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Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (94) of 2000 AD on restructuring the cleansing committees The Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, Upon review of: • Law No. (10) of 1423 FBP on cleansing and the implementing regulations thereof; • General People's Committee Decree No. (108) of 1430 FBP amending certain provisions of Decree No. (189) of 1423 FBP on the implementing regulations of Law No. (10) of 1423 FBP on cleansing; • Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (100) of 1423 FBP on forming the cleansing committees and their working procedures and specifying their headquarters and areas of jurisdiction; • Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (720) of 1423 FBP on establishing a cleansing committee at the Supreme Court; • Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (936) of 1423 FBP on establishing cleansing committees at the Armed People; • Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (1) of 1424 FBP on establishing a Police cleansing committee; • Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (2) of 1424 FBP on establishing an Internal Security cleansing committee; • Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (3) of 1424 FBP on establishing an External Security cleansing committee; • Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (4) of 1424 FBP on restructuring the cleansing committees at the Armed People; • Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (945) of 1425 FBP on establishing an energy sector cleansing committee; • Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (1072) of 1425 FBP on establishing the Abu Najim cleansing committee; • Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security Decree No. (711) of 1428 FBP on restructuring the cleansing committees; has decreed: Article (1) The cleansing committees shall be restructured in accordance with the lists attached to this decree. Article (2) The areas of competence and headquarters of the cleansing committees shall be established in accordance with the list attached to this Decree. This document constitutes an un-official transcription/translation. DCAF cannot be held responsible for damages that may arise from its use. For official reference, please refer to the original text as published by the Libyan Authorities. DCAF’s Libyan Security Sector Legislation project is financed by the DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa. www.security-legislation.ly Page 1 of 41 Article (3) The ordinary meetings of cleansing committees shall be at their headquarters in their area of jurisdiction. Committees shall meet at least twice each month to discuss matters within their jurisdiction and undertake the measures they deem fit with regard thereto. In cases of necessity or as required based on the chairman’s assessment, the committee may hold any of its meetings outside of its determined headquarters. Article (4) The areas of competence and headquarters of the cleansing committees shall be established in accordance with the list attached to this Decree. Article (5) Cleansing committees shall hold their ordinary meetings at their headquarters in their area of jurisdiction. Committees shall meet at least twice each month to discuss matters within their jurisdiction and undertake the measures they deem fit with regard thereto. In cases of necessity or as required based on the chairman's assessment, the committee may hold any of its meetings outside of its set headquarters. Article (6) Members of cleansing committees shall attend the meetings of their committee on the set dates. If there is justification for not attending, the member shall inform the committee chairman of such prior to the date set for the meeting. Article (7) Committee meetings shall be deemed valid only with the attendance of a majority of its members, including the chairman. Decisions shall be issued by absolute majority of the number of members present. Article (8) The chairman of a cleansing committee may form one or more committees from among its members to study a specific issue within its area of competence. The committee shall submit a report on the outcomes of its study on the date set for submission thereof to the committee. The chairman may also assign one or more of the committee members to perform any of the procedures that the committee holds competence to perform. Article (9) Cleansing committees may seek the assistance of those working in public bodies whose expertise they deem necessary. They may also request any information from any public or private body and such bodies shall respond to committee requests within their area of competence even if confidential. Article (10) Cleansing committees shall prepare periodic monthly reports on their workflow and the procedures they have taken during the reporting period and refer it to the monitoring committee at the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security. Such reports shall include the number of cases referred to the People's Prosecution Bureau for investigation and disposal and the number of cases administratively closed by the committee. This document constitutes an un-official transcription/translation. DCAF cannot be held responsible for damages that may arise from its use. For official reference, please refer to the original text as published by the Libyan Authorities. DCAF’s Libyan Security Sector Legislation project is financed by the DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa. www.security-legislation.ly Page 2 of 41 Article (11) Cleansing committees shall perform their activities in accordance with Law No. (10) of 1423 FBP on cleansing, the implementing regulations thereof, and the provisions of this Decree. Article (12) The following decrees referred to above shall be repealed: (100) of 1423 FBP, (936) of 1423 FBP, (1) of 1424 FBP, (2) of 1424 FBP, (3) of 1424 FBP, (4) of 1424 FBP, (1072) of 1425 FBP, and (711) of 1428 FBP. Article (13) This Decree shall enter into force on the date of its issue and shall be published in the Official Gazette. Mohammed Abu al-Qasim al-Zawi Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security – Libya Issued on: 27 Dhu al-Hijja Corresponding to: 1 April 1430 FBP This document constitutes an un-official transcription/translation. DCAF cannot be held responsible for damages that may arise from its use. For official reference, please refer to the original text as published by the Libyan Authorities. DCAF’s Libyan Security Sector Legislation project is financed by the DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa. www.security-legislation.ly Page 3 of 41 List of the Districts and Headquarters of Cleansing Committees in the Areas of the Great Jamahiriya Cleansing Committee / Tobruk – Headquarters: Revolutionary Working Group Tobruk Number of congresses: 20 Congresses within the Committee's jurisdiction Musaid – Al-Bardia – Al-Sahel – Ras Azar – Qasr al-Jadi – Bir al-Ashhab – Kambut – Al- Qa'arah – Gamal Abdel Nasser – Tobruk al-Madina – Shuhada al-Nathura – Al-Gharbat – Bilkhater – Al-Marsus – Ain al-Gazalah – Al-Gurdhiya – Al-Shaaba – Al-Jaghbub – Marsa Dafna – Bab al-Zeitoun Cleansing Committee / Derna – Headquarters: People's Leadership Building Derna Number of congresses: 8 Congresses within the Committee's jurisdiction Al-Fataih – Al-Maghar – Abu Mansour – Al-Balad – Kirissah – Al-Jabiliya – Al-Sahel – Al- Sharqi – Ras al-Helal Cleansing Committee / Al-Qubbah – Headquarters: Revolutionary Working Group Al- Qubbah Number of congresses: 10 Congresses within the Committee's jurisdiction Al-Qubbah al-Madina – Ain Mara – Al-Qayqab – Al-Abraq – Al-Tamimi – Umm al-Rizam – Martuba – Al-Ezzeiat – Mechili – Al-Lalli Cleansing Committee Al-Bayda / Shahhat – Headquarters: Revolutionary Working Group Al-Bayda Number of congresses: 19 Congresses within the Committee's jurisdiction Shahhat – Susah – Al-Faydiya – Al-Wasita – Massa – Qasr Libya – Marawa – Gandula – Omar al-Mukhtar – Zawiya al-Arqub – Al-Khweimat – Al-Hamamah – Suluntah – Al-Jihad – Qirnada – Al-Haniyah – Al-Bayda al-Madina – Al-Kuf – Bilhadid Cleansing Committee / Al-Marj – Headquarters: Al-Gilal Company Number of congresses: 7 Congresses within the Committee's jurisdiction Al-Marj al-Markaz – Farzougha – Taknis – Jardas al-Abid – Al-Bayyadah – Al-Uweilia – Battah Cleansing Committee / Al-Abyar – Al-Agouriya – Headquarters: Revolutionary Working Group Al-Abyar Number of congresses: 15 Congresses within the Committee's jurisdiction Al-Abyar al-Markaz – Abu Mari – Junub Al-Abyar – Al-Agouriya – Al-Dirsiyah – Al-Mlitanah – Barsis – Daryanah – Sidi Mahius – Sidi Khalifa – Jira – Sahl Al-Saheli – Masus – Al-Rajma – Al-Mabna This document constitutes an un-official transcription/translation. DCAF cannot be held responsible for damages that may arise from its use. For official reference, please refer to the original text as published by the Libyan Authorities. DCAF’s Libyan Security Sector Legislation project is financed by the DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa. www.security-legislation.ly Page 4 of 41 Cleansing Committee / Al-Salawi – Headquarters: The People's Committee of Al- Kuwayfiyah Number of congresses: 7 Congresses within the Committee's
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