to' continue to hold it build up a striking force with which to resume once the enemy is in a position to invest it effectively. the offensive at the earliest possible date. Should this appear inevitable, the place will This front should cover Tobruk and as many be evacuated, and the maximum amount of as possible of the forward landing grounds in destruction carried out in it, so as to make it Eastern Cyrenaica. It should not, however, be useless to the enemy as a supply base. In too far. to the west, as during the period which this eventuality the enemy's advance will be must elapse before we can launch our offensive, stopped on the general line Sollum—Maddalena we should aim at making it as difficult as possible —Giarabub, as laid down in Operation Instruc- for the enemy to concentrate strong forces against our covering position and so force us tion No. no. to waste our strength in opposing him. This 5. It is extremely .desirable to regain for our can best be avoided by making him extend his air forces the use of the landing grounds in the line of communications to the maximum extent area Derna—Martuba, for the following 'without thereby endangering points vital to reasons:— ourselves. (a) To enable our air reconnaissance and 11. I propose therefore to confirm the in- air striking forces to join up with those from structions already given to General Ritchie, Malta, so as to cover the whole sea area. (6) To enable them to keep up a more which are: — effective offensive again Bengasi, and thus (i) To hold a line covering Tobruk. prevent or severely restrict its use by the (ii) To hold Giarabub in order to secure enemy for supply purposes. our southern flank against enemy raids based (c) To reduce the degree of support the on Siwa. enemy can give his forward troops. (iii) To proceed, as an insurance, with The possession of Derna would also permit making of defensive areas at Sollum and near the use of motor torpedo boats against enemy Maddalena, in accordance with the policy shipping using Bengasi. previously laid down. And to tell him at once to begin to build up 6. To get and keep possession of the area a striking force for the resumption of the offen- Derna—Tmimi—Gazala entails holding firmly sive at the earliest possible moment. up to, and inclusive of, the general line Lamluda—Mechili—Tengeder, and it is not my 12. It is vital to the success of this plan that intention that you should attempt this opera- every possible effort should be made from now tion until you are sure:— on by our naval and air forces to deny the use («) That it will not endanger the safety of Bengasi to the enemy for supply purposes. of Tobruk. To do this effectively it is necessary that we (&) That it will not involve the risk of should have the use of landing grounds in the defeat in detail and so prejudice the chances area Derna—Martuba and be able to base motor of our launching a major offensive. torpedo boats, with which to attack enemy I wish you, however, to study the possibili- shipping using Bengasi, on the port of Derna. ties of such an operation, and to make all The possibility of undertaking a limited offen- preparations for carrying it out immediately sive at an early date to secure Derna must there- circumstances permit. fore be seriously and urgently considered. It is important, however, that such an operation • 7. Meanwhile you will do all you can by the should not prejudice the chances of success of use of offensive mobile columns to prevent the .a main offensive later. use by the enemy air force of landing grounds C. J. A. in the area Derna—iMartuba—Mechili. 8. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force are making every effort to deny the use of 9. the ports of Bengasi and Derna to the enemy. G.H.Q., M.E.F. Operation Instruction No. in. 9. Your tasks are, therefore:— Lieutenant-General N. M. Ritchie, (a) To hold the enemy as far west of Commander, Eighth Army. Tobruk as possible without risking defeat in nth February 1942. detail. (b) To organise a striking force with which i. I intend to resume the offensive in Libya to resume the offensive, with the object of as soon as possible with the aim of defeating destroying the enemy forces in the field, and the enemy forces in the field, occupying occupying Cyrenaica at the earliest possible Cyrenaica and subsequently Tripolitania. date..
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